


TOP SECRET/S.I. Covert Operations Source Book, Vol. 2 by John Prados



TOP SECRET/S.I.™

Covert Operations Source Book, Volume 2



Preface

This second volume of the *Covert Operations Source Book* is intended to accompany the **Top Secret/S.I.**[™] role-playing game. The *Source Book* is designed for Administrators and players who wish to develop adventures based upon actual case materials. The information contained here, however, can also be used for any adventure for any espionage role-playing games, or it can be treated as a set of capsule studies of espionage organizations and cases for a general readership.

For this volume of the *Source Book*, the focus is on the wider world of intelligence organizations and activities. Three types of material are presented: profiles of intelligence agencies of various nations, case files on individual spies, and notes on specific cities and countries as intelligence operating areas. Profiled are intelligence agencies of 11 nations, excluding the Soviet KGB and the American CIA, which were covered in Volume I. There are a dozen case files, mostly of major espionage cases of the 1950s and 1960s. Operating area notes cover the United States, the Soviet Union, Berlin, and Vienna. Suggestions for further reading can be found at the end of the manuscript.

John Prados
Washington, DC
February 1988

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Part I: Intelligence Organizations

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British Intelligence

The most renowned and historically acclaimed intelligence services have been those of the United Kingdom. British intelligence is often said to have a history going back to the days of the Spanish Armada, but the modern British intelligence system began its formation in the late 19th Century and was given impetus by the Boer War (1899-1902). At that time military intelligence received recognition as an important aspect of operations and was put on a sounder footing. Military (and naval) intelligence then played remarkable roles in World Wars I and II.

Security services, as with much else in British history, had their formal origins in troubles with the Irish. During the 1880s, Irish revolutionaries conducted a series of terrorist bombings, the so-called "Fenian" bombings, all over England. In response the British police, Scotland Yard, formed a Special Irish Branch in March 1883. A little over a year later, on the evening of 30 May 1884, the Special Irish Branch's own headquarters was demolished in one of the Fenian bombings. About two years afterward, the Fenian bombing campaign sputtered to a halt. The Special Irish Branch was rapidly reduced and then, in January 1887, reconstituted as the Special Branch of Scotland Yard, responsible not to the Yard's director but to the Home Secretary of the British Cabinet. Though less glamorous than its sister services, Special Branch holds pride of place as the first of the modern British security and intelligence organizations.

Special Branch does not run operations, however, merely conducting investigations as requested by the counter-intelligence service MI-5. Special Branch makes the arrests in MI-5 cases, investigates alleged violations of the British Official Secrets Act, provides surveillance upon request, watches and guards embassies, ports, and airports, investigates immigrants applying for naturalization, prepares lists of individuals to be interned or deported in time of war, and provides

personal security for royalty. Special Branch headquarters is located on the top floor of Scotland Yard's building on Victoria Street in London. The Branch reported had a budget of between £5 and 6 million in about 1975, with about 1,000 personnel, half stationed at headquarters. Approximately two-thirds of the London complement reportedly work for the section that monitors ports and airports.

Security Service officers with MI-5 say that, while Special Branch would like to be MI-5, the Security Service has no desire to be Special Branch. With its existence recognized in law, Special Branch serves as a convenient cloak for MI-5, which is not authorized by statute nor acknowledged in common law. Frequently called the Security Service, MI-5 had its origins in a Secret Service Bureau established within the War Office in 1909. This bureau, like the intelligence services of some other countries, had responsibility for both counterintelligence and foreign intelligence, but in 1910 the two components were separated to become independent units. Each will be discussed separately below.

When war came in 1914, the Security Service unit became MO-5g of the War Office. Its first director-general, Vernon Kell, held the post until 1940. The unit was redesignated MI-5 in a January 1916 War Office reorganization. By the spring of 1917, MI-5's central archives held 27,000 personal files and a card index of 250,000 entries, updated by a staff of 130 female clerks. At its World War I peak in 1918, MI-5's staff totalled 844 military men and civilians.

The postwar interregnum naturally brought reductions, so by 1930 the Security Service was down to a professional staff of seven civilians, all with military backgrounds, plus six officers intended to command the War Office Constabulary, for which MI-5 was responsible and which then served as a sort of cover for the service. The high point of MI-5's success during the interwar period came with the ARCOS raid of 1927. Then Special Branch, acting on MI-5's information, raided the offices of the All-Russia Cooperative Society

Limited (ARCOS) and the Soviet trade delegation, both housed in the same building, seizing vast quantities of espionage equipment. A similar success came in 1938 when MI-5 and Special Branch broke up the Woolwich Arsenal ring, three spies plus a controller from the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) who had been feeding the Soviets with information, including plans for the 14-inch guns later mounted on the *King George V* class of battleships.

Throughout the 1920s and 30s, MI-5 monitored the correspondence and telephone lines (through the post office) of the CPGB, and in September 1931, following Royal Navy mutinies at Invergordon, MI-5 received formal responsibility for all investigations concerning communists or revolutionary movements. After the December 1931 Statute of Westminster, which gave self-governing status to the British dominions, MI-5 received responsibility for all intelligence work, both counterespionage and positive intelligence, carried out in the states of the British Empire (later Commonwealth).

In 1940, soon after the beginning of World War II, Vernon Kell was replaced as director-general by Sir David Petrie, a former police official. Petrie presided over a very effective service that virtually eliminated Axis espionage in the British Isles. In fact, under branch chief Guy Liddell and controller Sir John Masterman, MI-5 and the interagency XX Committee ran a sophisticated double agent program that fed the Germans with false information throughout the war, greatly contributing to final victory.

During the war MI-5 headquarters was located at the London prison Wormwood Scrubs, an ironic setting given MI-5's mission. After the war it moved and expanded, acquiring offices in a number of London buildings. By the 1950s the main offices were at Leconfield House on Curzon Street in the Mayfair district of London. The central registry occupied the ground floor. In 1955 it had about 2,000,000 personal files, plus subject files, list files, and an extensive card index. The number of files remained constant through the 60s but

grew further during the 1970s. The first floor housed F Branch, which covered political parties of both the right and the left. On the second floor was E Branch, responsible for the overseas work in the dominions. D Branch, specialized in counterespionage and on the Soviets and Soviet Bloc, occupied the third and fourth floors. On the fifth floor was A Branch, which handled administration plus technical support and surveillance. Recruitment, training, and personnel matters were the business of B Branch, while C Branch handled protective security.

Although the Security Service retained the designation MI-5, in 1951 it was moved out of the Defense Ministry and made directly subordinate to the prime minister. Then, in 1953, MI-5 was relocated as a semi-independent unit under the Home Office and responsible to the Home Secretary. Its chain of command now parallels that of Special Branch.

Overseas the Security Service played major roles in the insurgency in Malaya, and later those in Kenya and Aden, but the big MI-5 story was at home, in the series of spy cases that broke one after another, beginning with Klaus Fuchs in late 1949 (see entry, this volume), closely followed by Burgess and McLean in 1950 (see entries in volume I). Kim Philby of MI-6 was the natural suspect for the "third man" thought to have tipped off Burgess (see volume I) and these cases provided grist for the Security Service mill, not to mention various writers, for many years. There were also cases in the dominions with which MI-5 collaborated, such as that of the Canadian atomic scientist Alan Nunn-May. F Branch continued the historic MI-5 contest against the CPGB and, in operation Party Piece, involving a burglary of CPGB offices, even succeeded in copying all 55,000 of the CPGB's secret membership files.

The Security Service continued to have difficulties operating against Soviet intelligence in Britain. Surveillance often proved ineffective no matter how carefully done, almost as if the Soviets always knew when they were being followed. Microphones planted in the Soviet consulate at

Bayswater Road suddenly went dead. They seemed impervious to D Branch's counterespionage activity. While Sir Dick White was director-general in 1955, MI-5 for the first time brought in a scientific adviser, Peter Wright, to assist its efforts. Wright was quite inventive and enthusiastic about the work, but the degree of success against the Soviets did not increase much if at all. By degrees some Security Service officers, including Wright, came to believe that the KGB must have succeeded in placing an agent within MI-5 itself. Dick White moved over to lead MI-6 in 1956 and was replaced by Sir Roger Hollis, who presided over the Security Service during the time when fears regarding a mole in its ranks rose to feverish proportions.

There were, however, other operational successes during this period. In operation Tiepin, the F Branch succeeded in bugging CPGB offices. The most extensive bugging, in those days colloquially known as "wiring operations" was of Lancaster House, where Commonwealth and colonial conferences met in the 1950s and 1960s. MI-5 also cooperated with the British communications intelligence service to develop means of breaking machine cipher systems. In 1956 these were successfully used against the Egyptians, to the degree that throughout the Suez crisis the British were able to read all the Egyptian secret cable traffic. The same techniques were used against other nations, and proved successful even against sophisticated systems like the French, but they failed against the Russians.

The string of Soviet and Polish defectors beginning in 1960 brought a seeming panacea to the counterespionage experts at MI-5. Defector information enabled the Security Service to uncover a number of spies in the Royal Navy and Air Ministry in the early 1960s. In the course of one of the naval cases, MI-5 also uncovered the Soviet illegal Konon Molody (alias Gordon Lonsdale). By 1964 the Security Service had positively identified Anthony Blunt (see entry, this volume) as another member of the notorious Cambridge ring and kept him under interrogation for some years afterward. On the other hand, the service was embarrassed

in the Profumo affair of 1963, a scandal involving the personal affairs of Secretary of State for War John D. Profumo, the call girl Christine Keeler, and a Soviet military intelligence officer who shared her favors. While it is not clear that any intelligence was compromised in this affair, it did come out that MI-5 had had facts indicating a potential security breach for over two years before informing the prime minister.

In the mid-1960s came the height of the mole search. Suspicion focused successively on officers ranging up the MI-5 chain of command until the candidate suspect was none other than the director general, Sir Roger Hollis. Aware of the mole suspicions, Hollis nevertheless held out until 1965 as director general, but submitted to MI-5 interrogation after his retirement. The charges could not be proven. The question of Hollis's real role remains controversial in Great Britain today. Martin Furnival Jones, head of the FLUENCY Committee, which had made the original official review of the potential existence of the mole in MI-5, succeeded to the post of director general.


Furnival Jones was very conscious of the Soviet espionage threat, worked hard to counter it, and achieved some success in expanding MI-5, though personnel figures remain unknown. His greatest success came in 1971, when the United Kingdom expelled 107 Soviet diplomats, journalists, and trade representatives for activities incompatible with their status. MI-5 decimated Soviet intelligence capability in Britain for a certain period afterward. He retired in 1972, replaced by Michael Hanley, another former FLUENCY Committee candidate suspect. In many ways, the mole controversy in MI-5 consumed the best and the brightest minds in the Security Service. Hanley restored morale at MI-5, giving the Security Service a measure of its old esprit.

Under Margaret Thatcher the director general has been Sir John Lewis Jones. The security service has remained alert, with two Russians expelled in the 18 months before December 1982, when the British sent home a senior GRU officer, naval Captain Anatoli Zotov, reportedly for efforts to set up

a ring to penetrate British military secrets. In September 1983 Michael Bettaney, one of MI-5's own officers, was arrested for attempting to volunteer for service as a Soviet spy, luring the Russians with sample documents and evaluations of MI-5 information. The Russians evidently regarded Bettaney as a provocation, and they reportedly made no response to him. Bettaney received a 23-year sentence in April 1984 after conviction on all ten counts in his indictment. In the fall of 1985, MI-5 provided target lists for two more rounds of mass expulsions of Soviet representatives in Great Britain, with a total of 31 ordered home. Only 205 Soviet diplomats would henceforth be accredited by the British. The security service currently seems near the peak of its proficiency. Despite its lack of standing in law, MI-5 has even been allowed to exercise a right of prior review on scripts for the British Broadcasting Corporation.

While MI-5 has been very active it missed out altogether on what is perhaps the most significant British spy case, that of Geoffrey A. Prime (see entry, volume I), a Russian analyst with the radio intercept service known as Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The Prime affair developed coincidentally from unrelated criminal activity. Hardly had the Prime business subsided when GCHQ again drew public attention in a dispute over whether civilian employees at its Cheltenham main complex should be allowed to unionize. Prime Minister Thatcher decided against the code breaking agency employees and was upheld by the courts. The GCHQ has been estimated to have a budget the equivalent of about \$200 million with 20,000 personnel—5,000 at headquarters and 15,000 in the field, a unit of a size almost equal to the CIA.

MI-5 ORGANIZATION IN THE 1970s



SOURCE: Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind*. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985.

The Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) has been the central military intelligence unit since 1964, when it absorbed the separate intelligence components of the British Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force. The Defense Ministry's director general of intelligence heads the DIS, which has divisions for economic intelligence, service intelligence, scientific and technical intelligence, and management, plus support.

Daily management of the British intelligence services is carried out by a representative of the prime minister, and under him, the Joint Intelligence Committee chaired by the Foreign Office (the British state department). Committee leadership clearly shows British commitment to foreign intelligence, and is not surprising given the Foreign Office's direct responsibility for the main spy agency, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the unit most people think of when they think of British intelligence.

Like the security service, SIS had its origins in the Secret Services Bureau formed within the War Office. SIS became independent in 1910 under Captain Sir Mansfield Cumming and by 1914 it had three officers, a lawyer, and seven clerks. In 1915 it became MI-6 in a defense reorganization, a designation since then used interchangeably with the SIS, even after the intelligence agency was moved to the Foreign Office. MI-6 accomplished feats of derring-do in World Wars I and II. After 1945 it also absorbed the unconventional warfare capabilities of the wartime Special Operations Executive (SOE).

The SOE-type missions played an important role in the early postwar history of the SIS. There were attempts to mount paramilitary operations in Greece, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. In Albania between 1949 and 1951 there was a spectacular failure by SIS in concert with the CIA. The British also acted in concert with the CIA in Iran in 1953, the Middle East in 1956, and Indonesia in 1958. Unilateral British operations in Egypt at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 temporarily poisoned the atmosphere with the CIA while proving wholly ineffective in their own right. The Brit-

ish subsequently turned more toward political action as a means of exerting influence. Here they proved successful, again in concert with the CIA, in unseating the government of British Guiana in 1962.

One reason for the failures in the early paramilitary missions was unquestionably penetration by Soviet spies. Those were the days of the Cambridge ring, when Philby was active in MI-6, including as the liaison officer to the CIA in Washington, where he learned all about the Albania operation, among others. Philby was isolated after the escape of Burgess and Maclean in 1951, then he was let go, but the fear of penetration remained at MI-6 for many years thereafter. In 1956 the intelligence service was even taken over by a counterespionage specialist, Sir Dick Goldsmith White, formerly director general of MI-5. White led the SIS through 1969 and later continued as intelligence adviser to the prime minister for a long and distinguished career in British intelligence.

The SIS recovered from the Philby affair to achieve a modicum of espionage success. It collaborated with the Americans on a tunnel in Berlin from 1954 to 1956 that tapped Soviet trunk line telephones to their Karlshorst headquarters. It was also the British who took the initiative in recruiting and running the famous Western spy in Soviet military intelligence (GRU), Colonel Oleg Penkovsky (see entry, this volume). SIS also made penetrations into Soviet Bloc services, including the Czechs, some of whom fled to the West following the abortive "Prague Spring" of 1968.

By some accounts the Berlin tunnel was betrayed to the Soviets by George Blake, a KGB agent in place inside MI-6 who at that time served in Berlin. In 1960 the Germans arrested one of Blake's top agents on suspicion of having been a Soviet double, while the defector Michal Goleniewski also brought intelligence pointing toward Blake. Blake was arrested in April 1961, made a full confession and was tried at the Old Bailey in March 1962, sentenced to a record 42 years in prison. Blake escaped from Wormwood Scrubs, by

then reconverted to a prison, in 1966 and then likely proceeded to Moscow.

At the time of his escape, SIS most likely was anticipating trading Blake to the Soviets in exchange for their own imprisoned agents. Indeed the 1960s under Goldsmith was an era of great spy swaps, beginning with the American-Soviet trade of KGB Colonel Rudolf Abel (see entry this volume) for the CIA U-2 spy plane pilot Francis Gary Powers. One trade Goldsmith arranged brought home Greville Wynne, Penkovsky's captured MI-6 handler.

Though the British moved more in the direction of reliance on technical intelligence during the 1970s and 1980s, they have continued to enjoy some notable espionage successes. Espionage provided important intelligence for the British during the Falklands Islands war with Argentina in 1982. There has also been a penetration of the KGB almost on the level of Penkovsky in the case of Oleg G. Gordiyevsky (see entry, Volume I).

In the 1960s the SIS moved from its long-time headquarters, at 21 Queen Anne's Gate on St. James Square, to a modern facility across the Thames River at Century House. The intelligence service remains a relatively small organization with a total manpower of perhaps 1,000 to 1,500, of whom perhaps 600 are stationed at headquarters and 300-500 in the field. It was estimated in the mid-1970s that only about 20 to 25 SIS officers were stationed in Africa. The British remain focused on the developed countries and the Far East—in the early 1980s the number of stations in all Third World countries together was put at only 30, most of them units of just two or three officers. There is some use of regional stations as, for instance, Buenos Aires, which until 1982 covered all of South America.

The British also receive considerable assistance from liaison with foreign services. There is fair cooperation with the French but this has been especially close at times in the past, such as during the joint Anglo-French intervention at Suez in 1956. Through NATO the British share intelli-

gence with almost all the Western allies; several of the allies and Britain also participate in the TRIDENT counterterrorism network. The British intelligence relationship with the United States was and is very close, first formalized in 1947 in a quasi-treaty, the BRUSA (British-United States of America) agreement, which originally covered exchange of electronic intelligence. Sharing was later broadened and the pool of participants widened with the UKUSA (United Kingdom-United States of America) agreement, which also incorporated Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.


One feature of the cooperation under this agreement has been full-fledged international conferences on intelligence matters held every four years. In 1962, for example, one of these UKUSA conferences was in progress in the middle of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Held at Washington that year, the CIA had difficulties disguising from the UKUSA participants that a full-scale flap was in progress as the Americans scrambled to find a response to the Cuban problem. Later in the 1960s CIA counterespionage chief James Angleton succeeded in adding international conferences on counterintelligence in which the British also participated. Codenamed CAZAB, sites for these meetings also rotated among the member states. In 1968, for example, the CAZAB services met at Melbourne, Australia. On the British side, intelligence liaison involves all services and MI-5, GCHQ, and SIS each have their own representatives abroad.

Until after World War II, the SIS was organized along conventional department and section lines. It now has a more radical style of organization in which field units report straight to the director general. The field units are organized on a regional basis and each is managed by a "controller." It was reported in 1985 that SIS had controllers for the United Kingdom, Europe, the Soviet Bloc, Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and the Western Hemisphere. Necessary central services are the responsibility of four SIS directorates. Respectively these are personnel and administration, special support, counterintelligence and security, and requirements and production. Except in

conjunction with the controllers or with other services, the directorates are not involved in field operations. The Centry House complex is at 100 Westminster Bridge Road in London. There is also a joint office with MI-5 at 140 Gower Street, a Training Center at 296-302 Borough High Street, and the London Station at 60 Vauxhall Bridge Road. There is a training facility for special operations at Fort Monkton in Gosport. Both SIS and MI-5 are financed by the so-called "secret vote" within the British budget. This stood

at £62 million in 1982 but more recently has been unofficially put at over £100 million. Costs for GCHQ and DIS are borne by the defense budget and are even greater—GCHQ alone has been estimated to cost over £300 million a year, a figure driven in recent years by British efforts to develop an electronic intelligence "ferret" satellite that reportedly has sustained considerable cost overruns. This limited cost data nevertheless suggests that the United Kingdom retains a robust and highly capable intelligence community.

MI-6 ORGANIZATION IN THE 1980s



SOURCE: Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind*. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985.

French Intelligence

A major western power, France operates a complex of intelligence and counterintelligence services. One of these is military intelligence, the 2d section (*Deuxieme Bureau*) of the general staff. The counterintelligence service, roughly analogous to Scotland Yard's Special Branch plus MI-5 in Great Britain, is known as the DST (*Defense et Surveillance du Territoire*). Of main interest to this source book, however, is the French foreign intelligence service, analogous to the CIA or Britain's MI-6. The foreign intelligence service has functioned historically under several labels as will become clear later.

The foreign intelligence service had its origins in the French military under the Third Republic. Even before World War I, the War Ministry established a semi-autonomous *Service de Renseignements* (SR), or Intelligence Service, which sought to fulfill intelligence requirements set by the *Deuxieme Bureau*. The SR had headquarters in Paris at 2-bis, Avenue de Tourville, in the Invalides complex. During the interwar period it comprised divisions for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, communications, and a central archive. The two main divisions (foreign intelligence and counterintelligence) each were organized in parallel sections that dealt respectively with Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy plus Spain. The Foreign Intelligence Division also had a functional section that collected intelligence on aviation and military material. The SR mainly focused on order of battle and military intelligence, as befit its tasking from *Deuxieme Bureau*.

In terms of field organization, this service had officers posted abroad at French embassies in Europe under cover as military attaches. SR had stations in France at Metz, Belfort, and Marseilles, and in the French colonies of Algeria, Morocco, and the Levant. The counterintelligence division worked in conjunction with DST, which

was established by the Ministry of the Interior in 1937. When Germany overran France after its May 1940 invasion, SR operations were cut back by the Vichy government and operated under cover of the so-called Rural Works Department (*Travaux Ruraux*).

Meanwhile the German conquest of France resulted in many Frenchmen fleeing abroad to continue resistance in the Free French movement of Charles de Gaulle. The Free French quickly determined to have an intelligence service of their own to cooperate with the Resistance in France and the British Special Operations Executive. For leader of the group De Gaulle selected Andre Dewavrin, who took the *nom de guerre* "Colonel Passy." In January 1942 Passy's group acquired the formal name of Central Bureau for Intelligence and Military Action (*Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action Militaire*) or BCRAM and, when a political section was added that March, "Military" was dropped from the title to make BCRA. Headquartered at 10 Duke Street in London, where it had moved from St. James Square, the BCRA continued to build itself into a full-scale intelligence service, liaising with the British government at the top level and with SOE, MI-5, and MI-6 at working levels.

In November 1942 Anglo-American forces invaded French North Africa, liberating both Morocco and Algeria and creating a necessity for the unification of BCRA with the former Vichy intelligence service. Through 1943 and 1944 De Gaulle, who emerged after much political maneuvering as the top French leader, resorted to a variety of committees and organizations in the effort to unify intelligence. When De Gaulle's provisional government moved to Paris, after that city's liberation by the Allies in August 1944, the service was renamed the *Direction Generale des Etudes et Recherches* (DGER), still under Colonel Passy. Many from the Resistance, the French Army, and even Vichy managed to get themselves assigned to DGER, which carried out operations both in Europe and in French Indochina. Passy became disillusioned with the burgeoning size and apparent lack of discipline of DGER and left France to direct field

operations in the Far East.

The situation within DGER did not improve, however, and in the summer of 1945 Passy was recalled to supervise a reorganization of the service. This took effect in July when, in one day, the service was cut back from 11,800 personnel to 1,300. It retained but three of the 100 buildings that had been in use, and only 20 of about 400 vehicles in its fleet. The streamlined organization became the *Service de Documentation Exterieur et de Contre-Espionnage* (SDECE), the French post-war intelligence service.

Intelligence headquarters was at 128 Boulevard Mortier in Paris. Across a side street, rue Tourelle, a large public swimming pool was later built. The ten-storey building, Caserne Mortier, was variously named after the pool ("la Piscine"), the street ("Tourelle"), the building ("Caserne"), or simply "the house" ("la maison"), a nickname that had been used for SR before World War II.

The SDECE had two main divisions, one for administration and the other for research and intelligence exploitation. This, the major operating unit, was subdivided into sections for intelligence, counterintelligence, studies, and action. The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence sections were strictly compartmented from each other and maintained separate stations in French embassies. Intelligence station chiefs usually had cover as assistant military attaches, counterintelligence bosses as vice-consuls in charge of passport divisions. Agents working for SDECE were called "honorable correspondents," and worked for motives of patriotism or favors—as a rule they were not paid.

Though Passy and his deputy both came from BCRA, many from that service returned to civilian life in the 1945 reorganization. Military officers with SR backgrounds directed most of the departments. Many SR military analysts returned to their old specialties in the intelligence section. Some men from the Free French service, like Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoly, and others from the Resistance, such as Marcel Le Roy Finville and

Dominique Pontchardier, stayed on and became senior SDECE officers. Nevertheless there was a heavy concentration of military types and a quiet bureaucratic struggle between the military and civilians for domination within the service. Passy was forced to resign a couple of years after the war, when he was implicated in one of a series of scandals involving currency speculation by intelligence officers. His replacement, Henri Ribiere, also left under a cloud, in a scandal called the "Affair of the Generals" that involved intelligence, leaks of military information, and money.

The Affair of the Generals was a byproduct of the French Indochina War (1945-1954), one of the series of colonial engagements that preoccupied France for two decades after World War II. SDECE was heavily committed in the colonial wars, a fact that naturally favored the military faction in the competition for bureaucratic control. One French parachute battalion, the 2d Shock (II^{me} *Bataillon de Choc Parachutiste*), which fought in Indochina early in that war, was actually a sort of SDECE special action unit. The SDECE was even represented at Dien Bien Phu, the climactic battle, by a small unit working with highland partisan networks.

In the Algerian War (1954-1962) the SDECE was even more heavily involved in covert operations. These ranged from efforts to impede fundraising by Algerian rebels to sabotaging arms shipments intended for them and sinking or sabotaging at least 14 ships bearing rebel supply shipments. SDECE masterminded the 1956 aerial abduction of Ahmed Ben Bella and other Algerian revolutionary leaders who had been promised safe conduct and were flying the personal plane of the Sultan of Morocco to peace talks with the French. This covert action brought about the fall of the French cabinet of Guy Mollet. Another SDECE initiative was the creation of a supposed terrorist organization, the Red Hand ("*Main Rouge*") that operated against rebel organizers and arms dealers trading with them. Two arms dealers were assassinated, Marcel Leopold in Geneva in 1959, and George Puchert in Frankfurt in 1962. The latter action triggered a secret official protest of

SDECE by the West German intelligence service.

Many of the covert actions were conducted by Service 7, SDECE's action unit under Le Roy Finville. Service 7 also carried out a wide variety of espionage and other missions. These included penetrations of the Egyptian and other embassies in Paris, efforts to start paramilitary movements in Czechoslovakia, and secretly opening and photographing the contents of diplomatic pouches. Service 7 held a champagne party on the occasion of its 1,000th pouch opening, and another at the 2,000th. Technical intelligence coups included one in which a Soviet jet engine, then a novel and very sensitive technology, was temporarily diverted to be dismantled and examined in detail.

Service 7 also employed merchant vessels and fishing boats as electronic intelligence collectors and induced commercial airline pilots to stray from their assigned routes to take aerial photographs over Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In Africa during the troubles in the Congo (1960-1964) it was said the SDECE had Katanga province so thoroughly covered that nothing could happen without the knowledge of Tourelles. Cameroonian politics was also affected by another assassination, the 1960 poisoning of opposition leader Felix Moumie in Geneva.

In 1958 the Algerian war triggered the first of a series of mutinies among French Army units. This revolt brought down the Fourth Republic and led to the return to power of Charles de Gaulle as president of a Fifth Republic under a new constitution. De Gaulle was suspicious of the military bent of SDECE and took various actions to curb its strong-arm proclivities. When he began peace negotiations with the Algerians at Evian, for example, De Gaulle forbade the presence of SDECE agents in that city. An abortive military coup against De Gaulle in 1961 caused him to order the dissolution of the 2d Shock Battalion on the grounds that its members had a broad range of contacts with the French Army rebels. Not too long afterward De Gaulle replaced the director of SDECE, General Paul Grossin, whom he had originally appointed to clean up the organization,

streamline its structure, and make it responsible directly to the president of France and not a cabinet official. By the mid-1960s the SDECE's personnel profile had shifted to about 65% civilians and 35% military.

Unlike his predecessors, De Gaulle was not especially pro-American or committed to the NATO alliance. There are indications he became enraged when the Soviet defector Anatoliy Golitsyn (see entry, this volume) made accusations regarding Soviet spies in French NATO posts and in SDECE. He also took a dim view of SDECE espionage assistance to the CIA in Cuba, where French intelligence reporting helped the Americans in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoly, SDECE station chief in Washington since 1950, was recalled under suspicion of being a CIA agent, but instead sought political asylum in the United States. Intelligence liaison between SDECE and the CIA reached a low ebb at this time.

De Gaulle was incensed at U.S. refusal to cooperate with France in its creation of an independent nuclear force, a centerpiece of his policy. He ordered SDECE chief General Paul Jacquier to conduct espionage operations against the United States to collect intelligence on nuclear weapons and technical matters. A refusal to countenance such operations was one of the issues that led to Vosjoly's break with the SDECE. Jacquier, whom some have described as too weak a personality to be a real boss for SDECE, went along with De Gaulle's orders. One of the last activities conducted by Service 7 was reportedly an attempt to steal a U.S. tactical nuclear weapon from a base near Frankfurt, Germany.


In the mid-1960s the SDECE received a real setback in the Ben Barka affair. This concerned Mehdi Ben Barka, a Moroccan political figure who disappeared in Paris in October 1965 and is widely believed to have been assassinated. At the request of Moroccan intelligence, with which SDECE had close liaison ties, Service 7 had had Ben Barka under surveillance for some time. Ben Barka may have been plotting the overthrow of

Sultan Mohammed V of Morocco and he may even have been working with elements in Moroccan intelligence. He may have been killed by the Moroccans, or by the French, or he may have died under interrogation, but Service 7 took the blame in the public controversy that followed revelation of the affair. Service 7 chief Le Roy Finville went to prison and was put on trial and his action unit was dismantled, with officers scattered to other parts of SDECE, some of its capabilities transferred to military security, and only a rump action service left behind.

Nevertheless the SDECE was not left entirely without resources. It has been linked with a 1966 incident in which an ecological group was prevented from disrupting a French nuclear atmospheric nuclear test in the South Pacific, when the engines of its ship *Trident* were sabotaged. In 1967 the same ship was prevented from interfering in a French nuclear test when it was quarantined by Cook Islands health authorities after a crew member suddenly developed a contagious disease. Again the SDECE was suspected in the incident.

Directorship of SDECE went to the aristocratic Alexandre de Marenches in 1970. He led the agency for a decade in which it was once more heavily engaged in covert actions in Africa. In the Angolan Civil War of 1975-1976 the SDECE hired mercenaries and helped fund an Angolan faction led by Jonas Savimbi. The French were reportedly involved in the Shaba (formerly Katanga) incidents of 1977 and 1978 and in the Central African Republic (formerly Central African Empire), formed after a French military intervention deposed the self-styled Emperor Bokassa I. An abortive military coup in Libya in August 1980 against Muammar Qaddafi was followed by a number of high-level resignations from SDECE. In the Middle East, senior SDECE officers are widely believed to have advised Saudi Arabian security forces during the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by a band of Islamic fundamentalists.

SDECE ORGANIZATION IN 1971



*Conventional Means = Espionage and open sources

SOURCE: Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, *La Piscine*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985.

At home the SDECE continued to have its share of squabbles both with other services and internally. The 550-person Radio-Electric Group, comparable to the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States, had been an independent agency until taken over by the SDECE in 1970. Its activities became controversial in 1978 when it was revealed that the unit's coverage contained remarkable gaps suggesting that information regarding Eastern Europe was being suppressed.

Then there were problems between SDECE and the DST over operations within France. The SDECE charter confined it to activities outside France but Marenches claimed a right of "hot pursuit" into the country. By the late 1970s it was reported that as much as 80% of SDECE activity was taking place inside France. In 1978 the French press reported that new directives had been issued emphasizing the DST's responsibility at home. That these were not quite effective is indicated by the March 1983 murder (or possibly suicide) of Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Nut, an officer of the counterintelligence department who was identified as being responsible for protection of the land-based missile complexes on the Albion Plateau, the manufacturing plants for nuclear weapons, missiles, and guidance systems, the nuclear submarine base at Toulon, and the Radio-Electric Group's listening stations in the Alpine foothills.

The Ben Barka affair meanwhile had begun a shift back toward the military faction within French intelligence. By the late 1970s, under Count Marenches, SDECE was once more directly responsible to the Ministry of Defense. A 1978 reorganization which moved perhaps a half dozen senior officers further strengthened the military faction in the agency. When Francois Mitterand succeeded to the presidency of France in 1981 about 65% of the service's approximately 2,000 personnel once again were military.

A conservative anti-communist, Marenches refused to work under the socialist Mitterand. He was replaced by Pierre Marion, a friend of the new defense minister and former chief executive of Air

France. Marion had a brief to reform the intelligence service and he did what he could. A new basic character document was drafted and, for the first time, made public in early 1982, when it was printed in the government's official journal. The name of the agency was simultaneously changed to the General Directorate for External Security (*Direction Generale du Securite Exterieur*) or DGSE.

The service was not very receptive to Marion. Many staff members were alienated, perhaps as many as 500 resigned. According to press accounts, whole agent networks evaporated. Visiting one DGSE base, Marion was suddenly surrounded by 400 tough commandos who seemed to threaten him. This was passed off as a rite of initiation for intelligence directors. In an incident passed off as a supposed security exercise, Marion was abducted from his office on the first floor of "la piscine." In broad daylight four armed men bundled Marion into the trunk of a car and drove away from the heavily guarded DGSE headquarters, all the way to the south of France where he was put in a helicopter and flown to a trawler in the Mediterranean. Marion was also embarrassed by a spate of deliberate leaks. On one occasion, after Mitterand's office pressured DGSE to hold special briefings for cabinet ministers, a right-wing newsmagazine received the tip that the four communist ministers in the French cabinet would be going to DGSE. The service was then lambasted for opening its files to communists.

Despite this conservative overreaction, reports are that the socialist housecleaning at DGSE was relatively mild. Marion brought in some officials from the DST and the national police and urged notorious incompetents into retirement. That was all. Intelligence inefficiencies and insubordination continued. In October 1981, when government officials saw wire service reports that Libyan forces were invading Chad, DGSE proved unable to evaluate the claim because its agents were out of contact. In 1982, against orders, DGSE officers allegedly supported an abortive coup in the Central African Republic. Marion is rumored to have had a nervous breakdown in the course of his serv-

ice. When the French chief of staff later complained of the inadequacy of DGSE intelligence, Defense Minister Charles Hernu replaced Marion with a naval officer, Admiral Pierre Lacoste.

A continuing theme in French intelligence operations has been assisting and protecting French nuclear programs. This question again arose in the mid-1980s as the international environmentalist coalition Greenpeace planned to disrupt nuclear tests in the South Pacific. Defense Minister Hernu, by his account, ordered DGSE to monitor the Greenpeace activities. Admiral Lacoste instead planned and carried out an operation that, on 10 July 1985, sank the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* at her moorings in Auckland, New Zealand, en route to the French test site. Photographer Fernando Pereira was killed in the explosion of the limpet mine that sank *Rainbow Warrior*. Two DGSE officers were caught by New Zealand police and tried for the crime, although a number of others escaped. The two were later repatriated on condition they be made to serve out their prison terms, but French authorities freed both during 1987. Admiral Lacoste was dismissed after he refused to respond to government questions about the affair. He was replaced by General Rene Imbot. Charles Hernu was also forced to resign.

DGSE foreign intelligence has had at least one significant reported success in recent years. This is the recruitment of a senior Soviet officer, allegedly a KGB colonel codenamed "Farewell," who worked for the French for an 18-month period until the end of 1982 and is now believed to be dead. Farewell reportedly supplied details of Soviet efforts on technological and scientific espionage, including the KGB personnel involved plus over 4,000 documents. The CIA evidently relied upon this material in an extensive public report on KGB technological and scientific espionage it published a few years later, indicating the renewal of warm relations between DGSE and the Americans. In April 1983 France expelled 47 Soviet diplomats and journalists for activities incompatible with their status, an action probably related to the Farewell case.

The French have also had a number of counterintelligence successes in recent years. These have included arrests of individuals spying for both the Soviets and the Chinese, observing the French foreign ministry, the missile submarine base at Brest, and the European Space Agency. In 1984 France expelled a member of the Soviet commercial mission in Paris, and in 1985 the Soviet Consul General at Marseilles. In connection with the Brest case, in February 1986 the French expelled four additional Soviet diplomats.

Altogether, France must be considered to have strong capabilities for both intelligence operations and counterintelligence. The DGSE, which has risen to a strength of 3,000 in recent years, can be expected to continue its involvement on a global scale.

Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (GRU)

(Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff)

Where the KGB seeks all types of intelligence material, the Soviet military operates its own intelligence service that focuses specifically on military subjects. That service is the 2d Main Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, also known as the Chief Intelligence Directorate, or simply as the GRU. The GRU operates in parallel to the KGB abroad, with its own agents and networks, its own *rezidents* and case officers, and its own technical services. Unlike the KGB, the GRU does not have internal security functions, for which the Main Political Administration is responsible within the armed forces. Instead the GRU concentrates wholly on military intelligence, both strategic and tactical in nature.

As a collection agency for foreign intelligence, the GRU actually holds pride of place in Soviet history, being the first such unit established by the Soviet Union. Creation of the agency was driven by the Soviets' realization of their need for large amounts of intelligence regarding Poland on the occasion of their invasion of that country in the spring of 1920. It was then that Jan Karlovich Berzin, a Red Army officer of Latvian origins, stepped forward to organize and lead this new appendage of the high command. Berzin took the Cheka's Registry Section as the nucleus for the intelligence agency. The Russo-Polish war brought little success for Soviet arms, but the GRU went on to expand its activities to the remainder of Europe and, in the late 1920s, the United States. Berzin became very adept at using embassy and commercial cover for his agent operations.

In the 1930s the GRU was quite active on the republican side in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Berzin himself went to Spain as "General Grishin." But the military intelligence department, like the Soviet armed forces at large, was caught in the Stalinist purges. Grishin/Berzin was ordered home in 1937 and submitted meekly, only to be executed after his return to Moscow. This was the beginning of a massive disruption of GRU networks throughout Europe as many officers were recalled to a similar fate. Some were more circumspect. Ignaz Reiss and General Walter Krivitsky, chief of GRU operations in Western Europe, defected rather than returning when requested. Reiss was gunned down before his defection became known to Western services, but Krivitsky gave evidence to both the British and Americans, including to a Congressional committee in Washington, D.C. Shortly thereafter Krivitsky too was found dead, in his hotel room, and it has never been established whether he died of natural causes or was the victim of a murder contrived to seem like a natural death.

The GRU performed its intended function successfully in the months preceding the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. At that time, in common with the Americans and British through

diplomatic channels, the GRU provided Stalin with warnings that Germany intended military action. The German invasion came as a surprise because the Soviet political leadership refused to believe the warnings, not because the information had not been discovered. As World War II intensified and progressed, the German network *Rote Kapelle* and the "Lucy" ring in Switzerland continued to provide the Soviets with high-grade intelligence regarding German intentions and capabilities, although lately there has been speculation in the literature over whether "Lucy," at least, might not have actually been a *British* agent, acting as an avenue to disguise information derived from decoding of German military communications traffic. The Soviet agent Richard Sorge, who also furnished high-quality intelligence, has at various times been claimed by analysts to have been an agent of both the GRU and the KGB.

For a short time after the war, the GRU was absorbed by a different unit of the high command, but it re-emerged by 1948 and has maintained its identity and autonomy ever since. A significant portion of the GRU's immediate postwar problems resulted from the defection, in Canada during 1945, of the code clerk Igor Gouzenko from his embassy post, compromising Soviet networks and communications.

The headquarters of the GRU, bearing the innocuous cover designation "Military Department 44388," was and remains in Moscow's Arbatskaya Square. Global communications flow through Vatutinki outside the capital. Officers are recruited from the Soviet Army, either directly from the ranks, as was common in the immediate postwar years, or from the ranks of Soviet special forces (*Spetsnaz*) as seems to be recent practice. Either way training begins with a three-year or longer course at the Military-Diplomatic Academy, or "Military Department 35576," located in a grand old building decorated with greek colonnades on People's Militia Street.

In the years since World War II, the GRU has been extremely active throughout the world. This is

especially true in the United States and in NATO countries, with large GRU operating bases in Austria and East Germany. There have been recurrent major espionage cases involving the GRU in West Germany, as well as GRU agents arrested in France in the 1960s and the 1980s. A Soviet intelligence officer implicated in the British Profumo affair was from the GRU, as was a naval captain expelled in 1982 after efforts to establish a ring seeking British technological secrets. A major GRU ring was broken in 1967 with the capture of the Italian Giorgio Rinaldi, followed by 29 arrests in seven NATO countries. Also a GRU agent, arrested in 1963, was Swedish Colonel Stig Wennerstroem, formerly attache in the United States.

Penetrations in the United States by the GRU have included the case of Lieutenant Colonel William Henry Whalen, arrested in 1966, formerly intelligence adviser to the Army chief of staff. During the 1980s there have been several expulsions of Soviet military officers stationed in the U.S. as attaches, the most frequent form of cover for GRU men. In the 1983 case of Lieutenant Colonel Yuri P. Leonov, the Soviet officer among other items had sought a copy of the Pentagon's official directory of wargames in use by the military. The Soviet officers handling the Walker spy ring may originally have been GRU before the case was considered so valuable as to be taken over by the KGB.

It is not unusual for the KGB, in fact, to become involved in GRU operations. The two services use the same methods in foreign intelligence gathering and respond to some of the same intelligence requirements. There is also natural competition between the GRU and the KGB, who are called the "neighbors." The competition is overlaid with a layer of fear, of course, as the KGB is responsible for the loyalty of all Soviets stationed abroad, including GRU officers. A certain degree of self-policing occurs within the GRU simply as a defense mechanism to prevent KGB encroachments in its activities.


These features of GRU-KGB relations were shown in high relief by events of the late 1950s and early

1960s. It was toward the end of 1958 that Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Popov of the GRU was exposed as a CIA agent in place. The Popov case brought the fall of GRU chief Lieutenant General Mikhail A. Shalin, who was replaced by KGB deputy chief Colonel General Ivan Serov. Four years later Serov in turn was forced out after exposure of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky as a CIA and MI-6 agent. Once again the Soviets turned to the KGB for a GRU chief, General Petr Ivanovich Ivashutin, who has now held the post for over a quarter of a century. Though from a KGB background, Ivashutin is said to have defended military prerogatives in his GRU post.

As presumably outlined by Penkovsky and then written up in the manuscript known as *The Penkovsky Papers*, the GRU organization in the late 1950s and early 1960s consisted of a number of directorates, operations sections, and service sections. The 1st Directorate handled illegal agents, including their training and support. The 2d Directorate was the Anglo-American unit, handling the United States, the United Kingdom, British Commonwealth nations, and also Latin America. The 4th Directorate had responsibility for the Middle East and Far East, and an African Section was later added. The 5th Directorate's responsibilities included diversionary actions and sabotage and command of Soviet special forces. Tactical military intelligence of the sorts required to support Soviet military operations was gathered by the 6th Directorate.

Intelligence analysis within the GRU was carried out by the Information Directorate. A separate Naval Intelligence Directorate serviced the intelligence requirements of the Soviet navy. There were autonomous operational sections for scientific and technical intelligence, communications and decryption, Soviet Bloc nations, and all official relations with foreign nationals. In addition there were GRU service sections for radio intelligence and communications, organization and the selection of appropriate cover, archives and the central registry, administration and supply, personnel, and training schools.

GRU ORGANIZATION IN THE 1970s



* The organization headed by a major-general is a "direction" if it is connected directly with overseas agents; if it is not connected directly with agents, it is a "department".

SOURCE: Viktor Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*. New York: Macmillan, 1984.

A far different pattern of GRU organization has been described by the Soviet defector who writes under the pen name "Viktor Suvorov." According to Suvorov there are 14 major directorates plus a number of autonomous directorates or departments of a service nature. Suvorov also writes that there is no separate illegals unit as the GRU does not consider such an apparatus necessary. Instead, the 1st Directorate, with five subordinate "directions," handles Europe. The 2d Directorate remains responsible for North and South America. The 3d Directorate handles Asia, and the 4th Africa and the Middle East. The 5th Directorate handles all military and naval tactical intelligence, including command of intelligence units of fleets and armies as well as Soviet special forces.

Intelligence is also gathered by four "directions" that are directly subordinate to the first deputy chief of the GRU. Each headed by a major general, these directions carry out agent intelligence in the Moscow area, in East and West Berlin, in liberation movements, and from bases in Cuba. Some of the autonomous directions are as large or larger than the major directorates. Though no illegals directorate exists, the first deputy is responsible to the GRU chief for an illegals section, while other illegals may be run under the personal control of chiefs of other directorates.

Under this organization, the GRU's 6th Directorate handles electronic intelligence in all forms. An unnumbered Cosmic Intelligence Directorate is responsible for Soviet reconnaissance satellite programs along with a semi-autonomous Fleet Cosmic Intelligence unit. These two directorates are directly responsible to the chief of the GRU and not to his first deputy.

Another set of GRU major directorates deals mainly with the analysis of information gathered from secret sources. Among these, the 7th Directorate reports on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 8th Directorate carries out detailed studies of selected individual countries worldwide, the 9th Directorate reports on military technology, the 10th on military economics. The 11th Directorate performs studies of strategic

nuclear forces and foreign strategic concepts and also supplies technical specialists for Soviet arms control negotiating delegations. There is reportedly a 12th Directorate about whose activities Suvorov maintains he has no information. Finally the GRU has an Information Institute that produces reports on all subjects, based entirely upon open source information such as the press and technical journals.

The GRU support apparatus includes a number of independent directorates and departments. There is a Personnel Directorate, an archives department, a financial department, and a political department that monitors the political loyalty of GRU personnel. The Operational/Technical Directorate develops specialized equipment necessary for GRU activities. The Administrative/Technical Directorate stocks and dispenses foreign currencies as required for GRU operations. A Communications Directorate staffs the GRU radio network and develops equipment and techniques. The 1st GRU Department handles passports and cover documentation for GRU officers and illegals. The 8th GRU Department develops and maintains the security of GRU codes and ciphers. Then there is the network of training centers for GRU officers and illegals.

Typically a Soviet embassy abroad contains a GRU *rezidentura* in parallel to its KGB station. The GRU apparatus is much smaller than the "neighbor's" though, and GRU representation in an embassy is usually outnumbered two- or three-to-one by the KGB. At the lowest level a station consists of a *rezident*, a deputy, and a communications specialist. In large *rezidenturas* there is a contingent of operations officers, technical and photographic sections, an administrative department, and a communications unit. Large stations also have security units, often manned by Soviet special forces troopers.

There are no reliable estimates of the total size and manpower of the GRU. Given the number and responsibilities of its directorates and their responsibilities, a ballpark figure might range as high as 10,000. If one were to include the intelli-

gence sections of Soviet field force staffs along with manpower of Soviet special forces, an overall figure could be 40,000 to 50,000. While this does not match the size of the KGB, it is clear that the GRU is a large and powerful intelligence organization.

Israeli Intelligence

The state of Israel maintains relatively small but very high-quality intelligence services that operate in close coordination with the Israeli Defense Forces and the National Police. The elite intelligence services are the Mossad (*Mossad Letafkidim Meyouchadim* or Secret Intelligence Service) and the Shin Beth (*Sherut Bitachon Klali* or Counterespionage and Internal Security). Military Intelligence (*Agaf Modiin*) is by far the largest service but, at least until the October War of 1973, was traditionally regarded as a poor sister since work in the combat arms of the armed forces was a much surer path to career advancement. Given the Middle East context, military intelligence has remained focused on the Arab countries while Shin Beth, though interested in all counterintelligence, has also concentrated on the Arab terrorist threat. The Mossad's operations have been global in scope.

Israeli intelligence grew out of the pre-World War II period of Jewish immigration to Palestine and struggle against the British forces there (under the League of Nations Britain had a mandate over Palestine that consisted of the modern states of Israel and Jordan). At that time the intelligence service operated under the innocuous name of the Information Service (*Sherut Yedioth*), popularly known as Shay. The Mossad was first established in 1937 as an intelligence branch of the Jewish underground militia *Haganah*. Shay, in the meantime, extended its operations into Western Europe and the United States during the 1930s.

Shay remained the intelligence service of the newly founded state of Israel after 1948. It contained components for political intelligence, counterintel-

ligence, police branch of military intelligence, plus naval intelligence and security. The branches worked independently and were individually responsible to different ministries. There was a good deal of competition and services sometimes worked at cross-purposes.

In April 1951 the cabinet decided upon a complete reorganization of intelligence. Independent units were established to be coordinated by a Committee of Heads of Services (*Va'adat Rashi Hasherutim*). Mossad became the political intelligence service, separate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which retained a small intelligence analysis unit of its own. Shin Beth was promoted to an independent service without change. The various military, naval, and air intelligence components were consolidated into a single Military Intelligence service. The national police formed a Special Tasks Division which also had *Va'adat* membership.

This remained the basic organization through the 1970s although, a decade before, Shin Beth was removed from the portfolio of the defense minister and made directly responsible to the prime minister, who added an intelligence adviser to his personal staff. The director of Mossad chairs the *Va'adat* and is directly responsible to the prime minister for intelligence community operations.

The Mossad headquarters is located in a wing of a commercial office building in Tel Aviv. Until the October War the organization had departments of Technology, Technical Operations, Collection, Operational Planning and Coordination, Political Action and Liaison, Manpower, Finance, Logistics and Security, and Training. After 1973, as a result of the recommendations of an investigating commission, a department of research was added to prevent Israel from being entirely dependent upon the analytical capabilities of Military Intelligence. A division for Psychological Warfare or Special Operations is believed to be located within the Political Action and Liaison department.

Mossad functions under a director who has no deputy. While the director for collection functioned as

second senior officer, by the late 1970s the director of operational planning and coordination assumed this role. This agency controls all foreign intelligence activities excepting those conducted against military targets in neighboring states. Special operations are organized on an ad hoc basis directed from headquarters and may call on any Mossad officer or agent for participation.

The collection and liaison departments maintain a parallel structure of regional branches within which are desks that monitor one or more countries. In the late 1970s the regional branches reportedly were Central and South America, Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, Africa, Asia and Oceania, the Mediterranean and Near East, Europe, and North America. The liaison department maintains extensive cooperative relationships with foreign intelligence services, usually directly in the foreign capitals where the department has offices that are compartmented from the regular Mossad stations. A major relationship is with the CIA, handled for many years by James A. Angleton on the American side.

Mossad also participates in the counterterrorist KILOWATT Group that also includes the services of the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Luxembourg, Denmark, Switzerland, Ireland, Sweden, and Norway. More informal channels for exchanging information on terrorism exist with Spain, Portugal, and Austria. Until the late 1970s another group, TRIDENT, united Mossad with the services of Turkey and Iran. In Africa there were liaison relationships with South Africa, Zaire, and Kenya. There were relationships with at least ten South American services in the late 1970s.

One method the Israelis have used to extend liaison into even closer cooperation has been through helping to establish and train foreign intelligence services. A prominent example was Iran under the Shah, where the Mossad and the CIA jointly developed the Shah's service (called SAVAK). Mossad later cooperated with SAVAK in supporting a Kurdish uprising in Iraq during the 1970s. Less well known are the Israeli operations in Africa,

where they helped establish the Ghanian Military Intelligence Service and train the Zairois, Liberian, and Ugandan services.

In the Far East the Mossad had liaison, especially on terrorism, with the services of South Korea, Thailand, Japan, and Indonesia.

Mossad maintains stations in the United States, most European countries, Turkey, Iran until 1979, and other capitals that are considered strategic. Stations in Arab countries except Egypt operate clandestinely but in most other countries are under diplomatic cover. Some stations work as regional centers conducting most or all work in their areas. Paris, for example, has been identified as a regional nexus in Western Europe. There are reportedly regional stations in Rio de Janeiro for the Southern Cone of South America, Caracas for Central America and northern South America, and Singapore for the Far East. Station chiefs and staffs are typically Mossad officers but function on behalf of all Israeli intelligence services. In specific cases where an officer of Shin Beth or Military Intelligence is considered better qualified for a field station, he may be assigned in place of Mossad personnel.

One major area of Mossad operations has been in acquiring scientific and technical information and equipment and denying this to Arab adversaries. Mossad has been especially successful in this area. The Israeli *Kfir* fighter, for example, is based on a French Dassault Mirage design whose blueprints were given to Mossad by a Swiss engineer asked for assistance in about December 1967. The blueprints were shipped in weekly 110-pound lots for a year beginning, by one account, on 5 October 1968. They were smuggled across the border to Bavaria, flown to Brindisi in Italy and then on to Israel.

Despite a long history of French military cooperation with Israel, this espionage was necessary because French President Charles de Gaulle put an embargo on military exports to Israel following the 1967 Six Day War. The embargo also affected five missile patrol boats Israel had ordered from

French shipyards. Here Mossad contrived to effectively steal the completed boats from Cherbourg harbor on 24 December 1969 and sail them to Haifa in Israel. Mossad supported the Israeli nuclear program through operation Plumbat, in which 200 tons of uranium oxide was diverted in 1968 through fake orders and shipping documents, being carried to Israel aboard the hired vessel *Sheersburg A*. There was also an operation in the United States, whose authenticity is still disputed, in which 587 pounds of weapons grade uranium evidently disappeared from a nuclear reprocessing plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania.

In more recent years Mossad technical intelligence efforts have been supplemented by those of a secret office within the Defence Ministry formed to collect scientific data under the Hebrew acronym Lekem. This office was under Rafi Eytan, also counterterrorism adviser to the prime minister, who has been linked to the Apollo nuclear diversion and to earlier Mossad operations, including the 1960 abduction in Argentina of former Nazi extermination camp boss Adolf Eichman. It was Lekem that ran the American agent Jonathan Jay Pollard whose 1986 arrest and conviction for espionage strained U.S.- Israeli relations. The group has also reportedly succeeded in gaining access to American computer technology.

Another reported Mossad effort was one to deny nuclear technology to Iraq. According to a German press account this was codenamed "Big Lift" and involved three demolition experts separately sent to Marseilles who joined up for a strike at the French nuclear reactor production plant at LaSeyne, which was producing components for a reactor to be exported to Iraq. In April 1979, 48 hours before scheduled shipment of the components to Iraq, the plant was racked by explosions that blew a hole in the containment structure for the planned Iraqi reactor. Damage was estimated at \$25 million and the reactor project delayed by some two years. When the reactor eventually was shipped and installed near Baghdad, an Israeli Air Force bombing raid hit it again in the summer of 1981.

Operations against individuals and organizations have also been a major facet of Mossad activity. In the early years following World War II these were focused on former Nazis, most notably Eichmann who was sought for years before being tracked down in Argentina, where he was kidnapped in May 1960 by a team jointly supervised by a Mossad and a Shin Beth officer. The most extensive anti-Nazi operation was actually anti-Egyptian as well. This followed from the Egyptians' use of German scientists in the research and development of rockets the Israelis considered a threat to them. In 1962 and 1963 the Mossad conducted an active campaign against the German scientists, German industrialists exporting related technologies to Egypt, and the Egyptians with whom they were working. The campaign included aircraft sabotage, attempted murder, and a series of letter-bombs. Israeli prime minister David BenGurion considered that Isser Harel, Mossad's chief for a decade, had exceeded his instructions during this campaign and dismissed him.

Through the 1970s and 80s the focus of this type of Mossad operations has turned against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), its factions, and splinter groups. This escalated into a virtual war of terror and counterterror after 5 September 1972, when PLO terrorists of the "Black September" group killed 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich. Barely a month later one Palestinian was assassinated in Rome, in December another Black September leader in Paris, and three more in various locales in early 1973. On the night of 9 April 1973 Mossad officers and an Israeli team gunning for the alleged mastermind of the Munich raid mistakenly killed an Algerian in Lillehammer, Norway. This time six of the Mossad team were captured and tried by Norwegian authorities, being sentenced to terms ranging from one to five and a half years, of which they served between seven and 22 months. Israel, of course, denied any connection with the incident at Lillehammer. Ever since Munich there have been periodic assassinations and attempted assassinations on both sides. In fact Israel used the attempted assassination of a diplomat in London, which it alleged was by the PLO, as the excuse for

its invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It is now believed that this particular attempt was made by an anti-PLO Palestinian faction.

Paramilitary special operations has been another category of Mossad activity. Early on these led to acute embarrassment for the Israeli government in the so-called Lavon affair, named after the defense minister forced to resign as a result. The idea was to use sabotage operations inside Egypt to undermine American confidence in the government of Gamal Abdul Nasser but it backfired in 1954 when the Egyptians broke up the Israeli network and agents detailed the Israeli role at their trial. Rather more successful was an early Beirut raid, made on 28 December 1967, when commandos landed at the international airport there and dynamited 13 Arab-owned aircraft. Even this had its downside as it caused De Gaulle to tighten his arms embargo against Israel. By all odds the most successful special operation occurred in July 1976 after an Air France plane en route from Tel Aviv to Paris was hijacked to Entebbe in Uganda with 257 hostages. Mossad intelligence supported an Israeli paratroop raid that freed the passengers with only three fatalities.

Mossad espionage has also been quite effective over the years. It has scored important penetrations in neighboring Arab states and within the Palestinian groups. A senior adviser to Syrian President Hafez el-Assad was reportedly an Israeli agent. Intelligence in Egypt and Jordan has been good enough to allow the Israelis to warn leaders in each of those countries of plots against them. In Egypt during the Nazi scientist operations, Mossad successfully planted the agent Wolfgang Lotz, who posed as an Afrika Korps veteran and became known as the "champagne spy" for his lavish parties that attracted many senior Egyptian officers who unwittingly became Mossad sources. Lotz was arrested by Egyptian security in February 1965, but then further confused the Egyptians by implicating West German intelligence.

One version of how the United States got hold of a copy of Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech on de-Stalinization, to the XXth Congress of the Sovi-

et Communist Party, was that the Mossad prevailed upon one of its sources, an Eastern European diplomat, and then passed the document to the CIA's Jim Angleton.

Press reports of the 1970s put Mossad manpower at 900 to 1,000, but a CIA study of Israeli intelligence, taken and leaked by Iranian students who captured the U.S. embassy in Teheran in 1979, quoted figures of 1,500 to 2,000, of whom 500 were officers. Israeli counterintelligence, the Shin Beth, is rather smaller, with about 1,000 personnel including 550 officers. Military Intelligence then consisted of as many as 7,000 people, among them 450 officers.

Shin Beth works primarily against the Arabs, Soviets, and Eastern European services although it also collects information on the operations and organization of friendly services in Israel. At one time it conducted overseas operations, like Mossad, in the Balkan countries, but this is no longer the case. Like the British MI-5, Shin Beth does not have powers of arrest and for this it relies on the Special Tasks Division of the National Police.

Originally located in an old building in Jaffa, in June 1970 Shin Beth moved to a custom-designed complex in north Tel Aviv containing offices, laboratories, and a guest house for visiting foreign intelligence dignitaries or sensitive agents. Shin Beth is divided into eight departments: administration, technology, operational support, protective security, interrogation and legal counsel, coordination and planning, non-Arab affairs, and Arab affairs. Field organization is divided into regional departments for Gaza, the West Bank, Northern Israel, and the remainder of Israel.

Field offices carry out both offensive and defensive counterintelligence activity. The most important department, Arab Affairs, is typical of departmental organization. It is responsible for counterespionage, antiterrorist operations, control of political subversion, analysis of information received, and the maintenance of a card index on Arab radicals. The Non-Arab Affairs department also handles liaison with foreign services and infiltrates domes-

tic political parties to monitor their activities.

The Coordination and Planning department actually handles recruitment and training, security investigations, and methodology for both counter-intelligence and protective security. It also houses the central registry and card files, except those concerning Arabs. The department's card index has been computerized on an Israeli military computer. It contains entries not only for all who have come to Shin Beth's attention but also for anyone in Israel who has a police record. Shin Beth communications security is the responsibility of the Administration department. Shin Beth also has a sophisticated telephone switchboard that enables it to tap any telephone in Israel without installing microphones or interfering with wiring.

Two important Shin Beth targets historically have been the headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Jerusalem and the U.S. Embassy, for many years at Tel Aviv. Attempts have been made to recruit UNTSO personnel using intimidation and blackmail. On two or three occasions money has been offered to Marine guards at the U.S. embassy in efforts to recruit them. In 1954 a hidden microphone was discovered in the office of the U.S. ambassador while, two years later, telephone taps were found on two phones at the residence of the American military attache.

Shin Beth dealt with several serious espionage cases in the 1950s and 1960s. One of these was Dr. Kurt Sitte, a nuclear physicist who researched questions of cosmic radiation at the Institute of Technology at Haifa. Born a Sudeten German in Czechoslovakia, Sitte was also a Jew and eventually ended up at the Buchenwald concentration camp where he joined a communist cell. Later he was recruited by Czech intelligence and went to Haifa in 1954. Some of his work at Haifa was for the U.S. Air Force but he eventually came under suspicion. He was tried on seven counts of passing secret information and sentenced in February 1961 to five years in prison.

Aharon Cohen, another agent captured in this

period, worked in behalf of the KGB. Cohen had a good record as a politician and was a Middle East expert for the left-wing Mapam Party, but passed information to a courier who was a representative of a scientific research mission. Cohen was sentenced to five years imprisonment in 1962 but that September the Israeli Supreme Court commuted half his sentence.

A most serious KGB penetration was that of Israel Beer, a Defense Ministry employee who was actually intelligence liaison officer to the minister. Beer was born in Austria and claimed to have been a socialist there, as well as a member of the international brigades in the Spanish Civil War. He emigrated to Palestine in 1938 where he joined the *Haganah* secret militia, fighting against the British during the Mandate period and against the Arabs in the War of Independence (1948-1949). He became one of the youngest lieutenant colonels in the Israeli Army and author of its official history of the 1948-1949 war, on which he had had an important perspective as assistant chief of staff for planning and operations. Beer later served as senior aide to the chief of staff and as a top security official. He was in a position to divulge much Israeli and NATO information.

By one account Shin Beth's leads to Beer came from CIA liaison, having been provided by the Polish defector Michal Goleniewski (see entry, this volume). Beer was put under surveillance and seen to meet with a Soviet diplomat at a small Tel Aviv cafe one evening in March 1962, handing him papers from a briefcase. A few hours later they met again and the Soviet returned the documents. Beer was arrested the same night and appeared in court in April 1962. After a secret trial Beer was sentenced to ten years in prison.

A most recent case which probably involved both Shin Beth and Mossad is that of Mordechai Vanunu. In 1975, at 20 years of age, Vanunu was hired as a technician at the Israeli nuclear plant Dimona. There he worked for ten years until laid off in a November 1985 budget cutback. Reportedly concerned at Israel's push to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities, Vanunu went to England

where he sold information the London *Sunday Times* used to publish an extensive expose of the Israeli nuclear program on 5 October 1986. The Israelis must have been aware of Vanunu's intentions as they mounted an operation to get him back. Vanunu was reportedly lured to Rome by a woman who called herself "Cindy," and was abducted at the Rome International airport on 30 September, even before the *Times* expose appeared. At this writing Vanunu is still on trial in Israel.

The most controversial of Shin Beth's programs have been the activities of its Arab Affairs bureau. The opening wedge of this controversy stemmed from a 1984 terrorist incident in which a bus was hijacked by four Palestinians, two of whom died when the vehicle was recaptured by security forces. The other two died subsequently, it has been revealed, after beatings from Shin Beth officers. Security officers then lied to investigating panels in an effort to conceal Shin Beth's role in the affair. Then, in May 1987, an Israeli Arab Army officer was released by the Supreme Court after evidence that his "confession" had been extracted by similar strong-arm methods. A government panel formed to examine Shin Beth interrogation techniques has found that since 1972 the agency has systematically lied to courts about not using duress in interrogations. Since that time Shin Beth has achieved about 80% conviction rates in Arab cases based solely on the testimony of Shin Beth officers plus such "confessions." As many as 3,000 to 4,000 convictions were based on these confessions.

It is not yet clear what changes may be adopted as a result of the recent controversies. What is clear is that both Mossad and Shin Beth remain powerful elite agencies with extensive capabilities.

Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services

East Germany

Ministry for State Security—*Ministerium für Staatsicherheit*—MfS

In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or East Germany, the Ministry for State Security fills a role analogous to that of the KGB in the USSR. The MfS, by its German abbreviation, performs both the police and counterespionage work of internal security and the necessary gathering of foreign intelligence. This organization has had substantial success in espionage activities in West Germany and, from the 1960s to 1980s, has begun to appear as well in regions as far afield as Africa and Latin America.

The MfS was originally a post-war development in the Soviet occupation zone in eastern Germany. It was first conceived as an adjunct to Soviet security organs for the occupation. As the Cold War developed and possibilities for German reunification and a peace treaty for Germany receded, the Russians began to move from mere use of a network of informants to a more formal security apparatus. The East German police force, first formed in 1947, predates the creation of the GDR. Its *Kommissariat 5* (K-5), attached to the Soviet *Kommandatura* at Karlshorst, assumed counterintelligence and espionage functions. K-5 desks soon appeared at many regional and local police offices. After a 1949 experiment at formation of a parallel service for internal security, the MfS (also called *Staatsicherheitsdienst* or SSD) was formed in 1950 under Wilhelm Zaisser.

At that time foreign operations were not an MfS priority. Instead parallel services sponsored by the Soviets engaged in a wide range of economic and industrial sabotage in West Germany in an effort to prevent the success of the Western Allies in their formation of a nation state in the western occupation zone. These sabotage efforts were masterminded by a long-service Comintern activist named Ernest Wollweber. Massive riots in East Berlin in the spring of 1953, combined with unrest throughout East Germany, brought the downfall of Zaisser, who was replaced by Wollweber.

As chief of the MfS, Wollweber began to put more emphasis on foreign operations. To this end he confirmed the leadership of Marcus Johannes Wolf over the Acquisition Section (HVA), or intelligence office. Wolf was a sharp young innovator Zaisser had brought into MfS in 1951. Son of an old German communist family, in 1933 he had gone into exile with his father in Moscow after Adolf Hitler came to power. There Wolf attended the Karl Liebknecht Academy and the Comintern school at Kushnarenkovo, where some espionage techniques were taught as well. "Mischa" Wolf ended up graduating from Moscow University, then spending two years in the diplomatic service once the GDR was created. Foreign intelligence was Mischa's specialty from the day he went to work for MfS and he was quite good at it.

Meanwhile the organization of MfS expanded from the three "main departments" (*Haupt Abteilungen*) under Zaisser to as many as 14. Main Department I, with a strength of about 1,200, monitored the political reliability of GDR armed forces. Main Department III handled protection of the industrial activity of the GDR against sabotage or work stoppage by disgruntled citizens. Counterintelligence was the responsibility of Main Department IV. Censorship plus surveillance of political, cultural, and scientific organizations in the GDR was the portfolio for Department V. The last of the major units, Main Department VI, handled industrial security against foreign industrial espionage.

Another MfS unit is the Guard Regiment with

responsibility for protective security of government offices and personnel. With weapons including artillery and armor, the Guard Regiment has four battalions, a heavy battalion, and a training battalion for a total strength of perhaps 4,000. The MfS also exercises supervisory control over the GDR Border Guard, totalling 46,500 troops and armed with heavy weapons including anti-tank guns and mortars. Total MfS manpower is in the neighborhood of 20,000. In addition the Interior Ministry has 17,500 security police while the Worker's Militia has a strength of about 15,000. Overall GDR security forces number some 433 per 10,000 population, a ratio higher than any other Soviet Bloc nation and indeed more than twice as high as the ratio for the Soviet Union itself.

The pride of the MfS has been Wolf's HVA, officially Main Department II of the ministry. It is something of an elite unit, enjoying special privileges even within state security. HVA geographic intelligence gathering sections include American, British, French, West German, and Warsaw Pact, especially Poland. In 1968 information from HVA's Czech section is credited with helping precipitate the Soviet intervention in that country. Similarly, in 1981 HVA's Polish section supplied material regarding the Solidarity labor union that helped exacerbate GDR and Soviet relations with Poland and almost resulted in another military intervention.

Several sections of HVA specialize in intelligence analysis. There is also a special naval intelligence section that operates its own electronic intelligence collection ships, a disinformation unit formed in 1964, and offices for administration, communications, cryptography, finance, archives, training, documentation, and technical development. With a total size estimated at about 800 in the late 1960s, the HVA has nevertheless developed a full range of intelligence activities.

For a long time the main center of HVA operations, of course, has been West Germany. Marcus Wolf, who rose to the rank of major general by 1960, has made great use of entrapment operations, often of a sexual nature, to achieve penetra-

tions into NATO. With great regularity, each year several cases emerge in which senior West German officials, their advisers, or their secretaries, turn out to be HVA agents. An agent in East German parlance is called a "secret informant" (*geheimer informator*) or, at the very top level of valuable agents, a "secret cooperator" (*geheimer mitarbeiter*). Most of HVA's 14 regional offices are controlled by informants rather than agency personnel, although its Potsdam office is kept under direct control for the most sensitive operations.

One HVA setback occurred in June 1961 when Captain Gunther Maennel, chief of its American section, defected to the United States, reportedly after some time working in place as a CIA agent. Another serious flap occurred in 1969 with the defection in West Berlin of Lieutenant Werner Stiller, a Wolf protege. That defection led to 17 arrests in Berlin and West Germany while another 15 secret informants fled to the GDR. General Wolf survived both these setbacks and achieved a major penetration, ended only in 1974, by recruiting Gunther Guillaume, a top adviser to West German Chancellor Willi Brandt. The unmasking of Guillaume as an agent actually led to the fall of Brandt's government. Guillaume himself was exchanged with the GDR in October 1981. This penetration was but one of a legion of agents. HVA agents in West Germany were estimated as high as 5,000 during the 1960s, and still put as high as 3,000 in 1985, at the time of the defection to HVA of a senior West German counterintelligence officer.

During the 1960s the HVA began to appear farther afield than Germany. There were some successes in recruiting former Nazis in Arab, black African, and Latin American countries in that period. A more recent case occurred in France in the summer of 1980. On 15 August of that year, General Heinz Bernhard Zorn was arrested in Lille bearing a briefcase filled with French secret documents pertaining to tanks and anti-tank weapons. Zorn had been a Luftwaffe officer in World War II and rose to chief of staff of the GDR air force before his 1977 retirement, when he went to work for HVA. His French trip occurred in his

capacity as president of the France-East Germany Friendship Society. After a reported six days of interrogation, Zorn was tried and convicted for espionage.

General Wolf survived the Zorn affair as well. In fact, Wolf is believed by analysts to be most likely to succeed to the post of chief of the entire Ministry of State Security. That moment cannot be too far off since the current chief, Erich Mielke, was already the deputy head of MfS in the long ago days of Zaisser and Wollweber. The East Germans quite possibly have the strongest intelligence service of any of the Soviet Bloc nations.

Polish Intelligence Service

A relatively small but significant intelligence service has been that of Poland, called the UB (by its Polish initials) in the 1960s. This service has been active since the immediate aftermath of World War II, when it operated against the British occupation forces in Germany. Until the political unrest in Poland in 1956, which obliged the Russians to cede more autonomy to the Poles, the UB operated under the very close control of the "cousins," a term Soviet Bloc officers uniformly use to refer to the KGB. After 1956 the Soviets were more advisers than controllers, although they have continued to work in close coordination with the Poles, as with most other bloc intelligence services.

Although the numeration of its component units is frequently changed, especially after major defections or internal scandals, the following describes UB organization in the 1960s and delineates offices that most probably are still in operation. The main foreign intelligence resources reside in Department 1 of the service, which is composed of a number of subordinate branches. Branch 1 concentrates on illegal operations, primarily against the United States, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavia. Illegal officers

are highly regarded for their difficult missions and are paid at double the already high rates prevalent for UB personnel. An associated unit, in the 1960s Branch 1-A, does illegals support including documents, equipment, communications and training.

Intelligence through official stations abroad under diplomatic cover is carried out by several more units. Branch 2 in the 1960s was responsible for the United States, Canada, Central America, Latin America, and later the United Kingdom as well. Branch 3 operated in Western Europe including West Berlin, West Germany, and Austria. The latter was used primarily as a base for operations into West Germany. Branch 4 also worked Western Europe but focused on France, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, Italy, and the Vatican. This branch conducted important political operations and, given that Catholicism is the predominant religion in Poland, had a special interest in intelligence information from the Vatican.

The largest unit in the UB, with 60 or 70 personnel at headquarters and hundreds overseas, was Branch 5 that in the 1960s dealt with Polish emigres. With over 12 million people of Polish descent worldwide, including 6 million in the U.S., 700,000 in France, and 150,000 in Britain, the emigration is regarded as a fertile field for intelligence recruitment.

Scientific and technical intelligence is the specialty of Branch 6, under the control of Colonel Michal Goleniewski (see entry, this volume) until 1960 when he defected to the CIA in West Berlin. This was and remains an extremely important unit of UB. Branch 7 was responsible for counter-intelligence. Unlike other UB units, in the 1960s Branch 7 had two chiefs, perhaps to prevent any one officer from gaining complete control over investigative organs. The Polish archives and central registry were the function of Branch 8, while research and analysis for UB was done by Branch 9. Branch 10 handled financial and administrative matters. Branch 12 ran the UB training school, which typically handled classes of 25 to 40 trainees for a course of six months to a year's duration.

An unnumbered Personnel Branch handled UB assignments and also recruitment of new intelligence officers.

A relatively small service, in the 1960s the UB had about 400 to 500 officers stationed in Warsaw headquarters plus another 1,500 to 1,600 on assignment abroad. There were numerous cover posts in embassies, but also cover assignments in Poland's extensive trade, cultural, and scientific organizations and its large merchant marine.

After the near-uprising of 1956, the KGB drastically reduced its intelligence contacts with the UB, as did many Soviet Bloc services. Cooperation gradually regenerated in the 1960s, although when KGB and bloc services decided in 1965 to establish direct interservice contacts on disinformation projects, Poland was excluded. Relations subsequently improved further, however, and following the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, a former Czech intelligence officer evaluated the Poles as best placed to assume primacy among the bloc services. In fact the Poles did assume a major role through the 1970s in the Soviet-coordinated program for the illegal acquisition of Western technology, with major efforts in the West, including that conducted by the *rezidentura* in the Polish embassy in Washington. Illegal operations took the same direction. One example of the latter is the 1981 case of William Holden Bell, a radar expert for the Hughes Aircraft Company, convicted for passing secret electronics information to his handler Marian Zacharski from 1977 to 1981. The Polish illegal officer was also arrested and convicted on the espionage charges.

It is likely that since the Solidarity union troubles of 1980-1981, the Polish-KGB relationship has again cooled to some degree. Poland must nevertheless be judged to have a strong and capable intelligence service.

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

(First Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior)

There is a break in Czech intelligence history naturally defined by the "Prague Coup" of 1948, in which a parliamentary democracy was supplanted by Soviet-style "people's democracy." Prior to that time the small but efficient Czech intelligence service remained Western-oriented and built on its pre-World War II heritage of parallel work against Hitler's Germany. Before the war the Czechs had been particularly close to the French services; during the war they had extensive contacts with the British. With the predominance of Soviet power in Eastern Europe after the war, the Czechs had to be careful about the old relationships, but they also resisted carrying out operations against their old allies.

Everything changed after 1948, when the Soviet "cousins" assumed close control of Czech services, which were reformed under the rubric of various ministries. The main service, State Security Intelligence, was formally the First Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and informally was called the political intelligence service. In addition there was a Military Intelligence Department under the General Staff, plus Frontier Guard Intelligence, which was active mostly within a strip 40 to 60 miles wide along the Austrian and West German borders. The Soviet delegation to the Czech services was headed by a chief with the rank of general who carried the title "adviser" but who actually wielded a great deal of operational control. Under the top "cousin," several Soviet intelligence officers were similarly attached as "advisers" to each branch and office of the politi-

cal intelligence service. A separate Soviet delegation, with the same basic pattern of relationships, was attached to Czech military intelligence.

This pattern of Soviet control exactly paralleled the cousins' practice in Poland. There, however, the 1956 unrest obliged the Soviets to step back, reducing their presence in the various offices of the intelligence service to single officers, then styling those officers as liaison men rather than advisers. Whereas the Poles achieved this increased autonomy at the expense of the Soviets' confidence, the Czechs eventually reached the same place through their efficiency. Soviet cousins assigned to the Czech services became liaison officers during 1964. The cousins gave up their broad powers of command within the Czech services, replacing the old system with one of coordination of operations through the liaison officers. In 1965 the general liaison was supplemented by a system for direct contacts among Soviet and bloc services on disinformation subjects.

By the mid-1960s the State Security Service (*Státní Tajna Bezpečnost* or STB) had reached a state of full development. It had developed sophisticated surveillance and disinformation techniques and was the first bloc service to make use of computers to maintain data bases for intelligence purposes. The STB then had about 1,500 officers under Colonel Joseph Houska. In general the STB was divided into an operational group and a support unit.

The STB operational group consisted of those units involved actively, either at home or abroad. Of these, the Technical Department trained and directed illegals. The Foreign Counterintelligence Department fulfilled that function following the Soviet pattern, that is, counterintelligence operations were not restricted to Czechoslovakia itself but could be carried out on foreign territory against any target considered to be of counterintelligence interest, including emigres, propaganda units like Radio Free Europe, or intelligence and police services. The STB Scientific-Technical Department was already considered so effective by the mid-1960s that the estimated value of the

research and development costs it saved Czechoslovakia exceeded the annual STB budget.

In keeping with the increasing emphasis the Soviets put on disinformation activities, the STB formed a Department of Special Operations, officially called Department 8, in February 1964. This department helped revise and broaden a long-range disinformation plan regarding the strength of the Warsaw Pact that the Czech General Staff had developed the previous year. Many STB operations through the 1960s focused on disinformation themes.

Foreign intelligence collection was the main duty of a number of departments organized on a regional basis. The most important of the geographical departments were the American Department, which focused on the United States, Canada, and Latin America; the German Department, concentrating on Austria and West Germany; the European Department, charged with gathering intelligence on NATO, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, Scandinavia, and the Vatican; and the Afro-Asian Department, which covered selected Third World countries.

The non-operational group of STB also included a number of departments. Intelligence products from all the open source and secret information that was gathered was the responsibility of the Department of Research and Analysis. A central registry and the computerized data base were maintained by the Operational Dossier Archive. The Cadres and Training Department concerned itself with personnel assignments, political reliability, recruitment and training. An STB officer would typically undergo a training course of six months to a year duration. Advanced training and, after a 1964 agreement with the Soviets, refresher training for senior officers down to the level of deputy department chief, was provided through a one- to two-year course at the KGB Higher Intelligence School in Moscow. Finally, the Financial-Economic Department handled pay, foreign currencies, and related matters.

Headquarters of the STB is located in Prague's Old Town district, in a former Roman Catholic monastery on the banks of the Vltava River next to the George Bridge. The building's classic architecture was considered so precious that the Czech government prohibited the STB from making any structural changes in the complex. This also led to security headaches, however, in that tourists frequently admired and photographed the building and often had to be chased away by guards when they sought to take pictures of the interior. There were other ironies in the use of a former monastery as well—the lack of a modern auditorium meant that communist party and STB official meetings took place in the monastery chapel complete with portraits of Catholic saints on the walls!

Counterintelligence work was simplified by clever urban planning. Prague was given a pattern of one-way streets such that the movements of vehicles belonging to foreign embassies could easily be predicted. Special license plates simplified vehicle identification. At the same time STB vehicles were carefully prepared for changes of identity, with rotary plates that could quickly be changed, foreign registrations, easily removable markings for various official departments or businesses, even roofs that could change color with the removal of a plastic foil. Foot surveillance teams were naturally disguised as well. Veteran STB officers were called "cossacks" in much the same fashion as successful GRU men are called "vikings."

Czech disinformation operations were extensive in the 1960s. In the estimation of one officer who fled to the West, the STB was the second largest producer of disinformation next to the KGB. One STB action, Operation Neptune, attempted in 1964 to prevent the lapse of war crimes statutes in West Germany and to limit BND espionage in Czechoslovakia, by dredging up chests from two lakes, with great media coverage, containing Nazi documents plus forgeries. An STB action in the Congo introduced a bogus letter from the American ambassador to Congolese dictator Joseph Mobutu. In Panama, after anti-American riots during January 1964, the STB attempted without success to

foment renewal of that activity. The Czechs reportedly helped finance newspapers in Mexico and Uruguay and even owned a paper in Brazil until that periodical was banned following a 1964 military coup. A large-scale disinformation effort designed to discredit the military in Indonesia backfired in late 1965 when generals overthrew the Sukarno government and initiated a bloody purge of the membership of the Indonesian communist party. Altogether there were about 115 STB special operations during the Czech fiscal year 1965.

In its conventional espionage the STB has had some success in West Germany recruiting former Sudeten Germans who emigrated to the Federal Republic. In Latin America, Mexico and Uruguay were in fact operational bases in the 1960s and activities were reportedly directed against Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Together with the KGB, the STB played an important role in assisting the Cubans in forming their own intelligence service, the *Direccion General de Inteligencia* (DGI). Middle Eastern targets during the 1960s included Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Morocco. In Africa the STB was active in Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Tanzania, and until a 1966 coup, in Ghana. STB operations in the Far East were largely restricted to Indonesia (until 1965) and India.

The STB was briefly disciplined by the Czech government during the 1968 period of liberalization known as the "Prague Spring." The former leadership and personnel were restored after the Soviet intervention of August 1968, but the intervention triggered a wave of defections from the Czech service and then an internal purge of STB. Afterward the KGB did not retain its previous confidence in the Czechs.

Relations regenerated somewhat over the 1970s but it is not clear whether the former quality of the STB has been entirely restored. From 1973 to 1977 the STB did manage something at which the KGB had not succeeded, a penetration of the CIA through Karl F. Koecher (see entry, volume I). On the other hand, KGB confidence may have been eroded once again after the 1985 defection of

Milan Svec from the Czech embassy in Washington. On balance the STB should be regarded as a capable service with substantial potential.

Hungarian Intelligence Service

Of all Soviet bloc nations, it is Hungary whose intelligence service has perhaps the poorest reputation. Formed in 1945 as Soviet armies occupied Hungary, the State Security Authority (*Allavdelmi Hatosag* or AVH) followed the Soviet model of a single organization that combined the functions of internal security and foreign intelligence. While police operations rapidly increased, foreign intelligence lagged until the entire organization was thrown into chaos by the Hungarian Revolt of 1956.

The AVH established itself in Budapest at Andrássy Ut 60, an address that was notorious as the former headquarters of the Hungarian fascist party Arrow Cross. A further suggestive fact was that the AVH actually recruited numbers of former Arrow Cross members for its security forces, which rose to a strength of 50,000 by the 1950s. Called "Avos" by the Hungarian people, the AVH officers were greatly feared, and were instrumental in the deportations of perhaps 40,000 Hungarians to the Soviet Union and the internal deportations of another 75,000. At one time in the 1950s it was estimated there were as many as 100 AVH detention camps in Hungary. The purges and pogroms ultimately reached into the heart of the AVH itself, in 1954, when General Gabor Peter, Soviet-trained chief of the AVH, was purged.

Revolt began in 1956 with little more than demonstrations, but the Avos succeeded in fanning the flames of revolution through their efforts at harsh repression. AVH security troops opened fire on an unarmed crowd of demonstrators outside Radio Budapest on 23 October, and did the same the next

day at an orderly demonstration at the Hungarian parliament building, when a thousand demonstrators were killed or wounded. In northwest Hungary, AVH forces killed 85 demonstrators who marched on the Avo headquarters in the town of Magyarovar. The first violence by Hungarian citizens during the revolt was directed at the AVH. At Magyarovar, once again, AVH headquarters was burned down and all Avos who were caught were killed. A government of national unity took office to quell the disturbances, disciplining the AVH, but was itself overthrown after about two weeks by Soviet armed intervention.

The net result of the late 1956 uprising was the dissolution of the AVH, which was nevertheless resuscitated by the government of Janos Kadar. Although state security has had a different name since 1956, however, Hungarians continue to refer to it as the AVH. The organization has never regained the degree of power it once had.

Problems for AVH in 1956 also brought major difficulties for that organization in its capacity as a gatherer of foreign intelligence information. Seeing the demise of the old government, networks of agents working for the Hungarians melted away. Similarly, many Hungarian intelligence officers defected. After the uprising the agent nets had to be rebuilt from scratch, while the Soviet "cousins" lost all confidence in the Hungarian service. Hungarian economic difficulties also dictated very limited resources to be devoted to intelligence work, further hampering the effort to improve the service. The watchword became slow progress and improvement.

In common with a number of the Soviet bloc intelligence services, the Hungarians formed a branch for disinformation in 1964 and joined the Soviet direct contact network in this area. None of the known major penetrations in the West have been credited to the Hungarian service, nor are there any known major successes of Hungarian disinformation. Espionage efforts have reportedly concentrated on the Vatican, Austria, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Hungarians' greatest successes have come, according to a form-

er Czech officer, in espionage against the Vatican. The Hungarian intelligence service has now had a considerable length of time in which to improve its efficiency and should therefore be seen as competent but of limited potential.

Rumanian Intelligence Services

Although Rumania has exhibited substantial independence from the Soviet Union in terms of its foreign policy and commercial activities, opinions differ as to the actual extent of this independence in the intelligence field. General Ion Pacepa, who defected from Rumania in 1978, maintains that Rumanian independence is a sham and cover for close actual cooperation. On the other hand Ladislav Bittman, an officer in the STB until 1968, has pointed out that Rumanian cooperation with Soviet Bloc intelligence services degenerated to the point of "official, formal, but unproductive contacts."

Until the Pacepa defection the major Rumanian intelligence unit was the Department of External Information (*Departamentul de Informatii Externe* or DIE). This was strictly a foreign intelligence unit that remained relatively small through much of the postwar period. Soviet advisers were entirely withdrawn during 1962. This suggests a certain degree of independence from the KGB, as does the sensitivity of President Nicolae Ceaucesceau, Rumanian leader since 1965, to any suggestion of links between Rumanian officials and the Soviets. By Pacepa's account there is substantial evidence of KGB espionage operations mounted against Rumania, as well as espionage efforts on the part of the GRU.

Ceaucesceau has assumed an active leadership role over Rumanian intelligence, right down to micromanagement of individual intelligence operations, according to General Pacepa, who served

as senior adviser on intelligence matters to the president. This role began in late February 1972, at a time when DIE was a relatively small service with a table of organization providing for about 700 personnel but about 1,000 actually at work. Overnight Ceaucescu increased the establishment to 2,800 and multiplied the DIE budget eightfold. By 1978 the DIE had about 3,000 officers.

Organizationally the DIE is composed of directorates, brigades, and services. Major conventional intelligence gathering is the responsibility of the Foreign Intelligence Brigade, although there are independent brigades for regional areas of special interest. One such unit is the Middle East Brigade. A scientific-technical espionage component, Brigade SD, has existed since at least 1959 and is a unit in which Ceaucescu has taken special interest, doubling its size in 1972 and adding nuclear and industrial information requirements to its previous focus on military technology. Brigade SD was organized by target country and within that by industry, although there were several specialized services for the main types of military equipment, servicing both Rumanian and Soviet requests for intelligence. Major target countries included the United States, Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, all other NATO countries, and representative Third World countries.

Special Service Z was a DIE unit explicitly tasked to handle relations with terrorist groups, principally the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with whom the DIE actually ran an exchange program. Rumanians received special knowledge of terrorist operating methods while instructing the PLO on disinformation techniques. In 1976 the DIE actually succeeded in recruiting a senior aide to the PLO chief as a Rumanian agent. This agent was personally supervised by the head of the DIE. Another DIE resource was the Rumanian section of *Transport International Routier* (TIR), an international trucking organization that frequently moves privileged diplomatic shipments. By 1974 most of the drivers were actually DIE

officers. A DIE Counterespionage Directorate handled that function adequately. Directorate LM was the DIE technical unit responsible for espionage support matters. The DIE training school, created in 1964 at Snagov, by the 1970s was located at a former jamming facility used to impede Radio Free Europe transmissions at Branesti. DIE recruits received training in languages, trade-craft, and as waiters or waitresses, in which capacity they were used in embassies abroad as well as at Bucharest's Athenaeum Palace Hotel, a joint project of the DIE and the *Securitate*.

Securitate was Rumanian state security, which became involved in the hotel project as an intelligence-gathering mechanism after the place was wired for sound by the Soviets in the early 1950s. This project was the brainchild of the *Securitate* Counterintelligence Directorate. Meanwhile Service D, the major Rumanian disinformation unit, was also located within state security as a protective cover. Service K was a small state security component that conducted counterintelligence work within Rumania's prison system.

Another significant *Securitate* unit was the DGTO (*Directia Generala de Technica Operativa*) which was essentially a technical surveillance unit. The DGTO had the capacity to tap any telephone in Rumania on short notice, as well as to bug rooms, make movies, and conduct other sophisticated surveillance work. DGTO's role in the Palace Hotel operation was to maintain the equipment and do the taping and transcribing of material gathered in daily activity.

Directorate V of the *Securitate* was a special unit of security troops. This has existed since 1950 and was modeled on the KGB's Guards Directorate. The Security Troops have their own uniforms and regulations, and are armed with weapons including armor and artillery, plus a chemical warfare unit added in 1976. While the directorate initially was charged with protection of communist party and government buildings and personalities, Ceaucescu's control became such in Rumania that, after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the guard unit's sole duty became

personal security for Ceaucesceau himself.

Another top secret security unit existed outside the *Securitate* with the specific purpose of monitoring members of Ceaucesceau's own family plus senior government officials such as members of the central committee, retitled the political executive committee in Rumania. This security unit, headed by a colonel with great discretion, was located near the West German embassy in Bucharest. The unit consisted of something over 1,000 officers and had the capacity to simultaneously tap 600 telephones and conduct 400 microphone operations.

One final intelligence unit was the National Center for Encyphered Communications (*Centrul National de Transmisiuni Cifrate* or CNTC), a Rumanian equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency or the British GCHQ. This was originally the DIE Service H, responsible only to its Soviet adviser, but had been transformed in November 1962 when Rumanian leaders began to suspect that Moscow was routinely reading Rumanian secret communications. In late 1964 Rumanian intelligence procured a NATO-type random number generator which they used to create one-time pads for coding messages, then to design a Rumanian machine enciphering system, Romcif, supposedly proof against hostile decryption. Ceaucesceau approved creation of a Central Cipher Service in March 1965 and this became CNTC in February 1972. The unit was secretly subordinated to the DIE and Ceaucesceau also ordered CNTC to build a communications center for Rumanian message traffic built exclusively around the Romcif machine system. The center officially became operational in 1977 with 1,000 personnel. In addition to government message traffic, CNTC also secretly monitored all telegrams sent or received by other Rumanian organizations. According to Pacepa, the machine coding system was faulty in that the Rumanians had been unable to change the original NATO machine in any significant way.

Returning to the question of the independence of Rumanian foreign policy, Pacepa maintains that a major disinformation operation inspired by Ceaucesceau, called HORIZON, was intended precisely to encourage the notion that Rumania was independent. In the Middle East, in addition to the PLO, Rumania established intelligence cooperation with Jordan, Libya, and Iran during the reign of the Shah. There was cooperation with Pakistan on nuclear matters. In Europe Rumanian intelligence cooperated with the services of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Aside from Bulgaria, however, Pacepa makes no mention of intelligence cooperation with any other Soviet Bloc nations.

A number of Rumanian operations have been directed at West Germany, which has one of the largest DIE stations abroad and where Radio Free Europe is located (in Munich). There have also been operations in France, particularly against Rumanian emigres. The Rumanian services have been grievously damaged by a number of defections. These include the 1969 defection in France of a protege of the chief of DIE counterintelligence, the 1972 defection to the U.S. of the DIE chief of station in Tel Aviv, the 1973 defection to the CIA of a DIE engineer who took an entire Rumanian diplomatic pouch with him, the 1977 defection of a senior DIE officer in Iran, and the 1981 defection in France of a scientific-technical officer who had been ordered to take executive action against emigres. The second secretary of the Rumanian embassy in Washington, Nicolae Ion Horodincea, defected in February 1980. He may or may not have been an intelligence officer. Most damaging was the fall 1978 defection of General Pacepa, who at one time or another had held virtually every important post in the DIE. It is likely that Rumanian intelligence was reorganized following the Pacepa defection. Rumanian intelligence has substantial resources but apparently uncertain political loyalty.

Bulgarian Intelligence Service

Probably the least well known intelligence service of any Soviet bloc country is that of Bulgaria. An internal security service has existed since the immediate aftermath of World War II and, until after Stalin's death in 1953, exercised almost total power in Bulgaria. Of the different bloc services, the Bulgarian probably was, and remains, closest to the KGB in terms of continued Soviet control over operations. Most police functions were absorbed by the People's Militia in the late 1950s. After an unsuccessful coup in April 1965, an independent Committee of State Security (*Durzhavna Sigurnost* or DS) was established but did not succeed in suppressing political maneuvering—there were no fewer than six coups attempted in Bulgaria between 1965 and 1971; DS officers themselves took part in several of them. In the late 1960s the DS was absorbed into the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1983 the minister was Dimitur Stoyanov, an Army officer and graduate of the KGB Higher Intelligence School who was reportedly a protege of the Soviet leader at that time, Yuri Andropov, himself a former chief of the KGB.

Headquarters of the DS is in Sofia at 30 General Gurko Street. It is a modern yellow building that occupies half a block and has no identifying signs. All the first floor windows are barred. As a combined internal security and intelligence service the DS has large manpower, estimated at 40,000 in 1983, of whom perhaps 24,000 are officers and the other support personnel. There is no hard data on the number of actual foreign intelligence personnel but these probably do not exceed a couple of thousand. The DS comprises seven divisions including Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Counterintelligence. One division is a guard unit that is responsible for the personal security of Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov. In addition to the DS, Bulgarian security forces

include 15,000 border guards and another 10,000 security police.

Of all the bloc services the DS has had the fewest defections and relatively little is known of its foreign operations. It is believed to follow Soviet orders closely but has some degree of independence, particularly in the Balkans, including a collaborative relationship with the Rumanian intelligence service and border guard. The DS is suspected of involvement in executive actions or so-called "wet affairs." Most known of these is the death in London in September 1978 of George I. Markov, a Bulgarian emigre playwright who also worked part time for Radio Free Europe and the British Broadcasting Corporation. Markov died from a pellet containing the poison ricin injected into him from an umbrella held by a passerby in the street during morning rush hour, with physical collapse the following day and death a few days afterwards. Although DS involvement is widely believed, it is notable that the United Kingdom has never officially accused the Bulgarian government of complicity.

When Markov's death became known another Bulgarian emigre, Vladimir Kostov in Paris, reported he had been a victim of a similar incident which he had survived. Again DS involvement is suspected but evidence is lacking. Mehmet Ali Agca, a Turkish national who attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II in Rome in 1981 implicated the DS in his operation and the accusations were given wide international publicity. Massive investigations revealed no hard evidence, however, and the accusations foundered upon Agca's own evident mental instability. One Bulgarian DS defector, Colonel Stefan Svirdlev, who went public in early 1983 to support the hypothesis of DS involvement, found himself deserted by his wife that November. She returned to Bulgaria from Munich and took their son with her. Svirdlev believes the desertion was voluntary and did not reflect a DS operation.

Some analysts believe that DS is inept as an intelligence service, but this judgment does not square with the apparent professionalism of the Markov

execution and the attempt against Kostov. The Bulgarian service may be small and hampered by limited resources, but it should be seen as dangerous.

West German Intelligence

The border between West and East Germany is the front line of the espionage war much as it is of the cold war confrontation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. The intelligence services of West Germany are therefore of prime interest in any survey of intelligence organizations. In common with Western practice, the Germans separate intelligence and counterintelligence functions. Their major agency is the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*) or BND. Counterintelligence responsibilities are divided between the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV is its German acronym) on the civil side and Military Counterintelligence (MAD is its German acronym). These services have waged a constant battle against Soviet and Eastern European intelligence efforts.

As with so much else, the roots of BND lie in the maelstrom of World War II. At that time German intelligence on the Soviet Union was the product of three services—the Nazi organization (RSHA), general military intelligence (*Abwehr*) and the German Army's branch Foreign Armies East (*Fremde Heeres Ost*) or FHO. The first two were relatively ineffective and remained so even after RSHA absorbed the *Abwehr* in 1944. Despite limited intelligence resources, however, FHO enjoyed remarkable success in producing estimates of Soviet intentions and capabilities. The chief of Foreign Armies East was Colonel, later General, Reinhard Gehlen (1902-1979).

As Soviet armies closed in on Berlin in the spring of 1945, General Gehlen determined not to allow FHO's extensive files and valuable personnel to


fall into their hands. He contrived to have FHO files relocated to southwestern Germany where they were buried for safekeeping. Gehlen also got many FHO personnel transferred out of the endangered German capital. General Gehlen was then captured by advancing American forces. He was interviewed by representatives of American intelligence, then called the Office of Strategic Services.

Coming out of the war the Americans realized their information regarding the Soviet Union was extremely limited and they were anxious to fill in the gaps. Gehlen was captured on 20 May 1945. His information was almost up to the minute since he had headed FHO until 9 April, but many German officers claimed they had important information to give the U.S., while the Americans had only seven Eastern European specialists available. Though the Americans wanted information, Gehlen had to wait his turn and was held temporarily in a prisoner camp at Salzburg.

American attention was drawn to Gehlen again when a Soviet team looking for FHO personnel learned his identity and began asking to see him. American military intelligence chief General Edwin L. Sibert then tracked Gehlen down and met with him. The former FHO chief talked at length about the Russians and the work of Foreign Armies East. Gehlen produced a more detailed 129-page report on his work, and followed it in August 1945 with the equivalent of an FHO appreciation—a report with estimates of Soviet military production, locations, strength, and composition of Soviet units, analysis of Russian civil and military morale, and so forth. The material interested Sibert enough that Gehlen was put on a list of German officers to be sent to the United States for more detailed debriefing.

It has been written that Gehlen traveled in the uniform of an American major general, that he was treated as a VIP with hunting trips, luxurious quarters, and meetings with American leaders like Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral William D. Leahy. The truth is more prosaic, however, according to a declassified CIA review of the major

ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN OF THE FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE



SOURCE: E.H. Cookridge, *Gehlen: Spy of the Century*. NY: Pyramid Books, 1971.

books on Gehlen. The former FHO chief came to the U.S. in August 1945 with four of his officers to give information to the Americans, but this was to be for a handbook on the Soviet Army. Gehlen, in fact, "was a rather shabby POW in civilian clothes, and he was kept very much under wraps." There were plenty of German officers with more claim to VIP status than Gehlen and the highest ranking American with whom he met, according to this source, was a colonel.

In the meantime General Sibert was collecting other former FHO officers in the American sector of Germany and preparing them to work in the U.S.'s behalf against the Soviets. This started as a small unit located near the American base at Oberursel and began operations about the beginning of 1946. Sibert took this action on his own authority without approval from Washington, but once the organization started moving, U.S. officials began talking to Gehlen about cooperating with the unit. Discussions continued from February to June 1946 and ended with Washington informing Sibert it would approve the German intelligence unit provided Gehlen was put in charge of it.

Reinhard Gehlen returned to Europe by ship, sailing in early July and docking at LeHavre, France, from where he was flown to Frankfurt and stayed overnight with Sibert at Oberursel, before going to work at the new German intelligence unit. Gehlen soon outmaneuvered former FHO associates to emerge as chief of what became known as the "Gehlen Organization," or simply as the "Org."

In quest of Soviet expertise the Org hired almost anyone deemed useful, including former Nazis, members of the police (*Gestapo*), or RSHA. These men joined under assumed names to insulate them from war crimes investigations and "denazification" procedures. Other German Army officers deemed more impressive to the Americans used their real names, including Lieutenant General Friedrich W. von Mellinthin and Lieutenant Colonel Heinz Guderian, son of the famous panzer leader. The initial staff numbered 50; Section I

(Hermann Baun) handled acquisition, Section II (Gerhard Wessel) evaluation. By the autumn of 1946 the Org had started a recruiting drive. Relations with the Americans were governed by a gentleman's agreement of July 1946 between Gehlen and General Sibert.

Baun, the man who lost out to Gehlen for control over the Org, was convinced that the Germans could re-establish contact by radio with some of their old networks in Russia. Much effort was expended on this to very little result. Infiltration of agents into the Soviet zone of Germany and farther east was quite difficult and brought only limited success. The most useful resource the Org developed was interviews with Germans fleeing the east or German prisoners returning from Russia. This effort was tedious but developed quite valuable intelligence information.

To house its growing staff, meanwhile, the Gehlen Organization searched for a new base, which it found at a model housing estate built by the SS before the war on the outskirts of the village of Pullach, eight miles from Munich. The Org moved in on 6 December 1947 and gradually made changes to its liking. Org manpower grew to 400 by the end of 1948. By that time U.S. military intelligence was considering ending its support for the Org, which was saved by the new American agency, the CIA.

In May 1949 the Central Intelligence Agency signed a formal agreement with the Gehlen Organization to support it in exchange for intelligence information. The first annual budget was \$3.4 million. There was an Org station in the occupied city of Berlin where 20 case officers each ran ten agents, and a number of additional posts in the American sector of Germany. When the U.S. and British merged their occupation areas into the so-called "Bizonia," Org bases established themselves in the formerly British sector as well and British efforts to set up a competing intelligence bureau of ex-FHO men came to an end.

The Org cemented its reputation with the CIA in 1949 by providing some of the first intelligence

regarding Soviet plans to form an East German Army, which they initially called "Barracks Police" but formed 24 infantry, three armor, seven artillery, two engineer, and three signals regiments for a total of 48,750 troops. Gehlen also supplied early reports of Soviet jet fighters before the Americans met them in the sky over Korea in 1950. The Org developed good sources to monitor East German railway traffic and shipping, and even started to infiltrate high levels of the East German leadership.

Gehlen reorganized his unit and became its director-general. Department I collected and evaluated foreign intelligence; it comprised sections for political, economic, military, naval, and air intelligence. Department II was responsible for psychological warfare. Department III handled counterintelligence and evaluation of material gathered at home. An administration section took care of training and recruiting and handled the central registry and card index.

Agents of the Org were colloquially called "V-men" (*Vertrauens-Mann*) for "trusted men." Gehlen set up an elaborate scheme in which his V-men were identified by a letter-number combination with the letter standing for what kind of source they represented. There were six types of agents in the code: penetrations into adversary organizations, agents living at or near target areas, transportation agents, technically expert agents, top agents, and counterintelligence agents. By 1953 the Org reportedly employed over 3,000 part- or full-time V-men. The Org itself had over 1,200 professional intelligence officers.

Western Germany, formerly occupied by the British, French, and Americans, became the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. The FRG made do at first without an intelligence service of its own, but it did form a counterintelligence service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz*) or BfV, subordinate to the chancellor (prime minister) under legislation passed in 1950. There was naturally some competition between BfV and the Gehlen Organization, exacerbated due to personal

animosity between Gehlen and Dr. Otto John, the first director of BfV. Rumor had it that John maintained contacts in the East but there was no solid evidence against him until 20 July 1954, when the BfV director disappeared into East Berlin, drugged as he claimed later in a memoir, but he is now generally thought to have been a KGB agent. It was the start of a stormy history for BfV, nearly all of whose directors have been forced to resign amid scandal or controversy.

The disappearance of John did not eliminate competition between BfV and the Org, which soon became a direct competitor as the CIA gave up its relationship with Gehlen, and the Org was transformed into the Federal Intelligence Service (BND). One source reports that over the decade-long formative period, the United States financed West German intelligence with a total of some \$200 million. In any case BND, still under Gehlen, became a federal service under the chancellor. Gehlen undertook a certain amount of housecleaning at that point, interviewing all his senior officers and eliminating those with the most objectionable Nazi pasts. Gehlen did not completely rid the BND of former Nazis, however, as would become evident during the Felfe affair (see entry, this volume).

Under the Federal Republic, the BND began a process of renewed expansion. The number of outstations in Germany increased to about 100. In 1958 the BND opened up stations abroad in London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and there was already a station in Washington. Regular liaison was established with the NATO powers' services. Gehlen would meet annually with the directors of many of the other services, especially the French, with whom there was fairly close cooperation. In 1959 the BND opened up liaison with the Israeli Mossad at a time when the FRG did not yet have diplomatic relations with Israel.

In terms of intelligence operations the BND continued to have substantial success in East Germany, fair success in Czechoslovakia, some success in Hungary, but almost none in Poland or the Soviet Union. Gehlen became convinced that the Soviets

had placed agents within BND, but efforts he made to identify the penetration proved unsuccessful until his chief of Soviet counterintelligence, Heinz Felfe, was revealed as an agent in the early 1960s.

The question of counterintelligence has remained at the fore for both BND and the BfV ever since the Felfe affair. With the great influx of refugees after the war, the thousands of East Germans who entered the FRG before the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, and the continuing trickle since, there has been a broad flow in which it was easy for the adversary to insert agents. There are several million West Germans with origins in the east and the counterespionage problem is intractable given the quite understandable West German policy of hospitality for those who wish to emigrate from East Germany. At various times in the 1960s and 1970s, field grade officers in the Air Force, an admiral in the Navy, and a senior adviser to the chancellor have been revealed as agents. In the latter instance, in 1974, Chancellor Willi Brandt was forced to resign and his cabinet fell. In a most recent instance, in 1985, BND counterintelligence chief Hans Joachim Tiedge defected to the east and was revealed to have been an East German spy. A pernicious East German practice has been recruiting people who work as secretaries to responsible officials and they have achieved a number of penetrations in this fashion. Published speculations as to the number of spies active in the FRG start at about 4,000 and range upward.

The BND can do no better than to work with the material it has. Given its situation it has done quite well. Gehlen retired in 1968 and was succeeded by his erstwhile FHO deputy (and replacement for one month in 1945), Gerhard Wessel. By that time the BND had a staff of between 4,000 and 5,000 and a budget of DM70.0 million. The director now carries the title president. Department I still handles collection and has subdivisions for East Germany, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, other East Bloc countries, Western Europe, Southern Europe, Northern Europe, North America, the Middle East, the Far East, Latin America, and Africa. Department II is

the technical division and develops equipment required by BND. Department III does evaluation, with the counterintelligence function as an adjunct responsibility shared with BfV. Department IV provides central services such as administration, recruitment, training, security, and the archives.

Manpower has continued to rise and was quoted in the German press in 1980 at 6,500. Liaison remains important and BND participates in NATO intelligence sharing and in the KILOWATT counterterrorist group. The service continues to run important agents in East Germany. Some, however, believe there is a sort of lackadaisical attitude at Pullach. At the time of the Tiedge affair, one NATO intelligence officer, for example, was quoted saying, "Pullach is a four-and-a-half day a week place. You should try to get a phone call through there on a Friday afternoon." Still, the BND has solid roots, plenty of experience, and good resources. West German intelligence must still be reckoned with.



TOP SECRET/S.I.

Part II: Espionage Case Files

Rudolf Ivanovich Abel (1902-1971)

The case of Rudolf Abel is puzzling in that a highly competent and professional espionage agent who worked at his last assignment for almost a decade cannot be connected to any actual spy activity. The Abel case was quite controversial in the United States in the late 1950s due to the legal maneuvering surrounding his arrest and conviction. Abel is also a textbook example of Soviet intelligence use of "illegals," officers who operate without official diplomatic or other cover.

The future Soviet intelligence officer was in fact born in England in 1902, at Newcastle-on-Tyne. He was the son of a Volksdeutsche family, ethnic Germans who lived in Russia. His father, Henry Fischer, an immigrant to England in 1900, became deeply involved in the British labor movement and an early member of the Communist Party in Great Britain. His mother was a midwife. They named their boy William Gerrykovich. The family moved back to Russia after the October Revolution of 1917, William Fischer with them, though Henry makes no mention of his son in the memoir he published in Moscow in the late 1920s.

Years later, in detention in the United States, Abel told questioners he had attended primary and secondary school in Moscow during this period. Accounts given after Abel's repatriation in Soviet media maintain that he was active in the Young Communist League (Komsomol) between 1922 and 1926 and worked with young emigres who had moved to Russia. He became an amateur radio enthusiast as well. He probably served a regular draftee's tour in the Red Army, ending with two offers for work upon his demobilization. One was in radio engineering for a Soviet research institute, the other for work with the foreign directorate of Soviet intelligence, then known as OGPU. Friends reportedly insisted Abel should use his knowledge of language in the service of the state, while his radio ability was certainly

useful for an intelligence career as well. Abel's official Soviet biography records that he joined OGPU on 2 May 1927.

Details of Abel's career past that point are sparse, but he evidently carried out a major illegal assignment even before the one in America. In a 1965 article commemorating Soviet intelligence work in World War II, KGB chief Vladimir Semichastny mentioned Abel in context that implies he carried out illegal work in enemy territory. This reference is reinforced in the memoir of Soviet illegal Gordon Lonsdale (a.k.a. Konon Molody), who recounts that when he was captured near Minsk in 1943, a German intelligence (Abwehr) officer "recruited" him for work against the Soviets, and that that officer was none other than Rudolf Abel. Lonsdale served as Abel's radio operator and received important training from him that proved fundamental to his own later role as a major Soviet illegal in Canada and the United Kingdom. While the Lonsdale memoir is believed to have been ghost-written by Kim Philby, and undoubtedly contains items of disinformation, the Soviets stood to gain nothing from fabrications regarding work against German armies in the field in World War II, while indeed Russia was by 1965 engaged in a significant burst of revelations on its wartime history.

The first real record of Abel is of his arrival in the North American area of operations. That came on 14 November 1948 when he landed at Quebec, Canada, as one of 1,587 passengers aboard the SS *Scythia* from Cuxhaven, Germany. Abel used the identity "Andrew Kayotis," in reality a naturalized American of Lithuanian origins who visited his native land in 1947 and died there. The Kayotis identity was never again used; instead, Abel turned up in New York City in 1950 as Emil Goldfus. It is believed he had previously entered the United States and spent some time traveling through the west, to Oregon, California, and elsewhere.

In New York City Abel became Emil Robert Goldfus, born there on 2 August 1902 (the real Goldfus died as a baby on 9 October 1903). Abel-Goldfus rented a furnished apartment at 216 West 99th

Street on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, a low rise apartment building between Columbus and Amsterdam Avenues. He became a depositor at the Columbus Avenue and 96th Street branch of the East River Savings Bank, a huge barn of a building with the architectural style of a central train station. Goldfus listed his occupation as a photo finisher.

Abel clearly liked the Upper West Side and felt comfortable operating there. He went often to the Symphony Theater at Broadway and 95th Street, which he later used as a meeting place with his assistant. Abel also prepared two "dead drops" at nearby locations in Riverside Park and another in Central Park at about 94th Street, where a footbridge crosses the scenic horse path. Abel would later hold meetings in Brooklyn and Queens but he returned again and again to the Upper West Side.

During 1951 Abel moved to another apartment at 74th Street and Riverside Drive, but in 1953 he relocated to a boarding house in Brooklyn and rented studio space at Ovington Studios on the edge of Brooklyn Heights. There he overtly pursued life as a retired photo finisher really interested in art, and he drew and painted with other artists at Ovington, becoming acquainted with the cartoonist Jules Feiffer, and friends with artist Burton Silverman. About twice a week Abel stayed late at his studio to keep his radio schedule with Moscow. This aspect came to the attention of American counterintelligence long before there was an Abel case, when the code-breaking National Security Agency informed the FBI that it was monitoring broadcasts from Russia, at different times on different days each week, in which a voice would come up beginning "Allo, Allo," and then recite in English various series of five number groups. Only much later was any connection made between the messages and Abel. The Soviet illegal continued these communications for many years, and actually returned to Moscow in July 1955 for a visit of nearly a year, while telling his Brooklyn friends he was going to California to try to sell a new color film processing machine.

Abel's nemesis turned out to be another Soviet intelligence officer, Reino Hayhannen. Born in the village of Pushkin near Leningrad, Hayhannen studied Finnish, was a good student, and had begun to teach elementary school in Leningrad when he was drafted in 1940 during the Russo-Finnish war to help translate captured documents and interrogate Finnish prisoners. He stayed on in the internal security branch of Soviet intelligence, which decided in 1948 to use him for illegal operations. Hayhannen went to Estonia for a year, then to Finland for two, developing an identity as "Eugene Nikolai Maki" (actually an American citizen born in Idaho who had disappeared with his family on a visit to Finland when he was ten years old). Hayhannen married the Finnish woman Hannah Kurikka, despite being previously married in the Soviet Union, and in July 1951 applied to the U.S. embassy in Helsinki for a passport to "return" to America.

While papers were being processed, Hayhannen received additional espionage training in Moscow and was introduced to a case officer assigned to the Soviet United Nations delegation. His passport came through in 1952 and Hayhannen arrived in New York City aboard the *Queen Mary* on 20 October 1952. Hannah came over in 1953. The diplomatic case officer handed Hayhannen over to Abel, whom he met in the summer of 1954.

A major in Soviet intelligence, Hayhannen was to be the deputy to Colonel Rudolf Abel, the Soviet illegal *resident*, or intelligence chief, according to his own later account. But Hayhannen was basically scared and incompetent, never making any move to activate his cover occupation as a photographer, had drinking problems, and developed problems with his wife Hannah. Abel and the Moscow Center were patient, and bore with Hayhannen for two years as he moved from Brooklyn to Bergen, New Jersey, to Peekskill, New York.

At length Moscow Center issued instructions for Hayhannen to come home for a visit. Abel told Hayhannen, codenamed "Vic" (Abel himself was "Mike") in the winter of 1956-57 that it was time for a vacation. Vic was also informed at this time

of his promotion to lieutenant colonel. Hayhannen delayed his departure several times on various pretexts, including that he was being followed by several men. Hayhannen finally sailed for Europe on 24 April 1957. En route across the continent, in Paris on 4 May, he defected at the U.S. embassy.

While Hayhannen went to Europe, Abel traveled south to Daytona, Florida, where he painted a large seascape. He returned to New York City on 17 May and checked into the Hotel Latham as "Martin Collins." In the meanwhile Hayhannen had been talking to U.S. authorities and the FBI by then had the Ovington Studios under surveillance. Abel returned there on the 23rd late at night and was then followed to the vicinity of his hotel but lost his FBI pursuers. Three weeks later he was again found at Ovington and then trailed successfully to his lodgings.

At this point the Americans had a legal problem, which was that there was no evidence against Abel for espionage other than the account of Hayhannen, who refused to testify in public. The FBI resorted to the subterfuge of bringing in the Immigration and Naturalization Service and building a case against Abel for illegal entry into the United States. He was arrested on this basis at his hotel on 21 June 1957.

Following Abel's arrest the FBI carefully searched his lodgings and studio, minutely examining all his possessions. The search uncovered espionage equipment, often hidden inside seemingly innocuous items, such as inside a tie clasp or within the hollowed out eraser end of a pencil. Abel's radio was relatively obvious, but searchers also found one-time cipher pads and a schedule of radio transmissions, among other things. Hayhannen also finally agreed to provide evidence, and did so to a grand jury.

On 7 August 1957 Abel was indicted for conspiracy to commit espionage. Thus the immigration case against him, which carried no worse a penalty than deportation, was converted into something altogether more serious. At his trial the major prosecution testimony again came from Hayhan-

nen, while the concrete evidence consisted solely of Abel's espionage paraphernalia.

Despite his knowledge of Colonel Abel's operating methods, Hayhannen could provide no evidence of actual espionage by the illegal *resident*. One cash payment had been made to the wife of a figure in one of the earlier atomic espionage cases, while another, never made, had been intended for Morris and Lona Cohen, also involved in the atomic cases, who disappeared in 1950 and resurfaced in London a decade later as Peter John and Helen Joyce Kroger, assistants to Gordon Lonsdale in his espionage in Britain. But this connection lay in the future at the time of Abel's trial, which had to focus on the broad charge of conspiracy. Abel was nevertheless found guilty on all counts and he was sentenced, on 15 November 1957 to 45 years in prison.

Abel's case was actually appealed all the way to the United State Supreme Court because of questions of the admissibility of evidence. The material taken from his studio and hotel had been sequestered at a time when there was no warrant outstanding on the espionage charge and indeed no possibility of obtaining such a warrant. Thus there was a question of the legality of the search and seizure. In any event, the Supreme Court found against Abel, upholding his conviction on 28 March 1960.

Rudolf Abel did not serve out his prison term. In February 1962, on the Glienecke Bridge in Berlin, Abel was exchanged by the United States for CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers, who had been shot down while flying a spy plane over the Soviet Union in May 1960. For the remainder of his life Colonel Abel is believed to have served as a senior instructor at KGB espionage training schools. Abel died in 1971. Whether he was a master spy who covered his tracks so well that no knowledge of his espionage has come to light, or merely an illegal who could never get his operation off the ground, remains the central mystery of Rudolf Abel's case.

George Blake (b. 1922)

Next to the combined effect of the activities of the Cambridge Ring, the case most damaging to British intelligence is probably that of George Blake. A trusted officer in the Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6), Blake allowed himself to be recruited by Soviet intelligence during the 1950s and exposed to them important MI-6 agents and operations, including joint operations with the Central Intelligence Agency. Blake's is an unusual story in that there is little evident reason for his having succumbed to recruitment, and the tale is also unusual for what transpired subsequent to his capture.

George Blake was born Behar in Rotterdam, Holland on 11 November 1922. He was of a Jewish family, the son of Albert William Behar, of Dutch descent but a citizen of the British protectorate of Egypt. The elder Behar served with the British Army in Flanders during World War I, was twice wounded and badly gassed, ending up on the intelligence staff of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. Behar was decorated with the Order of the British Empire and a French Legion of Honor for his wartime service. Son of a banker, William Behar himself worked in import-export, met a Dutch woman in London in 1919 and married her there in January 1922, settling in Rotterdam, where George was born soon afterwards. He was named after King George V. George was the eldest, followed by two sisters. The father retained his British nationality, making George an expatriate Englishman.

Given William Behar's frequent business trips abroad, George was raised by his mother, but also visited relatives in Egypt. After William's death in 1936, however, his mother, who had had an agreement with his father to give George some experience of life in Egypt, sent George to live with his father's sister in Cairo. He attended the English School there but had vacations at home in Rotterdam. George returned permanently to go to a Dutch high school just before Christmas of 1938.

A few months afterward, of course, came the outbreak of World War II and in May 1940 German armies invaded and overran Holland. The German conquest prevented George's graduation from high school. Moreover, as an Englishman, he was soon arrested and interned by the Gestapo.

George Behar escaped from the German prison camp in October 1940 and went to stay with an uncle. He then joined the Dutch Resistance and took the *nom de guerre* "Max Van Vries." As Max the young Behar was quite active against the Germans and was being sought by security forces before his twentieth birthday. Behar decided to make a break for England in late 1942. He disguised himself as a Trappist monk, bought a bicycle, and managed to make his way across both Belgium and France to the Spanish border. Crossing the Pyrenees, however, Behar was apprehended by Spanish *carabineros* and interned at a prison in Barcelona and later a camp near Burgos. He was allowed to contact the British embassy, was interviewed by a consular official, and was freed to proceed to England, where he arrived in November 1943.

British security, following its standard practice, sequestered Behar upon his arrival and interrogated him at some length to establish his bona fides. He was eventually permitted to join the Royal Navy as an ordinary seaman and was assigned to a minesweeper. Behar anglicized his name to Blake during this period, as his mother and sisters had done when they fled Holland in 1940. After a few months in the Royal Navy, Blake's linguistic abilities (he was fluent in English, French, German, and Dutch) led personnel officers to send him to officer training school at Hove aboard the HMS *King Alfred*. Blake graduated with excellent ratings in the spring of 1944. Volunteering for naval intelligence, Blake instead received an assignment to attend submarine school, but there he was invalidated after medical examination and ended up in intelligence after all.

Blake served briefly as an interpreter on the staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEP) and also had a job assisting

the Special Operations Executive (SOE), an intelligence unit that worked with the Resistance in occupied Europe. By April 1945 he was assigned to headquarters of Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's British 21st Army Group. There he was among the officers who witnessed the capitulation of German forces in northwest Europe in May 1945.

Following the German surrender Blake, now a full lieutenant, was posted to Hamburg as commander of a naval intelligence detachment. The unit had two essential missions: garnering technical intelligence information from the Blohm & Voss shipyards, particularly regarding the advanced submarines in which the British were very interested, plus interrogating former German U-boat officers and examining their records in search of possible war criminals. Blake led his section effectively enough to be kept on at Hamburg from 1945 until 1947, by which time most war commission officers had long since been demobilized. Indeed it is reported that during this period MI-6 first approached Blake to carry out counterintelligence work against the Soviets in parallel to his naval duties.

Returning to England in the spring of 1947, Blake wished to transfer from the Royal Navy to British military intelligence but was unable to secure a position. He did receive a job offer from the Foreign Office, the British diplomatic service, which also allowed him a year leave to attend Cambridge University for Russian language and area studies. He went to work at the Foreign Office in mid-1948 with the rank of vice-consul and was attached to the Far East Department. At some point that is not clear from existing accounts, MI-6 formally employed Blake and his diplomatic work became a cover for espionage activity. In any case, he was eventually assigned to the British legation in Seoul, South Korea.

South Korea was a perfect post from which to observe Soviet activities in the Far East, but things got too close for comfort in June 1950, when North Korea invaded the south, igniting the Korean War. The North Koreans rapidly captured

Seoul, interning the small staff of British diplomats, including Blake. The diplomats were held for almost three years, subjected all this while to "re-education" efforts designed to change their thinking regarding communism and the Soviet Union, much of it supervised by Soviet intelligence officers. In April 1953 Blake and his colleagues were repatriated by way of Peking, Moscow, and Berlin. By all accounts Blake steadfastly resisted all the Korean brainwashing.

Home leave followed the return from captivity. Soon afterward, Blake went to work at MI-6 headquarters and his name disappeared from the Foreign Service List in 1954 despite the high regard for him after the Korean experience. He became engaged and married Gillian Forsyth Allan on 23 September 1954. The couple subsequently had two sons.

From the late summer of 1954 Blake knew that MI-6 would send him to West Berlin and he prepared for that assignment. In March 1955 he learned he would be sent the following month. The Blakes arrived in Berlin on 14 April. There they found lodging in an apartment reserved for British personnel and lived quietly, going to concerts, occasionally to the theater, but very rarely to any of the numerous cocktail parties or after-dinner gatherings arranged by members of the British community. Blake did not join any of the British clubs in the city. The Blakes vacationed at Lake Garda in Italy in summer of 1955, in Austria and Switzerland that winter, at Venice and Dubrovnik in the summer of 1956, and in the French Alps in 1958.

Blake worked from an office in British headquarters. His post was deputy director for technical operations at the Berlin station of MI-6 under Peter Lunn. He reverted to using the cover name "Max Van Vries" with his agents and, among others, worked with the former Gehlen Organization agent Horst Eitner. Blake lasted for four years at the Berlin station, so his work must have seemed satisfactory to MI-6, but almost nothing is known of his positive intelligence missions.

Conversely a great deal is known or surmised regarding Blake's espionage for the Soviets. His later indictment charged Blake with active espionage during every day of the Berlin assignment, from 14 April 1955 to 3 April 1959. As a technical officer, it is widely supposed that Blake divulged to the Soviets one of the most ambitious technical intelligence operations then in progress, the CIA/MI-6 collaboration on a tunnel into East Berlin to tap Soviet underground telephone cables from their Karlshorst headquarters. The tunnel was completed a couple of months before Blake's arrival and the taps went into operation in May 1955, leading some observers to hypothesize that everything the Soviets allowed over the cable must have been disinformation.

On balance this seems unlikely for several reasons. First, it is not clear how quickly Blake learned of the tunnel or could pass along his knowledge of it. Second, given espionage tradecraft, to safeguard its source the KGB could have made no obvious use of its information and certainly would not have shared it with the GRU or the Soviet military, who also made substantial use of the telephone cables. The Soviets could, and did, introduce certain technical countermeasures, such as rerouting some communications by radio or installing devices to mix different conversations on single phone circuits, but these were susceptible to technical solutions and the Western services were quite inventive in this regard. Even if the KGB put some disinformation on its circuits the GRU and Soviet military calls alone would have been vital intelligence for the West. Moreover, some of the circuits carried coded teleprinter traffic about which the Soviets must have been more confident Blake probably did not know, given compartmentation and restricted sharing between CIA and MI-6, that the Americans, who had responsibility for the teleprinter traffic, had developed a method of reading these messages in their plaintext form. In any case the tunnel caper went on for almost a year, until the taps were "discovered" by an East German telephone repair crew in April 1956, in what may have been a charade staged after a decent interval.

Aside from the Berlin Tunnel, Blake has been connected with other intelligence losses as well. One is the February 1956 abduction of an East German defector, a former senior security official, who had lived in Blake's own apartment building. He has also been associated with actions taken during this period against Soviet emigres in West Germany. How much of this represents blaming the known spy for everything is not known, but a certain amount must have been. Overall Blake is credited with exposing at least 12 German agents plus 40 MI-6 ones throughout Eastern Europe, in particular Czechoslovakia, and in the Middle East.

Blake's operational security began to unravel in 1958. It was then, according to accounts, that he learned his subagent Horst Eitner was also a double agent working for the Soviets. These accounts maintain that Blake, who used his alias "Max Van Vries" with Eitner, admitted his own double game to the German. One of them was the Soviet contact for German naval spy Horst Heinz Ludwig who was arrested that year. Though Eitner was not immediately exposed, once he was, suspicion could be expected to fall on Blake as well. Max was probably happy to be reassigned to MI-6 headquarters in 1959.

Following his return to London, Blake spent 18 months at work on a headquarters desk job. Concerning Blake's London activities, both before and after Berlin, his indictment later charged him with treasonable actions between 1 September 1953 and 13 April 1955, when he left for Berlin, and from 4 May to 17 September 1959 (excluding one day) after his return. Why his Soviet contacts supposedly lapsed at that point remains unexplained, while Blake stayed at his MI-6 post for a year thereafter.

A change of venue came in October 1960, when Blake moved to Shemlan, near Beirut, for the course at the Middle East Center for Arab Studies, a specialist institute run by the Foreign Office. It was there that his luck ran out. The first break was the espionage for the West of Polish intelligence officer Michal Goleniewski. The UB officer

described an agent in MI-6 that the Security Service christened "Lambda 1" and provided enough information for MI-5 to identify three documents he had divulged: a "watch list" for Poland, the Polish section of an annual report circulated to MI-6 stations, and a portion of an annual MI-6 report to stations on technical developments. Considering the leak might have been from the stations in Warsaw or Berlin, MI-5 drew up a list of ten officers, including Blake, who had had access to all three documents. Blake and the other officers, however, were cleared of suspicion by the spring of 1960.

Equally serious was the demise of Horst Eitner, whom the Soviets had called "Victor." Eitner's identity had not actually been discovered at the time of the Ludwig case, but he was uncovered in another espionage investigation during 1960. Put under surveillance that September, Eitner was eventually arrested and is believed to have implicated Blake. This information was passed on to MI-5 which then built a case against the MI-6 officer.

On the pretext of discussing a promotion and new assignment, Blake was recalled from Lebanon in April 1961. He was then confronted by Special Branch officers for interrogation but initially denied everything. Allowed to leave for lunch, surveillance teams watched Blake panic over whether to flee and this knowledge was used to break down his resistance. Blake reportedly made a full confession. He was arraigned at Bow Street Police Station and went to trial at the Old Bailey on 3 May 1961. He was sentenced to 42 years in prison.

The question of George Blake's original recruitment remains one of the great mysteries of this case. The most likely occasion for this, especially given the supposed date of his first espionage in September 1953, was during the Korean War period of brainwashing. But Blake's companions in this experience refuse to believe he was subverted. In addition, the Soviet officer who masterminded the brainwashing later defected to the United States and was a contract agent on a three-man

CIA team sent to debrief Blake after his conviction. This Russian also reportedly believed Blake was not converted during the Korean experience. When could the recruitment have been made? It is possible Blake was initially brought under Soviet control as a "sleeper," or inactive agent, in Hamburg immediately after the war, or at Cambridge in 1947-1948. If that seems too farfetched then the next real possibility is that the chronology of espionage is inaccurate and that he was recruited in place at Berlin during his tour there, casting yet more doubt on the hypothesis of early KGB knowledge regarding the Berlin tunnel operation.

The final mystery in this case is what happened to George Blake. He was held, ironically given the wartime location of MI-5, at Wormwood Scrubs prison, where he became friendly with a number of the other prisoners. Blake was never moved despite repeated exchanges between prison authorities and MI-5 over housing Blake at a maximum security facility. On Saturday evening, 22 October 1966, Blake escaped from Wormwood Scrubs and vanished. Former inmates probably assisted but it is unknown whether the KGB organized the effort. Blake is believed to have fled to Moscow but, unlike Philby and many other Western defectors, the Soviets never surfaced him. Blake, like Philby, is believed to have written a memoir of his espionage but this has also never been published. Thus George Blake's case ends in mystery, as it began.

Sir Anthony Frederick Blunt (1907-1983)

There is one name that was mostly missing from the accounts given in the first volume of this source book of the famous (or infamous) British spies of the Cambridge Ring. That is Sir Anthony Blunt, art critic extraordinaire who managed to dabble in espionage on the side. Anthony Frederick Blunt was born on 26 September 1907 at

Bournemouth on the south coast of England. He was the third (and last) son of a cleric, Reverend Arthur Stanley Blunt, and his wife, the former Hilda Violet Master.

As with the other members of the ring, Blunt was a scion of the upper classes. Like certain others too, in particular Guy Burgess, Blunt was homosexual, more or less openly gay from an early age, even at public school at Marlborough. Blunt showed early artistic talent and was sketching by the age of four, a budding art historian at fourteen at Marlborough, when this discipline was virtually unknown in England and only becoming popular in continental Europe.

Blunt went to Cambridge in October 1926, where he attended Trinity College and collected "firsts," as the British call top academic honors in the various subjects. He stayed on for graduate work, founded an abortive literary journal called *Venture*, and wrote a thesis on the history and theory of art in Italy and France from 1400 to 1700. So successful was Blunt at his studies that he was invited to become a professor, or don, and continued this work throughout the 1930s.

This period of the 1930s, with the Depression and the rise of Hitler in Germany, saw the radicalization of British colleges including both Oxford and Cambridge. Blunt turned toward communism as a matter of political conscience, as he put it after his unmasking much later. In the single press conference he held to comment on these matters, Blunt remarked, "in the mid-1930s, it seemed to me and many of my contemporaries that the Communist Party and Russia constituted the only firm bulwark against fascism, since the Western democracies were taking an uncertain and compromising attitude towards Germany." Moreover, according to his most recent biographers, Blunt saw Marxist theories of social classes and social change as a useful tool in the analysis of art, producing many articles through the decade that reviewed art works from a Marxist perspective.

In the summer of 1935, along with his brother and a number of Cambridge friends, Blunt boarded a

Soviet cruise ship to Leningrad for a visit to the Soviet Union. He also sympathized with those Cambridge students who went to Spain to fight in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War.

Blunt became an active Soviet agent at some point in the mid- to late-1930s. He was a "talent spotter," or agent who identified individuals who might be suitable for recruitment as spies. Guy Burgess used Blunt's name in an attempt to recruit mutual friend Goronwy Rees in 1936 or 1937. Blunt himself made at least one effort at recruitment that has been identified. That was in early 1937 when he approached Michael Straight, an American friend and student who had also been on the 1935 visit to Russia.

In late 1938, following the notorious Munich Conference that allowed Hitler to march into Czechoslovakia, Anthony Blunt volunteered for British military service but was rejected. He volunteered again in September 1939 when Hitler invaded Poland. Due to his language skills Blunt was assigned to military intelligence after officer training school.

The basic military intelligence course at that time was given at Minley Manor. On his third day at Minley, Blunt was ordered out of the course due to a report that he had been a communist at Cambridge, the only time this ever happened at Minley according to senior officers at the school. Sent to London for interrogation by the Director of Military Intelligence, it turned out that the report was based upon nothing more than a couple of rejection slips from leftist periodicals Blunt had received for articles he submitted, plus knowledge of his 1935 trip to Russia. British intelligence was evidently unaware of the many articles from the Marxist perspective that Blunt had published. Blunt was able to talk his way out of the tight situation, arguing that his experience was no different from that of many others and referring to some of the many Englishmen who had also visited the Soviet Union with him. The Director of Military Intelligence dropped this investigation of Blunt and sent him back to Minley Manor to com-

plete his training.

Having finished the intelligence course, Blunt was sent to France as a junior lieutenant commanding a platoon of Field Security Police with the British Expeditionary Force. The Field Security Police handled special security and counterintelligence work within the British Army. There were no great emergencies during the "Phony War" period of 1939-1940, but with the German offensive into France and the Low Countries, Blunt's unit was driven back along with the other forces of the BEF. Blunt escaped across the English Channel from Boulogne with part of his platoon, while others of his men, who tried to get out through Dunkirk, didn't make it.

Back in England, Blunt was called for an interview with MI-5, the British counterintelligence service, in August 1940. He was accepted for service with MI-5, ushering in the most active period of Blunt's espionage career. The Russians handled Blunt under the codename "Johnson." His Soviet case officer was Anatoli Gorski (a.k.a. Gromov), ostensibly the press attache at the Russian embassy. Gorski, who worked under the codename "Henry," was evil tempered and never seemed satisfied, but was posted on to Washington in 1943 and replaced by "Peter," actually another embassy officer, Yuri Modin.

Within MI-5 Anthony Blunt was at first assigned to D Branch, which liaised between the security service and the War Office. Blunt had little access to sensitive material in this job and lobbied for a better position, becoming a close friend of Guy Liddell, the deputy director of B Branch, which did some of MI-5's most important work. Liddell got Blunt transferred to B Branch, where his first task was to evaluate the effectiveness of MI-5's surveillance force, knowledge of whose techniques was undoubtedly of vital importance to his Soviet controllers as well.

But Blunt did not get along well with Liddell's secretary, who made untenable his position directly under the deputy. Anthony then transferred again, to Section B-1(b), which was responsible

for assessing the German intelligence sources in Great Britain, thus supporting the massive British double-agent effort that became known as Operation Double-Cross. At B-1(b) Blunt shared an office with Herbert Hart, MI-5's liaison with the British codebreakers at Bletchley. With German intelligence intercepts crossing Hart's desk, Blunt was in a position to pass summaries along to his controllers. From 1941 to 1944 Blunt had even greater access with a sub-agent, Leo Long, who worked on Luftwaffe intercepts at Bletchley. Long, however, felt guilty about his own activities and managed to get himself assigned to General Bernard Montgomery's staff at 21st Army Group, thus ending the relationship.

The Soviet controllers apparently were not completely satisfied with summaries and pressured Blunt to produce the actual intercepts. Reportedly, on the one occasion that Blunt managed to smuggle an original out of the MI-5 offices in his briefcase, he was stopped by a policeman who inquired about the contents of his bag. Blunt managed to talk his way out of that encounter but thereafter confined himself to the summaries he could memorize.

Another intelligence source for Blunt was his social circle, which included many senior intelligence, military, and political officials such as Guy Liddell. On many evenings Blunt's friends gathered at the apartment he shared with Guy Burgess (after Burgess's own place was bombed out in the London "Blitz") to gossip about the progress of the war. Though this did not give Blunt documents, it was a source of much inside information that he could pass along. No doubt it provided a source for Burgess as well.

As the Allies worked their way up to the Normandy invasion, efforts to deceive the Germans regarding the operation, OVERLORD, assumed center stage. Blunt played a role here as well. A major by 1944, he was senior enough to attend a number of meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), representing MI-5 in the last six weeks before the invasion. According to some sources, the American James Angleton, who later

became counterintelligence chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, and also sat on the JIC, developed certain suspicions regarding Blunt but evidently never followed them up.

Following the invasion Major Blunt reverted more nearly to his specialty as art historian. He was dispatched, first to Rome later to Paris, with intelligence teams sent to recover art works stolen by the Germans during the war. In the last weeks of World War II Blunt was appointed by the Crown as Surveyor, or custodian, of the royal art collection. By all accounts the Soviets gave up using Blunt as an intelligence source at this time.

Blunt continued to advise the Crown on art until 1972, receiving a knighthood in 1956. From 1947 until 1974 he also served as director of the Courtauld Institute for art history in London.

There was one last Blunt flirtation with espionage in May 1951. That involved the famous escape of Burgess and Donald Maclean to the Soviet Union. According to some sources Blunt was the man who warned Burgess that Maclean was about to be interrogated by MI-5, thus enabling them to escape. The truth of this version is not certain, however. Blunt did meet Burgess at Southampton when he arrived aboard the *Queen Mary* in early May and the two drove back to Blunt's London apartment. But other accounts maintain that Maclean himself had already noticed that secret papers were no longer reaching him, and even pointed out MI-5 surveillance men to Burgess.

In the meantime Blunt continued his career as an art historian, his espionage for a long time unnoticed. After seeing Burgess in Washington, Michael Straight made a half-hearted effort at confession at a lunch with his cousin Tracy Barnes, then an official of the Central Intelligence Agency. Straight asked Barnes, "please ask me questions about Cambridge," but Barnes replied, "it doesn't interest me." Straight eventually did reveal his knowledge to the FBI in 1963. MI-5 interrogators under Peter Wright confronted Blunt in April 1964 and, after receiving immunity from prosecution, he confessed. Wright continued

weekly meetings with Blunt for years afterwards in hopes of gaining additional knowledge of Soviet operations but with relatively little success.

Not until 1979 was Blunt's espionage career discussed publicly in detail, by author Anthony Boyle in *The Fourth Man*. Though Boyle used the pseudonym "Maurice" for Blunt, the account led to questions being posed in Parliament and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher identified Blunt in her reply in the House of Commons. Queen Elizabeth subsequently stripped Blunt of his knighthood.

Blunt continued to live quietly at his apartment near Marble Arch in London. With a history of heart trouble, he collapsed one morning over breakfast and passed away. Anthony Blunt died on 26 March 1983.

Heinz Paul Johann Felfe (b. 1918)

Of the many Soviet and Eastern European penetrations into West Germany in the postwar years, the case of Heinz Felfe is one of the two or three most serious. Felfe served in the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND), or Federal Intelligence Service. The Felfe case, like that of Philby, is another example of the Soviet predilection for attempts to recruit adversaries specifically charged with counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union. As will be seen, the damage to BND from this recruitment was massive.

Son of a policeman, Heinz Paul Johann Felfe was born in Dresden in 1918. When the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933 the young Felfe joined the Hitler Youth. Still a teenager, he later became a storm trooper and showed so much enthusiasm that within two years Felfe rose to command mobile units working with the SS on the anti-Jewish pogroms. At 21 years of age, Felfe joined the newly formed Main Office of Reich Security (*Reichssicherheitshauptamt* or RSHA) where he

worked to ensure personal protection for Nazi leaders.

At the height of World War II Felfe was transferred to the SD (*Sicherheitsdienst*), a foreign intelligence component of this Nazi service, where he ran the Swiss section. Felfe later bragged that his SD networks successfully penetrated Allen Dulles's Office of Strategic Services (OSS) station at Berne, Switzerland, and claimed his agents had gotten accurate information regarding the conferences among Allied leaders at Teheran and Yalta.

As the Third Reich collapsed, Felfe left Berlin for the Rhineland in March 1945. Where many other SS officers discarded their uniforms and tried to appear as ordinary Germans, Felfe still wore his SS uniform when captured by the British in May. The British sent Felfe to an interrogation center in the Kensington section of London, then to a prisoner camp at Doncaster, and finally to internment in Canada.

Unaccountably, the British seem either to have missed Felfe's Nazi activities or to have determined to make use of him themselves. When other Nazis were being sent to trial as war criminals, Felfe was released in 1946 with a denazification classification of "Category 4/Uninvolved." Then the former SS man got a job as an informant for British Intelligence Headquarters at Muenster. Felfe helped supply the British with leads to the whereabouts of other Nazis less fortunate than he. He also joined left-wing groups in Cologne and Bonn and reported their activities. Felfe continued to dabble in intelligence work after being hired by the Federal Office for All-German Affairs, which handled the many Eastern European refugees in the Western Powers' sectors of Germany.

About 1948 Felfe encountered a fellow Dresdener, Erwin Max Tiebel, who had worked under him at RSHA. Tiebel put Felfe in touch with a third Dresdener, Hans Clemens, also a mainstream Nazi. Clemens had been a party member from the early 1920s, became police chief of his suburb in 1933, and superintendent of the Dresden constabulary the following year. Later he rose to Gestapo chief

for Dresden, then worked on the staff of Reinhard Heydrich at RSHA. After heading an SD intelligence section, Clemens was sent to Rome in 1943 as security attache, in effect Gestapo liaison to Mussolini's Italian government. When the Italians opted out of the war, Clemens took command of local SS units in raids on Italian towns and villages, in one instance ordering the execution of 334 Italian hostages. Clemens, who acquired the sobriquet "Tiger of Como," was captured by the Americans in 1945, charged, and convicted by a war crimes tribunal, spending four years in prison before his release in 1949.

It is not clear whether it was Felfe or Clemens who cooked up the idea of spying for the Russians, but Clemens made the initial contact. At the interzonal border village, Walkenreid, Clemens met with a Soviet colonel who called himself "Max," embracing the former Nazi, giving him an advance payment of DM 1,000 and promising monthly pay of DM 1,500. Clemens's wife remained in Dresden and in fact became the mistress of Max.

At first there was not much to give the Russians, but over a year later on a train trip, Clemens met another former Nazi who told him that the Americans had set up an intelligence agency under Reinhard Gehlen, formerly head of the *Wehrmacht's* Foreign Armies East, its Russian front intelligence unit. The new group, called the Gehlen Organization, needed recruits and employed many former Nazis. Clemens joined and became a talent spotter for one of the branch offices. He did so well that he was transferred to Gehlen's headquarters at Pullach.

With his own Nazi past meanwhile, Felfe failed in a bid to get a job with the German federal police. But Clemens was an entree into the Gehlen Organization. Clemens recommended Felfe to the chief of Department III/F, Gehlen's counterespionage unit, and he was hired. Felfe began work as an assistant investigator for III/F in November 1951 under the cover name "Dr. Friesen." The Soviets' codename for Felfe was "Paul."

Felfe enhanced his position within the Gehlen Organization with a number of counterintelligence successes. In August 1952 he cracked one case for the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) when he turned in Michael R. Rothdrug, a former Army captain who was supplying material simultaneously to the British, French, and Russians under cover of an import-export company. For Gehlen, Felfe uncovered agents Victor and Erika Schneider, then Irmgard Roemer, then broke up an alleged espionage ring in Hamburg under the supposed Soviet resident for Germany, Vasili Kudravshev.

In 1955 the Americans turned over the Gehlen Organization to the West German government and it became the BND. Though Gehlen interviewed all his senior officers, and got rid of some of the former Nazis in the organization, he retained Felfe, who became chief of Soviet counterespionage. Clemens also stayed on with BND as chief of a surveillance team, as did Tiebel. The KGB supplied both Felfe and Clemens with A-3 radios which they used extensively, while Tiebel worked mostly as a courier. In more than a decade of espionage, Felfe had fewer than 20 meetings with KGB case officers. Clemens admitted to more than 40, including meetings in Vienna, Salzburg, Berlin, Switzerland, and Italy.

Felfe's participation through the mid-50s compromised one of Gehlen's most ambitious undertakings, operation URANUS. This was the penetration, using an allegedly disaffected East German geologist, of the Joachimstal uranium mines in Czechoslovakia. Supposed recruits through URANUS included two Soviet colonels, one of them the Joachimstal security chief. Though the Soviets supplied bogus intelligence through the supposed agents, to lend credibility to the reports they did give up genuine samples of the uranium ore, which were shared between BND and the CIA. In 1956, at the end of the two-year operation, the CIA invited Felfe along with a delegation of five other BND officers on an all-expenses paid visit to Washington. It was Felfe's only post-war trip abroad.

Meanwhile the flow of Felfe's intelligence to the Soviets broadened to a torrent. As Felfe put it at his trial, "I wanted to rank as top class with the Russians," and he gave enough to do just that. From January 1957 "Paul" began to furnish copies of the BND weekly reports on current operations. In 1958 Felfe added BND's monthly reports on hostile radio traffic monitored by its radio intercept unit. Beginning in March 1959 he provided the monthly counterespionage reports of the Federal Security Service (BfV), and from June he furnished BfV's monthly situation reports. In addition "Paul" gave the Soviets data from BND's card index files, lists of its agents and accommodation addresses abroad, copies of its basic directives and its office telephone directory. Altogether there were 20 tapes and over 300 Minox films totaling 15,661 frames. BND officials estimated that Felfe compromised 94 agents, including 46 of the top performers.

As all this espionage proceeded, however, cracks began to appear in the KGB security mantle that protected their BND penetration. The first came as early as 1954, when Soviet intelligence officer Peter Deriabin defected in Vienna. Deriabin warned the CIA that the Soviets were running two agents, "Paul" and "Peter" (Clemens) inside the Gehlen Organization. In 1957 the CIA conducted a security survey of the BND that concluded that Felfe might be a Soviet penetration agent. At that time Gehlen considered the evidence too circumstantial for a full-blown investigation of Felfe.

Gehlen worried about possible penetration of the BND and at length he concocted the idea of playing an agent, dangling him before the KGB in the hope they would recruit him, and that their assignments to the agent might reveal the location of the leaks from BND. This was called operation PANOPTICUM (Waxworks). Unfortunately Gehlen went to Felfe to propose the candidate to play this double agent role. Felfe suggested Friedrich Panzinger, another of those former Nazis who, in fact, Gehlen had dismissed in 1955 and who, unknown to BND until 1959, had cooperated with the Soviets during World War II. Panzinger

was hired, fed the Soviets doctored information, but in turn fed back intelligence the Soviets doctored for BND consumption. Naturally PANOPTICUM was a failure and collapsed when Panzinger's Soviet connections became known.

In his own memoirs, Gehlen claims he began to suspect Felfe but was dissuaded from a high-intensity investigation by his own legal advisors, who warned that evidence uncovered, for example by surreptitious entry into Felfe's home, would not be admissible in a court of law. Nevertheless the BND chief arranged a small party in his office to celebrate the tenth anniversary of Felfe's service and presented the Soviet agent with a silver plaque commemorating his counterintelligence activities.

Then, in June 1961, there was a defection to the CIA in Berlin of an East German intelligence officer who reportedly had been serving as a double agent for over a year. The officer was Captain Gunther Maennel. Among the information Maennel provided was, once again, the codename "Paul," but this time with a description of the agent. Equally telling was a 1961 report from a Polish intelligence officer, Michal Goleniewski, who secretly informed the CIA that a senior KGB officer had boasted to him that two of the six BND men who had visited Washington in 1956 were really Soviet spies.

Both reports pointed directly at Heinz Felfe. In October 1961 Gehlen secretly met with General Wolfgang Langkau, his chief of security, and determined to put Felfe under intense surveillance, an operation the CIA codenamed DROWZY. This monitoring quickly disclosed an unusual frequency of telephone conversations between Felfe and Hans Clemens. After that BND radio monitors broke two messages from the KGB's East Germany headquarters at Karlshorst to Felfe which clearly indicated he was working under control. After a warrant was issued, a BND search of Felfe's home uncovered Soviet espionage equipment including a radio transmitter, and Clemens was found with another one. On 6 November 1961 Gehlen issued orders for the arrest of Felfe, Cle-

mens, and Tiebel.

The trio went to trial in July 1962. Immediately following reading of the indictment, the court went into secret session for three days to hear a succession of BND witnesses. Only a few sessions were open to the public. Felfe admitted to receiving DM 180,000 from the Russians but Gehlen puts this at over DM 300,000. All three were convicted. Felfe was sentenced to 14 years in prison, Clemens to ten, and Tiebel, with a relatively minor role, to three.

In the summer of 1968 Heinz Felfe was exchanged in a big spy swap with the Soviet Bloc. Traded back were three students with no BND connection, who had been recruited by the CIA to spy in Russia, and a number of East German prisoners, including only one actual BND agent, according to Gehlen. Hans Clemens expressed sincere repentance for his espionage and had no desire to be traded to the Soviets, serving out his prison term in West Germany.

Heinz Felfe settled in East Berlin and still collects a KGB pension. He became a professor of criminology at Humboldt University there. His two children in West Germany refuse to talk to him, as Felfe left them and a wife behind. He later married an East German doctor, and claims that he is happy, drives his own Mercedes, and has a video recorder. In 1986 Felfe published a memoir in West Germany titled *In Service of the Adversary*. At a press conference timed for this publication, Felfe claimed his motive for espionage was outrage at the Western Powers for their March 1945 firebombing of Dresden. This differs from the stance Felfe took at his trial, where he maintained his motive was disgust at the treatment he received in British prisoner camps after the war. At the press conference Felfe also claimed he had been allowed to use KGB archives in Moscow for research on his book, but at the same time denied that his memoir might be viewed as Soviet disinformation.

Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs (1911-1988)

When the U.S. Army Security Agency made its break into wartime Soviet codes that uncovered Donald Maclean in 1949, some of the messages from the Soviet consulate in New York City that were decrypted also pointed in another direction—toward a Soviet source in the Manhattan Project, the top-secret research and development program that led to the atomic bomb in World War II. Almost simultaneously in the United Kingdom, a senior nuclear physicist stepped forward to identify himself to British security, MI-5, as having had contacts with the Soviets. That man is Klaus Fuchs, identified as “the atom spy,” who later became a professor and science adviser in the Democratic Republic of Germany, East Germany as it is often called.

Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs was born in Ruesselsheim, near Darmstadt in the German state of Hesse, on 29 December 1911. Klaus was the third son of a professor and well-known Quaker figure. Quiet and shy, Klaus evinced little interest in politics as a boy but was always a top student. It was his fortune to come up through the German school system at a time of political ferment, of the unstable Weimar Republic and the *frei korps* movement. When, in 1928, young Fuchs received a prize as the best high school student in Eisenach, the award had to be presented at a private ceremony because officials disapproved of the father's socialist connections.

In 1930 Fuchs moved on to become a student at the University of Leipzig. There, that year or in 1931, he joined the Democratic Socialist Party (SPD) and eventually also its action arm, the *Reichsbanner* paramilitary group, which participated in street fights against both the communist KPD and the Nazi Party, or NSDAP. Klaus transferred to the University of Kiel in 1932. When the SPD supported the presidential candidacy of former General Paul von Hindenburg, whom Fuchs

regarded as ineffectual and unable to meet the rising Nazi challenge, the 21-year-old student broke with the party and was expelled from it. Fuchs then joined the communist KPD.

Parliamentary tactics proved insufficient to block the rise of the NSDAP, however, and Adolf Hitler became chancellor under Hindenburg. On 27 February 1933 a mysterious fire consumed the Reichstag building in Berlin, the seat of the parliament. The Nazis, now in power, blamed the KPD, suspended civil liberties, and began a nationwide roundup of known KPD members. Klaus Fuchs escaped arrest only because he had left Kiel that morning by train to attend a conference of KPD student representatives in Berlin. Hearing news of the crackdown Klaus immediately went underground. His father, sister, and brother went to prison.

Fuchs managed to leave Germany in the summer of 1933. He went to Paris, then to England that September. Attending the University of Bristol, Fuchs completed his undergraduate studies in physics in 1933-1934. Though he made no secret of his party affiliations in Germany, Fuchs took no part in British politics. Instead he went on to become a graduate student in the fall of 1934. In December 1936 Fuchs completed his doctorate at Bristol with a dissertation titled “The Cohesive Forces of Copper and the Elastic Properties of Non-Valent Metals.” With good recommendations from his faculty supervisors, Fuchs went to the University of Edinburgh where he joined Max Born's physics laboratory as a postdoctoral researcher. Fuchs worked at Edinburgh from 1937 to 1939 on financial aid, then a Carnegie fellowship, producing papers under Max Born on wave functions, quantized field relations, and electromagnetic radiation.

When World War II began in September 1939, Fuchs was but one of 80,000 German, Austrian, or Czech refugees residing in Britain. Life immediately became much more difficult for these people. On 12 May 1940, shortly after Germany invaded France and the Low Countries, Fuchs was interrogated by British authorities and interned as an

enemy alien. The new internee was sent to a large camp for aliens on the Isle of Man. Later, in the summer of 1940, Fuchs and a number of the other internees were sent by ship to Canada, where they arrived on 13 July. Fuchs was then interned in a Canadian army prison near Quebec. According to biographer Robert C. Williams, Fuchs was a model internee and soon achieved a measure of responsibility as supervisor of his group in the camp.

As a "wizard war" in which science was applied to the techniques and technology of warfare to an unprecedented extent, World War II placed great demands on the resources in scientific expertise of each of the belligerents. This was what got Klaus Fuchs out of internment and into the war effort. The British had ideas of their own for the creation of an atomic bomb and set up a project codenamed "Tube Alloys" to this end. Physicist Rudolf Peierls, who had known Fuchs since his days at the Max Born laboratory and considered him an ideal analyst with a phenomenal memory, hired the former German internee soon after his release in 1941. Upon recommendation of "Tube Alloys" officials, on 18 June 1942 Fuchs was allowed to become a naturalized British citizen. When the British effort was merged with the Manhattan Project, after the Churchill-Roosevelt conference at Quebec in the fall of 1943, Fuchs went with Peierls and others to work on the atomic bomb in the United States.

Klaus Fuchs's involvement in espionage began soon after his release from internment, at a time when Hitler had just invaded Russia, bringing the Soviet Union into the war. Fuchs apparently approached Juergen Kuczynski, a former KPD leader also living in Britain, to ask how he might best help the Soviet allies. Kuczynski simply sent Fuchs off to contact the Soviet embassy. The Russians assigned a military intelligence (GRU) case officer to Fuchs named S.D. Kremer, who used the codename "Alexander." Sometime in 1942 Kremer arranged communication with Fuchs through a courier, "Sonia," who was actually Ursula Kuczynski, Juergen's sister. Sonia maintained periodic contact with Fuchs through December 1943, when

the physicist arrived in the U.S. to work directly with the Americans. Fuchs was given instructions to contact "Raymond," an American courier for the Soviets, whose real name was Harry Gold.

Fuchs landed at Norfolk on 3 December and proceeded to New York City. There he worked with the British Mission under James Chadwick on methods for separation of atomic isotopes. The research was administered by Columbia University and the Kellogg Corporation, and Fuchs made important contributions to the design of the K-25 separation plant at Oak Ridge.

It was not until February 1944 that "Raymond" succeeded in establishing contact with Fuchs. The courier held seven meetings with Fuchs and scheduled the eighth, but Fuchs neither appeared at the appointed time nor made the pre-arranged backup contact. Harry Gold spent several hours with his Soviet case officer, Anatolii A. Yakovlev, speculating about what had happened to Fuchs. They feared that the physicist had been mugged or suffered other mayhem.

In fact Fuchs did not make his meeting because he was no longer in New York. At the super-secret Manhattan Project research center in Los Alamos, New Mexico, physicist Edward Teller had been promoted from his job as chief of the T-1 Group, which handled the hydrodynamics of implosion and theoretical aspects of a potential "super," or thermonuclear weapon. Division chief Hans Bethe brought in Rudolf Peierls to replace Teller and Peierls, in turn, insisted on having Fuchs on his team. Bethe, who had known Fuchs since 1934, had no objection and eventually came to consider Fuchs one of the most valuable men in his division. Fuchs was assigned a dorm room at Los Alamos on 14 August 1944. Colleagues recalled that he engaged in virtually no political discussions and said little about himself or why he had left Germany.

The Soviets reestablished contact with Fuchs through Harry Gold in February 1945, when the physicist came east to visit his sister, who now lived in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Fuchs passed

along a paper of several pages summarizing methods of bomb assembly, warning of the danger of predetonation through spontaneous fission when using plutonium. Gold picked up the paper, and met again with Fuchs in Santa Fe, New Mexico, early in June.

Meanwhile Fuchs continued his work on the Manhattan Project and was renowned for the accuracy of his theoretical calculations. He was one of the small core of scientists allowed to witness the first atomic test, Trinity, on 16 July 1945. The war ended soon afterwards but Fuchs's work was considered valuable enough that he was held over into 1946 to help plan the atomic test series held at Bikini that year. Fuchs finally left Los Alamos on 14 June 1946 and returned to the United Kingdom by air.

By this time the British were moving into high gear on an atomic bomb development program of their own, financed by a secret allocation of £100 million the Attlee government secured from Parliament. A weapons design center was established at Aldermaston but the scientific center of the effort was located at Harwell. Returning to Britain, Fuchs was soon employed at Harwell. MI-5 ran security checks on him in the summer and fall of 1946, and again in 1947 when Fuchs was given a permanent civil service job at Harwell. Fuchs's prewar political activity was known, both from German *Gestapo* reports and also from that of a British agent active in Kiel, but the information did not preclude his employment. Fuchs represented the United Kingdom in 1949 talks with the U.S. and Canada regarding the declassification of atomic information. By this time he was chief of the Theoretical Physics Division at Harwell.

Still in America, Harry Gold had one last meeting with Fuchs in September 1945. There may have been another in the spring of 1946, but Gold later disputed this. In 1947 Sonia met with Fuchs again and transferred him to control of a GRU case officer in the London embassy. Fuchs had six more meetings with the GRU officer from 1947 to 1949, and provided him with a formula to calculate radiation intensity as a function of distance. Biogra-

pher Robert Williams believes that there is some evidence this GRU man was himself recruited as a double agent by British intelligence (MI-6) during an earlier assignment in Ankara. If so, Fuchs may have unwittingly functioned as a British disinformation agent from 1947 to 1949.

Fuchs's double life began to unravel in the fall of 1949. At that time he received news that his father was being offered a professorship of theology at the University of Leipzig in East Germany. Believing that this might make him an open security risk, Fuchs consulted the chief of security at Harwell. Meanwhile the American break into Soviet cryptographic communications had occurred earlier in the fall and uncovered a Fuchs wartime report. In early September the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sent a highly classified memo to MI-5 on the subject, and on 22 September opened its own case file on Fuchs. The fact that MI-5 took no action against Fuchs until he himself began consulting security officials at Harwell lends some weight to the belief that the British may have been using him.

Once Fuchs began discussions at Harwell, MI-5 dispatched William J. Skardon to interrogate the physicist. Their first meeting occurred on 21 December 1949, over two months after Fuchs's initial statement and three since the FBI's statement of its suspicions. There were additional meetings between Fuchs and Skardon on 30 December 1949, and 10, 24, 27, and 30 January 1950. In the last two meetings Fuchs gave Skardon a detailed recounting of his espionage role.

Klaus Fuchs was arrested on 2 February 1950. He was arraigned the following day and sent up for trial at the Old Bailey on 1 March. He was charged with violations of the Official Secrets Act but, because the Soviet Union had been allied with the United Kingdom during the war, not with espionage. The trial took but one-and-a-half hours and there were only two witnesses, including Skardon. Fuchs nevertheless told the press afterwards that he had received a fair trial. Fuchs was convicted and sentenced to 14 years in prison. He was released on 23 June 1959 and immediately

left England for East Germany where he joined his father. Ursula Kuczynski, "Sonia," who has been connected with both Fuchs and members of the Cambridge Ring, was interviewed by MI-5 but never arrested, and allowed to leave the country for East Germany, where she too resides.

The value of Fuchs's espionage remains unclear. The most important "secret" of the atomic bomb—that it worked—was revealed over Japan in an unmistakable fashion. The United States, moreover, released a detailed history of the atomic project immediately after the war that provided voluminous data about the organization of the project. Fuchs himself appears to have been quite fastidious about his espionage—he never accepted money for his work despite Soviet attempts to press it on him, and he most often turned over only the results of his own work. Fuchs frequently provided the Soviets with results of calculations but stopped short of giving them the detailed derivations that would have enabled them to duplicate the work. In addition he never passed on any information regarding thermonuclear weapons, the even more powerful "H-bombs" whose potential was conceived at Los Alamos. Moreover the Soviets had other sources for information including the Canadian scientist Alan Nunn-May, and David Greenglass, a young soldier assigned to the machine shop at Los Alamos. The Soviets' own physicists were aware of the theoretical possibilities of atomic weapons from 1941, as the Manhattan Project was just getting started, and the Russians had their own program by 1943. Espionage may have shortened the Russians' road to atomic weapons, but it was by no means the decisive factor, while Klaus Fuchs's precise effect on all this is virtually impossible to disentangle.

In East Germany Fuchs, like his father, became an academic. He acquired a villa overlooking the Elbe River near Dresden where he lived for many years. He received many official honors including the title Distinguished Scientist of the People and the Karl Marx Medal, East Germany's highest civilian award. He married Greta Keilson, a German communist he had known during his Paris period in 1933. After nearly two decades in retire-

ment from his espionage career, Klaus Fuchs died on 28 January 1988.

Michal Goleniewski (b. 1922)

For a time starting in 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency was incredibly well supplied with senior defectors from the KGB and other Soviet Bloc intelligence services. The first of these defectors was a colonel from the Polish intelligence service (UB) named Michal Goleniewski. This defector was also one of the most productive intelligence sources the CIA developed during this period. Perhaps, because he was not as controversial as Nosenko or Golitsyn (see their entries, this volume), Goleniewski is also the least well known.

Very little is known of the antecedents or early history of Goleniewski. His high rank, however, suggests that Goleniewski must have been among the very earliest members of Polish intelligence. In addition, another UB defector of the later 1960s writes that Colonel Goleniewski, at the time of his defection, had been "for many years" a UB branch director, again suggesting very early participation in the Polish service, from the time UB was almost entirely a creature of the Soviet service.

The Americans first learned of Goleniewski, though they could not decipher his identity, from a March 1959 letter sent to Henry J. Taylor, the U.S. ambassador to Switzerland. The letter, postmarked in Zurich, contained a sealed inner envelope addressed to Federal Bureau of Investigation director J. Edgar Hoover. The CIA opened this envelope and found a single-spaced typewritten letter in German which was signed "Sniper" and offered to spy for the United States. From the sentence construction and syntax, CIA officer Howard Roman concluded the letter must have been written by a Pole. Hoover was furious when he learned the CIA was opening mail addressed to him, but

relented and allowed the agency to run this agent when the CIA agreed to share the intelligence take with the FBI.

Following Sniper's instructions, the CIA placed a personal advertisement in a Frankfurt, Germany, newspaper that agreed to the offer and provided a post office box address in Berlin to which letters could be sent. By the same means the CIA provided Sniper with an emergency telephone number he could use if and when he desired to be extracted from Poland. Thus began a secret correspondence that lasted over two years, during which Goleniewski sent 14 letters that comprised a mixture of low-grade and very important intelligence information. Some of Sniper's claims were simply silly, some were marginal, but Roman later estimated about four per cent consisted of absolutely vital information the CIA needed to know. Leads furnished by Goleniewski led directly to the unmasking of Gordon Lonsdale and George Blake by the British, and to that of Heinz Felfe by the West Germans.

According to the later UB defector, Colonel Goleniewski was chief of Branch 6 of Department 1 of the UB. This branch conducted scientific and industrial espionage for the Poles in the West. At some point the Soviets became aware there was a leak from UB—a KGB officer told Goleniewski there was a "pig" in his service and initially enlisted him in the drive to find the leak. This occurred at the end of July 1960, and British counterintelligence officer Peter Wright connects this event with MI-5's initiation of intensive surveillance of Lonsdale, which occurred in mid-July.

Through the fall and into the winter Goleniewski cooperated with the UB/KGB mole hunt, but finally he realized that he himself was coming under suspicion. In December Goleniewski called the CIA emergency telephone number and stated he wished protection for himself and his wife. He actually defected over the Christmas holidays, in the course of one of his many trips abroad for UB, but Goleniewski crossed into West Berlin with his girlfriend instead of his wife. The defection was planned quite thoroughly—Sniper even managed

to conceal about 300 pages of photos of UB documents in a hollow tree trunk in Warsaw which, over the holidays, a CIA officer was able to retrieve. The documents identified hundreds of UB agents all over the world.

The CIA met Goleniewski in West Berlin and evacuated him to an American base in West Germany. From there he was taken to the United States by aircraft, a 24-hour flight with a refueling stop in the Azores Islands that ended at Andrews Air Force Base in Washington. The CIA then spirited Goleniewski to a safehouse in Virginia near the capital, where extensive debriefings began. Goleniewski would drink liquor at the sessions and play records of old European songs at full volume on a Victrola.

Sniper provided plenty of information both in his letters and at the debriefings. He warned of a Soviet agent within the CIA. One letter, for example, showed the KGB had specific knowledge of a CIA plan to attempt to recruit a certain UB officer serving in Switzerland. The timing of a KGB officer's remark to Goleniewski suggested the Soviets had to have learned of the plan within two weeks of its origin at CIA headquarters. Since the plan naturally had been very closely held, this in turn created suspicion of a Soviet agent within the CIA. This information fueled the deep suspicions of CIA counterintelligence expert James A. Angleton and helped create the mole controversy that secretly raged throughout the 1960s.

Goleniewski helped create mole suspicions among the British as well. Here he provided material regarding a "middling grade agent" within British counterintelligence, MI-5. The British were unable to resolve this indication, and in November 1963 an MI-5 team met with Sniper to see if they could develop more detail. It emerged that Goleniewski, a friend, and his former UB boss had had serious discussions in the late 1950s about defecting to the West. They decided it would be preferable to go to Great Britain because of its sizable Polish emigre population, but they knew they could not approach British intelligence (MI-6) because it was penetrated. When Goleniewski sug-

gested contacting MI-5 through some of the emigres, who were under frequent MI-5 surveillance, his boss rejected the idea saying there was a Russian agent in MI-5 too. A couple of the other details Sniper provided seemed, to MI-5 officer Peter Wright, to fit his own boss, Sir Roger Hollis. These allegations contributed to the never-resolved controversy over whether Hollis in fact worked secretly for the Soviets.

Goleniewski's information seemed outdated toward the mid-1960s and Western intelligence services stopped making use of him. Sniper added to the growing reticence with bizarre claims he began making that he was a descendent of the Romanovs, the Russian Czars, and later allegations that Henry Kissinger was also a Russian spy. During a 1968 Washington visit, Jim Angleton drew MI-5 officer Peter Wright aside to talk about a theory that Goleniewski himself had been under Soviet control and was a KGB disinformation agent. While some facts of the Sniper case fitted this thesis, and MI-5 had some sympathy for Angleton's theory, Goleniewski's intelligence had clearly been valuable to both CIA and MI-5. Since by that time Sniper was no longer being used, even if true the disinformation agent theory was essentially of limited value.

Goleniewski became an American citizen in 1963 through a special act of Congress, an immigration bill introduced at the request of the CIA by South Carolina Democrat Senator Olin D. Johnson. At that time the CIA attested that Goleniewski was a citizen and native of Poland, born in the village of Niewswiez on August 16, 1922, and entered into the United States on January 12, 1961. It was a few years later that Goleniewski made claims to being Grand Duke Alexei, czarevitch and the last of the Romanovs. Some of these claims he made in open letters to directors of central intelligence William F. Raborn and Richard M. Helms which he published as paid advertisements in the Washington *Daily News*. After that virtually no one wished to continue in intelligence cooperation with Goleniewski, who has faded into obscurity.

Anatoliy Golitsyn (b. 1926)

The defection of KGB officer Anatoliy Golitsyn at the end of 1961 was an essential element in touching off the so-called "mole war" that enmeshed the CIA and British intelligence throughout the 1960s. Even in retrospect it is difficult to decide what to make of Golitsyn, whose claims alternately helped and hindered Western intelligence efforts during that decade. Perhaps the best that can be done is to recount the particulars of this case insofar as they are known at this time.

By his own account Anatoliy Golitsyn was born in the Ukraine in 1926. He was raised in Moscow and joined Soviet intelligence at the age of 19. He also joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1945. Within Soviet intelligence, Golitsyn specialized in counterespionage and rose through the ranks to major by 1961.

Golitsyn was always a stickler for operational security, going to great lengths to ensure his personal protection, not hesitating to change facts to confuse those who might be perceived to be his opponents.

In his major work, *New Lies for Old*, published in the United States in 1984, Golitsyn is identified as having been stationed in Vienna from 1953 to 1955. This is certainly true as another officer, Peter Deriabin, who defected from Soviet intelligence in Vienna in 1954, identified Golitsyn for the CIA. In fact, Deriabin gave the CIA a list of Soviet officers who might be most susceptible to recruitment and Golitsyn's name appeared second on that list.

Before the Americans could take any action on the Deriabin information, however, Golitsyn was transferred back to Moscow. He worked at KGB headquarters in the late 1950s, including service with the NATO section of the Information Department of the First Chief Directorate in 1959 and

1960. Using the cover name "Klimov," Golitsyn was posted to the KGB station at Helsinki, Finland, with his wife in 1961.

Due to the use of a cover identity, the CIA was reportedly unaware that Klimov of Helsinki was the same individual as the Golitsyn of Vienna. There was evidently no effort made to contact him in the Finnish capital. Nevertheless, one evening in early December 1961 Klimov appeared unannounced at the home of the CIA station chief in Helsinki, bearing a pile of KGB documents and saying he wished to defect to the West. The Americans quickly organized an operation and spirited Golitsyn out of Finland on 15 December 1961.

In 48 hours of a preliminary interrogation, Golitsyn furnished enough information to convince his CIA handlers that he was a very valuable defector. Golitsyn provided material on the KGB station in Helsinki, on which the CIA had substantial information of its own that could be compared with Golitsyn's.

The agency evacuated Golitsyn to Washington. Initially he was given the new identity "John Stone" and provided with a \$40,000 suburban Washington home complete with color television. The CIA gave him the codename "Ladle." But Golitsyn proved a very difficult man to satisfy. Langley's Soviet Bloc division was assigned to debrief Golitsyn but, in succession, Ladle refused to cooperate with a whole string of division officers, whom he reportedly thought to be idiots.

In some desperation John McCone of the CIA finally assigned his Counterintelligence Division to handle the Golitsyn case. Though Ladle remained difficult, the change began a sort of alliance between Golitsyn and James A. Angleton that endured through the 1960s. Golitsyn insisted he had to speak with top officials of the U.S. government; Angleton was able to get him in to see Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General.

Ladle provided information on a top-level penetration of NATO through an espionage ring operating in France under the KGB codename SAPPHIRE.

This led French intelligence (SDECE), who called Golitsyn "Martel," to send an interrogation team to Washington, after John Kennedy sent a personal letter to French President Charles DeGaulle by hand of officer. The SDECE team worked with Golitsyn in the spring of 1962 and later came back for a second round of debriefings. Golitsyn recounted how the KGB had extensive knowledge of SDECE organization and activities and expected to learn of major intelligence the French gained within only a day or two of its receipt at SDECE. Golitsyn provided some information about three alleged agents in France, and leads to SAPPHIRE that supposedly comprised six more agents.

As a result of these leads, in July 1963 the French arrested Colonel Georges Paques, then deputy press officer at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the NATO high command. Paques was caught red-handed giving a briefcase full of documents to a Soviet diplomat from the Paris embassy. He was sentenced to life in prison.

Golitsyn was also of some use to the British, where information from his debriefings first arrived at the counterintelligence service (MI-5) in March 1962. As a result of the initial reports the British prepared ten "serials" of questions for Golitsyn and three came back with apparent leads. Later that spring MI-5 sent its own team to question Golitsyn and developed another 153 "serials," but most of these led up blind alleys. Golitsyn did supply additional material on Kim Philby and the Cambridge "Ring of Five," and leads to a naval spy.

The naval spy turned out to be John Christopher Vassall, a clerk in the secretariat of the Admiralty naval staff and formerly assistant private secretary to the civil Lord of the Admiralty, Thomas Galbraith. Vassall had served in the British embassy in Moscow in 1956 as a clerk to the naval attache and, a homosexual, had been caught by the Russians and blackmailed into espionage. MI-5 scientific expert Peter Wright devised a test for Golitsyn in which the defector was able to identify the photographic method the spy had used to copy

certain documents Ladle had seen in Moscow. Meanwhile, the FBI's Soviet source "Fedora" (see entry, Volume I) had supplied the information that the naval spy was homosexual, which pointed to Vassall, and a search of his apartment uncovered a camera of the type identified by Golitsyn. Vassall was arrested on 12 September 1962, confessed, and was sentenced to 18 years in prison.

To the Americans, Golitsyn adverted that the CIA was penetrated by a major KGB mole, "Sasha," who had been activated in 1957 by KGB general Viktor Kovshuk in a visit to Washington. Naturally this was a bombshell for Angleton, who spent most of the rest of the decade trying to find this penetration and identify the agent. Golitsyn's information was not precise enough to point in a particular direction, but he offered to help find the spy if given access to CIA's personnel files. This Angleton did, allowing Golitsyn to see an undisclosed number of files, which in ordinary intelligence tradecraft would have been seen as a major breach of security. Golitsyn looked for cases where failure could be attributed to officers acting individually, then suggested that various of them might have been acting for the Russians. One CIA officer after another came under suspicion and many of their careers were ruined. At least four CIA officers have been identified as having had their careers adversely affected by Golitsyn: David Murphy, Paul Garbler, Peter Karlow, and Richard Kovich. By 1968 many of the Soviet Bloc Division experts had been transferred or forced out of the service. Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms even rebuilt the division using mostly officers who had gained prominence in Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The intelligence effort against the Soviet Union was crippled.

Golitsyn himself continued to be difficult. He refused to speak with any intelligence officers fluent in Russian, on the grounds that if they had had language training they must have been exposed to Russians and were therefore tainted. He disliked the United States and wanted to live in Great Britain, where he was in fact taken and honored by award of an order, Commander of the

British Empire (CBE). But in the summer of 1963 a garbled account of his presence in England appeared in the British press (it referred to a "Dolitsin") and he was forced to move back to preserve his personal security. Golitsyn continually baited questioning officers in efforts to discover whether they knew Russian. He was diagnosed by a CIA psychiatrist and separately by a clinical psychologist as a paranoid personality type.

In fact Ladle particularly muddled the waters around him by warning that the KGB would send disinformation agents after him to cast doubt on his intelligence. This automatically impeached the credibility of subsequent Soviet defectors, most notably that of Yuri Nosenko (see entry, this volume). In the Nosenko case, in fact, Golitsyn disputed many points of Nosenko's information, including items on who he was and where he had served with the KGB. Where Nosenko was subjected to hostile interrogation, this treatment was never extended to Golitsyn.

Indeed, through thick and thin James Angleton remained loyal to Golitsyn. In 1968, when the Western intelligence services inaugurated periodic joint conferences on counterintelligence matters, Angleton arranged for Golitsyn to address the convention, held in Melbourne, Australia. The Soviet defector launched into his favorite theme, disinformation, claimed the West was poor at catching Soviet spies, and extolled his own method of helping by examining the services' personnel files. MI-5 took up his offer and brought Golitsyn to England for four months, paying £10,000 a month in cash and opening its files. The British got help on minor details and a few cryptonyms from old cable traffic, but very little of use on the mole problem. "By the end of his stay," Peter Wright recalls, "my sessions with Golitsyn had degenerated into tedious diatribes about disinformation, and recycled information which already existed in our registry."

Wright lunched with Golitsyn again in New York the following year, and found him still talking about disinformation and hoping to set up an institute to study the method. But the various

Western intelligence services largely stopped relying on Golitsyn about then, in 1969 or 1970, and the defector remains in retirement, though the French may have called on him one more time.

Indeed the disinformation theme is central to Golitsyn's message for the West. Even when he was in active use by Angleton in the mid-1960s, Golitsyn tried to argue within the CIA that the Sino-Soviet split was in reality a KGB disinformation plot. According to David C. Martin's reconstruction in *Wilderness of Mirrors*, the CIA actually assembled a panel of its top intelligence analysts to examine this claim of Ladle's. Except for the presence of some Soviet scientists and KGB officers in China, which would have been logical in the context of Soviet efforts to preserve a modicum of friendly relations with China and to gather intelligence about that country, Golitsyn failed to introduce any evidence to support his theory and completely failed to convince the CIA analysts.

Golitsyn repeats this theory in some detail in his book *New Lies for Old*, but carries the claim even further to assert that virtually every event in Soviet history from Lenin's New Economic Policy to Soviet leadership successions, the Soviet-Yugoslav split, the dissident movement, alleged Rumanian "independence" from Moscow, and the "Prague Spring" of 1968, constitute maneuvers in a Soviet disinformation war. There is no doubt that the Soviets resort to disinformation techniques, but one can accept Golitsyn's report that the KGB and Soviet Politburo adopted an explicit disinformation strategy in 1958 and 1959 without subscribing to the full panoply of Golitsyn's claims.

Meanwhile the nature of Golitsyn's contribution continues unresolved. "Sasha," as a top Soviet penetration agent inside the CIA was never found. Nosenko also had a candidate for the role of "Sasha," who was not inside the CIA, and that man at least turned out to be a real spy. Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoly, the Washington station chief for SDECE at the time of Golitsyn's information to the French, notes that "Martel's information several times contained only a whiff of a treasonable

association." Similarly Peter Wright, who began as a Golitsyn acolyte, writes "the vast majority of Golitsyn's material was tantalizingly imprecise." Yet the allegations caused immense damage to the CIA, the French, and the British (whose MI-5 director Sir Roger Hollis was also impugned in the affair) intelligence services.

In the question of bona fides between Golitsyn and Nosenko, it is relevant to examine perceived value of the defector revelations. Golitsyn was central to the apprehension of Colonel Paques who was an important agent. He contributed to the Vassall case. Most of his other information concerned old cases like Philby or sowed distrust. By some accounts Nosenko also contributed to Vassall; he revealed the Moscow embassy bugging, gave data on Popov (see entry this volume), William Henry Whalen, apprehended by the U.S. in 1966, and over 50 other leads.

Who was the defector and who was the disinformation agent? It is held against Nosenko that "Fedora" (see entry, Volume I) confirmed elements of his story. "Fedora," however, also assisted Golitsyn in the Vassall case. In the "wilderness of mirrors," which was Angleton's description for the world of counterespionage, there are a myriad of possibilities. Golitsyn could have been the true defector and Nosenko the disinformation agent, or it could have been the reverse. Both could have been true defectors, who spoke against each other out of some sense that the other threatened their own status. Alternatively, both might have been disinformation agents, along with "Fedora," "Top Hat," and perhaps Goleniewski (see entry this volume), in some massive KGB scheme to create dissension among its adversaries. No one will ever know for certain.

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko (b. 1927)

Yuri Nosenko was one of a string of defectors from the KGB in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These defectors, separately and in combination, triggered sharp conflicts and controversies within the CIA and other western services that persisted through much of the 1960s. The controversies revolved around who in the western services might secretly be working as double agents for the Russians. The whole problem was so convoluted that it has never been entirely resolved and schools of thought remain today on the credibility of the various defectors and on the theory that "moles" were hidden in the western intelligence services.

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko was born in Nikolayev in the Ukraine on 30 October 1927. He was the son of a Communist Party official, Ivan Nosenko, who rose to a high level in the *nomenklatura*. The elder Nosenko became an alternate member of the party Central Committee and was, by the 1950s, Minister of Shipbuilding in the Soviet government. The honor guard at his 1956 funeral included all the top Soviet leadership: Nikita Khrushchev, Georgi Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, and Kliment Voroshilov. Ivan Nosenko merited burial in the Kremlin Wall, where Lenin and the highest Soviet leaders rest.

Raised to a life of privilege, the younger Nosenko elected to join Soviet intelligence. In 1949 Yuri became a member of Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, working in the naval section of the organization. He was assigned to the Far East to train Japanese prisoners of war who agreed to serve as Soviet spies after returning home. In 1953 Nosenko was recruited out of the GRU by the state security organization now titled KGB. Here Nosenko was posted to the Second Chief Directorate (see entry, Volume I) with responsibility for internal security.

From 1953 to 1955 Nosenko worked for the directorate's First Department in its First Section, which works to recruit United States embassy personnel. In 1955 he was transferred to the First Section of the Seventh Department, which operates against American, British, and Canadian tourists in the Soviet Union. Nosenko became deputy chief of this section in 1958. A year later he received a special commendation from the KGB chairman for the success of his operations.

Further reward followed in January 1959 when he was transferred back to the First Department to work against the embassy. After two years Nosenko returned to the Seventh Department as deputy chief of the department. Almost immediately, however, Nosenko was given a special assignment as top security officer for the Soviet delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference that met in Geneva from February to June 1962.

It was at Geneva that Nosenko made his initial approach to the CIA, offering to sell information for the bargain basement price of 900 Swiss francs. Nosenko explained he needed the money to replace KGB operational funds he had spent on a drinking spree. For the money, Nosenko revealed that the KGB had placed hidden microphones at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. George Kisvalter, a senior CIA officer from the Soviet Bloc Division flown into Geneva for the occasion, and Peter Bagley, a case officer from Bern, were impressed with Nosenko's information and cabled Langley on 11 June that "subject has conclusively proven his bona fides."

Not everyone was so convinced in Washington, however. In particular, CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton had been working with another Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn, some of whose information conflicted with Nosenko's. Angleton gave Bagley access to the Golitsyn material and allowed him to meet this defector secretly in New York, convincing the case officer that Nosenko, codenamed "Foxtrot," might be a plant.

There matters rested for about 18 months.

TOP SECRET/S.I.

Nosenko had returned to Moscow with the Soviet delegation. At his final meeting with CIA case officers, Nosenko demanded that no effort be made to contact him in Moscow. The CIA agreed, leaving Nosenko only with a telephone number to call and password he could use in case of need. Thus there was no further contact until January 1964.

In the meantime, in November 1963 President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, by Lee Harvey Oswald. A commission under Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren investigated the assassination, including the background of Oswald. It happened that Oswald, after a tour with the U.S. Marine Corps in Japan, had defected to the Soviet Union. The Warren Commission had great interest in finding out about Oswald's life in Russia but no direct means of discovering information about it.

That was the situation on January 20, 1964, when Nosenko arrived in Geneva again with a new Soviet disarmament delegation and promptly set up a meeting with his CIA case officers. This time Nosenko told them that he had been the KGB official who handled the Oswald file. Nosenko also pronounced himself ready to defect to the United States, despite leaving a wife and daughter in the Soviet Union. As the CIA pondered Nosenko's offer, the KGB agent returned to say he had been ordered to return to Moscow by 4 February. Nosenko feared the KGB now suspected him and would begin interrogations when he got home.

The CIA could not resist the offer of a first-hand source on Oswald and agreed to bring in Nosenko. The Soviet officer slipped away after a morning session of the conference, rendezvoused with CIA men, was bundled into a car and driven to Germany where he was put on a plane for Washington at a U.S. military base. Nosenko did give the agency Oswald material for the Warren Commission. He told them the KGB had had nothing to do with Oswald, had avoided him essentially, made no effort to debrief Oswald although the former Marine had been stationed at an airfield in Japan that operated the U-2. Oswald had even married a Soviet woman without triggering substantial

KGB interest, and had worked in Kiev until he tired of the Soviet Union, then returning to the United States.

Nosenko's account was accepted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which controlled this portion of his debriefing. FBI officers were especially satisfied after their secret Soviet source "Fedora" (see entry, Volume I) vouched for Nosenko as a lieutenant colonel in the KGB. Questions about Oswald that the CIA had prepared the FBI refused to ask Nosenko, whose account was given to the Warren Commission with little elaboration.

With the CIA, however, Nosenko had a more serious problem that was rapidly worsening. Jim Angleton from counterintelligence already suspected Nosenko due to the Golitsyn material, while the account of KGB disinterest in Oswald seemed farfetched and too conveniently suiting Moscow's interests. Moreover, the agency was not convinced of the bona fides of "Fedora" who was vouching for Nosenko and, to make it worse, there were discrepancies between what "Fedora" said about Nosenko and what the KGB defector said about himself.

Both the CIA and Nosenko exacerbated the difficulties. At the time of Nosenko's first contacts with the agency in Geneva, notes were taken at his interviews by a CIA case officer not fluent in Russian. Although the safehouse talks were taped, the tapes were never transcribed so the nuances of conversation were lost and the notes could not be checked. Nosenko himself, in going to these meetings, checked for surveillance and cleared his tail by going to four or five bars and having a drink at each. There was more liquor still at the safehouse. "I must tell you honestly," Nosenko explained later, "at all of those meetings I was snookered." The KGB man made it worse by saying things in an effort to exaggerate his importance, while the small amount of money (about \$300) he had demanded was highly unusual in such deals.

After defecting to the United States, Nosenko continued the heavy drinking at his early debriefing

sessions. No doubt it became difficult to remember what he had said before, so that discrepancies emerged not only with others' accounts but with Nosenko's own story. There was a major difference between Golitsyn and Nosenko on one matter of the highest importance: Golitsyn claimed the KGB had placed a mole at a high level within the CIA codenamed "Sasha," and that a certain 1957 trip by a senior KGB officer to Washington had been for the purpose of activating this source. Nosenko, who claimed to have been the deputy of the senior KGB man, A. V. Kovshuk, instead connected the trip with another agent, "Andrei," a military man with the motor pool of the U.S. embassy in Moscow in the early 1950s. To Angleton, in search of big game, the "Andrei" lead appeared designed to confuse the CIA about "Sasha." Although Nosenko himself mentioned "Sasha" in 1964, he then identified him as an Army officer, not a CIA man.

Other discrepancies concerned Nosenko's putative rank, which was confirmed by "Fedora," by certain documents leaked to the CIA by a Russian who did not defect, and his KGB commendations. Nosenko could give little account of his case work when asked to explain his rapid promotions. In one case he claimed to have worked on, against the air attache at the U.S. embassy, Nosenko reported that the man had finally returned home after a normal tour. In fact, the Soviet Union had expelled Colonel Edwin M. Kirton in 1960, in what the CIA believed was a provocation, after the officer was handed a parcel of documents while visiting Stalingrad. Golitsyn also said he had dealt extensively with the U.S. embassy department of the KGB and had not known Nosenko there. When Nosenko changed his story and said he had only been a captain in the KGB, it was too much for CIA counterintelligence. The agency "fluttered" Nosenko—gave him a lie detector test—which the defector did not pass.

By June 1964 the CIA had major doubts regarding Nosenko. It then began to subject him to hostile interrogation trying to pick apart his story. For three years it kept Nosenko in solitary confinement, using psychological and chemical methods

in efforts to break him down. Nosenko changed his story many times but Angleton was never able to show conclusively that the defector was a Soviet disinformation agent. There were both partisans of Nosenko and others convinced he still served Moscow. When Richard Helms became Director of Central Intelligence in 1967 he demanded that counterintelligence settle the case one way or the other within 90 days. Once again this proved to be impossible. At length Helms ordered Nosenko released, given a new identity and resettled.

Although Nosenko's bona fides were never proved, in fact he furnished U.S. intelligence with much information of great value, by one account over 50 leads to active or former spies. Nosenko revealed that the KGB had placed microphones in the Moscow embassy and 40 were found in one section of the building alone, leading to a dramatic scene at the United Nations where the U.S. ambassador showed how one of these microphones had been emplaced within the great seal of the United States. Nosenko provided data on the Soviet capture of a CIA double agent, Major Pyotr Popov, and information regarding "Andrei" that enabled the FBI to track down a sergeant who had served in Moscow in the 1950s. It was information from Nosenko about a major leak from Orly airport that helped build the case against Robert Lee Johnson (see entry, Volume I), and other information uncovered spies in both Britain and France. Nosenko's belief that "Sasha" was a military officer also may be related to the 1966 arrest and conviction of U.S. Army Colonel William H. Whalen. These were not all old "blown" or minor operations—the Moscow embassy bugging and one of the French espionage cases were current and major KGB penetrations.

After numerous investigations proved inconclusive, and after the 1975 retirement of Angleton and his top assistants, the CIA reopened the Nosenko case. John L. Hart, an experienced officer, was called out of retirement to head this investigation. Hart found the mistakes made in Nosenko's initial interviews and pointed up many of the other problems with the case. Nosenko might have had far fewer problems had he not

drunk so much liquor or been so anxious to tell the CIA what he thought it wanted to hear. The agency ultimately warmed up to Nosenko and even employed him occasionally as a consultant on counterintelligence matters. Meanwhile the various schools of thought on Nosenko continue to flourish.

John Arthur Paisley (1923-1978?)

Ready-made for the sleuth in all of us is the case of John A. Paisley. This is a case that had no solution and remains a mystery to this day. Paisley was a senior analyst with the Directorate of Intelligence, but some claim he was also an officer on the CIA's clandestine side. Paisley appears to have committed suicide but some insist the incident was contrived for appearances. There are even some who believe that the body found was not Paisley's. The Paisley case is an enduring mystery bound up in several of the political and CIA controversies of the 1970s.

John Arthur Paisley was born in 1923 at Sand Springs, just outside Tulsa, Oklahoma. When he was two-and-a-half years old, his mother left his alcoholic father and moved the three kids to Phoenix, Arizona. Paisley was raised and went to school in Phoenix, where he developed an early interest in radio and would play around with the primitive crystal and coil radio sets of that day.

Paisley put his radio interest and skills to good use in World War II, when he fulfilled the dream of a mid-American landlubber and went to sea as a radioman in the merchant marine. He continued to work in radio after the war and, interested in international organizations, worked with the United Nations. For the UN, Paisley went to Palestine in 1948 to assist in radio communications for the mediation mission of Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte, who had performed signal services during the war in arranging exchanges of disabled prisoners, easing conditions for Scandina-

vian detainees, and attempting to end German persecution of Jews, only to be assassinated by members of an Israeli extremist group on 17 September 1948. Paisley and other members of the mission wound up their business and returned to their homes.

In New York Paisley met Maryann McLeavy, who worked for Tom Yawkey, then owner of the Boston Red Sox. The two married in March 1949. That fall they moved to Chicago where Paisley began college at the University of Chicago, studying for a degree in international relations with a concentration in Soviet affairs. To support himself at college Paisley worked part-time as a radio operator for various steamship companies headquartered in Chicago. At home his living room was dominated by a large ham radio set that Paisley used to communicate with ham operators throughout the world, including on at least one occasion a chess game played out in morse code against an opponent in Russia.

After graduation Paisley and 15 classmates went to Washington to seek employment. Paisley applied to the CIA, then went to sea again with the merchant marine. At the agency was one of Paisley's former professors at Chicago who put in a good word for the applicant. Of the 15, Paisley was the only one to get a Washington job and it was with the CIA, which hired him for a branch that analyzed Soviet advances in electronics. Paisley was at sea when he learned of the job offer.

Paisley put in two good years at the CIA, then he was detached to serve with the National Security Agency from 1955 to 1957. After this Paisley studied the Russian language to read sources in the original. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s Paisley's CIA career remains as mysterious as his death. He is believed to have been stationed in Washington throughout his agency career, but where some insist he was entirely concerned with analysis, other CIA officers reportedly told Paisley's widow that he "loved" clandestine operations. A telephone book or file recovered after his death reportedly contained numbers for CIA undercover officers stationed in various parts of

the world.

During the 1960s came a series of defections by important Soviet and East European intelligence officers. The most notorious of them was that of KGB officer Yuri Nosenko, whose bona fides are still disputed. With his knowledge of Russian and technical background, Paisley was considered a useful interlocutor and, according to his wife, participated in many of the debriefings, meeting some of the defectors numerous times. He would talk at home about whether one could believe defectors' stories but never any of the specific cases. But here too there was mystery—naturally CIA counterintelligence played a major role in the defector cases yet James A. Angleton, chief of counterintelligence, has denied ever meeting Paisley or even knowing who he was. Despite this, sources generally agree Paisley participated in the debriefings and that he supported the theory that Nosenko, at least, was genuine. After Nosenko was released and provided a new identity and home in North Carolina, Paisley kept in touch, repeatedly visiting him and keeping his boat at a marina within driving distance of Nosenko's place.

Meanwhile Paisley continued his rise through the ranks of the Directorate of Intelligence, becoming a division chief probably in the mid-1960s. In October 1969 he was promoted to become deputy director of the Office of Strategic Research, a unit formed in 1967 to analyze important technical intelligence, principally Soviet space and missile systems. At about this time Paisley apparently considered resigning to take a job at the Pentagon in disgust at the CIA's refusal to use some of the defector data in its intelligence publications. He dropped the idea when the agency reconsidered, but he was then given a year's sabbatical in London to take the course at the British Imperial Defense College.

Returning to Washington in the summer of 1971 Paisley became involved with the nefarious White House "Plumbers" unit of Watergate fame. The CIA apparently assigned Paisley as an agency liaison with the White House unit. At a meeting on 9 August 1971 at Langley, Plumbers officer

David Young assigned Paisley to assemble a data base on leaks, using a running file on these kept by the United States Intelligence Board, plus exhibits on *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post* compiled by the White House. Paisley was to focus on 14 questions posed by the Plumbers in an effort to assemble a composite picture of leaking behavior. There were phone calls on the matter and evidently a further meeting on 18 August. This activity followed Paisley into 1973-74, by which time Watergate had become a political issue and Paisley had to field inquiries from the CIA Inspector General.

Shortly afterward the CIA sent Paisley to Helsinki as agency representative on the delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). There was a SALT negotiating round from July to September 1971, and another in March-April 1972. One day a KGB officer approached Paisley and offered him a large sum of money in exchange for information about the U.S. negotiating position in the talks. Paisley advised superiors of the approach but was asked to go ahead and talk with the KGB in an effort to ascertain what concerns that Russians had at SALT. Reports do not specify what information might have been provided in the course of these maneuvers.

After Helsinki Paisley resumed work as deputy director of the Office of Strategic Research, then under E. Henry Knoche. He held this job for about two years and figured himself in line for a promotion, but this would have meant transfer to a different part of the directorate since Knoche stayed on at OSR until 1975. Instead Paisley took early retirement in June 1974, receiving a CIA decoration as he left the agency.

Paisley bought a new sailboat in North Carolina called the *Brillig* after a line from Lewis Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky," and spent about a year knocking about. According to reports possibly inspired by the Angleton faction, it may have been at this time that Paisley met Nosenko. It was also in 1975 that his marriage broke up under strains that are not known. Returning to Washington Paisley went to work for the Mitre Corporation on

overhead reconnaissance and contributed to the manual for the KH-11 spy satellite, later passed to the KGB by disgruntled former CIA employee William Kampiles (see entry, Volume I). During this period the CIA also retained Paisley as a member of its Military Economics Advisory Panel, which consulted with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on the quality of CIA models of Soviet military spending.

In 1976, impelled by recommendations from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, DCI George Bush approved an experiment in "competitive analysis," in which the regular CIA analysts compiling their annual national intelligence estimate on Soviet strategic forces would compare their product with that of a panel of outside consultants. The CIA analysts were called the "A Team" while the outside panel became known as the "B Team." John Paisley was temporarily brought back into the CIA as executive secretary for the exercise, custodian for the documents being assembled and the materials both teams were using in their efforts. DCI Bush reportedly gave Paisley a sweat shirt emblazoned "A Team" on the front and "B Team" on the back.

Paisley remained a CIA consultant with the military economics panel after his A Team-B Team service, and had the privilege of unescorted access into CIA headquarters, including to many compartmented offices. He met on more than one occasion with President Jimmy Carter's DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner. Paisley, according to his wife, was still interested in unraveling the numerous conflicts between the accounts of various defectors and studying the charges that there was a high-level "mole" within the CIA. He also retained his interest in strategic analysis issues. For a livelihood Paisley got a job with the management consulting firm Coopers & Lybrand under K. Wayne Smith, himself a former official of the McNamara Pentagon. After separating from his wife, Paisley rented an apartment in downtown Washington, coincidentally in a building also inhabited by a number of Soviet diplomats.

Finally come the events of late September 1978.

On Sunday, 25 September, Paisley drove a rented car to Solomon's Island where his boat *Brillig* was docked and took her out onto Chesapeake Bay. He went out with a friend but docked later in the day to let him off, then went back out to work on a paper which, according to various accounts, may have been about the A Team-B Team exercise, the CIA mole hunt, or strategic force questions. Allegedly documents bearing on all these questions were recovered later, either aboard *Brillig* or at Paisley's apartment. Again coincidentally, Paisley was just about to come up for revalidation of his security clearance, the first time he was to be investigated since June 1967.

Taking the *Brillig* back onto the bay, Paisley radioed that he would be in late that night, asking that the dock lights be left on for him. That area was close to a Soviet summer residence on the eastern shore of the bay as well as to a CIA safe-house. An unusual amount of communications traffic was detected from the Soviet residence that night. John Paisley never returned to shore.

At mid-morning the next day a ranger at Point Lookout State Park was advised that a boat was evidently adrift on the Chesapeake Bay. The ranger drove down to Hays Beach where he found the 31-foot *Brillig* aground in a few feet of water. He waded aboard and found the boat deserted but saw neatly stacked papers dealing with nuclear missiles. The ranger notified the Coast Guard which quickly took possession of the boat. A military officer and two men from the CIA Office of Security reportedly took away the papers. Maryann Paisley was driven out to the boat later that night but there was little she could do.

On 1 October, near the mouth of the Patuxent River, a badly bloated and decomposed body washed ashore despite having been weighted down with two diving belts carrying 38 pounds of weights. The body had a single gunshot wound behind the left ear. It was a 9mm pistol bullet, the same caliber as a gun Paisley owned, and 9mm bullets were found scattered about both aboard *Brillig* and at Paisley's downtown apartment. But the gun was never found. The body had no hair where Paisley

had a beard, its dimensions were slightly different from his, and it was rapidly cremated after an autopsy without any family members being allowed to identify it. Still decomposition can cause such changes, while dental work and fingerprints reportedly matched Paisley's. What happened to John Paisley is the last mystery in this case.

Did John Paisley commit suicide? Was he murdered? Was he close to finding the CIA mole? Was he the mole? Was the *Brillig* incident a cleverly contrived plot to cover his own defection? There are many unanswered questions in the case of John Arthur Paisley.

Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky (1919-1963)

One of the most damaging penetrations by either side in the history of the intelligence war between east and west is unquestionably the case of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who decided to spy for the West against his native Soviet Union. Penkovsky was a senior officer of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) and a "walk in," or volunteer, agent for the West. Penkovsky, just within his short 16-month career as an agent, provided the Western services with a vast amount of information on both the organization and operations of the GRU and on the most secret political and military decisions taken by the Soviet Union.

Born on 23 April 1919 in the North Caucasus city of Ordzhonikidze, Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky (or Penkovskiy, as his name is sometimes rendered) from a very young age wanted to be a military man. His grandfather had been a jurist in the city of Stavropol, where his father was born between 1895 and 1897. Penkovsky's ambitions might have followed from his grandfather's broth-

er, Valentin Antonovich Penkovsky, who was a military man and Soviet officer, and rose to Colonel General in command of the Far East Military District in the late 1950s.

Penkovsky's own father, whose career caused him problems later on, was an engineer trained at the Politechnical Institute of Moscow. In the Russian Civil War, in what became problematical for Penkovsky, his father joined the anti-Bolshevik "Whites," where he became an officer serving in an artillery unit but was killed in the year of Oleg's birth. Penkovsky, by his own account, never knew his father. His mother told him that his father had seen the boy only once, in August 1919, in Stavropol where the young Penkovsky was taken for christening.

Oleg grew up in a Soviet environment, began school when he was eight years old, and was a promising student. He completed ten grades of the school at Vladikavkaz. After this secondary schooling, Penkovsky recalls, "I wanted to be a commander of the Soviet Army." In 1937 he went by train to Kiev where he passed officer candidate entrance examinations. Penkovsky was accepted by the 2nd Kiev Artillery School. Here he took a two-year course and passed out in 1939 as a 20-year-old junior officer.

Initially placed in a unit that participated in the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland in September 1939, the young officer was then posted to the 91st Rifle Division of the Siberian Military District. He served as a battery political officer with the 321st Artillery Regiment. The Soviet Union fought a war with Finland in 1939-1940 and suffered heavy losses. Planning a renewed offensive, in January 1940 the high command redeployed the 91st Division to the Vyborg front where Penkovsky received his baptism of fire. The division was sent against the Finnish Vyborg defenses and suffered fifty per cent casualties on its first day in action, including loss of all three regimental commanders. The division was withdrawn to reorganize but, as a proficient political officer, Penkovsky was transferred to the political Department of the Moscow Military District. There he was assigned

as the assistant chief of the Political Section of the Krasin Artillery School.

Penkovsky kept the artillery school assignment for about a year. In 1941 he was promoted to senior instructor of the district's Political Directorate for Komsomol Work. In 1942 he became a special assignments officer for the Military Council of the Moscow District. Through all this the Soviets had been fighting a war against Germany, which invaded in June 1941. Penkovsky wanted to get into the action and made repeated requests for assignment to the combat fronts. His pleas were answered in November 1943 when Major Penkovsky received assignment to the artillery command of the 1st Ukrainian Front, under Colonel General Sergei S. Varentsov. On Varentsov's staff and then as chief of the command's artillery training camps, Penkovsky built close relations with this senior officer.

In February 1944, as the 1st Ukrainian Front prepared to hurl the Germans back from their positions near Kiev, Major Penkovsky was posted as a battalion commander in the 8th Guards Antitank Artillery Brigade. A month later, on Varentsov's recommendation, he was promoted to regiment commander. The brigade was assigned to 60th Army, which captured Ternopol in April, and Penkovsky's regiment distinguished itself in the defense of that city against German counterattacks. Penkovsky was wounded and left the 27th Antitank Regiment, convalescing at a hospital in Moscow.

During the summer of 1944 Penkovsky renewed his relationship with General Varentsov, who was also in a Moscow hospital recuperating from serious injuries suffered in an automobile accident behind the front. Following his own return to duty Penkovsky was assigned as Varentsov's liaison officer, conveying his instructions to front artillery commanders and investigating the fate of Varentsov's family in Kiev under the Germans and the Soviet liberators (Varentsov's daughter had committed suicide and his mother was freezing and not provided for). Varentsov was grateful and henceforth treated Penkovsky like a son.

Toward the end of the year Penkovsky returned to combat as commander of the 51st Guards Anti-tank Regiment, still with the 1st Ukrainian Front. General Varentsov had also returned to his post by then. Penkovsky came to the attention of front commander Marshal Ivan S. Konev by developing a method in which antitank crews could swiftly change the facing of their pieces to engage new targets. For this and for combat action he was awarded the Order of Aleksandr Nevsky. Penkovsky's unit fought its way across south Poland, participated in the capture of Cracow, and entered Germany, its first city there being Kreuzburg. The front took part in the initial phase of the offensive across the Oder River against Berlin and then turned south to capture Prague in Czechoslovakia.

Oleg Penkovsky ended World War II as an esteemed Soviet officer. Wounded in battle, he held the Nevsky medal already noted, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star, the Order of the Fatherland War, and eight other assorted medals for service. In 1945 he was posted to the Frunze Academy for a three-year course in military arts.

During the early wartime period Penkovsky met Vera Dmitriyevna Gapanovich, daughter of a general in the political administration. They married and the liaison gave Penkovsky even more contacts in senior Soviet circles. The couple had a daughter Galina in 1946 and another toward the end of his career, born on 6 February 1962.

As he moved toward graduation from the Frunze Academy, the GRU first approached Penkovsky in 1948 with an offer to enter intelligence work and an attendant appointment to the Military Diplomatic Academy. On the advice of his father-in-law, Penkovsky passed up the appointment. Instead he was assigned to the Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the Moscow Military District where he worked as a senior officer for six months. Uncomfortable with the political maneuvering that followed Soviet leader Josef Stalin's appointment of his son to an air force post in the Moscow

District, Penkovsky managed to get a transfer to the Ministry of Defense, where he worked as a staff officer on the ground Forces Staff under Marshal Konev.

In 1949 the GRU again offered Penkovsky an appointment and this time he accepted. He entered the Military Diplomatic Academy that fall. On 6 February 1950 Penkovsky was promoted to full colonel. He continued his studies at the Military Diplomatic Academy, including espionage techniques and a three-year English program, and graduated on 22 July 1953. Colonel Penkovsky was then posted to GRU headquarters, working for the 4th Directorate, which focused on the Middle and Far East. Penkovsky specialized in Egypt.

The GRU shifted Penkovsky to its Pakistan desk in August 1954. He was slated for a field assignment to Pakistan in the office of the military attache at Islamabad, but the Pakistani government rejected a Soviet request to increase the size of its attache office. Penkovsky was then selected to be sent to Turkey as assistant military attache there and went to Ankara in the summer of 1955. His wife Vera enjoyed the posting with its diplomatic whirl; the receptions allowed her to make use of her French language proficiency.

Penkovsky truly did do the diplomatic circuit at Ankara, but there was very little of the extracurricular goings-on that characterized some intelligence officers, such as Kim Philby when he headed the British station at Ankara in the late 1940s. Penkovsky is known to have made but one trip outside the capital, and that was to Trebizond where he went to investigate the crash of a Soviet military aircraft.

Despite his caution Penkovsky got into trouble in Turkey but it was with his own service. In January 1956 the military attache, Penkovsky's boss, was replaced. The new attache was Major General Nikolai Petrovich Savchenko (alias "Rubenko"), a former Soviet attache in Afghanistan whose methods seemed crude to Penkovsky who notes, "my relations with him gradually became quite strained." It was this growing acrimony within

the GRU *rezidentura* that first brought Penkovsky to the attention of British intelligence (MI-6). An agent who watched comings and goings at the Soviet embassy noticed Penkovsky sitting alone at an open air cafe, not once but several times. It was not unusual to see a Russian sipping a drink, but Soviet colonies in foreign countries were so inbred and closed that it was strange to see such a senior GRU officer repeatedly isolating himself from comrades. Undoubtedly Penkovsky was brooding about his difficulties with General Savchenko.

Before MI-6 could decide what to make of this report Penkovsky was gone from Ankara. The sudden recall upset Vera's enjoyment of the foreign posting, but troubled Penkovsky even more as his whole career was on the line. The final break with Savchenko resulted from the latter's sloppy methods. It happened that the Shah of Iran visited Turkey in 1956 and GRU headquarters sent out orders that the *rezidentura* was to conduct no operations during the period of the visit. Savchenko nevertheless sent one of his officers out to meet an agent and the man was picked up by Turkish counterintelligence. When Penkovsky expressed an opinion on the affair Savchenko told him to mind his own business. Penkovsky then composed a cable on the matter which he sent to Moscow through KGB channels to get it past Savchenko. It was Penkovsky who was recalled, in November 1956.

At first it seemed that Colonel Penkovsky was in deep trouble. The GRU did not appreciate Penkovsky's getting the KGB, the so-called "neighbors," involved in its affairs. Savchenko naturally also took a dim view of Penkovsky's action. But Savchenko had violated orders and the KGB eventually brought the matter to the attention of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who ordered a complete investigation that established the particulars. Savchenko was recalled and dismissed from the GRU.

Penkovsky was theoretically reinstated but could get no assignments. A GRU personnel officer told him that Savchenko, after all, had been a general and now there would be few generals willing to

have the colonel work for them. Frustrated at his situation, Penkovsky finally went to Marshal Varentsov and told of a desire to return to the artillery corps. In September 1958 Penkovsky was sent to take the nine-month guided missiles course at the Dzerzhinsky Military Artillery Engineering Academy, where he finished first in a class of 60 officers.

The GRU did not in fact allow Penkovsky to return to the artillery branch. Instead it selected him for assignment as military attache in India, a job that would have carried promotion to major general with it. At this moment, after the many security investigations of Penkovsky over the years, the KGB produced the information that his father had been a "White" during the Civil War. Penkovsky responded with an affidavit from his mother that was inserted in the personnel file and cleared him of association with the erstwhile counterrevolutionaries. The India posting disappeared in this latest controversy.

Penkovsky's career was then resurrected by General Ivan Serov, former KGB chief who had been appointed to direct GRU after exposure of the CIA "walk in" agent Pyotr Popov. It was Serov who had handled the KGB's action on the Penkovsky cable regarding Savchenko. Serov appreciated Penkovsky's forthrightness and brought him back to a responsible position after completing his guided missile training. Thus Penkovsky served as a senior officer in the GRU 4th Directorate in 1959-1960. In June 1960 Serov appointed Colonel Penkovsky a member of the GRU personnel selection board, in which capacity he also lectured twice a year to entering GRU student classes.

On 15 November 1960 Penkovsky was additionally assigned to the GRU special group, a pool of officers seconded to other Soviet agencies but secretly working for intelligence. In this capacity Colonel Penkovsky was sent to the State Committee for Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work where he was deputy chief of the Foreign Department of the Directorate for Foreign Relations. Penkovsky's unit arranged for the import of Western technology to the Soviet Union and also for

contacts between Soviet and Western scientists.

Penkovsky now had an official reason for being in extensive contact with Westerners. It was in this period that the GRU officer began to try seriously to establish contacts with Western intelligence services. In the summer of 1960 the GRU man accosted an American couple on their way to a U.S. embassy reception and thrust an envelope into their hands for appropriate American officials. The envelope contained a sample of intelligence and an offer to spy for CIA. But U.S. intelligence officers worried that the approach was a Soviet provocation and did not respond to Penkovsky.

Penkovsky also approached MI-6 through a Canadian trader in 1960 and the British took his offer rather more seriously. That November an MI-6 official instructed Greville Wynne, an agent handler who specialized in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union under cover of corporate export salesman, to establish contact with the state scientific committee. Once Wynne had done so he was told MI-6 had reason to believe Penkovsky was trying to make contact. On his second visit to the state committee Penkovsky took Wynne for a walk outside but made no approach. It turned out MI-6 had had another man on this trade delegation to whom the GRU man had talked but who reacted much as had the CIA, refusing to carry the envelope out of the country to the British. In April 1961 during a further Moscow visit Wynne finally struck the right chord with Penkovsky and drew him out on his desire to work with the British. Wynne asked him where he got his information and Penkovsky explained that in preparing his lectures for GRU students he had free access to the GRU and Defense Ministry archives.

The contact was made. Meanwhile, the Soviets allowed Penkovsky out of the country with scientific delegations visiting Britain. Twice in 1961 Penkovsky brought out priceless information. Intelligence he provided in May established him as a major agent. In July he brought more, vital material on Soviet atomic and missile programs, on ground forces reorganization, even on Soviet plans to erect a

wall between East and West Berlin.

Penkovsky believed he was fulfilling a great mission, but this did little to staunch the gnawing insecurities of the spy in enemy territory. MI-6 and the CIA, which by now had jumped onto the Penkovsky bandwagon and was splitting the expenses with the British, did what they could to satisfy his every whim. On one visit to London the services arranged a quiet dinner party where Penkovsky met with 20 defectors to the West, including men he knew but thought were dead. On another visit Penkovsky was humored by simultaneous commissions as colonel in both the British and U.S. Armies and his photograph was taken in the uniforms of both. When Penkovsky expressed a desire to meet the Queen of England, he could not be accommodated, but instead the CIA arranged, according to Wynne, for him to meet with President John F. Kennedy. Wynne and Penkovsky were spirited out of London, taken to a U.S. air base, flown across the Atlantic for a short meeting, and returned to London within 18 hours, quickly enough that the GRU man's presence was not missed by the Soviet delegation. The services also opened a Swiss bank account for Penkovsky into which they paid \$300 a month, money the Russian never used.

By all accounts Penkovsky was also very fond of women, with numerous conquests in Moscow though he loved his wife and adored his daughters. When the colonel was sent to Paris for a Soviet trade and scientific exposition in September 1961, MI-6 sent four volunteer women officers to keep Penkovsky from straying after the Parisian lovelies.

In his most recent memoir, Greville Wynne observes that not all went smoothly in the cooperation between MI-6 and the CIA. Specifically Wynne complains the Americans made several attempts, including on the occasion of the visit with Kennedy, to recruit Penkovsky away from the British and turn him into an exclusive CIA agent. Penkovsky remained attached to Wynne, however, and resisted all CIA blandishments.

From Paris, Penkovsky returned to Moscow in

October 1961. By that time, in order to have more regular contact with him, MI-6 arranged to have the wife of one of its officers there serve as a courier. She was introduced at an innocuous party, then contrived to run into the Russian while taking the baby for strolls in Gorky Park. At least a half dozen rendezvous were made in this fashion. At some point Penkovsky came under KGB suspicion. Wynne believes this was as a consequence of the successes he seemed to be achieving in trade affairs. Penkovsky thought he detected surveillants in a car as he approached a January 1962 Gorky Park meeting. He felt he saw the same car again within the week.

The method was then changed to communication by "dead letter drops," several of which were used alternatively. When a pickup was to be made Penkovsky would call a Western diplomat, then hang up when the phone was answered. He would mark a certain lamp post on Kutusov Prospekt as an all-safe signal, then confirm with a second aborted phone call. The method was cumbersome to preserve security but there was little alternative. Both MI-6 and the CIA had a hand in servicing the Moscow drops.

Greville Wynne met Penkovsky again in Moscow in July 1962 and found him haggard and worried. The GRU man was now convinced he was under suspicion and indeed, at a 5 July dinner in a restaurant, it seemed clear there was very heavy surveillance of their meeting. The next morning Penkovsky took Wynne to the airport and got him out of town before his scheduled flight by using the influence of a GRU officer.

The British were by now convinced that Penkovsky had to be exfiltrated and had concocted an elaborate plan to hide him inside a custom-built trailer that Wynne was ostensibly to use for a traveling trade show. But the Cuban Missile crisis intervened and the game was up. On 22 October 1962, the day John Kennedy went public with U.S. knowledge of Soviet intermediate range missiles being emplaced in Cuba, Penkovsky was arrested in Moscow. Ironically Penkovsky's intelligence was crucial to the Americans in the crisis—he had given the CIA the Soviet

missile manual showing standard emplacement layouts that enabled the CIA to identify the missile sites in Cuba.

Greville Wynne was arrested in Budapest on 2 November and extradited to the Soviet Union. That day in Moscow Western intelligence officers received the regular signals to service a dead letter drop and the KGB identified everyone who made any move in consequence. Eight British and five American "diplomats" were then expelled from the Soviet Union.

Penkovsky and Wynne were next seen together in May 1963, when the Soviets staged a trial in Moscow. A three officer military court sat from 7 to 11 May and sentenced Penkovsky to death by firing squad and Wynne to eight years imprisonment. Wynne was taken to the Lubyanka and never again saw Penkovsky, later he was held at Vladimir prison. On 22 April 1964 Wynne was exchanged in Berlin for the Soviet spy Konon Molody (alias Gordon Lonsdale) captured by the British.

The intelligence from Penkovsky was a coup for the West. It reportedly comprised over 5,000 documents plus manuscript fragments and notes from the Russian that were collected by the CIA, translated by KGB defector Peter Deriabin, and published in the United States as *The Penkovskiy Papers*. The documents included directives signed by Khrushchev, minutes of Kremlin meetings, and reports on events and Soviet weapons programs.

As with so much in the secret war, however, there is little consensus on the ultimate value of Penkovsky. British counterintelligence (MI-5) expert Peter Wright even wrote a paper in an effort to show Penkovsky must have been a Soviet disinformation agent. Wright notes that the British divided the Penkovsky intelligence into two classes, RUPEE (counterintelligence) and ARNIKA (positive intelligence). The RUPEE material, Wright notes, consisted mainly of identifications of GRU officers with no leads to illegal agents, which he finds incredible, comparing this to Pop-

ov, who gave leads to almost 40 illegals. Meanwhile the ARNIKA material sometimes included original documents, which must have been missed from the archives, while the famous missile manual was shown to Penkovsky by his great uncle the colonel general. The agent reported he had copied it while his relative was out of the room, which seemed to Wright more like James Bond than real life. Finally, Wright believed the trade-craft in handling Penkovsky was so reckless that the agent must have been blown at an early date—1,700 people in Britain alone were on the distribution list for his intelligence. Wright's disinformation agent theory was dismissed at the time but gets a second hearing in his memoirs.

If Penkovsky really was a Soviet plant, the cost to the Russians of this operation was huge. First, there was a very great amount of intelligence divulged, and the information was of the highest sensitivity and quality. Second was the human cost—Penkovsky's exposure led to the downfall of GRU director Ivan Serov, artillery Marshal Varentsov, and the disciplining or demotion of many other Soviet officers. It was a very great distance to go to preserve the credibility of a plant.

Greville Wynne and Peter Deriabin both agree that Penkovsky was motivated primarily by a fear that the Soviet Union was willing to provoke a disastrous nuclear war. Wynne certainly believes that Penkovsky was genuine, but of course in counterintelligence terms he was too close to the case for his opinion to be taken seriously. Penkovsky was also motivated, as is evident from his papers (which some, by the way, believe to be CIA disinformation), partly by disdain for Khrushchev and his senior leadership. Khrushchev's purge of the Soviet military, including the popular wartime leader Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, also infuriated Penkovsky, who must also have been affected by the injustices of the Soviet system as it operated in his own case during the Savchenko affair and elsewhere. If what we think we know about Penkovsky's life is accurate, it is quite possible he would never have agreed to serve as a Soviet disinformation agent.

Pyotr Semyonovich Popov (1922-1960?)

One of the most valuable sources to work for the Central Intelligence Agency "in place" inside the Soviet services, Pyotr Popov's case was viewed as so serious by the Russians that his demise evidently triggered the replacement of the chief of the Soviet service for which he worked. Popov was also a prime example of the "walk in" agent, a man who identifies himself to the other side and volunteers his services. According to one account, the CIA estimated that intelligence material Popov provided saved the United States over a half billion dollars in military research and development expenditures. In addition Popov provided the CIA with a wealth of information on Soviet intelligence officers, organizations, and agents.

The Soviets had no way of knowing that Pyotr Popov would turn out to be a double agent. If anything, Soviet personnel officers must have seen him as a model of the "new Soviet man," risen from the masses to take his place among the privileged in Soviet society. Popov was born a peasant in 1922 at Solnechnaya, a tiny village of perhaps a hundred log huts lining an unpaved road, in Ivanov district near the Volga. As a young boy Pyotr witnessed the massive dislocations and privations attendant to the Soviet campaign against allegedly wealthy farmers ("kulaks") that began in 1928. His own family would have been resettled except for a letter of appeal written by older brother Aleksandr, who had had a few years' schooling, to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin (1875-1946), titular head of the Soviet state and chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Of peasant stock himself, and a metal-worker before the revolution, Kalinin had a reputation for attempting to alleviate hardship in individual cases. This he did for

the Popovs, who were saved from deportation and returned to Solnechnaya.

It was Aleksandr who insisted Pyotr attend school, but the nearest one was at the village of Khady, over an hour's walk away. Aleksandr worked for two weeks to earn money to buy Pyotr a pair of shoes for him to make the trek. Pyotr got oversized shoes that he could grow into, thus using them for a longer time, and began to attend the Khady school at age 13. His father died at about that time but Aleksandr insisted Pyotr continue his schooling, which he did. Pyotr showed aptitude for studies and progressed enough that, in 1938, he was sent to attend a middle school at Tula, south of Moscow.

It was his schooling that led Popov into the Soviet Army. The Soviets attacked Finland in 1939 and suffered grievous losses in the Russo-Finnish war, in addition to the serious losses among the officer corps from the purges of the 1930s. With the need for new officers the Soviets began a program of converting schools into military academies and one school so converted, in 1940, was that at Tula. Pyotr Popov suddenly found himself an officer candidate.

With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the officer candidates were called up for active service. Popov was assigned to a quartermaster unit that ran supplies and ammunition to Soviet artillery units. He worked on supply trains through the war, mostly on the central front, and was twice wounded. In 1943 Popov joined the Communist Party. For the Red Army Solnechnaya produced a couple of sergeants, perhaps, but Popov was the only officer ever to have come from his village.

Wartime losses again provided Popov an opening in 1945, when he was selected to attend the Frunze Military Academy as a captain with four years' service. At the officers' mess there he met Gallina, a slim blonde schoolteacher from Tula, who had fled to Moscow with her mother as German General Heinz Guderian's panzers approached their town in the winter of 1941. Gal-

lina had been teaching German at a combat intelligence school, and she married Popov in December 1945. They were assigned a two-room apartment in Moscow and a daughter, Gallina, was born in 1946.

Popov continued his studies and completed the course at Frunze in 1948. That April, shortly before graduation, he was interviewed by a senior officer from Soviet military intelligence (GRU), and chosen for further training as a GRU officer. Pyotr Popov was then seconded to the Military Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, which provided training for intelligence officers. This program of studies continued for another three years.

After graduation in June 1951 Popov was assigned to the GRU's Strategic Intelligence Directorate. Here he worked on the Austrian desk of the European Division. Popov held the desk job for a little over a year, until GRU headquarters sent him into the field with an assignment to Vienna. Austria was then under joint occupation by the allies of World War II and had become a hotbed for intrigue and intelligence work. Promoted to major, Popov went to Vienna as "Pyotr S. Panov," and was assigned to the Yugoslav "line," or section, of the GRU Strategic Intelligence *rezidentura*, where he was to work against Yugoslavs residing in Austria. According to the major account of this case, Popov's Vienna assignment began in August 1952.

It was not long before Popov encountered difficulties in Vienna. He was barely conversant in German much less the eight major languages of Yugoslavia, while Colonel Ivan Yegerov, chief of the Yugoslav "line," evidently disliked Popov. The 30-year-old major further complicated his situation by starting an affair with one of his agents, a destitute woman whom he helped with money. When Popov's wife and daughter joined him in Vienna his pay was not enough for everyone, and Popov used some operational funds for his girlfriend. Fearing Yegerov would discover the missing money, Popov first approached the Americans.

The first the CIA learned of Popov was in November 1952, when the intelligence coordinator for the U.S. high commissioner in Austria found an envelope in the front seat of his car. The envelope contained a letter offering the U.S. the newly revised table of organization and equipment for a Soviet tank division in exchange for 3,000 Austrian schillings (about \$120.00 at the time). The CIA came in to translate the letter and then took over the case. A first meeting with Popov was held at a CIA safehouse in Vienna where he handed over the information and collected some of the money.

In the interval between the first and second meetings with Popov, the CIA's Vienna station set up procedures to handle the agent, whom they called "Max." Washington headquarters first codenamed Popov "Attic" but changed the designator every several months thereafter. Headquarters also sent two Soviet specialists to Vienna, one of them George Kisvalter, who became Popov's case officer. From listening to tapes of the first safehouse meeting, Kisvalter was able to tell Popov was of peasant origin and a Great Russian.

Kisvalter took over Popov at the second meeting and handled him thereafter. An immediate intelligence gain at that time was Popov's identification of 24 GRU officers in Vienna with their operational assignments and cover names. At first Popov inflated his own importance by claims to be handling eight agents, but he later admitted to control of only six. He also gave numerous details of the Soviet intelligence (MGB, then KGB) *rezidentura*, which had 70 officers in 14 different sections under Evgeny Kovalov. Popov also brought in a GRU payroll with names of every GRU officer, technician, clerical worker and driver in Vienna along with their ranks, dates in grade, and even the amounts of currency they had converted at the GRU finance office.

In mid-1953 Major Popov returned to the Soviet Union for home leave enabling Kisvalter to get a rest at home himself. Popov returned to visit his brother and sister at Solnechnaya, where he used money from the CIA to buy them a cow. Pyotr found the village unchanged since his last visit in

1949, and indeed since his childhood. He was filled with chagrin at a Soviet system that did nothing for its least advantaged citizens and redoubled his efforts for the CIA. From conversations between Kisvalter and Popov upon his return, the Americans were able to conclude that Popov's real motive was revenge against the Soviet Union for the injustices he perceived.

The CIA did try to pay their Russian agent, and budgeted \$400 a month for Popov, but except for the money Popov took to purchase the cow for his siblings, the GRU man rarely used more than \$50 of his monthly CIA allotment. At one meeting "Max" found a copy of the magazine *American Farming Journal* and showed his roots with intensive questions to his handlers on American agricultural techniques, hardly believing that the methods described and products advertised in the magazine could be real ones. Thereafter the CIA was careful to stock the safehouses with issues of the journal, with which Popov frequently relaxed at the meetings. Popov met his CIA handlers about three times a month, setting the frequency of meetings himself. The Vienna station soon developed a backlog of material to process as it took them about three weeks to complete the paperwork and transcriptions from each safehouse meeting.

Meanwhile the GRU promoted Popov to lieutenant colonel in 1953 and gave him another home leave in July 1954. He returned from that trip with intelligence material on Soviet atomic submarines and guided missiles, subjects of the greatest intelligence interest to the CIA. In another instance, Popov was able to provide a copy of an important Soviet classified document, the Soviet Army's field service regulations. The U.S. military had been seeking the manual, which detailed basic Soviet ground tactics, since they learned of its post-war edition in 1947. At one Washington interagency meeting to set intelligence requirements, the Pentagon had even put a price of \$500,000 on a copy of the manual. When asked, Popov did not see how he could get hold of a copy of the 1947 edition, since that manual had been withdrawn when a revised edition was adopted in

1951. It was the first the Americans heard that a 1951 edition even existed. Popov and Kisvalter spent a full meeting at the safehouse photographing each page of the 1951 field service regulations.

In late 1954 Popov recruited an important agent for the Russians in the Austrian interior ministry, who was able to provide the Soviets with all the kinds of documents they might need to establish cover for their agents. With his reputation within the GRU thus enhanced, Popov continued working for the CIA until September 1955, when the GRU transferred him to headquarters in Moscow. Concerned with security, the CIA reportedly made no effort to run "Max" as an agent or to contact him in Moscow.

One day in December 1956, in Washington where the CIA read the intercepts from the Berlin tunnel, tapping the main telephone circuits into Russian military and intelligence headquarters, the Americans found in the traffic an administrative message routinely informing Karlshorst, the Soviet headquarters, that Lieutenant Colonel Popov should be expected to arrive the next day. Kisvalter was sent to Berlin where the CIA tried to figure out how to make contact with "Max." But before they could find a solution, Popov himself initiated contact through a letter he passed to a couple of British liaison officials traveling in East Germany. The safehouse meetings resumed, as did Popov's covert subscription to *American Farming Journal*.

Once again, for almost two years, the CIA mined Popov's rich lode of intelligence. He provided extensive details on GRU and KGB intelligence organization and operations in Germany. In another instance, Popov told his case officers that a visiting colonel, drunk partying, had boasted that the Soviets had acquired full technical information on the characteristics of the U-2 spyplane, which had been overflying the Soviet Union since 1956.

Meanwhile, in both known and unknown ways, the operational security surrounding "Max" was slowly unraveling. Popov provided great informa-

tion but he made mistakes that contributed to his downfall. One that the CIA knew about was the fact that Popov stayed in touch with his former girlfriend in Vienna, who was still a Soviet agent being run by the GRU. The Soviets could have discovered this at any time and the knowledge, at the least, might have led them to question the quality of Popov's tradecraft, which could result in his recall from the field. Another error, unknown at the time, was his letter passed through the British. Using that avenue tipped off the British that the Americans had a major agent in East Germany, and the British Berlin station included George Blake (see entry, this volume), a Soviet spy who undoubtedly passed this information along to his Soviet handlers.

It is difficult to say whether it was Blake or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who most immediately triggered the end of the Popov affair. The Soviets had assigned "Max" to their illegals line to supervise agents being sent under deep cover to the West. The first of Popov's illegals was Margarita Nikolievskaya Tairov, being sent to New York City. When she arrived in October 1957, she was placed under intensive surveillance by the FBI until, never having made any apparent effort to engage in espionage, she fled on 12 March 1958. Tairova had evidently detected the surveillance and terminated her mission as a result.

The Soviet investigation of the breach of its security in the Tairov case led directly to Popov. He was questioned in detail by the GRU, and in November 1958 by a senior colonel of the KGB. Popov was then recalled to Moscow for an ostensibly temporary assignment. Apparently not suspecting the serious nature of his situation, Popov refused a CIA offer to defect, as he had done on several previous occasions. "Max" never again appeared in the West. In a development that may have been related to the Popov leak, the GRU chief was dismissed toward the end of 1958 and replaced by KGB director General Ivan Serov.

One detailed account of the Popov affair opens with a scene in Moscow in which "Max," clearly being played back under Soviet control, makes contact with an American diplomat. This was the denouement of the affair. In 1962 the Soviet press revealed the Popov affair and indicated that he had been shot for treason.





Part III: ***Operating Areas***

Operating Area: Berlin

Berlin forms an enclave some 110 miles inside East Germany. Under an agreement signed at Lancaster House, in London, on 12 September 1944, the city was to be jointly administered by the victorious powers of World War II—the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union. Each of the powers was given a zone of occupation including some of Berlin's districts. Later France was added as an occupying power and allotted a zone as well. Berlin is the setting for much spy fiction only because it has been the locale for so much espionage in fact.

Celebrating its 750th anniversary in 1987, Berlin is an old city that has witnessed much history, from Hohenzollern kings and emperors, to a victory march by Napoleon, to the massive destruction of World War II and the occupation following it. The city measures about 28 miles along its east-west axis and slightly more from north to south, totalling 341 square miles, altogether about the size of the five boroughs of New York City.

Soviet forces captured Berlin during the last days of World War II and wreaked havoc upon the city and its inhabitants for several months thereafter. In the first week of July 1945 the Russians withdrew from districts slated for occupation by the Western powers, making way for 50,000 troops of the British 7th Armored Division and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division. Some 2,200,000 Berliners lived on 158 square miles in the Western sector, with another 1,150,000 in the larger Soviet occupation zone.

The city was not at first divided after the war, except theoretically into the occupation zones. Rather, the city as a whole was to be administered by an Allied Control Commission comprising the commanders of each of the occupation forces, sitting as a council with the chairmanship rotating each month among the members. Various subcom-

mittees regulated city functions under the direction of the Commission, utilizing Berliners to staff departments and agencies providing city services. As a first step in political reintegration, a Berlin senate was created to advise the occupation authorities, known collectively as the *Kommandatura*.

Surprisingly enough, the cumbersome administrative system worked relatively smoothly in the immediate aftermath of the war. General Lucius D. Clay, American commander and later high commissioner in Germany, has written of his friendly relations with Soviet Marshals Georgi Zhukov and V.D. Sokolovsky, opposite numbers on the commission. Cooperation gradually broke down with rising international tensions, reflected in Berlin by obstructionism within the *Kommandatura* and progressive breakdown of services.

When, in 1948, Western occupation authorities in Germany determined to proceed with currency reform in the Anglo-American zones, cooperation came to an end. On 1 April 1948 the Soviets imposed restrictions upon travel to Berlin and began to delay British and American trains at the interzone boundary along the Elbe River. On 5 April a C-47 making its final approach to Berlin's British airfield Gatow was destroyed when a Soviet fighter plane collided with it in midair. The Soviets apologized but the Western allies then ordered fighter escorts for their transport planes to Berlin.

Then, on 18 June the Soviets imposed a total blockade on all ground traffic in and out of Berlin, gambling that this would starve out the allies. The British, French, and Americans reacted with Operation VITTEL'S, a full-scale airlift of everything necessary to sustain the city behind the lines. The massive lift utilized the three air corridors to which the Soviets had agreed on 30 November 1945: Hamburg-Berlin, Buckeburg (Hannover)-Berlin, and Frankfurt-Berlin. VITLES delivered 80 tons the first day but within a month was shipping 3,000 tons a day into Berlin, and kept it up until the Soviets lifted the blockade on 12 May 1949. Berliners helped with distribu-

tion, work crews, and building by hand the new Tegel airfield in the French zone. During the airlift there were a total of 733 air incidents and 39 British, 31 American, and five German airmen lost their lives. This first Berlin crisis ended the pretense at joint occupation, in effect creating West Berlin and East Berlin as separate entities.

One of the earliest consequences of the breakup of "joint" control was the demise of the Berlin-wide police force, an 11,000 strong unit the Soviets originally formed before the arrival of allied occupation troops. The Soviet-selected chief of the force, Paul Markgraf, had been a Wehrmacht colonel and division commander captured at Stalingrad who had joined the so-called Free Officers Movement and was "re-educated" in Moscow. Markgraf exhibited a predilection for firing police officers who failed to demonstrate a pro-Soviet orientation. When he did this once too often in 1948 the allied sector commanders refused to continue accepting Markgraf's authority.

The Soviets kept their police force, but West Berlin then organized its own, with a chief subordinate to a designated senator. The West Berlin police grew and improved with plentiful budgetary allocations; by the 1960s spending on the police consumed roughly ten per cent of West Berlin's annual budget, twice as much as the city spent for roads and mass transit combined. By 1969 there were 10,000 in the uniformed force, the *Schutzpolizei* or "protective police" (called "*Schupos*"), plus 1,400 in the investigative detective force or *Kriminalpolizei* (called "*Kripo*"). There were also 3,000 in the paramilitary "emergency police" or *Bereitschaftspolizei* (called "*Bepo*"). Finally there was the "Volunteer Police Reserve" of 5,000, another paramilitary force somewhat akin to the U.S. National Guard, wearing military-style fatigue uniforms and undergoing periodic callup for military training. It has been estimated that the West Berlin police overall are so well equipped that they have firepower equivalent to a Wehrmacht infantry division during World War II.

The real military power in Berlin was of course


the allied occupation forces. Their peak strength occurred in the immediate aftermath of the war, but there was another peak of sorts in 1961, at the time of the Berlin Wall crisis. At that time the U.S. contingent consisted of 6,500 troops, the British had 4,000, and the French another 3,000 soldiers in West Berlin. The Americans reinforced their Berlin formations with an additional battle-group of about 1,200 troops. Numbers were reduced gradually as tension dissipated after 1961 and as armed forces manpower levels declined. By 1975 the American Berlin brigade had 4,400 soldiers, the British 3,000, and the French another 2,000. In 1986 U.S. strength stood at 4,300 in a brigade, the British had 3,000 in three battalions and an armored squadron, and the French had increased their presence to 2,700 in an infantry regiment plus an armored regiment.

Western occupation forces were a natural espionage target for the Soviets and later their East German allies, both for tactical intelligence bearing on any prospective battle for Berlin and also for general operational and technical intelligence on the quality of Western armies. Naturally the Soviet and East German forces have been a similar target for the various Western intelligence services. So, almost from the beginning, Berlin became a cockpit of the espionage war.

The Soviets established their headquarters in East Berlin at Karlshorst in 1945, the site being the former Sankt Antonius Hospital. Soviet intelligence was briefly under Lavrenti Beria, then Ivan Serov, both future heads of the KGB. Headquarters of the GRU was at Wuensdorf, and later also at Karlshorst, plus by 1956 there was a Transborder Operations Directorate at Stossen-Umsdorf. Manpower was extensive—there were 800 officers of the MGB (later KGB) in East Germany in the early 1950s, and it is reported that after Stalin's death some 1,700 of 2,800 intelligence officers were recalled or dismissed. A 1970s estimate was that the KGB had 60 offices in East Germany, many of them in Berlin, with 900 officers of the First Chief Directorate and 600 of the Second Chief Directorate. The GRU manpower was at least 250 in the early 1950s, while the

Karlshorst contingent in 1956, the so-called *Opergruppe* for espionage throughout Western Europe, had 90 by itself. The GRU continues to maintain an autonomous 2nd Direction solely to conduct intelligence work in the Berlin area. Meanwhile there is the East German MfS (also known as the SSD), with headquarters in East Berlin at Normannstrasse 22 and a Technical Department on the Freienwalderstrasse on the outskirts of East Berlin.

In West Berlin the British Military Commandant, with his offices in the Olympic Stadium Buildings, also provided facilities for the MI-6 station. Headquarters for U.S. intelligence, after 1947 called the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was in the Dahlem district. During the early cold war years Germany had the CIA's biggest station, with about 1,200 officers assigned, and Berlin was its largest operating base.



In the early post-war years, before technical intelligence was very well established, much of the information that flowed to the Soviet and Western intelligence officers was bogus. This was the heyday of the "papermills," so called because much of the supposed "intelligence" provided by agents actually came right out of newspapers or other open sources. In Berlin these freelance agents were called *hundert mark jungen*, or "hundred mark boys," because they would often retail information for this pitiful amount, about £5 at the time. One 1955 estimate was that there were 7,000 agents in Berlin alone, and in 1961 a Swede raised the Berlin tally to 12,000 spies. East Berlin's Cafe Warsaw developed into a favorite meeting place for agents and intelligence officers, a sort of spy stock exchange, where half the tables could be occupied by Soviet, Czech, Polish, British, American, French, East German, and West German officers.

Such agent numbers seem out of proportion until one stops to consider the traffic of humanity through West Berlin. For example, a favorite Soviet and East German tactic was to insert agents into the mass of refugees making their way west. There were 129,245 refugees in 1949 alone, 197,788 in 1950, 58,605 just in the month of June 1953, when riots in East Berlin shook the East German government, altogether 2.3 million registered (and an estimated 430,000 undeclared) refugees before the Berlin Wall went up in August 1961. In addition, East Berliners until that time had free access to West Berlin and the daily rate of crossings to the Western zone averaged 500,000, with as many as 60,000 East Berliners actually having jobs in West Berlin. Similarly West Berliners had free access to East Berlin, as did foreigners. There were about 40,000 foreign nationals resident in West Berlin, including 3,000 Americans (the largest single national group being Israelis), another 20,000 foreigners who became naturalized German citizens, plus an average annual tourist flow of 160,000 foreign nationals and 400,000 West Germans.

Whatever the actual numbers of agents, some of the most valuable intelligence came from techni-

cal collection. In this category the most notable instance was the joint CIA/MI-6 operation called GOLD from 1954 to 1956. Western intelligence officers examining old Berlin city plans discovered that the main underground telephone cables, which ran from Potsdam (Altenglienecke) to Karlshorst to Lichtenberg actually approached within 1,000 feet of the American sector at Rudow, at the southwest corner of the city. The cable ran just eighteen inches under the drainage ditch along the Schoenfelder Chausee that connected the Soviet military airfield Schoenfeld with the rest of the city. The CIA drove a 6 1/2 foot diameter tunnel some 1,476 feet to intersect the phone cable, extracting 3,100 tons of dirt, and MI-6 inserted phone taps that were active for eleven months before discovered. The intelligence "take" was so massive that MI-6, at least, was still processing it in 1961.

It was also in the early 1950s that the espionage war was bloodiest. There were murders and kidnappings, about 40 kidnappings alone in West Berlin between 1952 and 1954. The Soviets felt sorely tried by the (reportedly CIA-financed) League of Free Jurists, which was sending researchers and investigators into East Germany. On 8 July 1952 the SSD (MfS) mounted an operation to kidnap Dr. Theo Friedlander, the league chairman. Unable to trap the chairman, the East Germans went after his assistant Dr. Walter Linse, who was bundled into a car disguised as a taxi and spirited into East Berlin. The Soviets denied all knowledge of the incident but, months later, themselves released an announcement that Linse had confessed to espionage and been sentenced to 25 years in prison. He was never heard from again. An incident that went the other way was the 1955 exposure of the Institute of Economic Studies on Klosterstrasse, which turned out to be a front for Soviet intelligence. Thirty-five agents were arrested and the director, Dr. Hans Hartig, hanged himself in a cell of the British prison.

Renewed international crisis, the so-called Berlin "Deadline" crisis of 1958, reminded everyone of the importance of good intelligence on develop-

ments around the city. This crisis revolved around Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's suddenly setting a deadline of several months in which to settle the German peace treaty, which the powers had not been able to agree upon in the 13 years since 1945. The deadline passed with no treaty, but there was no Soviet action either; the situation remained essentially unresolved. In Washington, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered a special study by a group under his National Security Council to examine United States options in the event of a renewal of the Berlin crisis. In Moscow, thinking began that led to the Berlin Wall a few years later. According to the accounts of MI-6 officer Greville Wynne, both Penkovsky and another Soviet agent working for MI-6 produced information, long before the 1961 crisis, indicating that the Soviets would back down if openly confronted by the West.


By 1961 the Soviets and the East German government of Walter Ulbricht had reached a state of complete frustration. East Germans continued to take advantage of their access to West Berlin to escape from the GDR. In fact the tide of refugees reached flood proportions, with thousands fleeing every day. On 1 August 1961, for example, 1,322 persons registered at the Marienfelde Refugee Reception Center; on 5 August the number was 1,283 and on the 9th it was 1,926. On 13 August Soviet and East German troops suddenly filled East Berlin with their armor and heavy weapons, while East German militiamen began to erect a barrier between East and West Berlin.

The Berlin Wall began as a simple barbed wire obstacle no more than knee high, but that was soon supplemented by cinderblock, then cast concrete walls, then vehicle obstructions and every kind of device suitable to impede passage. The West made no effort to pull down the wall. American President John F. Kennedy felt he could bring along the allies in the case of a Soviet action, but not one being carried out by East Germans. The U.S. did mobilize some of its reserve troops, and it reinforced the Berlin Brigade with a battlegroup of the 3rd Armored Division sent up the *autobahn* from West Germany. The closest thing to confron-

tation came at Checkpoint Charlie in the American sector, where U.S. tanks and troops faced off against Soviets on the East Berlin side. Kennedy later made a trip to West Berlin during which he proclaimed, "I am a Berliner too!"

The advent of the Berlin Wall did not ultimately lead to war, but it did slow the flow of refugees to a trickle. The Wall greatly reduced the ease with which espionage could be conducted in Berlin, even though foreign nationals continued to be allowed in both parts of the city. The Wall also spawned a new generation of shady characters replacing the "hundred mark boys." These were the *fluchthelfers* (literally "Flight helpers" or escape assistants) who, often for a price, would concoct more and more imaginative plans to aid persons wanting to escape from the GDR. Many refugees were killed or arrested, but many succeeded in reaching the West, at least 4,000 by one account. There were escapes in the trunks of cars, concealed in trucks, through tunnels dug under the Wall, on boats, using false identities, climbing the Wall, and so forth. East German border guards themselves were not immune, and some 546 of them defected between 1961 and 1969.

Each escape made the East Germans redouble their efforts at making the Wall impenetrable. Over the years it has become a virtual fortified zone. The Wall extends over a full length of 102.7 miles and has an average height of ten feet. It consists of different materials at different points, including cinderblock, poured concrete (with rounded top edges to prevent handholds), and metal gratings. Barbed wire adorns the top of the Wall, and there are extensive barbed wire barriers on the eastern side, along with anti-tank obstacles to prevent vehicles from crashing through, a technique that has been tried. There is a raked sand perimeter to allow patrols to detect the presence of persons near the Wall, and after the repeated defections of border guards, patrols themselves were enlarged to two and then three men. The East Germans have cleared a 275-yard-wide field of fire behind the Wall and its obstacles, and in the most densely populated areas they relocated inhabitants and razed buildings to create this



zone. The basic security network consists of 252 watchtowers, 136 bunkers, and 262 enclosed runs for fierce guard dogs. The Berlin Wall is indeed a formidable barrier.

In 1966, meanwhile, the East German government began to allow a certain amount of controlled emigration to the West, perhaps 4,000 a year. The two Germanys reached an agreement on the status of Berlin in 1971, after a technical agreement on telephone service in July 1970. In January and April 1971, for the first time since May 1952, telephone service between the two Berlins was restored with 15 lines in each direction. A further agreement among the four occupying powers was reached in 1971 and finally signed on 3 June 1972, providing for a Soviet consulate in West Berlin and for renewed access by West Berliners to East Berlin, using West German passports. This agreement also guaranteed the road, rail, and air links from West Berlin to West Germany. In the 1980s the East German government has again begun to allow limited access by East Berliners who have families in West Berlin.

Most access to West Berlin is now by road or air. Railroad service has been greatly reduced—where once there were 18 trains a day to Frankfurt, by 1968 this was down to two. Air flights are more numerous, do not require dealing with East German authorities, and tickets into (though not out of) West Berlin are partly subsidized by the city government. Major road access exists from three points on the West German border, each with a checkpoint just inside East Germany where visitors, including West German citizens since 1968, must purchase a transit visa. Fees for the papers were estimated at that time to have a potential value for the East German government of \$400 million a year; it is suspected that some of the funds are used to help pay for MfS espionage in the West. The checkpoints are at Zarrenthin for Road E15 (Hamburg), at Marienborn for E8 (Hannover), and at Wartha for E63 (Frankfurt). At each checkpoint the traveler receives a date/time slip that allows checkpoints at the Berlin end to tell whether excessive time has elapsed in transit, one indicator of possible espionage or other question-

able activity along the way. There is also an entry to the south for Road E6 (Munich) with a checkpoint at Hirschberg, and entry checkpoints for travelers by sea at Warnemunde and Sassnitz. Traffic density in the late 1960s averaged 860,000 vehicles a year including about 90,000 buses.

Entry from West to East Berlin is strictly regulated and supervised. Foreign nationals can enter East Berlin only at Checkpoint Charlie or at the Friedrichstrasse subway station. There are another two checkpoints that may only be used by West Germans, plus five checkpoints that are restricted to residents of West Berlin.

The violence of the secret war, at least, has abated since the heyday of the early 1950s. For example, attempted murders (for all reasons) in West Berlin in 1967 numbered only 56, of which only 46 were successful. That year there were more than 300 murders in Chicago and over 500 in New York. Berlin is perhaps no longer the center for spies it once was, but it remains a key operating area for many intelligence services.

Operating Area: Soviet Union

Controls in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are such that the Russians regulate the internal migration of their own people. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Soviets regulate the foreign nationals resident in or visiting Russia. In fact the controls are so strong that the Central Intelligence Agency routinely refers to the Soviet Union as a "denied area."

Most foreign nationals in the Soviet Union reside in Moscow (1974 population: 8,396,000) or Leningrad (1974 population: 4,779,000). The United States has also been interested for some time in opening an official consulate in Kiev (1974 population: 2,355,000). All three of these cities are open to residents and visitors, although travel restrictions often begin at city limits. At Moscow, for

example, foreign nationals are restricted in most areas beginning outside the ring road that encircles the city (see map below). The United States has its embassy and residences in Moscow and a holiday *dacha* outside the city.

Not only do territorial restrictions apply, but the Soviets use most provision of basic services to residents as an additional means of keeping tabs on foreign activities. For official residents this is done by the Administration for Servicing the Diplomatic Corps (*Upravleniye po Obsluzhivaniyu Diplomaticheskogo Korpusa* or UPDK). This unit does virtually everything including leasing apartments, providing plumbers, painters, telephone repairmen, maids, bartenders, translators, and even piano teachers. UPDK services extend to printing calling cards and giving driving lessons. The UPDK is officially a unit of the Soviet Foreign Ministry but foreign nationals assume it is KGB. In fact the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB is explicitly tasked to operate against foreigners in Russia, as is the 1st Direction of the GRU around Moscow. The KGB's independent Seventh Directorate provides surveillance teams for all purposes.


Diplomats and other officials who desire to travel outside Moscow must make their arrangements through UPDK, while private citizens must use Intourist. Soviet security maintains close relations with hotels and restaurants throughout the Soviet Union and undoubtedly uses many of them for intelligence gathering. The Fourth Section of the First Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate has the specific task of monitoring contacts between foreign nationals and Soviet citizens outside Moscow. In addition, local offices of the KGB throughout the Soviet Union routinely report on foreign nationals moving through their areas.

Only certain roads may be used by foreign nationals in the Soviet Union, while certain parts of the country are closed to foreign travel. Until 1978 Soviet travel restrictions closed approximately twenty-four per cent of the Russian landmass to foreign nationals (see map below). At that time

revised regulations were issued that reduced the proportion of the landmass that is restricted to about twenty per cent.

Foreign diplomats use special license plates that identify ownership of their vehicles. Plates on United States vehicles, for example, bear the code number "04." Even use of the telephone is not a simple matter in the Soviet Union. There is no telephone number "information" service, while telephone books are not considered public information. All these factors tend to complicate intelligence operations inside the Soviet Union and simplify Soviet counterespionage efforts.

FREE MOVEMENT AREAS AROUND MOSCOW



SOURCE: *The Washingtonian Magazine*, May 1986

Note: Dark areas along edges of map are restricted. The dark areas in the center are Moscow itself. Dark lines leading to the map are highways open for travel. Istra, Zvenigorod, and Domodedovo Airport are open; Sheremet'yevo Airport is a Soviet military base and is closed. Light irregular lines crossing the map are rivers.

SOVIET RESTRICTED AREAS PRIOR TO 1978



SOURCE: *The New York Times*, February 3, 1977

Operating Area: United States

Travel restrictions on American citizens resident in the Soviet Union (who consist principally of diplomats, journalists, and [of course] spies) have existed for many years and persisted despite repeated U.S. requests to lift them. The United States retaliated in 1955 by imposing similar restrictions on Soviet citizens in the United States. A sort of tit-for-tat system developed under which the United States closed off a proportion of its landmass equivalent to that portion of the Soviet Union off limits to Americans. The prohibited list was revised in 1967 and most recently in 1983.

The obvious reason for closure of a territory is the presence of defense facilities, military production plants, or other sensitive sites. But a number of

locations, the State Department itself concedes, are on the prohibited list merely to preserve the principle of proportionality. In addition, there are closed cities within otherwise open areas, as well as open cities within closed areas. The system generally operates to facilitate surveillance of Soviet activities.

Soviet nationals are allowed free movement within 25 miles of the main Soviet missions in the United States, which are Washington, D.C., New York, and San Francisco. Otherwise, even in traveling to open areas, a Russian must file with the State Department, in writing at least a day in advance, his intention to take a trip, as well as his destination and the route he intends to follow. Soviet representatives can also request permission to visit closed areas, but this is rarely granted. In making a trip, a Soviet national would be allowed transit on interstate highways that go through closed areas although they would not be permitted off the road except to nearby rest stops, restaurants, or gas stations. For example, a Soviet national could use the New Jersey Turnpike through prohibited portions of New Jersey en route from New York to Washington. It should be noted that Soviet intelligence officers, as in the Lindberg case (see entry, Volume I), covered by these rules are not permitted to rent unchauffered cars, planes, helicopters, or boats. Finally, there are prohibited locations even within the free movement areas, such as Bayonne and Nutley, New Jersey near New York or certain locations near San Francisco.


The major impact of the 1983 revision was to reduce the restricted portion of the U.S. landmass from about twenty-four per cent to about twenty per cent. Officially closed for the first time in 1983 is "Silicon Valley" south of San Francisco, as well as the cities of Houston, Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Seattle. Opened in 1983 were Birmingham, Cleveland, Indianapolis, Little Rock, Louisville, Memphis, Phoenix, Savannah, Spokane, Topeka, and Tucson. Following, for visual reference, is a map showing the 1967 restrictions.

The delineation of the open area within Los Angeles County is quite detailed in the 1983 revision and serves as an example of the attention given this project: only those portions of the County of Los Angeles within the following boundaries are open: the Pacific Ocean coast from Route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway) northwest to California Route 27 (Topanga Canyon Road) thence north on Route 27 to U.S. 101 (the Ventura Freeway), east on U.S. 101 to California Route 2, then north and east on California Route 2 to the area of "Little Jimmy Spring" in the Angeles National Forest (34°20'43"N, 117°49'42"W), thence south along a straight line bearing 183.5° to Route I-10 (the San Bernardino Freeway), west on I-10 to California

Route 19 (Rosemead Boulevard), south on Route 19 to I-5 (the Santa Ana Freeway), north on I-5 to Slauson Avenue, west on Slauson Avenue to Route I-465 (the San Diego Freeway), north on I-465 to Route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway), and west on I-10 to the Pacific coast. Offshore, along the Pacific coast between I-10 and California Route 29, the open area is limited to an area within 100 meters of the low water line. (It would not be surprising if Soviet spies were left a little confused by all this.)

Under the 1983 regulations, the state of Hawaii is entirely closed and the state of Rhode Island is entirely open.

WASHINGTON DC FREE MOVEMENT ZONE



SOURCE: *The Washingtonian Magazine*, May 1986.

Note: Shaded areas are open to movement of Soviet nationals. Labeled highways are open even where surrounding areas are not. Other areas require prior notice and permission or are prohibited.

UNITED STATES CLOSED AREAS UNDER 1967 REGULATIONS



SOURCE: *The New York Times*, February 3, 1977.

Note: The Soviet Union is the only foreign country against which the United States enforces travel restrictions. Thus officers of Soviet Bloc intelligence services, for example, retain free access to all points in the United States.

Operating Area: Vienna

Vienna is an old and venerable city descended into the modern age. It stands on the site of an old Celtic settlement that was transformed into a Roman stronghold in 90 A.D. The name *Wien* (Vienna) first appeared as long ago as 1030, and the city first was used as a capital in 1140. Some

maintain the city reached its apogee under the early Hapsburgs Charles VI (1711-1740) and Maria Theresa (1740-1780), when it housed many scientists, artists, and musicians such as Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Vienna has nevertheless retained a place as one of the great cities of Europe throughout Hapsburg times, during the interwar period, and despite the massive destruction wrought by World War II.

Like Berlin, Vienna emerged from the war a city under joint occupation. Its 23 districts were appor-

tioned among the Russians, Americans, British, and French. Unlike Berlin, the true city center, the *Innere Stadt* ("Inner City"), was under the control of a single occupying power but that power rotated every month. The *Innere Stadt* was only a small portion of Vienna's area but it contained much of the city's treasure of palaces, museums, libraries, and churches, along with its best hotels. When the occupying powers moved in, they rapidly requisitioned many of these buildings, so that the zone of rotating administration also became the focus for much espionage activity.

The Soviets, for example, housed their occupation authority at the Imperial Hotel (Kaerntnerring 16), formerly the palace of an archduke built in the late 19th century, which is still reputed to be the best hotel in Vienna. It was no doubt incongruous for Soviet officers and communist officials to enter this building and ascend the palatial stairway, dominated as it was by a huge portrait of the Hapsburg emperor Franz Josef, but even after the painting was stored the connotation of empire was unmistakable.

Beyond the atmosphere was the tight fit. The Imperial had 160 rooms to accommodate the Soviet Control Commission plus the *rezidenturas* of the KGB and the GRU, on its fifth floor. The GRU had almost 30 officers responsible for networks of agents and operated four "strategic intelligence points" around Vienna in 1953. The KGB station had some 14 sections in 1952 with about 70 officers assigned. The total number of Soviet officers working at the Imperial around that time was about 250.

Most of the Russians were billeted across the street at the Grand Hotel, whose official entrance was also on the Kaerntnerring. Soviet officers had a 10 P.M. curfew. Only the KGB *rezident*, his deputy, and a few others had keys permitting them to enter the Grand through a rear door. Thus only these senior officers evaded CIA surveillance, for an agency photography specialist ingeniously rigged a miniature camera in a car left parked on the Kaerntnerring that took pictures of Soviet officers entering or exiting the Imperial Hotel and

sometimes the Grand.

Headquarters for the Soviet occupation army in Austria, a force of 100,000 troops, was located outside Vienna at the town of Baden bei Wien. Soviet headquarters also contained the GRU tactical intelligence *rezidentura*, which was kept separate from the elite strategic intelligence specialists, although it handled administrative matters for both units. The Soviet occupation zone extended north and west of Vienna, which caused additional difficulties for Western intelligence services.

Just a few steps down the Kaerntnerring, Americans had requisitioned the Bristol Hotel (Kaerntnerring 1) where the U.S. housed its own officers. The U.S. also requisitioned the former Luftwaffe airfield at Tulln, a village of 5,500 several miles inside the Soviet occupation zone. Tulln was satisfactory for most occupation purposes, but for sensitive flights like smuggling defectors out of the city, its location made its use undesirable. The U.S. Air Force therefore improvised a small emergency airstrip in the American zone of Vienna out of an L-shaped parking lot. This strip was only suitable for light aircraft, however. There was, finally, a daily U.S. military train from Vienna to Bavaria nicknamed the "Mozart Express," but the train also crossed the Soviet zone and was subject to search.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the most active U.S. service in Vienna was the Army's Counterintelligence Corps (CIC). The forerunner of the CIA, called the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), worked in Vienna under CIC cover on a much smaller scale. The CIA arrived in Vienna in 1947, upon creation of the agency, when the Central Intelligence Group (successor to SSU) converted to the new identity. In 1948 an additional station was opened by the newly formed Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). In 1952 the two stations were melded into a single CIA station, which remained the smallest component of the American legation save for the Office of Naval Intelligence, which maintained a single officer in Vienna. CIA personnel were outnumbered by CIC and G-2 military intelligence men by a ratio of more than 5-1.

The station's office for Soviet operations maintained cover as the legation's "Plans and Review Section."

British MI-6 was also active in Vienna and came up with one of the most successful early intelligence efforts, a tap on Soviet underground telephone cables. This operated under cover of a haberdashery that imported English Harris tweeds, but the cover had to be dropped when the shop proved so popular that secrecy was endangered. MI-6 then pitched in with CIA for a joint effort, operation SILVER, which involved a 70-foot tunnel dug from a house in the Vienna suburb Schwechat. These efforts took place between 1949 and 1951, and the CIA followed up with a further five telephone taps. Two years later, according to a Soviet officer who defected in 1954, the MGB (KGB) was constantly preoccupied with suspicions that the Americans were organizing ingenious wiretapping schemes. Soviet fears, however, evidently centered on the Vienna telephone exchange, located at Schillerplatz in the Innere Stadt, rather than on the outlying cables.

The CIA achieved its greatest success in the 1952-1954 period with recruitment and defections. In that time there were defections in Vienna from every major East European intelligence service, plus a senior Soviet petroleum industry official and an intelligence officer. In addition, it was during this period that the CIA recruited its major Soviet agent-in-place: GRU Major Pyotr Popov (see entry, this volume). Though there was a defection from Soviet intelligence during this period in Germany, and another in Australia, the Vienna station was arguably the agency's most successful in this area of activity.

The occupation came to an end in 1955 with the Austrian State Treaty. Soviet occupation forces withdrew and the Russians gave up the Imperial Hotel. The Soviet embassy was established in one of Vienna's old buildings with facades, turrets, columns, and mock balconies. It reminded a later GRU officer of the Lubyanka Prison in Moscow. The GRU station in the embassy was now located in the basement, and the building itself was next

door to Vienna's Russian Orthodox Church. Relations between the newly redesignated KGB and the CIA became almost amicable, with the CIA deputy chief of station going on fishing trips with his Soviet counterpart. In fact, the outbreak of the Hungarian uprising in late 1956 disrupted a dinner party between CIA and KGB officers. Later, as Hungarians began to flee their country, senior CIA officials and U.S. Vice-President Richard M. Nixon came to Vienna to observe the refugees.

After the occupation, Vienna became more a platform for both sides' operations elsewhere than an intelligence target in its own right. The CIA found Vienna useful for operations in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. MI-6 also used Vienna for activities in Eastern Europe, including those of Greville Wynne. The Czechs used Vienna to move agents into West Germany, and the GRU found it useful as a waypoint for dispatch of officers into Switzerland, covering various international conferences in Geneva, as well as West Germany.

Since the 1970s, Vienna has again become something of a target for intelligence services and terrorists. In a 1975 raid, the terrorist known as "Carlos" succeeded in taking hostage the oil ministers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), while a decade later came a bloody terrorist attack at the Vienna airport's El Al (Israeli) Airlines ticket counter. Vienna itself became the locale for negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. The talks have endured for more than ten years and are naturally an item of major intelligence interest.


Vienna also remains a favorite site of the KGB for meetings with its agents. The Soviets met in Geneva with the spies Andrew D. Lee, Ronald W. Pelton, and Geoffrey A. Prime (see entries, Volume I) at various times, while over a 13-year period KGB agents met in Vienna with Canadian spy Hugh George Hambleton at least eight times. The Soviet defector and later CIA double agent Nicolas Shadrin, who disappeared in December 1975 and was probably killed by the KGB, was last seen in Vienna. His covering CIA agents on that trip

stayed at the Imperial Hotel and Shadrin himself at the Bristol. Shadrin's first meeting with the KGB (he disappeared at the second) was at the Votivkirche, in direct line of sight of the U.S. consulate at Friedrich Schmidtplatz 2. This was ironic in that the Votivkirche is a church built between 1856 and 1879 to commemorate Hapsburg emperor Franz Josef's escape from the knife of a Hungarian assassin.

Finally, there is a United Nations organization in

Vienna that is a continuing object of intelligence interest. This is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), responsible for global monitoring of nuclear plants and safeguards to prevent nuclear fuel being diverted to the construction of bombs. Procedures and activities of the IAEA, as well as the information it holds, have likely been of importance not only to the major powers but to smaller nations such as Israel, Iraq, Pakistan, South Africa, and Libya.

VIENNA: INNERE STADT



SOURCE: *Fodor's Austria* (1983).

FOR FURTHER READING

Perhaps due to British secrecy laws, or perhaps because of a fascination with individual spy cases, there is still no adequate study of all the British intelligence agencies. Christopher Andrew's book *Her Majesty's Secret Service* (NY: Viking Penguin, 1987) is excellent for the period before World War II but very cursory for the war and postwar periods. There is no good post-war account of MI-6, but for MI-5 (and for many of the mole cases) a fine account is that of Peter Wright in *Spycatcher* (NY: Viking, 1987).

There is no good English language source for French intelligence services, but in French we have Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop's *La Piscine: Les Services Secrets Francaises 1944-1984* (Paris: Editions du Sueil, 1985).

On Israeli intelligence a reasonable place to start is with Stewart Steven's *The Spymasters of Israel* (NY: Ballantine, 1980).

The best single source on the GRU is "Viktor Suvorov's" *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence* (NY: Macmillan, 1984).

There is no one-volume compendium covering Soviet Bloc intelligence services, but there are partial accounts for a few of them. On the Polish service see *Double Eagle* by Mr. "X" with Bruce E. Henderson and C. C. Cyr (NY: Ballantine, 1979). On the Czechs see Ladislav Bittman's *The Deception Game* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972). For Rumanian intelligence see General Ion Pacepa's *Red Horizons* (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1987).

A reasonably good open source on West German intelligence, which should nonetheless be used with care, is the biography of Gehlen by Heinz Hoehne and Hermann Zolling, *The General Was a Spy* (NY: Bantam, 1972). Gehlen presents his own view in *The Service: The Memoirs of Reinhard Gehlen* (NY: Popular Library, 1972).

Most works in the British literature focus on the Cambridge Ring and the mole hunts. One book that purports to deal principally with Anthony Blunt is Barrie Penrose and Simon Freeman's *Conspiracy of Silence* (NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1987). A primary source account on Rudolf Abel is James B. Donovan's *Strangers on a Bridge* (NY: Atheneum, 1967). For George Blake see E. H. Cookridge's *The Many Sides of George Blake, Esq.* (London: Vertex, 1970). An excellent recent biography of Klaus Fuchs is Robert C. Williams's *Klaus Fuchs: Atom Spy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). For Heinz Felfe see the Hoehne and Zolling book already cited.

On the Soviet defectors Michal Goleniewski, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and Yuri Nosenko, the best basic source is David C. Martin's *Wilderness of Mirrors* (NY: Harper & Row, 1980). Golitsyn's own book, *New Lies for Old* (NY: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1984) is actually a discourse on disinformation and says little about his own intelligence work. For Penkovsky see his own purported work *The Penkovsky Papers*, translated by Peter Deriabin (NY: Avon, 1965), and also the two books by Greville Wynne, *Contact on Gorky Street* (NY: Atheneum, 1968) and *The Man From Odessa* (London: Granada, 1981). Finally, there is an excellent account of the case of Pyotr Popov in William Hood's *Mole* (NY: W. W. Norton, 1982).

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