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tion pertaining to AH games in use. Articles from subscribers are considered for publication at the discretion of our editorial staff. Articles should be typewritten, double-spaced, and embrace the tenets of good English usage. There is no limit to word length. Accompanying examples and diagrams should be neatly done in black or red ink. Photographs should have caption and credit line written on back. Rejected articles will be returned whenever possible

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diagrammed. No questions can be answered which are unaccompanied by a self-addressed envelope. Questions must be based on rules of play (not historical or designmatters) and be based on the current rules edition. Question on more than one game must be listed on separate pages and ompanied by a separate SASE for each game.

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Avalon Hill Philosophy Part 97

On Page 23 of this issue can be found the results of our latest masochistic effort to determine how the collective readership (or at least those who responded) view the labors of the designers and artists at Avalon Hill. There were 884 response sheets returned (which represents only about 4% of The GENERAL's current list of subscribers), enough to provide a valid sampling. Indeed, a few continue to trickle in with each day's mail, weeks after my arbitrary cut-off. This was both surprising and gratifying-well beyond my cynical expectations. Before proceeding, for the awesome task of tabulating the thousands of numbers that this figure represents, a word of thanks is tendered to our secretary, Karen Knezevich, and to Richard Hamblen's programmable calculator-both for dedication above and beyond the call of duty.

A word on the WARGAME RBG is in order to preface this presentation. As explained in AH

Philosophy 94 (Vol. 19, No. 4), the titles here evaluated are ranked according to the readergenerated Overall Value, ranging from the bestaccepted downward. In general, the lower the numerical average for a title in a category, the better the cumulative view of the respondents. However, in the case of Complexity, the lower values represent games of adjudged ease in mastering; in the Game Length category, the lower values indicate shorter periods necessary to play the game to conclusion (in terms of ten-minute multiples; hence, a rating of 9.00 reflects the concensus that an hour-and-a-half is required to complete play). The column Number of Responses merely lists the total number of readers who rated that particular title. The Percentage of Total indicates what fraction of the total 884 respondents considered the game (a barometer of popularity).

Continued on Page 22, Column 2



FIRST IMPRESSIONS An Intro to SL Plus Three

ANVIL OF MY EYE

GIs in the maelstrom, Part 1

GLASS ANVIL

A Dissenting View of G.I.

THE G.I. DESIGN TEAM REPLIES In Defense of the Design

GUN DUELS Experimental Armor Rule

SERIES REPLAY VITP-PBM-SM, Part II

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24 By James Collier

28 By D. Greenwood, J. Mishcon, R. McNamara

> 33 By Don Greenwood

34 By J. Lutz, D. Sinay & S. Resman

2



PENNANT RACE! IS HERE



PENNANT RACE!. Avalon Hill's revolutionary new baseball game, is available both by direct mail and in your local hobby shop! The latest addition to AH's **SPORTS ILLUSTRATED line of games, PENNANT RACE!** scientifically evaluates all of the teams and players of the fabulous 1982 season and allows you to recreate this magic on your gaming table, either by yourself, with a friend, or at a Friday night gathering of gamers. This game is intended to allow players to replay an ENTIRE baseball season according to actual schedules and the eccentricities of the weather. Each of the 26 teams will play a complete 162-game schedule; as General Manager of a given team, you must trade players to improve your club's weak spots, bring players up from the minors to replace injured veterans, establish a pitching rotation that is both effective and physically durable, and most important of all-keep winning!

Most baseball games on the market concentrate on a play-by-play system that is fine if you are recreating a World Series or are participating in a league with a limited schedule. But if you want to recreate the actual baseball year in all of its confused and hectic glory or wish to understand more of what makes a good team click and a bad one bomb, then PENNANT RACE! is for you. The game system is based on a game-by-game rather than play-by-play concept; as such, you can replay a three-game set between two clubs in a minute or two. Game resolution takes all of baseball's vital elements into account: pitching, relief, power, speed, defense, endurance, ballparks, weather, the minor leagues, right-handed and left-handed pitching and batting, and more! With a little record-keeping, you will find that you can simulate an entire baseball season in a remarkably short period of time.

PENNANT RACE! is available from the Avalon Hill Game Company, 4517 Harford Road, Baltimore, Maryland 21214 for \$14, plus 10% shipping and handling (20% for Canadian orders, 30% overseas). Maryland residents please add 5% state sales tax. PENNANT RACE! will be a regular feature in ALL-STAR REPLAY - optional rules and great seasons of the past will be regularly featured.

1982	HOUSTO	N ASTH	IUS (NL I	NEST)	
BAT ENDURANCE 22 A Starters	ROTATION B POS	-2	MINORS 3 POW	RHP/LHP - 1/ + 2 SPD	the second s
	HE BUTH AND				
PHIL GARNER	2B	4	3	4	0
RAY KNIGHT	3B	5	3	0	0
TONY SCOTT	CF	2	0	4	+1
ALAN ASHBY	C	2	3	0	0
BENCH	POS	BAT	POW	SPD	FLD
DANNY WALLING	0F/1B	0	0	2	0
MIKE IVIE	18	1	3	0	0
KIKO GARCIA	INF	0	1	1	-1
PITCHERS	R/L	START	END	REST	RELIEF
NOLAN RYAN	R	4	1	4	200 - 20 77
BOB KNEPPER	e inter Ende	2	1	4	-
MIKE LACOSS	R	4	1	6	0
RANDY MOFFITT	R	-	-		0
BILLY SMITH	R				-1

1000 HOHOTON ACTOOD (NIL WEOT)



Friday, May 21, 1982 Oakland af Boston* California at Detroit* Seattle at Milwaukee* Minnesota at New York* Bailfimore at Toronto* Cleveland at Chicago* Texas at Kansas City* Saturday, May 22, 1982 Oakland at Boston California at Detroit Seattle at Milwaukee Minnesota at New York* Bailfimore at Toronto Cleveland at Chicago* Texas at Kansas City* Sunday, May 23, 1982 Oakland at Boston California at Detroit Seattle at Milwaukee Minnesota at New York Bailfimore at Toronto Cleveland at Chicago Texas at Kansas City Monday, May 24, 1982

Monday, May 24, 1982 California at Boston* Baltimore at Toronto Kansas City at Chicago* Cleveland at Minnesota*

Tuesday, May 25, 1982 California at Boston* Oakland at Milwaukee* Kansas City at Texas" Boston at Seattle" Detroit at Oakland" New York at Minnesota"

Saturday, May 29, 1982 Toronto at Baltimore* Chicago at Cleveland Milwaukee at California Kansas City at Texas* Boston at Seattle* Defroit at Oakland New York at Minnesota

Sunday, May 30, 1982 Toronto at Baltimore Chicago at Cleveland Milwaukee at California Kansas City at Texas Boston at Seattile* Detroit at Oakland (2) New York at Minnesota

Monday, May 31, 1982 Texas at Bailimore* Minnesota at Cleveland* New York at Toronto* Detroit at California Chicago at Kansas City* Boston at Oakland Milwaukee at Seattle*

Tuesday, June 1, 1982 Texas at Baltimore* Minnesota at Cleveland* New York at Toronto*



On March 1, 1815, the exiled Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte landed with a small escort on French soil at Cannes, having escaped from the island of Elba. For the next 100 odd days, he would once again terrorize Europe at the command of the feared imperial French legions. Surrounded on all sides by armies of the great European powers, Napoleon's plan was to march north to Brussels, separate the Prussian and Anglo-Allied armies from each other, and defeat each in detail. Destruction of these armies would probably mean peace for France and the saving of the Emperor's Crown. Failure was unthinkable.

HUNDRED DAYS BATTLES is Avalon Hill's new strategy game for two or three players which recreates the climax of the Hundred Days Campaign. The division sized units of both sides are represented on the map by leaders who command their corps and army formations. Leaders march, force march, and influence combat according to their individual abilities. Combat is resolved by rolling a die on the Combat Results Table. To win, the French must exit units off the map towards Brussels, or destroy the Allied armies. The Allies win by preventing French victory.

HUNDRED DAYS BATTLES comes complete with a colorful map of the historic battle areas of southern Belgium, 100 playing pieces, and a short rules booklet.

Playing Time: 2 hours

Complexity Rating (from 1-10, 10 the highest): 4



HUNDRED DAYS BATTLES is now available for \$6.00 from the Avalon Hill Game Company, 4517 Harford Road, Baltimore, MD 21214. Please add 10% for shipping and handling (20% for Canadian orders, 30% for overseas). Maryland residents please add 5% state sales tax.





FIRST IMPRESSIONS An Introduction to Squad Leader Plus Three

INTRODUCTION

Just as GI: ANVIL OF VICTORY is the fourth installment of the Squad Leader system, this article is the fourth in a series. The original appeared in Vol. 14, No. 5 of The GENERAL shortly after the publication of SL itself, and set the pattern generally followed since. (The first gamette, COI, was the subject of an article in Vol. 15, No. 6; Vol. 17, No. 2, contained what I had to say about COD). In the past, my articles in this series have contained a detailed look at the way parts of the rules worked, as well as views on some of the scenarios.

The character of the "how it works" portion of these articles grew out of my playtest experiences, all those years ago, with the original SL. I learned the rules, mastered the routines, but, frequently, found myself having a hard time making up my mind about how the game should be played in the light of these things. With a game like STAL-INGRAD, a glance at the CRT showed one just what you had to worry about when you attacked at 2-to-1. On the level at which the SL system operates, however, things are a lot more complicated. For example, looking at that village on Board 3, just what kind of a chance do I have of running a tank through it if there's an enemy squad sitting there in a small building I'd like to go past? Or, playing a point purchase scenario, just what's an artillery module

By Bob Medrow

worth to the Russians? How many shots can you really get off with those crummy radios? And how much damage will they be likely to do?

Practically speaking, the typical scenario places the player in a position comparable to that of a battalion commander if one considers the range of weapons systems available. However, as in the bad old days when officers purchased their commissions, in the SQUAD LEADER system that rank comes with purchase of the game. The experience required in order to handle such a command well does not also, unfortunately, come in the box. This, of course, is true, to varying degrees, in all wargames and we usually cope on the basis of some combination of study and playing experience. Unfortunately, with respect to the latter, there are two problems for the SL system fan: the number of different situations and the wide range of possible outcomes. The weapons systems used, the time at which the scenario takes place, the character of the opponents, the nature of the terrain and the weather are all variables, apt to change radically from scenario to scenario. As to the range of possible outcomes, my favorite example involves a stack of three identical squads stacked with a leader and fired upon twice. Until GI, there were 30 possible ways that attack could end, and the relative probabilities of each of those 30 distinct outcomes

depended upon the troops, the leader, the terrain occupied, and the weight of the fire brought against them. With *GI*, the number went up.

With those sorts of variables, it would take a whole lot of remembered experience in order to really grasp what might happen and how often you could expect to see it. That observation caused me to start examining, mathematically, the outcomes of various basic happenings in the game.

Most of the time it's not too difficult to calculate exactly the probability of a particular event taking place. To illustrate, consider that squad sitting in a building on Board 3, just waiting to have a shot at immobilizing my tank. In order to even make such an effort, the squad would first have to pass a basic morale check. If the squad has a morale of '8', the chance of passing is 26 out of 36. The probability that the MC will be passed is just the ratio of those two numbers, 0.722. Then, under the original rules, if the MC was passed, the attempts would be successful if the attacking squad rolled '3' or less, which happens thrice in 12, for a probability of 0.083. The probability of both passing the MC and making a successful immobilization attack is found by simply multiplying those two probabilities together. The result is 0.060. Expressed as a percent, then, the squad would stop my tank a mere 6% of the time.

I chose this particular example for three reasons. The first was to illustrate the type of calculation which has played a major role in the preparation of these four articles. The second was to emphasize the fact that knowing the rules does not, directly, tell you how effective some effort will be. Thirdly, the rules governing the success of this particular activity have been revised in GI. One of the purposes of these articles (except, of course, for the first one) has been to point out the extent to which changes introduced by the current gamette into the older rules alter play. Comparisons between how things worked out under the old rules and how they now work out are for the benefit of the experienced gamer, who might well like to know whether or not his tactics will require modification.

The nature of the artillery rules prompted something a bit different in connection with the *COD* article. There, a number of the important results, such as the number of shots one can get off, depended upon events over a large number of turns. Since the chain of events keeps branching every turn, the type of calculation illustrated above becomes impractical. The answer lay in utilizing a computer to, in effect, "play" a game in which it tried to do nothing but get off as many shots as it could in as short a time as possible. By keeping track of various things for several hundred "games", the computer program developed a statistical picture of what could be expected.

As I think I've mentioned, one way or another, in each of the earlier articles, it has never been my intent to see your play of this marvelous game buried beneath reams of paper. Rather, I hope to aid all of us to develop intelligent, general doctrines. To that end I've drawn simple conclusions where possible.

As an example of what I mean by "simple conclusions", the table of numbers showing the probabilities of Defensive Fire Phase immobilization attempts published in the *COI* article led to the following quantitative conclusion: "if there's a leader present, it should always aid the attack of a squad, if possible, rather than attack on its own, if the dice roll required is three or more." In addition, numbers of squads (and their morale) is not nearly as important as the quality of the leadership present. Later on, in this article, we'll have a chance to see to what extent, if any, these conclusions are altered by the *GI* rules change.

I have, with the indulgence of the editor, gone on at greater length, about what you're about to read here, than might really be necessary. My reason for doing so is that the revised SL system rulebook will contain an entire chapter devoted to the types of results I've described above-the idea being that good play of the game requires some understanding of what's likely to work and what's not so likely to work. Up to this point, the subjects I've explored have been determined largely by what puzzled the gamers I know and what confused me. The results have been reasonably well received but, as an aid in writing that chapter, I'd like to know more about what you folks out there would like to see and how you'd like to see the information presented for best effect. For that reason, I'll close this article with my address. The more comments I receive, the better that chapter will be for all of us.

GENERAL COMMENTS

To begin by counting our blessings, relatively little of GI alters what's gone before. Commonly, when an earlier topic is reconsidered, much of the new material adds on. It may even plug a loophole or tidy things up. The five pages devoted to the armor system and types of ammunition do all three.

Far and away the largest single topic in GI is terrain. With five boards there are a whole host of new terrain features, both natural and manmade. In connection with buildings, the matters of heights, levels and lines-of-sight have all received much needed reorganization.

THE G.I.

A number of new rules affect the infantry aspect of the game. Both swimming and climbing (up and down cliffs) have been added. The new half-squad counters have resulted in a number of modifications, none of which should prove either difficult to use or controversial.

"Controversial" is, however, a word that has already arisen in connection with the new rules for the American fighting man. Of all the major participants in WWII, the US entered that war with the smallest army and the least militarily-orientated population. The reason for this fact were a consequence of both a history and a physical separation from potential foes unique to the United States. Added to that was the enormous diversity of backgrounds of its soldiers resulting, in part, from the vastness of the country. None of these factors aids the creation of an effective, low-level, tactical organization. There are strong sociological considerations involved in the creation and maintenance of effective platoons, companies and battalions. Regrettably, these considerations were largely ignored. (For those interested in learning some of the details about this I'd like to recommend the book Eisenhower's Lieutenants by Russell F. Weigley.)

Taken together, these factors led to a fighting force quite different from those fielded by the other major powers. One of the things a good tactical game system should do is represent any major nationalistic differences with some degree of accuracy. The centerpiece of the representation is, for the G.I. the break-to-green game mechanic.

As an idea, it's a simple one. In each scenario the American ground forces will be a combination of elite (7-4-7 or 6-6-7), first line (6-6-6) and/or second line (5-5-6) squads. These squads retain the SL-introduced American characteristic of being immune to the effects of Desperation Morale. However, each such squad will, if it fails a morale check by any amount greater than its Experience Level Rating (ELR), be replaced with a broken "green" (5-3-6) squad. Half-squads are also capable of being broken to green half-squads. Unlike Inexperienced Infantry, these squads have normal movement and their Broken-side morale is still '6'. However, unless stacked with a leader at the start of a phase, they suffer all the other penalties (rules 94. and 105.) associated with Inexperienced Infantry. Thus, their major troubles are that they are more readily bullied by AFVs and that they must pass a normal MC before being able to double their basic firepower at one hex (point blank) range. In addition, green units are subject to Desperation Morale.

To me, the natural question raised by this is just what are the chances of this sort of thing happening? Once that is known, a player can shape the general nature of his play of each scenario based upon the probable effects of ELR. The basic information which we have to work with is contained within *Table 1*.

Each of the Table's three sections considers one of the standard morales: 6, 7 or 8. While no American troops have a morale of "8", the ELR concept is not totally restricted to American forces. For example, three of the late war scenarios (#36, #42 and #46) feature German forces with ELR values, and one of the scenarios includes German 5-4-8s.

The first column of the Table shows the Firepower value. Values of 4, 8, 16 and 24 are FP values which seem to me representative of low, medium, heavy and super-heavy attacks. DRM's ranging from -4 to +4 were considered, although only three values (-2, 0 and +2) are used here. (The reason for this will become clear shortly.) Column three, headed "OK", states the probability (expressed as a percent) that a given attack will net absolutely *no* effect upon the defender (in the sense that the defender is neither killed nor broken). At the opposite end of the spectrum, column four is the "KIA" probability. The following column tells us the probability of the unit breaking. Allowing for round off errors, these three numbers should always total 100%. To illustrate, a FP attack of 8 with a DRM of 0 made against a unit having a morale of 7 will have no effect 54% of the time, will kill 8% of the time, and will result in a broken unit 38% of the time.

With the ELR rules in effect there is some chance that a broken unit will break-to-grean, and that's the information contained within the next five columns. Those numbers give the probability that a particular unit will, for a given attack and some specified ELR, break-to-grean *if it breaks*. To stick with the previous illustration, if a unit with a morale of "7" breaks as a result of a FP of 8 when the DRM is 0, it will break-to-grean 74% of the time for an ELR of 1. For ELR's of 2 through 5 the probabilities, should a break occur, for a break-to-grean are, respectively, 50%, 31%, 16% and 7%. An ELR of 5 is about as high as one can go before the changes of this event become so small that, statistically, they are essentially zero.

The reason why only three DRMs are used becomes apparent when you consider what happens for a given attack when the only thing that changes is the DRM. As an example, let's look at a morale "6," ELR 2 unit attacked with a FP of 4. As the DRM goes from -2 to +2 the probability of the squad surviving alive and unhurt goes from 44% to 89% while the probability of a KIA result drops from 17% to 0%. The three values in the next column show the probability of a broken result falling from 39% to 11%. However, for an ELR of 2, the probability that a particular broken result will produce a break-to-green changes by only 6%, from 59% to 53%. Over the same DRM range the maximum change anywhere in the Table is 12%, and only a few cases show a change of 10% or more. The obvious conclusion is that the relative likelihood of a break-to-green depends only slightly upon the DRM.

Moreover, considering all four of the FP attacks, I don't think that the FP value itself has a particularly large influence on the likelihood of a break-to-green. For the FPs used and an ELR of 2, the probability that a particular unit's break will be a break-to-green varies only between 53% and 77%for a morale 6 unit. This observation led to the construction of *Table 2*. Here, as a function of unit morale, I've supplied my estimate of the average chance that a unit having a particular ELR will break-to-green when it breaks. Generally speaking, without regard to the FP or the DRM, a 6-6-7 squad with an ELR of 3 will break-to-green around 35%of the time it breaks.

To see what effect these observations might have on play, let's go back to Table 1. The extent to which, for a given morale unit in a particular scenario, it becomes necessary to worry about the generation of green units certainly depends most strongly upon the general likelihood of any kind of broken result. In a scenario in which the enemy will have low-to-moderate firepower, green units will be more common when the GIs are attacking (at which time the DRMs will generally favor the defender) than when they are defending. Generally speaking, the higher the FP the more nearly the probability that broken unit generation will become independent of the DRM. Then, neither attacking nor defending will be a significant factor in this area. Moreover, as we can see by looking at the percentages in the broken column, the overall probability of some sort of broken result rises with the FP value.

Considered in the light of the historical performance, I think that the general consequences of the ELR idea agree well with what we should expect. Against light fire, unit performance stays fairly uniform as long as the units are under good cover. As the intensity of fire rises, however, the force, on either attack or defense, begins to disintegrate at a faster and faster rate. For my money, the ELR concept does what it's supposed to do.

MORALE CAN BE A TWO-SIDED ISSUE

Ever since the appearance of the SS, Inexperienced Infantry and Partisans in COI, we have had to deal with infantry having a different morale on its broken side than it had on its unbroken side. With SL itself, there were just three morale combinations for crews and squads since morale didn't change when the units went over. Now, however, looking at crews, half-squads and squads, there are ten combinations, ranging from a 6/4 to an 8/9. There are two significant areas in which the frontside/flip-side morale combination has an effect which might be important to our play. The first of these involves the danger present in stacking with a leader. The second has to do with the question of the desirability of a single, large fire attack versus a couple of smaller ones.

Because of the introduction of half-squads begun in GI, these matters have increased in importance. All half-squads have a flip-side morale either one or two levels poorer than that which they possess in an unbroken state. As Rule 13.6 makes clear, what you've got showing is what you go with.

Leaders Can Be Hazardous

One of the first things to be learned in playing SL should be that a leader will always increase the probability that a unit stacked with it will be destroyed. This is due to the facts that a leader is of no benefit against a KIA result, and that a MC combat result could break the leader and, thereby, cause the unit to take two MCs as the result of a single fire attack. By virtue of GF's 142.312, a broken squad that breaks again is replaced with a broken half-squad. For half-squad and crews, elimination is still the penalty for a double break.

Table 3 provides some interesting data about the hazard to various types of units as a function of the leader with which it is stacked when subjected to a single attack. In the morale column the two numbers are, respectively, the normal and broken morale values. Under the "none" heading, "G" (for "Gone") represents the KIA probability, while "O" (for "Okay") is the probability of surviving the attack alive and unbroken. For the eight leaders listed, "G" represents the KIA probability *plus* the probability of double-break elimination (for crews and half-squads) or (for squads) the probability of

Because the effects of leaders on 6/6, 7/7 and 8/8 units were discussed in the initial *SL* article, the results for a single attack presented here are provided for just two purposes. The first of these is to give us a look at the typical effect of variable flip-side morale. The second is to provide a set of values that demonstrates one of the most important aspects of good play. I'll look at these two aspects in order.

With respect to the double-break question, the leader modifiers are of no importance. For example, for a 7/7 and either an 8-0 or an 8-1 leader, the probability that the unit will be "Gone" is 36%. Now consider how the "G" values change as a function of flip-side morale. As the morale of the leader goes up, the range of the "G" values goes down rather sharply. For example, with a 6+1 leader, a 6/4, a 6/5 and a 6/6 will be "Gone", respectively, 59%, 55% and 49% of the time. With any "9" morale leader the corresponding values are 41%, 40% and 37%. Qualitatively, this is the trend in all of the cases I looked at: flip-side morale is *not* a major factor as far as double-break elimination is

		ELR Val	ue							
FP	DRM	Ok	KIA	Broken	1	2		3	4	5
	-2	44	17	39	80	59		39	24	12
4	0	70	3	27	79	57		37	22	11
	+2	89	0	11	77	53		34	19	9
- st a	-2	24	28	48	83	63		44	28	- 13
8	0	45	8	46	81	60		41	25	13
	+2	71	0	29	80	58		38	23	12
	-2	11	42	48	86	69		51	34	21
16	0	25	17	59	84	66		47	31	18
	+2	46	3	51	82	62		43	27	15
	-2	4	58	37	90	77	2	62	46	31
24	0	11	28	61	88	73		56	40	26
	+2	25	8	67	86	68		50	34	21
	Morale =	= 6.								
		ELR Val								
FP	DRM	Ok	KIA	Broken	1	2		3	4	5
	-2	52	17	32	73	49		30	15	(
4	0	76	3	21	72	47		28	14	3
_	+2	92	0	8	70	44		25	11	-
0	-2 0	32 54	28	40 38	76 74	52 50		33 31	18 16	
8			8							
	+2	77	10000	23	73	48		29	15	
	-2	17	42	41	81	59		40	24	13
16	0	34	17	49	78	56		36	21	10
-	+2	55	3	42	76	52 69		33 51	18 34	2
-	-2	8	58	34	86					
24	0	18	28	54	83	64		45	29	11
1	+2 Morale :	35	8	57	80	59	2013	40	25	-
	morule	- /.								
		ELR Val	ue							
FP	DRM	Ok	KIA	Broken	1	2		3	4	5
	-2	60	17	23	67	40		21	8	
4	0	82	3	15	66	39		19	7	
	+2	94	0	6	64	36		16	4	(
1.2	-2	42	28	31	69	44	12.	24	11	
8	0	64	8	28	68	42		22	9	
	+2	83	0	17	67	40		20	7	
	-2	25	42	33	74	50	8	30	16	
16	0	45	17	39	71	47		27	13	
	+2	65	3	32	69	44		24	11	
	-2	13	58	29	80	59		40	24	- 1
24	0	27	28	45	77	55		35	20	1
	+2	46	8	46	74	50		31	16	121
	Morale :	= 8.								
la 1 L	formation a	oncerning the	relative pro	hability that a up	it will brea	k-to-green	when it	breake		
. II	normation c	oncerning the		bability that a un			anen n	oreans.		
~	2000	000	000	EI	R Valu			~	000	00
		M	orale	1 2	3	4	5			
			6	80 80	45	30	15			
		And the second se					1 million 1			
			7	75 55	35	20	10			

8 /0 45 25 10 5
 Table 2. The approximate probabilities that any fire attack will cause a breaking unit to break-to-green.

Leader	223	one	120	+1	1000	.0	1022	-0	G	-1	- 329	-1	1.1	-2	G)-2	100	-3
Morale	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	0	-	0	G	0	G	0		0	G	0
6/4			59		54		48		48		41		41		37		37	
6/5	28	24	55	16	50	18	45	20	45	24	40	27	40	33	35	36	35	44
6/6			49		46		42		42		37		37		34		34	
7/5			50		46		42		42	-	38		38	201	34		34	
7/6	28	32	46	23	43	26	39	28	39	33	36	36	36	42	33	45	33	51
7/7			41		39	107	36		36	1	34		34	11 1	31		31	
8/6			42		39		37		37		34		34		32		32	
8/7	28	42	38	32	36	36	34	37	34	42	32	45	32	50	31	53	31	58
8/8	-		34		33		32		32		31		31		30		30	
8/9			32		31	HE S	30		30	der .	30		30	No.	29		29	141

concerned, and the effect falls off rapidly as leadership goes up.

One of the simplest and, also, most important conclusions of the first article was that the 8-1 leader was the "neutral" leader with respect to the probability that a unit would survive alive and unbroken. Looking at the three "O" column numbers for an 8-1 leader you'll see that they are within 1% of those in the "O" column when no leader is present. Stacked with any leader poorer than an 8-1, a unit has a reduced chance of being fully functional. In all of the different FP/DRM combinations I've looked at, it works out the same way. For this reason, the 6+1, 7-0 and 8-0 leaders should only be used to man radios, accelerate troop movement, and rally broken units-with those latter two activities carried out only where the hex occupied cannot be hit by enemy fire of any importance. If there's anything approaching an absolute rule of play in this game, that's it! Yet, in six years of playing this game and watching it being played, I've seen stacks exposed with these inferior leaders time after time. If this article convinces you of nothing but the desirability of avoiding this mistake, you'll have gotten your reading time's worth.

Two Little Versus One Big

This was one of the first, and most frustrating, problems I faced in playtesting SL. Because of the rules, adjacent stacks have the option either of firing together at one target or of taking separate shots. At an elementary level, it's like this: you have two 6-6-7 squads side-by-side—should they fire together for one 12 FP attack, or separately as a pair of 6 FP attacks?

Table 4 has enough numbers to provide a reasonably complete answer. Once again, all ten of the current morale combinations are involved. In addition, this Table also makes use of the "G" and "O" headings previously defined. At the top of each pair of "G" and "O" values there are two numbers; the first is the strength (FP) of the attack and the second is the number of times it's applied. Thus, "4x2" refers to the results obtained against a particular unit when fired at twice by 4FPs. The

Table presents six comparisons: "2x2" versus "4x1"; "4x2" versus "8x1"; "6x2" versus "12x1"; "8x2" versus "16x1"; and "18x2" versus "36x1" for three different DRMs: -2, 0 and +2.

To look at things from the American point of view, from which the typical FPF is 6, the 6x2 versus 12x1 comparison tells us what is best. Let's suppose that the target is a 7/7 morale unit. For the two units firing separately, the enemy will be "Gone" 58% of the time if the DRM is -2. For the other DRMS the probabilities of this happening are 24% and 2%. The corresponding numbers in the 12x1 column are 28%, 8% and 0%, all of which represent KIA results. Even allowing for the fact that all of the "G" outcomes will not involve complete elimination of the enemy, it's pretty clear that for DRMs of -2 and 0, the separate attacks are best. This is a generally valid observation for all of the comparisons made. The only point of departure (and it's not by much) comes with the highest FP attacks versus the 8 front-side morale units.

Returning to the specific example already used, the three different DRMs yield untouched survival for the target 16%, 41% and 73% of the time when separate attacks are made. For a single fire the comparable numbers are 25%, 44% and 66%. These values are the important ones when a break is as good as a kill. This particular example reflects the common reality: as the cover value goes up, the single group attack becomes more likely to inflict some kind of damage upon the foe. However, it never gains the decisive advantage found by separate attacks made with more favorable DRMs.

Here, as in the previous place we considered it, we also find that the flip-side morale is not a major factor. You might think of that as negative information. At least, though, it means one less thing to worry about.

My personal rule-of-thumb in this area is to stick with multiple attacks so long as the DRM is +2 or less. Now, there are several factors not considered in the above. The most obvious one is the influence of leadership. Just flip through any of the scenario sets and you'll discover that there just aren't many leaders with leadership modifiers of -2 or -3. This means that you'll seldom have the luxury of even considering the possibility of a large FP attack directed by a great leader. In general, since the other guy gets to shoot back, putting a lot of goodies into one basket has its risks. Concentration is one of those principles some people like to talk about in connection with war, but it does not mean that you should create attractive targets. Moreover, many scenarios require that you give careful thought to *both* fire and movement. The bigger the shot you take, the more units and weapons you pin down by that effort.

What you've just read doesn't mean that you should never concentrate firepower into single, big attacks. What it does mean is that you should not make that sort of thing your basic tactical doctrine. I'm still working on trying to produce a more flexible and effective doctrine. If and when I find one, you'll read about it here.

IMMOBILIZATION

One of my treasured moments in playtesting SL came when a villainous opponent decided to forego the usual victory conditions and establish the elimination of the Cpl. Medrow counter as his highest priority. In what I can only regard as a truly just result, I rolled snake eyes when he was thoughtless enough to put his pursuing AFV adjacent to my counter. Ever since that experience, Defensive Fire Phase Immobilization has been a favorite of mine.

Figure 1 shows, in (a), the old DFPh Immobilization Table from 36.12 while (b) shows the new one from 144.73. You'll note that the first one gives the dice roll required to immobilize. To that roll, the leadership modifier of any leader present who passes a normal MC is the only DRM. The table in (b) consists entirely of additional DRMs based upon the new requirement that the modified dice roll must be less than or equal to "2". Combined with the new rule concerning what units are eligible to make this attack, the net effect is to make this type of attack both more common and more effective.

Att	ack	2	x2	4	x1	4	x2	8	x1	6	x2	12	x1	8	x2	16	ix1	12	x2	24	x1	18	3x2	30	6x
Morale	DRM	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	0	G	
	-2	41	26	17	44	50	14	28	24	68	7	28	17	71	3	42	11	84	1	58	4	93	0	83	
6/4	0	9	61	3	70	15	44	8	45	32	27	8	35	43	15	17	25	56	8	28	11	72	3	58	
	+2	0	88	0	89	2	76	0	71	5	61	0	58	11	44	3	46	22	27	8	25	38	15	28	
Law Street	-2	40	28	17	44	49	17	28	24	66	8	28	17	74	4	42	11	82	2	58	4	91	1	83	
6/5	0	9	63	3	70	14	46	8	45	30	29	8	35	41	17	17	25	53	9	28	11	69	4	58	
	+2	0	89	0	89	1	78	0	71	4	63	0	58	10	47	3	46	20	30	8	25	36	18	28	
	-2	38	31	17	44	46	19	28	24	64	10	28	17	71	6	42	11	79	3	58	4	89	1	83	
6/6	0	8	65	3	70	13	50	8	45	28	32	8	35	37	21	17	25	48	12	28	11	65	6	58	
	+2	0	90	0	89	1	79	0	71	4	66	0	58	8	50	3	46	18	34	8	25	32	21	28	
Bina an	-2	38	31	17	52	45	19	28	32	63	10	28	25	70	6	42	17	77	3	58	8	88	1	83	
7/5	0	8	66	3	76	12	50	8	54	27	33	8	.44	36	21	17	34	47	12	28	18	63	6	58	
	+2	0	90	0	92	1	80	0	77	3	66	0	66	8	51	3	55	16	34	8	35	30	21	28	
	-2	37	34	17	52	43	23	28	32	61	13	28	25	67	8	42	17	74	4	58	8	86	2	83	
7/6	0	8	68	3	76	11	54	8	54	26	37	8	44	33	24	17	34	43	15	28	18	59	8	58	
	+2	0	91	0	92	1	82	0	77	3	69	0	66	7	54	3	55	14	38	8	35	27	25	28	
- SHOWER	-2	35	38	17	52	41	27	28	32	58	16	28	25	64	10	42	17	70	6	58	8	83	3	83	22
7/7	0	7	71	3	76	10	58	8	54	24	41	8	44	30	29	17	34	38	20	28	18	55	12	58	
	+2	0	92	0	92	1	84	0	77	2	73	0	66	5	59	3	55	11	44	8	35	23	30	28	
	-2	35	38	23	60	40	26	28	42	57	16	28	35	63	10	42	25	69	6	58	13	82	3	83	
8/6	0	7	71	3	82	10	58	8	64	23	41	8	56	29	29	17	45	37	19	28	27	53	11	58	-
	+2	0	92	0	94	1	84	0	83	2	73	0	75	5	59	3	65	11	43	8	46	22	30	28	1
	-2	34	42	23	60	38	31	28	42	56	19	28	35	60	13	42	25	66	9	58	13	80	4	83	
8/7	0	7	75	3	82	9	62	8	64	21	46	8	55	26	34	17	45	33	24	28	27	50	15	5.8	T.M.
	+2	0	93	0	94	0	86	0	83	2	76	0	75	4	64	3	65	9	49	8	46	19	36	28	-
	-2	33	47	23	60	36	36	28	42	54	23	28	35	57	17	42	25	62	12	58	13	77	6	83	
8/8	0	6	78	3	82	8	67	8	64	20	51	8	55	24	41	17	45	29	31	28	27	45	20	58	
	+2	0	95	0	94	0	89	0	83	1	80	0	75	3	69	3	65	6	56	8	46	16	43	28	4
	-2	32	50	23	60	34	41	28	42	52	27	28	35	54	21	42	25	58	16	58	13	74	9	83	
8/9	0	6	81	3	82	7	72	8	64	19	56	8	55	21	46	17	45	25	36	28	27	41	25	58	1
	+2	0	96	0	95	0	91	0	83	1	83	0	75	2	74	3	65	4	62	8	46	13	49	28	313

Table 4. A comparison of individual versus combined firepower attacks.

*.		L.t.	7		H-3	7		1.1	7
5-6		1			1-6			A North	
		Ľ			<u></u>			1.0	_
mber of squads		1			2			3	
equad morale Leader	6	7	8	6	7	8	6	7	8
None	1	2	2	2	3	4	3	5	6
8-1	7	8	8	9	10	10	10	11	12
9-1	8	9	9	10	11	11	11	12	13
9-2 10-2	15 17	16 17	16 17	17 19	18 19	18 19	19 20	19 21	20
10-3	27	27	27	29	29	29	30	31	31
	Net D.	RM = 0	without	leader n	odifier.				
None	3	5	6	1 7	9	12	10	14	17
8-1	10	12	13	14	17	19	18	22	24
9-1	12	13	14	15	18	20	20	23	25
9-2 10-2	21 23	22 24	22 25	26 28	28 30	29 31	30 32	33 35	34
10-2	36	38	38	42	43	43	45	47	48
					modifier.				
None	7	10	12	13	18	23	19	26	32
8-1	16	19	21	24	29	32	31	37	41
9-1	18	20	22	26	30	33	33	38	43
9-2	30	33	35	40	43	45	47	50	53
10-2 10-3	32 49	35 52	37 54	42 58	45 60	47 63	49 64	53 66	55
10-5					modifier.	05	1 04	00	0,
None	12	16	20	22	30	36	31	41	49
8-1	23	28	32	36	43	48	46	54	59
9-1	25	30	33	38	45	49	48	56	61
9-2	41	46	49	55	59	62	63	68	72
10-2	44	48	52 67	58 72	62	65	67	71	74
10-3	60 Not D	64			74 modifier.	76	78	80	82
None 8-1	17 32	24 39	30 44	32	43 58	51	44	57	66
9-1 9-1	34	41	44	49 52	60	64 66	61 64	70 72	76
9-2	50	57	61	67	73	76	76	82	85
10-2	54	60	64	70	76	79	80	84	87
10-3	69	74	77	82	85	87	88	90	92
					modifier.				
None 8-1	24 40	34 49	42 56	42 60	56 70	67 77	57 73	71 82	81 88
9-1	40	51	58	63	73	79	75	84	89
9-2	58	66	72	77	83	87	86	91	93
10-2	61	69	75	80	86	89	88	92	95
10-3	76	82	86	89	92	94	94	96	97
					modifier.				
None 8-1	30 46	42 57	52 66	51 68	67 79	77 86	66 80	81 89	89 94
9-1	40	59	68	71	81	88	83	91	94
9-2	64	73	80	83	89	93	91	95	97
10-2	67	76	83	86	91	95	93	96	98
10-3	81	87	92	93	96	97	96	98	99
Marra			6 withou				1 70	24	
None 8-1	35 51	49 63	60 73	57 73	74 85	84 91	72 85	86 93	94 97
9-1	53	65	75	76	86	93	87	93	98
9-2	68	78	85	86	93	96	93	97	99
10-2	72	81	88	89	95	97	95	98	99
10-3	84	90	95	95	97	99	97	99	99

Table 5. The probability of successful immobilization of an AFV by a Defensive Fire Phase attack.

As an example of the first, any condition (other than height advantage) which would give the infantry unit a favorable TEM with regard to fire from the vehicle's adjacent position now makes the immobilization effort possible. Thus, infantry separated from an AFV by a wall, or sitting in a smoked hex, can now take a crack at it. The increased effectiveness is reflected in the fact that the maximum effective dice roll possible (before any leader effects are considered) has risen from *SL*'s "4" to *GI*'s "9".

Because of the interesting things discovered in connection with the treatment of this topic in the COI article, I just had to dig out the old program and rerun it for the additional cases. Table 5 contains all of the material from the earlier article as well as that required by the revised rule. One of the most striking features of the way the original rule worked was the extent to which the results were so extremely leader dependent, with both numbers of squads and their morale being quite secondary.

The best way to illustrate this fact is to compare the numbers in the column below the first '6' and those below the third '8'. The first gives us the probability of success for a single, morale ''6'', squad stacked with various leaders. The latter has the same information for three morale 8 squads. In the first part of the table, where we have the success probabilities if the dice roll must be two, a single morale ''6'' squad stacked with an 8-1 leader does better than three morale ''8'' squads.

Continuing on through the various dice rolls required, compare what happens, for the same leader, to the ratio of the value in the far right column to that in the far left. Nowhere will the maximum stack do more than 2.6 times as well as the lone morale "6" squad. For example, if the modified dice roll (before leadership effects) required is '6', the fifth section of the table tells us that, for a 9-1 leader, the success values are 34% and 78%. The ratio of those two numbers is less than 2.3. There can't be many situations in which those two squad groupings would have success chances that close together.

The net effect of the new rule is to increase the hazard to AFVs in congested terrain. As a natural consequence, this also emphasizes the importance of combined arms in such terrain. Armor and infantry, supported by such artillery and/or air power as is available, must work together. Understanding how the rules work in a situation like this is the true test of the SL system rules expert. Being able to use them effectively is the true test of the expert player.

THE TO HIT TABLE

Here we have what is, I think, the place where the GI changes have the biggest impact on how the game is played. After all these years of seeing things grow more complicated, here's a place where, at least on the surface, things get simpler. Figure 2, part (a), shows the TO HIT TABLE as it was in COD, while the second half displays the current one. The most obvious difference is that the new one has fewer rows. Where earlier both infantry and vehicles had three separate lines they are now reduced to one apiece. The entry "Guns" has vanished entirely.

This magic has been accomplished by establishing a single line for each basic category of target. Here, "basic" is defined in terms of the first shot probability of hitting that particular type of target if both it and the firer were sitting, motionless, on a flat, featureless plane. As before, this probability is modified up or down depending upon the firer's motion, condition or intention. Also, as before, the target's motion, position and previous history enter into things as DRMs. The major conceptual change comes in connection with *Case R* of the new table. No longer does terrain dictate the line on the TO HIT TABLE. Instead, its presence is felt as a DRM.

 1	£.	A	ŋ	۱
3	Ľ	ų	d	1

	Location of Firing Ur	nits	Dice R Requir				Upon seeing
	Leader unit only, any		Kequir	eu			thoughts was that
	ground hex	non open	2				fantry targets wo
	Squad in wheat field		2				the first line. In (
	Squad in small building	ng, shellhole,					generally, a spot l infantry out in the
	entrenchment		3				try would enjoy a
	Squad in woods or la (3 hexes)	rge building	4				the TEM influenc
	(c minos)						no effect whatsoe
	Part (a) is the Table in 36	.12					infantry in a buil
			_				hurt if you do hit Table 6 perse
2000000	0000000	0000	0000	3000	000		work out in the
Condi	ion	-		DRM			wooden building.
	sing VBM in same hex as fit	rer		-2 -2			is the probability t
	hindrance not fully tracked			-1			when fired upon. the case in which
AFV is	CE			+1			Correspondingly,
	er is HS er is Crew			+1+2			which the only me
	accompanied by exterior p	assengers &/or u	nbroken	+2			both cases the bla
	y on foot in same hex per H		loronon	+1			Since ordnanc
** Ter	rain occupied by attacking i	nfantry		- TEM ***			results columns a
* A s	quad earns a +2 DRM						common gun cal
** Doe	s not apply to SMC's EM of -3, -4, -5, etc is treated	25 -2					show the IFP equ ranges are includ
•••• A 1	Live of -5, -4, -5, etc is treated	as -2					represents a rather
Part (b) i	s the Table in 144.73.						typical board arra
·	state rable in trans.						few enough variab
							front-side morale
							Let's first con
Figure 1.							unit morale of ' ending up dead of
				Contraction of the local division of the loc			
	TO HIT TABLE	33.3	3			HIT D	ETERMINATION DICI
Target Type/Range	1-6 7-12 13-2	24 25-39 4	0-59 60-	F.			FIRER MODIE
INF in building,			- 1.2				ide Covered Arc
shellholes, entrenched	8 8 7 6 6	5 5 3	3 0 0	-2	D. 1		ing Adv. Fire Phase after lovement Phase
INF in woods	8 8 6 6 5	4 4 2	2 -1 -1	-	С. Т	ank firing dur	ing Adv. Fire Phase afte
INF in other			4 1 1		D. S		cle defensive fire (135.4 in firing during Adv. Fire
Vehicle is hull down			2 -1 -2			within hex du	uring Movement Phase (F
	ldg 9 9 8 7 7		4 1 1	-2	E. 5		in firing during Defensive uring Defensive Fire Pha
Vehicle is in woods/b		7 7 4	5 3 3				
Vehicle is in other	<u>₹</u> 1010 98 8		5 2 2			tensive Fire (7	
	<u>₹</u> 1010 98 8		5 2 2 0 -2 -2		*G. D	eliberate Immo	obilization (66.2) side/real
Vehicle is in other me Gun	E 10 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4				*G. D *H. C	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna	
Vehicle is in other	E 10 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4				*G. D *H. C 1. B	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna uttoned Up (64	bbilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13)
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI	10 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS *J. Tar	3 2 0	0 -2 -2	- tion target, 135.	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna uttoned Up (64 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ	bbilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1)
Vehicle is in other Field Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type * L 7-12 hexes +1 0	10 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS *J. Tar 0 0 *K. Tar	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai	0 -2 -2	tion target, 135. range, 111.44 &	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna uttoned Up (64 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 °O. Mov	bilization (66.2) side/real nec (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less N
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1	ID 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS LL *J. Tat 0 0 *J. Tat -1 +1 L. Tat	3 2 0	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x.	ntion target, 135. range, 111.44 &	•G. D •H. C 1. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna uttoned Up (64 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 °O. Mov 2 °P. Mov	bbilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1)
Vehicle is in other Image Gun Gun Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type * L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 -1 -1 -1	ID IO 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS *J. Tat *K. Tat 0 0 0 *L. Tat *J. Tat -1 +1 L. Tat *J. Tat -2 +2 M. Tar	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai rget is in adjacent he: get is in bore-sighted	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mo n, snow 6 + hex x t hex (78.4)	tion target, 135. range, 111.44 &	•G. D •H. C 1. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna uttoned Up (64 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 O. Mov 2 P. Mov 2 Q. Targ	bbilization (66.2) side/real noce (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less N ing target using 3 or less N
Vehicle is in other Image Gun Gun Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type * L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1	ID IO 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS *J. Tat *K. Tat 0 0 0 *L. Tat *J. Tat -1 +1 L. Tat *J. Tat -2 +2 M. Tar	3 2 0 get is moving (Defer get is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he get is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge we	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mo n, snow 6 + hex x. d hex (78.4) eapons with sep	otion target, 135. range, 111.44 & parate To Hit Ta	•G. D •H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ 	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna uttoned Up (6 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 °O. Mov 2 °P. Mov 2 °Q. Targ T, bazooka, p	bilization (66.2) side/real nnce (90.13)
Vehicle is in other Image Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type * L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1	10 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS LL APCR *J. Tar 0 0 *K. Tar L. Tar -1 +1 M. Tar -2 -2 +3 *Applicable *Applicable	3 2 0 get is moving (Defer get is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he get is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge we	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mo n, snow 6 + hex x. d hex (78.4) eapons with sep	otion target, 135. range, 111.44 & parate To Hit Ta	•G. D •H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ 	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna uttoned Up (6 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 °O. Mov 2 °P. Mov 2 °Q. Targ T, bazooka, p	bilization (66.2) side/real nnce (90.13)
Vehicle is in other Image Gun Gun Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type * L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1	I0 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS *J. Tar 0 0 *K. Tar 1. Tar -1 +1 L. Tar -2 +2 M. Tar -2 +3 *Applicable	3 2 0 get is moving (Defer get is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he get is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge we	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x t hex (78.4) eapons with sep	otion target, 135. range, 111.44 & parate To Hit Ta	•G. D •H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ 	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna uttoned Up (6 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 °O. Mov 2 °P. Mov 2 °Q. Targ T, bazooka, p	bilization (66.2) side/real nnce (90.13)
Vehicle is in other Image Gun Gun Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 HD: Colored Die ≥ White Di White Di	I0 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS *J. Tar 0 0 *K. Tar 1. Tar -1 +1 L. Tar -2 +2 M. Tar -2 +3 *Applicable	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai rget is in adjacent he: get is in bore-sightee to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 1-	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. hex (78.4) eapons with sep 45.1	otion target, 135. range, 111.44 & parate To Hit Ta	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna uttoned Up (6 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 °O. Mov 2 °P. Mov 2 °Q. Targ T, bazooka, p	bbilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) ssk): add + 2 if hull down
Vehicle is in other Image Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type L 7-12 hexes +1 13-24 hexes +2 13-24 hexes +3 40+ hexes +3 40+ hexes +4 HD: Colored Die ≥ White Di Target Type/Range	iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai rget is in adjacent he: get is in bore-sightee to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 1-	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x	stion target, 135, range, 111.44 & sarate To Hit Ta 37-42 43-4	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA	eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 *O. Mov 2 *P. Mov 2 *Q. Targ T, bazooka, p	bbilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) ssk): add + 2 if hull down
Vehicle is in other Image Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type L 7-12 hexes +1 13-24 hexes +2 13-24 hexes +2 40+ hexes +3 40+ hexes +4 HD: Colored Die ≥ White Di Carget Type/Range Vehicle	iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he get is in bore-sightec to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow $6 + hex$ x. thex (78.4) thex (78.4) thex (78.4) thex (78.4) thex (78.4) the of the or Mc the or Mc	stion target, 135, range, 111.44 & sarate To Hit Ta 37-42 43-4 5 3 4	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attored Up (64 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Targ T, bazooka, p	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less N ing target using 3 or less N et size (64.6) ssk): add +2 if hull down GUN & A
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 HD: Colored Die ≥ White Di Target Type/Range Vehicle Infantry, Aircraft	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai rget is in adjacent he: get is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow $6 + hex$ x. thex (78.4) thex (78.4) thex (78.4) thex (78.4) thex (78.4) thex (78.4) therefore the set of th	stion target, 135. range, 111.44 &	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA 68 49-54 2 3 1	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 IODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Targ T, bazooka, p 55 + 2 0	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type * L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40+ hexes +4 -1 CONTROL Colored Die ≥ White Di Carget Type/Range Wehicle Infantry, Aircraft Building, Smoke	I0 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS LL APCR -1 *J. Tat *K. Tat L. Tat M. Tat *Applicable -2 +2 *J. Tat *Applicable (145.2) TO I 0-6 7-12 13-18 10 10 9 8 7 8 7 6 6 5 12 11 10 10 9	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he get is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8	$\begin{array}{cccc} 0 & -2 & -2 \\ \hline & & \\ n, snow 6 + hex \\ x, \\ $	stion target, 135, range, 111.44 & warate To Hit Tr 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA ************************************	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attorned Up (64 ODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 *O. Mov 2 *P. Mov 2 *Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 55 + 2 0 -1 -2 4 2	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less N ing target using 3 or less N et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 COUPER HD: Colored Die ≥ White Di Farget Type/Range Wehicle Infantry, Aircraft Building, Smoke RED Numbers: Russian, Minor,	I0 10 9 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 DIFICATIONS APDS *J. Tat 0 0 *K. Tai -1 +1 . Tar -2 +2 *Applicable -2 +3 *Applicable c: (145.2) TO I 0-6 7-12 13-18 10 10 9 8 7 8 8 7 6 5 12 12 11 10 10 9 French, US pre-7/43, captured * * *	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defen rget is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he get is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 1- 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 Multiple 2) AP CH:	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit Tr 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (≤40mm DR 2 + dr (1 o	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ 	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 ODIFICATIO 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Targ 2 *0. Targ 2 *0. Targ 2 *0. Targ 55 + 2 2 0 -1 -2 4 2 0 HIT Numbed 58.1) [unmodi 1.1	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less N ing target using 3 or less N et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes fied]
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type * L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 White Di Target Type/Range Wehicle Infantry, Aircraft Building, Smoke RED Numbers: Russian, Minor, ong Range Hit Possibility: unn	$ \begin{array}{c} 10 \ 10 \ 9 \ 8 \ 8 \\ 6 \ 5 \ 5 \ 4 \ 4 \\ DIFICATIONS APDS LL APCR *J. Tar *I. Tar *K. Tai *K. Tai *K. Tai *K. Tai *J. Tar *K. Tai *Applicable *(145.2) TO I 0-6 7-12 13-18 10 10 9 8 8 7 8 8 7 6 6 5 12 12 11 10 10 9 French, US pre-7/43, captured vodified DR 2 + dr < 6 [+1 dr$	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defen rget is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he get is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 1- 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 Multiple 2) AP CH:	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit Tr 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (≤40mm DR 2 + dr (1 o	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ 	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 ODIFICATIO 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Targ 2 *0. Targ 2 *0. Targ 2 *0. Targ 55 + 2 2 0 -1 -2 4 2 0 HIT Numbed 58.1) [unmodi 1.1	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes er (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or≤ ½ TH#) (14
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOD Range/Type * L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40+ hexes +4 -1	$ \begin{array}{c} 10 \ 10 \ 9 \ 8 \ 8 \\ 6 \ 5 \ 5 \ 4 \ 4 \\ DIFICATIONS APDS LL APCR *J. Tar *I. Tar *K. Tai *K. Tai *K. Tai *K. Tai *J. Tar *K. Tai *Applicable *(145.2) TO I 0-6 7-12 13-18 10 10 9 8 8 7 8 8 7 6 6 5 12 12 11 10 10 9 French, US pre-7/43, captured vodified DR 2 + dr < 6 [+1 dr$	3 2 0 rget is moving (Deferget is concealed (rais is no concealed (rais is no concerned)) 1 1 rget is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge we concerned	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 Multiple 2) AP CH:	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit Tr 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (≤40mm DR 2 + dr (1 o	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ .53)+ .53)+ .53)+ .54 .53)+ .53)+ .54 .53)+ .54]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55]. .54]. .55].5	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attorned Up (64 2 N. Targ 2 *O. Mov 2 *P. Mov 2 *Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 55 + 2 0 -1 -2 4 2 0 HIT Numbel 86.1) [unmodiling target: 2	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes er (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or≤ ½ TH#) (14 TARGET HIT DETE
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40+ hexes +4 -1 WHD: Colored Die ≥ White Di Target Type/Range Wehicle Infantry, Aircraft Building, Smoke RED Numbers: Russian, Minor, Long Range Hit Possibility: unn Turret/Upper Body Hit: Colored A. Firing outside CA per he:	$\begin{array}{c} \hline 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \\ \hline DIFICATIONS \\ \hline APDS \\ \hline 1 & 1 \\ \hline -1 & +1 \\ -2 & +2 \\ \hline -2 & +3 \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{c} *J. \ Tar \\ *K. \ Tar \\ *K. \ Tar \\ *Applicable \\ \hline \\ $	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai rget is in adjacent he: get is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance m/# < 2 TH#] (33.3 ATION DRM's: +1 + 1] [ST: +2 +4	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. hex (78.4) eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 Multiple 2) AP CH: HE CH: +1 +1][NT:	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit Tr 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (\leq 40mm DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 +1 +1]	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53]+ .53]+ .53]+ .53]+ .53]+ .53]+ .54]+ .53]+ .53]+ .53]+ .53]+ .54]+ .54]+ .54]+ .54]+ .54]+ .54]+ .54]+ .54]+ .55]+ .54]+ .55]+ .54]+ .55]+ .54]+ .55]+ .54]+ .55]+ .54]+ .55]+ .54]+ .55]+ .54]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]+ .55]+ .55]+ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]++ .55]+ .55]++ .55]++ .55]++ .55]++	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 ODIFICATIU 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Another 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Another 2 *0. Mov 2 *	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less N ing target using 3 or less N et size (64.6) GUN & A <u>Range/Type</u> 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes er (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or $\leq \forall \geq TH\#$) (14 TARGET HIT DETE icle (DF or Motion target;
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40+ hexes +4 -1 COMMONSTRATE HD: Colored Die ≥ White Di Target Type/Range Vehicle Infantry, Aircraft Building, Smoke RED Numbers: Russian, Minor, Long Range Hit Possibility: unn Turret/Upper Body Hit: Colored A. Firing outside CA per he: B. Firing in AFPh after chai	$\begin{array}{c} \hline \mathbf{E} & 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \mathbf{OIFICATIONS} & & & \\ \hline \mathbf{APDS} & & & \\ \hline \mathbf{APCR} & & & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 2 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1$	3 2 0 rget is moving (Deferget is concealed (railing is in adjacent heights in adjacent heights is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge were shaped-charge were shaped-charge were shaped and the shaped shap	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 2) AP CH: HE CH: +1 +1][NT: ST: +1	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit Tr 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (≤40mm DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 +1 +1] NT: +3	*G. D *H. C I. B 3)+ .53)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA ************************************	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attorned Up (6 2 N. Targ 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes er (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or≤ ½ TH#) (14 TARGET HIT DETE icle (DF or Motion target; nfantry no using Assault
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40+ hexes +4 -1 CONSTRUCTION HD: Colored Die ≥ White Di Target Type/Range Vehicle Infantry, Aircraft Building, Smoke RED Numbers: Russian, Minor, Long Range Hit Possibility: unn Turret/Upper Body Hit: Colored A. Firing outside CA per hea B. Firing in AFPh after chaa C. T/ST firing in AFPh after	$\begin{array}{c} \hline 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \\ \hline DIFICATIONS \\ \hline APDS \\ \hline 1 & 1 \\ \hline -1 & +1 \\ -2 & +2 \\ \hline -2 & +3 \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{c} *J. \ Tar \\ *K. \ Tar \\ *K. \ Tar \\ *Applicable \\ \hline \\ $	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he get is in bore-sightec to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance m/# < 2 TH#] (33.3 ATION DRM's: +1+11][ST: +2 + T:0	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mcn, now 6+ hex x. thex (78.4) thex (78.4) the (78.4) t	Attion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit Tr 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: $(\leq 40mm$ DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 + 1 + 1] NT: +3 3) +5	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA 	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 2 N. Targ 2 *0. Mov 2 *P. Mov 2 *Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 *0 -1 -2 4 2 O HIT Numbe 68.1) [unmodi ling target: 2 *Moving veh **† Moving i 2 *† Moving i	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less N ing target using 3 or less N et size (64.6) GUN & A <u>GUN & A</u> <u>Range/Type</u> 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes rr (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or $\leq \frac{1}{2}$ TH#) (14 TARGET HIT DETE icle (DF or Motion target; nfantry not using Assault nfantry in open
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 COURT OF A COURT	$\begin{array}{c} \hline 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \\ \hline DIFICATIONS \\ \hline APDS \\ \hline 1 & +1 & \\ -2 & +2 & \\ \hline -2 & +3 & \\ \hline +1 & \\ -2 & +2 & \\ \hline -2 & +3 & \\ \hline +1 & \\ -2 & +2 & \\ \hline -2 & +3 & \\ \hline +1 & \\ -2 & +2 & \\ \hline +1 & \\ \hline +1 & \\ -2 & \\ -2 & +3 & \\ \hline +1 & \\ \hline +1 & \\ -2 & \\ -2 & \\ \hline +1 & \\ \hline \\$	3 2 0 reget is moving (Defer reget is concealed (rai reget is concealed (rai reget is in dore-sighted to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 1 - 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance m/# < 2 TH#] (33.3 ATION DRM's: 4 1 + 1] [ST: +2 + 	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mcn, snow 6+ hex x	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit Ta 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: $(\leq 40$ mm DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 +1 +1] NT: +3 3) +5 +2	*G. D *H. C I. B 3)+ .53)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA 	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attorned Up (6 2 N. Targ 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *0. Mov 2 *1. Mov 2 *1	bilization (66.2) side/reat ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes rr (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or≤ ½ TH#) (14 TARGET HIT DETE icle (DF or Motion target; nfantry no using Assautt nfantry no using Assautt nfantry no using Assautt nfantry no wsing Assautt nfantry no target thex (78.4).
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 Wehicle 2 Concerd Die ≥ White Di Farget Type/Range Vehicle Infantry, Aircraft Building, Smoke RED Numbers: Russian, Minor, Long Range Hit Possibility: unn Furret/Upper Body Hit: Colored A. Firing outside CA per here B. Firing in AFPh after chan C. T/ST firing in AFPh after D. Firer is pinned (144.44). E. Firing within own hex at F. Intensive Fire(70.2)	$\begin{array}{c} \hline 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \end{tabular}$	3 2 0 get is moving (Defer get is concealed (rai get is in abacent he get is in bore-sightec to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance m/# <2 TH#J (33.3 ATION DRM's: +1 +11 [ST: +2 + 	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow $6 + hex$ x. thex (78.4) thex (78.4) the (78.4)	tion target, 135. range, 111.44 & arate To Hit Ta 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: $(\leq 40mm$ DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 +1 +1] ,NT: +3 3)+5 +2 +2	*G. D *H. C I. B 3)+ .53)+ .53)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA + ble (PF, PIA + 	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 ODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 *0. Mov 2 *P. Mov 2 *Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *1. Moving i 2	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less N ing target using 3 or less N et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes rr (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or≲ ½ TH#) (14 TARGET HIT DETE icle (DF or Motion target; nfantry not using Assault nfantry in open (target) thex (78.4) .)) (per fire phase, maxim
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 Wehicle L Infantry, Aircraft Building, Smoke RED Numbers: Russian, Minor, .ong Range Hit Possibility: unn Furrer/Upper Body Hit: Colored A. Firing outside CA per he: B. Firing in AFPh after chan C. T/ST firing in AFPh	$\begin{array}{c} \hline \mathbf{E} & 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \mathbf{OIFICATIONS} & \\ \hline \mathbf{APDS} & \\ \hline \mathbf{APCR} & *J. Tar \\ \hline \mathbf{K}. Tar \\ \hline 1 & +1 & \\ -1 & +1 & \\ -2 & +2 & \\ \hline \mathbf{K}. Tar \\ \hline \mathbf{-2} & +2 & \\ \hline \mathbf{K}. Tar \\ \hline \mathbf{-2} & +2 & \\ \hline \mathbf{K}. Tar \\ \hline \mathbf{-2} & +2 & \\ \hline \mathbf{K}. Tar \\ \$	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he: get is in bore-sightee to shaped-charge we HIT TABLE 1- 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance m/# <2 TH#J (33.3 ATION DRM's: +1 + 1][ST: +2 + 	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 Multiple 2) AP CH: HE CH: +1 +1][NT: ST: +1 3)(G: + +5)	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit T: 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (≤ 40 mm DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 +1 +1] NT: +3 3) +5 +2 +2 +2	*G. D *H. C I. B 3)+ .53)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA 	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attorned Up (6 2 N. Targ 2 *O. Mov 2 *P. Mov 2 *Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 *O. Mov 2 *Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 *O. Mov 2 *Q. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *O. Mov 2 *O. Mov 2 *Q. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *O. Mov 2 *O. Mov	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes rr (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or r (130.5) 6fed] + dr (1 or r ARGET HIT DETE icle (DF or Motion target; nfantry no using Assault nfantry no tsing Assault nfantry in open (target) thex (78.4) .1) [per fire phase, maxim ess MP's or MF's in firer's ess MP's in firer's LOS
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type * L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 COURT OF A COURT A COURT OF A COURT A	$\begin{array}{c} 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \\ \textbf{DIFICATIONS} \\ \hline APDS \\ LL & APCR & *J. Tar \\ \hline 0 & 0 & *K. Tar \\ \hline 1 & +1 & L. Tar \\ \hline -2 & +2 & *. \\ \hline -2 & +3 & *. \\ \hline \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$	3 2 0 get is moving (Defer get is concealed (rai get is in adjacent he get is in bore-sightec to shaped-charge wo HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance m/# <2 TH#J (33.3 ATION DRM's: +1 +1][ST: +2 + 	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 Multiple 2) AP CH: HE CH: +1 +1][NT: ST: +1 3)(G: + +5)	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit T: 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (≤ 40 mm DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 +1 +1] NT: +3 3) +5 +2 +2 +2	*G. D *H. C I. B 3)+ .53)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA 	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attorned Up (64 ODIFICATIO 2 N. Targ 2 *0. Mov 2 *P. Mov 2 *Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 *0. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 *0. Mov 2 *0. Targ 7 *0. Mov 2 *0. Mo	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less N ing target using 3 or less N et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes rr (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or $\leq \frac{1}{2}$ TH#) (14 TARGET HIT DETE icle (DF or Motion target; nfantry not using Assault nfantry in open et (rain, snow 6 + hex rang x
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 Wehcle state +4 -1 Wehcle bill bill bill bill bill bill bill bi	$\begin{array}{c} \hline 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \\ \hline DIFICATIONS \\ \hline APDS \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 \\ \hline -1 & +1 & 1 \\ \hline -2 & +2 & -2 \\ \hline -2 & +3 & Applicable \\ \hline \\ $	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai rget is in adjacent he: rget is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge wo HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance m/# <2 TH#J (33.3 ATION DRM's: +1 +1][ST: +2 + T:0 41) vehicle DF (144.4 priority (144.4) priority (144.4	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 Multiple 2) AP CH: HE CH: +1 +1][NT: ST: +1 3)(G: + +5)	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit T: 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (≤ 40 mm DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 +1 +1] NT: +3 3) +5 +2 +2 +2	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA 1000-14 231000-14 453000-14 453000-14 4530000-14 453000000000000000000000000000000000000	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 ODIFICATIO 2 * O. Mov 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2	bilization (66.2) side/reat ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes rr (130.5) 37 + hexes fied] + dr (1 or r (130.5) 6fed] + dr (1 or r ARGET HIT DETE icle (DF or Motion target; nfantry no using Assault nfantry no tsing Assault nfantry in open (target) thex (78.4) .1) [per fire phase, maxim ess MP's or MF's in firer's ess MP's in firer's LOS
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 COMMON A COMMON	$\begin{array}{c} \hline 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \\ \hline DIFICATIONS \\ \hline APDS \\ LL & APCR & *J. Tar \\ \hline & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & & & & & \\ \hline & & & & & & &$	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai rget is in adjacent he: rget is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge wo HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance m/# <2 TH#J (33.3 ATION DRM's: +1 +1][ST: +2 + T:0 41) vehicle DF (144.4 priority (144.4) priority (144.4	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 Multiple 2) AP CH: HE CH: +1 +1][NT: ST: +1 3)(G: + +5)	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit T: 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (≤ 40 mm DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 +1 +1] NT: +3 3) +5 +2 +2 +2	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA 1000-14 231000-14 453000-14 453000-14 4530000-14 453000000000000000000000000000000000000	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 ODIFICATIO 2 * O. Mov 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes fied] + dr (1 or < 1/2 TH#) (14 TARGET HIT DETE fiel (DF or Motion target; nfantry not using Assault nfantry in open
Vehicle is in other Gun GUN & AMMO TYPE MOI Range/Type • L 7-12 hexes +1 0 13-24 hexes +2 -1 25-29 hexes +3 -1 40 + hexes +4 -1 Wehicle Lift of the second sec	$\begin{array}{c} \hline 10 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 8 \\ \hline 6 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline \\ \hline DIFICATIONS \\ \hline APDS \\ LL & APCR & *J. Tar \\ \hline & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & & & *S. Tar \\ \hline & & & & & & & & & \\ \hline & & & & & & &$	3 2 0 rget is moving (Defer rget is concealed (rai rget is in adjacent he: rget is in bore-sighted to shaped-charge wo HIT TABLE 14 3 19-24 25-3 7 6 6 5 4 4 9 8 8 ordnance m/# <2 TH#J (33.3 ATION DRM's: +1 +1][ST: +2 + T:0 41) vehicle DF (144.4 priority (144.4) priority (144.4	0 -2 -2 nsive Fire or Mc n, snow 6 + hex x. eapons with sep 45.1 0 31-36 5 6 4 3 3 2 7 8 6 Multiple 2) AP CH: HE CH: +1 +1][NT: ST: +1 3)(G: + +5)	tion target, 135, range, 111.44 & marate To Hit T: 37-42 43-4 5 3 4 2 1 1 7 5 6 Hits: (≤ 40 mm DR 2 + dr (1 o TH# 8 +: 2; TH +3 +1 +1] NT: +3 3) +5 +2 +2 +2	*G. D *H. C I. B TARGET M 3)+ .53)+ ble (PF, PIA 1000-14 231000-14 453000-14 453000-14 4530000-14 453000000000000000000000000000000000000	Eliberate Immo aptured Ordna attoned Up (64 ODIFICATIO 2 * O. Mov 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ T, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2 * Q. Targ 7, bazooka, p 2 * O. Mov 2	bilization (66.2) side/real ince (90.13) 4.47) DNS et is acquired (69.1) ing target using 1 or less M ing target using 3 or less M et size (64.6) GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes fied] + dr (1 or < 1/2 TH#) (14 TARGET HIT DETE fiel (DF or Motion target; nfantry not using Assault nfantry in open

Status of Infantry Targets

the new table, one of my first t the effect of this change upon inould be the tricky thing. Consider COD, infantry in a building was, harder to hit than was motionless e open. If hit in a building, infana favorable TEM. Now, however, ces the likelihood of a hit, and has ever upon the IFT roll. That makes lding harder to hit, but easier to them.

ents a comparison of how things common case of infantry in a The basic information presented that a unit will be killed or broken The COD results are presented for there is no net TO HIT modifier. , the GI case is then the one for odifier is that due to the TEM. In ack TO HIT numbers were used.

ce uses the TO HIT procedure, the are headed by four of the most alibers. The parenthetical values uivalent of each fire. Only three ded because I feel that 18 hexes er long engagement range given the angement. Fortunately, there are bles so that the results for all three es can be included.

nsider the case of 40mm HE. For a "7" the probability of the unit or broken falls from 7% to 4% as

]	01	нп	T	ABLE	33.3												H	IIT DI	TERM	INATION DICH	ROLL	MODI	FIERS	33.31	
	1.	6	7-	-12	13	-24	25-	39	40-	59	60	+									FIRER MODIF	ICATIO	NS			
	8	8	7	6	6	5	5	3	3	0	0	-2					3. Tank	firin	g durin	ng Adv.	red Arc Fire Phase after Phase	pivoting	g withi	n		
	8	8	6	6	5	4	4	2	2	-1	-1	-				C					Fire Phase after					
	9	9	8	7	7	6	6	3	4	1	1	-1				r					during Adv. Fire					+5 +3
	7	6	5	4	4	3	3	1	2	-1	-2	-				r					vement Phase (Fr					+3
dg	9	9	8	3 7	7	6	6	3	4	1	1	-2				E	. SP G	in/A	T Gur	firing	during Defensive	Fire Ph	ase aft	er pive	oting	
10	10	10	9) 8	8	7	7	4	5	2	2	0									fensive Fire Pha					
	6	5	5	4	4	3	2	0	0	-2	-2	-									n (66.2) side/rear					
																*1	I. Captu	red (Ordnar	ice (90.1	3)					+2
IFI	CAT	ION	S																			1.264.274.3		2.00130	cranter :	0.0.1
	A	PDS	į.												TAI	RGE	T MOD	IFIC	ATIO	NS						
L	A	PCR			•J. T.	rget is	movi	ng (De	fensiv	e Fire	or Me	otion	targe	et. 135	.3)		+2	N.	Targe	is acou	ired (69.1)			es se s	/fire p	hase -1
0	1.00	0	and in		*K. T																using 1 or less M					
1		+1				rget is															using 3 or less N					
2		+2				rget is															4.6)					
2		+3				2201110		10000000											12100	10/1625705	an dealers and the second		and the second		the second second	
				Ap	plicable	to sha	ipea-a	marge	weap	ons v	ath se	para	te 10	Hit I	able (rr,	PIAL, 0	azoc	ka, ps	k): aud	+2 if hull down	or in w	bouen	ounun	ig, auu 4	1 III wood
o (14	5.2)	~				ніт				.1				1				~	~	~	GUN & A					TIONS
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Frer odif Die FIF	0-0 10 8 12 ich, ied 1 >V	10 8 12 US p DR 2 White	9 7 11 • re-7/ + d • Die T DI	8 6 10 (43, 0 r < 6 (130 ETE	TO 13-1 8 6 10 apture (+1 d 1)	8 1 7 5 9 1 ordni tm/# <	TAI 9-24 7 6 5 4 9 8 1000 2 TH	BLE 25 6 4 8 8 H#J (3:	145 -30 5 3 7 3.32)	31- 6 3 8 N A H	4 2 6 Nultiple P CH: E CH	37- 5 2 7 : Hit : DR : TH	42 3 1 5 s: (≤ 2 + # 8 +	43-4 4 1 6 40mr dr (1) : 2; T	18 4 2 0 4 n): DR or < 1/2	49-5 3 0 - 5 ≤ ≤ 1 4 TH	54 55 1 2 -1 -1 3 4 4 TO H 1#) (68.1 building J. *M	5 + -2 2 1T N 1T N targ	lumber modifi et: 2 +	(130.5) ied] dr (1 c TAR(ie (DF c	GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes 37 + hexes or 42 TH#) (14 GET HIT DETE or Motion target;	* 0 +1 +1 +1 5.6) [mo RMINA' 135.3)	L 0 -1 -1 -1 dified]	MOI LL 0 -1 -2 -2 DRM's	DIFICA APDS APCR 0 +1 +2 +3	Smoke +1 +1 +1 +1 +1
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Free odif Die FIF side ging mo	0-4 10 8 12 nch, ied I >V EER chan chan chan chan chan	10 8 12 US p DR 2 Vhite HIT in M o new	9 7 11 re-7/ + d Die T DI 144.4 IPh (1 / hex/	8 6 10 (43, 0 r < 6 (130 ETE 1) 44.4 'moti	TO 13-1 8 6 10 capture i [+1 d .1) RMIN [T: +1] 2) on (135	8 1 7 5 9 4 ordna rm/# < ATIO +1 + 	TAI 9-24 7 6 5 4 9 8 ance (2 TH N D 1] . [5 F:0 . hicle I	BLE 25 6 4 8 H#] (3 8 RM's ST: + DF (14	145 -30 5 3.32) : 2 + 1 ST 4.43)	31 6 3 8 M A H + 1] . : + 1	4 2 6 Nultiple P CH: E CH: .[NT: .(G; +	37- 5 2 7 Hitt DR : TH +3 	42 3 1 5 s: (≤ 2 + # 8+ +1 + NT: -	43-4 4 1 6 40mr dr (1 : 2; T -1] +3 +5	18 4 2 0 4 n): DR or < 1/2	49-5 3 0 - 5 ≤ ≤ 1 4 TH	54 55 1 2 -1 -1 3 4 4 TO H H#) (68.1 building J. *M J.' *† J.' *†	5+ -2 2 IT N 1 [un targ Iovin Mo Mo	umber modifi et: 2 + g vehic ving in	(130.5) ed] dr (1 c TAR le (DF c fantry r fantry i	GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes 37 + hexes or 42 TH#) (14 GET HIT DETE or Motion target;	* 0 +1 +1 +1 5.6) [mo RMINA' 135.3) (hazardo	L 0 -1 -1 -1 dified] FION the first second s	MOI LL 0 -1 -2 -2 DRM's .1)	DIFICA APDS APCR 0 +1 +2 +3 s:	Smoke +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1
Frer odif Die FIF side ging mo	0-0 10 8 12 ach, ied I >V ER char char char char char char	10 8 12 US p DR 2 White HIT nge (1 in M o new	9 7 11 9 re-7/ + d e Die F DI 144.4 IPh (1 /hex/	8 6 10 (43, 0 r < 6 (130 ETE 1) (44.4 'moti	TO 13-1 8 6 10 capture (+1 d 1) RMIN (T: +1 2) on (135)	8 1 7 5 9 4 ordna rm/# < ATIO +1 + .41) ve	TAI 9-24 7 6 5 4 9 8 ance (2 TH N D 1][! F:0 .	BLE 25 6 4 8 H#] (3: RM's ST: +: DF (14	145 -30 5 3 7 3.32) : 2 + 1 ST 4.43)	31- 6 3 8 M A H +1].: +1	4 2 6 Nultiple P CH: E CH: .[NT: .(G; +	37- 5 2 7 Hitt DR +3 3).	42 3 1 5 s: (≤ 2 + # 8 + +1 + NT: -	43-4 4 1 6 40mr dr (1 - : 2; T - 1] + 3 + 5 + 2	18 4 2 0 4 n): DR or < 1/2	49-5 3 0 - 5 ≤ ≤ 1 4 TH	54 55 1 2 -1 -1 3 4 4 TO H 14) (68.1 building J. *M J.** J.** K.**	5+ -2 2 IT N 1 [un targ Iovin Mo Co	umber modifi et: 2 + g vehic wing in wing in ncealed	(130.5) ed] dr (1 c TAR ele (DF c fantry i fantry i 1 (rain, s	GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes 37 + hexes 37 + hexes or 42 TH#) (14 GET HIT DETE or Motion target; to using Assault 1 nopen	* 0 +1 +1 +1 5.6) [mo RMINA' 135.3) Movemed (hazardo e; 111.44	L 0 -1 -1 -1 dified] TION to mov t & .53)	MOI LL 0 -1 -2 -2 DRM's .1)	DIFICA APDS APCR 0 +1 +2 +3 s: 2) Fire]	<u>Smoke</u> +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1
Free Die FIF side ging mo	0-0 10 8 12 nch, ied 1 >V ER char char char char char char char char	10 8 12 US p DR 2 White HI in M o new	9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 7 11 9 7 11 9 7 11 9 11 9 11 9 11 9 11 9 11 1 9 11 1 9 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	8 6 10 (43, 0 r < 6 (130 ETE 1) (44.4 (moti .45)	TO 13-1 8 6 10 capture (+1 d 1) RMIN [T: +1 2) on (135)	8 1 7 5 9 4 ordna rm/# < ATIO +1 + .41) ve	TAI 9-24 7 6 5 4 9 8 40 9 10 9 10 9 10 9 10 9 10 9 10 9 10 9 1	BLE 25 6 4 8 H#J (3: RM's ST: +: DF (14)	145 -30 5 3 7 3.32) : 2 + 1 .ST 4.43)	31. 6 3 8 M A H ++1]. :+1	4 2 6 Nultiple P CH: E CH: .[NT: .(G; +	37- 5 2 7 Hitt DR +3 3).	42 3 1 5 s: (≤ 2 + #8+ +1++ NT: -	43-4 4 1 6 40mm dr (1 : 2; T -1] +3 +5 +2 +2	18 4 2 0 4 n): DR or < 1/2	49-5 3 0 - 5 ≤ ≤ 1 4 TH	54 55 1 2 -1 -1 3 4 4 TO H. 149) (68.1 building J. *M J.' *† J.2 *† K. *† L. AG	5 + 2 0 -2 2 1 1 N 1 IT N 1 J Iun targ 1 Ovin Mo Co djace	umber modifi et: 2 + g vehic ving in ncealee ent hex	(130.5) ied] dr (1 c TAR ie (DF c fantry r fantry i 1 (rain, s	GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes 37 + hexes or < 1/2 TH#) (14 GET HIT DETE or Motion target; not using Assault 1 nopen now 6 + hex range (target 1)	* 0 +1 +1 +1 5.6) [mo RMINA ' 135.3) Movemen (hazardo e; 111.4/2)	L 0 -1 -1 -1 dified] FION t (145 us mov 4 & .53) s away	MOI LL 0 -1 -2 -2 DRM's i) ement [Area 1	DIFICA APDS <u>APCR</u> 0 +1 +2 +3 s: 2) Fire])	<u>Smoke</u> +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1
Free odif Die FIF side ging mo	0-1 10 8 12 nch, ied I >V tER chan cha	10 8 12 US p DR 2 White HIT nge (1 in M o new	9 7 11 0re-7/ + d e Die T DI 144.4 IPh (1 /hex/ (144.	8 6 10 (43, ((130) ETE (130) ETE (130) (144.4 ('moti) , (45)	TO 13-1 8 6 10 apture ([+1 d 1) RMIN [T: +1 2) on (135)	8 1 7 5 9 4 ordna rm/# < ATIO +1 + 	TAI 9-24 7 6 5 4 9 8 ance (2 TH N D 1] . [[1] . [] 17:0 . hicle I	BLE 25 6 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	145 -30 5 3 7 3.32) :: 2 + 1 ST ST	314 6 3 8 M A H H +1].:+1	4 2 6 Nultiple P CH: E CH: .[NT: .(G; +	37- 5 2 7 Hitt DR +3 3).	42 3 1 5 s: (≤ 2 + #8+ +1++ NT: -	43-4 4 1 6 40mr dr (1 4 : 2; T 	18 4 2 0 4 n): DR or < 1/2	49-5 3 0 - 5 ≤ ≤ 1 4 TH	54 55 1 2 -1 -1 3 4 4 TO H 14) (68.1 building J. *M J.' *† J.2 *† K. *† L. AC	5 + 2 0 -2 2 1 1 N 1 IT N 1 J Iun targ 1 dovin Mo Co djace	umber modifi et: 2 + g vehic wing in ncealed int hex ighted	(130.5) ied] dr (1 c TAR le (DF c fantry r fantry i 1 (ran, s 	GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes 37 + hexes or \checkmark '2 TH#) (14 GET HIT DETE or Motion target; to using Assault 1 nopen now 6 + hex rang 	MMO 7 * 0 +1 +1 +1 5.6) [mo RMINA' Moveme (hazardo e; 111.4/ wo hexe	L 0 -1 -1 -1 dified] TION the (145 us mov t& (145 us mov t& (145) s away	MOI LL 0 -1 -2 -2 DRM's 	DIFICA APDS APCR 0 +1 +2 +3 :: 	Smoke +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1
Free Die FIF side ging mo	0-1 10 8 12 nch, ied I >V tER chan	10 8 12 US p DR 2 White HIT nge (I in M o new side.	9 7 11 ore-7/ + d e Die T DI 144.4 (144.4 (144. (144.)/belly	8 6 10 (43, ((130) ETE (130) ETE (130) (130) ETE (130) (130	TO 13-1 8 6 10 apture (+1 d 1) RMIN [T: +1 2) 	8 1 7 5 9 4 ordna rm/# < ATIO +1 + 	TAI 9-24 7 6 5 4 9 8 9 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 1 1 . [5 17:0 . 11 . [5 17:0 . 11 . [5 17:0 . 11 . [5 17:0 . 12 . 12 . 12 . 12 . 12 . 12 . 12 . 12	BLE 25 6 4 8 H#) (3: RM's ST: +. DF (14 	145 -30 5 3 7 3.32) :: 2 +1 ST 	314 6 3 8 M A H H +1].:+1	4 2 6 Iultiple P CH: E CH: .[NT: .(G: +	37- 5 2 7 Hitt DR +3 3).	42 3 1 5 s: (≤ 2 + #8+ +1+ NT: -	43-4 4 1 6 4 4 4 1 6 -1] +3 +5 +2 +2 +2 +2 +3	18 4 2 0 4 n): DR or < 1/2	49-5 3 0 - 5 ≤ ≤ 1 4 TH	54 55 1 2 -1 -1 3 4 4 TO H 4 (68.1 building J. *M J.' *f K. *f L. Ac M. Be N. Ac	5+ -2 IT N) [un targ lovin Mo Co djace ore-s cquir	lumber modifi et: 2 + g vehic wing in ncealec ent hex ighted ed (69.	(130.5) ied] dr (1 c TAR) le (DF c fantry i 1 (rain, s 	GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 25-36 hexes 37 + hexes or < 1/2 TH#) (14 GET HIT DETE or Motion target; not using Assault 1 nopen now 6 + hex range (target 1)	MMO 7 * 0 +1 +1 +1 5.6) [mo RMINA 135.3) Moveme (hazardo e; 111.44 wo hexe: um of -2	L 0 -1 -1 -1 dified] TION & .53) s away	MOI <u>LL</u> 0 -1 -2 -2 -2 DRM's 1	DIFICA APDS APCR 0 +1 +2 +3 :: 	<u>Smoke</u> +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1
Free Die FIF side ging mo	0-1 10 8 12 nch, ied I >V LER char (CA ve to 	10 8 12 US pDR 2 White HIT in M o new arget 	9 7 11 + d = Die T DI 144.4 (144.4 (144	8 6 10 (43, c) (130 ETE (130 ETE (130) (13	TO 13-1 8 6 10 capture [+1 d 1) RMIN (T: +1 2) on (135 con (135) (8 1 7 5 9 i ordna rm/# < ATIO +1 + 	TAI 9-24 7 6 5 4 9 8 100 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 10	BLE 25 6 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	145 -30 5 3 3.32) :: 2 + 1 ST 2 + 1 ST 4.43)	31- 6 3 8 M A H H +1].: +1 +5	4 2 6 Iultiple P CH: E CH: .[NT: .(G: +	37- 5 2 7 Hitt DR +3 3).	42 3 1 5 s: (≤ 2 + #8+ +1++ NT:-	43- 4 4 1 6 40mr dr (1) 2; T -1] +3 +5 +2 +2 +2 +3 +2	18 4 2 0 4 n): DR or < 1/2	49-5 3 0 - 5 ≤ ≤ 1 4 TH	54 55 1 2 -1 -1 3 4 4 TO H. 4// (68.1 building J. *M J.' *f J.' *f L. AC M. BC N. AC O. *U P. *U	5 + 0 -2 1 2 IT N) [un targ lovin Mo Co djace cquir Jsing Jsing	umber modifi et: 2 + g vehic ving in necealed ent hex ighted ed (69). 1 or let 3 or let	(130.5) ied] dr (1 c TAR ie (DF c fantry i fantry i fantry i t (rain, s hex (78. 1) [per f ss MP's ss MP's	GUN & A Range/Type 7-12 hexes 13-24 hexes 13-24 hexes 13-24 hexes 37 + hexes or < 1/2 TH#) (14 GET HIT DETE or Motion target; hopen 	MMO 7 * 0 +1 +1 +1 5.6) [mo RMINA 135.3) Moveme (hazardo e; 111.4/ wo hexe um of -2 LOS	L 0 -1 -1 -1 dified] TION tt (145 us mov & .53) s away]	MOI LL 0 -1 -2 -2 DRM's 1 [Area 1	DIFICA APDS APCR 0 +1 +2 +3 : 	<u>Smoke</u> +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1
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range goes up. Under the GI rules the corresponding numbers are 11% to 4%. (By the way, all of these numbers do include the possibility of a critical hit.) Moving up to 70mm fire we see even better agreement. The important thing to note, however, is that in order to move closer together, the GI numbers have fallen with respect to the COD ones. As the strength of the fire goes up this trend continues. By the time we've moved to the 150mm column, that fire is only from about one-half to twothirds as effective as it was a gamette ago.

From that we draw our first lesson: HE fire from on board artillery has gone down in effectiveness in this case. Moreover, there is a clear trend to be seen in that any given fire will now decrease in effectiveness more rapidly with increasing distance than was the case before. Yet a third conclusion can be reached by looking at the corresponding numbers as a function of target morale. Compared to *COD*, target morale is much less important than it was earlier. This latter effect is due to the fact that the IFT roll is no longer modified in favor of the defender, resulting in the increased probability of a KIA, a morale-independent result.

One of the other things that quickly caught my eye was that Movement *Case J* had now been broken into two categories: one for vehicles and one for infantry. On general principles, this was a change of which I heartily approved. Movement attracts the eye—thereby, I feel, increasing the likelihood that someone hostile to your side will notice you and decide to try and do something about you. Vehicles, by virtue of their greater speed, should be harder to hit when moving while infantry, by virtue of the fact of drawing attention to themselves, should be easier to hit. Thus, in a fairly painless way, we have a fact of life built into the system.

For infantry, the resulting situation is now the opposite of the one just considered. They will be easier to hit when moving in the open, but harder, once hit, to hurt. This comes about from the fact that, having been used in the TO HIT process, the moving TEMs are no longer used when the dice roll is made upon the IFT.

The results are shown in *Table 7*, which is laid out in the same way as was *Table 6*. As far as the *COD* results are concerned the only DRM is that for the old *Case J*, and the infantry suffers from a -2TEM when rolling on the IFT. The *GI* set of results incorporates a -2 DRM on the TO HIT TABLE by virtue of the new *Case J* for infantry while the IFT DRM is gone. (Note that, in the First Edition *GI* rules, the last example following 134.11 is in error; the movement and woods DRMs cancel.) This, then, is the typical Defensive Fire Phase attack against an infantry unit moving in the open as seen by the two sets of rules.

In this situation the 40mm results are not significantly different, just as was true for the previous case. This time however, we see that the new rules lead to an increased threat to life and limb as the weight of fire goes up. Another reversal is to be found when we observe that the new way of doing things shows more variety with morale than did the old way. These changes seem reasonable.

Comparing the last two tables also shows some interesting things. If you look at the last two HE sizes, you'll see that, under the *COD* rules, there was about as much risk to be found sitting in a wooden building as when one was moving around in broad daylight. In the 1-to-6 hex range the new rules generally show the hazard to be about twice as great. As the range opens up the ratio rises to around four. The first of these facts doesn't bother me, but I'm not especially comfortable with the second one. My gut feel is that there should be more attenuation of effect as the range opens up.

The other combinations of infantry position and activity can be worked out fairly easily. For instance, the TO HIT numbers for infantry in woods



 Table 6. The probability that a unit of the morale shown will, when in a wooden building, be destroyed or broken by the on board HE fire indicated.

0000000000



1-0	92/ 30	941 33	74/42	921 33
7-12	83/28	83/47	72/17	72/42
13-18	72/17	72/42	58/8	58/33
19-24	72/17	58/33	58/8	42/25
25-30	58/8	42/25	17/2	28/17
31-36	58/8	42/25	17/2	17/11
37-39	58/8	28/17	17/2	8/6
40-42	42/3	28/17	3/1	8/6

Table 8. A comparison of normal TO HIT probabilities with Hull Down TO HIT probabilities.

are about the same in both sets of rules, but, in *GI*, there is no beneficial terrain modifier. The net result will then be to increase the HE hazard for troops in woods.

Looking at the results obtained, I'd have to say that the new way of doing thing is smoother to use. The fact that it yields somewhat more satisfying results is more than enough justification for the change.

Vehicle Target, Before and After

This topic can be handled by just considering the two TO HIT TABLES, which makes the comparison a lot easier. For the most part, over normal engagement ranges, the new Vehicle TO HIT numbers are the same as the old values. For example, since being in the woods now yields a + 1 DRM, which has the same effect as that produced by a drop of one in the TO HIT numbers. Comparing the old "Vehicle in Woods/Bldg" entry with the new "Vehicle" one shows that we end up, then, with the same net TO HIT number.

In fact, the only substantial difference I've found has to do with Hull Down vehicles. However, this change is a major one. It is now necessary to roll the appropriate "Vehicle" TO HIT number and have the colored die come up greater than or equal to the white one. For any given TO HIT number this condition will be met more than half the time.

Long range armor duels are much more common than are long range attacks on infantry. Looking for elevated firing positions is just about automatic for everyone who's learned to use German armor intelligently. For that reason, the results in *Table 8* came as something of a shock. Because of their importance I've given, in *Table 8*, the results for both sets of numbers out to a range of 42 hexes.

Since the DRMs which can effect such duels are the same under both sets of rules, the table gives a

very complete picture of the situation. In each of the four results columns there are two numbers separated by a "/". The first of these is the probability of a hit using just the "Vehicle is in Other" (for *COD*) and the "Vehicle" (in *GI*) lines on their respective TO HIT Tables. The second value is the probability of a hit against a Hull Down vehicle at that range. To illustrate, in the 19–24 hex range, the Black "Vehicle is in Other" TO HIT number is an "8". As shown, rolling an eight or less with two dice happens 72% of the time. The "Vehicle is hull down" number is "4", which will come up just 17% of the time. Under the *GI* rules the corresponding numbers are 58% and 33%.

First of all, let's look at, for the Black TO HIT numbers, the numbers to the left of the slash. Out to 18 hexes the numbers are the same. Beyond that, the basic chance-to-hit falls off more rapidly under the new rules than it did under the old. To the right of the slash, where we find the Hull Down hit probabilities, the same trend is there, but the *GI* rules show a much more slowly decaying hit probability. As a result, the virtues of being hull down have been much reduced. As is to be expected, the same trends are to be seen for the red TO HIT numbers.

The scenario that immediately came to my mind demonstrates this change very clearly. In "Paw of the Tiger," the Germans can open up at 24 hexes against the oncoming Russians. Even if the target is not in a bore-sighted hex, the hit probability is 72%. Under the COD rules, any Russian unit stopping to slug things out at long range had but an 8% chance of scoring a hit. Thus, from the ratio of those two numbers, the German player had a nine-to-one TO HIT advantage. As things now stand the same two probabilities are 58% and 25%, for a ratio just about four times worse. In the 7-12 hex range, the German player used to enjoy an edge that was still almost five-to-one. Now, that advantage has fallen to just about half that. All in all, a major change. Is it in the right direction? Well, that'll be one of the things I'm sure will be debated on the road to the revised rule book.

CLOSURE

And there you have some of what I've learned about how the SL system stands with the addition of GI. I hope some of these figures and opinions will help you to play this game with more insight and more success. If, after you've had a chance to think things over, you have any comments concerning similar material to be included in the revised rule book, drop me a line at 1322 Highland Drive, Rolla, Missouri 65401.

CIRCUS MAXIMUS 2nd Edition

The rules of CIRCUS MAXIMUS, adjudged by the readership of The GENERAL one of Avalon Hill's best games (see the RBG of next issue), have recently undergone a beneficial facelift. A number of rule changes-some merely cosmetic, others quite important-make this classic game of chariot racing even more exciting and complete than before. Henceforth, the second edition rules will be included with current press runs of CIRCUS MAXIMUS and will be considered the official rules for all tournament play. For owners of the game who desire the latest edition, copies are available for \$3.00 plus normal shipping and handling costs. Maryland residents please add 5% state sales tax to their remittance.

CONVENTION CALENDAR

JULY 2-3-4

TEXCON 1983, Austin, Texas Contact: Martha Ladyman, 8028 Gessner #1805, Austin, Texas 78753.

JULY 14-15-16-17 ORIGINS '83, Detroit, Michigan Contact: Metro Detroit Gamers, 083 Info, P.O. Box 787, Troy, MI 48099.

JULY 29-30-31

NANCON 88-VI, Houston, Texas Contact: Frank Joines, Convention Coordinator, 118 Briargrove Center, Houston, TX 77057. (713) 783-4055.

NOTE: Many tournaments including SQUAD LEADER, RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, CIRCUS MAXIMUS and STORM OVER ARNHEM.

JULY 29-30-31

PEERICON III, San Diego, California Contact: Larry Peery, The Institute for Diplomatic Studies, P.O. Box 8416, San Diego, CA 92102. (714) 238-0893. NOTE: An exclusively DIPLOMACY event.

AUGUST 5-6-7

OMACON 3, Omaha, Nebraska Contact: Greg Dorn, 2007 Betz Road 6C, Bellevue, NE 68005.

NOTE: Emphasis is placed on Science Fiction, both print and games.

SO THAT'S WHAT YOU'VE BEEN PLAYING

Fitles	Listed 158		Tota	Respon	1ses: 823
Rank	: Title	Pub	Rank Last Time	Times On List	Freq. Ratio
1.	Squad Leader	AH	2	14	5.4
2.	G.I.	AH	1	4	4.7
3.	Third Reich	AH	4	14	3.9
4.	TRC	AH	3	14	3.1
5.	Civilization	AH	8	4	3.0
6.	War & Peace	AH	10	- 14	2.6
7.	D&D	TSR	13	2	2.4
8.	COI	AH	7	14	2.2
9.	COD	AH	6	14	1.8
10.	Gunslinger	AH	-	1	1.7
11.	Guns of August	AH	19	2	1.7
12.	Fortress Europa	AH	14	4	1.6
13.	Bulge '81	AH	5	9	1.5
14.	SON	AH	-	1	1.4
15.	Panzerblitz	AH	9	5	1.3
16.	Panzer Leader	AH	17	9	1.3
17.	Diplomacy	AH	20	2	1.2
18.	Midway	AH	-	1	1.1
19.	Afrika Korps	AH	-	1	1.0
20.	WSIM	AH	12	14	1.0

If there was ever any doubt in this editor's mind that The GENERAL has an impact on what is being played by he readers, this issue's column laid it to rest. CIVILIZA TION continues, following the recent issue (Vol. 19, No devoted to the fine game, to make a strong showing on our poll; our featured game in Vol. 19, No. 5-STRUGGLE OF NATIONS-jumps onto this elite list of titles. And Rod Walker's fine series on a personal favorite of mine seems to have brought DIPLOMACY into a welldeserved limelight. Certainly this issue's featured game will long remain on the list of our readership' preferences. These ratings, taken together with the percentages of the repsonses in re-rating the RBG (see the AH Philosophy of this issue), indicate that a few strong ellers dominate the collective interest of our readers Certainly, these are the "new classics". Ironically, the ti tle featured in the last issue-VITP-disappears from the ist after a long showing. Joining it are FLAT TOP and TORM OVER ARNHEM, while two old favorites return AFRIKA KORPS and MIDWAY

SECOND EDITION BATTLE OF THE BULGE '81

Taking advantage of a reprinting of this popular game, a number of changes were incorporated into the rulebook. As described in Vol. 19, No. 2 of The *GENERAL*, several significant changes to the Basic and Advanced games as well as additional Optional Rules are to be found here. The Second Edition of *BATTLE OF THE BULE* '81 can be ordered from The Avalon Hill Game Company, 4517 Harford Road, Baltimore, MD 21214, for \$4.00 and the usual 10% shipping and handling fee (20% Canadian, 30% Overseas). Maryland residents please add 5% state sales tax.

CONTEST 113

Once again valiant squad leaders are thrown into the breach! It is the last player turn of a DYO scenario, the beginning of the American player turn. The German player has done his worst, obtaining a KIA on one of your few remaining squads. Only Board 3 is in play; only the counters shown remain. Normal environment and weather conditions prevail. The players have agreed to use all rules through those of *GI* with the exception of Command Control, Equipment Possession and Battlefield Integrity. To win, the American player -you—must solely occupy two of the following three buildings: 3T1, 3T3 and 3S5. All dice rolls will equal "9" (nine); and all single die rolls, "1" (one).

Your task is to guarantee an American win. List each American action during this crucial last turn in the appropriate phase. Be sure to specify the routes used by any moving unit. In anticipation of a large number of contest entries, the correct solutions will be further winnowed by selection of those which use the *fewest* US infantry MFs.

The answer to this contest must be entered on the official entry form (or a facsimile) found in the insert of this issue. Ten winning entries will receive AH merchandise credits. To be valid, an entry must be received prior to the mailing of the next issue of The *GENERAL* and include a numerical rating for this issue as a whole, as well as listing the three best articles. The solution to Contest #113 will appear in Vol. 20, No. 2 and a listing of the winners in Vol. 20, No. 3 of The *GENERAL*.





Mark Nixon, author of the delightfully true "They Shall Be Playtesters", headed one of the most prolific G.I. playtest groups. His play balance reports were every bit as detailed and insightful as this article. Which, of course, is why we asked him to write it.

Any praise which may be generated by what follows is due in large part to the efforts of a veritable cadre of G.I. heroes: Tim Fuchs, Russ Hall, Ken Stein, and Pat Nicely. Only through their industry was I able to accumulate a substantial number of high quality playings of the fifteen scenarios-both initially for the playtest and subsequently with revised rules. However, any outrage with the ensuing account need look no further than this writer, who alone has construed the fine work of this crew to suit his own ends in preparing this article, so published without opportunity for their comment. I have glossed over and excluded many worthwhile ideas, strategies, positions and concepts for the sake of presenting in a reasonable amount of words what are to me, at this point in time, the most obvious and basic considerations for each of the fifteen scenarios.

In all honesty, I confess it may be presumptuous to subject the reader to the following treatment of detailed analysis without defining and illustrating my personal philosophy of "How to Play SQUAD LEADER". However, fortune smiles and the

gentle readers will not be subjected to anything so potentially oppressive. Rather, the scenario analyses will hopefully be as interesting and fun to read, perhaps study and even criticize as they were to produce. As a matter of fact, the very concept of detailed analysis for a game offering the scope of the SL family may seem a contradiction in and of itself. The instant I specify that 6M6 is the ideal location to hide an ATG is the instant someone (usually my opponent) will maul the position with HE, avoid it altogether or contrive some other means to nullify the pronouncement. That he may go out of his way to "do me in" may be small consolation for losing the opportunity to fire myself, even though it may have already served a better purpose by distracting. The plethora of strategies which may revolve around such a circuitous set of reasoning ensures that the SL system shall long retain its appeal for those willing to invest the time and effort intelligent play demands.

Nevertheless, analysis is forthcoming. Through the lengthy process of printed word, continued play, rebuttals, improvements and even mere time itself our calibre of play shall improve such that we may approach that level which sees us declare ourselves "experts", only to be dashed on the shores of frustration by some whippersnapper novice who has not read all the analyses and has not put in his ten years plus of wargaming experience, but who does bring into the gaming world a fresh outlook with new ideas and strategies and employs them well. This then, is the first step.



Scenario 33 A Belated Christmas Rating: 50%-50%

Attraction: A real free-for-all. Some abstraction in the US set-up works very well while German mobility provides the cutting edge for a mad dash to the gliders which deposit their cargo of troubles for friend and foe alike as they land with unbridled abandon.

American Advantages: Defense. Firepower.

If you could win by sitting snugly in the nine entrenchments and mauling the German assault, there would be no contest here at all. Instead, you must force your troops out of their nests and entice them forward to occupy portions of Board 4 in order to keep the enemy at bay and claim enough gliders for a win. However, once established in these forward areas, your combination of superior firepower versus an advancing foe ensures victory in the vast majority of playings. The catch is, naturally, to make such a successful advance before German countermeasures and defensive fire nail you with only a partially developed defense. Only if you bring the approximate area east of and including 4G3-4O3-4T4-4AA4 within your grasp can you be reasonably certain of controlling enough gliders and of placing the crucial enemy approach areas within the four-hex range of the majority of your firepower. Certainly, the scattering of the gliders may necessitate adjustments to this perimeter, but the general idea should be clear and adequate to provide a viable objective for establishing a sound defensive posture.

American Disadvantages: Dispersed. Must Advance. Lack of Mobility. Must Control Gliders.

Since the gliders land at random, your force must be spread either singly or in small groups along the length of the west edge of Board 5, permitting you to advance across a broad front and subsequently move to rapidly control as many gliders as possible, and at least shield with firepower those you cannot immediately possess. I advise against stacking exclusively in one area and embracing the hope that a disproportionate share of the gliders land nearby-the "Hall" Gambit. Odds that the required number of gliders will land within reach and that German units blitzing across undefended sections of the board will not roll right over you are not great, and certainly not worth investing time and energy which could be better spent on serious play.

That you must advance in order to realize the full potential of your advantages has already been emphasized. It is the one obstacle most likely to prove insurmountable. Though there is no question of your ability to advance, to do so quickly and on a wide front without suffering excessive casualties is your objective. Your degree of success in meeting these three facets of your advance—speed, scope and integrity—will indicate your chances of winning this scenario.

Unfortunately, once in these forward positions, you suffer a lack of mobility-in part due to the relative freedom of movement enjoyed by your opponent, but mostly due to your geographic situation as created by the terrain of your front line. The east edge of Board 4 is not conducive to north-south movement, meaning once a flank goes it is most likely gone for good. This dilemma can be greatly alleviated by the cautious American who maintains reserve forces in strategic locations. Of course, the problem with any reserve lies in their very being; it is difficult to leave powerful forces out of the main engagement for even a few turns. The solution is to position your reserves such that they immediately provide some useful service (semi-active reserves). Units in 511 with an entrenchment and in 5BB2 can easily reach your extreme flanks or move to bolster the central defenses on one turn notice. The 511 position protects the line to 4Y8 and, if you include a MMG, also provides some surprising shots around building 4Y9. (Why, such can even slide between the wall and woods in 4Z0 to hit 4DD6. Face it; if you're going to defend seriously, you will have to scope out "cheapos" such as the one to 4DD6; you may catch a stack of squads at -2 for your effort.) Hex 5BB2 is a great spot for reserves, but offers no support fire opportunities until you return to this scenario and play with the Crest (151.5) rules. Peering out from the gully will still not present many targets to infantry with only a four-hex range, but you do cover 4F4 and 4E5 as well as the immediate approaches to your northern outpost at 5EE1. Until you utilize the Crest rule, a reserve in this gully may seem overly susceptible to fire from Board 2 heights, but you will find ways to eliminate that menace in the next section. Finally, both 511 and 5BB2 provide another crucial advantage to units positioned there—a safe rout path.

American Set-Up:

As outlined above, your initial placement should cover the entire length of the front from north edge to south edge. By this, I do not mean that you should string units from A to GG; rather, you should set up such that your units can bring the whole area under heavy fire after the first turn. The risk here should be obvious: units which break during the first turn and do not reach their intended objectives may not be able to provide defensive fire against the German first turn advance. In this event, your only recourse is to adapt the movement of those units which do reach cover to compensate for those which don't. The Advance Phase is the ideal time for this realignment.

Nine entrenchments provide the means to secure your flanks, to safely cross otherwise open terrain and to establish a one-hex fire base which threatens to sweep the Board 2 heights of enemy troops. This one hex is 5S4, the most important single hex on the playing area. In this hex you should place entrenchment, a 9-2 leader, both HMGs and two squads. Even should one of these squads break, nothing is lost by firing both heavies with one squad at the ranges involved here. From this hex, one can hit the most important Level 2 and Level 3 positions on Hill 621 with a 16 (-1) or 16 (even) attack versus any entrenched enemy, lower die doubled in both cases.

Opposing this, the German 9-2 leader directing the HMG fires at 5S4 with a 2 (+1) attack with the lower die doubled. The AA gun can manage only a 4 (+3) attack. Since you will prep fire first, these enemy weapons may not even be placed on Hill 621. Maybe they'll set-up on Hill 538, which won't change their fire, but you will still enjoy an 8 (+1)or 8 (even) attack and have effectively chased them away from their best locations. Of course, the 20L can opt for two shots at you from an 18-hex range, gambling for two 1 (even) attacks. But again, he knows he will have to weather your prep fire first.

I obviously believe this US commitment of troops, leadership and firepower is worth keeping the enemy off Hill 621. But considering the German countermeasures, a strong case can be made for hedging the bet and placing only one HMG and/or a -1 leader in this position. Without detailing the mechanics again, we can surmise that one HMG, the 9-1 and only one or two squads probably will not keep the Germans off Hill 621, but will still give them ample cause for concern and has the added advantage of freeing your 9-2 and one HMG for front line duty.

Put entrenchments in 5EE1 and 5C1 to cover the extreme flanks. Hexes 511, 5U4 and 5Y1 are good entrenchment locations if only because they make interior movement easier for your forces. Hex 511 has already been recommended for other reasons, while 5Y1 also gives you a nice shot to 4I5 and 4H5, although regrettably beyond the four-hex range. Establishing these links to the 4H1 and 4AA1 woods masses and between 5T4 and 5V3 is the most you can do to ensure the maximum ability of your troops to adjust to the ebb and flow of battle.

German Advantages: Height. Second Placement. Mobility.

Hills 621 and 538 offer such commanding positions it is difficult to avoid placing substantial forces there, namely the 9-2 leader, HMG, AA gun and maybe a few LMGs as well. But if the US player utilizes the HMG formation I went to great lengths to describe above, you must realize the risks you are taking by exposing these important units to the initial US prep fire. Your main advantage is that you get to see the US set-up before placing your own units on the board.

If the enemy HMGs are split and within normal range of your own HMG, you do not give away too much by placing this weapon on the heights. Adding an entrenchment with a few LMGs on the hill will fill out the position. The AA gun can be at ground level near your front line allowing it to fire at gliders during the first three turns without risking enemy return fire. Subsequently it can be pushed into a new hex offering fire opportunities at enemy squads. Hex 2V1 is an ideal location, with a move to 4V10 on Turn 3.

If the 5S4 position is fully manned, you should not expose anyone to its initial prep fire. Take comfort in the knowledge that the GIs will struggle for many turns to relocate their HMGs while you can transport your own heavy to 406 on Turn 1, courtesy of a friendly halftrack. In effect, you have been denied your height advantage and the American first turn advance will be much more successful than you would like. But his substantial forces in 5S4 are now out of the fight for several turns, an advantage you must exploit before they are brought back into play. Your other option, which I endorse, is to locate the HMG in 2M5 and the AA gun in 214. Their fields of fire are partially blocked by woods in their immediate vicinity, but they still have plenty of shots (although at extremely long range) and are not exposed to fire from the deadly 5S4.

The German is assured of the advantage of mobility. This is embodied not only in the two halftracks, but also in the relative ease of your troops advancing across the west half of Board 4 as compared to the more difficult advance of the US forces. Once in the forward positions, you enjoy an interior mobility far superior to your American counterpart, due to the Board 2 north-south road. This superiority will be even more pronounced if you have managed to maintain any machine guns on the heights in good order.

As with the US force, the existence of a few reserves may allow you to take advantage of an opportunity which might otherwise have disappeared ahead of your reaction time were all your troops on the firing line. Also, because of your maneuverability, this reserve can be centrally located such that the entire force may be hurled at whatever point you desire. Because it can be formed from those units which break during the initial advance and subsequently rally, it is not even necessary to leave any units behind for this reserve.

German Disadvantages: Receive First Fire. Outgunned at Close Range.

Receiving the first fire is basically whatever you make it. The German player can set up out of enemy LOS, thereby suffering no casualties but consequently enjoying very few, or even no, defensive fire opportunities during the US first turn movement. But since this would forfeit your best chance to hit the enemy as they move onto Board 4 when they are most vulnerable, such a placement can hardly be considered admirable. You must carefully balance the US set-up and prep fire opportunities with your own requirements of selfpreservation, a first turn advance and the need to cover enemy lines of advance. Fortunately, it is a transitory disadvantage. It can only affect the balance of the scenario if you ignore the warning signs and permit US prep fire to blow you away, or if you play it too conservatively and allow an unopposed US advance on Turn 1.

Your only long term disadvantage is evident if you close within a four-hex range of the GIs. At such close quarters, you are outgunned squad for squad. So, do your level best to remain at a five- or six-hex range where your 5-4-8s and 4-4-7s are equal in firepower (squad for squad) to the 7-4-7s and your 4-6-7s are superior.

German Set-Up:

The dilemma of your second and third level positions has already been presented. Since the majority of your force is going to advance on the first turn, you must position them to do so behind blocking terrain features dominating the middle of Board 4, which also conveniently happen to be your territorial objectives. At the same time you must be in position to deny those objectives to a US Turn 1 assault and to attempt to keep the GIs out of their own front line objectives.

Take a look at the following entrenchment hexes: 2C1, 2E1, 2M5, 2Q1, 2Q2, 2W1 and 2DD1. The LMGs in 2C1 and 2E1 cover the line all the way to the crucial 4P2-R2 area as well as the northern board edge. The HMG in 2M5 enjoys an array of targets hampered only by the 2M4 woods, which graciously shields your force from 5S4. Hex 2I4 is another good spot for the AA gun offering many fire opportunities on the southern half of Board 4. Hexes 201, 202 and 2W1 do a reasonable job in the center of the mapboard, while 4DD1 is most certainly your only decent position in the south, presuming the US presence in 5S4 has convinced you not to scale the heights of Hill 538.

Except for Hex 2M5, these entrenchments should be manned by LMG-wielding 4-6-7s, taking advantage of the 12-hex long-range fire of the latter. I'd use a 5-4-8 in 2M5 to man the HMG. The extra morale factor may come in handy, precluding the need for two squads with a morale of "7" here. Naturally, the 9-2 leader directs the HMG, while an 8-0 leader on each flank completes your firebase. This leaves a 9-1, two 8-1s, two halftracks, five 5-4-8s, eight 4-4-7s and two LMGs for your assault on the 415 woods, building 406 and the southern hedge line. Do not make the mistake of stacking your 5-4-8s together for the sake of mere uniformity. You need them spread throughout the advance to provide smoke, and you don't know where it may be desired until the critical moment of need. And, a 5-4-8 may pass a morale check where a whole stack of 4-4-7s may have failed, thereby averting a disaster. In short, spread them around.

The southern hedge line is easy to reach. Units beginning in 2EE1 will not even be exposed to fire unless the GIs have successfully skipped through all your defensive fire and occupied the hedge themslves. This is unlikely. You will have to use the halftracks to transport units into the 415 woods mass. Drop off the infantry and move the AFVs into the central board area to provide fire on enemy positions which are inadequately covered. Or, locate them to modify enemy fire at your units moving from 4K9 to 4I6, or from 4N9 to 4O7. Needless to say, avoid the bazookas like the plague.

It should take two turns for you to occupy 406. Units destined for this area should have begun in 2M1 and 2O1. They may require help from the halftracks and willl certainly bear the brunt of enemy fire.

Conclusion:

With all this in the way of preparation, there is little to say about the balance of the scenario. Once both forces manage to reach their front line positions in the middle of Board 4, possessing and destroying the gliders will consume the remainder of the game energies. Only if one of the combatants does not reach his initial objectives in force or part of his line crumples or the gliders land with unusual favor for one side or the other will the scenario end before the eighth turn.





Scenario 34 Climax at Nijmegen Bridge Rating: 40%-60% Pro-German

Attraction: Call this one a bloodbath in the true sense of the word. This will become most evident should the Allies begin to despair of meeting the criteria of Special Rule 34.5, and proceed as madmen in their attempts to bring on the Guards Armor

German Advantages: HE Firepower. Defending Stone Buildings. Foul Play North of the River.

The new HE rules make occupation of even a stone building a hazardous pastime. Your four heavy guns will scare away the bravest Allied squad leaders, even if the sly devil is using both the McNamara and the Mishcon pieces. That you may realize seven shots per player turn with this equipment speaks volumes about your potential to annihilate enemy units.

In contrast, the advantages you enjoy on defense in stone buildings against a foe with no large weapons need hardly be itemized here. However, even against stone buildings, the Allied Turn 1 fire can hit you with the following attacks: 24 (+1), 24 (+2), 24 (+2) again, 20 (+2), 12 (+3), nine mortar shots, three PIATs and three bazookas. The forces can be rearranged to produce a 36 (+2) shot or greater number of 12 (+3) and 16 (+2) attacks, but one thing should be obvious. You need those stone buildings.

In the north, your forces will be able to make things exceedingly hairy for the US reinforcements. After your first turn (Turn 2), you shoud have units at 4B3, 4B6 and 8FF9. Don't move into 4A4 and 4A7, for the reinforcements will plop right onto you from off-board in the Advance Phase (out of "Nowhere", so to speak). You will probably have a few turns to try out your shovels before picking up your weapons to fire at the intruders. The first opportunity will certainly be the German Prep Fire Phase, as the US will not enter until his own Advance Phase. If you simply can't send the 4-3-6s to 4B3 and 4B6 (maybe you have a cousin in the Korps), send some 4-4-7s to 4D3. Starting from 8CC10, they can bypass and doubletime with a leader assist and Advance Phase in one turn and then roll to entrench on Turn 3.

German Disadvantages: Receive First Fire. Brittleness. Leaders.

Disadvantages? That's hard to believe! However, Turn 1 features an awesome Allied prep fire which more or less forces the SS to back off their front line positions, leaving them with little depth to contain the Allied assault on the bridge. But the alternative of setting up in the front line as a target for the initial Allied potential knockout punch is even less appealing.

Ordinarily, three leaders would be adequate for the needs of ten squads. In the city, where movement from building to building is exceedingly hazardous, you may well find your leaders spread too thin. They cannot be everywhere at once along your lengthy perimeter and invariably will never be where you need them to rally broken units or, in the case of the 9-1s, to lead a crucial counterattack. Brittleness and leadership are also twin problems in the north. You have not the resources to hold off a five or six squad attack, but by defending the west board edge as outlined above, you may deny the reinforcements at least one turn of movementperhaps enough to keep them out of the fight for the bridge itself. If only three or four squads enter, your force may be able to blow them away immediately and, in any case, should be able to deal with whoever breaks through.

German Set-Up:

There is no good reason to avoid placing the HMG on Level 3 of the Valkhof. Remembering your leader shortage ought to make you think twice about committing a 9-1 leader with it. One leader on Level 3 leaves only two leaders to manage the bulk of your forces. You will have either one or two squads with the heavy, depending on your personal preference; thus, you must ask yourself whether an 8-0 and a 9-1 are adequate to handle the other eight or nine squads and roughly 90% of your line. The answer is a definite "No"-but I'd put a 9-1 leader on the third level anyway. That -1 modifier simply demands to be coupled with the HMG. Granted, after the first turn or two you may well have to pull the leader out for service elsewhere; but you should at least allow yourself the opportunity to try this combination. In fact, the tremendous amount of Allied firepower the position attracts may justify this commitment by virtue of the quantity of enemy forces engaged. Obviously, this logic will wither in the face of US-made hot lead should the enemy roll an untimely KIA-but in this scenario you run that risk all over the board with the powerful stacks the Allies can muster.

Forget about manning the northeast corner of Board 1 and the east edge of Board 8. Forget about buildings 1V2, 1T4 and 1S4. Look at building 1W1 and the magnificent fire lanes down the roads hemming in building 1X3, but forget it for purposes of your initial placement. Maybe later, when it is evident the Allies cannot hit 1W1 with a 24 (even) or a 36 (+1) attack, you might think about moving in. But if you set up there, I guarantee you'll get mauled

Building 1X3 is the Allied jump-off point. Key on it, but cover the flanks as well-1S9 area and the road to 1GG6. You should defend the buildings at 1Q6, 1Q3, 1S1, 8M2 and 8J2. If you begin with two squads in each of these buildings, you have a reasonable opening position. I like to place the 8-0 in 8K3, second level, out of harm's way but handy to rally broken squads manning the second levels of 8K2 and 8J2. Only LMGs and possibly one PSK go on Board 8.

This leaves you six squads, two 9-1s, the HMG, two MMGs, two LMGs and one PSK to defend the crescent from 1S1 through 1Q4 to 1Q6. Hex 1S1 is a crucial hex for the Germans because the Allies can't prep fire at this position, but you can hit every open ground hex from 1T1 to 1Z2. Two squads with a MMG and a LMG will cast an ominous shadow on any premature northern thrust from building 1X3. The balance should be in buildings at 1Q3 and 1Q6 making certain to avoid stacking more than one squad in any hex susceptible to Allied initial fire. A MMG in 1P5 and the HMG should prevent the Allies from crossing the street to building 1P7.

The PzJag, StuG and AT gun have many options. Wherever you put them, just be sure they can hit the majority of the second level hexes of building 1X3. Hex 1X3 itself is the only one you may not be able to strike, but your HMG draws a bead on it. Check out the Pzjag in 1J9. It enjoys a +3 TEM to incoming fire, is beyond most inherent Allied squad range (barring enemy units in the region of 1S9), and threatens the second level of hexes 1X2, 1W4, 1W5, 1X5, 1Y7 and 1Y8. The StuG in 8I3 zeroes in on the second level of 1W4, 1X2, 1AA4, 1AA7, Most of the set-up north of the river has already been mentioned. One squad in 8R9 with the PFs will be concealed at the end of Turn 2. Locating a 20L in 8P9 or 3Q10 may provide that extra little bit of antitank security to your northern bridge defense which so often seems to be what it takes to convince the enemy not to run the gauntlet. You may want to send a 4-4-7 with one LMG to the second level of 3M2. Units in this location realize a familiar influence upon advancing enemy forces well demonstrated in numerous other scenarios.

Allied Advantages: Numbers. Smoke. 51mm Mortars. Armor.

Be thankful there is strength in numbers, because you will lose a good many squads trying to get the tanks into play. They are the key to victory. Hope that a few FFEs will land on target before you lose contact or break the radio; and that you'll get to shoot the 51mm mortars; and that you'll not deplete your smoke capability before the tanks are in. Roughly speaking, for each of these three capabilities you lose in the first three turns, your chances of winning decrease by 10%. Deduct another 10% for every game turn after Turn 5 that the tanks have not arrived.

The 51mm Mortars are wonderful weapons. Don't forget that they can lay smoke, as can the British and the offboard artillery. Of course, without smoke you would be in serious trouble from the outset, as it is the device which makes street crossing a tenable procedure.

When your tanks arrive, put them to work herding the SS where you want them. The smart German player will flee your acquired hexes just as you have been avoiding his. The PzJag and StuG cannot stand up to the Guards Armoured, but watch out for the ATG and the 88L. It is unlikely you will want to cross the bridge unless the 88L is silenced or at least shrouded in smoke. Since you cannot depend on the northern reinforcements until it may be too late, you must enter your tanks with some form of action against the 88L already in mind, so that you will be ready at a moment's notice to hurl a few AFVs across the river before German countermeasures are made effective.

I have not bothered to list the initial prep fire opportunities as an advantage because it can be so devastating that the majority of German players will probably set up behind the front line as detailed above—nullifying your prep fire with no overwhelming detriment to their own position. With enemy forces beyond a four-hex range from building 1X3, you can no longer stack units three floors deep to obtain those murderous combination attacks in which you break a unit with a 24 (+1) attack and keep shooting at it with incredibly large fire attacks until it vaporizes. Your best prep fire will be from 1R7, 1S7 and 1T6, but this set-up leaves your forces in wooden buildings and a mediocre position.

Allied Disadvantages: Street Crossing. Initial lack of HE. Rule 34.5.

The horrors of crossing the street are familiar to all who have come this far in the *SL* series. Many factors play a roll in your decision to cross a city street and in the actual act of doing so. Available enemy defensive fire and smoke are perhaps the two most crucial elements of the actual procedure in this scenario. You will rarely enjoy an opportunity to cross a street unopposed in the early going, so you need to place smoke and utilize assault movement.

Though your forces possess a tremedous amount of firepower, you will experience a great deal of trouble bringing it all into action in the form of 16 FP or higher attacks (what I call "large attacks"). Even these attacks will be diminished by applicable TEMs, whereas the HE attacks brought to bear on you will not be modified on the IFT. Barring some good fortune or a bazooka-daring German, there is no remedy for this, but the arrival of your tank support will at least equalize the situation.

This finally brings us to the most important issue of the game, other than the final victory conditions: How do you get the tanks onboard? Forget about seeing them on Turn 1 or Turn 2 and concentrate on meeting the criteria on Turn 4. This means there are only four or fewer SS squads in good order south of the river at the end of either player turn, probably your own. The tanks will then enter on Turn 5 during your Movement Phase. If you're lucky you may meet the criteria on the third game turn; if unlucky, on the fifth. Rule 34.5 is listed as a disadvantage simply because of what you must do to knock so many SS squads out of action. Even with all your firepower, it is unlikely you can break more than three squads with your initial prep fire. As you begin to advance and suffer casualties of your own, this situation will worsen; broken enemy squads will rally and you will have gained nothing to advance the timetable of the British entry. Therefore, you must begin by actually planning to eliminate enemy squads, and double-breaking them when you can't obtain an outright KIA. A half squad is as good as a dead squad. Although you can't do much about two half squads combining into a full squad, you will at least see one squad gone for your efforts. If you kill one enemy squad every turn for the first three game turns, you then have only three SS squads to kill, break or demote to half squads on either player turn of Turn 4 to bring on the Guards. A dead SS squad is money in the bank.

Obviously, the stacks you create to attain such killing attacks will themselves be targets of the best the German has to offer. Herein lies your disadvantage. You will be shooting at only one enemy squad per attack, while he returns fire at three of your squads per attack. His small arms fire will not be as great as yours since he is shooting with only one- or two-squad fire groups, but his ordnance fire can be deadly to you.

Allied Set-Up:

As stated, your initial objective is not necessarily to advance but to inflict casualties. Units in hexes 1X2 and 1Y3 may be able to blow away anyone in 8K2 or 8J2, while those in 8R7 and 8S7 and 8T6 can nail the Valkhof. If you are presented a target containing more than one squad, throw everything you have at it. Two dead SS on the first turn may be all you'll need to satisfy 34.5 by the third turn and be ahead of schedule.

Stay out of sight of the big guns as much as possible, especially that 88L. You should also try to avoid wooden buildings, but in the case of 1S7 and 1T6, I'm afraid it is unavoidable. When you return to this scenario after learning the hidden ordnance rule, that 75mm ATG may give you a nasty surprise; wooden buildings are the most susceptible to such.

Your American 8-1 leader and his radio belong well in the rear, perhaps in 1Y8, second level. You may also debate leaving one squad with a bazooka or PIAT in this area to prevent the StuG from running in to block 1Y10 on the turn your tanks are due.

Conclusion:

The onus of attack rests heavily on the Allies. Whenever necessary the German can pull back during his own movement phase to avoid enemy fire, advance back into position and gain an extra Rally Phase to return a few squads to good order and perhaps delay the British tanks yet another turn. German preparations in the north do not allow the US reinforcements much chance of success. The verdict in this scenario will be determined by how well the German guns deal with the enemy as the few SS leaders attempt to manage their hard-pressed troops while the Allies tiptoe through smoke and across enemy fire lanes to bring their unwieldy numerical superiority to bear. The sentence will be exacted by tanks of the 2nd Grenadier Guards, or refuted by their late arrival.



Scenario 35 The French Decide to Fight Rating: 50%-50%

Attraction: There is some concern that the US doesn't have enough time to meet the tough victory conditions. Indeed, if his artillery is ineffective and his squads take even one turn too long to break through the outer defenses, he will be in trouble with time. However, the very fact that time is his biggest problem tells him to make the most of what time he does have. He can beat the difficult victory condition, but cannot take his time in doing so.

French Advantages: 3rd Level Building. Centralized Defense. Ordnance.

The 3rd level of hex 14L5 is the position which will do the most for the French. The HMG ought to have a shot every player turn from there. The biggest problem will be which of a wide selection of targets at which to shoot. If either prong of the US attack is foundering, pick on it, because the Victory Conditions force the enemy to clear your units from both sides of the airstrip. If one of his groups has to cross Board 14 to accomplish this because the other group has fallen apart, they will be hard pressed to get there with sufficient strength in the allotted time.

Your interior lines and the geography of the playing area give you a surprising ability to shift forces. Your broken units rout towards your center while your opponent has to advance carefully yet quickly, probably allowing you a few long-range shots at him moving in the open. He has to engage your forces, so you will enjoy a great deal of first fire opportunities. Remember, in the right circumstances your ability to intentionally break and rout away can save a unit in a lost position.

The ordnance weapons are what keep the AFVs and spotting plane off your back. The American will not attempt to duel AFV versus Gun, so your guns will mostly be shooting at the infantry and spotter plane. The importance of these guns is best emphasized by considering the freedom of movement the AFVs would enjoy were these not in the French arsenal. French interior lines would no longer be a significant factor with AFV fire lanes cutting across the center of Board 14.

French Disadvantages: Morale. Willingness to Surrender. Number,

French morale becomes a problem when squads start breaking, which compounds the disadvantage of being outnumbered. Unless the unit in question is threatened by capture, a DM of "2" is not even worth the chance of rolling a casualty MC if you have good reason to suspect the unit will not be DM'ed in the next Rally Phase. If it will be under DM again, go ahead and try for the "2".

There are not enough defenders to cover the three groups of advancing US troops as effectively as the French would like. After a few of the defenders have broken, at least one of the screening forces will dissolve, leaving the US a path onto Board 14, where he can bring the airstrip and surrounding areas under fire. If the US can hit 14L5 with normal range squad fire from both sides of the airfield on Turn 6, you are in serious trouble, all other things being equal.

French Set-Up:

The HMG, 9-1 leader and one squad go in that 3rd level. Put another squad in the 2nd level of the same building. Obviously, the second squad will man the HMG if the first one breaks. Place the ordnance on Board 14 in sight of the airfield. Hex 14Q5 simply demands the 75mm in a trench. From here it can sight the airfield and fire at any spotting plane brave enough to zero in on the airfield defenders, and can also bring fire on a very large percentage of the playing area.

Your squads are too few to cover everything, and it would take pages to enter into even a cursory analysis of each worthwhile position. Suffice to say that hexes worth special attention are: 415, 4N5, 406 (1st level), 4P6 (1st level), 4R5, 4M8, 4T9, 4Y8 and 4BB7; 14Y3, 14T3 (crest), 14R1, 14Q5 through the woods in 14H0, 14L10, 14H10, all the airfield buildings and 14F1; 6J1, 6X5, 6X3 to 6T0, 6Z6 and 6Z4. Certainly other locations are equal to some of these and deserve study. You do not have the option of setting up strong forces on one side of the airfield and a screen on the other with the intention of a quick elimination of the foe on one flank followed by reinforcement of the other to bolster its defense. Even the relatively weaker US force #3 cannot be ignored, as it has ample firepower to force you out of 14L5, especially if within a six-hex range. In this respect, the time constraint limits your options, because by the time your hypothetical strong side force had eliminated any threat from the US group in question, it would be too late to get the troops back for a last ditch stand at the airfield.

American Advantages: Firepower. Rally Ability. Mobility.

The firepower of 22 American squads is awesome. In fact, it is twice the inherent firepower of the 16 French squads, and four times the French at a six-hex range! Admittedly, it is unrealistic to consider the quadrupled firepower advantage other than for illustrative purposes, but the doubled advantage is very real. The defensive strength of wellplaced French MGs, ordnance and artillery, as well as the fact that all of the US squads will not be onboard until Turn 3 at the earliest—and even then will be moving almost as often as they stand and fire—are some of the reasons why the US player doesn't simply crush the French with firepower.

As always, the lack of Desperation Morale for non-green squads gives them an overwhelming advantage over their opponent in first-chance rally. This was true to some degree against the SS in Scenario 34, and against the French broken morale of "6" ("2" with DM), it is the single greatest advantage possessed by either side. The American units usually have no reason to rout from their front lines to rally if already stacked with a good order leader.

The AFVs are reasonably free to move as they please, provided they avoid the French ordnance. It's also a good idea to keep the halftrack 17 hexes away from the HMG and 9-1 leader in the 3rd level building. The French will respect the vehicle MGs moreso than the main armament, as MG fire limits his movement. Look for fire lanes to hem his troops in. Remember that your mobility advantage is offset by his interior line mobility, so whatever you can do to curtail his freedom of movement in the center—which will involve using your AFVs in the early going—will be well worth the effort and will reward you with a "gaggle" of prisoners, broken units unable to rally because they can't rout to a leader, and KIAed enemy squads.

American Disadvantages: Time.

What can I say? Is time the US player's disadvantage; is it the tough Victory Conditions; should we suggest that he may require additional AFVs, squads, leaders and/or MGs to fulfill the conditions in the allotted time? The US force itself suffers no disadvantages; it is well equipped to meet the Victory Conditions which, in themselves, are a realistic concept. The problem is to meet these in eight game turns. So my preference is to suggest that the time constraint places the greatest and only potentially insurmountable obstacle in the path of US victory. However, given average luck with the dice (particularly for your artillery) and realizing that you cannot afford to waste time, you will be able to move quickly enough to reach your objectives and clear out the defenders without being reckless.

American Advance:

Hope that Groups #1 and #2 both enter in the first two game turns. Artillery might be great for softening up this defense, but if the spotting plane comes in first, every Frenchman and his brother will be shooting at it. You have to take the 14O5-14G3 woods line with your southern forces. The tanks are great for cutting French routs, but you must keep the AFVs away from those French guns at all costs. It may be wise, if possible, to sneak an AFV across the west edge of Board 14 and onto Board 4 to aid the northern force. This may have the added advantage of giving you an AFV in an area where your opponent has no anti-tank capacity. But if the northern force is having no difficulty (which they shouldn't if your artillery is landing), the AFVs are better concentrated on the southern and might consider lending support to the third group.

In the north, you'll probably have to go through the wheatfields and up the center, but not all three. If there are French guns in 14W6 and/or 14T6, it would be best to send some squads through the 4J7 wheatfield to deal with them. Look for open terrain the French have failed to cover. If all you have to face is the HMG in 14L5, a rush across the open may leave you with one dead squad, but you'll also be in possession of 50% of Board 4 on your first turn of entry. This would be a catastrophe for your opponent.

Hex 4P6 is an ideal spot for your HMG and three 6-6-6s. Blast away at 14L5, no one else will stick around to put such a stack in their sights. But watch out for ordnance fire on this hex. Keep moving and keep closing on the airstrip. Move your people, but not in the open against enemy fire. You have a tremendous firepower advantage-and will need it. For you must fire some of your squads, move others, rally broken ones, and either annihilate or forcibly eject your foe from approximately 75% of the playing area (where he will set up, where you will advance, and where you cannot permit him to remain). Remember always that you've only eight turns to do all this, which means only five turns for the last group to fulfill its responsibilities.

Conclusion:

The concern about time pressure on the US player is justified; but, he needs to have at least one thing to worry about, so he will simply have to MOVE IT! The US forces cannot take too long reducing the outer defenses (Board 6 and the 406-4Z10 region), because they will not have enough time left to actually meet the Victory Conditions if they do. After all, these preliminary opera-

tions do not bring victory in and of themselves. So really, both players are keeping their eyes on the clock in this one.



Scenario 36 Weissenhof Crossroads

Rating: 45%-55% Pro-German

Attraction: Two SiG 38Hs provide a real fireworks display while a winterized American "Rat Patrol" cavorts through the mayhem of the opening stages of Hitler's last western offensive.

American Advantages: 60mm Mortar. HMGs.

The mortar is your single greatest advantage. If the SiGs are in LOS, you have a fair chance for a stun, or at least of forcing them to move away. Due to the artillery barrage versus open-top AFV modifier, the German will probably not leave his vehicle in LOS for long. But, more importantly, this weapon rates first class when engaging infantry in the woods.

As always, the US rally capability must be balanced against their normal morale. The ELR of "3" means you will quickly inherit some of those blasted green squads. Compared to the German morale combination, it might be argued that the American comes out ahead, but certainly not with anything approaching what I'd term a real advantage. The defense of hex 1318 may hinge on the interaction of your squads breaking/turning green and their percentage of first-chance rally. That is, it will hinge on these factors if a SiG doesn't demolish the hex first.

American Disadvantages: Dispersal. Time.

Your defense is sufficient to prevent the enemy from blitzing across the board in one fell swoop, but can fall considerably short of stopping a nineturn assault. Although you will enjoy some fire at the SiGs, you should not count on any effects, so you'll probably have to put up with them. But if you get within bazooka range, thank your lucky stars and blow the thing apart.

Your best chance is to conduct a fighting withdrawal, buying time for your free units to *i*abricate a defense in your rear. Starting units in the west of Board 5 is no solution, as your forward areas would then be too weak. Be sure to time your retreats well, such that some units fire while others move back under their cover. If you simply move them all on the same turn, you may end up leaving a string of broken units behind with none left to provide fire support while the leaders desperately strive to rally them.

American Set-Up:

Your first concern is to locate the jeeps somewhere they cannot readily be destroyed, while your 7-0 and a squad create HSs to man them. The middle of the forest road is the best spot, since the jeeps will easily be able to move either north or south once manned.

Because the German player can win on either the north or the south section of the playing area, you must spread your force much too thin for an adequate defense of both areas; anticipate that on Turn 2 or Turn 3 your troops covering the area not attacked by the Germans will be moving to protect the rear of the area he does choose to attack. You cannot risk waiting too long making this move, but to be premature is to invite disaster, as your foe can switch objectives and outmanuever you. The danger of this is very high if he is attacking in the north and you haven't defended the forest road. In essence, you must keep your eyes on his forces and not totally commit to one exit defense until you can actually count that the hexes his units would have to traverse to move off the other exit are greater than the time limit allows.

Should the German attack both north and south, you will be hard pressed on both ends of the board; but, in the long run, should benefit from his reduced depth of manpower. It is unlikely his main effort will be in the center. If he tries it, you should be able to contain him long enough for a win, but watch for him to head off in a different direction when he realizes your center is too strong to breach.

Due to the importance of the 5Y10 to 1319 road, it is best to defend the north flank strongly. Hex 1318 is the best forward position, but regrettably it is difficult to rout or move out once the pressure is on. At least two squads, a MMG, a 9-1 leader, and a bazooka go here—and will probably die here, but should slow the assault considerably. A squad with MMG entrenched in 13D9 has a great fire lane all the way to 13R1, which will make any German rush to the elevated road a chancy affair. You also need to put a few units in the 5Z9-5Z10-5X10 area to cover the Victory Condition.

The south is not as hard to defend as the north; hexes 13DD8, 13AA9, 13Z10, 13X10, 13U9 and 5D9 are good locations. I prefer to stay out of 13T7 due to the difficulty of retreat/rout. The center might hold units at 13O8 or 5S8, this latter ready to move either way as the developing situation demands.

German Advantages: HE. Concentration of Forces. Leadership.

The SiGs are what make your offensive feasible. Without them, you would certainly be at a disadvantage. It may therefore seem imprudent to commit them with the assaulting force. However, if you leave them on Board 2, they will have a hard time hitting anything and you will be denying yourself the greatest advantage in the game. Be brave, be bold, be sure to avoid bazookas.

Hit the GIs hard and fast on one flank, preferably in the north unless it is loaded with enemy forces. Send a few squads around the other way, which you may consider a nuisance force. I prefer to use 4-6-7s for this since the 4-4-7s are less effective on their own, but make good cannon fodder for the assault on 1318. Your quantity of leaders permits a two-pronged attack, but this generally carries less chance for victory than one large effort. Finally, if you can get it close enough, the FT carries its standard benefits and headaches (has anyone ever managed to use one twice without rolling a nine or greater). Send this little jewel toward building 1318.

German Disadvantages: None.

The terrain is adequate for your advance (indeed, the new terrain on Board 13 is a major attraction of this scenario). You will have some trouble breaking through the first line of defenders: the line based on 1318, 5H10 to 13EE9 or 13U9 to 13T7 areas; but with the aid of the SiGs these will fall and, unless your opponent is very skillful or very lucky, most of his strength will be exhausted from defending these positions. If he is successfully fighting a coordinated retreat, turn on the pressure and overwhelm him with your superior numbers. Don't let him stall your attack. Time is on your side, for you can wear him down and still have plenty of it left to get off the board. But if you are overly cautious, if you don't press the GIs at every opportunity, you are wasting your time and handing him an undeserved victory. If you lose, it should be due to losses sustained, not because the time ran out.

German Advance:

Basically, you should examine the US fire lanes and rush across whichever end of the mapboard is least covered. take the MMGs with you, for there are no Americans within your twelve hex range and you'll need the firepower when you close. Don't put the SiGs on Board 2 hills; move them forward! Don't move them within four hexes of a bazooka nor within six hexes of an enemy squad; and don't go CE until your Advance Phase. The elevated road is a great spot for these beasts. When they're located such that the GIs can fire at them, get your infantry in position to fire at these same US troops. You should present him with so many targets he will not be able to shoot at half of them. I'm talking about targets in woods or buildings or on the elevated road, of course-not moving across open terrain. Your forces shoulld either scare him away (unlikely), or blow him away (likely). The north approach is your best bet, you can lessen the victory condition by occupying the 5Y10-13I9 area. Assault 13I8 from the elevated road, 13F5 and 13F6, and through the 13H5 ford. These may not be able to break the enemy in 1318, but will draw fire away from your SiGs which are zeroing for the kill.

Conclusion:

So much depends on the SiGs, it is difficult to imagine a German victory without them. Certainly, should both of them fall early, the prospect of German victory changes from favorable to abysmal. Yet the American player cannot allow himself to fall into the trap of concentrating solely on the SiGs, for enemy infantry is present in sufficient numbers to walk all over him if unopposed for a turn or two.



Scenario 37 Medal of Honor

Rating: 40%-60% Pro-Allied.

Attraction: Replacing Board 4 with Board 6 in the Second Edition has turned a guaranteed American victory into a dynamite confrontation between a large and powerful but poorly-led American defender and a desperate but well-led SS attacker forced to play his role of aggressor to the hilt in order to have any chance of blowing the bridge.

American Advantages: Firepower.

It is rare that a defender enjoys such a firepower advantage. Adding up the squads and machineguns proves that you field 133 factors versus your opponent's 92 factors, calculated at normal range. Naturally enough, these raw facts indicate that something else must give the Germans a chance in this scenario. That something else is the Panthers. But what you want to remember is that wherever you can avoid the Panthers and bring your firepower to bear on the enemy squads, you ought to realize a tremendous advantage. They do not share with you the luxury of defense, but must constantly forfeit fire opportunities in order to advance on your positions. They have a grueling timetable to follow, meaning a fair number of your attacks will be answered with movement—not return fire.

American Disadvantages: Leaders.

Three leaders simply cannot keep fifteen squads in good order during a normal firefight! Fortunately, Private Towle can assist your 9-1 and 8-1 in directing the fire of the five MGs. His importance will become even more pronounced should the -1 leaders be called out of the lines to assist the 8-0 with rally duties. You cannot afford to lose any of your leaders, which may force you to abandon a squad here and there rather than commit a leader to attempt a rally. With fifteen squads, you have this kind of breathing room, especially since you will probably nail as few enemy squads during their initial advance.

American Set-up:

Your choice of excellent defensive positions is something a miser would envy. Your number one outpost is 8FF9 with entrenchment, squad, HMG and Pvt. Towle. Start the 9-1 in 8DD9, 1st level of the building, with a squad and two MMGs. The 8-1 leader, a squad and HMG go in the second level of 3M2 and a squad, MMG and entrenchment go in 3D3. These four positions should keep the SS off your back long enough for the bulk of your force, strung out every other hexrow, to move forward and occupy the gaps.

Since the Panthers are capable of a first turn romp (3D3 is particularly vulnerable), you must cover the open areas with squads and bazookas. Hexes 3B3, 3F7, 3H2 and 3J4 protect the road and Hill 547 about as well as possible. Hex 3C9 is such a powerful position that I often start with an entrenchment there with hopes of occupying it on Turn 1 with the squad in 3F7. Units on Board 8 will spend the first turn moving for both 8DD9 and the Board 3 central woods mass. The 3J3 road pass is very important. Units beginning in Q3 and O4 can move to J2 and J4 to assist the unit already there with entrenchment attempts, although you may already have placed an entrenchment there at the start. Once entrenched, a squad on each side of 3J3 and the HMG in 3M2 should ensure that no enemy infantry will ride through the pass to carry their demolition charge to the bridge.

The 8-0 leader goes in the Board 3 central woods mass so that he may move wherever needed for rally purposes. Obviously, you must avoid exposing him to enemy fire. If he is lost, one of your -1 leaders will have to fill the gap.

German Advantages: Panthers.

If anything is going to happen, you will have to force it with your tanks. Overrunning a position such as 3D3 if inadequately defended would be ideal, but not an opportunity you can expect. You might pull up to 6DD8 and 6EE8 to blast away at 8FF9 and 8DD9. Even laying smoke into these positions will greatly aid your infantry advance. Just don't allow any side or rear bazooka shots, and be leery of frontal ones as well.

German Disadvantages: Difficult Advance. Difficult Victory Conditions. Time.

There are three avenues of approach to the American lines. The north and south approaches require you to move through open ground. The central wheatfield eliminates the open ground problem, but you still face negative modifiers for moving and for enemy leaders and hero. No matter how you get to Boards 3 and 8, you are going to lose squads.

If you do manage to breakthrough, there will probably be precious little time remaining to get to the bridge and perform the exceedingly hazardous ritual required by rules section 133 to blow the bridge. Equally difficult will be eliminating twice as many GI squads. Should you actually manage to demolish a span of the bridge, there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that you have just won a big victory.

German Advance:

You cannot simply run your squads up to the American MGs; but you can't afford to give all fifteen enemy squads time to occupy the front lines either. You must do something to advance quickly without taking all that enemy fire. As will so often be the case in this scenario, your Panthers provide the solution to this dilemma.

The first act should be to run the tanks loaded with infantry as far forward as possible without exposing the vehicles themselves to danger. This will probably get you to either 3B7 or 3B4, whichever is least defended. If you don't draw sufficient fire to break the infantry, unload into the woods and move your armor to fire positions such as 6DD8 and 6EE8. The remainder of the infantry will have to assault move or choose their movement paths very carefully around fire lanes of those enemy units which have not yet fired.

On the other hand, if the mounted troops took heavy fire and maybe were even eliminated, do not allow their demise to have been in vain. There should not be a very substantial amount of defensive fire remaining, so you can move forward with all speed. You don't have the strength to draw fire in this manner again, so you must take full advantage of this one-shot affair. By your next movement phase, there will be twice as many enemy squads in the front line to oppose your assault.

Conclusion:

The GIs have good reason to feel even a bit cocky about their chances in this scenario. The German is going to have to work hard to breakthrough the American lines. The procedure for blowing the bridge is so encumbered, he should set his sights on eliminating enemy squads and preserving his own with the alternate end of the Victory Condition in mind. The fact that he can expect his own losses to be high is testimony to the difficulty of that mission.



Scenario 38 The Factory Rating: 50%-50%

Attraction: An overwhelming force of GIs takes a walk in the rain to see what tanks and guns can do against stone and steel.

German Advantages: Height. TEMs for Stone Buildings and Fortifications. Ordnance. Optional Reinforcements.

With machineguns and 9-1 leaders on second and third levels, your command of the playing area is imposing. If only the rain would stop! But so long as it continues, the US infantry will be incapable of bringing any significant fire on you, at least until the middle of the game. In this respect, the stone buildings are worth even more than usual in the early going, because the value of a + 3 TEM is much greater when applied to weak IFT attacks such as the GIs will mount through the period of rain.

The optional reinforcements are listed here as an advantage due to the accompanying control of game length. However, the fact that you must decide about them on Turn 5, as opposed to a later turn when the need would be more certain makes the whole thing pretty much a guessing game. If it is imminently obvious that you need to bring them in, the tendency is that extending the game two turns will harm you more than extra units will help. Still, you do get the choice, and under certain circumstances—such as a high loss of German squads this perhaps provides you the breath of fresh air you need to stabilize a deteriorating situation.

German Disadvantages: Rain.

Mostly covered above, the rain curtails your range as you attempt to cut down US squads moving in the open. Reasons have also been covered which explain aspects of the rain which aid the German player. But the ultimate verdict is that, without the rain, the GIs would never be able to advance on the village in force within the allotted time.

German Set-Up:

Can you resist fortifying hex 1207 and placing the 75mm Infantry Gun there? With the hedge, this gives a +7 DRM to infantry fire coming from buildings 1209 and 12P9; boresight one of these with that 75mm. Consequently, the 76L AT gun ought to be covering approaches not in the LOS of the 75mm. Hex 12Q4 is probably the best central location, but I'd rather try to stop the Americans before they get that close. Hex 12S5 also offers a central location and provides a better LOS array to the outlying areas, at least to the southwest of the village. But 12U6 rates as my favorite spot for this weapon. Although it lacks the central location advantages of Q4 and S5, it does a great job covering the southwest flank, while at the same time allowing a rout path for the crew and a chance to reoccupy the gun, which other locations lack. Rally with a leader when possible is still more certain than selfrally. Take a look at 12V5 and boresighting CC7 also. If no one enters the south edge, you can always move the gun.

Put your machineguns, squads and -1 leaders in second and third levels. I don't favor getting fancy with a 9-1 and 8-0 in the third level of 12U5, simply because you're going to need the leaders spread out for rally purposes. Hexes 12O4, 12O7, 12T7 and 12V5 are your best locations for a second level force. Hex 12Q8 (ground level) is ideal; and consider placing the sniper in 12S9 on the second level. At least from here he should have plenty of fire opportunities and is a modest deterrent to any American rush on that building. The panzer might start in 12Y3 with VCA facing X2-Y4, and TCA covering Z2-Z3 or Z3-Y4 with hex 12CC7 boresighted. This will give you the required antitank weapon on the south side of the village to make the US player think twice before entering forces there, with the added advantage of being able to move in the likely event that they don't.

Bore sight your weapons on the hexes you anticipate will be the American jump-off points for the final assault into the village. Sightings on 12N8, 12O9, 12P9, 12S9 and 12T10 are ideal. Remember that your medium machineguns can only bore sight six hexes away due to the rain. If you can nail him in these positions, he may not even get into the village at all. I prefer boresighting the two guns for infantry targets, since it is unlikely they will be offered the pleasure of vehicular targets. The panzer would do likewise, were it not for the superiority of the 12Y3 location, which casts an ominous shadow on American thoughts of a southern entrance.

Think of the victory conditions in terms of precisely which five buildings you intend to hold for the win. This may not be even vaguely evident until the GIs are attempting to enter the village propermaybe Turn 4 or Turn 5. His best approach is across Board 4. And, with a standard assault from 12K7 to the 12S9 area, you will probably be trying to hold onto 12U5, 12R2 and three of the following: 12M3, 12O4, 12P3, 12Q4 and 12S5. A great deal will depend on how he uses his tanks. If they manage to transport infantry into town, highly unlikely to be sure, you may find your troops scrambling for five buildings anywhere, wherever they may be free. If, on the other hand, he tries the southern approach, you will have a much easier time since you need merely hold five of the northern victory buildings. His only avenue of approach is through the graveyard, where many of his troops will take up permanent residence as you easily stall him there.

American Advantages: Armor. Quantity. Lack of DM and Possible Smoke (as always).

Hand-in-hand with armor goes the advantage of mobility. However, the rain curtails this to the point of making that celestial emission a liability for your vehicles, one which does not disappear even should the skies clear. Use your tanks to transport infantry and equipment. Keep away from the 75mm guns. Don't move too close to enemy infantry until your own infantry support arrives. But bear in mind that, once you've committed these vehicles, they cannot readily be shifted to a different sector of the playing area. A hex such as 1217 gives wonderful fire opportunities at a six-hex range to the second levels of 12O4, 12O6 and 12O7 without exposing yourself to return fire from any 75mm on the ground level of the buildings. Regrettably, it takes three turns to get there using motion movement and CE.

With 20 squads and the leaders too, you have a chance to win despite the expected heavy losses. It is this depth which allows you to be a bit reckless and run two squads and a 9-1 leader, the HMG and a MMG forward on the tanks. After all, you are going to be even more reckless with the GIs who have to advance on foot. If you plan to move through 12I10 with these vehicles and there is a 75mm gun which might possibly have the hex boresighted, either change your mind or at least send the halftrack through first and the tank with the leader last. Likewise, be suspicious of both bridges. I can't advise going up the center either. You're taking chances on that road. Try bypassing through, even though it is dreadfully slow. Another option is to bring the M8HMC and 7-0 leader on at 4C10, advance the 7-0 to 4D9 which will be concealed at the end of Turn 2, and begin indirect firing. When the rain stops you can shoot WP.

Your infantry will be running across the open as outlined above. Bring up the rear with the 8-0 leaders to rally your broken units. The remaining two 9-1s and the 8-1 will have to get to the edge of Board 12 to lead the infantry assault. This certainly won't be easy as they will be prime targets. Therefore, it is imperative that you get the squads forward as quickly as possible so that they can draw and return fire, allowing the leaders to advance more safely. You must get as many people to cover as possible before the rain stops.

With 20 squads, you don't run much chance of losing smoke-making capability. You will want it when the time comes to move across the paved roads and into the village itself. This is where you simply must have it—or pay a truly fearful toll. Of course, if the rain continues, you won't even have the smoke option and will pay that toll accordingly.

American Disadvantages: Must Cross Open Terrain. Defenders Tough to Subdue.

The cardinal sin of moving in the open is here

permitted due to the rain; and you won't win this one unless you do. The German has so few weapons with sufficient range to hit your troops that sheer numbers dictate many of your squads will get onto Board 12. You must avoid leaving large clusters of units for offboard artillery to target however. Be thankful the dead are only cardboard piece as your losses may be high.

It's difficult to put numbers on things, but if your AFVs are zeroing in on the strongpoints and you've reached Board 12 by Turn 4 or 5 with ten or twelve full squads, your assault of the village should pack enough wallop to get you across the street and into the buildings. Additional squads should be trickling forward as the rear leaders rally them. Once you have even a modest force inside the village, you must position the troops for the endgame, which involves crossing more streets and entering more stone buildings and fortifications as you try for the last few buildings needed for victory. Here is where it might pay to drive the AFVs into the streets between your squads and the enemy, especially if your smoke capacity is depleted or the rain continues.

You could not have gotten so far without the rain, but once on the edge of the village in force, you desperately need it to stop so that you can bring your superior fire to bear and lay smoke. Also, this would allow units in the middle of Board 4 who have rallied and are headed for the village to bring additional fire into play. If the German fires at these particular units, so much the better for your people already at the village outskirts.

American Advance:

You have a time problem, so whichever way you choose to enter, do it quickly. Board 4 is by far your best approach, but if the German has failed to adequately cover the southern edge, by all means use it. Due to the vagaries of the rain dice roll, you will have to rush across open terrain in order to advance as far forward as possible before the skies clear. Keep your units in stacks of but one; keep them spread out to avoid enemy artillery; take comfort in the fact that your opponent has only a few weapons which can hit you beyond six hexes. Naturally, plan your assault so as to avoid the 75mm guns and as many machineguns as possible. If he has a machinegun on ground level, don't give him the opportunity to utilize its penetration or spraying fire capabilities, but remember these cannot be used at long range-which is his usual normal range thanks to the rain.

Use the tanks to transport your heavy equipment and leaders. They will draw fire, so keep them away from MGs directed by enemy 9-1 leaders. It should go without saying that these should not move into LOS of those 75's. The new rules eliminate the +2 protection from the tanks, but at least you have a means to attempt to get a small infantry force quickly into the forward areas without risking the -2 for movement in the open.

For the tanks themselves, the most important thing to remember is as above-avoid the 75mm killers. Also-you should be conscious of this in every scenario-do not move adjacent to any terrain which may provide cover to an infantry assault on your AFV unless you have a very good reason to do so. Take your vehicles in close to the village if you can, but make the Germans run out in open terrain if they want to attack you. Any PF with only a one-hex range is worthless unless you blunder by allowing the enemy an adjacent hex with cover, or go in too deep without infantry support such that he can rush you from several directions in his turn. In addition to all these worries, the halftrack should steer clear of 9-1 leaders directing fire, due to the exposure of the crew.

Conclusion:

Rain is such a fickle thing, both helping and

hindering friend and foe alike. In the end, it may be the ultimate undoing of the GIs if it prevents their use of smoke in the village. They may still force a win due to sheer numbers alone, but the price may total something resembling a disaster in human terms—for those gamers who notice such things.



Scenario 39 Sweep for the Bordj Toum Bridge Rating: 35%-65% Pro-Allied

Attraction: A 1942-style clash between a mobile assault force and prepared defense complete with armor reserve.

American Advantages: 37LL AT. Height. Armor Reserve. Interior Lines.

The 37LLs on fourth level hexes 15N4 and 15Y6 command a great deal of respect. It is not unreasonable to calculate that American success will largely be determined by these guns. Should the Germans manage to knock them out before suffering any substantial armor losses, their resultant freedom of AFV movement and ability to then concentrate on the American tanks and halftracks should swing the balance in their favor. All this despite the apparent ineffectiveness of a 37LL, especially with the obsolete ammo, versus the Pzkw IIIs and IVs. But when the height advantage, number of shots, multiple hits, boresighting, acquisition, and possible shock are all considered, those 37LL ATs aren't all that bad.

In fact, the strength of these positions is so pronounced that I would not move the guns even when returning to this scenario and utilizing the Hidden Gun rule. This is because the full strength of the guns is demonstrated only when their imposing presence is employed as a deterrent force against enemy armor. Your knowledgeable opponent is aware of the abilities of the 37LLs, which will slow his assault considerably. An unknowing opponent is likely to suffer an unacceptable loss of armor in a very short time.

So long as the enemy AFVs are held at bay, your height advantage enables the GIs to likewise hold off the enemy infantry. Should one of the 37LLs be knocked out early, you must then rely on the Lees to fill the gaps. Certainly, two of these should head for Board 15 on Turn 1. You should feel confident enough on Board 6 moving only one Lee to the chateau, leaving the fourth tank at the bridge to bide his time and see which side of the river may require his services.

Although not an advantage in and of itself, your Board 6 contingent should have no trouble containing enemy forces north of the chateau. This should allow your fourth Lee to eventually move onto Board 15; although to do so before at least one of the enemy tanks on Board 6 is knocked out may be asking for trouble.

American Disadvantages: Brittleness.

In view of your armor reserve, this is not much of a disadvantage. However, should one or both of the 37LL guns on Board 15 malfunction or succomb to fire in the first turn, the Lees may not arrive in time to prevent an enemy armored blitz to the heights of Board 15. Even a second or third turn loss of one of the ATGs may allow the German to effect an advantage at one point of your line and subsequently exploit into your rear areas.

American Set-Up:

As already emphasized, the 37LLs go on 15N4 and 15Y6. The HMC goes in 15F2 because it can retreat from there easier than from F3. The unmanned M2 goes most anywhere you like. MMGs go into 15W6, 15L3, and 15Q4 or E3, with entrenchments in 15L3 and 15W6. The mortar is in 15Z4. There are plenty of other worthwhile positions.

With each play of this scenario, you should vary your boresighted hexes between the vast array of choices. You must anticipate enemy armor on Level 3 of Board 2 as well as around the north and south board edges, and even through the road pass. The offboard artillery is great for hitting the third level should the enemy armor appear there. This will not only keep them buttoned up, but has a chance to actually knock them out. Laying smoke is not a bad option if you can obscure a tank or two.

The Lees can either move to plug the central pass, undertake a joy ride onto Board 2 if enemy deployment permits, or gain height on the western slopes of Hill 783. Hexes 15E5 and 15N7 are usually good spots depending on the specific situation. The tanks are best used as a "back-up" for the ATGs. Gaining the crest of Hill 783 will usually not be advisable, as they then present too easy a target for German gunners. Naturally, this depends on the situation at hand as determined by the success of your 37LLs and the resultant reluctance or daring of the enemy armor commander.

The struggle for Board 6 revolves around the chateau. The 37LL gun goes in 6N3 or 6M6. Use of the Hidden Gun Rule will only add to German headaches. Despite you superiority here, you must endeavor to keep your foe occupied so that he cannot antagonize your countrymen east of the Medjerda.

(So far, I have been remiss in these discussions by *not* specifying where you should entrench, place concealment counters, create scouts, set fires and perform other mundane enterprises. The sweet and simple fact is that you should almost always be performing these activities—especially entrenching and placing concealment—whenever the opportunities present themselves and the units in question are not otherwise engaged. For any erstwhile squad leader who has reached this stage of *SL* play, these actions should be automatic. In this scenario, hexes 15X5 and 15Y5 are excellent spots to entrench. Coupled with the entrenchment in 15W6, this ridgeline can be made into a fortress; and you may even have the few turns required to do it.)

German Advantages: Armor. Leadership.

As in Scenario 37, you must depend on your armor to disrupt the defenders and cover the approach of your infantry. This time, however, your immediate concern will be the enemy ATGs. Only after they are controlled will you be able to run roughshod over the American infantry.

Once the infantry forces have engaged each other, the superior German leader modifiers give you a fighting chance against US entrenchments and height. You also enjoy a somewhat hidden advantage due to scarcity of quality American leaders and the morale of "6" for most of the Board 15 GI contingent. These advantages will be apparent when the opposing player sets up with only the 8-1 leaders on the line. He dare not risk the 7-0 and 8-0s in the line of fire, meaning that most of his troops, despite their lack of DM status when broken, will have to leave their positions to rout to a leader for rally. You may wish to shield your ears from the abysmal display of profanity regarding troops with a "6" morale emanating from the American lines.

German Disadvantages: Time. Firepower.

Ideally, you should pull all six tanks onto the third level of Hill 621 and not expose your infantry to enemy fire until the tanks have knocked out the 37LLs and maneuvered to chase the GIs from the eastern slopes of Hill 783. Unfortunately, you simply don't have the time for this and will have to move the infantry forward from the outset. Furthermore, you may require some MMG fire to help nail the ATG crews.

Thus, you may find your infantry on the receiving end of a murderous exchange of infantry fire if you are not careful to avoid the areas the GIs have scoped out. This imbalance is even more pronounced than a mere comparison of forces might indicate, because you have wisely positioned a small force in trucks and halftracks just behind Hill 621, ready to hurl themselves at the enemy lines when your tanks gain the upper hand.

German Advance:

Little hope can be placed in your chance of a breakthrough on Board 6. The most you should attempt is to position the MMG, radio and Pzkw IIIJ in the northeast corner of Board 7 and harass the GIs on the crest and western slopes of Hill 783. The rest of this force should fight a holding action against the engineers. If you achieve this deployment, the Americans will most assuredly come after you, probably committing two Lees with the assault. Attracting the extra tank and any inconvenience you cause the armored infantry are about the most this force can expect to accomplish. Nevertheless, once the enemy leaves the chateau to come after you, be alert for any opening which may allow you to burst through to the bridge.

The main thrust from the east will take on one of two forms. You will either go for the throat in a fullblown blitz against one part of the enemy defenses; or you will play a more cautious (and smarter) game, taking the time to maneuver onto Hill 621 or around the north or south edge of Board 15, sliding infantry into forward positions yet not exposing them to the full brunt of enemy fire and establishing a mobile assault force, ready to lash out at the enemy and capitalize on any advantage the armor can manage.

The scope of your offensive provides an excellent opportunity to exercise tactical muscles grown lethargic in the course of preceding scenarios which featured more limited engagements. For, at one time, you must duel enemy guns to achieve a localized breakthrough which advanced infantry can secure, while freezing the balance of the enemy line in place with the threat of a motorized infantry assault.

Conclusion:

Due to the size of the opposing forces, the 65% pro-Allied rating is not as devastating as it would be in a smaller scenario. Each side can afford sizeable losses and still possess the instruments of victory. The tanks and 37LLs are the most important pieces on the board, followed by the other AFVs and finally the infantry. However, in the end, the game is won and lost by the lowly foot soldiers. Everything else is merely hardware employed to attain some brief advantage over opposing infantry.

Given an even distribution of AFV and ATG losses, neither side successfully gaining an armor advantage, whatever remains of these will either continue to engage one another or each will concentrate on the enemy infantry with net result of nothing gained by either side in the clash of armor. However, should one side manage a sizable armor advantage by midgame, it is probable that the game is over at that point.





Scenario 40 The Dornot Watermark Rating: 45%-55% Pro-German

Attraction: Basically a chase, and a unique departure from anything seen in the system. The US player must draw the German into pre-registered artillery, although even the fear of walking into six consecutive rounds of 105mm HE is a substantial deterrent. If the German proceeds aggressively and is not slowed by artillery, he should win. But, on the other hand, the American knows where to lure the German—and herein lies the appeal of this encounter.

American Advantages: Harassing Fire. Smoke.

If you draw your foe into a few rounds of harassing fire, you will have a good chance of getting the required eleven squads/leaders across the Moselle. Not that 105mm harassing fire is necessarily all that destructive in and of itself ("6" on the IFT), but if the German knows you have him where you want him, he will be loath to move through open ground and may opt to endure the FFEs in his current position, at least until the barrage moves elsewhere. The time you gain from this delay may prove decisive.

There are several tricks you can pull to delay the SS. Most are covered in the discussion of your entrance and only one constitutes what ought to be called an actual advantage. That would be your smoke-making capability. With twenty squads in the scenario, there is little chance of losing your smoke, so you should use it liberally. Your eastmost squads should roll for smoke to cover movement every turn. Roll for it in the adjacent hex closest to the enemy and roll for it in the hex you occupy. The Germans will not only suffer shooting through the smoke, but will also suffer as they pay the extra MF to move through each hex of it (or take detours to avoid it). Don't make the mistake of laying such smoke in the path of your own units however!

American Disadvantages: River Crossing Time.

You should be able to get the majority of your fleeing infantry to the river. Getting eleven units to the other side will prove quite another thing altogether. There is also the danger that units on the west bank may be eliminated, particularly once the Panzer IVs arrive, so you must either protect your victory units or send a few extra across the river. Bear in mind that you cannot simply throw everyone into the water and hope that at least eleven units sprout waterwings and magically appear on the west bank. Instead, the crossing must be covered by a screening force on the east bank. These unfortunates are destined to sit out the remaining months of the war in captivity, but the soggy Americans who gain the west bank will sing their praises. Hopefully, the SS will turn these prisoners over to regular Wehrmacht formations.

The longer it takes to reach the crossing point, the longer you will be in the water exposed to fire from the German tanks in addition to an increasing number of enemy squads reaching the east bank. The need for haste is quite evident. The best way to combat your time problem, other than the obvious remedy of running fast, is to utilize the various means at your disposal to slow the pursuit. Smoke has already been mentioned, and other methods follow.

American Retreat:

The north and south extremities of the playing area are your best paths to the river. Advantages the northern route enjoys over the southern are numerous, but units running across the north edge are much more open to fire from the east than are units on the southern edge. The northern route provides the quickest way to get to the best crossing point, however, 8Y4. Whichever route you choose, and this scenario is a good one for those who revel in seeking out "perfect" plans, there are a number of things you must do to impede your pursuers, in addition to laying smoke.

Most obvious is to leave the MMGs behind with a squad apiece to cover your rear. If you chose the northern path, MMGs in 5Z9 and 5U9 assure that any SS entrance in the area will be a very sobering event. If they choose to avoid the north and enter in the south or center hoping to catch up to you, they will be disappointed. Your force can get to the river and set up an effective screen before they overtake you. More likely, they will move into hexes such as 5S10, 5T10, 5X10 and maybe even 5Z10 and send other units through the woods towards 5O3 which can be reached on Turn 2. All they have to do is prevent ten of your units from crossing the river, so their objective is to pick on these ten, slow them down, and let the others go.

If you choose the southern path, a squad with a MMG can get to 5W7 thanks to the road and Advance Phase. You might also place a squad at 5GG7. These are necessary because German units skirting across the north unimpeded could reach the river on your flank at the same time you do. The other MMG can be left in 5O9 to cover the immediate rear of the main group. As you proceed westward, it may be necessary to detach a delaying force northward across Board 4.

Naturally, your concealment counters can also be used to delay the SS. if you position a stack of these as though they are your rear guard or occassionally drop off a few throughout your retreat and intersperse real squads in these outposts, your opponent will waste precious time avoiding or eliminating them and-if driven to desperationmay finally chance running past one containing a real unit. For the purpose of this tactic, it is best to stack extra concealment counters on top of a real stack of units than to make a separate stack of concealment counters to move around the board and get in the way of your real units. The enemy is more likely to be suspicious of an outpost detached from a large stack, the balance of which continues moving west, than of an entire stack which remains behind. The only way this practice can work to your disadvantage is if the SS catch you and open fire, some of which may be directed at stacks of concealment counters had any been present. But the concealment technique presented above is designed to yield the greatest chance that you are not caught in the first place, which should be one of your preeminent concerns.

The openings listed thus far have endorsed leaving MMGs behind to cover your retreat. Since any units carrying these weapons will move one hex slower than your maximum speed and you can't afford to wait for them, they would eventually be left behind anyway. They would be great to have with your screening force on the Board 8 heights, but it is doubtful they would ever get that far. For these reasons, it is best to leave them behind to block the German entrance where their usefulness is certain. Pre-registered fire is your ultimate delaying weapon. Unfortunately, you cannot simply steer the Germans into it as they will be wary of any easy route you do not defend. You may not even get to choose the turn it begins to land, so don't preregister any hexes you intend to traverse, unless you feel like challenging German chances of rolling a "12" after placing a starshell. Instead, you should endeavour to hold off the enemy at your rear while plastering the flank with HE. This illustrates another advantage of a north or south retreat—you have only one flank to protect.

German Advantages: Morale. Starshells. LMGs.

I will choose a force with morale "8" over one with morale "6" and no DM status 99% of the time. With a broken morale of "9", the SS give away practically nothing to US initial rally attempts and are far superior when it comes to non-DM rallies. But the main point to be made is that with a normal morale of "8", you will not suffer a great deal of broken units in the first place and will be able to pursue more aggressively than would units with a morale of "7".

Quite naturally, you want to reread the Night rules before playing this scenario. Pay strict attention to the mechanics of placing starshells. This will often determine where you want your leaders positioned. When you reach the river bank, you should be able to illuminate the entire river—and everything in it. Enjoy the starshells; they are one of the very few things in the system you get automatically (not even a die roll for malfunction)!

Finally, we have a situation in which the limitations of the American proclivity for heavier machineguns are fully demonstrated. They cannot haul the mediums westward at full speed, nor can they be fired the turn they move. They almost certainly will be left behind. Once you have bypassed or broken their gunners, your own LMGs become the most valuable counters on the mapboard, due primarily to their long-range fire. They enable you to hit anything you can see with at least some firepower. Even a "1" attack carries a substantial threat against a moving target, especially when coupled with a -1 leader DRM.

German Disadvantages: Entrance.

If the GIs haven't covered the east board edge, you will be able to keep pace with their retreat and should have no trouble winning the scenario. But this is too much to expect. Certainly, they will leave behind a few sacrificial lambs to ensure that your entrance is substantially less than dynamic. As speculated above, this will probably involve the MMGs. If the GI commander wants to risk everything to stop you on the board edge or is feeling particularly sadistic, he may even leave behind as many as nine squads to tie you up in the east while the bare minimum of six squads and five leaders, no doubt his personal choices, waltz off to the east.

German Advance:

You cannot allow the GIs to gain a complete movement phase on you. There are two ways to prevent that—either move as far and fast as they move or slow them with firepower. Most likely, circumstances will dictate you avail yourself of a combination of these since enemy delaying tactics will not permit you to make full use of either.

The greatest hazard you face is the very act of entering the board without giving away too much time for the GI player to open the gap between you, or getting half your force blown away. Needless to say, if you enter out of LOS of the enemy you can proceed westward with all due speed. If you enter in LOS of hostile units, do so in woods terrain, preferably using assault movement. Any units entering open terrain in LOS of the enemy should be held off board until the Advance Phase. You will probably use all three of these modes to enter. If the GIs retreat across the northern edge and cover with machineguns as I have outlined, you should plan to enter squads with your MGs at 5CC10 and 5EE10 in the Advance Phase to harass the retreating Americans. Four squads with the MMG and a LMG assault moving into 5S10 and 5T10 have a good chance of nailing the enemy squad in 5U9 or the one in 5Z9. If he decides to stay put to prep fire at your trouble makers to the north. Two squads high-tail it to 5P7 and the other two might try 5X10, and even 5AA10, in the Advance Phase. Hex AA10 will really worry the boys on the bridge, and a northward rout through the gully won't hurt you much.

A southern pursuit would be structured along similar lines; but be alert for any opportunity to slip through a sketchy northern holding line. Even though he may run across the south of Board 5, the American player will have to work his way up river some to cross, since a crossing on the south edge of Board 8 would force some boats to drift offboard.

Either way you chase him, don't congregate all your troops in one area—or the pre-registered fire may defuse your offensive entirely.

Conclusion:

Vagaries of the visibility DR (the effects of moonlight, cloud cover and wind) have not entered into this discussion because these are totally random. Chances of any certain range on any given turn are identical to the probability of rolling that number with two dice. All you know for certain, and all your opponent knows, is that you will always be able to see at least two hexes away and will never see further than twelve hexes, except as starshells and enemy gun flashes allow.

AH Philosophy . . . Cont'd from Page 2

As envisioned, a dramatic re-shuffling of titles resulted. Significant changes can be noticed in the rankings of such favorites as *THIRD REICH*, *THE LONGEST DAY*, and *VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC*. Too, in some cases the re-rating corrected unjustified values (as, for example, those for *STRUGGLE OF NATIONS*) brought about by a limited sample response to the first attempt. Often these merely reflected the unfamiliarity with innovative systems by a handful of purchasers. And, needless-to-say, the converse holds true; a number of elder titles, when compared with current state-of-the-art designs, show their age. We need but refer to *LUFTWAFFE* and *FRANCE '40*.

Surprisingly in our sophisticated age, the hardware of a game—the components—often form, and dominate, the first impressions of a title among buyers. The attention to detail and graphic talents of Avalon Hill's fine cadre of artists and craftsmen is renowned. This is not to say that new techniques and new policies are always greeted with acclaim. But in a value conscious time, Avalon Hill's logo still means quality for the price. The average, given the range of ratings for **Components**, is 3.23, indicative of this perception among the survey respondents. The following, the ten titles with the best ratings, are therefore truly remarkable in their eye-pleasing detail and utility:

Components

1.	G.I.:	AN	VI	10	F	V	IC	27	-0)F	? }	1						1.93
2.	CRO	SS	OF	IR	0	V		4							2			1.95
3.	THE	LOI	VG	ES	T	D.	A	Y	٤.,		•							1.95
	CRES																	
5.	SQU	AD	LE	AD	E	R												2.09
6.	BAT	TLE	0	FT	H	EL	Bl	U	10	GE	Ē	8	1					2.46
7.	THE	RUS	SS	IAM	10	2	4/	И	P	A	10	G/	٧				2	2.53
	SUBI																	
9.	THIR	DR	El	СН														2.67
	ANZI																	

To my mind, the software – rules and systems – of any game are vastly more important than the hardware. The physical components of a game can be upgraded with relative ease (an Avalon Hill specialty with previously released titles acquired from other publishers); not so the intangibles. Often no amount of developmental skill can save a game with unplayable systems, vague and contradictory rules, or that is neither competative nor exciting in play.

Nothing is more exasperating for the novice (and the veteran too, for that matter) than rules which raise more problems than are resolved, or that have flaws and failings obvious even to him. The newcomer could do no better than utilizing the above as an introduction to our hobby. A bonus lies in the appreciation that these ten titles span the gamut of level of simulation (from tactical to strategic) and complexity (from 1.19 to 6.52). Taken together, these games provide an intensive "short course" initiation for the novice wargamer. The cream of Avalon Hill's line:

Completeness of Rules

1.	CA	4ES	AR	A	E	SI.	A												2.32	
				-	-														2.48	
																			2.52	
4.	BA	ATT	LE	OF	TH	IE	E	36	IL	G	E	1	81	1					2.53	
5.	S7	OR	MO	DV	EF	24	1F	٢٨	IH	IE	N	1							2.73	
																			2.79	
7.	M	DV	VAY	1.											÷				2.80	
8.	S7	AL	ING	R	4D	١.													2.88	
9.	VI	CTO	ORY	11	V7	H	E	P,	4	C	IF	10	;						2.89	
10.	AF	AB	-ISI	RA	EL	11	N	A	R	S		4	2			5			2.92	

A further important consideration for the novice, and for anyone searching for the elusive good "game", is the **Playability** of a title. This amorphous quality has no simple parameters. However, it appears that a tenuous relationship can be sketched between this and "Completeness of Rules" since six titles are common to both lists of the ten best in the respective categories.

Playability

	1. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGI	N						2.12
	2. MIDWAY							2.21
	3. VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC							2.22
	4. WARATSEA				÷			2.37
	5. STORM OVER ARNHEM							
	6. AFRIKA KORPS							2.48
	7. NAPOLEON							
	8. WATERLOO							
	9. WOODEN SHIPS & IRON I	M	E	N				2.67
1	10. STALINGRAD							2.75

For the historian-gamer, the "simulation" is the key to enjoyment. And make no mistake, the historical aspects of our titles provide much of the fascination for novice and expert alike. Gone are the days when Avalon Hill games "put YOU in command". But the echo remains. Few elements of game design come under closer scrutiny or more vociferous criticism by reviewers and public than the "historical accuracy" of a release. Given that no game can ever be a "perfect" simulation of war, some of our titles seemingly approach the boundaries. And, a pleasent surprise, one (*CAESAR ALESIA*) even has a relatively low "Complexity" rating—giving lie to the old designer's "saw" regarding realism and complexity.

Authenticity

1. CRESCENDO OF L	00	0	N	1								1.85
2. G.I.: ANVIL OF VIC	27	0	R	Y		4						1.88
3. STRUGGLE OF NA	T	10	N	S								1.92
4. CROSS OF IRON												1.99
5. THELONGEST DA	Y						•					2.04
6. WOODEN SHIPS &	21	R	01	V	N	1E	N	1				2.39
7. SQUAD LEADER												2.45
8. TOBRUK								÷				2.50
9. CAESAR ALESIA												2.52
10. ANZIO												

Of prime interest in our fast-paced world is the time commitment demanded by many titles. Avalon Hill has long catered to the adult gamer, those whose profession, education, family and other pursuits make their personal free time precious. Luckily, Avalon Hill's extensive line can satisfy their requirements in this regard, spanning the range from *RICHTHOFEN'S WAR* to *THE LONGEST DAY*. The basic scenario of a number of games can be played to conclusion in under two hours (tournament organizers, take note). The following are the ten quickest-playing games, a library of tactical challenge:

Shortest Game Length

	. RICHTHOFEN'S WAR
	2. AIR FORCE
	B. DAUNTLESS 1 hr., 6 min.
ŝ	WOODEN SHIPS & IRON MEN . 1 hr., 10 min.
	5. ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 1 hr., 27 min.
į.	6. WARATSEA 1 hr., 31 min.
	7. SUBMARINE 1 hr., 34 min.
Ň	B. PANZER LEADER 1 hr., 35 min.
ŝ	0. TRIREME
1(. <i>NAPOLEON</i> 1 hr., 37 min.

For those who want to really "sink their teeth" into a game, the following should be to their taste:

Longest Game Length

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1.
۱.
1.
۱.
۱.

8. GETTYSBUR	G	. 9 hrs., 31 min.
9. FORTRESS E	UROPA	. 8 hrs., 11 min.
10. 1776		. 7 hrs., 31 min.

To see where a favorite falls, it is helpful to compare the ratings to those of a hypothetical "median game". Obviously, this is but a crude indicator, being that the ratings for this "median game" are simply the averages of all responses for each category. These also serve to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the entire AH wargame line. Our efforts at much more detailed computer analysis and summary of interrelated factors will provide exacting insights. Nevertheless, for the edification of the readers in determining how their favorites fare, the ratings for the "median game" are:

Overall Value: 3.44 Components: 3.23 Map: 3.55 Counters: 3.09 Player's Aids: 3.28 Complexity: 4.98 Completeness of Rules: 3.28 Playability: 3.20 Excitement Level: 3.28 Play Balance: 3.34 Authenticity: 3.51 Basic Scenario Game Length: 14.67 Advanced/Campaign Game Length: 35.34

Most of the impetus for embarking on this task was my interest in what the readers are familiar with and, therefore, would like to see dealt with in these pages. I desired some manner of obtaining a percentage—from a controlled data base—of those readers who would be interested (no matter

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how superficially) in an article on a particular title. I have long harbored reservations about the worth of our "So That's What You've Been Playing" column serving this function. With the exception of a handful of the top titles, the ratings fluctuate to such an extent and their rankings are so obviously affected by recent issues of The GENERAL that it is of little worth in projecting contents of future issues. While the respondents do represent only 4% of the readership, I must assume that the percentage of response to each title would not vary drastically if the entire subscriber list were involved. Thus, looking over the past few issues, it appears that PANZER LEADER, PANZERBLITZ, THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN and AFRIKA KORPS deserve considerable attention in our pages. This then becomes my next priority, the fostering of quality submissions on these, and other popular but slighted titles.

Due to space limitations, this has been only the most superficial of reportage on our efforts, containing little of insight or analysis. We are currently delving deeper into the mass of numbers generated by this and I have come to some intriguing conclusions to pass along-all of which must wait until the ADVENTURE GAME RBG is completed. I hope to take a look at what is of crucial importance in various types of our games (tactical, strategic, operational, naval, WW2, etc.) and what is of but passing interest. Too, we've here only looked at the best of our titles; as important is to acknowledge the failings of some releases and look critically at the categories in which, should they be updated, effort should be spent to bring them up to the high standards that hobbyists today demand. In summation, it is thought that the new RBGs reflect the perceptions of our readers rather well.

						WAR	GAME F	RBG							
	Overall				Player's		Completeness		Excitement	Play			Length	Number of	Percentage
Title	Value	Components	Map	Counters	Aids	Complexity	of Rules	Playability	Level	Balance	Authenticity	Shortest	Longest	Responses	of Total
1. G.I.: Anvil of Victory	2.02	1.93	1.84	2.14	2.15	9.24	3.01	3.38	2.19	2.36	1.88	12.84	35.33	264	29.8%
2. Cross of Iron	2.06	1.95	2.15	2.00	2.13	8.19	3.29	3.13	1.94	2,38	1.99	11.61	29.27	532	60.1%
3. Third Reich	2.21	2.67	2.63	2.95	2.67	8.91	3.81	3.40	2.38	2.88	2.73	25.94	69.24	273	65.6%
4. Crescendo of Doom	2.23	1.97	1.85	2.11	2.07	9.13	3.12	3.08	2.06	2.50	1.85	12.15	30.20	224	50.6%
5. The Russian Campaign	2.29	2.53	2.76	2.79	2.83	3.83	2.52	2.12	2.32	2.74	3.11	17.44	37.74	540	61.0%
6. Squad Leader	2.31	2.09	1.92	2.12	2.31	7.55	3.48	2.87	2.28	2.57	2.45	10.17	27.90	680	76.9%
7. Wooden Ships & Iron Men	2.53	3.04	3.95	2.84	2.88	5.12	2.93	2.67	2.43	2.50	2.39	7.01	34.90	464	52.4%
8. War & Peace	2.61	2.76	2.85	2.80	2.77	5.08	3.46	2.93	2.79	2.96	3.04	13.04	57.19	374	42.3%
9. Battle Of The Bulge '81	2.67	2.46	2.03	2.55	2.61	4.01	2.53	2.94	2.78	3.43	2.91	19.62	35.09	277	31.3%
10. The Longest Day	2.68	1.95	1.93	1.97	2.15	7.40	3.72	3.54	2.85	3.36	2.04	24.44	170.68	119	13.4%
11. Victory In The Pacific	2.72	2.86	3.33	2.44	2.74	2.46	2.89	2.22	2.45	3.23	4.52	16.96	22.36	420	47.5%
12. Caesar Alesia	2.85	3.01	2.98	2.98	3.23	3.85	2.32	2.89	2.63	3.28	2.52	25.14	32.57	252	28.5%
13. Struggle Of Nations	2.92	3.03	3.33	2.98	2.56	9.05	3.72	4.09	3.26	2.96	1.92	29.50	81.78	123	13.9%
14. Storm Over Arnhem	2.97	2.79	3.35	2.30	2.94	3.43	2.73	2.41	2.50	3.11	3.88	18,22	22.57	232	26.2%
15. Fortress Europa	3.00	2.72	3.01	2.56	2.69	5.92	3.21	3.21	3,04	3.33	3.00	21.17	49.05	345	39.0%
16. Submarine	3.08	2.64	4.06	2.37	2.52	6.83	3.13	3.08	2.67	3.03	2.74	9.41	26.15	281	31.8%
17. Midway	3.13	3.51	4.37	3.25	3.47	2.92	2.80	2.21	2.48	3.14	3.44	14.75	20.74	395	44.7%
18. Anzio	3.17	2.72	2.46	2.49	3.05	6.35	3.18	3.86	3.43	3.34	2.68	18.63	63.40	292	33.0%
19. Panzer Leader	3.19	2.94	3.14	2.66	3.03	6.01	3.31	3.13	2.91	3.25	3.50	9.49	25.80	479	54.2%
20. 1776	3.21	2.97	2.32	3.70	3.03	5.79	3.09	3.03	3.02	3.37	3.10	10.16	45.09	373	42.2%
21. Flat Top	3.23	3.12	4.07	2.92	3.11	7:13	3.22	3.67	2.89	2.47	3.16	24.51	57.39	196	22.1%
22. Panzerbltiz	3.35	3.08	3.49	2.66	3.27	5.15	3.73	2.90	2.96	3.15	3.94	10.35	23.07	448	50.6%
23. Bismarck	3.45	2.96	3.52	2.67	2.74	5.33	3.43	3.25	3.15	3.50	3.06	12.41	26.35	248	28.0%
24. Air Assault On Crete	3.52	2.95	2.87	2.89	3.13	4.99	3.02	3.26	3.42	3.26	3.07	15.52	26.53	239	27.0%
25. Fury In The West	3.53	3.14	3.71	2.81	3.42	3.74	3.17	2.94	3.22	3.50	3.72	16.14	30.01	100	11.3%
26. Caesar's Legions	3.54	3.35	3.29	3.42	3.45	4.10	3.15	3.33	3.73	3.94	3.79	12.53	25.53	136	15.3%
27. Dauntless	3.61	4.02	5.33	3.64	4.01	6.06	3.85	3.22	3.15	2.87	3.29	6.66	19.94	120	13.5%
28. Guns Of August	3.66	3.37	3.22	3.10	3.19	4.80	3.67	3.79	4.44	3.33	2.98	18.68	60.06	297	33.6%
29. War At Sea	3.71	3.67	4.17	3.17	3.65	1.36	2.48	2.37	3.51-	3.71	5.98	9.09	12.71	396	44.7%
30. Gettysburg	3.72	3.12	2.98	3.09	3.23	5.46	4.64	4.41	3.42	3.97	2.84	13.25	57.13	248	28.0%
31. Air Force	3.74	4.16	5.30	3.93	3.96	5.68	3.98	3.34	3.34	2.49	3.35	5.61	16.02	192	21.7%
32. Arab-Israeli Wars	3.74	3.05	4.24	2.41	2.71	6.52	2.92	3.52	3.36	3.79	3.06	8.69	25.36	308	34.8%
33. Little Round Top	3.75	3.60	3.50	3.78	3.85	4.53	3.53	3.39	3.57	3.39	2.96	13.04	17.00	56	6.3%
34. Trieme	3.80	3.76	4.27	3.40	3.23	3.73	3.33	3.60	3.96	2.75	3.70	9.51	25.79	72	8.1%
35. Waterloo	3.83	4.17	4.29	3.95	4.28	1.93	2.95	2.64	3.76	3.60	5.00	17.08	23.13	296	33.4%
36. Napoleon	3.87	3.29	3.84	2.61	3.83	2.63	3.27	2.56	3.02	3.74	4.89	9.69	14.40	159	17.9%
37. Afrika Korps	3.92	4.38	4.02	4.12	5.63	2.11	3.30	2.48	3.44	3.65	5.09	14.49	19.13	492	55.6%
38. Alexander	4.03	4.05	5.18	3.63	3.93	4.10	3.69	3.18	3.43	4.22	3.57	12.34	17.93	217	24.5%
39. Tobruk	4.06	3.53	5.29	2.74	2.87	7.06	3,48	4.47	4.61	3.50	2.50	11.28	32.50	304	34.3%
40. Richthofen's War	4.14	3.14	3.17	3.12	3.38	4.20	3.32	2.91	3.31	2.68	3.98	4.22	21.15	311	35.2%
41. Jutland	4.17	3.20		2.92	3.54	5.15	3.61	3.83	3.76	4.04	3.22	16.01	36.66	193	21.8%
42. PanzerArmee Afrika	4.17	4.24	4.06	3.96	3.80	4.18	3.79	3.99	4.51	3.50	3.70	15.51	25.24	144	16.2%
43. D-Day	4.22	4.07	4.58	4.10	4.06	2.31	3.04	2.88	3.92	3.95	4.64	17.54	26.25	367	41.5%
44. Chancellorsville	4.39	3.80	3.97	3.72	4.05	3.26	3.35	3.52	4.14	5.91	4.67	14.76	24.96	140	15.8%
45. Stalingrad	4.39	4.29	4.79	4.26	4.39	2.03	2.88	2.75	3.84	4.18	5.83	20.57	28.85	320	36.1%
46. Luftwaffe	4.45	3.75	3.90	3.24	3.92	4.53	3.77	3.79	4.25	4.23	4.79	13.36	34.14	372	42.0%
47. France '40	4.79	3.49	3.42	3.56	3.52	3.92	3.47	3.75	4.62	5.03	4.06	16.27	26.95	244	27.6%
48. Blitzkrieg	4.73	4.16	4.11	4.31	4.08	5.80	3.65	3.77	4.50	2.71	5.27	20.43	41.44	336	38.0%
49. Tactics II	5.62	5.25	5.39	4.93	4.87	1.19	2.79	3.23	5.39	2.85	6.34	11.70	19.29	285	32.2%

GLASS ANVIL A Dissenting View of G.I.: ANVIL OF VICTORY

James Collier is one of the newest members of the SL playtest and development team, having made his initial contributions with GI. Unfortunately, as the reader will soon see, Mr. Collier's experience was apparently not an altogether happy one. Frustrated by his inability to get more of his views accepted in published form in the game, he has been outspoken in his criticism of the game. His critique, and our reply to it in these pages, is in no way meant to belittle Mr. Collier's opinions. To the contrary, he makes several excellent points which will be addressed to the benefit of the game system as this monumental project continues to evolve. On the other hand, we do disagree with the majority of his opinions and will summarize these disagreements following his presentation. Regardless of whether the reader is more influenced by Mr. Collier's criticisms or the rebuttals, I wish to publicly thank him for his participation in the playtest. The game is better for his involvement and contributions made in the past, and we wholeheartedly welcome his participation in future endeavours. His critique makes fascinating reading and offers us a better chance, in rebuttal, to give the players an inside look at the design process than could be accomplished with mere Designer's Notes.

There is no doubt in my mind that having paid 330.00 plus for a GI "gamette", I would be satisfied with what I got. No game is without its faults in the eyes of the individual player. Each individual will have biases, preconceptions and expectations; it would be unreasonable to expect to satisfy them all. This dissent therefore addresses itself to two major and fundamental concerns only: the philosophical direction of the rules development, and the soundness of the American design.

By now it should be generally recognized that the SQUAD LEADER series is virtually unique among WWII board games by being a game in evolution. The succeeding gamettes have not been mere additions to the original, but instead have introduced substantial revisions to the original parameters. This is even more true with GI where the bulk of both components and rules represent revisions rather than new material. There are, for example, only 300 more counters than provided with CRESCENDO OF DOOM, and well over half the GI counters represent replacements for counters previously introduced (only a handful of the original SL counters are still usuable in their printed form). Despite their variety, many of the new vehicle and ordnance pieces are still replacements for the original US counters; except for the heroes, all the new infantry counters are replacements or just US versions of existing types.

Though one must pay the price of forfeiting obsolete materials above and beyond the purchase price, the loss can be accepted as the cost of progress. There are few who would quibble with the appropriateness of the added dimensions of the revised vehicle and ordnance counters introduced in *CROSS OF IRON*. That process is, of course, carried forward in *COD* and *GI* to include the relevant nationalities. Now *GI* introduces a similar order of revision for the infantry counters in addition to a number of new maneuvers and capabilities. As this evolution continues, one is eventually compelled to ask where it is going and why?

Though the mass and variety of the game keeps increasing, the purpose of the increase is nebulous. One would think the objective is a closer simulation of the historical model—more realism. Yet each By J. M. Collier

new facet is caught in a stranglehold of subservience to a presumed requirement of "playability". Unfortunately, from my perspective this development has been schismatic. The result does not correspond with the logical application of convention to the known historical setting and does add considerable complexity and mechanistic burden to the flow of the game.

The practical result is that players often cannot respond to the spirit of the rules but must respond to the letter of the rules instead. This is no small challenge as the rules have become so long, convoluted and at times contradictory that a game of SL more often resembles a legal battle with each side calling for continuances to meticulously research the body of the "law" in order to justify their verdict for resolution of the particular conflict in question. This satisfies neither the realist who deals better with more historically accurate detail and fewer arbitrary constraints, nor the gamer whose objective is to sit and play, not sit and argue. The potential fate of such a schism is not compromise but alienation of these two major factions of players. (In all fairness, it must be noted that a substantial amount of effort in GI has gone into collecting and refining several of the more confused and disparate rules to good effect.)

Several examples can be considered. *GI* provides a significant change in the rules for transporting personnel by vehicles. After protracted argument, Mr. Greenwood was finally persuaded that infantry who load onto a stationary vehicle with less than their maximum MF could pro-rate the remaining infantry MF to vehicular MP and continue moving. If nothing else, this allows consistency with cavalry and motorcycle rules. However, he balked at allowing both vehicle and personnel to move prior to the act of loading even within constraints. His argument is that this allows for too much coordination; and we all know that confusion reigns on the battlefield.

First, this selectively ignores the inescapable fact that the time course of events in SL and in all two-player board wargames is greatly compacted due to the unavoidably detailed knowledge of enemy dispositions and unanimity of friendly intent and decision. Secondly, it defies the simple logic that it ought to be a simple matter to summon a vehicle just down the road or out behind the building. But the truly illogical and inconsistent fact is the prohibition of both loading and unloading in the AdvPh. A squad can carry a MMG out of a house, over a wall and up a wooded slope in the AdvPh but cannot perform the simple task of jumping down off the open deck of a tank. This sort of constraint is completely arbitrary. How it aids playability is unfathomable, and it is certainly frustrating to the realist who "sees" men dumbly sitting on an idling tank while danger lurks on a nearby ridge.

There is an effort in GI to introduce conventions for "command control". This would only seem reasonable in a game which by its very name purports to emphasize the role of the small unit commander. The evolutionary trend has been to increasingly portray the battlefield psychodynamics of both individuals and groups. But the command control rules provided are so ludicrously simplistic as to be contemptible. Apparently playtest comments and general correspondence have indicated a negative desire to emphasize command control. This is certainly a difficult aspect to simulate mechanically. But the information seems to imply that only a select group of hard-core simulators are even interested in such rules. Other players will simply ignore them if optional. If such rules are to exist, they ought to respond to the requirements of those who actually desire them.

The first module (on the following page) contains two versions of rules providing for what was originally labeled a "morale challenge" and finally published as "Rally Phase Surrender". On initial reading the originally proposed rules appear quite complex (Mr. Greenwood's term was "horrid"). But if a few moments of thought is given to the historical and psychological considerations which prompted them, they become much clearer. The initial observation was that, despite entertainment media demonstrations to the contrary, it is only the most stalwart or fanatic of souls who will face the lethal assaults of an enemy force of obviously great superiority. Crediting victory to a player who only manages to salvage a handful of survivors in a supposedly important building while a horde of enemy infantry gather in the streets outside is not a tenably realistic outcome. In reality, those survivors would be strongly tempted to chance their lives on a surrender or a rout.

Several particulars then need consideration. 1) Very few individuals are immune to fear. Regardless of at-start morale, any unit which becomes isolated is more likely to be subject to the consequences of fear. 2) Leaders, though relatively more resistant to surrender or rout, are nevertheless still human and still susceptible to fright. 3) The situation of the defending (inferior) force ought to be highly relevant. A 16 IFT attack is much less threatening in a stone building than in open ground. 4) The obvious presence of attacking (superior) force ordnance or AFVs ought to constitute a significant perceived threat. 5) The same-phase ability of the defender to call down an FFE on the challengers might well vitiate the challenge. 6) The challenge is not neccessarily intended to take prisoners. It may be quite sufficient to threaten the defender into routing away. But if prisoners are to be taken, the attacker ought to be constrained to maintain the threat until the prisoners are actually secured. 7) The surrender of military units is an exercise in group psychology. The resistance or surrender of others will certainly affect a unit's decision.

In sum, once the general objective of a rules provision is established, and with it the particulars to be emphasized, the rules often manifest themselves. Rules then need only be appreciated as a convention by which to represent reality, not as largely arbitrary constraints. If the rules are realistic, they are relatively easy to recall because they reflect common knowledge and logic.

Of more compelling interest is whether or not both the realists and the gamers will enjoy playing the *new* Americans. From my very first experience with them, my attitude toward playing the US units has been one of perpetual frustration. As I progressed through the *GI* playtest, this attitude of defeatism became increasingly burdensome and inescapable. No matter what your philosophical bias, if the edge of competition is lost, so is the enjoyment.

The SL system has grown into a Gothic structure of interdependent facets. Few changes can be made without militating effects at multiple points. At their foundation, US units were decreed to have a substandard base morale (ML6) but were theoretically compensated by freedom from Desperation Morale. In theory this should have imposed a different sort of thinking and tactics on the US player but still have permitted a competitive chance for victory. In practice, I have found this to be untrue and infer the same of other players. Subsequent scenarios, commentaries, contests and replays have generally favored use of US paratroops with ML7 and virtually ignored the 6-6-6s. (Part of this neglect may be due to the design blunder in two of the original six US scenarios which virtually required players to hunker on the floor like children to play on four end-to-end boards, to the considerable detriment of their more vulnerable backs.)

The conclusion is that the 6-6-6s are not competitive without a lot of special help. It doesn't matter how well a unit might have rallied if it is eliminated by a double-break. Being broken with a ML6 engenders a significantly greater fragility and provides a relative handicap to rally attempts subsequent to the first. Theoretically, broken US units ought to be able to stay in the line being free from repeated imposition of DM. In practice, this would only invite more casualties, a fact reinforced by the sacrament of the leader-loss induced MC to which troops attempting to rally are necessarily vulnerable.

COD and now GI have introduced new levels of sophistication into the activities of infantry units. In general, these have conspired to compound and recompound the inherent weaknesses of the US forces. The newest and most profound of these changes is the "greening" concept, whereby units may suffer permanent impairment of ability from a given level of morale failure. Though potentially applicable to any combatant, it is mandatory for all US units and in only three of the fifteen GI scenarios is it ever applicable to a non-US force. In my opinion, this represents a double penalty. I concur, as would most students of the era, with the basic premise that US units were more reluctant to take casualties than other armies and were thus more likely to break off an engagement against stiff resistance. There is also the issue of inadequate preparedness for the rigors of combat. But this latter was a problem universal to all combatants to some degree. And US soldiers overcame these problems as witnessed by ferocious fighting performances Bataan, Salerno, Cassino, Utah Beach and Bastogne-to name a few.

This lesser morale has many more subtle consequences than just the obvious vulnerability to fire. US units are more likely to lose concealment or be discovered when hidden. They are less likely to survive movement to close combat or pass a PAAMC (though more likely to obtain a KILL). They are less likely to succeed in placing a Demo Charge and more likely to lose possession of their SWs, especially for DF purposes if hit by prep fire. (It may be argued that the US has the advantage of an inherent LMG-the BAR. This is probably more of a design convenience since if represented it would probably have to be a 1-6/B11 LMG counter. In tactical deployment and contribution to total firepower it is just not that significant.) US units are less likely to create Scouts or Snipers or to deploy into Half-Squads-and US HSs are weaker and thus less likely to be desired, especially from Second Line infantry squads. (Whether by design or by limitations of counter space, the Second Line US squads must be deployed as green HSs and may only reform into green squads regardless of their experience in the current game. This uncovers one of the little absurdities of this game system. When reformed into green squads, these units will have a higher smoke-making capacity than their unit of origin.) The erosive effects of Suppression Fire will tell on them more and they are more likely to suffer casualties and, thus, lose Battlefield Integrity. As a consequence, they are more likely to be susceptible to surrender. There are a variety of terrain and

Module 1

The originally proposed 153.4 If at any time in Prep Fire Phase the phasing player can confront an "Morale Challenge": individual squad/halfsquad/crew/SMC with the potential to deliver an attack with at least 3 times the firepower possessed by the unit, including any defending SW (EXC: FT, DC) and FFE (must have current radio contact and battery access and in-place Red SR or FFE), then the attacker can challenge the defender's morale, provided the defender is not within 4 hexes or its normal range LOS of an unbroken friendly unit. The 3X FP is not just the summed attacker's FP but rather the ability to deliver a modified IFT equivalent to 3X FP accounting for TEMs (Eg. a 12 IFT against Infantry in woods is equivalent to 8 IFT). Against a leader or Hero, the potential must be equivalent to an unmodified 16 IFT. Ordnance may not be counted for the attacker unless a direct fire hit is certain excluding breakdown. A multi-unit defending hex can be challenged providing each and every unit in the hex can be challenged. Weapons which always affect every unit in a hex may be counted against each unit. At least one attacking squad equivalent must be able to move adjacent to the defending hex in the following Movement Phase.

> 153.41 The defender, if correctly challenged, must then make a MC against each unit challenged. There is a -1 DRM for each other unbroken counter in the hex and leader DRMs apply. There is a +1 DRM for any other broken counter in the hex, +2 if the checking counter is itself broken, +1 for each multiple of FP superiority above 3X. Any broken leader's DRM becomes a + DRM.

> 153.412 Check the morale of the current highest morale level unit first. then any others in declining order. Leaders of current ML equal to a MMC roll first. If the current ML of other units are equal, that with the highest BPV rolls first. Always check broken units after all unbroken units have checked. The DRMs apply at the moment each unit checks. (EXAMPLE: 8-1, 8-3-8 with 2 ML loss and 4-6-7 with 1 ML loss in the same hex. 8-1 checks first with -2DRM for two other unbroken units in the hex and passes. 8-3-8 and 4-6-7 have same current ML (6) so 8-3-8 checks first as it has highest BPV. It fails despite -3 DRM: -1 Ldr DRM, -2 two other unbroken units in hex. 4-6-7 now checks with net -2 DRM: -1 Ldr DRM, -1 other unbroken unit in hex (which is also the leader) and +1 for other broken unit in the hex. Had the leader failed at start, each other unit would have had a +2 DRM: +1 other unbroken unit, +1 reversed Leader DRM.)

> 153.413 Any unit failing is broken, regardless of other outcome. if all units in a hex fail, mark them with a DM counter of the attacker's color. Those so marked will surrender provided 153.21 is met by the following Rout Ph. Challenged units suffer no further penalty other than being made temporarily susceptible to surrender.

> 153.42 If the attacker has challenged but either is shown to have not met the criteria, or all challenged units in the same hex did not fail, then the potential PFP must be carried out. Surviving defending units behave as usual.

> 153.421 If the challenge is successful, the challenging units may then move provided that they could deliver the same strength attack in the following AdvFP, disregarding any movement penalties but accounting for any new PBF potential. The moving units may actually AdvF against any target of their choice. Their only requirement is to maintain the potential LOS.

> 153.422 If as a result of DF or other hazard (e.g. mines) neither this criteria nor that of 153.21 can be met at the start of the following RoutPh, the defending units lose the opposing DM counter and Rout normally.

The published "Rally 153.23 RALLY PHASE: At the conclusion of every RPh, unbroken in-Phase Surrender": fantry units subject to surrender (hereafter referred to as the inferior force) which are out of the LOS of, or are a number of hexes \geq their current morale from, a friendly unbroken leader or friendly AFV are subject to a surrender NMC if within the inherent normal range and LOS of opposing infantry. The dominant force (i.e. the opposing infantry) would have to be able to conceivably attack them in their next fire phase from their present positions with four times the inherent FP (five times if the defender is in possession of functioning ordnance or MG's) of the inferior force. No actual attack need take place, nor are the units involved deprived of any movement/fire possibilities in subsequent phases. Should the dominant force player feel that a surrender possibility exists, he merely points out the susceptible unit(s) and those units of his own which can supply the necessary inherent FP, being sure not to use any of his own units more than once. Inferior force units thus selected must take a NMC (HS's check morale with a IMC), and are broken if they fail. Such units are not subject to DM unless they are subsequently fired on. The dominant force need not necessarily be the more numerous and powerful side in play.

weather factors for which passage of a MC is required for optimal performance, or even survival, in which US units are less likely to succeed.

And still, that is not all. There is a stated principle that US leaders will be valued less than their counterparts in the other armies. As a result, US forces will be functioning with 7-0, 8-0 and 9-1 leaders while their opponents will have 8-0, 8-1 and 9-2 leaders in command. In tandem with the above, this is no minor handicap. These lesser leaders are themselves more likely to break and, as a consequence, force even more MCs on their already more fragile troops. Recognizing this risk, the smart US player will be most reluctant to stack leaders with MMCs, thus foregoing the benefits of the leader movement bonus, avoidance of cowering and longrange MG fire. What is more, not being stacked with their leaders, broken units are less likely to end up stacked with leaders during the first available Rally Phase and thus lose their supposed compensation of quicker rally. And since US leaders will often have a negative DRM, US units will often be trying to rally with a lesser ML, especially as the greening process continues. Finally, if the command control options are used, the weaker US leaders will more often be broken and their units thus out of control.

The second chart (next page) presents some statistical analyses of the fourteen GI scenarios which feature US troops. The major emphasis is on infantry comparison. The first column of the chart indicates which type of infantry is most numerous in the scenario, generally by Morale Level. [ELR] denotes scenarios where non-US units are subject to Green Unit Replacement. The second column is the

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ratio of leaders to squads (total number of leaders divided by total number of squads, including halfsquads and crews as 1/2 squad each). The higher the number, the greater the likelihood of leaders being available to help a particular squad (direct fire, rally, move, etc.). The next column is simply the average morale level of the leaders engaged; the fourth, their average leadership DRM. These should provide some idea of the quality of the leaders. The fifth column is a ratio of the total leadership DRMs divided by the total number of squads. This gives some indication of the effectiveness of the leaders in that a higher number implies that a given squad is more like to benefit from a leader DRM at various times in the game. The last column shows the general direction of changes made in the scenario during the playtest from the originally proposed draft to the published version. (Significant) implies that the scenario had to be drastically changed to substantially add strength or modify the victory conditions for the side indicated, in my judgement. The final entry on the chart is the average of the lines above (excluding the French forces in Scenario 35).

Looking over the chart, several observations emerge. The designer's philosophical bias is that German small unit leadership is superior to the US. This was to be reflected by both fewer leaders and lesser Morale Levels and Leadership DRMs among the American leader counters. Accordingly, for the whole GI package the average German leader DRM is significantly greater than the US and the German squads correspondingly benefit from better leadership per unit. However, the overall average leader to squad ratio and leader Morale Level are nearly

Scenario	Predominant Infantry Type	Leader per Squad	Av Leader ML	Av Leader DRM	DRM per Squad	Direction of Scenario Change
33	US Para Ger ML 7&8	.38 .29	8.2 8.3	.67 .83	.25 .24	Favor US (Significant)
34	US Para & Br ML 8 Ger SS	.38 .27	8.6 8.2	.88 .40	.33 .11	Favor Allies (Significant)
35	US ML 6 Fr ML 7	.32 .28	8.1 8.4	.57 .40	.18 .11	Favor US
36	US ML 6 Ger ML 7 [ELR]	.29 .33	8.0 8.3	.40 .63	.12 .21	Favor Ger
37	US Para Ger SS	.33 .33	8.3 8.5	.70 1.3	13 .42	About Even
38	US ML 6 Ger ML 7	.35 .34	8.3 8.6	.70 .60	.21 .20	Favor US
39	US ML 6 Ger ML 7&8	.35 .42	8.0 8.5	.38 .75	.26 .32	Favor Ger
40	US ML 6 Ger SS	.33 .44	8.1 8.5	.29 .75	.10 .33	Favor US
41	US Para & ML 6 Ger ML 8	.24 .45	8.8 8.6	1.2 1.2	.27 .55	Favor US
42	No US units	and the second second		WI2 CT		and the second second
43	US ML 6 Ger ML 7	.31 .33	8.3 8.3	.75 .67	.23 .22	Favor US (Significant)
44	US ML 6 Ger ML 7	.33 .50	8.4 8.8	.60 .75	.20 .38	Favor US (Significant)
45	US Para Ger ML 7	.25 .33	8.0 8.3	.33 .75	.08 .25	Favor Ger
46	US Para Ger ML 7 [ELR]	.33 .29	8.2 8.3	.25 .40	.08 12	Favor Ger (Significant)
47	US ML 6 Ger SS	.33 .38	8.6 7.6	.80 .40	.27 .15	Favor US
Average	US German	.32 .36	8.3 8.4	.61 .73	.19 (5.26) .27 (3.70)	

equal. Furthermore, during the course of the playtest it was necessary in four of the fourteen scenarios to add or improve US leaders and to devalue one German leader. (Conversely, in one scenario a US leader was devalued; in another scenario the number of German leaders was increased but the German Victory Conditions were also significantly increased.) Thus, in practice it was necessary to compromise the original bias.

Of more pertinent interest are the observations that in virtually all -12 of 14-scenarios some US elite squads are required for balance. One third of the scenarios feature elite US infantry units exclusively; in more than half of the remaining scenarios it was necessary to add additional elite infantry to assure balance. (Of the two scenarios without elite US units, one features a distinctly green German force. The other is a night scenario in which the German, as attacker, is actually outnumbered; even in this instance, some of the US infantry were upgraded from Second Line to First Line.) And finally, the course of scenario revision required changes to favor the US in two-thirds of the total. And, of five scenarios judged to be significantly changed, only one was changed to favor the Germans.

It can be argued that the purpose of a playtest is to adjust the balance of forces allocated in each scenario to arrive at a parity of victory opportunities. Therefore, it would be expected that some changes will be necessary. One assumes that the scenarios were designed based on a reasonably detailed historical research to delineate with accuracy the historical terrain and force composition. If that is so, then it would follow that a faithful design should reproduce, by simulation, the historical outcome fairly often and that adjustments should most often need be made to favor the historical loser or affect either side with near equal frequency. The foregoing analysis indicates conclusively that this was not the case in this playtest. Most of the historical sources were American victories. But in most of the simulations, the initially allocated U.S. forces lost most of the time.

Though this could reflect that the research and/or design were faulty, the consistency and the magnitude of the inequities suggest that another factor is at work. It is simply my contention that the other factor is inaccurate assessment and depiction of U.S. capabilities rather than inaccurate force composition. The implication is that, in actual play, the philosophical assumptions by which the scenarios were designed could not be adhered to and provide balance. The obvious conclusion is that the original philosophy is wrong. Following it without substantial modification leads to scenarios which are neither historically correct nor playably balanced.

Not just the US infantry have been so maligned. Again, there is no argument that in terms of gunpower and armor, the US AFVs were inferior to the German and Soviet AFVs. But, in *GI* the values assigned to many US vehicles are so poor as to render them little more than rolling junk. The example in the third chart (see right) demonstrates that in a front-to-front engagement at the relatively short range of 300m (7 hexes), a PzIV is 240% more likely to obtain a first shot kill on a Sherman than the reverse.

To heap insult on injury, the decision has been taken to rate bow MGs on AFVs as 2FP instead of 4FP. I dispute that decision and consider it another double penalty. BMGs already suffer from shorter range, lack of leadership modification, motion penalties and a restricted field of fire though they were usually the identical weapons to the infantry MMGs. AFV MGs have certain advantages not allowed for: larger and cleaner ammunition supplies, the security of being armored, at least as stable a mount, and a slight height advantage. It

was also surprising to see that the US halftracks are subject to Excessive Speed Breakdown at the lower level (red Movement Factors). This will give them a poorer performance than the German HTs (and the identical Russian vehicles). It is generally acknowledged that the SPW 251 was under-powered and that the German road-wheel interleaved suspension caused excessive mechanical breakdown. No modern AFV uses the German-style suspension, while the M5 HT is still in action in the armed forces of several nations.

In analyzing these armored aspects, we must return to our previous considerations of realism. There are actually two categories of realism: detail and outcome. The two are not necessarily compatible. I doubt the authenticity of the Allied 75mm tank gun ratings; but, even if they are accurate in detail, their use in SL yields an unrealistic outcome. (It is a little difficult to assess this outcome in the GI scenarios however. In not a single scenario do the Allies enjoy an actual AFV superiority of numbers over their Axis opponents. Historically, they generally did.) Despite the ravages of total air superiority and tank destroyers possessed of superior ballistic technology, a great many German AFVs were actually knocked out by Allied AFVs. Such a fact is not very likely to be repeated in the SL system. In the chart are some considerations of tactics for redistributing the dismally lopsided odds to favor the Sherman. It is obvious that some level of parity can be achieved by keeping the Sherman in motion-if it is fortunate enough to have a usable

Module 3

Tank Tactics: Sherman M4 vs. Pzkw IVH Pz IVH: Front Armor-+1 MA 75V Other Armor--1 Size-0

First Shot Kill Probabilities: Firer stationary, buttoned Target stationary Range 7-12 DRMs: + Buttoned-up -1 Size +1 Sherman frontal armor

Firer in motion, buttoned Target in motion Range 7-12 DRMs: +5 Motion +5 Moving target +1 Buttoned-up -1 Size +1 Sherman frontal armor Firer stationary, buttoned Target in motion Range 7-12 DRMs: +2 Moving target +1 Buttoned-up -1 Size +1 Sherman frontal armor Firer stationary, buttoned Change TCA one hex Target in motion Range 7-12 DRMs: +1 Change TCA +2 Moving target +1 Buttoned-up -1 Size

Note: If the VCA is changed as advocated by

+1 Sherman frontal armor

Mr. Collier, the DRM for change of CA becomes "+ 3", and the overall chance for a KIA drops to .10.]

gyrostabilizer. This was, of course, the historical tactic used. But it doesn't work out in SL for two reasons. First, there will always be an initial DF shot at the attacker (which the Sherman will have trouble surviving). Second, attempts to maneuver to flank or rear can be thwarted simply by pivoting the defending vehicle in DFP to again present the front facing. Possession of a more agile tank with fast turret and gyrostabilizer will not defeat this simple countermeasure. Finally, the uses of maneuver or ambush at close range are limited due to the highly detailed knowledge the potential prey will have of its hunter's whereabouts and condition in this type of board wargame.

Similar arguments are relevant to the issue of BMGs. The origin of the tank and the theory still prevalent in WWII was the concept of an antiinfantry weapon. In this concept, the role of the tank was often that of an MG carrier. Though described as secondary armament, the MGs were often the weapons with which the primary mission was accomplished. Limiting the majority of medium and heavy tanks to 4FP total MG makes it difficult to recreate this effect. If we pay attention to the rather compelling arguments presented by Hal Hock ("Tobruk Defended", The GENERAL, Vol. 19, No. 2), then perhaps it is the CMGs which have been underrated and the BMGs overrated. In either event, the impact of tanks on the infantry will be lacking in realistic outcome. (Mr. Greenwood may stress that Point Blank Fire is more likely for mobile tanks. This is true for the early war; but, as

Sherman M4: Front Armor-+1 M 75 Other Armor--1 Turret-+1 Size--1 Single Shot Kill Probabilities: Firer stationary, buttoned Target stationary Range 7-12 DRMs: +1 Buttoned-up +1 PzIV frontal armor 49 20 Firer in motion, buttoned Target in motion Range 7-12 DRMs: +3 Motion +2 Moving target +1 Buttoned-up +1 PzIV frontal armor .016 .023 Firer in motion, buttoned, Gyro Target stationary Range 7-12 DRMs: +3 Motion +2 Buttoned-up +1 PzIV frontal armor .34 .08 Firer in motion, buttoned, Gyro Acquisition of Target Target stationary Range 7-12 DRMs: +3 Motion +1 Buttoned-up -2 Acquired +1 PzIV frontal armor .24 .16

the use of potent infantry anti-tank weapons became common in the later years, this option is less viable)

Since SL is a game, playability cannot be ignored. The quest for realism must make some concessions to the need for equality in competition. One of the problems of this evolving game is the lack of uniform change for all nationalities. Though it may be planned for the future that all BMGs will be devalued and all HTs will be subject to lower ESB, for the next two or three years only the US (and some British) units will suffer the penalties. Once again the US player loses a little competitive edge.

The inescapable conclusion from all this is that the US Army in SL is not just different. It is distinctly second-class. It suffers from a cascade of penalties to which other combatants are much less susceptibleif at all. Though the penalty concepts may be based on historical fact, the actual mechanisms employed result in overkill both from a realistic and a playability viewpoint.

This polemic is not to say that there is nothing of value in GI. There are a number of new terrain features and improved procedures. But the major purpose of the gamette (so we players anticipated) is to bring the US Army into the mainstream of up-todate SL. It is my conclusion that players who anticipate doing so will be disappointed. These US components perform so poorly that playing with them is an unpleasant prospect and leaves one with a competitive disadvantage. Though the GI scenarios have been revised to accommodate the US inferiority, for the prospective DYO player, it might be just as well to select a Russian-or even Republican French-force. Perhaps DYO BRVs for US units will be 30 + % less than corresponding German components? Otherwise, squad for squad, tank for tank, the US player should expect to lose.

Finally, there is left the even more philosophical question of where SQUAD LEADER is going. The expansion gamettes have introduced a policy of not just introducing new boards and counters with which to play by the same old and tried rules, but of adding to and enlarging upon those rules. But, with this added complexity there is an undue hesitancy to make a firm committment to a truly high order of realism. Players who really stress ease of play will reject this complexity anyway, while those who seek realism will be frustrated. If both "gamer" and "simulator" are disappointed, the entire project will stall and may well perish.

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THE G.I. DESIGN TEAM REPLIES

By Don Greenwood, Bob McNamara and Jon Mishcon

First, from Don Greenwood, who needs no introduction:

At the outset, allow me to concede the point about the present sorry state of the rules organization for the entire game system. SL and its three gamettes have evolved in four separate rulebooks published over an eight year period of constant changes and improvements. The need for a rewritten, succinct and complete compilation of the entire game system in one rulebook is of major concern and will account for much of my time in the year ahead. When finished, the Advanced SQUAD LEADER Rulebook will be a major publishing event greater than any of the previous gamette releases. Beyond that, however, I feel that the majority of James' discontent stems from GPs scenario mix-which is admittedly not representative of the typical "action" fought on the Western Front in WW2.

Mr. Collier asks how America managed to win the battles of WW2 with a second-rate army? While I contend that the term "second-rate" is a mite strong, I feel the US Army owed its victories in Europe more to the factories of Pittsburgh than to its tactical prowess in Normandy. In short, the US Army won the war with quantity rather than quality. Most engagements fought by the US Army against the Germans were so lopsided in the Americans' favor that the outcomes were never a question of who would win so much as at what cost in time, men and material. Massive American superiority in airpower, sheer numbers of AFVs and support, and logistics usually paved the way for the GI. The Germans were rarely able to neutralize these advantages, and even then only briefly. It was relatively rare that the Germans and Americans faced each other on even terms. However, such encounters seem eminently more interesting to competitive players than scenarios in which the Americans only real adversary would be the imposition of arbitrary time limits for the accomplishment of the unhinging of an outclassed opponent; and therefore we chose to depict atypical situations to portray. These are situations in which Germany's true man-to-man and tank-to-tank qualitative superiority is not overcome by a wealth of American material advantages. In point of fact, all SL scenarios suffer from this problem to some extent. A time warp exists in the game system in that players are able to do more in a given time frame than any real life commander could do. In real life, given twenty minutes to take a position, an American CO would just call in artillery to pulverize the target; but as that is not very glamorous to portray in SL, our troops assault with a tenacity that would make Kelly's Heroes proud. In point of fact, James Collier's Command Control rule not withstanding, to really approximate the problems of command at this level the entire game system would have to be scrapped in favor of one in which getting any unit to do anything would be a major accomplishment. The oft-maligned cowering and grounding rules are actually grossly understated. It is more fun to portray our soldiers gallantly advancing and firing from the hip with imagined glee at dispatching another Hun than dwelling on their main preoccupation-staying alive. It would have been an easy matter to give Mr. Collier his easy victories, but somehow the prospect of mowing down outgunned defenders in situations wherein play balance would depend heavily on beating a clock rather than an enemy just didn't seem very exciting. In summation, I feel that Mr. Collier has overlooked the strategic advantages enjoyed by the US Army in WW2; to expect tactical superiority as well among comparative units prior to 1945 is not very firmly based in history.

On a more specific matter, Mr. Collier cites a vivid example of why he believes the game system unrealistic in not allowing loading and unloading in the Advance Phase. His statement is easy to agree with on the surface, until you put it in context with what this change means to the game system as a whole. To cite just one example: consider what transpires when you allow men to "jump down off the open deck of a tank" in the Advance Phase. Did the tank pay the 2 MP expenditure for unloading? If not, then the men are actually bailing out, aren't they? If it did expend 2 MP, then the tank is not considered moving for my DF, right? "But I didn't know that during my Defensive Fire Phase because you didn't state that you were going to unload in the Advance Phase, and if you did I didn't see the 'Will Unload' counter you forgot to place on the AFV because it was hidden by the other information counters you've since placed on it." Is it really any more realistic to allow men to leave a tank moving at 30 mph as orderly as if they put down a step ladder and dropped off-which is what Advance Phase loading and unloading allows? More importantly, Mr. Collier proposes mixing apples and oranges. Vehicles cannot move in the Advance Phase; yet he wants infantry to be able to move on and off them with impunity during this phase with no detrimental effect whatsoever on the vehicle. A vehicle's Advance Phase capability is factored into its Movement Factor, and to allow infantry to load or unload in the Advance Phase is to grant them the ability to do it without the vehicle-like some mythical air guitarist. Given the phase system of the game, infantry on an AFV must assume the vehicle's restrictions in the Advance Phase if they are to enjoy the full fruit of the vehicle's movement capability in the Movement Phase. While exceptions could certainly be written to allow this, I hardly think SL needs either more rules or more exceptions

As to the matter of Command Control, I will merely consign the reader to his own judgement of the relative merits of the two rules cited in Module 1 by Mr. Collier. For my tastes, the difference in pure verbiage alone makes the choice an obvious one. Transcending even that, however, is my gut reaction alluded to earlier that any true Command Control rules short of a computer or third-party moderated system are doomed to failure due to the player's omniscent view of the battlefield. Moreover, the simple fact is that players want to command their own pieces—even if their control of those forces in real life would be far less.

As an aside of relatively little consequence, I would differ with Mr. Collier's terming of those scenarios which use four end-to-end boards as a "design blunder". I point this out only because it illustrates the wide variance of likes and dislikes from one person to the next; in my opinion the scenarios he alludes to are among my four favorites in the entire system. This configuration allows for much more maneuver along a wide frontage or through a long corridor than the standard 3 X 3 configuration wherein piece densities are invariably unrealistically high with men and guns behind every bush and rock.

Mr. Collier's chief gripe with the GI infantry seems to be that the American 6-6-6 squads are not competitive due to their "6" morale level. I have little problem with this. Indeed, the overall effect of the ML 6 units is precisely what I wanted for reasons which are stated elsewhere in this article by my colleagues and need not be belabored here. The American forces were simply less accustomed to

hardship than their European counterparts-a trait even more marked in the recent Vietnam conflict where American servicemen (meaning no disrespect to the valor exhibited and hardships endured by our vets in that most regrettable conflict) retreated into an oasis base camp of cold beer, steaks, and all the attainable comforts of home between sorties with a suddenly appearing and disappearing opponent hardened by constant deprivation. That, Mr. Collier, was a battle which American arms did not win despite their huge technological edge. I would also point out that US second line troops are rare and used only to represent rear-area or battledepleted forces. Furthermore, the fact that a second-line unit must break down and then recombine to increase its smoke capability is, in itself, sufficient to make its smoke rating inferior and that is adjudged penalty enough.

Actually, I am much more concerned about the portrayal of the American firepower than their lessened morale. The decision to reduce American 8-4-7s to 7-4-7s was a very near thing and I'm not at all convinced that it was correct. Moreover, even the 6 FP of the line squads may not adequately portray the superiority of American firepower. The superiority of the M1 Garand and the two extra men per squad are enough in and of themselves to warrant 6 FP. The main weakness of the GIs' firepower is that at seven hexes or more, they're no stronger than the Germans-actually weaker if the latter has a LMG. Therefore, we propose to make Area Fire for a US squad equal to 1/2 FP +1. This small change provides a significant firepower increase without altering any counters, and neatly simulates the BAR's tactical usage. The German LMG was used as the base of its squad's firepower, with the squad's maneuvers dependent on it; the BAR, though, was used more to supplement its squad's firepower. So, since the BAR can't be used independently (i.e., neither at a separate target than the squad's nor by any unit smaller than a squad), its effect will be a definite plus for the American, but without the tactical versatility of a LMG-just its niche historically. I heartily recommend this change to all GI players.

The information James so carefully documents in Module 2 is totally unnecessary. I freely admit to the German bias he strives to prove-it forms the very cornerstone of the design of not only GI but the entire game system which identifies and exaggerates nationality differences for the sake of flavor. And the exaggerations are not as pronounced as Mr. Collier would have one believe. Virtually all historians, regardless of nationality, acknowledge the superiority of German small unit leadership at the outset of the war-a superiority which battlefield experience could only heighten in contrast to the Americans who were not yet battle-tested. As for changes in the scenarios tending to favor the US player, I fail to see any relevance therein. Perhaps as a newcomer to the SL playtest group, James may have been surprised by the amount of change taking place during the playtest. He needn't have been. Any veteran of my playtesters will testify to the amount of tinkering that takes place as a common occurrence. I tend to be more influenced by playtesting than anyone else I've ever come across, and changes are the rule rather than the exception. Few people, including the designer, would even recognize the initial playtest version of my current project (UP FRONT) in comparison to the published version. I don't believe any SL scenario (or any other game I've ever done) has ever gone through a playtest unscathed. That is what a playtest is for to my way of thinking. The initial scenarios are just starting points. Blending troop types within a scenario Order of Battle to achieve the historical performance is not only a valid design tool, but extremely effective also. That James wishes to attribute more significance to these changes is a matter that I do not feel any particular need to defend.

"US tanks are rolling junk." While Mr. Collier accurately points out several problems, I think he overstates his case. I will leave the point-by-point rebuttal to Bob McNamara (whose reply follows) who answers with much more expertise and skill than I could hope to muster. Instead, I will limit my response to two items of limited agreement. First, the matter of "First Shot" opportunities cited by Mr. Collier is a valid problem, although it is by no means limited in nature to the German's benefit. An experimental rule is found elsewhere in this article (Module 4) dealing with this very problem. Secondly, GI does suffer by pitting state-of-the-art rated American AFVs against CROSS OF IRON German ones. However, the old ratings of the German vehicles conceived prior to such things as "Turret/Upper Superstructure" armor inferiority does not always work to their advantage. The capabilities of some German AFVs will be enhanced while others are lessened. There is no denying that it would be nice to have the new German OB in GI: but there is a limit to how much you can stuff in a box-let alone how much you will be willing to spend for that box's contents. The publication of those revised counters in the next gamette will doubtless be of great help.

In summary, because I chose to depict relatively even situations, the overall image of US-German battles may be distorted; but the game system remains more faithful to history than Mr. Collier's perceptions. That may offend generations of Americans nurtured on John Wayne movies, Sgt. Rock comics, and episodes of *Rat Patrol* and *Combat* in which the Germans invariably oblige Sarge, Little John, Kirby, Caje, the Duke, et. al. by standing erect to catch a bullet before performing their "86's" into the dirt... but it is historic.



Speaking from the Playability Viewpoint By Jon Mishcon

Mr. Collier's comments are made from the viewpoint of a playtester who is entrenched solidly in the realism camp-so much so that he is constantly irritated by playability excuses that rebuff his suggested attempts to insert greater realism (and the accompanying rules) into the game. In developing the game, Don had to constantly weigh Mr. Collier's requests for more realism against the pleas of other testers who cited a need for increased playability. The decisions thus reached were not often easy ones. In any case, the reader may gain a better appreciation for his dilemma from the comments below by another SL playtester who leans toward playability in his approach to the game. Jon Mishcon, together with his playtest sidekicks Joe and Mike Suchar, have been among the most valued contributors to the SL system since their participation began with COI.

My bonafides for commenting on Mr. Collier's are based solely on my readings. In addition to the usual US and British official histories and unit accounts, I am fortunate to own a number of Australian, South African, Indian and other foreign texts. My opinion on American participation in World War II European combat is summed in three concepts. First, the GI was a rational combatant with little of the hatred for Germans that

possessed the Commonwealth or Soviet trooper. Generally speaking, he had little tenacity in combat but rather "broke" when it was prudent to do so, not when all cohesion had been lost. Secondly, the US Army had more of, and depended more heavily upon, every kind of support weapon and equipment than any other combatant. Of this support, the rapid, flexible, accurate, and prodigious use of artillery was most important. Third, by and large, US armor was under-armed and -armored compared to German AFVs. Only at very close range (The Bulge) or when maneuvering to the flanks (using their motorized turret race as compared to the German's hand-cranked, possibly with gyrostabiliers to maintain gun elevation) was this armor disadvantage minimized.

Before embarking upon a point-by-point review of "Glass Anvil", I will say that my overall assessment of GI is that it *does* reflect both the different psychology and effects of US ground forces in Europe in 1944-45. However, the rules are far too disorganized and complex, and the ordnance TO HIT and IFT/TO KILL rules need revision.

Point by labored point then:

1) *Boarding a moving vehicle*: Summoning a vehicle and then boarding it should have been a simple matter. Frequently it was not. If changed, this capability will give motorized infantry unrealistic mobility in battle.

2) Loading and Unloading in the Advance Phase: It is not the motion itself that is in question—rather the ability to do so without the exposure to fire penalties of the Movement Phase. The vulnerability of dismounting troops is a recurrent theme.

3) Command Control: I totally agree that good rules would be of great benefit. However, any such rules must take into account unit formation (line or column or dispersed), terrain (city or open field), exposure to fire, morale, leadership, training, environment, and exhaustion. Any rules we've come up with have either been overly complex or unrealistic.

4) *Morale Challenge*: I feel this proposal is very complicated and time consuming for little added realism. The attacker will start "counting factors" to qualify every turn. The end result is that this would slow play to a near standstill. And, I hate "counting factors".

5) US Army "Second Rate": I certainly agree that in every possible way the GI was less "warlike" than the others on the European battlefield. If you try to use the GI as you would a Briton, you will—and should—get a bloody nose. However, the US player has certain tremendous advantages. Key to the successful use of American forces lies in use of different tactics.

6) *Module 2*: I feel the Module 2 comparisons are most unfair. No account is taken of the the incredible changes in the rules that accompanied the changes in forces. A designer's eye for balance must change as the rules change. Furthermore, I feel the scenarios are still unbalanced—now being pro-American.

7) US Armor Effectiveness: Notwithstanding my feeling that a redo of the TO HIT/TO KILL system is overdue, and my agreement that the scenarios represent atypical situations, I think US armor is NOT "rolling junk". The M4A3 has frontal armor equal to that of a Tiger I. The ability of gyrostabilized guns to move and shoot is, if anything, overstated. Again it depends on the proper use tactically. Yes, the 75mm is damn weak and the MkIVH is more than a match for a single Sherman in *GI*. Yet, it is interesting to note that Colonel T.N. Dupuy in his *Numbers, Predictions & War* lists (for example) the German 11th Panzer as more than 150% Combat Effective (CEV) as compared to the 1st US Armored—number of vehicles notwith-

standing. I don't dispute a BMG factor of "2". Considering the extremely limited view from the vision slit and the distractions of a jolting tank in battle, a FP of "2" certainly sounds reasonable. Rather, other AFVs should have their BMG downgraded. I have to admit I was surprised about US halftracks being subject to excessive speed breakdown.

8) Why was the US Army so successful if it was "second class"?: I steal a quote (to the best of my memory) from a German who had first fought the Russians, then the British, before being captured by the Americans. When asked to compare the three armies, the German said the Russians were fanatical in attack or defense but inflexible, the British were brave and courteous but tended to do things slowly and pause between tasks. The Americans, well it was hard to say, all he recalled was the endless artillery strikes and fighter-bomber attacks. Not that he hadn't attacked or been attacked while facing Americans, just that it was hard to see them through all the explosions.

My answer to the problem of US play has been to develop more scenarios which may yet see print in 1983. Hopefully these will allow players to see more of the tactical problems encountered in Northwest Europe. Perhaps these, and time, will resolve the differences Mr. Collier and I share.

I'll close with what I think is the best non-US evaluation of the GI. In Robert Woollcombe's Lion Rampant: The 15th Scottish Division, Normandy to the Elbe, he describes his time with an American unit in Holland. An American patrol was doing recce for the British in the woods when the GIs were mortared. "As soon as they reached the woods there were bangs, and all the little figures came tumbling out . . . He [the American Captain] was not scared; it was simply the straightforward reaction that if there were bangs in a place the first thing to do was to get the hell out of it . . . 'We'll go back, Cap'n, if you say', said the tubby little engineer readily, panting away. And have gone back they would. I had only to say. The panting little captain-'We'll go back . . . if you say'-perfectly represents the Americans, as we saw them, in 1944."

1 guess I agree.

Rechecking Our Sources By Bob McNamara

Now we turn over the defense to Bob McNamara, who was ultimately responsible for much of the historical research and hardware data on which the design was based, as well as being judged the most valuable playtester in GI.

My first reaction after reading Mr. Collier's article was to check the GI Design Credits out of curiosity to see if he had been cited as a major playtester. Knowing from experience how much work and dedication is necessary to achieve this, I feel it is truly unfortunate that in spite of all the time and labor he expended, he is very disappointed with the final product. However, from the content of his article, I must infer that his disappointment with and criticism of the gamette derive more from his own preconceived notions and expectations than from research and analysis of the subject matter, especially insofar as the AFVs are concerned. His position is that since the "feel" of the Americans don't comply with his own impressions of what should be, the gamette's treatment of the GI is therefore wrong. I disagree with his overall conclusions (though not with all his contentions) and I believe that GI is a valid representation of the

American Army in WW2. I say this not to disparage Mr. Collier nor to present myself as some selfappointed expert—not at all. His opinions are pertinent and thought-provoking, and in the following pages I mean to examine some of them, not so much to refute them as to give the reader the view from this side—the type of research done and the reasons the game specs came to be what they are. I also wish to preface my remarks by stating that I am not a Germanophile; like Mr. Collier, I am interested in simulating a "correct" version of "reality", although the interpretation of this presents somewhat of a problem since there are roughly 230 million versions of reality in this country alone.

How we formulate the various "national characteristics" of our cardboard troops is a totally subjective process-history is, after all, nothing more than the currently accepted judgements of past events; so the prejudices of both the designer and his research materials cannot be escaped, and can only be mitigated by consulting with as wide a range of sources as possible. In my research, I attempted to acquire a balanced picture of the Americans by collating material from U.S., British and German sources, and I must admit that I had a few of my own preconceived bubbles burst in the process (perhaps the two biggest bangs came from reading about the poor design of both our early optical equipment and our halftracks). The upshot of this research was that the Americans were generally inferior to both the Germans and the British in individual disciplines, patriotic fervor, and military tradition-but superior to both in raw firepower as well as quantity (and in many respects, quality too) of material. Simply put, the GIs could dish it out a lot better than they could take it; their 6 ML is, in my opinion, a completely valid representation of this. In fact, Mr. Collier's paragraph which cites the "subtle consequences" of the 6 ML-and which is part of what he terms "overkill"-is to my mind a nicely stated proof that the game simulates the above-mentioned inferiorities rather well; in terms of the relative lack of discipline and aversion to authority among the GIs, a 7 ML would have caused a much more pervasive lack of realism than is presented by, for example, the fluke which makes it harder for them to push ordnance through mud or deep snow (really now, how often is it necessary to attempt this).

On the other hand, I am not (and never was) a fan of the "greening" process. During the playtest, I suggested several changes to it—none of which got off the ground (in retrospect, perhaps just as well)—and having only about a million other things on my mind, I didn't press the issue further. What I'd like to see is the 5-3-6 treated as just inexperienced infantry—which is all a green squad really was anyway—and used in a per-counter type of battlefield integrity wherein a squad of any nationality can be replaced by an appropriate elite or inexperienced counter as the result of specific acts of bravery or cowardice.

Mr. Collier's remarks are the philosophy expressed in GI that the Americans should generally have less effective leaders brings to mind another aspect of the game system which I feel requires further development: the fact that any leader who breaks, regardless of whether he is a 6+1 or a 10-3, subjects his squads to an equal penalty (i.e., the leader-loss MC). The early drafts of GI had a rule that varied the effects that different leaders had on their squads when those leaders broke; the rule was dropped however, with the result that players are still forced to unrealistically segregate each 90-day wonder from his squads lest in his demise he cause all his veterans to become so overwhelmed with grief that they are rendered lost for the duration of the scenario! An appropriate solution to this type of silly occurrence will both simplify movement considerations and aid the Americans.

Mr. Collier's probabilities for the GI scenarios made me wonder how they look in relation to those for prior scenarios in the SL system, so I duplicated his process on all the scenarios preceding GI which featured the Germans against either the Americans or the Russians. Below are the results:

American	(Sqds/Ldr) Ldr/Sqd	Ldr ML	Ldr DRM	(Sqds/DRM DRM/Sqd
SL	(2.38) .42	8.6	1.11	(2.27) .44
Post-SL excl GI	(2.63) .38	8.3	.49	(5.26) .19
Change from SL	(+11%) -9%	-3%	-56%	(+132%) -57%
Post-SL incl GI	(2.86) .35	8.3	.55	(5.26) .19
Change from SL	(+20%) -17%	-3%	-50%	(+132%) -57%
German (v	s Americans)			
SL	(2.33) .43	8.4	.86	(2.44) .41
Post-SL excl GI	(3.03) .33	8.5	.85	(3.70) .27
Change from SL	(+30%) -23%	+1%	-1%	(+52%) -34%
Post-SL incl GI	(2.86) .35	8.4	.79	(3.70) .27
Change from SL	(+23%) -19%	0%	-8%	(+52%) -34%
German (v	s Russians)			
SL	(2.33) .43	8.8	1.35	(1.85) .54
Post-SL	(2.38) .42	8.6	1.09	(2.17) .46
Change from SL	(+2%) -2%	-2%	-19%	(+17%) -15%
Russian	-			
SL	(9.09) .11	8.6	.67	(12.50) .08
Post-SL	(4.17) .24	8.2	.59	(7.14) .14
Change from SL	(-54%) +118%	-5%	-12%	(-43%) +75%
cont t		ing of the second s		C 111 1 1

This comparison—as well as Mr. Collier's—is very crude since it doesn't take into account such factors as the possibility of a nationality's overall advantage in SWs, AFVs, or the scenario's ratio of offensive to defensive postures for each nationality involved. Hopefully though, it is still valid enough to draw a few general inferences.

First, it's surprising to see that the German leadership in SL was, on the average, inferior to that of the Americans in terms of DRMs. However, scenarios subsequent to SL have reduced the American leaders' DRMs much more drastically than those of the Germans—and even prior to the release of GI. This is perhaps an indication that the SL Americans were too powerful in terms of their abundant leadership DRMs when coupled with squads that had no DM penalty.

Second, it is interesting to note that the GI averages for both American and German leaders do not substantially differ from those of the post-SL, pre-GI period. This would seem to refute any claim that the German leadership in GI had been weakened in order to compensate for the "second class" Americans.

Third, as the numbers show, the characteristics of Russian leadership have undergone a most tremendous change; the all-but-leaderless hordes are disappearing, and along with them is going much of the distinct "feel" that they originally possessed. This might be attributed to their original portrayal and feel being proven incorrect as the years have passed—but I think not. Rather, it's my belief that the cause is twofold. First is the emphasis on low unit density scenarios; if you have 27 Russian squads and three leaders, and one leader is KIA'd—well, you still have two left. On the other hand, if you have only nine squads and one leader, and he makes the supreme sacrifice, then you have big problems. Thus, there is a definite incentive to increase the Russian leader/squad ratio to lessen this new-found "weakness", and this is borne out by the fact that the SL Russians averaged one leader for about every nine squads but the post-SL Russians average one leader for about every four squads. The second cause is related to the first, and that is that the low density scenarios automatically reinforce this use of a "mutated" Russian tactical premise, which in turn eventually results in the presuppossing of German tactics (including leadership characteristics) for the Russians in the subsequent design (and play) of scenarios-even when the use of mass is a viable option. Hence, the unique differences of the Russian masses as portrayed in SL are slowly fading away as designers and players alike become unknowingly caught up in a vicious circle of change.

Perhaps this creeping tendency toward uniformity in tactical premises is one of the underlying reasons for Mr. Collier's disenchantment with the GI Americans, for they cannot be used like the Germans. If one plays the GIs like them, he will quickly be shown the errors of his thinking by a competent German player. The new GIs have been given their own feel and any player who cannot adapt his tactics to their unique qualities will lose with them. But, for a more "expert" opinion on the Americans' competitive aspects, I defer here to Bill "Fish" Conner, the 1982 COD tournament winner, a playtester of both COD and GI, and the epitome of a competitive player if ever there was one:

"While agreeing with Mr. Collier's analysis of the Americans in that their 6 ML and greening process are major liabilities, I feel that they are successfully able to compete because of other offsetting assets—"

1) Mechanical reliability and repairability of SWs.

2) Excellent range and firepower of SWs; the .50 cal. HMG is without peer.

3) Radios with "9" or less to make contact and "11" or less to maintain it.

 Superior smoke grenade ability, plus WP from squads, ordnance and offboard artillery (although I think WP should be more potent).

5) No DM for squads or crews-if used *correctly*, the Americans' most important asset.

"Tactics for the GIs must differ because of those advantages and disadvantages if maximum effectiveness is to be obtained. All players must, of course, always try to maximize firepower at the enemy while minimizing their own exposure to fire-'give more than you get'-but the GIs, because of their increased fragility (the 6 ML and the greening) must be more concerned than any other nationalities about exposing themselves to fire. The 6-6-6s and 6-6-7s have the most lethal combination of firepower and range in the game and must use this advantage to either inflict casualties-which in effect helps to minimize their fragility-or intimidate an enemy into leaving a position by the threat of firepower which could break him and leave him unable to rally free of DM. Spreading out, deploying half-squads with the SWs (with other HSs held in reserve), and using smoke grenades to block certain LOSs are some good methods of minimizing exposure without giving up too much firepower. Taking advantage of the GIs DMlessness and other assets depends upon the situation at hand-experience being the key ingredient. The American player must give extra consideration to the following:"

1) Proper positioning of leaders; this is critical to taking advantage of DM-lessness.

2) Knowing when to stack units and when not to.
 3) Knowing when to hold and when to fall back.

4) Best employment of bazookas and .50 cal. HMGs; one or two .50s properly positioned (and defended) can devastate the enemy. Sustain only when absolutely necessary.

"Personally, I enjoy commanding the GIs and prefer playing them over the other nationalities. I also enjoy, for some psychological reason, WINNING—and would not use them as much as I do if they weren't competitive."

If one can't win with the Americans, Fish doesn't seem to have discovered it yet!

Now, on to the GI AFVs. My inference from Mr. Collier's sardonic remarks is that he has passed judgement on the game effects of these vehicles' historical characteristics whole apparently knowing very little about what these characteristics were. He mentions three specific areas where he believes the use of U.S. AFVs yields unrealistic results: the Sherman vs. the Pzkpfw IV; the BMG FP; and the halftrack ESB. However, to corroborate his feelings that their traits are misapplied in the game, he offers nothing more than unsupported generalities and his own impressions. In the following paragraphs I'll examine these three disputed areas in detail, showing the research done and citing some of the evidence that led to the assignment of the current AFV specs. Hopefully, this will lay to rest Mr. Collier's (and possibly the reader's) questions and doubts concerning them.

BMGs

In looking back through my records, I found that the BMGs of U.S. AFVs were first discussed in April of 1979-even though I didn't receive the first GI Armor Listing until March 1980 (just thought I'd mention this to give the reader some idea of the time span involved in some of these "minor" details). Anyway, the reason that the U.S. BMGs were rated at 2 FP is very simple: they had no sights. The Germans, Russians and British all provided telescopic sights for their BMGs but the Americans had to fire theirs "indirectly" (i.e., the gunner had to guesstimate the approximate elevation and traverse necessary to engage the target while looking through his vision slit or periscope, then observe the flight of tracers in order to correct-his fire). Moreover, if the gunner's two periscopes (in the case of a Sherman) were unusable due to moisture condensation (a common problem) or due to HE or gunfire damage, he had to open his hatch and stick out his head (and neck!) to use the MG. Complaints from the field about the BMGs inaccuracy led to the design of a remote sighting device for those in Shermans; unfortunately, it was not yet ready for issue at the war's end.1 The bottom line is that these MGs were less effective overall, and lowering their firepower to "2" was the simplest way to account for this without taxing players' memories with special rules.

Addressing Mr. Collier's remarks about AFV MGs in general, my reply is that they are penalized for their limited fields of fire, poor vision, and for often having only one operator who usually has other tasks to perform as well. On the positive side, the operator *is* more secure since he usually has elite morale and can't be broken or pinned while buttoned up. Furthermore, it's beyond me how Mr. Collier can call it a penalty when a BMG is halved as Area Fire after having moved; he must have forgotten that when infantry move a MMG, they can't fire it *at all* during the AFPh!

The larger and cleaner MG ammo supply of an AFV is somewhat accounted for by having a B12 regardless of type; then again, it's questionable whether AFV MGs in a very dry climate like the desert or the steppes were really any cleaner than their infantry counterparts, since in these conditions AFVs, when moving or firing, often raised substantial dustclouds which permeated their interiors. And, unlike an infantry crew, an AFV crew had much more daily maintenance to perform than the cleaning of one MG.

I concur that for most AFVs, the CMG should be more potent than the BMG; but we must define what "more potent" means. Granted, the CMG has a lower-base FP, but giving it a longer effective range and excluding it from the penalties of longrange MG fire greatly add to its potential, as does the fact that it is more effective (in terms of probability of effect) than the BMG when firing outside the VCA despite its lower FP (except when using PBF—in which case they are equal): traversing the turret one hexspine yields a CMG FP of "(2 + 1)" with a dice roll of "4" or less needed for possible effect, while one hexspine VCA change yields a BMG FP of "4 (+3)" with a dice roll of "3" or less needed. So, in terms of overall potency, I feel that the CMGs specific superiorities adequately balance its base FP inferiority.

Halftracks

The U.S. halftrack is usually perceived as having been a sturdy, reliable, well-designed, and wellprotected quasi-tank. In actuality, it was anything but. And while it's true that U.S. halftracks were not underpowered as was the SdKfw 251, that was about their only virtue. Their armor plating (and most everything else) was continually vibrating loose (one writer described driving one on an improved road as "rather like driving a ten-ton kitchen cabinet on a washboard"2). Their floors were unarmored and gave no protection against mines-unlike their German counterparts; their side armor could be pierced by .50 cal. AP rounds at over 1000 meters, and even by .30 cal. AP rounds out to 350 meters (the figures for the more heavily armored and ballistically well-sloped SdKfz 251 are about 600m and 30m respectively).3 And their tracks had about 25% less ground contact area than those of the SdKfz 251 (although the U.S. halftrack had driven front wheels while the German didn't). Speaking of tracks, the German tracks were very sophisticated, expensive, and maintenance intensive-but I've never read anywhere that they were plagued by frequent breakdowns. They did have a tendency to bind up if packed with mud or snow, but this seems to have been a problem only when the vehicle had been motionless long enough for the substance to freeze, and I challenge Mr. Collier to present proof that this design "caused excessive mechanical breakdowns". On the other hand, U.S. tracks wore out quickly due to their construction, which consisted of steel plates attached to a loop of steel cables, with the whole assembly being covered with vulcanized rubber. At high speed (even on paved roads) or in loose terrain, the rubber was flung off by centrifugal force and/or abraded by the ground material, thus exposing the plates and cables and causing thrown tracks and damaged boogie wheels. "Even with good tracks, good boogie wheels, and proper tension, [halftrack] tracks were often thrown at inconvenient times."4 The commander of the 1st Armored Division stated in a report to Allied Forces HQ (dated 13 June 1943) that halftracks "have been continually subject to the throwing of tracks" and went on to declare that they were more trouble than they were worth and should be replaced by trucks!5 This might sound incredible to wargamers who for so long have made their armored infantry assaults with squads ensconced in halftracks; but in reality, such occurrences were rare. The infantry almost invariably dismounted to fight.6 It's not surprising, considering the above penetration specs! And would it be any more surprising, in view of all of the above, if U.S. halftrack drivers tended to be cautious when their vehicles were in close proximity to the enemy; moreover, would it be any more surprising that a halftrack would sometimes throw a track at an inopportune moment?

The German halftracks were far from perfect, but they were the product of a long design and development period and were generally superior for this reason, in contrast to the American design whose creation was somewhat of a fortuitous accident and whose production was halted even before the war's end, in early 1944.⁷

The Sherman

Mr. Collier's implication that the game specs of the Sherman relegate it to the genre of "rolling

junk" is somewhat surprising, since during the playtest there was some feeling that its armor was over-rated—especially in the case of the +2 for the late versions—and I had to defend my figures at some length, and fully expected to have to do likewise in these pages. I think, though, that if the M4 and the PzKpfw IVH are compared point by point, there can be little doubt that the German tank was the better of the two in a meeting engagement.

Main Armament: The gun of the PzKpfw IVH was the 7.5cm KwK 40 L/48, with a penetration roughly 1.5 times that of the M4's M3 gun. The actual figures are about 96mm and 66mm respectively for an APCBC projectile at 500m and an armor slope of 30 degrees from the vertical." Extrapolating these figures by adding 25% to each gives a zero slope penetration of approximately 120mm and 83mm respectively.9 The decisive superiority of the KwK 40 is obvious; the relative merits of these two guns are one of the reasons that the "big" guns were uprated on the TO KILL Table. Their lethality vis-a-vis the medium velocity and small caliber weapons was not well enough portrayed, especially considering the game's time factor of two minutes per turn-but more on the TO KILL Table later.

The PzKpfw IVH also had better gun optics than the Sherman. This is covered in the rulebook and is reflected by the use of the Red TO HIT numbers until July '43; actually, for AGVs this date should have been about Jan. '44, so we were a little generous here with the Americans.10 Another important fact to consider is that every German medium and heavy tank (as well as many of the light) had an all-round vision cupola for the commander, which greatly improved the AFV's fighting efficiency. In contrast to this practice, Shermans with vision cupolas didn't see action until mid-1944, and even then only the 76mm versions had them as standard equipment until cupola production became sufficient. As a result, many Shermans finished the war without one. This visibility problem, while not directly factored into the game, is nicely reflected in Mr. Collier's probabilities: the Sherman is often forced to remain CE in order to increase its effectiveness, as was the case in reality.

In relation to both main armament and optics, mention must be made of the U.S. gyrostabilizer. Strictly speaking, we have again been generous to the GIs, for the gyro was used much less in reality than we permit in the game. Many sources state this lack of use, but perhaps one quote can sum it up: "later, in France, 1944, another officer reported that 'experience has proven that tank crews have no faith in gyrostabilizers and will not use them. No amount of training seems to convince the tank's crews of the value of firing while moving . . . it could be left out of tanks scheduled for theaters of operations'"." Fortunately they weren't omitted, and with constant emphasis on training their use slowly but steadily increased in 1945. To compensate for our generosity, it can be rationalized that the gyro's frequent availability helps simulate the very fast turret traverse rate of the Sherman. Originally, GI was to have had rules for fast traverse specifically to benefit the Sherman, but comparative data proved too difficult to find for many other tanks; on the other hand, mention of the slow traverse rates of many tanks was much more common, so it was decided to use this method of differentiation instead. While, it's true that a combat asset of the Sherman was thereby lost, the fact that 50% of the Shermans used in 1944 scenarios should have functioning gyrostabilizers is a definite and deliberate compensation. After all, the Sherman was designed and used as a weapon of maneuver and exploitation, not for armored slugfests or for trading frontal blows with a more powerful enemy, and its game capabilities encourage the player to adopt these tactics. If the scenarios don't give the GIs their historical numerical advantage in tanks—well, that's hardly the fault of the counter specs. If the Shermans are just rolling junk, more of them would have been needed in the scenarios—to balance them!

Armor: The hull front of the PzKpfw IVH consisted of two basically vertical 80mm plates and a 25mm plate (containing three countersunk hatches) sloped at 73 degrees from the vertical; the turret front was 50mm, again almost vertical, with a small curved 50mm gun mantlet.12 The M4's front hull armor included a one-piece lower hull front of 51mm sloped at 0-56 degrees and a five-piece upper hull front of 51mm sloped at 56 degrees; the turret front was 76mm, sloped at 30 degrees and somewhat curved horizontally, with a two-piece rotor/gun shield of 51mm and 89mm respectively. (On models built prior to 1943, the lower hull front was three pieces bolted together, the gun shield was 76mm, and the rotor shield was 51mm but too small to make much difference.)13 Using calculations based on penetration tables and slope evaluation formulas,14 the effective armor thicknesses (i.e., the ballistic resistance based on the combined characteristics of the actual thickness plus the amount of slope) of the PzKpfw IVH is only a few mm more than those figures given above, but the M4 hull front becomes about 114mm thick and the turret front almost 100mm, which should give the Sherman a +2 armor DRM. This effective thickness is illusory however, and the clue to why is the fact that whereas the front of the PzKpfw IVH essentially consisted of four sections, that of the M4 was made up of no less than nine (and as many as thirteen in the early M4A2), and these separate sections-no matter how well attached to each other-were still inherently weaker than if they had been fewer in number.15 How much weaker is a subjective judgement and ultimately was determined by the evaluation of as many action reports and authors' opinions as could be obtained. The +2armor DRM of the M4A1 and other Sherman models results not from heavier armor but the more consistent protection afforded by their two-piece cast or rolled front hull.

This +1 versus +2 hull armor DRM raises a point which must be considered when viewing Mr. Collier's probabilities. Of the total number of 75mm Shermans retained by U.S. forces (excluding the M4A3E2), the +1 versions accounted for significantly less than 45%—and perhaps as little as 30%. Moreover, by VE Day well over half of the Shermans in U.S. units were of the 76mm variety.¹⁶ So, using a +1 armored Sherman is somewhat misrepresentative of U.S. forces, although it was still the main AFV of our western allies. When using a late-war Sherman for comparison, it would be more correct to use the M4A1 or M4A3(75)W, which will lower the first shot kill probability of the PzKpfw IVH to .40.

Looking to the turret armor of the +1Sherman, it would appear to rate a +2 but does not, partially because all the earlier models had less protection (and differentiating between them and the intermediate models would have meant another 26 or so Sherman counters) and partially because a +2 just didn't "feel" right in view of the tank's reputation of vulnerability. The reader should know that originally the Sherman's front turret and hull armor DRM had been 0 (+1 for the M4A1); the increases to +1 and +2 didn't occur until the beginning of 1982 and were accepted with some question as to their correctness and necessity.

The 76mm and 105mm M4 Shermans had +2 turret armor originally but were somewhat borderline; in view of objections raised during the playtest to Shermans being rated frontally equal to Tigers, the +2 was lowered to +1. As for the PzKpfw IVH, hopefully the reader noted earlier that its front turret armor was weaker than its hull front. Unfortunately, the counter doesn't reflect this since the HD DRMs hadn't yet been "invented" in COI. The simple truth is that the COI counters are outdated and require a major reworking. This is currently in progress and, when completed, the PzKpfw IVH will have front -HD. This will raise the M4's first shot kill probability to .23—not a great change statistically but a considerable aid to the Sherman when it hits the PzKpfw IV turret!

One last point concerning armor—although not the Sherman's: an M4's first shot kill probability versus a Tiger I (in the same situation as with the PzKpfw IV) is .14 and .23 at six hexes. This is junk? In reality, the M4's gun could only penetrate about 87mm at 250 yards and zero slope, leaving an unpenetrated 13mm-23mm on a somewhat annoyed Tiger.¹⁷ Obviously, there is a flaw here; more on this later also.

Size: This is perhaps the biggest liability to the M4's survival. It's usually easier to hit than its opponent, and this fact contributes significantly to its inferiority in Mr. Collier's calculations. Unfortunately, this is a reflection of reality too. When compared to the other work-horses of the war, the PzKpfw IV and the T-34/76, the M4 was a much bulkier target.18 Both were at least a foot lower in height (exclusive of any vision cupola), which is an important factor since an AFV's height determines its vulnerability to a much greater extent than does its width or length. Moreover, both had their guns mounted almost a foot lower, enabling them to assume an effective hull-down position behind a lower obstacle; if the M4 were to be behind this same obstacle, it would be more exposed both above and below its gun and thus be easier to hit.19 All in all, it was felt that these factors necessitated a size penalty for the Shermans.

To summarize the PzKpfw IVH/Sherman M4 comparison, the former had a more powerful gun, better optics, a vision cupola, and a lower height; is it really any surprise then that its first shot kill probability is significantly higher than the M4's? Even if some feel that this probability is too high, it's not the fault of the GI design; rather, as has been indicated, the COI counters and the TO KILL Table have become obsolescent. Should the GI AFVs have been regressed in design so as to be compatible with those of COI? The answer is no. The state of the SL system's design had already advanced in COD and further refinements considered to be superior were included in GI. Had the Sherman's game specs been "weighted" to make it more equal to the PzKpfw IV, this would have temporarily alleviated certain conditions but at the cost of aggravating others, and such a trade-off would have necessitated the eventual redesign of the Sherman counters-which we are determined not to do.

This whole issue must be viewed in light of the fact that the system is still in evolution and the design of the GI AFVs was done with an eye to future, as well as to past, gamettes. It's easy for one to say in retrospect that this philosophy should have been adhered to more strictly from the beginning. Actually, every attempt has been made to do so, but the form evolution will take is often unsuspected until it occurs (i.e., until someone has a new idea which is worth incorporating into the system).

So where is the system headed in terms of armor? The *COI* vehicle revision has already been mentioned; in addition to Russian and German, the Hungarian and Rumanian AFVs may also be included. The whole package will be vastly more detailed in its Notes section than *COI*, and will of course utilize all the abbreviations, symbols, etc. of the *GI* counters. Perhaps (and hopefully), the British vehicles will also be gone over to correct a few mistakes and to generally bring them up to the current state of the art.

Also in the process of design is an Advanced TO KILL Table, which will be directly structured on the historical capabilities of guns and armor, including a more accurate representation of the advantage of armor slope-in contrast to the current Table which is simply an overloaded vestige of the original SL method, having TO KILL numbers that are total abstractions and which is not flexible enough to realistically portray the myriad of guns and AFVs now available. The Advanced TO KILL Table will look slightly different but will function in essentially the same manner as the present one, but with a simple additional step that will greatly reduce the occurrence of such aberrations as a 37L needing a "5" to knock out a PzKpfw I at six hexes, or the aforementioned ability of a Sherman 75 (or T-34/76) to destroy a Tiger at six hexes, also with a roll of "5". Using both the Advanced TO KILL Table and the revised German vehicles, these TO KILL numbers will change to "8" and "3" respectively ("2" for the T-34/76 vs. the Tiger), and pursuing the Sherman/Tiger example further, the latter's return shot will have a TO KILL die roll of "13". The legend of the Tiger will vividly return!

In the M4/PzKpfw IVH confrontation we've looked at, use of both the Advanced TO KILL Table and revised German vehicles will yield respective first shot probabilities of .39/.69 (.39/.50 if using an M4A1 or M4A3(75)W, while an M4A3(76)W/PzKpfw IVH meeting will yield .64/.50 respectively), as opposed to the GI probabilities of .42/.40.

The lowered efficiency of AFVs with two-man turrets, which is alluded to in GI, will be more fully dealt with in the next gamette. In addition to slow traverse, 2MT tanks will also suffer some additional penalty to their TO HIT ability, perhaps an extra +1 versus unacquired targets. In addition, many Russian tanks with 2MT will not be able to fire either their MA or CMG while CE, reflecting the fact that they often had the commander doubling as the gunner rather as the loader. In conjunction with ST, this will realistically show the qualitative superiority of the PzKpfw III and IV over the early Russian designs.

On final note: since I prefer DYO scenarios to the printed scenarios, I was especially surprised and disappointed to discover that GI contained no point values of any kind. I trust however, that the design of an improved point value system will enable the American player to re-create the numerical superiority which the GIs usually possessed. At any rate, the re-creation of this superiority should have a high priority in the system's design, so that this aspect of the feel of the American Army will also be present.

³Calculations using 6.35 mm @ 35 degrees, using U.S. Army Field Manual *FM-1914*, pp. 189, 191. ⁴Fines, op. cit., Part II, Vol. 3, #11, 1972, p. 15. Data of the report is from: G. Howe, *Battle History of the 1st Armored Division*, Washington DC, 1954, p. 253.

³Major General E.N. Harmon, "Lessons Learned from Combat: Operations of the 1st Armored Division in Tunisia", taken from *AFV-G2*, Vol. 6, #10, p. 47.

⁶J. Steuard, R. Fines, *American Combat Vehicles: Halftracks*, Vol. 1, La ePuente CA, 1976, p. 58. ⁷The non-annotated material in this section is taken from: D. Crow, ed., *Armoured Fighting Vehicles*

¹R.P. Hunnicutt, *Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank*, Belmont CA, 1978, pp. 128, 216-217. Information on the other nationalities was taken from a variety of sources.

²R. Fines, "The T-12/M3 75mm Gun Motor Carriage", Part I, from *AFV-G2*, Vol. 3, #10, 1972, p. 29.

of Germany: World War II, New York NY, 1978, pp. 161-169.

¹⁷WkK40: P. Chamberlain, H.L. Doyle, T.L. Jentz, *Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two*, New York NY, 1978, p. 245. M3: Hunnicutt, op. cit., p. 562. *FM-1914*, p. 202.

'This rule of thumb is from: G.S.O. Playfair, *The Mediterranean and Middle East*, Vol. 2, in the "History of the Second World War", London, 1956, p. 342. Incidentally, the calculations for the M3 gun exactly matches the figure given it for 500 yards and zero slope in *FM-1914*.

¹⁹C.M. Green, H.C. Thompson, P.C. Roots, *The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War*, from "The U.S. Army in World War II, The Technical Services" series, Washington DC, 1955, pp. 334-342, 346. Harmon, op. cit., pp. 36, 47; this reads in part, "At the present time the German has approximately four times the sight range of our tank gunners".

¹¹J. Reynolds III, "Gyrostabilizers in W.W.2", from *AFV News*, Vol. 13, #6, Nov. 1978, p. 9. Also see: Hunnicutt, op. cit., p. 215; Green et al., op. cit., p. 343.

¹²Chamberlain et al., op. cit., p. 98; D. Crow, ed., op. cit., p. 96.

¹³Hunnicutt, op. cit., pp. 154, 544.

¹⁴Primarily: *FM-1914*; Hunnicutt, op. cit., p. 558; and Playfair, op. cit., p. 342.

¹³Hunnicutt, op. cit., pp. 142, 149, 150, 222.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 141, 150. 311. 525, 526.

¹⁷*FM-1914*, p. 202. Chamberlain et al., op. cit., p. 136.

¹⁴A good illustration of this appears on p. 38 of *Russian Tanks 1915-1968*, by J.M. Brereton and V. Feist, Fallbrook CA, 1970.

 "Hunnicutt, op. cit., p. 538. S. Zaloga, J. Grandsen, T-34 in Action, Carrollton TX, 1981, p. 15 (measurement from scale drawing). Bellona Military Vehicle Print Series 6, no page numbers, (measurement from scale drawing).

SECOND EDITION G.I.: ANVIL OF VICTORY

The Second Edition of G.I.: ANVIL OF VIC-TORY is now available, incorporating the errata and changes generated by extensive play since its release. Significant changes were made to the G.I. rulebook and the scenario cards, as noted in Vol. 20, No. 1 of The GENERAL. Both are priced similar to the original edition: \$4.00 for the rulebook, \$5.00 for the Scenario/CRT Card Pad. Order may be made directly from The Avalon Hill Game Company, 4517 Harford Road, Baltimore, MD 21214. Please add 10% shipping and handling (20% for Canadian orders, 30% for overseas orders); Maryland residents must add the usual 5% state sales tax.

FACTORY OUTLET

Whenever in the Baltimore area feel free to drop in at our Factory Outlet store located in our design offices at 900 St. Paul and 20 E. Reed St. This store is the world's only retail outlet featuring a complete selection of Avalon Hill games, parts, magazines and accessories. Pay by cash or check or bring your credit card, and if visiting on Saturdays feel free to stay and attend a gaming session with Interest Group Baltimore and get involved with whatever playtesting happens to be going down. Or just drop by and play or talk the games of your choice on Saturday with any of the locals and enjoy the competition.



Mr. Collier raises a valid point concerning the inability of an advancing Sherman to get in the first shot on an enemy target. In reality, if both saw each other simultaneously, the Sherman's fast traverse often did allow it to fire first, which greatly increased its probability of survival (from: Hunnicutt, Sherman, p. 184). In the game, these sudden encounters are non-existent due to the players' omniscience of enemy movements and the strict alternation of shots. Below is presented a rule which will add tension and excitement while at the same helping to minimize a deficiency which has been rightly brought to attention.

X.1 A turreted AFV which either pivots or moves to another hex during its MPh might be able to fire its MGs and/or turret ordnance *before* the DFing player can fire. At the end of the AFV's MPh, its owner declares whether or not the AFV wishes to fire, which weapon(s) it will fire, and at what target(s). The DFing player then announces which (if any) weapon(s) *in one hex* he wishes to fire at the AFV, and what ROF he will use (including whether or not he will use Intensive Fire). Both players then make a dr, using the following DRMs which pertain to each player's own unit and apply to each player's own dr.

BOTH PLAYERS

- any Acquisition DRM

- any armor leader or applicable leader/ hero DRM

-1.... if German AFV in pre-1944 scenario +1.... if AFV has 1MT, 2MT or ST (regardless if firing outside of CA)

+1... if in buildings or rubble or woods

+1... if buttoned-up

+2.... if in Motion

MOVING PLAYER

-3 if AFV has functioning gyrostabilizer

DFing PLAYER

-2 . . . if concealed or hidden

-1 . . . if non-vehicular weapon (n.a. to ord-

nance of 120mm)

+ . . . , any gun traverse DRM (144.8)

X.2 The player with the lower modified dr must then immediately fire all the weapons he had predesignated; when his fire is concluded, the other player must then immediately fire all of his predesignated weapons (EXC: **X.3**). Place a Prep Fire counter on the moving AFV after it fires. If both players' modified dr's are equal, both must fire all their predesignated weapons but no results take effect until both *have* fired all such weapons.

X.3 Sustained Fire may not be used during a Gun Duel but Intensive Fire may; however, the Intensive Fire shot (or any second shot for multiple

ROF guns) may not be made until both players have fired once. If both sides Intensive Fire or have multiple ROF guns, their fire alternates (i.e., the player who fires first will also fire third—if still surviving; EXC: if both players' Gun Duel drs were equal, **X.2**).

X.4 Once a Gun Duel is finished or the moving AFV declines to make a Gun Duel dr, all remaining DF against it is conducted normally. If an AFV engages in a Gun Duel during its MPh, it is then no longer considered to be a moving target for DF unless it remains in Motion; also, it cannot then fire any armament during the AFPh. DF Immobilization attempts against an AFV are always made before any Gun Duel involving it is resolved.

X.5 If the DFing player has no weapons which can fire on the moving AFV, or if he wishes not to fire at it, the moving AFV can still attempt a Gun Duel so as to be able to fire at a target before it can DF. In this case, the DFing player must still make his dr but receives no drms and need not predesignate any hex (since none of his units are firing). If the moving player loses the dr, his AFV may not fire until the AFPh, when it must then do so at its predesignated hex(es).

These rules have been playtested by members of Bob McNamara's local group and have worked very well. Up until now, the DFing player, knowing that no enemy units can fire at him until he has fired first, could unrealistically defer his shots until all movement was ended, thereby allowing himself to leisurely weigh the merits of the enemy's move and how to best coordinate his DF to annihilate the now "frozen" enemy. Use of Gun Duels forces the DFing player to consider firing before each vehicle ends its movement, in order to deny the moving player a possible first shot. This helps to diminish the unrealistic amount of coordination allowed to the DFing player, and thus restores to the moving player some of the advantage of initiative which the defender's present abilities deny him. Another realistic effect of the rule is that it re-creates the occurrence of chance encounters in which the defender doesn't notice the approaching enemysomething which was very common in both the chaos of battle and in the laxness of a quiet position "behind the front lines", but which has heretofore been impossible in the game. There is also lots of room for expansion in these rules (e.g., allowing use with any vehicle carrying FP which can be used in the AFPh; or infantry moving with SWs; or for that matter, any unit possessing FP which can be used in the AFPh). I guess it depends on how gross you want to get! We would like to hear the reaction of anyone trying this experimental rule in their games, as it is being contemplated for inclusion in the Advanced SQUAD LEADER Rulebook; address your comments to the attention of Mr. Don Greenwood.



Allies: David Sinay Japan: Steve Resman Commentary: James Lutz



This Series Replay utilizes the PBM system described in the preceding issue. All standard rules mentioned were in force throughout the game, and no optional rules were included. The Random Number Table was used to resolve speed rolls, attacks and damage (although the mechanics of the derivations will not be presented—only the results).

TURN 5

The 1 Mar reappears at Pearl Harbor and the 2 Mar is brought back at Australia. The Valiant, Warspite, Resolution, and Revenge are withdrawn.

JAPAN, AFTER PATROLLERS: This turn will be crucial for the Japanese. I must take Midway, which will not be easy since the Allies have amassed ten air units and will no doubt fortify Midway with a good number of them. At first glance it seems that I should invade the area with both marine forces that I have at Truk; but, it would almost surely give him Guadalcanal and Port Moresby from the two marine units at Australia. I have decided to safeguard my positions in the south and send only one marine to the Central Pacific. His patrolling force will give me a better picture of his strategy, but the more I look at the board, the more I see an invasion of the South Pacific aiming for the capture of Lae, a move that would really flank the IJN's loose perimeter. Operation DOWN UNDER has been sunk! I would like to hang on to a base in the Indian Ocean, but an air unit there would be wasted since Port Moresby has a good chance of falling. The air unit is needed in the Coral Sea where I feel I must put up at least some resistance. The South Pacific was weakened as a result, but so be it. In the Marshalls he will probably invade with his marine unit, but this move would be a diversion to the main thrust in the Coral Sea and South Pacific areas.

Besides the large number of air units, the Allies still have a formidable surface fleet that, if it were concentrated, could give a good account of itself. It would take most of the IJN fleet to contain it. Even with my success last turn, another one is needed to stem the Allied tide on Turn 6.

ALLIES, AFTER PATROLLERS: With my limited carriers and excess land-based air, the obvious strategy is to hold back virtually my entire fleet for raiding duties. Overall strategy here is to hold on to as many POCs as possible with landbased air while using the surface fleet to take away his POCs. Surely this turn he will finally commit the necessary units to patrolling duties. Having to contend with such massive raiding forces has been a severe problem for me which I have paid dearly for in carrier losses. If I can keep one or two holes open in the perimeter this turn, I should be able to end the war in 1944, saving the atomics for the Nazis.

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER PATROLLERS: The Allied move is cautious in that Allied forces are

awaiting Japanese activity. The Allied position in the game makes the resulting dispositions appropriate ones. Dave should have brought the 2

Mar back at Samoa where it would be more threatening than at Pearl Harbor. Steve expected the marines elsewhere, and although two marines at Pearl were not necessary, the move demonstrates the difficulty in anticipating where marines will return, generally an advantage to the Americans given the major bases at Pearl Harbor, Samoa, and Australia while the Japanese basically have Truk as an option (or the Home Islands in the end game). Steve's move is not aggressive enough since he is not forcing the action. He might have patrolled to the Hawaiian Islands, gambling on a weak defense. In addition to the 5 POC swing, IJN control would bottle up the American Turn 6 reinforcements, permitting him to solidify his perimeter for the inevitable assault. At worst, he might force a major fleet action while he still has clear superiority. Such a move would be risky, but he must take such risks.

JAPAN, AFTER RAIDERS: Looking over the Allied patrollers, one thing stands out-the complete lack of interest in the Central Pacific. Not even one land-based air unit! Does this mean that he will come in force to stop my expected invasion? Or will he go for the Marshalls? Or will he try to push the single marine unit at Australia into the South Pacific for a surprise invasion of Lae? Or will he not invade and save his three marine units for next turn for a large operation? I am perplexed as to his goals! I must take Midway and I must protect the Marshalls and the South Pacific from possible invasion, and yet I do not have enough units to cover two of those areas, let alone three. I am sure that Dave is aware of this quandry and expects me to split my forces to cover these areas. If I did this, he would be guaranteed a good POC gain with limitations on mine so that we would break even. Since I need to grab as many POC as possible for the coming turns, my strategy will be to raid, and at the same time to garrison the ever important South Pacific with enough units to hold the area and Guadalcanal/Lae.

I have sent carriers into the Aleutians and cruisers to the North Pacific on raids, as well as more substantial forces (hopefully including the *Musashi* and *Mutsu* pounding along at 24 knots from Japan) to the Bay of Bengal. In the South Pacific, a major task force escorts the marines in their landing exercises. And, in the most risky operation of all, the *Kure* marines will go into the Central Pacific, unescorted, to take Midway.

This turn could be a good one for the Japanese. There is a good chance that the whole British fleet will show up in Bengal which would (hopefully) seal its fate. The POC gain is always welcome for the IJN, and the raids will affect the Allies next turn. He will be kept guessing about the Japanese intentions. The negative results could be the failure to take Midway and the establishment of an Allied base in the Marshalls. These problems I can live with. The Japanese cannot afford to engage in any fleet action unless their forces are superior in strength. The fleet cannot afford any more losses unless the results justify them.

ALLIES, AFTER RAIDERS: He continues to keep virtually his entire fleet back to raid. This tactic really makes things difficult. It has only just now dawned on me that his successful control of the Indian Ocean last turn has eliminated my Australiabased fleet from participating in any Indonesian operations! The fact that I can concentrate only in the Coral Sea or the South Pacific is just too obvious. These areas surely are the ones where he will concentrate his forces. My objectives this turn are to keep open a corridor to his internal areas for next turn's reinforcements, continue to preserve my fleet, and keep chipping away at weakly held areas. One battleship (expendable) should keep open the Central Pacific route, and the remainder of the fast carriers and fleet should be an unexpected surprise to him in the Marshalls. For lack of anything else to do, the British will assist in the retaking of Port Moresby.

NEUTRAL COMMENT, AFTER RAIDERS: Pluses and minuses are present for both sides after the raider placement. The Japanese will be able to capture Midway cheaply, and no major bases are in danger. Allied control in the North Pacific, Bay of Bengal and the Aleutians should be negated-saving much needed POCs for the Japanese.I am uncertain as to why Steve is so concerned with the British fleet given its limited mobility. The Japanese need to inflict serious casualties and the moves have precluded that possibility, so the Allied fleets, including the British, will remain intact. Dave avoiding the chance of an unequal action in the South Pacific to maintain his fleet. One advantage for Steve is that he is intentionally changing his raiding tactics sufficiently to keep Dave guessing. He may be able to be cautious next turn having now demonstrated his willingness to split his fleet.

THE BATTLES: In the North Pacific, the lone Allied cruiser was disabled. In the Central Pacific, the Mikuma is sunk, but Midway falls. In the Coral Sea, the Japanese win the desired surface action and then withdraw. In the Marshalls, the 23AF is eliminated in an air action, only damaging the 1 MAR in return; but, the I-Boat disables the marines, thus preventing the Allies from securing a new base. In the Bay of Bengal, it is all Japanese as the Ramilles and Royal Sovereign go down in two successive air actions. In the Aleutians, after six air rounds, the tenacious RNZAF is finally eliminated after disabling the Hiryu in the first round and the Zuikaku in the sixth, just as it was eliminated itself. (The last four rounds took only one mailing since Steve and Dave agreed to a continuous air action until the situation was resolved.)

JAPAN, AFTER COMBAT: Again he has shot down one of my land-based air units with a single hit. This borders on the ridiculous. My air units fall like flies to his fire, and his are impervious to damage from my forces. I finally managed to eliminate the air unit in the Aleutians, but just barely. My air unit in the Marshalls failed to stop the marines. The *I-Boat* saved the day, however, by disabling the marines before they could land.

This turn is a good one for the IJN as they break control in the Bay of Bengal and the Aleutians. The Japanese gain 3 POC to total 19 POC. I would like to have more, but I have won before without sur-



passing a 20 POC lead. I would like to have more to be sure, particularly given the carrier losses I have suffered. My victories in the past were achieved with a relatively intact carrier force. Turn 6 lies ahead, and that means the start of the Allied offensive.

ALLIES, AFTER COMBAT: I am only down 19 POC, my fleet is intact, and there are numerous lanes into his inner areas. What more could an Allied commander ask for at this point in the game?

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER COMBAT: Neither Dave nor Steve has been able to deliver a knockout blow through the first half of the game. Dave has kept himself in a position to win (the best an Allied player can hope to do against a competent opponent). On Turn 6, the initiative passes to Dave, and if he can handle being on the offensive, he is in a good position to win. One of Dave's marine units might have been better placed by being returned to Samoa rather than Australia. Steve's return of units to the Indonesia ports at least forces Dave to worry about defending the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

TURN 6

The Sasebo marines appear at Singapore, and the Victorious withdraws.

JAPAN, AFTER PATROLLERS: I have patrolled all main areas with land-based air and kept almost the whole of the surface fleet on raid status to await the disposition of his units. I have sent a decoy force into the Bay of Bengal, hoping to draw his forces at Australia into the area to defend against a possible Japanese followup raid. Of course, there will not be such a raid.

ALLIES, AFTER PATROLLERS: My basic strategy is to patrol the rear areas with land-based air while raiding into his inner areas with surface forces. Nothing fancy. Depending on how he patrols, I will try to control at least one area from among the South Pacific, Central Pacific, or the Marshalls.

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER PATROLLERS: Steve's patrolling forces are again a little weak as he leaves himself open to the loss of important POCs. The weak patrolling forces are particularly a problem since he is forced to remain on the defensive given Allied land-based air and the presence of the new carrier forces. At least (and at last), however, there is a feint into the Bay of Bengal. Finally one of the players is willing to try to directly mislead the other. The Allied dispositions are good in that rear areas are safe, other areas in the Japanese sphere are threatened, and the fleet can strike anywhere. Dave has to start to be concerned about blocking raiding lanes to his rear areas and securing advanced bases. The initial part of his move can accomplish these goals.

JAPAN, AFTER RAIDERS: The Allies have sent out eight fleet units as patrollers, which does not give him that much to raid with. The disposition of his forcces looks as though he will raid into the Marshalls (including a marine unit) and also into Indonesia (including two marine units), linking up with the British forces. My reasoning on the latter course is that Dave must think Indonesia is ripe picking since he will assume that Bengal is my target. My two cruisers patrolling Bengal have given me an advantage. If he goes into Bengal expecting me there, I gain an extra turn of peace in Indonesia. If he goes into Indonesia, he will find the whole Imperial Navy there. I am massing my forces from Truk and Singapore, plus the two marine units, in this area, hopefully to destroy Allied sea power in the Southwest Pacific-the Allied sea power that I am almost sure will appear. If he invades the South Pacific, my two marine units will

ensure my control of Lae.

Elsewhere, I am trying to negate his control and save POCs or sending minor reinforcements to areas he is threatening where I have a chance of control. This turn could be another good one for the IJN.

ALLIES, AFTER RAIDERS: If he could use landbased air units as raiders. I am sure that he would do so! His powerful surface fleet still makes him extremely dangerous. The fact that I can only concentrate in the South Pacific (of the forward areas) makes that move too obvious. I am thus splitting my forces with the following objectives: (1) negate control in Indonesia (and with some luck, take the Philippines); (2) capture a forward base in the Marshalls from which I can launch future sea attacks from closer range; (3) negate control in the Marianas so that I have another access route to Indonesia; and (4) reinforce the patrollers in the Central and North Pacific with expendable units. Knowing my opponent's offensive tendencies, I doubt he will support his land-based air unit in the Marianas, thus giving me a good shot at stealing 2 POCs. Also, his patrolling of the Bay of Bengal illustrates his offensive characteristics. I have chosen to ignore this threat due to the relatively unimportant strategic consequences. The Sasebo marines at Saigon pose a threat to Port Moresby and the Adaman Islands, but his lack of land-based air along with my own abundance of the same reduces the value of such a move for him, although this move is what I anticipate from him. Lastly, a back door landing at Guadalcanal by the 1 Mar would indeed be nice!

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER RAIDERS: The raiding turn has clearly favored the Japanese. There is an opportunity here for an important Japanese victory, and the threat to the weak Japanese POC position could potentially have been much worse. Steve may be able to control most areas and has a chance of hurting the Allied fleets. Although Dave correctly assessed the relatively minor importance of control in the Bay of Bengal, he jumped the gun in Indonesia. Steve baited a trap and Dave sailed into it. It was gamble that need not have been taken! The American forces and the marine unit committed in Indonesia could probably have ensured the capture of Guadalcanal. Given the POC situation, Dave could have used a more cautious step by step approach to win the game-slowly compressing the Japanese position, safeguarding the rear areas, and establishing new bases for his superior land-based air. If inclined to gamble, he might have ventured a raid into Japanese waters from Pearl Harbor instead of going into Indonesia (replacing the carriers in the Marshalls from Pearl with ones from Australia). Depending upon the battles, Steve may have increased his chances of victory significantly.

THE BATTLES: In the North Pacific, an air round nets nothing. In the surface round that follows, the Minneapolis is disabled and the Boston damaged. Another air round sinks one Japanese cruiser, but in another surface round the damaged Boston is disabled. In a final air action the Oi is sunk. In the Central Pacific, Steve gets his preferred surface action. The Tennessee and Independence are sunk, while the Japanese lose only the Kako in return. The surviving Allied cruiser then retires. In two air actions in the Marianas, one light carrier is disabled and the other sunk. The Allies score two hits on the 22 AF, but it survives. In the Marshalls, Steve again gets his preference, and in an air action the marines are disabled, although the Allied carrier aircraft shoot down the land-based air. In the Coral Sea, the Japanese luck does not hold as the I-Boat misses the marines, and Guadalcanal falls. In an air action in the South Pacific, the Canberra is damaged and disabled, and the California suffers maximum

damage while withdrawing. In the Bay of Bengal, the Japanese win a preference for a surface action, and the two cruisers successfully withdraw. The Indonesia battle is the climatic one. Dave opted for an air action and Steve wanted surface. The tie in the preference roll resulted in a day/night action. Only two British cruisers were not sunk or disabled in the combined action. Allied air strikes sink the Zuikaku, and the combined firepower of the fleet sinks the Kumano and disables a number of other ships. A final air action sinks the two British cruisers.

JAPAN, AFTER COMBAT: Again my strategy paid off as Dave sent all of his Southwest Pacific based forces into Indonesia. The IJN virtually annihilated a major Allied fleet, which will definitely thin out his forces during the remaining game turns. Japanese losses, on the other hand, were light. Turn 7 will find the IJN in good shape. The Allies still have not established themselves in the Japanese perimeter, except in the South Pacific by the acquisition of Guadalcanal. With only three turns remaining it will be difficult for Dave to overcome the IJN lead. He needs a major victory and a major base inside the perimeter. I will be looking for him to invade the Indonesian area again. A simple enough deduction since he has nowhere else to go! A confident Japanese commander now awaits the Allied patrollers.

ALLIES, AFTER COMBAT: [Expletives depleted by neutral commentator.] What a disaster! Nothing worked! I got caught in Indonesia; failed to take Kwajalein; could not negate control in the Marianas! I very cleverly snatched defeat from the jaws of victory-maybe. A lopsided game turned into a desperate struggle. The two hits I got on the 22 AF in the Marianas while losing a CVL in the process really shook Allied morale.

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER COMBAT: Dave took an unnecessary gamble and lost big. The results were even worse than he deserved. He not only lost preferences, he shot very poorly. The air/surface action in Indonesia at least gave all his outnumbered forces a chance to fire. Eight modified air strikes and the Hermes' solitary shot netted one hit, and twenty surface shots managed only one more. Steve's comments about bad luck on previous turns have now been more than balanced. Dave did manage to take Guadalcanal, control the Marshalls, and negate IJN control in the Central Pacific. Thus, raiding lanes are open. He still has substantial carrier forces, but Indonesia cost him many of the screening craft he desperately needs for his carriers. After this turn, the game is very even, although 19 POC is not as big a lead as Steve thinks. The Allied ships returned to Australia may be wasted since they are not really enough to contest Indonesia effectively.

TURN 7

The Hermes and Exeter withdraw to meet requirements. The Kure marines appear at Truk, and the 2 Mar return at Pearl Harbor. JAPAN, AFTER PATROLLERS: I have used the barest minimum forces for patrolling duty. I really do not know what to expect from Dave this turn. At first glance, the Indonesian area looks like a likely target, but the South Pacific and Central Pacific also look good for invasions. His patrollers will tell me much more.

ALLIES, AFTER PATROLLERS: I will start the Allied offensive all over again by taking smaller bites. Unless I can catch his fleet somewhere (with mine having superior firepower of course), I am in big trouble. The main objectives this turn are to control the Marshalls (causing the fall of Kwajalein and Maloelap) and/or controlling the South Pacific. His patrolling air units could disrupt both of these plans. He is controlling the tempo of the


game, which is bad news at this point for me!

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER PATROLLERS: Steve again sends out minimum patrollers. He has gotten away with it as often as not, particularly last turn given Dave's dispositions, but he is still asking for trouble. A stronger committment in the Marianas might have been justified. He has apparently decided against any feints this time. The Aoba and the damaged 22 AF were apparently sent out to contest the South Pacific and the Marshalls so that any Allied carriers in those areas would not be able to raid Truk. Truk, however, will lose its importance as a central port if the Allies are premitted to control the Marshalls and the South Pacific. The Philippines would be just as useful, or Japan, given the pattern of controlled areas. The new carriers in Japan serve as excellent raiders since they are very useful in contesting areas with land-based air.

After having bit off more than he could chew last turn, Dave is moderating his appetite. His key concerns should be to capture new bases (such as in the Marshalls) and, secondly, to set up a barrier of Allied-controlled areas to permit minimal garrisoning of his key rear POC areas. In this regard, the Wichita in the Central Pacific is insufficient. Such a barrier would permit him to concentrate his fleet and air units in forward areas where they will be needed. The forces in Australia should definitely not go into Indonesia, although their placement in Australia may draw Japanese forces into that area. A good gamble this turn might be for Dave to send two or three CVLs to the Japanese Islands, escorted by a fast battleship and a cruiser from Pearl Harbor. He has indicated no interest in the past in this type of raid, and thus he might take Steve by surprise. There is a definite advantage in changing tactics in mid-game. The loss of three POCs to the Japanese total might well be worth the gamble, and since the ships involved are fast ones, they can return to Pearl Harbor or Australia and still be involved in key areas on Turn 8.

JAPAN, AFTER RAIDERS: After seeing the Allied dispositions for patrollers, I am again feeling optimistic about the upcoming turn. The Allies will probably again push into Indonesia to coincide with a raid into the Marianas that would secure the Philippines. He may also go after Midway this turn with his marine unit based at Pearl Harbor. The mission for the IJN this turn is to keep Lae and the Philippines in Japanese hands. To accomplish this task, I sent a strong fleet and the two marines into Indonesia. I must stop his marines in this area. In other areas, I have sent the carriers, cruisers, and Kure marines into the Coral Sea to attempt to take Guadalcanal and negate his air forces in the South Pacific. In the Aleutians, the three new CVLs may save a POC.

It is the IJN's intention to hit the Allies where they are vulnerable. If he gains two POCs in one area, he should lose two POCs elsewhere to my raiders. If I come close to achieving this goal, the Allies can never amass the POCs needed for victory in the turns remaining. Also, keeping the remaining units of the IJN intact until Turn 9 will help to assure a Japanese victory. I should be in great shape this turn since the only major battle looms in Indonesia, and my losses should be light. This turn could be another good one for the IJN.

ALLIES, AFTER RAIDERS: No surprises for his patrols—as usual! I have quite a carrier advantage but am sorely behind in surface ships. I should be able to raid safely with carriers lacking sufficient escorts as long as the areas are already UScontrolled, giving me a +2 DRM for preferences. My most important objective is to open up a lane to Indonesia with the key being negation of his control in the South Pacific. To do this, Guadalcanal must be held. I will try to get marine reinforcements ashore from the Coral Sea side where Allied air cover is likely to be more effective. As a backup to this operation, I will try to capture a new base in the Marshalls either by amphibious assault with the 2 Mar or, even better, by isolation. I should be able to match up well in carriers in either area, and, with a +2 DRM on the preference roll, have a decent chance against his fleet which will more than likely show up in superior numbers in either the South Pacific, the Marshalls, or the Coral Sea.

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER RAIDERS: An excellent raiding turn for Dave. The Allies will gain the bases in the Marshalls, and the marines in the area will be available for movement into the inner Japanese areas next turn. Sending the marines was an excellent safety precaution. Allied control of Guadalcanal and the South Pacific seems assured (remember that marines land simultaneously, not Japanese marines first). Half of the remaining Japanese carriers with modified strikes are in jeopardy in the Coral Sea. Dave apparently bluffed a move into Indonesia, although he did not state this as his motive. Even the raid to the Japanese home waters would have worked (although admittedly the neutral commentator has an advantage for these suggestions having read all the previous comments). Dave should even gain a few POCs this turn. For Steve, he placed too much confidence in his evaluation of Dave's probable moves. He guessed wrong and will probably pay the price. Sending the three CVLs to the Aleutians is a standard, but still wise, action.

THE BATTLES: In the Aleutians in a number of air actions, the Chitose is sunk and the Chiyoda disabled. The Ryuho then retires gracefully. In the Central Pacific, Dave wins a surface action and the cruiser retires. In the North Pacific an air action results, and the Minneapolis survives the pursuit shots when it runs. In the Marshalls, the Aoba falls to numerous air strikes, and Kwajalein and Maloelap fall to the Americans. In the Coral Sea, a surface action occurs. The Soryu and two IJN cruisers are sunk with one cruiser disabled, all with minimal damage to the Allies. Kure and the crippled 3 MAR land (simultaneously) cancelling each other. The fast Japanese carriers run, sacrificing the Myoko, damaged in the preceding surface action, to pursuing Allied ships. In the South Pacific, in successive air rounds the 23 AF downs the Naval AF and damages the 5 AF before being shot down.

JAPAN, AFTER COMBAT: Not much to say about the turn except that I am pleased with the results. I must confess, however, that his raiders did surprise me. The raid into the Coral Sea was something I did not expect, especially this late in the game and with the IJN 17 POC in the lead. His raid in the Coral Sea was more a help than a hindrance. It diverted attention away from Indonesia and the bases of Lae and the Philippines to an operation outside of the IJN perimeter. It would have been nice to have gotten lucky in the South Pacific and gained a control which would have closed off Indonesia to most of his units. Control there would have sealed an IJN victory. My 17 POC lead appears formidable with only two turns left in the game. The five land-based air units should be enough to help me control areas on Turn 8.

ALLIES, AFTER COMBAT: Going back over my objectives for this turn I accomplished all of them, with the possible exception of inflicting severe damage to his fleet. The only problem is that these objectives were accomplished one turn late! An American victory is still entirely possible but will take some good guessing (and maybe even a little luck!). The game is close enough that it might be decided by a preference roll on Turn 9.

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER COMBAT: *Turn 7 was a qualified success for the Allies. New bases were established, protection for the Coral Sea* and US Mandate POCs provided, and units were returned to good jumping off points for Turn 8. Thus, Dave's raiders were appropriately placed since the successful capture of a base in Indonesia was unlikely. On the other hand, the Japanese have a good POC leads (but it is not insurmountable). Japanese POC leads can evaporate rather quickly. Steve's risking of the air unit in the South Pacific was logical, since the potential gains from victory far outweighed the losses. Both sides are still in the game. The IJN units in the Coral Sea could have been more badly hurt, but the losses suffered on the turn cost the Japanese more.

TURN 8

The I MAR appear at Australia.

JAPAN, AFTER PATROLLERS: I must be careful with my land-based air this turn since any that are lost will not return. I must be able to withdraw them from any area that seems doomed. I will need them for the Turn 9 Allied assault. I have sent two air units to Indonesia and the Marianas, with the crippled unit patrolling the Japanese Islands. I could have placed this last unit with the others, but the Allied CA at Dutch Harbor would have required surface units of my own to guarantee my control. My surface units are better off as raiders.

ALLIES, AFTER PATROLLERS: His deployment in the Philippines with the accompanying threat to patrol the Bay of Bengal and/or the Indian Ocean makes for a difficult move on my part. My most pressing need is for another forward base, the best of which would be the Philippines. Second best would be a combination of Lae and Saipan. As far as POCs go, I need to control the Marianas (primarily for defensive purposes next turn) and negate control in Indonesia, while holding on to what I have. Quite a tall order! Accomplishing these goals would knock his lead going into the last turn to 7 POCs, putting an allied victory within easy reach. In any event, there can be little doubt that the first preference roll will be awfully important!

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER PATROLLERS:

Steve as usual has rather weak patrolling forces, but at this stage a few surface ships would be unlikely to preserve Japanese control should Dave mount a major offensive. Dave sent ships to the areas he must control this turn, but all three battleships failed their speed rolls. It may be that he is getting too ambitious this turn. If he simply controls the areas in which he now has patrollers and captures Saipan and Lae, the Japanese POC will be cut to 10-11 if Allied control of the Aleutians or Bengal is negated by carrier raids. With a base touching on Indonesia and Saipan plus secure rear areas, he could easily win on Turn 9 by simply controlling Indonesia and negating Japanese control of the Japanese Islands. However, Allied control of the Central Pacific is essential to this approach, and Steve's move could easily create complications. The Yamato and one carrier would almost insure no control in the Central Pacific. Steve also has a tendency to raid widely on Turn 8 to hold a POC lead. If he does so now, the above calculations are obviously inoperative. A very tricky raiding turn coming up with no right strategy. The right strategy is the one which counters the opponent's move in the best fashion.

JAPAN, AFTER RAIDERS: One thing is apparent! I must withdraw my two land-based air units from the Marianas as soon as possible. He will be coming in force in that area (I hope), and I want to extract them in good order for Turn 9. After seeing his patrolling forces, my plan is to hold both Indonesia and the Japanese Islands this turn while I throw 60% of my carrier forces into the Bay of Bengal and the Hawaiian Islands, hoping to break



My one great fear is that Dave will hit Indonesia hard and break control, taking away the 3 POC that I am counting on. Another fear, of course, but not as great, is that Dave would retain some of his heavy units in the Hawaiian area—a disaster for the raiding carriers.

Since I will not fight for Indonesia or the Marianas next turn, the two marine units I have in the Philippines become expendable. So these will be sent into the South Pacific in the hope of capturing Guadalcanal, disabling his two land-based air units, and costing him 1 POC. The Allies will surely capture both the Philippines and Saipan, and I will not try to stop his marine landings. I will concentrate instead on his carriers and escorts. The more I knock out, the fewer I will see come Turn 9. I hope my units in the Marianas might be able to prevent control before they are withdrawn or overwhelmed in a round of combat.

ALLIES, AFTER RAIDERS: The obvious move is to mass in the Marianas where I can have my best shot at air and sea superiority. If I mass in the Marianas, however, the only good thing that can happen is for him to mass there also. Upon which I would lose my marines on an air roll (he gets the +2DRM for preference), and possibly my patrollers as well. If a surface action results, I will lose carriers to his superior surface gunnery. I am wondering what is so good about even that! My gambling in one area also leaves the door open to a Japanese raid in the South Pacific with the possible fall of Guadalcanal. Ouch! I have thus decided to take the biggest gamble and split my fleet. The suicide CV and CVL mission in Indonesia has a chance of negating control while at the same time possibly catching an IJN backdoor amphibious reinforcement of Lae. I think he will depend on his land-based air and the +2 DRM for preference to negate landings in the Marianas. I am obviously expecting the brunt of his power in a raid in the South Pacific; although, a carrier raid on the Hawaiian Islands could negate control there, put me in a horrible POC position, and cause a sharp increase in Exedrin sales!

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER RAIDING: The Marianas were so obvious that neither side went there in strength, an indication of what may happen with simultaneous movement. Dave's patrollers in the area may have looked like a trap to Steve, but they turned out to be something of a feint; although Dave's comments indicate that he did not initially intend them to serve that purpose.

Ships have obviously become expendable this turn for both sides. The Japanese missions to the Hawaiian Islands, Marianas, and the South Pacific and the Allied incursion into Indonesia demonstrate this fact. I would argue that marine landings are more important than Steve concedes. A forward base at Saipan will permit the slower battleships in the area to be available for combat in the Japanese Islands. Too, if the Allies lack the bases for air units, then surface ships must perform patrolling duties and these ships will be needed elsewhere on the critical Turn 9.

The Japanese raiders may have been ill-used, even if they take away the 3 POCs in Hawaii. Their placement leaves Dave a solid perimeter shielding the Hawaiian Islands, US Mandate, North Pacific, and Coral Sea (8 uncontested POC) on Turn 9. Depending on combat in the Marianas, the Marshalls could also be secure. Thus, Dave will be better able to concentrate his forces. Steve could also have attempted to negate control in the Central Pacific, opening up raiding lanes for Turn 9. At the very least, he should have spared the Yamato for the Indian Ocean. Negation of Allied control in this single area could have permitted fast carriers at Singapore to threaten Allied control of the Coral Sea, thus spreading out Allied forces on Turn 9. (The fast carriers could just as easily be used ultimately in the Home Islands if the Coral Sea defenses were too strong.)

Dave anticipated well on his move, covering most bets. His move is somewhat out of pattern for him, an excellent change this late in the game. The Japanese carrier forces could be badly decimated on this turn, leaving Steve with little to defend the Home Islands on Turn 9. The incursion into Indonesia looks bad in retrospect, but it was a worthwhile gamble. Since the Japanese fleet is there, it cannot be elsewhere-so the other battles look more promising. If the bulk of the fleet had gone elsewhere, then the carriers would have a chance. At least one carrier was needed so as to have shots at any marines that might have been attempting to reinforce Lae. The F-Boat will have numerous targets, but Dave might consider sending it to Bengal where a surface action would permit the potential disabling or sinking of a Japanese carrier and a greater chance of retention of Allied control.

The battle in the Hawaiian Islands will be a key one this turn. The surface units could make a difference. A night action, if it comes first, would virtually eliminate the chances of a successful outcome for the IJN. Since Allied control of the Central Pacific is assured, the battle around Hawaii will be very important.

THE BATTLES: In the South Pacific, the two Japanese marines are sunk in a surface action and Lae falls to the American marines. In Indonesia, Steve gets his preferred surface action, and the American carriers are slaughtered. In the Bay of Bengal. Steve again wins a preference roll, but his pilots miss the RAAF. The Australians disable the Akagi, and the F-Boat sinks the light carrier. In the Hawaiian Islands, a tie on the preference roll results in an air/surface action. Both land-based air units are knocked down with only the Hiryu being disabled in return. The remaining three carriers are then sunk in the surface action, damaging the Wisconsin in return. In the Marianas Dave wins his first preference roll, getting an air action. But, only one land-based air unit is shot down, with the other being damaged. Steve concentrates on the patrolling ships, and the Quincy II is damaged and disabled. The next round is Steve's preferred surface action. Both Japanese battleships fire on the Iowa, the last patroller. It is damaged and disabled, as is the Fuso. Steve then withdraws his damaged air unit, and the Haruna is easily sunk by the pursuit shots of the Allied ships and air strikes.

JAPAN, AFTER COMBAT: Praise to Buddha and Shinto! For the loss of three carriers, I have broken control in the Hawaiian Islands. The IJN forces in the Marianas even managed to cost the Allies a very important POC, again with only modest losses. These two strategic victories almost automatically assure the Japanese of at least a draw in this game since the +14 POC lead means the Allies will have to control the Japanese Islands to win. In fact, I will only have to stop Allied control to gain a draw.

I must comment on the Allied strategy this turn. I expected the Allies to come out charging this turn to put as much hurt on the IJN as possible. The more losses he would have inflicted this turn, the less units he would have encountered come Turn 9. Also curious, why did he not follow up with raiders in the Marianas or at least attack in strength in Indonesia? I still wonder why Dave played a semidefensive turn this late in the game. Of course, I am looking at his move from one side of the coin, and everyone wishes they had foresight. The beauty of pbm VITP is that anything can happen at any time. His moves were unexpected to me, but he did expect mine in Hawaii, so Dave's strategy was not all that bad.

ALLIES, AFTER COMBAT: I could not find enough Excedrin to cure the headache he gave me in the Hawaiian Islands. I was sure that the land-based air units could hold at least one round and give me a second chance to knock out his carriers with surface gunnery. That first preference roll in Hawaii really hurt.

NEUTRAL COMMENT, AFTER COMBAT: Steve's move was great in retrospect. The key was the fact that he won the preference rolls, ultimately including the one in the Marianas since his surface craft (well-placed) did have an opportunity to fire. Other than the Bay of Bengal, he also shot well. The odds were equal on the preference rolls in Indonesia and the Hawaiian Islands and Steve won them both. Thus, an element of luck has left him in great shape. If the Allied carriers in Indonesia had negated Japanese control, it would be a different game. It must be added, however, that Steve made a move that permitted him to have the opportunity for the good results that he got.

TURN 9

The Kure marines appear in Japan.

JAPAN, AFTER PATROLLERS: My returns for Turn 8 placed a large number of units in the Phillippines in the hope of luring some of his forces to areas other than the Home Islands. All my forces will patrol this area. The units in the Philippines all have a speed factor of seven or better, so they all can patrol to the Japanese Islands. The IJN still has considerable battleship strength and remains a formidable foe. More than likely I will seek a surface action at first opportunity to make use of this still potent force.

Here the drawback of not attacking in force in the Marianas will become apparent to Dave. His large fleet in the South Pacific is incapable of reaching the Japanese Islands for patrol. This fleet should have been in the Marianas for use on Turn 9 (as potential patrollers, that is).

ALLIES, AFTER PATROLLERS: Being down 14 POC instead of 11 (Hawaiian Island loss) almost guarantees my losing any chance of surprise. The guessing is gone. The only way possible to get 14 points is to control everything I have now, plus the Marianas and Indonesia, while at the same time negating his control in the Japanese Islands. These facts are surely just as obvious to Steve. If his entire fleet patrols the Home Islands, which I think is his only move, the chances of an Allied victory are slim! If I only could take Turn 6 over again. My strategy is simply to hold what I have while trying to control Indonesia and the Marianas, leaving as fast a raiding force as I can.

NEUTRAL COMMENT, AFTER PATROLLERS:

The Japanese Islands are the key for this turn as both Steve and Dave correctly surmise, but both moves could be better. Steve's move is too cautious. A few carriers such as the Chitose or Katsuragi could have been kept as raiders to force Dave to worry about control of the Aleutians or the Marianas. He might be forced to divert ships from the Home Islands as a protective measure. Such a raid could even give Steve a victory if IJN control of the Japanese Islands is negated. These carriers may even have been sent as raiders to the Home Islands. It would be unlikely for them to be ignored as targets in an air action in any event. Since Dave knows that he must fight in the Japanese Islands, he should have sent in the few patrollers that he could muster. It would make Steve's selection of targets more difficult. There is nothing worse than being forced to allocate air strikes to a light American carrier that has received maximum damage but is still



afloat, or concentrating battleship gunnery factors on a cruiser.

JAPAN, AFTER RAIDERS: Either Dave did not count POC correctly or he is trying for a draw the hard way. I think the former is obvious since he is wasting ships on patrol duty and does not even attempt to send patrollers into the Japanese Islands, I doubt that Dave can overcome the large LIN fleet along with five-land based air units with his raiding forces. One thing is clear-the Japanese will not lose this game!

ALLIES, AFTER RAIDERS: Steve made it easy for me by patrolling with all his ships in the Japanese Islands. All available ships will raid there and hope for the best. He will have more surface ships, so I have to hope for a series of air actions.

NEUTRAL COMMENTS, AFTER RAIDERS: After the patrolling moves, the dispatch of the raiders was a simple task. Dave did neglect to guard against the movement of the marines into the Marianas. If Saipan falls on the same turn that the Philippines are invaded, the two air units will be disabled since simultaneous landings only permit land-based air to remain at the same base. Negation of Allied control in the Marianas would insure a Japanese victory regardless of the outcome of the battles in the Japanese Islands.

THE BATTLES: In the Marianas an air action is the preference and the Japanese marine is disabled preventing an early Japanese victory. In the Home Islands the first action is on the surface. When the smoke clears, six Japanese surface units have been sunk and an additional six disabled. Only seven cruisers remain for future actions. Only four American ships are sunk and four others disabled, including one of the two CVLs fired upon. The F-Boat then sinks the Shokaku. In the air portion of a day/night action on the second round of combat, four of the Japanese land-based air units are eliminated, and all the carriers except the Chitose and Ryuho are sunk or disabled. Seven American carriers are sunk or disabled, but six remain. In the following surface action, five of the Japanese cruisers are sunk or disabled while only three American ships are put out of action. Another air action results in the downing of the last land-based air unit and the sinking of the Chitose at the cost of two American fleet carriers. With only the Ryuho and two cruisers surviving to face four American carriers and seven surface ships, Steve concedes the draw.

JAPANESE, EPILOGUE: So it wound up as a draw after all! I gave Dave little chance in the Japanese Islands last turn. But again, the weak showing by my land-based air units, not to mention Dave's run on "6"s, did me in. The luck factor may have been all mine on Turn 8 in terms of preferences, but I would bet that in the most important area of shooting, Dave has prevailed in this game. Give me good shot and damage rolls any day over preference rolls. I am still miffed about my land-based air units. They were a big disappointment this game, falling every time they were shot at (or so it seems). I had a chance to win the game Turn 9 by sending some carriers to raid in other areas, but I thought that the forces necessary would be more useful in the Home Islands where I assumed that I would win the game.

Even with the few (by my book) IJN blunders, the Japanese came out with a type of victory in the fact that I did not ever surpass 20 POCs and DID NOT lose the game.

ALLIES, EPILOGUE: The Japanese Empire is history! As long as I have been playing Victory in the Pacific, I have never been conscious of the fact that the Allies get three POCs for controlling the Japanese Islands! I picked a good time to find out. I feel like an idiot! I should have sent patrollers to the

area anyway, if for no other reason than to make him waste shots at lousy targets. Fortunately, he played the last turn as badly. All those preference rolls I lost on Turns 7 and 8 (and 9!) finally evened out as my shooting was quite a bit better than his. Because of the kind of guy that Steve is, I am sure that he will refrain from any reference to luck!

I felt that I clearly had the upper hand going into Turn 6 due to some of his tactical errors, foremost of which I thought was his taking on the British in the Indian Ocean. However, my untimely and weak foray into Indonesia on Turn 6 pretty much erased any edge I might have had at that time.

In any event, this certainly was an exciting game, typical of most pbm Victory in the Pacific games.

NEUTRAL COMMENTATOR, EPILOGUE: So. one year later (typical playing time for the game by mail), the contest ends in a rare draw. While it took great expertise on the part of both players to bring about this conclusion, the outcome does reflect the closeness of the contest. Both players generally did well while on the defensive and less well when they had the advantage. Thus, their basic strengths and weaknesses evened out

Steve in the early turns failed to build up a large lead. He never forced Dave to fight on his terms for key positions or POCs. His effort to isolate Australia was not unsound strategically, particularly in the pbm game, but his tactical implementation was weak. Dave was always able to negate control in the Indian Ocean or the Coral Sea. A few patrolling battleships or two patrolling land-based air units might have changed the game. Thus, the tactical implementation of the strategic goal was ineffective. Throughout the game Steve appears to have had the edge in terms of anticipating Dave's moves, yet he could never really capitalize on it.

Dave's strategic goals seemed to be to take what he could conviently get, although this conclusion can only be inferred from his comments. It is not a bad approach for an Allied player-parry the Japanese moves early and then go on the offensive. Dave's gamble in the Central Pacific on Turn 2 was one exception. He survived the battle, but failure could have cost him the game. Midway was not that important, and he could not afford to lose the battle, whereas Steve could. The Turn 6 debacle in Indonesia was a second exception that hurt him badly. The lack of patrollers in Japanese waters on Turn 9 has received ample comment from Dave himself. A few raids early in the game might also have borne results for the Allies. Dave did do a good job of planning for the upcoming turn, a factor the Japanese have less concern with given the centrality of Truk as a major port.

Since Steve brought up the luck factor, a comment is in order. Granted that Dave had good rolls on Turn 9 (and Turn 2 in the Central Pacific), Steve has forgotten his good shooting. The Allied landbased air fell easily in the Hawaiian Islands on Turn 8, as did the patrolling ships in the Marianas. Then, there was the very poor Allied shooting on Turn 6 in Indonesia. In fact, Steve's shooting was generally excellent everywhere on Turn 6. All but one marine unit was turned back through a combination of preference roll victories and shooting. Poor Allied shooting in the Indian Ocean on Turn 3 also permitted the escape of numerous IJN fleet units that might otherwise have been sunk. Thus, Steve's early luck helps to explain his position on Turn 9. On the whole, it does not seem to me that Lady Luck chose a side in the game.

Notwithstanding the presumed incisiveness of these comments and the ones made during the game, it is always easier to see the "correct" moves when one is not actually playing the game and when the comments from all the previous turns are known. My ultimate conclusion is that it was a wellplayed game, although doubtless many out there are sure that they would have done better. T

AREA TOP 50 LIST

Rank	Name	Times On List	Rating	Previous Rank
1.	K. Combs	32	2596YOV	1
2.	B. Dobson	7	2368RJR	2
3.	T. Oleson	41	2210WXZ	11
4.	B. Sinigaglio	17	2150GHI	3
5.	P. Siragusa	26	2145DGI	6
6.	D. Burdick	31	2134GFM	4
7.	D. Garbutt	30	2126FHM	5
8.	E. Mineman	2	2090CED	7
9.	F. Preissle	29	2052LMX	8
10.	P. Kemp	3	2024EEI	9
11.	J. Kreuz	26	2016FGK	10
12.	J. Zajicek	35	2004HJQ	12
13.	M. Sincavage	21	1991DEI	13
14.	P. Ford	12	1946GCD	
15.	W. Scott	29	1937JHS	15
16.	M. Simonitch	2	1927CDF	17
17.	B. Remsburg	15	1921GHN	14
18.	P. Flory	8	1910CFI	21
19.	R. Leach	34	1909HLR	23
20.	W. Ownbey	1	1904CEI	
21.	F. Reese	12	1898GDF	29
22.	F. Freeman	6	1897EEF	16
23.	L. Kelly	25	1896VWZ	18
24.	J. Sunde	7	1895KKS	19
25.	J. Beard	21	1893GHO	20
26.	R. Phelps	13	1888GIP	27
27.	J. Anderson	8	1876DDE	22
28.	P. Landry	6	1870GHM	26
29.	D. Munsell	27	1864GFK	25
30.	C. Wannall	8	1863GKO	24
31.	R. Beyma	7	1836CDE	28
32.	S. Martin	25	1828GIL	32
33.	B. Schoose	12	1827FHL	30
34.	N. Cromartie	17	1823GGN	31
35.	B. Downing	21	1803FHL	41
36.	E. Miller	18	1801GJP	33
37.	R. Hoffman	18	1798EGL	34
38.	B. Armstrong	4	1796EFK	35
39.	F. Ornstein	15	1784FGL	37
40.	G. Charbonneau	6	1780DFI	38
41.	D. Greenwood	32	1779FFJ	39
42.	S. Johns	2	1779GCD	47
43.	C. Olson	15	1778DEJ	40
44.	P. Gartman	15	1777FCC	
45.	D. Kopp	4	1770EHL	48
46.	R. Jones	8	1769GJN	40
47.	G. Smith	6	1761EEK	42
48.	R. Shurdut	.3	1760CDI	50
49.	F. Sebastian	27	1758FHN	50
50.	J. Baker	4	1757CDH	44

MEET THE 50...

Mr. Gary Charbonneau is 32, married, with Masters degrees in library science and history, and works as a librarian in Bloomington, Indiana.

Favorite Game: MACHIAVELLI	
AREA Rated Games: AK, TRC	
AREA W-L Record: 10-6	% Time PBM: 50%
Gaming Time/Week: 8 hrs.	Play Preference: PBM
Hobbies: Model Railroading	
Pet Peeve: Fantasy/Science Fiction	Games & Gamers-a "weire

Mr. Charbonneau compliments Avalon Hill:

"AREA, of course, emphasizes competition. Unfortunately, the turn sequences of many of our most realistic games are too complex to permit PBM-which is where the better competitive games are played. We need more "classics" Avalon Hill deserves a big pat on the back for having established the AREA system. AREA, as well as the publication of The GENERAL, shows that the company really cares about the wargamer. Avalon Hill games are not necessarily any better than those of other manufacturers, but they get better support. As a result, I find that over the years I have purchased and played more games by AH than by anybody else.'



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Victory Games, Inc. 43 West 33rd Street Suite 603 New York, NY 10001

Dear Rex:

I think you did a fine job in presenting Part 1 of the infamous SQUAD LEADER Quiz. There are but a couple of points that need to be made in regard to it.

First, the comment in Question 2 regarding the commander who "should be strapped to the treads of a T-34" should have been attributed to Bob Kalaski and not to Mark Bakke. The comment by Mark was also a very resounding "NO", but stated much more mildly. This is the only real error I can find, which is amazing considering the initial draft you had to work with and all the editing and re-editing that went on.

There was one section in Question 4 omitted which I think should have been included. This was a discussion of the CC attack with one 8-3-8 plus both LMGs with leader benefit attacking both Russian squads at 3-2 (-2) and the other squad attacking both squads at 1-1. This attack has almost as good a chance as the 2-1 (-2) of clearing the hex and is considerably better than attacking each souad separately. I suspect that many players are not aware that there can be more than one CC attack against an opposing squad. This is not prohibited in the SL rulebook and in the O&A section of COI it is specifically allowed. In his article "Basic Arms And The Man" (Vol. 18, No. 5), Mark Swanson does not mention the 3-2 and 1-1 type of attack, although he does state that the presence of a leader gives one large attack the highest possibility of winning. The reason the dual attack is almost as good is that the LMGs can be used here, while they are of no benefit in the 2-1 attack

Bill Nightingale Lynnwood, Washington

Dear Mr. Martin:

I was amazed at, and somewhat surprised, reading letters like the one in Vol. 19, No. 2 condemning the new "light-weight" mapboards. Personally, I have nothing against these boards. In fact I quite like them. The old boards never fit together very well, but the new fit perfectly. The hinges don't wear out and tear or crease as they do on the older boards. As for the *minor* warp in each board (and there is a warp found in any board no matter the style), all one needs do to remedy this is bend the board back slightly each time one sets up the game. Exceedingly simple.

William Bowers Reno, Nevada

Mr. Bower's missive is typical of a number of

such that have come to my desk. They prove once again that every issue has two sides.

Dear Editor:

Having just sent my renewal for The GENERAL, I thought the time appropriate to communicate my views about the most recent issue (Nov/Dec 1982). On the whole I thought this was the worst issue I've seen in the last several years.

It is not the "Ancients" theme which I am annoyed with. Actually, this is a nice change and probably enjoyed immensely by those few gamers with interests in the era. However, there are some articles in this issue which I feel are unwarranted as subject matter for The GENERAL because of their inappropriateness to a wargaming journal, or because of their lack of subject matter, and some things were just plain missing.

The most objectional article was "Oh-Wah-Ree". After many hours of guessing your intention on this piece, I still cannot see why this parlor game was included in the pages of The *GENERAL*. The purpose of The *GENERAL* is to present "authoritative articles on the strategy, tactics and variations of Avalon Hill wargames" (emphasis added). In case you don't recognize the quote, it is right off page 2. Under no circumstances can you consider *OH-WAH-REE* a wargame. By including this article, you have cast serious doubts on your credibility as editor of this fine wargaming publication. I sincerely hope you intend to explain this article and apologize to the readership.

I also consider the "Wars of Marnon" another non-wargame article. WIZARD'S QUEST is not a wargame. It is of the Dungeons & Dragons ilk. Although part of the larger "adventure gaming" gene, it is not strictly a wargame and does not belong in The GENERAL nor on the RBG. Letters to the Editor ...

This may raise the question of what defines a wargame. My definition of a wargame is any game designed to recreate a historical event or hypothetical event based on historical parameters, using scientific methods to quantify the variables. WIZARD'S QUEST has none of this and does not belong on the pages of The GENERAL.

If there was ever an article that I was glad to see come to an end it is the "SQUAD LEADER Clinic". I admit this series has double the reasons to be in The GENERAL compared to the OH-WAH-REE and WIZARD'S QUEST articles. Unfortunately, it is overlong, boring and of no practical use. SQUAD LEADER is a game based on quick decisions and luck. There does exist certain tactical considerations in the game which increase the probability of successful moves and attacks. But to examine these under a microscope as this article does gives the false impression that SL moves are to be analyzed and dissected minutely in order to be successful. In a good SL game there is not the time to engage in such a lengthy process of intimate evaluation of consequences of every move. In my opinion this type of analysis serves not to improve the play of the game but rather encourages slow "count-everyfactor" type play. If I remember correctly, this is exactly the same type of game playing you have written against. So why include it?

Lastly, there is that to be considered which was not in The GENERAL. Avalon Hill, through the pages of The GENERAL, has never been very communicative about upcoming products and plans. With the establishment of Victory Games, there is more of a need to communicate to the readers than ever before. Victory Games has seemingly become the creative arm of AH. Their products are all original and new and by established designers. AH, on the other hand, is best identified by those designers who have quit and publication of titles which were previously published by companies gone out of business. This set of circumstances raises several questions.

First, why doesn't AH tell us more about those games which they are reissuing? There exists the possibility that the readers already own the original version and need good reason to consider purchasing the new edition. Improved graphics are not all that important. But if you have not significantly changed the game, I feel you owe the readers this information. Second, it is my understanding that the most

Second, it is my understanding that the most recent AH products are either reissues or fantasy games. Has AH given up on new products or doesn't there exist the design/development staff to produce a new wargame? A recent GENERAL listed the expected games for 1983 but there were no significant new products in the wargame line. However, the last few issues have included a fullpage advertisement for Victory Games. This indicates that AH will be depending on games already issued and not new ventures. This is unfortunate because this means that new games coming from VG will not have the benefit of mounted mapboards and other conveniences associated with AH games while the re-packaged altos seem to have limited appeal and giving them a complete AH repackaging cheats the good *original* designs of Victory Games.

Third, speaking of original designs, what has become of *Rising Sun* and the redesign of the *PL/PB/AIW* system? Both have been talked about for years and *Rising Sun* was promised for 1983. There hasn't been a progress report on either for quite some time.

All in all, this past issue of The GENERAL was quite poor. And keep in mind, I've yet to mention the deteriorating publishing schedule. As a long time subscriber to The GENERAL, I have come to expect quality and quantity. This issue fails on both points. John G. Alsen

St. Paul, Minnesota

I've no intention of apologizing for the piece on OH-WAH-REE. I will spare a moment to explain, although the ratings for the individual articles in Vol 19, No. 4 indicate that little justification is necessary. It would seem that many of those who choose to voice their opinions in the manner of selecting the three best articles disagree with you as to my propriety in printing it—or Mr. Fawcett's fine WIZARDS QUEST piece either. Rather, responsive to the tastes of those readers who take the effort 1p make their collective view known through a medium which I do consider creditable (the article/issue ratings found on each insert), I would be more inclined to question the form or content of the pieces on CIRCUS MAXIMUS, DIPLOMACY or GLADIATOR (not to mention the articles on 1776 and GETTYSBURG in Vol. 19, No. 3).

The editors of this periodical in the past have labored under no constraint such as you seek to give voice to; I refuse to have one imposed now. The pages of The GENERAL have been graced by "authoritative articles on the strategy, tactics and variations" of titles as diverse as FEUDAL, LEMANS, MANAGEMENT, OUTDOOR SUR-VIVAL, RAIL BARON and WORD POWER, as well as such "non-wargames" (by your definition) as BLITZKRIEG, DIPLOMACY, DUNE, KRIEGSPIEL, MAGIC REALM, ORIGINS OF WW2, TACTICS II and STARSHIP TROOPERS. Certainly, economic progress (RAIL BARON) and sports events (LEMANS) are "historical events", just as OUTDOOR SURVIVAL can be considered a "hypothetical event based on historical parameters". I do, however, reject any notion that these games can be passed off as "wargames".

[I will refrain from voicing my opinions on "the scientific methods to quantify the variables" (do I hear laughter from the design offices?) that, in Mr. Alsen's opinion, qualify a title for the rarefied status of "wargame". Suffice to say, as I view it, the creation of a "wargame" is as much a product of creativity and compromise as of scientific method.]

Where then am I to draw the line? This magazine will continue to deal primarily with wargames—by my definition of such as any simulation of armed conflict. But I do not intend this to operate to the exclusion of consideration of our other fine titles which do not have a forum in the family of Avalon Hill periodicals.

As to the condemnation of the style of play fostered by the recent SL Clinic, I reiterate my dislike of such play of a game designed for enjoyment. I also, however, reiterate that this is my private philosophy, one not shared by many of our readers. And, as such, it will intrude upon my selection of articles as little as possible. I would be a poor choice as editor of this periodical indeed if I included only those articles which conformed to my personal—as opposed to professional opinions. I've also made my views on play-bymail clear; yet I will argue vehemently that Mr. Lutz's recent fine article on VITP PBM is a valid and worthwhile subject for these pages. "AH... is best identified by those

designers who have quit and publication of titles which were previously published by companies gone out of business." On behalf of Messers. Greenwood, Uhl, Hamblen, Shelley and Balkoski, I'll take umbrage with this statement. It is a fact of life that talented and creative professionals, whatever their field, move on in search of new challenges; however, I would hardly discount the talents or creativity of those who remain. Too, a number of the designers/developers now en gaged in other pursuits continue to labor in the free-lance capacity for Avalon Hill. And I, for one, "identify" AH with its classics, both old (AK, STAL, WAT, DD) and new (3R, the SL family, RW, TLD, BB'81, PB/PL). Surely, Mr. Alsen, you must have missed the recent relea GI, NAPOLEON AT BAY, STRUGGLE OF NATIONS, DRAGONHUNT and PENNANT RACE-in-house designs all? How sad for you And, of course, you also overlooked the references to UPFRONT, RENAISSANCE, BULL RUN, WESTERN CAMPAIGN and PRO TENNIS in the brief listing of 1983 projects in Vol. 19, No. 3? Avalon Hill continues to have one of the most creative and talented design staffs in the business, as witnessed by the fact that their abilities are in demand by a number of other companies. As to the lack of progress reports on RIS-ING SUN and the PL/PB/AIW redesign, the reason is quite simple-there has been no progress.

Why doesn't The GENERAL inform the readers of the component and rules changes in detail of redeveloped tilles previously published by other firms? The elemental fact remains that this periodical is not composed of reviews. If the reader cannot glean this type of information from the advertisements and articles presented, I would suggest he turn to those hobby publications devoted to reviewing new game releases. As you point out, Mr. Alsen, The GENERAL is dedicated to "authoritative articles on the strategy, tactics and variations" of our games—not reviews

In closing this overlong reply, a point must be stressed here. Victory Games is not the "creative arm of AH". Indeed, it is no arm at all of AH; VG is a separate and distinct entity—a fact that all too many seem oblivious to. As such, while these pages will occassionally bear information on the release of our sister company's fine games, The GENERAL continues to be devoted to the AH line of titles.

And if you won't mention the "deteriorating publishing schedule", I won't.

Dear Mr. Martin:

The article entitled "Napoleon's War at Sea: Naval Rules Changes for WAR & PEACE" (Vol. 19, No. 5) contained many long awaited and badly needed revisions. Such is our relief that loyal W&P admirals everywhere will praise the efforts of Mr. McLaughlin, Mr. Bruegge and Mr. Parsons. Not since WS&IM has such a great gap in Napoleonic naval affairs been filled. And, of course, kudos to Mr. Waido and Mr. Parsons—the content of their strategic analyses enlightens naval gamers the world over.

However, these efforts call to mind the one question that plagues historical buffs and game designers alike, "How much should the historical situation govern the system and scenarios?" I bring this up because, though no mention nor attention has been given to it, the historical naval situation as of September 1805 is ignored. Some may say that I am arguing over tittle-tattle, for indeed the setup as it stands now bears a high correlation to the position of forces on March 1805; but I resoundingly answer that if one is to incorporate a naval system into W&P, then it could at least be done correctly! Yes, I am well aware of the common and necessary changes required of a game by playability and play balance, but it seems to be pure Anschluss to throw the historical situation right out of the window!

Behind all this complaining lies three basic questions of historical fact:

 How can Lord Nelson, then Viscount, be at sea in the Mediterranean with a fleet counter at game's start if he was on leave in England from the 18th of August 'til the 15th of September, when he set sail and immediately joined the British blockade of Cadiz?

2) Where in the world is the Allied fleet (French and Spanish) under Villeneuve, which held up in Cadiz's port from the 20th of August until its fateful departure on the 19th and 20th of October? It contained a force of 18 French SOLs and 15 Spanish SOLs that were ready for sea—roughly four French fleet counters and three Spanish counters in terms of W&P.

3) And where is the British blockade of Cadiz, which was made up of roughly 27 SOLs throughout the month of September?

Heavens! If you started the Ulm campaign with Napoleon on the Channel and the Austrians in Vienna, it would have drawn some comment. If the land forces are to begin the game in September, shouldn't the naval forces do likewise?

So, for all the W&P gamers out there who have been in the dark since 1980, I offer the historical setup as of the 1st of September 1805:

At Rochefort: I English fleet blockading I French fleet

At Plymouth: 2 English transports and Nelson

At Corunna: NOTHING

At Cadiz: English fleets blockading 4 French fleets, 1 French transport, 3 Spanish fleets and 1 Spanish transport

In the Mediterranean: NOTHING

One should remember that these changes affect only the cities listed—and then only the naval forces. Now I am sure that many out there will now rant and rave, saying "It's Trafalgar all over!" True, I say, but the only way to avoid this is to begin the naval game in March 1805 and play a naval scenario that never existed.

Alexis Bugnolo Gainseville, Florida

Dear Mr. Martin:

In your March-April (Vol. 19, No. 6) issue, why was a picture of a German U-boat commander used as header art for an article entitled "Flattop Gamemastered"? How many people do you think will get the joke? Dale A. Sheaffer

The Avalon Hill Game Company

Very few, Mr. Sheaffer, very few.

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G.I.: ANVIL OF VICTORY

The following changes in content will be made to the second edition of GI. Additional cosmetic changes will be made but are not listed here.

COUNTER ERRATA:

U.S. 12.7 AA is missing the 360 degree symbol. The MAA3 survival listing should be S6, not S7. The M4A3E2 counter A is missing a red 4 turret armor modifier.

The M36B1 counter F should have a MF of 14; not 15.

The LVT(A)4 should be shown as an OT vehicle. DUKW counters C & D should have red stars; not black.

Delete the A4/5 listing of the British M4A1(76)w.

Delete the A5/6 listing of the British M10.

Scenario Errata:

34 Change "target" to "target hex" everytime it appears in the Clarifications. Add "(Re: 133.52)" between "obstruction" and "although" in Special Rule 34.1.

35 Incorrect versions of certain counters are shown. Replace the French 2-3-7 crew and all French MG's with the proper corresponding counters for their nationality. The Stuart I tank counter should be the version with a 4 BMG factor.

37 Insert "or" between "row" & "adjacent" in the U.S. setup instructions. Change board "4" to "6".

38 The M4A3(75)w counter should have a MF of 15; not 14. Add to the Victory Conditions: "Control is gained by being the last sole occupant of the ground level at the end of the last player turn in which the building was occupied if there are no opposing units on higher levels of the building. If an enemy occupies a higher level of the building, the U.S. player must also be the last sole occupant of that level."

41 Change the U.S. HS in 205 to a 2-3-7 crew, and the 44a bazooka in 1503 to a 42b version.

42 Insert "ground level" between "each" & "building" in the victory conditions.

43 Insert "ground level" between "each" & "building" in the victory conditions. The two U.S. HS's should be crews.

ORDC ERRATA:

Delete the triangle symbol from the 144.7 chart, and add "AFV is not fully tracked $\ldots -1^{iv}$. Change caption for note E on the Vehicle Movement Costs Chart to: "bog DR necessary (144.82)". Add an "**" after "10+" in the Non-Road column of the Ground Pressure Bog DR Numbers Chart. Delete the word "Same" from 169.2 chart. Add "Gun changed CA $\ldots +1^{iv}$ to 167.2 chart. Insert "CT" between "CE" and "AFV" in Table 20.3.

RULEBOOK ERRATA:

141 Transpose First Line Squad & Elite Squad captions.

The Question Box

141.6 Delete: "unless ... phase". Substitute: "when not stacked with an unbroken U.S. leader. SSR designated Combat Engineers which turn green may not use special engineer weapons (141.2) without penalty."

142.2 Add: ",but it may not move out of a bunker/entrenchment and into a bunker/entrenchment in the same APh. It would have to remain outside those special terrain features in the adjacent hex."

142.3 Change "131.4" to "121.4".

142.311 Add: "(EXC: wounded leaders; 122.1)" after "unit.".

142.312 Add "(EXC: wounded leaders; 122.1)".

142.5 Insert "After reaching the closest suitable cover" between "hex." & "Broken". Insert: "hex" between "building" & "towards".

142.7 Add: "The hazardous movement DRM is not cumulative with the Movement DF DRM nor the Movement in the open DRM, nor is it dependent on being performed in open terrain." Add: "moving on a rooftop (174.25)" to the list of hazardous movements.

143.11 Substitute "MG" for "SW".

143.43 Add: "A MG trying To Kill an AFV is assumed to have hit the weakest armor that the vehicular target facing presents."

143.7 Add: "Note: Overruns which end their turn in the target hex check for Random SW Destruction of non-portable/abandoned ordnance even if the overrun did not result in a KIA unless that ordnance occupied a trench/entrenchment."

143.91 Add: "or during CC."

143.94 Insert: "using its printed (not berserk) morale level" between "NMC " and "At".

144.3 Delete: "32.6". Insert: "(Re: 51.3)" betweeen "TEM" & "is".

144.4 Change Case B to agree with the TO HIT Table on the ORDC.

144.414 Add: "Mk V, Mk II AA, Mk VI" to the British column.

144.43 Add: "(EXC: Overruns)" between "hex." & "Turretted".

144.46 Substitute "A & B" for "A-C".

144.6 Delete: "or sunken . . . hexside,".

144.61 Delete: "or sunken road".

144.7 Add: "Cowering does not affect Immobilization attempts."

144.76 Insert: "or has succeeded in immobilizing or destroying an overrunning AFV in its hex (72.5-.6)" between "immobilization" & "may".

144.8 Insert: "(or changing their VCA in)" between "entering" & "woods". Insert: "directly



from another woods or building hex" between "entered" and "in".

144.82 Change last line to read: "marsh hex is a bog hex."

144.92 Add: "(EXC: any halftrack, or bren carrier not already carrying ordnance)".

144.932 Add: "and ESB".

144.942 Change "(144.92)" to "(144.94)".

145.11 Add: "Similarly because Terrain does not affect the placement of Indirect Fire, it is resolved on the IFT with full TEM."

145.2 Delete the 6th sentence and substitute: "A HD target behind a wall cannot claim that TEM in the To Hit calculation." Change the following EX to read: "A P2KwIVH fires during its DFPh at an enemy squad seven hexes away within its TCA. The basic TH# is a 7. If the enemy squad is in a woods, shellhole, or graveyard hex there is a +1 DRM to the To Hit DR for Case R. If the enemy squad is in a stone building, there is a +3 DRM to the To Hit DR for Case R. If the enemy squad is moving several hexes and through a woods hex, there is a +1 DRM to the To Hit DR for Case R, and a -1 DRM to the To Hit DR for Case J'.

145.3 Insert: "a trench/entrenchment DRM or" between "to" & "a".

145.4 Add: "Ordnance with its own inherent TO HIT Table (SCW's) never use either the Advanced TO HIT Table or structure size DRM's. Delete: "or Stream/Gully Bridge" from the chart.

145.41 Replace the 4th sentence with: "All the occupants of the vertical building hex are affected unless they occupy a level of the building hex which is out of the LOS of the firer (EXC: rubble)."

145.5 Add at the end of the first sentence: "at a range of 7 hexes or more". Add: "Ordnance cannot place smoke in its own hex."

145.61 Change: "2 prior to modification" to "2 either prior to or after modification".

146.1 Delete: "during its PFPh". Change: "TH#" to "TK#".

146.2 Insert: "(not in woods or rubble)" between "hedge" & "against". Insert "or HEAT rounds" between "SCW's" & "only".

146.34 Change "four" to "two".

146.36 Delete: "adding . . . SCW's".

148.14 Change "148.23" to "148.21".

148.21 Change "85L" to "88L" and drop it to the third row, "Vehicular Only" refers only to the German 75. The British 77L has D5 capability in 1945.

148.41 Insert: "If the Cannister depletion number has been exceeded, the attack must be repeated with HE or IFE but using the same DR as a To Hit DR." between "Table " & "Cannister".

148.45 Substitute: "the depletion number" for "12".

148.51 Insert: "prior to all other Prep Fire" between "PFPh " & "Placement."

148.524 Substitute: "1" for "0".

148.6 Substitute: "at the outset of" for "in".

149.11 Change: 170.63 to 170.61.

149.42 EX Change "ten" to "nine".

150.3 Delete: "/DFPh".

150.5 Change "DFPh" to "MPh".

150.6 Change "units" to "squads".

151.5 Add: "Crest status provides no additional TEM to indirect fire."

153.11 Insert: ",partisans" between "SS" & "or".

153.23 Change "further . . . range" to "are a number of hexes ≥ their current morale".

153.232 Add: "Green/Inexperienced infantry need not check for use of PBF (141.62)." EX: Change "Q3" to "O3". Delete: "its inherent range and".

156.11 EX Delete the black arrow.

156.12 Insert: "the brown contour lines of" between "through" & "another". EX: Change "13J8" to "13J4".

156.23 Change "fully-tracked" to "tracked" twice.

156.4 Insert: "Elevated Road" between "a(n)" & "bridge".

157.4 Add: "Moving directly from a stream hex to a marsh hex during the MPh is possible at a cost of 3 MF's only if the hexside crossed contains Open Ground. If the hexside clearly shows marsh on both sides along its entire length, movement into that hex would be possible only during the APh. R3-R4, X6-W7, and X7-W7 are the only such restrictive hexsides on board 13".

157.43 Add: "unless berserk" between "foot." & "An".

157.61 Delete: "does not act . . . but does".

157.614 Insert: "ground level" between "on a" & "bridge". Add: "(in direct contrast to units on a level 1 bridge; 156.4)" after "versa".

158.24 Insert: "from/" between "withdrawing" & "into". Insert: "into a" between "or" & "booby".

158.3 Change "=3" to "+1 [capture attempt] = 4".

158.41 Change "do so automatically by" to "attempt to do so by first". Delete last sentence. Add: "The attacker must add 1 to his CC DR if he intends to capture the vehicle. Note that a SMC has an inherent CC value of 1 when attacking a vehicle in CC and trying to roll \leq its FP. Infantry may not attempt to capture a manned AFV."

158.42 Insert: "CT" between "CE" & "AFV's".

158.43 Add: "Regardless of the outcome, infantry attacking a vehicle in CC, must remain in melee in that hex if opposing non-passenger infantry occupy the same hex."

161.66 Insert: "unbroken" between "armed" & "infantry". Change "in LOS of an enemy" to "entering/exiting in LOS of an unbroken enemy".

162.22 Delete "44.1".

164.2 Add: "Normal smoke DRM's apply. A separate Acquisition DR is required for each SW in the hex which the unit wishes to acquire.

164.44 Add: "A scrounging DR cannot be attempted more than once per turn per side."

167.11 Add: "+1 Gun changed CA"

167.2 Add: "and RCL's" to EXC.

169.12 Change "adding" to "subtracting".

169.2 Delete "Same" from chart.

169.5 Insert: "or DFPh" between "MPh" & "provided".

170.6 Insert: "may enter even a stone rubble hex

170.7 Change "ground level" to "single story".

172.3 EX Insert: "at the firer's option" between

174.24 Add: "Units at treetop level are not eligible for Infantry Height Advantage, but units on

175.32 Add: "other than the crew and any directing leader which fired it" between "fires"

The new RBG, and the analysis of these

ratings, can be found in the Avalon Hill

Philosophy column of this issue. The considera-

tion of G.I.: ANVIL OF VICTORY, since this new title dominates the chart, has been integrated

into the AH Philosophy. An abbreviated form of

the RBG will return to this page in the next issue.

169.54 Delete: "in an adjacent hex".

171.26 Delete: "level hit (145.42)".

175.24 "(167.4)" to "(167.2)".

"hex " & "For".

a rooftop are.'

& "is"

between "hex" & "qualifies"

Our issue featuring STRUGGLE OF NATIONS -Vol. 19, No. 5-drew raves all around. Indeed, it proves to be the best rated issue in over three years (since Vol. 16, No. 1) with an overall rating of 2.75. Whether this is due to the Napoleonic theme, to the mixture of articles devoted to the old and the new (WATERLOO and STRUGGLE OF NATIONS), to the mix of tactical and strategic (WOODEN SHIPS & IRON MEN and WAR & PEACE), or simply to the joy of the SL community at having four new scenarios to chew, it is most gratifying. The ratings for the individual articles of this issue-based on a random sampling of two hundred responses with values of "3", "2" or "1" assigned to the first, second and third choices of those responding-are as follows:

PLAYING BOTH SIDES OF THE ELBE 30	
WS&IM OF THE LEVANT	5
SQUAD LEADER CLINIC	5
NAPOLEON'S WAR AT SEA	5
PRO-FRENCH NAVAL STRATEGY 11	0
BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY	3
NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS	5
VIVE L'EMPEREUR	0
THE COMPLEAT DIPLOMAT	31
LOGISTICS OF THE STRUGGLE	1
AH PHILOSOPHY	1

... and the Hittite artificer, Gutenkunstsublawalla, did fall upon the forces of Pharoah and fattened them and laminated them and did cut them to pieces... With that, most readers would surmise that Richard Gutenkunst has again worked his magic in offering top-quality counters of a recent variant that has graced these pages—in this instance, the AL variant entitled "Ramses II" (Vol. 19, No. 4). These laminated counters will be sent to those who forward to Mr. Gutenkunst the sum of \$2.00 a set, plus a self-addressed, stamped envelope. Mail check or money order to Mr. Richard Gutenkunst, Box 3301, Traffic Station, Minneapolis, MN 55403.

Politesse is the newsletter of the extremely active Dale City (Virginia) "telephonic" DIPLOMACY organization. Devoted to club news and reports of completed games, the 'zine serves the interests of DIPLOMACY gamers in the Northern Virginia and Maryland region. Currently, a Metro-DC area telephone game is being organized, with turns called in weekly to the gamemaster. In a unique departure, the editors of the 'zine offer subscriptions for any duration and price the subscriber feels is fair. Those readers residing in the Mid-Atlantic region searching for something out of the ordinary are urged to contact Mr. Ed Wrobel, 3932 North Forestdale Avenue, Dale City, VA 22193.

The third annual Northeast Gaming Association Playoffs (NGAP) are now complete. This is the annual team-gaming event, utilizing the Association's Team Gaming rules (3rd edition available for \$2.00), which involves many of the best overall gamers anywhere. Among the six games utilized for the 1982 competition were SQUAD LEADER, VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC, WOODEN SHIPS & IRON MEN and RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN. The finals of the NGAP were won in convincing fashion by the Southeastern Massachusetts Gamers, pitted against the Mid-Hudson Valley Games Club. Their victorious four-man team was comprised of Seth Owen, Mark Fastoso, Joe Medeiros and Pete Landry. Plans are being finalized for the 1983 competition, with scheduling to begin in August and the finals to be played in December. A \$ 10.00 entry fee will be imposed for each four-man team. The specific games which will be featured have not yet been announced. Those interested in learning more

Infiltrator's Report

of team gaming or in placing a team in competition are requested to contact Mr. Jeff Cornett, Commissioner of the NGA, 11 Robert Frost Drive, Shelton CT, 06484 (203-929-6147). Finally, the NGA plans a meeting a coincide with ORIGINS in Detroit to consider extending these playoffs to encompass the Midwest.

After almost a year of negotiations, Avalon Hill has acquired the rights to distribute Chaosium's popular fantasy role-playing game, *RUNEQUEST*, and its line of play-aids and supplements. The agreement requires Chaosium to develop a third edition *RQ* for publication by Avalon Hill in early 1984. The new edition is to be followed by quarterly publication of new supplements, which will initially combine new game material with re-edited material from previous publications. The Avalon Hill editions will all have a new boxed format.

RUNEQUEST was first introduced in July 1978 as a softcover book. Since then, the game system has been available in hardcover and boxed set versions. Its second edition won a 1979 Strategist Club Award for outstanding game design.

The 1983 edition of the *Black and Blue Book* is now available. Containing almost three times the number of entries as the 1982 edition, it is an indispensable aid for the serious student of the devious world of *DIPLOMACY* (over 300 FTF and PBM players in California are listed by name, address and telephone number, along with brief summaries of the state's eleven *DIPLOMACY* 'zines and their publishers). The *BBB* uses a unique cross reference system based on telephone area codes and postal ZIP codes to help players make local contacts when searching for opponents. The *BBB* is available for \$2.00, postpaid, from The Institute of Diplomatic Studies, Box 8416, San Diego, CA 92102.

In Redondo Beach is a group of active and talented game enthusiasts, styling themselves the Random Wargamers. Their regular club 'zine, *The Random Wargamer*, is an effort that would make many others envious. It contains club news, information on their official playtests, articles and reviews of new games and news of the hobby. Those residing in the area interested in top-notch play are urged to contact Mr. Charles Crain, Editor, The Random Wargamer, 2413 Mathews #b, Redondo Beach, CA 90278.

It is obvious that many players of STRUGGLE OF NATIONS suffer from an excessive attack of the elan that brought Napoleon low. Of the numerous entries to Contest No. 111, but six agreed with Mr. Zucker's opinion that the best French strategy is a defensive one. This is not to say that the French merely sit in their initial positions to accept the Allied onslaught; the occupation of key defensive terrain and adjustment of lines is necessary. Bernard Wodzinski came closest to recognizing that superior French play in the Dresden Scenario demands an "offensive, elastic defense". The following are awarded their Marshal's batons: Roger Daene, Detroit, MI; Scott Hess, Hooksett, NH; Bill Lagle, Cedar Rapids, IA; Danny McCarthy, Phoenix, AZ; Tom Scholle, Eldon, MO; and Bernard Wodzinski, Pittsburgh, PA. And Ruth Glaspey is awarded an Honorable Mention for her lengthy and well-considered justification for selecting the offensive-even if it is wrong.

In Contest #112, the Japanese player faces an almost incredible plethora of fine options. From the surprising placement of the Allied patrollers, it seems obvious that the American player has decided not to attempt control of the Japanese Islands, but is instead striving to guarantee a draw by seizing all areas worth POCs to him with patrollers and defending them with raiders. [Note that the New York was inadvertently listed as under repairs at Pearl; in point of fact it enters play on Turn 9 at Pearl. Although this error has no effect on the solution, apologies are tendered for the confusion.] Simultaneously, the Allied player must insure that the Japanese gain no POCs. As the readers will have noticed, this is precisely the situation faced by the Japanese player in our current Series Replay (which resulted in a draw). To now win, the Japanese player need merely retain control of any area or deny Allied control of any area in addition to that of the Japanese Islands (which the Allies cannot control without patrollers)!

Thus, the Japanese player may commit large forces to the Japanese Islands or Indonesia as patrollers, with substantial reinforcements as raiders (certain to bring the massive Allied fleet out from Lae); or he may go for control of a region the Allies have little interest in (the Central Pacific or Indian Ocean) – although this too will bring a descent of Allied raiders at one point to break Allied control; or he can attempt to block Allied control in numerous areas, placing his opponent on the horns of a dilemma – but in so doing diluting his own force and risking loss of all piecemeal. In point of fact, all are good strategies. However, the third option above is virtually foolproof.

Where to take on the Allies? Where else-the Aleutians. Given the placement of the Allied forces, the Aleutians are the one area on the board that can be reached by the bulk of the Japanese at Yokosuko and not by the Allies at Lae. This gives the Japanese player the balance of power at this one crucial point. To dilute the Allied effort and distract the Allied player, some effort must be made during the patrolling phase. The forces in the Philippines are the perfect sacrifice given your future move. Thus, send a ship to the Indian Ocean, another to the Central Pacific, a couple patrol Indonesia itself, and the rest steam to the Japanese Islands. Meanwhile, the 22nd AF joins the Japanese Island force and the 25th and 26th AFs annoy the Allies in the Marshalls. The Kure Marines will go to the Marianas. The rest of the fleet, including the two reinforcements, remain in reserve (remember that at this point you don't know that the enemy is ignoring the possibility of a win by ignoring the Home Island). You have covered all bases, laying the foundation for control in a number of places (including the important Japanese Islands). The reaction of the Allies (as described by their placement) allows you to ignore the Japanese Islands now, and send your fleet from Yokosuko to the Aleutians. The forces you have committed can easily eliminate the RAAF. If the American fleet shows up (only ten ships maximum against your eighteen, including the monsters) and a night battle is determined, odds are that most of the American carriers will be sunk on the first round. Even if a day battle results, the odds (still better than your chances of surviving any massive action with the Lae force) greatly favor downing the RAAF on the first round. This alone makes the IJN advantage overwhelming.

Thus, the answer for Contest 112 hinges on the commitment of a minimum of 16 ships to the Aleutians. The dispatch of the other ships, the Marines and the air units is a matter of little import, as long as these are aimed at diluting the Allied concentration of force.

OPPONENTS WANTED

Reliable novice adult (37) wants unrated pbm AZ, FE, PB, TRC. Not a fanatic. Honor system die rolls. First five accepted. Details negotiable. Forrest Opper, Box 81607, College, AK 99708, (907) 479-2768

907) 479-2768. What to set someone elses face across the table. Just so many times I can play myself before I figure out how to beat myself. Desperate! St., COI, COD. Russ: Clodifier, P.O. Box 1108. Eagle liver, AK 9957, (907) 644-5170 Ff opponents wantel for SL, COO, COD. Willing to learn others. Only 15, but I play mature. Not Area rated. Jay Zuelow, 2061 Countryclub Dr., Flagstaff, AZ 86001, 526-2269

Area 1100 + needs pbm opponents for PB, PL, TRC. Also fif SL gametics and most AH games. Mature opponents only. 1'm interested in any clubs. William C. Wilson, 13035 N. 18th Pl., Phoenix, AZ 85022, 971-3975

Pheenix, AZ 85022, 971-3975 1) yr: old needs one-rated phon opponents for SL, Will also play GE, DD'77, GOA or VITP, need ystems. Andy DeLais, '921 Tuixany Dr., Tuccon, AZ 85741, 297-6514 18 yr. old Area provisional 1500 is moving away to college. I need new opposition FH or phon. Willing to play anything? Letters only, please. Max Pruden, 1842 Fleetwood Ave., Castro Valley, CA 94546, 581-1892

Valley, CA 94346, 381-1892 Area 1480 Prov. seeks rated pbm 3R'81, AK. All letters answered. Lee C. Glacser, 10006 Bon Vue Dr., Ekasion, CA 92021 Experienced SL, COI, COD, GI player seeks fuf opponents in Santa Barbara area. Phil Seymour,

opponents in Santa Barbara area. Phil Seymour, 6613 Trigo Rd., Coleta, CA 93017, 685-6872 DIP pbm game openings in "Embassy Whispers" 'zine. For info send SASE to: Roger Lewis, 1709/4 S. Bonnie Brae St., Los Angeles, CA 90006

Adult player tired of irresponsible flakes. Desire rated opponents for fun games, win or lose, to the finish. PL, PB, WSIM, COI. No kids please. Kevin Kinsel, 26213 Via Roble, Mission Viejo, Ca 9260 (Taja sta).9281 CA 92691, (714) 830-2939

Area rated 1000 or less. Pbm opponents wanted for AX, Old BB, BB'81, D-Day and TB. For fun PAA. Marcel carbonneau, 1824 S. Broadway, Oceantide, CA 92054

Oceanide, CA 92054 Area 1600 + opponents wanted for pbm COI/COD/GI, I have good pbm system. You choore scenario-11% choose tables. Also seeking fif opponents for above-rated/unrated. Chuck Wannall, Jr., 1250 N. Mentor #14, Pasadena, CA 9106, (213) 798-6819

Wanted, players for CIV, GI, AIW, FT, John Wilson, 1418 Gordon #3, Redwood City, CA 94061, (415) 364-6350

Willen, 1418 Gordon 93, Redwood Chy, CA 90601, (413) 504-6350 Anyone want to play pbm W&PT Play any side, any scenario, any opt. rule. DNK Sauer, 1244 Libbyway, Sacramenio, CA 95821 Adula nz, player seeks 3R opponents in S.F. Bay area. Where are the wargame clubs in S.F., CA? Write: (MJ Steri K. A nnor, USS Kiska (AE-35), FPO San Francisco, CA 96670 2) ro: dd warst ff opponents for 3R, GOA, SL, WSIM, Area 1200 prov., rated or not I'll play. Dale Hawkin, SR Kenilworh Ave. San Leandro, CA 94377, (415) 430-8094 Adult (23) looking for ff opponents. Willing to

CA 94577, (415) 430-8094 Adult (25) looking for fif opponents. Willing ro-play or learn mout. AH games. Own 24 AH games. Looking for friendly game play. Will travel. Frank Lucas, 112 Vista View, Vacaville, CA 95588, 448-8369 Date 41

Pbm AL, WSIM. James John Myers, 15345 Hari St., Van Nuys, CA 91406, (213) 787-9639 14-yrs. old average gamer looking for fif op-ponents of same experience in Arvada area for 3R, SL, STAL. Will consider pbm. David Miller, 6055 Queen SL, Arvada, CO 80004

Buy, sell, trade classic and other AH games directly with other players. A national computerized system. Send SASE for details: The Game Ex-change c/o: John Farewell, 61 Midland Ave., Stamford, CT 06906, (203) 327-0919

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TOBRUK

-16

15 yr. old new resident desires frf opponent for W&P, 176, FT, plus 40 others. Any clubs in Broward County Mark Wilkens, TS21 NW 2420, Ltr., Coral Springs, FL 33665, 1039 752-6582. Wantel: Adult phon opponents, Will answer all letters. Am average to good player, TKC, PL, PB, Wanteling, Mark Mark, Phollywood, FL, 3021, (105) 963-3042.

(105) 963-3042 compared with a product of the standard standard

FL 32504, (904) 478-4688 Opponents wanted for SL, COI, COD, GI, in St. Pete area. Am not rated. Have all games men-tioned. Bob MacIntyre, 6810 21st. N., St.

Petersburg, FL 33702, (813) 522-8812 Area 1200 seeks rated or unrated pbm (if ap propriate) or ftf WSIM, CIV, DUNE, SST, etc

propriate) or fif WSIM, CIV, DUNE, SST, etc. will learn or teach! Jon Watkins, 1760 Bayview Dr., Sarasota, FL 33579, (813) 955-9025 Attempting to arrange SL, COI toury for greater Chicago area. Sometime in middle August. Send SASE ASAP to: Robert Witt, 3609 S. 53 Ave., Cicero, IL 60650, (312) 652-1388

Opponents wanted for AH war games. Will try any. Also, info on game cubin in Carbondale, IL. Dennis Williams, 407 N. Market St., Sparta, IL 62286, (618) 443-4227

Area 1500 prov. seeks 1400+ players for rated pbm games of PB, STAL and TRC. Also rated pbm in SL if you have system. Steve Gore, 4199 Johnson Rd., Booeville, IN 47601, (812) 897-4288

Looking for average to good opponent for phm 3R. I'm new to phm. Send opening Polish set up. Bob Stadelmayer, 1928 Lima Lane, Ft. Wayne, IN 46318, (219) 499-563 Area 1200 prov. Phm STAL, WAT, DD, FE, B831, TRC, Fri dovo plau GETY, VITP, WAS, B15, MID. Rated phm, Ftf or fun of it. Phil Byers, 5014 Kritshire, South Bend, IN 46614, 291-2240

Area 1600 + seeks ftf, phm opponents for SL, COI, COD. Need not be rated, Rules/scenarios/ sides on agreement contact. Roger Fowler, 406 Market Apt. #6, Emporia, KS 66801, (316)

343-6 Seeking ff in Central KY, for BL, FT, GOA, PB, PL, TRC, SST, 3R, W&P, WSIM. Your place or mine. John C. Chenault, Rt. 1 Box 378, Finch-ville, KY 40022, (502) 834-7879

Adult gamer, experienced in complete SL series seeking ftf in same. Don Clouse, 102 St. Franci Ct., #13, Louisville, KY 40205, (502) 451-8357

CL. 113, LOMANIE, KT WODY, LOUZ 917-8537 Seeking mature and exciting partners interested in adult wargame experiences. AW, BS, JU, MR, TAC, UFO, WO, Steve E, Lowther, Norway Cir, Augusta, ME 04330, (207) 623-6655 Opponents wanted for: Fif or pbm, AIW, PB, PL, TRC, BL, AK, VITP, GOA, 1776, Aholook-ing for ff pipe of SL, JR, WSIM, GE, Kein Ing for ff pipe of SL, JR, WSIM, GE, Kein G, GT, Gage Rd, Annapolis, MD 21402, 273-5012.

757-5012 KM, CIV, CM, GSL, GL, Willing to learn others. Alan Niedemayer, 206 E. 25th SL, Balto, MD 21218, 203-0062 Three Balto. area W&P players want only unbiased serious yre fun games. IPI: ASAP. GOA, 1776. Louis Sheehan, 300 Leverono Ave., Balto, MD 2128, 322-0335

21224, 522-0535 Need fif gamers in Northern P.G. County. No fantasy or children please. Looking to expand club. Play WWII games. Kevin Combs, 11225 Old Baito. Pike, Beltsville, MD 20705, (301) 27 2005

OPPONENTS WANTED

Wanted area adult gamers for ftf play in WSIM, 1776, RW, GE, CH, AK, DD. Walter Beall, Jr., 277 West 5th St., Frederick, MD 21701, (301) 662-0302 Adult gamer seeks opponents in the Gaithersbur area. Have SL, COI, SUB, LW, WAS. Joh Mattioli, 19667 Club Lake Rd., Gaithersbur MD 20879, (301) 869-3841

MD 20879, (30) 369-3841 Need pbm opponents for TRC. 1 prefer to play Russia, no optional rules. Also fit J 8, CAE, 1776, FE. All letters answered. Area rated 1705CDF. Brian Sutton, 1 Socitdale Cr., Lutherville, MD 21093, (20) 322-4597 Two beginner adult CIV and WO players seek other adult non-smoking opponents. Jim Staggs, P.O. Box 1616, Rockville, MD 20850, (301) 424-7218

4:42-3218 doi:10.1017/s0.2017.0017/s0.2017/

Area rated 900 prov. looking for pbm rated action in PB, PL, TAC, BL. Will fif other games, rated only. Richard M. Horn, 14038 Fairmount, Detroit, MI 48205, (313) 526-2481

Detroit, M1 48205, (313) 526-2481 Conflict gamers for friendly competition. Get organ-iedf M. Bates, P.O. Box 7091, Grand Rapids, Mi 45207, 241-4523 12 yr. old gamer seeks opponents for SL, COL, COD, GI in southeastern Michigan. Douglas Creutz, 8290 Chamberlain, Lambertville, MI 48144, 856-2301

The Raco Resort is looking for a few good gamers. Pom honor system is manditory. 3R, WAS, AOC, DD, AIW. Raco Resort, Box 15, Raco, MI 49778

RECO, MI 49778 TR players where are you? Looking for rated or non-rated players in any area. Possible pbm or club formation. Contact: G. Rose, 45433 Kenmore, Utica, MI 48087

b) China Orinandini, Comani, D. Koje, 5035 Kemmore, Unica Mi 48087 27 yr. old looking for experienced adult for friendly fit WIP, GOA, 38, SUB, many others. Will plom AZ, area applied for. Any clubs in area. Jeff Scholz, 2860 Tafi Ap, 2125 Xu, Wyoming, M1 49009, (616) 538-4488 Adult rated 1500 prov. seebs rated opponents for PB or PL. 1 have PB war gamers guide, PL variant kir. Anthony L. Gray, Box 376, Buffalo, MO 65652, (417) 345-7222

Non-area rated looking for pbm BB'81, STAL, FE, W&P. Am 19, have 11 years experience. Soon to be in KC area, any clubs? Chris Earls, 5837 S. Lakeshore Dr., Springfield, MO 65807, (417) 887-0237

4 yrs. experience, sick of solataire, have SL, COI, COD, GL, 1776, GL, GOA, TLD, LW, TKC, 3R, W&P, WSIM. Prefer fif, will try pbm. Dennis Maki, 314 113b Ln. N.W., Coon Rapids, MN 55433, (612) 755-4818

Area 1200 needs pbm opponents for PB, TRC. Also SL if you have good system. Paul Mee, 4928 Park Ave., So., Mplt., MN 55417 COI, COD, DD, FR, GE, GI, PB, PL, SL, 3R, WéP, Ray Kelly, 5417 Reynolds SL, Omaha, NE 68152, (402) 571-5428

Opponents wanted for ftf games of SL, COI, COD, GI, 3R, DD, TRC, AK, in the vicinity of Northern Ocean, Southern Mommouth counties Northern Ocean, Southern Mommouth counties of NJ. Bill Sosnicki, 415 Brick Blvd., Apt 34A, Bricktown, NJ 08723 I am seeking opponents in my home area. Bored Veteran gamer seeks challenge in W&P, Vacant thrones need soverign rulers! Mark J. D'Ulisse, 1023 Chelten Pkwy., Cherry Hill, NJ 08034, (609) 409 8407

er seeks pbm for BB, DD, TAC, WSIM just for fun. Sam Kramer, 15 W. Fron prence, NJ 08518 St., Flo

M., PIOTENCE, NJ 08318 Holmdel wargamers meet Friday night for multi-player Tactical games, SL, AF, etc. Also com-puter wargaming day once/month. No rules-lawyers. Bil Newmann, 680 N. Bers st., Holmdel, NJ 07730, (201) 734-2371 Any gamers in Linden area? Am 15, area rated. Fri SL, SUB, BIS, AF. 3 yrs. experience. Henry Gelabek, 2713 Oakwood PL, Linden, NJ 07056, 923-5679

Adult pbm 2nd Ed. TRC, 1st Ed. BB. Ftf many old, new AH. Area rated. Ed V. Spilker, 8731 Radburn Dr., Baldwinsville, NY 13027, (315)

638-1761

638-1761 (1) 797: old seeking supportents for for fTF, SL, COL, COD, GL, FE, JR, W&P and TRC. 4 yrs. ex-perince. Edmund Ulseth, 961-70 SL, Brocklyn, NY 11228, 680-4757 SL, COL, COD, GL, phyn deirdt, Area or not. My rating approx. 1000 PGL, All replies answered. Mike Stack, 8817 Heaht RA, Coden, NY 14033 Join S.G.L. 1 you'll never: he wanting for op-ponents again. Clab meetings Thurs. 712 p.m. Waterloo II, Mineola Blwd., Mineola, NY, Fou info. call 516-579-2497. Tom Spiritos, 227 S. Bayview Ave., Freeport. NY 11520 Serious WWII types wanted for ft SL, COL

Bayriew Ave., Freeport, NY 11520 Scrious WWII types wanted for fft SL, COI, COD, GL, TLD. Desperate 19 yr. old. Will ury phm. All letters answerd. John L. Bucek, SOU Wesi 122nd SL, New York, NY 10027, 222-1656 Average adult gamer, not rated, seeks ff or phm SUB, PB, BL, need systems. Frf only CSL, CM. Scriosts fur fun only. Jim Marvin, Sd-2 Lake Vita CL, Rochester, NY 16612, (716) 663-1684 Adult adm semesters answerd, 60 wBFn et Cl. Adult pbm opponent wanted for W&P or move RW. I have systems. Bruce Allen, Rt. 7, 5B, Chapel Hill, NC 27514, (919) 933-0828 7, Box

Wanted opponents for GI, COD, COI. Must be Area rated 1650 or above. Pbm or fif. All letters answerct. D. R. Munsell, 841 Havthorne Lm., Charlotte, NC 28204, (104) 333-6433 Looking for opponents for BL, PL. Have pbm for BL. I am a beginner non-Area rated. Warren Hovell, 921 1065 St., S.E., Jamestown, ND 34001, (201) 251-1200

58401, (701) 251-1200 Adult gamer seeks fif for SL, COI, LW, TRC. I have weekends free, can travel locally. Dale Miles, 21 Joyce Add. Box 156, Minot, ND 58701, (701) 852-1810. (701) 852-1910

n PB #21, AZ Area rated, fast, reliable. Mike lart, Rd. 1 Box 269, Germansville, PA 18053, 767-1759

Mature opponent wanted for pbm AZ, BB'81, DD'77, FE, LW, PZ, TRC. Must be Area rated and willing to play campaign length games to competition. John S. Galvin, 1033 Ritner St., Phila., PA 19148, (215) 389-7260

Mature opponent wanted for pbm AZ, BB'81, DD'77, FE, LW, PZ, TRC. Must be Area rated and willing to play campaign length games to completion. Rich PePe, 805 Porter St., Phila., PA 19148, (215) 389-1066

PA 19145, (215) 389-1066 Experienced ff opponents for: SL thru G1, CM, GL, AF, DL, KM, CAE, 3R, WAP, Ask for Alor Scott. Scott Asmenzizid, 2231 McMonagle Ave., Pitst., PA 15216, 343-2018 SL, RB, WQ, COI, TAC, WAS, DH, Keith E, Leth, 307 N. Greenland, Elida, OH 45807, (419)

Leth, 307 78. 405 339-4481 29 yr. old gamer with limited experience looking for casual games of FT or SST. Chris Puza, 5218 Homewood Ave., Maple Hts., OH 44137,

OPPONENTS WANTED

ed opponents to play DIP, TRC, 3R and political military games. Will play DIP, other political military games. Will play pbm. David Smith, 28374 Nandina, N. Oln OH 44070, (216) 779-0583 OH 440/0, (216) 79-0383 Area 900 prov. player secks rated or unrated phen game of DD using honor system. Will only play Area members. Jonathon Barlow, 1711 Rockydale Rd, Cave Jci., OK 97523, 592-3617 Opponents wanted fif, SL, COI, FG, 3R, phen TKC, BL, SL, COI using your system for latter two. William Combs, Rt. 1 Box 123-5, Cassatt, 87-20013

SC 29032 SC 20012 Area rated 1500 prov. seeks pbm opp. 1200 + PB, Sit. 1-25. Also ftf in MB area. Mike Rickman, 1060-A Redwood St., MBAFF, Myrite Beach, SC 29577, (803) 238-5517 Wanted—Area pbm opponents for TRC-1400 to 1650. My rating 550 prov. Charles Chapman, 4802 Omeara, Houston, TX 77035, (713) 297-7817

4802 On 729-7817

Seeking rated or non-rated ftf games of TRC, BB'81, CAF. Rated 1270, will travel up to 60 miles. Kenneth Tucker, 1514 40th, Lubbock, TX 79412, (806) 747-8200

29142, (86) 747-8200 Adult wants phon BPKS, all optionals but one way traffic, using honor system, Non-rated Want flun out of games. Norman MacDonald, 750 N. Bonham Ave, San Benio, TX 78356 Wanted fif opporents for SL, COJ, COD, Gl for fun. Rate myself arg. Will each system to newcomers. John Loth, 1266 Magnola Lane, Herndon, VA 22070, (103) 471-0797 Area 1365 wants rated TRC against German rated 15154. Kurks Sternito, Standard 2016 E. rules plus 26.8 (verather roll per impulse). Michael Crowe, 7639 Shorffeld Villag Lane, Lorton, VA 20079, (703) 550-7431

22079, (703) 550-7431 Mature adult looking for above average opponent for FE, TRC and other select games. No be-ginners please. Fif only. Randy Heller, 2175 N. Heritage Way, Oak Harbor, WA 98277, 675-1657 Heritage Way, Oak Haitsor, WA 96277, 675-1657 Struggle Of Nations, NAP ff fin north Seattle. Have area to leave game set-up. Chris Hawkins, P.O. Box 45398, Seattle, WA 98105, 324-0943 Mature but enthusiastic adult (26) seeking same for fin SL, COI at first, hen COD, Coi, Looking for fun and friends not blood, Andy Mazur, 3626 Fremont Ln. N. #2, Seattle, WA 98103, 633-2869 Average gamer, 31, new to area seeks pbm for WSIM using General Vol. 18 #3 rules. W&P also but need pbm system. Raymond Sand, 2517 1st Ave. E, LaCrosse, WI 54601, (608) 783-4621 Boniningal 200 Provisional 1200 seeking area rated pbm game of DD, OR, MD, TAC, DD, ftf, Will also play SL ftf unrated. Ken Latus, W270N890 Joanne Dr., Waukesha, W1 53186, (414) 544-5353

Wanted: Generals Vol. 14, Nos. 1,5,6 and Vol. 15 Nos. 1,2,4,5,6 in fair to excellent condition with all inserts. Must have Generals, name your price. James Crawley, Box 697, Bonnyville, Alberta, Can. T0A 0L0, (403) 826-5269 Can. 104 01.0, (403) 825-3269 Opponents wanted Ftf, AOC, BB, CL, FE, KM, LRH, TRC, JR. Year old veteran gamer. John Mensinger, 1550 Avenue Dr., Penfield, Apt. 901, Montreal, Quebec H36 1C2, (514) 937-0740

COLLECTORS CORNER

Wanted: out of print AH games. Also wanted ob-jective Atlanta, Shenandoah and Viva Espana. All inquiries will be answered. Howard R. Christie, 43 E. Houston Ave., Montgomery, PA 1752, (17) 547-1682 For sale AH sense For sale: AH games and Generals, V.7 No.3 through V.11 No. 2 plus V.15 Nos, 2,4,6. Send SASE for details. Eric Cumfer, 1055 Putnam Dr., Sarasota, FL 33580, (813) 351-3553

Wanted: out of print General magazines from Volumes 10 to 14. Prices paid according to the magazines' condition, paying even more for com-plete volumes. Steven Domzlaski, 8337 55. Karlov Ave., Chicago, 1L 60652, (312) 582-3784 Ave., chicago, Li. 60052, (312) 362-3784 Many games, magazines, miscellancous, for sale/ trade. All good/excellent condition. All letters answered. Send SASE for complete list. Many collector's items. Old Generals wanted. Bill King, 1317 5th Ave., S.E. Cedar Rapids, IA 52403, (319) 366-2036

(119) 366-2036 Augusta, Japanese, Ja

NY 11204, 259-5436 Gamet for Sale Tradel Avalon Hill, JM, Battle-line Classici Life 8 Gaw available (SASE please). I have what you want H.M. Levy, P.O. Box 197-Q, East Meadow, NY 1154 Wanted: C&O/B&O excellent condition. Will pay 500 + and trade excellent Do'di with D0'5577 or mint Origins I TB with 2nd Ed. parts, Robert McPhes, 509 William SL, Rome, NY 13440 GUAD Near mint unpunched units, board ex-cellent, row Slight tape repair back, boxford after first received. Albert Thomas, 120 Kimberty after first received. Albert Thomas, 120 Kimberly Dr. W., Syracuse, NY 13219, (315) 488-1943 Trade my dispatcher for your C&O/B&O Anchors, 2024 Walnut St., Durham, NC 27705 Want to trade 1914 game in VG cond. for Liddel Hart's book Great Captain's Unvelled in same cond. Also trade AH Civil War for AL. Mike Hopper, 30 Jamestown Dr., Cinti., OH 45241, (S13) 777-1039

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For sale: 1914 highest bidder—minimum \$30; also many others for sale; send \$A\$E for details; also pbm chess. Bobby G. Stepp, 1907 Solera Dr., Apt. C, Columbus, OH 43229, (614) 895-2128 Battlefield Integrity tables for all SL series scenarios. Send SASE for info and price list. Brett Byers, 630 Wynoroft Lane, Lancaster, PA, (717) 394-2619

394-2619 For als: Cuadalcanal AH wargame—perfect. All pieces, score sheets, instructions, etc. Best offer over 560, R. Crowell, RD /I Box 75B, Towanda, PA 18848, (171) 265-2267 Help! Want to start a club in South Central Texas. Yoakum area. Anyone interested call. Paul Tottat. 205 Coke, Yoakum, TX 73995, (512) 293-6049 For sale: Guadalcanal complete except no dice, 3 American counters missing. \$80.00 or best offer. Kevin Hobson, P.O. Box 15927, Seattle, WA 98115, (206) 525-5859

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Want-ads will be accepted only when printed on the appropriate form or a reasonable facsimile. Such form of a reasonable facinitie. Such must be accompanied by the appro-priate fee. This may take the form of uncancelled US postage; note that foreign postage is not acceptable. No refunds of this fee will be made, even should the ad not be printed due to failure to conform to AH policies.

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PART & RECEIPT OF MUT

Only the following GENERAL back issues are still available. Price is \$2.50 per issue plus 10% postage and handling charges (20%) to Canada, 30% overseas). Maryland residents please add 5% state sales tax GENERAL postage coupons may not be used for this or other non-game orders. Due to the low quantities of some back issues we request that you specify alternate selections should your first choice be unavailable. tities Below is a listing of each issue by subject matter; game abbreviations are italicized and found in the

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Opponents Wanted ad insert in this issue and article types are identified as follows: H-Historical Background, DN-Designer's Notes, V-Variant, SR-Series Replay (sample game), S-Strategy, Q-Questions, P-PBM (postal) systems, Sc-Scenarios, A-Analysis. The largest (feature) articles are always the first one listed in each issue. Those issue numbers printed in red indicate one-color reprints of previously out-of-print issues

- 12-2: *TB*−H, DN; *BB*−V; *BL*−V; *PB*−SR; *PL*−DN; *STAL*−S; *AZ*−Q 14-2: *KM*−S, H, P, DN, V; *AL*−SR; *SL*−DN 14-3: *AIW*−H, DN, S, Q; *TRC*−S; *3R*−S; *STAL*−SR; *WAS*−V; *PB*−Sc 14-4: *VITP*−DN, V, Q; *3R*−S; *RW*−V; *STAL*−SR; *JU*−P; *IT7*−S 14-5: *SL*−H, A, DN, Q; *WSelIM*−A; *TRC*−S; *MD*−S; *SST*−S; *3R*−S 15-2: PL-V, Sc; STAL-V; JR-V; DD-DN; RB-S; VITP-15-3: AOC-S, A, DN, Sc; TRC-V; JR-V; SL-V; WAS-V **154**: COI−A, DN, S, Sc, Q; WAS−V; AIW−S; SST−Sc; PL−V **16**-1: AZ−Sc, S, DN; JR−S; NP−S; PB−SR; I776−S; DIP−S **16**-2: BJS−A, Sc, H, DN, Q; PB−SR; AK−S; I776−S; WS&IM−S **16**-3: PL−A; WAS−S, H; TB−Sc; COI−SR; I776−S; MD−V 16-2: BIS—A, Sc, H, DN, Q; PB—SR; AK—S; 1776—S; WSdIM—S 16-3: PL—A, WA—S, H; TB—Sc; Col—SR; 1776—S; MD—V 16-4: MR—A, V, DN, Q; COl—S; 3R—S; TRC—SR 16-5: TRC—S; SUB—Sc; SST—S; WAS—S; PB—V, RB—V; NAP—S; COD—Q 16-6: DUNE—A; DIP—V; OS—V; AZ—DN, Sc, SR; PB—A, PBM 17-1: WdP—A, DN, V, Q; 3R—S; COl—S; MD—V; COD—A; MR–V; LW—S; WAS—SR 17-3: COD—A, Sc, Q; WAT—Sc; VTP—SR 17-3: COD—A, Sc, Q; WAT—Sc; VTP—SR 17-4: FE—S, P, DN, V; MD—V, Q; Col—SR; VTP—S; T76—S; WQ—A, SST –V; NAP—S 17-4: FE—S, P, DN, V; MD—V, Q; Col—SR; VTP—S; T76—S; WQ—A, SST –V; NAP—S 17-6: STAL—S; WSdIM—V, Sc; WAS—V; RR—SR SI, SL –S; ST—V; MZP—S 17-6: STAL—S; WSdIM—V, Sc; MS—V; TTP—S; TTD—Q; CL—S; WZP—S; MR—S 17-6: STAL—S; WSdIM—V, Sc; MS—V; TTP—S; TTD—Q; CL—S; WZP—S; RR—S 18-1: FITW—A, Q; BIS—S; SL—S; DUNE—V; DIP—S; AK—A; PB—SR; AL—S; WdP—S 18-2: AF—A, Sc, Q; AK—V; 3R—NV; TR—V; SL—S, Sc; SGMM—SR, P; DIP—S 18-3: COA—S, DN, V, Q; SL—SC, A, Sc; TTC—V; TD—V; TTP—S; DTP—S 18-4: GL—H, V, A, Q; SL—SC, A; C; TRC—V; TD—V; TD—V, TTP—S; DD—S 18-5: 3R—S, A, V, DN, Q; SL—S, A, Sc; TRC—V; TD—V; TD—V, DUNE—V 18-6: FT—A, Sc, V, DN; VTP—V, Q; MD—S, Q; SOTN—A, Q; SUB—Sc; BL—V 19-1: SOA—A, V, DN; SR, Q; TLD—A, Q; 3L—S, S; SOA—SR 19-3: GSL—A, Sc, V, SR, Q; DTP—A; RW—Sc; GE—V; 1776—Sc; LRT—V, Q; SL—A 19-4: CV—A, V, DN; CM —V, DIP—A; CL—V; TTT—Sc; WZ—S; L—A, Sc 19-4: CVT—PBM, SR; 3R—V, Q; DTP—A; TT—V; BSL—V, WA—S; SL—A, Sc 19-6: VTTP—PBM, SR; 3R—V, Q; DTP—A; TT—V; BSL—V, WA, S; LL—A, Sc; SUB—V, Sc

THE GENERAL

WHAT HAVE YOU BEEN **PLAYING?**

Top ten lists are seemingly always in vogue these days. Whether the subject is books on the Best Seller List, television's Nielsen ratings, or even games, the public never seems to tire of seeing how their individual favorites stack up numerically against the competition. Our preoccupation with this national pastime is almost akin to routing the home team on to victory every Sunday. So to further cater to your whims (and to satisfy our own curiosity) we unveil THE GENERAL's version of the gamer's TOP TEN.

We won't ask you to objectively rate any game. That sort of thing is already done in these pages and elsewhere. Instead, we ask that you merely list the three (or less) games which you've spent the most time with since you received your last issue of THE GENERAL. With this we can generate a consensus list of what's being played . . . not just what is being bought. The degree of correlation between the Best Selling Lists and the Most Played List should prove interesting.

Feel free to list any game regardless of manufacturer. There will be a built-in Avalon Hill bias to the survey because you all play Avalon Hill games to some extent but it should be no more prevalent than similar projects undertaken by other magazines with a special interest-based circulation. The amount to which this bias affects the final outcome will be left to the individual's discretion.

The games I've spent the most time playing during the past two months are:

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1. Want-ads will be accepted only when printed on this form or a facsimile and must be accompanied by a 50¢ token fee. No refunds. Payment may be made in uncancelled U.S. postage stamps. 2. For Sale, Trade, or Wanted To Buy ads will be accepted only when dealing with collector's items (out of print AH games) and are accompanied by a \$1.00 token fee. No refunds 3. Insert copy on lines provided (25 words maximum) and print name, address, and phone

number on the appropriate lines.

READER BUYER'S GUIDE

Rate each category by placing a number

ranging from 1 through 9 in the appropriate space to the right (1 equating "excellent"; 5, "average"; 9, "terrible"). EXCEPTION: Rate

items 7a and 7b in terms of minutes necessary

to play the game, in ten-minute increments.

(Example: If you've found it takes two and a

half hours to play the basic scenario of FRANCE 1940, enter "15" for category 7a.)

For an explanation of the categories, refer to the AH Philosophy of Vol. 19, No. 4. Sub-

categories are indicated by italics. Enter

ratings only for those categories relevant to the

game in question. Note that AH's ratings for

Complexity and Year of Publishing have been

provided; do not rate these categories.

The Campaigns of Prussia's Soldier-King

FREDERICK THE GREAT

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Overall Value

2. Components

2a. Mapboard

3. Complexity

3a. Complexity

5. Playability

Player's Aids

5a. Excitement Level

Basic/Shortest

7b. Advanced/Longest

8. Year of Publication

5b. Play Balance

6. Authenticity

7. Game Length

4. Completeness of Rules

2b. Counters

2c.

7a.

4. Please PRINT. If your ad is illegible, it will not be printed.

5. So that as many ads as possible can be printed within our limited space, we request that you use official state and game abbreviations. Don't list your entire collection, list only those you are most interested in locating opponents for.

Afrika Korps-AK, Air Force-AF, Alexander-AL, Amoeba Wars-AW, Anzio-AZ, Arab-Israeli Wars-AIW, Assault On Crete/Invasion Of Malta-AOC, Bismarck-BIS, Blitzkrieg-BL, Battle Of The Bulge-BB, Caesar Alesia-CAE, Caesar's Legions-CL, Chancellorsville-CH, Circus Maximus-CM, Civilization-CIV, Cross Of Iron-COI, Cressendo Of Doom-COD, Dauntless-DL, D-Day-DD, Diplomacy-DIP, Down With The King-DWTK, Dragonhunt-DH, Feudal-FL, Flat Top-FT, Fortress Europa-FE, France 40-FR, Freedom in the Galaxy-FG, Fury In The West-FITW, Gettysburg-GE, G.I.: Anvil of Victory-GI, Gladiator-GL, Guns Of August-GOA, Gunslinger-GSL, Jutland-JU, Kingmaker-KM, Legend of Robin Hood-LRH, The Longest Day-TLD, Little Round Top-LRT, Luftwaffe-LW, Machiavelli-MA, Magic Realm-MR, Midway-MD, Napoleon-NP, Origins-OR, Outdoor Survival-OS, PanzerArmee Afrika-PAA, Panzerblitz-PB, Panzer Leader-PL, Rail Baron-RB, Richthofen's War-RW, The Russian Campaign-TRC, Samurai-SA, Squad Leader-SL, Stalingrad-STAL, Starship Troopers-SST, Storm Over Arnhem-SOA, Struggle of Nations-SON, Submarine-SUB, Tactics II-TAC, Third Reich-3R, Titan-TT, Tobruk-TB, Trireme-TR, Victory In The Pacific-VITP, War and Peace-W&P, War At Sea-WAS, Waterloo-WAT, Wizard's Quest-WQ, Wooden Ships & Iron Men-WSIM.

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Ten winning entries will receive certificates redeemable for free AH merchandise. To be valid an entry must be received prior to the mailing of the next GENERAL and include a numerical rating for the issue as a whole as well as list the best 3 articles. The solution will be announced in the next issue and the winners in the following issue.

Issue as a whole (Rate from 1 to 10, wit Best 3 Articles	h 1 equating excellent, 10 equating terrible)
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NONTACT		SIZE	50 +	60+	70+	85 +	100 +	120 +	150 +	200+	-1 DRM	-2 DRM
RADIOCI COTTACI	BATTER	ACCESS#	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2
CONTACT		SIZE	50 +	60 +	70+	85 +	100 +	120 +	150 +	200 +	-1 DRM	-2 DRM

ODE TO PANZERBLITZ

The dawn had cast its shadow o'er the plain. The engines hum, their mighty roar is felt. The guns are set like eagles taking aim; As treads start pounding, earth begins to melt. With speed and skill and infantry arose. The monsters came with God-defying speed. The men were set to beat this mighty foe, A false idea in which they had believed. The first tank in the column was destroyed. The shells were coming from the side unseen. Commanders moved their tanks as to avoid Destruction that would terminate their means.

Then Victory was set with the final kill. I'm glad 'twas just a game from Avalon Hill. By Gerald McVey & Thomas Meadowcroft

EDITOR'S CHOICE AWARDS

This issue marks the beginning of Volume 20 in the life of The *GENERAL*. It is time once more for the editors to offer their nominations for the best articles of the past year. The winner receives a lifetime subscription to The *GENERAL*, in addition to a \$100.00 bonus. Please vote for only one of the nominees and vote only if you have read all the articles nominated. Eliminating those articles written by paid AH staff members from consideration, we have the following articles to select from:

THE LONGEST DAY, AN OVERVIEW by Jim Burnett, Nos. 1 and 2

BATTLE OF THE BULGE by Bruno Sinigaglio, No. 2

THEY SHALL BE PLAYTESTERS by Mark C. Nixon, No. 3

A QUIZ ON BASIC INFANTRY TACTICS, ANSWERS by Bill Nightingale, Nos. 3 and 4

PLAYING BOTH SIDES OF THE ELBE by Steven McHenry, No. 5

VITP PLAY BY MAIL WITH SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT by James Lutz, No. 6

DIPLOMACY IN THIRD REICH by Larry Bucher, No. 6

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A simulation for the most demanding

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Avalon Hill's Microcomputer Game of Armored

outstanding Hi-Resolution graphics, enhanced

Engagement, Rear Guard, and Static Defense to Breakout and Stalemate. The players control up to eight vehicles, guns and squads

simultaneously, utilizing the equipment of either

the German, British, Russian or American forces.

football field; watch the quarterback drop back

to pass, as the defensive players move on the intended receiver. You have offensive and defensive formations to choose from, as a

wargamers. Atari, Commodore, IBM versions

Computer Football Strategy The action is animated, on a large scrolling

detailed timeclock ticks away. This is truly

sound, and stimulating challenge. Five different

NEW FOR SUMMER'85





Paris in Danger

A simulation of Napoleon's 1814 campaign in France. One of Napoleon's finest, against the invading Allied Armies. (Austrian, Prussian and Russian). You can choose to take the role as Napoleon, Commander Schwarzenberg, or play both sides to re-create the actual campaign. PARIS IN DANGER is unique, in that it allows the players to compete on both the strategic and tactical levels, on a full-color scrolling map of France and surrounding countries.

		-	Diskette For:			
GAME TITLE	GAME NO.	PRICE	APPLE II,II+ IIe	ATARI 4/800 1200XI		
S.C.I.M M.A.R.S.	44552	26.00	48K			
Paris In Danger	44753	35.00		48K		
T.A.C.	46052	40.00	48K	1000		
Parthian Kings	45652	25.00	48K			
Fortress of the Witch King	46152	25.00	48K			

			Cassette For:		Diskette For:			
GAME	GAME NO.	PRICE	COMM. 64	ATARI 4/800 1200XL	TRS-80 &	ATARI 4/800 1200XL	IBM PC	
T.G.I.F.	45701	20.00	64K	40K				
	45253	25.00				40K		
Computer	41501	16.00	64K	32K				
Football	41551	21.00			32K			
Strategy	41553	21.00				32K		
	41554	21.00					64K	
Computer Diplomacy	43051	30.00			48K			
	43054							

New Additions: Just Released!

Commodore 64 Arcade Games: Moon Patrol, Flying Ace

Coming August 1:

B-1 Nuclear Bomber for Timex/Sinclair, and TI99 cassette, \$16.00 Completely redesigned **B-1 Nuclear Bomber** for Vic-20 & C64, \$16.00

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Parthian Kings

Feudal civil war is coming, and many nobles are declaring themselves king of Parthia. The whole situation is wide open for a brilliant commander, a great strategist, and a leader of men, for YOU!!! A 1 to 4 player game, in which you create, buy and command your own army, and use a great wizard, to do your bidding and casting of terrible spells on your enemies. A brilliant world of pageantry and conquest awaits you with PARTHIAN KINGS.

Fortress of the Witch King

Enter the Fortress of the Witch King, realm of a dark and mysterious lord, whose slightest whim gives you great treasures or plunges you into deadly combat with the vicious hacker. Your quest is to find the arch ruler and slay him, thus gaining the orb, scepter and crown, and releasing the land from his thrall. But beware, there are conditions to be met and battles to be fought. Your small band of scouts and warriors will be in constant danger, for there are others who will not hesitate to raid and steal, seeking the same rewards. So if you are ready, come ... the WITCH KING waits!

T.G.I.F.

(Thank Goodness It's Friday!)

Welcome to T.G.I.F, a fun party game (1 to 4 players) re-creating a typical week in the lives of the working class. MONDAY comes hard with bills due. TUESDAY is lottery day; buy 3 tickets, if you feel lucky. WEDNESDAY (hump day) may bring you windfall profits, or go out like a bump. THURSDAY is investment day, tempting you with boats, timber rights, and land; do you dare take the chance? FRIDAY comes, T.G.I.F, and that means PAYDAY. SATURDAY brings a treasure hunt worth digging for. SUNDAY is the day of rest, but is that what happens?

Computer Diplomacy

A computer simulation of Avalon Hill's classic board game of the same name. It's the turn of the century, and the world is preparing for WWI. A solitaire or multi-player game in which each player controls one of the major powers—Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, Russia, Italy, England and France. The goal is to spread your influence and control over other territories, with diverse methods, from diplomacy and political strategies, to back-stabbing and psychological intimidation.







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Break through the "flat" habit and experience a new dimension in video games. Play with the speed, control, and skill of handball, but without leaving home. Start slow or start fast, but don't be surprised if WALLBALL gives you a good workout!

WALLBALL-nine levels of 3-D racquet-and-ball simulation for the Atari 2600 and Sears Video Arcade



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DEATH TRAP IS AVALON HILL'S TRADEMARK NAME FOR ITS

for the Atari 2600 VCS

dds are tremendous. You're fighting for your life T seems to be playing games with you. You're squeezed by impassable defense shields. The cle shields are growing intelligent plasma lis threaten to disintegrate your existence. The tope for your survival is to beat IT. That requires are avasive maneuvering and dead-sure shooting sure dian't mention anything about IT in Cadet rd



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Play Game

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DEATH TRAP is an innovative space show touch of strategy. Unlike most shoot-outs, defenses build as you inflict damage. Yo strategy to control where the defenses are of the essence. You must be effective in yo th a

DEATH TRAP is a one player game requir-ing one joystick controller and is intended for use with a color television.



"AH!"

Finally, Video Games that really defy boredom!