TS 005 AGENT ASSIGNMENT

7604

TOP SECRET®

FILE TS005

ESPIONAGE GAME

OPERATION ORIENT EXPRESS

COMPILED BY DAVID COOK



TSR, Inc.

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7604 FILE CONTENTS

This file contains the following materials: ■ 32-page report on Operation: Orient Express, which lists proposed operations aboard European trains ■ large-scale map of train targets ■ cardboard figures of agents and other personnel, which can be cut out and moved on the train car maps provided ■ file cover showing major European train routes

Examine all materials and verify contents. If any pieces are damaged or missing, contact TSR, Inc., POB 756, Lake Geneva, WI 53147.

FILE 75005

TOP SECRET®

ESPIONAGE GAME

OPERATION ORIENT EXPRESS

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BEGIN MESSAGE
TO: All Local Administrators

MESSAGE: A recent report prepared by the Administration Bureau has proposed that we use the European train system as a target site for agency activities. The report says that the extent of the rail network throughout Western and Eastern Europe makes the network an ideal setting for operations. The speed and punctuality of European train service, as well as the laxness of border regulations along the train routes, are also reasons why such a setting would be favorable. Administrations has even acknowledged that the comfort provided by the rail lines should have a significant and positive influence on agent performance.

The Orient Express line, which ceased operations in 1978, would have been well-suited to our needs. Its run from France to Turkey provided excellent routes into and out of the Balkan countries, in particular. Fortunately, similar runs still exist. Administrations believes these runs will serve the agency's purposes well.

This file contains operations deemed appropriate by Administrations for on-train execution. All data required to run these operations has been provided. Good luck.

Mohawk Green
Administration Control
Director of Administrations
END MESSAGE

REPORT ORGANIZATION

PRELIMINARY BRIEFING
A list of information necessary to run the proposed operations

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS BRIEFING
Notes on European train travel and customs regulations: disclose at your discretion

GENERAL TARGET LAYOUT
A report on the general layout of European railroad cars, including notes on personnel and security

PROPOSED OPERATIONS
For the Administrator's eyes only; includes a list of possible operation complications

ADDITIONAL OPERATIONS
Outlines of suggested operations suitable for use on trains

APPENDIX: PASSENGERS AND AGENT PERSONNEL
A list of human passengers the agents are likely to encounter during these operations, and a list of agents determined by Personnel to be the most effective agents for on-train operations.

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PRELIMINARY BRIEFING

Operation: Orient Express is a complete module for use with the TOP SECRET® rules. Two editions of these rules are currently available; this module may be played using either edition.

If you have the first rules edition, you should be aware of two changes in the newer edition that may affect your play of the game:

*** There is no Wrestling value in the second edition. You may calculate an agent's Wrestling value by using his statistics, or you may simply use the agent's Hand-to-hand value.**

*** Flamethrowers are not given as a weapon in the second rules edition, although they are listed as an optional weapon in the new TOP SECRET® Companion. In general, the risks involved in using flamethrowers far outweigh the advantages in most operations. Assign them only after you have carefully studied the operation for which they will be used.**

How to use this file

Use the information given in this file to assign and direct agents in operations aboard trains in Eastern and Western Europe. Remember that these operations are only proposed; this file does not constitute an agency directive. Use these operations only if you feel your agents are capable of handling them.

No deadlines for using these operations have been set. We suggest that agents either be granted leave or reassigned to other missions after they complete any of the operations given here. Our studies have shown that continuous duty in similar operations leads to sloppiness on the part of the agents involved; such sloppiness creates unwanted risks for the agency. Furthermore, the agents' covers may attract the suspicion of local authorities if the agents are involved in several on-train activities in a short period of time.

Agent figures

Cardboard figures representing the agents and other personnel are given on the file cover. These figures may be used to show personnel location on the target maps. All agent personnel are identified by labels. Agents may select figures that represent themselves.

New agent traits

Administrations has prepared two new traits for use by the agents. These traits are taken from the TOP SECRET® Companion:

Observation: All agents have this secondary trait. Observation equals (Willpower + Knowledge)/2. This trait is a reflection of an agent's ability to notice and remember things. Agents having Observation values above 100 have "photographic" memories and an intuitive sense of direction. Agents must inform you when they want to use their Observation score.

Perception: All agents have this tertiary trait. Perception equals (Courage + Observation)/2. Perception allows an agent to detect concealed or disguised items, boobytraps, hazards, pursuing agents, concealed weapons, and lying and cheating at games of chance. Agents must inform you when they want to use their Perception score.

NEW EQUIPMENT

The following items are now available to agents through agency sources. You may decide if you want these items assigned to your agents. If you do assign this equipment, you must consult the regulations found in Appendix One of the TOP SECRET® rule book.



BUGGING DETECTOR
DISGUISED

Cost: $1,000.00 **Wt: 2 oz.**
Size: Variable

Features:

- Detection range is 6 feet. Small light activates in the presence of any transmitter. Q Section rates device reliability at 80%.
- Detector may be disguised as a pack of cigarettes, digital watch, calculator, part of a camera, or part of a hearing aid.




BULLETPROOF VEST
IMPROVED VEST

Cost: $400.00 **Wt: 2 lbs.**
Size: Variable

Features:

- Weapons of .38 caliber or below cause only 1 injury point. Weapons above .38 caliber only do 50% normal damage. Wearer suffers no loss of Coordination.
- Vest may be disguised as a suit vest, formal vest, or shirt.




BRIEFCASE
SECURITY

Cost: $3,000.00 **Wt: 10 lbs.**
Size: 18″x13″x3″

Features:


- Bulletproofing is equal to improved bulletproof vest (given above).
- Bugging detector (given above) is built in; detector light is mounted on top next to latch.
- Tape recorder detector is built in; its detection range is 3 feet. Small light next to latch flashes on if a tape recorder is in use within detection range. Q Section gives only 80% reliability for this device.
- Security compartment is concealed in lid: 1 1/4″ x 6″x 8″ (concealment rating 30); contents of compartment can be detected under X-ray scanning.
- Gross Motion Alarm System is included; alarm is activated by setting number code on front number lock. When case is closed, alarm is set. If case is moved more than 45 degrees, siren alarm sounds. Alarm is deactivated by setting second number code on front number lock. Q Section assigns Concealment Rating of 45 and Deactivation Rating of 70.
- Q Section assigns Deactivation Rating of 40 to the locks on case.



7MM MATCH PISTOL

PWV 50; RM 0/-20/-90/ X/X
WS S ROF 1 AMMO 1
Cost 400 DECP NC

The match pistol is designed for target competition use. It fires a 7mm bullet, using a bolt-action loading system. It is 21 inches long and weighs 4 pounds. A scope can be mounted on the pistol.



SCORPION AIR PISTOL

PWV 18 RM 0/ -40/X/X
WS BA ROF 2 AMMO varies
Cost 100 DECP NC

The Scorpion Air Pistol fires either BB-size pellets or .22 caliber pellets. The BB-size pellets cause no injury damage, but they may be used to deliver toxins to the target in specially designed pellets. Due to increasing Congressional pressure, these pellets may not be acquired from the agency.

The pistol is 15 inches long and weighs 3 pounds. A scope can be mounted on the pistol. The pistol's greatest feature is that it is extremely quiet.

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS BRIEFING

Use the information given in this section to prepare agents for their on-train operations. Much of the information is general knowledge, and may be shared with the agents at your discretion. Make sure, however, that the agents have all the information necessary to run their operations.

TABLE 2
CURRENCY EXCHANGE

Country	Currency	Exchange Rate	Customs Limitations
Austria	Schilling	13 = $1	15,000 AS limit
Belgium	Franc	35 = $1	No limitations
Bulgaria	Leva	1 = $1	No export allowed
Czechoslovakia	Koruna	10 = $1	No export allowed
Denmark	Krone	6 = $1	5,000 kr. limit
France	Franc	4 = $1	5,000 franc limit
East Germany	Mark	2 = $1	No export allowed
Hungary	Forint	25 = $1	No export allowed
Italy	Lire	1000 = $1	200,000 lire limit
Luxembourg	Franc	35 = $1	No limitations
Netherlands	Guilder	2 = $1	No limitations
Norway	Krone	5 = $1	2,000 Nkr. limit
Poland	Zloty	33 = $1	No export allowed
Portugal	Escudo	56 = $1	5,000 escudo limit
Romania	Leu	12 = $1	No export allowed
Spain	Peseta	85 = $1	100,000 ptas. limit
Sweden	Krona	4 = $1	6,000 Kr. limit
Switzerland	Franc	2 = $1	No limitations
Turkey	Lira	95 = $1	1,000 lira limit
West Germany	Mark	2 = $1	No limitations
Yugoslavia	Dinar	28 = $1	500 dinar limit

Train travel

The European Train System Map (inside folder cover) shows the location of selected European cities. The lines connecting these cities show common train routes that may be used for the proposed operations. Other train routes between cities do exist, however, and you may target missions on these other routes once you have gathered enough information about them. Check a guidebook to Europe for such information.

Along each train route on the map is a set of two numbers, divided by a slash. The number before the slash is the approximate ticket cost in U.S. dollars. The number after the slash is the travel time (in hours) between the cities. The ticket costs are for second class tickets. For first class ticket costs, add 50% of the listed price to the original cost. These ticket costs are not absolutely accurate; inflation and changing rates of exchange are likely to cause fluctuations in ticket costs. You may use the costs as given, or you may adjust them, according to these fluctuations.

You should also inform your agents of the following points concerning the European train system:

- **Northern European trains normally run on time. Long delays prompt investigations from the nearest station. Southern European train schedules vary greatly. Some run on time, while others may be hours late. These variations are considered normal in these countries.**
- **Stops at stations normally last only 2-15 minutes. Agents should be cautious about stepping off a train at a station.**
- **Cars may be switched to other trains at a station. Agents should be sure they are in the correct car when cars are switched.**
- **Trains travel at speeds up to 125 mph. It is not recommended that agents try to get off a train while it is moving. The average traveling speed of most European trains is 70 mph.**

European train routes

Some of the better known trains traveling international routes are listed on Table 1. These trains are among the best in Europe, and normally travel at faster than average speeds. Therefore, the travel time listed for some trains is less than that found on the European Train System Map.

Moving outside the train

Agents may occasionally have to perform actions on the outside of a moving train, even though these actions are considered extremely dangerous. Agents may reach the roof of the train by climbing out any open window. The chance of safely reaching the roof through a window is equal to the agent's Coordination as a percentage. For example, an agent whose Coordination is 68 has a 68% chance of safely reaching the roof. Any agent falling in the attempt suffers 2 injury points for every 10 mph at which the train is moving.

Alongside the train's connection tunnel is a space between the cars where an agent can stand. However, agents cannot reach the doors or windows of the train from this space.

Train name	No. Hours/ Trip
Catalan	9
Cisalpin	11
Erasmus	6
Etoile Du Nord	5
Iris	7
Lemano	4
Mediolanum	7
Rembrandt	9
Rheingold	11

Agents may also be able to lower themselves to the underside of the train. The chance of safely moving to a train's underside is equal to the agent's Coordination as a percentage. Any agent who fails suffers 4 injury points for every 10 mph at which the train is moving. Any agent trying to reach the train's underside also loses one Fame and Fortune point (even if the dice roll is successful).

Border crossings

Before undertaking any operations, all agents should become familiar with the border regulations of the countries in which they will be operating.

Assume that the agency has issued passports and visas to all agents. Passports are required in all countries. Agents may carry false passports, but they should be aware that severe penalties are imposed if these passports are proven false. Administrations cautions against the issuance of more than one set of identification papers.

Currency regulations vary widely from border to border. Table 2: Currency Exchange lists customs limitations and values for all currencies in the target area. All exchange rates on this table are approximate.

Most European nations have adopted the standardized United Nations proposals for customs regulations. Within the target area, customs procedures fall into two general categories: Western bloc nation regulations, and Eastern bloc nation regulations. Limits and procedures for each are explained below. Special exceptions are listed for some of the procedures.

TABLE 1
SAMPLE EUROPEAN TRAIN ROUTES

Route Taken	Train Composition*
Geneva-Lyon-Barcelona	7-9 sleeping/coach cars, bar car
Paris-Milan Venice	7-9 sleeping/coach cars, bar car
Amsterdam-Bonn-Frankfurt	3-9 sleeping/coach cars, dining car
Amsterdam-Brussels-Paris	6-12sleeping/coach cars
Brussels-Lux-Zurich	3-9 sleeping/coach cars, dining car
Geneva-Milan	3-9 sleeping/coach cars, dining car
Munich-Milan	3-9 sleeping/coach cars, dining car
Amsterdam-Bonn-Milan	3-9 sleeping/coach cars, dining car
Amsterdam-Bonn-Bern-Geneva	7-9 sleeping/coach cars, bar car

Western bloc nations

The Western bloc includes these countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and West Germany. In all countries, agents are only required to carry passports. Visas are not required for stays under 60 days. Limitations on spirits, cigarettes, and food vary slightly from border to border, but violations usually only result in confiscation. No art objects may be exported from France without a license.

Customs checks are made either at a border station, at the first station inside the country entered, or on the train. In Western bloc countries other than Spain, these checks are either simple or nonexistent. Officers verify and stamp all passports. Bags may be searched; most officials use the standard spot-check method of searching. However, any search that is conducted is thorough. Customs officers are likely to recognize most smuggling methods. Advise all agents to exercise extreme caution when carrying contraband.

Spanish and Portuguese railways use different size tracks, so passengers entering or leaving Spain on the French border must detrain while the wheels are changed. These stopovers each take about 1 hour, and border officials thoroughly search all luggage during the stopovers.

The importation of firearms is strictly controlled in all countries, both East and West. No service handguns or automatic weapons may be imported into any country. Competition match pistols may be imported if they are accompanied by a proper document stating that the owner intends to use the weapon in a competition in that country. Hunting and sporting rifles are also allowed. No prior permission is required to import hunting rifles into Western bloc countries. Only one hunting or sporting weapon and 50 rounds of ammunition per person may be imported. Any agent caught carrying any other type of weapon is subject to immediate arrest and imprisonment. Silenced weapons are legal in France, though they are illegal in all other countries.

Eastern bloc nations

The Eastern bloc includes these countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Passports and visas are required in all countries. Visas must be obtained in advance from an embassy of that nation. (In East Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia, visa regulations are more lenient: transit visas are available at the East German border for trips of 72 hours or less; visas are available at the Romanian border; and no visa is required to enter Yugoslavia.)

Customs checks are made at the borders. All bags are searched. Passports are collected and are not returned until each person reaches his or her ticketed destination. Customs officers seldom speak any language other than their native tongue. The officials are normally accompanied by armed guards during the customs inspections.

Any national currency brought in must be declared at the border. When an agent leaves the country, his declaration must match the amount remaining, plus any currency exchange slips.

Items considered contraband include: explosives; narcotics (unless accompanied by proper forms and doctor's certification); two-way radios; carrier pigeons; pornography; excessive amounts of clothing, film, or food; and any material considered critical of the State.

No more than one pack of playing cards may be imported into Turkey. No antiques, tea, coffee, cocoa, spices, or grain products may be exported from Turkey. Further restrictions may vary in different countries; the moods of the customs inspectors in these countries may also affect how easily agents pass through customs.

If an agent wants to carry a hunting rifle into an Eastern bloc country, he must get prior permission from one of that nation's embassies. The agent must present the papers for the weapon when he arrives at the border.

While in Eastern bloc countries, agents should not photograph border areas, railroad stations, tunnels, equipment, coastal waters, industrial centers, or any type of military installation.

GENERAL TARGET LAYOUT

The information given in this section will familiarize you with the general layout of the target site before you assign any operations.


You will be responsible for passing this information along to the agents, so they are comfortable with the target sites. Lay the map of the train cars out on the table during the course of the missions so the agents can visualize their operations. Use the car descriptions when agents are conducting the proposed operations.

The information is organized according to train cars. For each car, a list of personnel likely to be in the car, their duties, and the contents and appearance of the car have been given. Descriptions are written as if all cars are unoccupied.

The following features are common to all train cars: *car connectors, window curtains, and emergency brake lines.* The brake line is a cable that runs along the outer walls of the cars' interiors. If the cable is pulled, the emergency brakes on the train are automatically set and all of the wheels lock. Any passengers not prepared for the sudden stop are thrown violently to the floor or wall. Each has a 25% chance of taking 1 injury point of damage. All unprepared passengers are unable to take any action for 1 turn.

Do not give the agents a copy of any of this information. They must perform their operations based on what they have learned in their briefings with you.

MAP A:
FIRST CLASS SLEEPING CAR



A1. ENTRANCE

At each end of the car is a passageway connecting to other cars on the train. These passages are closed off by unlocked sliding doors. On each side of this area, steps lead down to doors, which are used for entering and leaving the car when the train is in a station. These doors are kept locked (-/25) while the train is moving.

Personnel

One attendant stays in this car. He has a key to the outer doors and a passkey to all compartments. The attendant is usually found in a chair in the hall. He has a list of all passengers in his car, identifying which compartment each is in, what their destinations are, and what nationalities they are. This attendant is usually helpful on minor questions concerning other passengers. Agents may obtain detailed information about other passengers by bribing the attendant.

A2. RESTROOM WITH SHOWER

This facility has a sink, toilet, shower, mirror, and electrical outlets. The door may only be locked (-/10) from the inside. The latch sign indicates when the room is in use. The window does not open.

A3-A13. SLEEPING COMPARTMENTS

Each compartment is furnished with a bench of three cushioned seats. These seats may be folded down to make a bed. Another bed folds out of the wall directly over the seats. A luggage rack rests over the window; another stands beside the door. In the corner next to the window is a small sink. Along the wall beside the sink is a table that may be folded out of the way. The floor is carpeted and the walls are wood-paneled. The windows open by sliding halfway down.

Each compartment may be locked from both sides; a key must be used to open the compartment (-/20). The walls between compartments 3 & 4, 5 & 6, 7 & 8, 9 & 10, and 11 & 12 may be opened to make larger rooms. There are deadbolt locks on each side (-/25), and both must be unlocked to open the partition.


The various compartment modifications are shown on the target map: some compartments are shown with benches, some with fold-out beds; also, some are shown with tables, while others are shown with opening walls.

A14. KITCHENETTE

This small room is locked (-/10) and must be opened by the attendant. In the room are dishes and cutlery, a hot plate, refrigerator, sink, and counter space. Passengers may prepare light meals and snacks here.

A15. WASHROOM

This washroom is identical to area 1, except there is no shower here.



B1. ENTRANCE
This is a passageway connecting this car to other cars on the train. This passage is closed off by unlocked sliding doors. On each side of this area, steps lead down to doors, which are used for entering and leaving the car when the train is in a station. These doors are kept locked (-/25) while the train is moving.

Personnel
One headwaiter, two other waiters, one cook, and two assistant cooks work in this car. The cook and headwaiter have passkeys to all locked doors and cupboards.

B2. SMOKERS' DINING AREA
This area has three tables with four seats each, and three tables with two seats each. During meals, each place is set with silverware, napkins, and flowers. The wall dividing this area from the other dining area is made of clear, etched glass. The door is also glass. It is not locked.

B3. NONSMOKERS' DINING AREA
This area is identical to the smokers' dining area, except that it has more seating.

B4. WAITERS' BUFFET
This compartment is used as a serving area for the waiters. Passengers are not allowed in this area. The swinging doors are kept locked (-/10) between meals. Inside are cupboards containing dishes, silverware, glasses, and menus. If necessary, agents may be able to find steak knives here. The partition between this area and area B5 can be opened from both sides. This partition is not locked.

B5. KITCHEN
This area contains items commonly found in a small restaurant kitchen. There are two ovens, one eight-burner gas range, a small sink, cupboards full of kitchen utensils, and some foods. A large assortment of knives is kept in one of the cupboards. Around mealtimes, the cook and both assistants are in this area.

The service door on the outside wall may only be opened from the outside. The doorway into the hall is locked (-/10) when the kitchen is not in use. The partitions between this area and areas B4 and B6 are not locked and may be opened from both sides.

B6. DISHWASHING
This area is used for washing dishes and for storage. Two large sinks and cupboards full of kitchen utensils line the walls. The partition between this area and the kitchen (area B5) is unlocked and may be opened from both sides. After a meal, one or two of the cook's assistants is here, cleaning up. When this area is not in use, the door to the hallway is locked (-/10).


B7. OFFICE
Set in this open area is a small desk/ table. The headwaiter and cook use this table for meal and seating plans. Two seats fold out from the wall in this area. The desk holds various papers, including menu plans and passenger lists. The passenger lists identify how many are in each first class compartment, what their names are, and which meal seating they will attend.

B8. WASHROOM
This room contains a toilet, sink, and mirror. The door may only be locked from the inside (-/10).

B9. REFRIGERATOR/ FREEZER
This locked (-/10) cabinet contains cold and frozen foods.

B10. STORAGE CABINETS
These locked (-/10) cabinets contain extra dishes, linens, and food.

B11. SERVICE DOOR
This door is used to load supplies into the dining car at stations. It is closed when the train is moving and can only be opened from the outside.



C1. ENTRANCE
At each end of the car is a passageway connecting to other cars on the train. These passages are closed off by unlocked sliding doors. On each side of this area, steps lead down to doors, which are used for entering and leaving the car when the train is in a station. These doors are kept locked (-/25) while the train is moving.

C2. KITCHEN
This is a small kitchen used to prepare light meals and snacks. It is furnished with sinks, a refrigerator, freezer, two microwave ovens, and cupboards of dishes and food. Agents may find kitchen knives here. The partition between this area and the bar (area C3) is unlocked and may be opened from both sides. All other doors leading to the kitchen are locked (-/10) when not in use.


C3. BAR
This area is a bar and informal dining room. A section of the bar near the kitchen swings up to allow access behind the counter. Behind the bar are dishes, glassware and cups, spirits, a large coffee machine, linens, sinks, and assorted supplies. The liquor cabinets are locked (-/5) when not in use. Padded swivel stools are set around the outer edge of the bar. The walls and doors are made of paneled wood.

Personnel
One bartender and one cook work in this car. Each has a passkey to all cabinets and doors (except outside doors) in the car. Any train attendant's passkey opens the outside doors.

C4-C7. COMPARTMENTS
Each compartment has six seats, three to a side. The seats are padded and have arm and head rests. Above each row of seats is a luggage rack. Large windows are set into the door and the wall facing the hall. The door can be locked (-/10) from both sides. The windows open by sliding halfway down.

C8. RESTROOM
This small restroom has a toilet, sink, mirror, small table, and electrical outlets. The door may only be locked (-/10) from the inside.

C9. WASHROOM
This small compartment contains a sink, mirror, and electrical outlet. The door may only be locked (-/10) from the inside.



D1. ENTRANCE
This is a passageway connecting the car to other cars on the train. This passage is closed off by unlocked sliding doors. On each side of this area, steps lead down to doors, which are used for entering and leaving the car when the train is in a station. These doors are kept locked (-/25) while the train is moving.

Personnel
One attendant works in this car. He has a passenger list for the car, and a passkey that opens all doors in the car. The passenger list identifies all occupants' compartments, nationalities, and destinations.

D2-D18. SLEEPING COMPARTMENTS
These compartments are all identical. Each has two seats, a sink, and a mirror. Small cabinets stand next to the sinks. Luggage may be stored under the seat. The seats may be folded down to form a bed. A second bed folds out from the wall above the seats. The door to the hall may be locked from both sides (-/10). The partitions between compartments 2 & 3, 4 & 5, 6 & 7, 8 & 9, 10 & 11, 12 & 13, 14 & 15, and 16 & 17 may be opened to form larger rooms. These partitions are locked from both sides by dead-bolt locks (-/40).


D24. ATTENDANT'S CUBICLE
This small area is furnished with a seat and a table that folds down from the wall. The area is used by the car attendant during the journey. The door may be locked (-/10) from both sides. The attendant's papers and personal effects are kept inside the cubicle.

D23. KITCHENETTE
This area is always unlocked. It contains a small hot plate, a coffee machine, a small refrigerator, and a cupboard of dishes. The window does not open.

D19-D20. RESTROOMS
Each of these compartments has a toilet, sink, mirror, and electrical outlets. The doors may only be locked (-/10) from the inside. The windows do not open.

D21. SHOWER
This small compartment has a shower stall, and space for changing clothes. The door may only be locked (-/5) from the inside.

D22. WARDROBE
This cabinet is kept locked (-/10) at all times. The attendant must unlock it. Inside is a small closet area for hanging clothes and other goods.




E2. RESTROOM
This room is equipped with a toilet, sink, mirror, small counter, and electrical outlets. The door may only be locked (-/10) from the inside.

E3. WASHROOM
This room contains a sink and mirror. The door may only be locked from the inside (-/10).

Personnel
There is no specific attendant for the car. A conductor comes around once to check tickets and seating. The conductor has a passkey to all doors in the car. If reservations are required for second class seating (as on many of the larger and better trains), the conductor has a passenger list for the occupants of the car. It lists the name, compartment, nationality, and destination of each passenger.

E4-E15. COMPARTMENTS
All of these compartments are identical. Each has six seats, three to a side. The seats are fitted with head and arm rests. Small writing tables fold against the wall next to the window seats. A luggage rack rests above each row of seats. The window opens by sliding halfway down. Large clear windows have been set into the door and the wall on the hallway. The door latches, but does not lock. The doors in the hall are made of heavy glass.

E1. ENTRANCE
At each end of the car is a passageway connecting to other cars on the train. These passages are closed off by unlocked sliding doors. On each side of this area, steps lead down to doors, which are used for entering and leaving the car when the train is in a station. These doors are kept locked (-/25) while the train is moving.



F1. ENTRANCE


At each end of the car is a passageway connecting to other cars on the train. These passages are closed off by unlocked sliding doors.

Personnel

One baggage attendant is here at all times. He has a passkey to all doors on the car, a list of which pieces of luggage belong to which passengers, and routing slips for all freight being shipped in the car. This attendant is armed; what type of weapon he has depends on the country from which the train left.

F2. BAGGAGE AREA

This is one large single compartment. The door opening into the hall is locked (-/10) at all times. The large loading doors on the side of the car are also locked (-/25).



G1. CAB

Each of these areas has two swivel stool seats set behind a control panel. Only one cab is in use at a time. A two-way radio used for communicating to station control towers is also in each cab. This radio may also be used to send radio-telephone or radio-telegraph messages. While the train is moving, only the controls for the cab in use operate. The doors to the outside are not locked and may be opened from either the inside or the outside.

Disabling: If the controls for one cab are damaged or destroyed, the engine may still be operated from the second cab. If the controls for both cabs are destroyed, Administrations has assigned probabilities to certain events (see Table 3).

Personnel

Two engineers work here. Both have a map of the route taken by the train. They also have the following information on paper: the schedules that they must maintain, the cars that must be added or removed, and the tracks that they will use. They also have passkeys to all the doors in the engine.

G2. MOTOR COMPARTMENT

This area takes up most of the space in the engine. Inside are the diesel motor, the electrical generator, and the cooling system. Agents should avoid taking any actions in this area.

Disabling: Due to the variety of functions in this compartment, Administrations cannot assign specific success or safety probabilities to any actions that may take place here. Generally, there is a 1% chance of major damage for every point of damage caused. These percentages are cumulative. The results of major damage are the same as those given in Table 3.

G3. FUEL STORAGE TANK

This area is located directly behind the motor compartment. The following action has been authorized in extreme emergencies: Place 3 ounces of plastique against the fuel tank wall. Detonation results in the destruction of the engine and the immediate derailment of the train.

TABLE 3
RESULTS OF DISABLING CABS

Action	% Chance of Occuring
Train gradually slows to a stop	01-50
Emergency brakes cause sudden stop	51-75
Train continues at same speed, engines overheat in 1-2 hours, causing gradual stop	76-90
Train continues at same speed until out of fuel	91-95
Derailment	96-00

PROPOSED OPERATIONS

This section details six proposed on-train operations. These operations have been selected as suitable for the target sites, and may also serve as possible emergency situations. You may incorporate them into your TOP SECRET® campaign as you see fit.

The data for each operation is presented in the following order:

1. **Administrator's briefing (an operation overview, and a list of operation objectives)**
2. **Agents' briefing (notes on carrying out the mission)**
3. **Target personnel (a list of non-player characters involved in the mission)**
4. **Operation procedure (the sequence of events)**
5. **Post-operation report (the wrap-up)**


Except for the Agents' briefing, all of the information in these areas is for the Administrator only. When you run these operations for the agents, read the Agents' briefing (boxed text) aloud before actually beginning the mission.

The layout of the train used by the agents in each operation is displayed at the beginning of that operation.

Remind the agents that virtually anything can happen throughout the course of a mission. A list of possible complications has been included in this section following the proposed operations.

MV - Movement Value
HTH - Hand-to-Hand combat value
S - Sex
CH - Charm
CO - Courage
CD - Coordination
DP - Deception
DA - Deactivation
LL - Life Level
SV - Surprise Value
H - Handedness
AMMO - Ammunition
HWV - Hand Weapon Value
PWV - Projectile Weapon Value
AOK - Areas of Knowledge
WT - Weight in lbs.
DECP - Deception change of armsbearer
RM - Range Modifiers
ROF - Rate of Fire
WS - Weapon Speed
HT - Height
* - Native Language
NC - No Change

Proposed operation 1: The courier run (Paris to Lisbon)



The abbreviations used in the target personnel statistics are:

PS - Physical Strength
W - Willpower
K - Knowledge
OF - Offense
EV - Evasion

Administrator's briefing

A double agent has defected to the other side, managing to take with him information on standard agency codes, courier routes, and passwords. Secondary courier routes cannot be used, as this information may also be known by the double agent. Until new procedures can be established, messages must be hand-carried by agents traveling on trains.

The agency has set up a courier run on the Paris to Lisbon route. The agents assigned this operation are not aware that a mole has infiltrated the agency. This mole has passed information that a courier run is being made on this train, but the mole does not know the agents' identities.

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY: The agency suspects that the mole has endangered its courier routes, and is using this courier run as a test. The run is a fake. It is important, however, that the agents believe this operation to be real.

This operations is recommended for 1-3 agents. The following agents from the Recommended agents list are available for this operation: Juan Matthews, Ruth Montiverdi, and Tokubei Tsuyu.

The operation's objectives are as follows:

1. **Safely deliver, by train, those documents given the courier team without revealing their contents. The team's movements should not be discovered.**
2. **Determine the identity of the mole within the agency, if the security of the courier run is compromised.**
3. **Detain or eliminate all opposition to the courier run without damaging agent covers.**

Agents' briefing

While staying in Paris, each agent receives the letter shown on the next page:

A ticket for the next train from Paris to Lisbon is included in each letter. The tickets are for first class sleeping compartments. Later in the day, each of you receives a package from a major department store. The package is labeled "shoes." In the package are business cards and a passport. All identify you as a sales representative for New World Distributors, an overseas sales firm.

A key for a locker at the Paris Nord train station has also been included in one of the agents' packages (your choice).

Dear _____,

The marketing department has recently proposed the expansion of our operation into the Lisbon area. We have already lined up a group in Lisbon who would be interested in our product; however, they have asked us to send them some cost estimates. With competition the way it is, it would be best for you to take the information to them personally. The salesmen for other manufacturers are starting to get pretty aggressive, and it certainly wouldn't do for the cost estimates to get into the hands of Nash, Inc., for example. On the other hand, if you can get any information out of the salesmen about their products, or if you can discover who is feeding them info about our plans, it would certainly help our position in the market.

Do be careful on the trip. We have made all the travel arrangements, but still, I would really hate to hear that you took ill on the journey.

Very truly yours,
Moe Green
Manager of Operations

Target personnel

Richard Mercer
(real name: *Max Rothman*)

PS 35	CH 50	W 66	CO 41	K 62	CD 44
OF 43	DP 46	EV 47	DA 53	MV155	LL 10
HTH 82	SV 92	S M	H R		

Description. Age: 45 Ht: 5′ 11″ Wt: 165 Hair: **brown** Eyes: **green/gray** Glasses: **no**
Languages. English*: 88 French: 32 Spanish: 47
AOKs. Animal Science: 57 Ecology/Earth Sciences: 98 Geology: 64 Law: 97 Literature: 107 Physical Education: 65 Psychology: 73

Mercer is a level 1 Investigator working for the KGB. He carries no weapon. If casually questioned, he gives the cover that he is an English tutor at a private boys' school in England. He is divorced and is currently taking the first vacation he has had in two years. He is staying in a second class sleeping compartment. His luggage contains nothing revealing.

If captured and questioned, he may tell the agents that he was hired to travel this train and observe all passengers traveling in first class. He was trying to learn the name, destination, nationality, and compartment of each. He was to pass this information in a matchbook during dinner to one who would identify himself by saying, "Could I have your matchbook? I collect them." Mercer does not know who hired him. In Lisbon, he was to register at the San Marco Hotel and collect any messages left for him.

Garcia Antonio Devrie
(real name: *Julio Masterson*)

PS 90	CH 84	W 47	CO 66	K 93	CD 80
OF 73	DP 72	EV 82	DA 87	MV217	LL 14
HTH172	SV157	S M	H R		

Description. Age: 30 Ht: 6′ Wt: 180 Hair: **black** Eyes: **blue** Glasses: **no**
Languages. English*: 67 German: 44 Russian: 47 Swedish: 65
AOKs. Astronomy/Space Science: 109 Computer Science: 58 Engineering, Electrical: 51 Hydraulic: 124 Literature: 69 Mathematics/Accounting: 65 Military Science/Weaponry: 89 Photography: 118 Psychology: 77
Weapon. 9mm PPK

PWV 37	RM 0/-45/-145/X	WS VF			
ROF 1	AMMO 7	HWV 4			

DeVrie is a level 3 Confiscator working for the KGB. His cover is an aerospace engineer traveling to Lisbon for a space flight conference. He carries his PPK in a shoulder holster (Deception already adjusted). He also carries a silencer in his pocket. He uses the weapon only if he must.

DeVrie is Mercer's contact. At dinner, he collects the information Mercer has gathered. He does not know Mercer, but he has a general description of him. If captured and questioned, DeVrie may identify his case officer as Andrei Bylinskof, an employee of the Paris office of Troika International. DeVrie has also learned of a supposed KGB agent in the agency, code named Fallen Angel. DeVrie was told to collect a telegram at the Lisbon station after collecting the information on the train.

In DeVrie's luggage is a secret compartment (40/-) containing a second passport (listing him as Tomas Rodrigo), 10 rounds of 9mm ammunition, a mini-camera, a canister of sleeping gas, a mini-gas mask, a vial of chloroform, and a set of mechanical lockpicks. He is staying in a second class sleeping compartment.

Operation procedure

These steps are identified by the day and time at which they occur. The standard military clock is used. This clock numbers the hours from 1 to 24, so 1:00 in the morning is 0100 hours, and 1:00 in the afternoon is 1300 hours.

1. Day 1, 0830 hours:


The agents arrive at the Paris station 30 minutes before the train leaves. If one of the agents goes to the station lockers, he finds the locker matching the key. A black briefcase is stashed in the locker. The briefcase is locked (-/65). Taped on the outside of the briefcase is a key to a locker in the Lisbon station. The case contains papers describing the future plans for the U.S. killer satellite program. Although these papers seem to be genuine and, when read, agree with facts already known, the important information in the papers is false.

Any agents who ask notice many people in the area; however, none of the people seem to be particularly watching the agents.

The agents are staying in the first class sleeping car. If only one or two agents are participating in the operation, they are given compartment **A7.** If three agents participate, the third is shown to compartment **A8.**

2. Day 1, 0900 hours:

The train leaves the station and heads for Bordeaux. Shortly after the train starts moving, Richard Mercer enters the car occupied by the agents and slowly strolls its length, apparently sightseeing out the windows. He then goes to speak to the attendant of the car. If anyone else is obviously standing in the hall, Mercer talks to the attendant only about unimportant things. If no one else is obviously in sight, Mercer bribes the attendant and gets a list of all the passengers in the car, their destinations, and their nationalities. Mercer then leaves. If Mercer notices the



agents acting unusual during this transaction, he makes a mental note to watch them carefully for the rest of the trip.

If the agents wish to obtain a similar passenger list, they may try to bribe the attendant. For the purpose of bribing, the attendant has a Willpower of 20. The attendant does not mention the fact that someone else has already bought the same information, unless he is specifically asked and bribed again. Five other compartments on this car are in use (determine occupants by rolling d100 on the Passenger list). The attendant also uses one of the compartments at night.

Mercer enters this car several times again before the train arrives in Bordeaux. Each time, he acts as if he is only sightseeing. If any agent does something unusual, however, Mercer's suspicions are aroused.

3. Day 1, 1300 hours:

The train arrives in Bordeaux for a 10-minute stop. The last car of the train is removed and replaced by another first class sleeping car. Otherwise, nothing unusual happens.

4. Day 1, 1400 hours:

The attendant comes to ask which seating the agents want at dinner. The first seating is at 1800 hours. The second is at 1930 hours. The attendant also checks the tickets of any new passengers.

5. Day 1, 1500 hours:

The train arrives at the Spanish border and is delayed for 1 hour while the wheels are changed to fit the narrower track. During this time, Spanish customs officials board the train and check passports. The agents' passports are approved without suspicion. There is a 20% chance per compartment that the officials ask to spot-check the luggage of one of the agents in the compartment. The officials do not check the bags of the agent carrying the briefcase. If the officials find anything unusual in an agent's luggage, that agent is detained and questioned. Detained agents are either questioned and released or held under arrest, depending on the seriousness of the items found by the officials.

6. Day 1, 1800 hours:

If the agents have selected the first seating at dinner, the attendant comes to announce dinner. The agents may sit anywhere in the dining car. There is a 50% chance that the other passengers from the first class sleeping car are also present.

If any of the agents has seen Richard Mercer in the hall before, and if any of them states that he is now studying the passengers, he sees that Mercer is in the nonsmoking section **(B3).** If the agents say they are watching his actions, they see a man approach Mercer and speak for a second. Mercer hands the man a matchbook, and the stranger wanders away. The agents may learn the identity of the stranger (Garcia DeVrie) by giving a large tip (at least $10) to the headwaiter. For a second tip (same amount as the first), the headwaiter tells the agents that DeVrie is traveling in one of the second class sleeping cars. Nothing else happens during the meal.

7. Day 1, 1930 hours:

If the agents have selected the second seating at dinner, the attendant comes to announce dinner. The agents may choose any table they wish. Nothing unusual happens during dinner.

8. Day 2, 0100 hours:

Any agents who are awake at this time hear the sound of something hitting the floor in the hall. If the agents look out, they see the attendant apparently asleep at the end of the hall. A heavy book lies at his feet. Hiding in the attendant's compartment is Garcia DeVrie. He has chloroformed the attendant and has obtained his passkey. If any agent investigates, DeVrie attacks from behind, trying to chloroform the agent. DeVrie remains hidden if more than one person is in the hall. If discovered, DeVrie uses his gun (and silencer) to capture or kill the agent(s).

Five minutes after releasing the gas, DeVrie uses the passkey to enter the agents' room. He is wearing a mini-gas mask. If all agents are asleep, DeVrie searches the compartment, the agents, and the luggage. If he finds the briefcase, he successfully picks the lock and photographs the information inside. If DeVrie does not find the briefcase in the first compartment, he goes to the next compartment and repeats the operation. If any of the agents are still awake, DeVrie tries to kill them using his silenced weapon. If he succeeds, he continues searching.

After he completes his job, DeVrie returns to his compartment, removes the film from the camera, and throws the camera, gun, ammo, holster, gas mask, gas canister, and chloroform out the window. He keeps the lockpicks, the second passport, and the film.

10. Day 2, 0630 hours:

All agents wake up at this time. If all agents were asleep when DeVrie searched their room, they notice nothing unusual, except that the air is slightly stale. The agents may notice more if they took special measures to detect intrusion. Otherwise, everything appears to be in order. The attendant tells the authorities that he was attacked, but he does not inform the passengers unless asked. If the agents know their compartments were searched, they may report it. If they bribe the attendant of any other car with at least $10, the agents learn that DeVrie and two other passengers were moving about the train during the night. The

TRAIN NO. 2



9. Day 2, 0130 hours:

Any agent awake at this time has a 30% chance to hear a faint hiss near the door. DeVrie is using his gas canister to fill the agents' compartment with sleeping gas. (If the agents are sleeping in more than one compartment, DeVrie attacks compartment **A8** first.) Any agents asleep at this time are automatically affected. Those who are awake must roll percentage dice each turn to see if they remain awake. They must roll until a window is opened. The chance to remain awake is the same as that for sleeping gas capsules. Affected agents are unconscious for at least 30 minutes.

agents must give the attendant another $20 to find out where these people are staying. If the agents confront DeVrie in his compartment, DeVrie tries to call for help (unless the agents use a gun or knife to threaten him). He claims to be innocent and tries to have the agents arrested.

11. Day 2, 0730 hours:

The train arrives at the Portugese border. Customs officials board the train (use the same procedure used by Spanish customs). Spanish police stop the train and do not let anyone off. The police question all occupants of the agents' first class sleeping car. If the agents do anything suspicious, they are detained. In any case, the

police take the names and addresses of everyone on the car. The police also question DeVrie, but do not discover anything incriminating about him.

12. Day 2, 1000 hours:

The train arrives at the Lisbon station. The mission is over.

Post-operation report

Post-operation report

If the agents go to the locker at the Lisbon station, they find an envelope inside. It contains an amount of money equal to $500 for each agent who participated in the operation. A note in the envelope tells the agents to report to the Lisbon Grand Hotel and await further instructions. The note also says the agents should leave the briefcase in the locker and destroy the locker key.

If an agent poses as DeVrie and collects his telegram at the station, he receives $1,000 and a message to report to the Lisbon office. If an agent poses as Mercer and goes to the San Marco Hotel, he finds an envelope containing $500 and instructions to return home pending further assignment. The agency can provide no further assistance in either instance.

You may want to assign the agents the task of identifying Fallen Angel, even though the agency has no information it can use to assist the agents in that task.

Proposed operation 2: The missing man (Geneva to Budapest)

If Zabronski is used, he has the following items: a 9mm FN Browning High Power rifle, a shoulder holster, a 9mm Uzi (hidden in a bulky clock radio), 1 lb. of plastique disguised as chocolate bars, three radio detonators, three timer detonators (all disguised as pencils), a toothpaste tube filled with thermite paste, a hand grenade disguised as a large bar of soap, and 3 feet of piano wire looped into his belt. He also has extra ammunition for his weapons. The ammo is disguised as common personal items.

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY: Daymonde takes the train to Budapest, but he boards it in disguise. Furthermore, he boards at Vienna, leaving the agents only 1 hour to find him and deal with the situation. A wanted embezzler is also on board, complicating matters further. The police have begun a major manhunt for the embezzler, and their search may interfere with the success of the mission.

The operation's objectives are as follows:

1. **Locate and detain Daymonde without creating unwanted attention.**
2. **Determine whether Daymonde is defecting or moving against his will.**
3. **Return Daymonde if held against will.**
4. **Eliminate Daymonde prior to reaching Communist borders, if he is defecting.**
5. **Eliminate all aid and assistance to Daymonde.**

Agents' briefing

Have the agents receive the boxed information via letter or messenger. You should give the agents as much information about Daymonde's physical appearance as they want.

Target personnel

Samuel Daymonde

PS 21 CH 83 W 22 CO 71 K 95 CD 68
OF 70 DP 77 EV 76 DA 82 MV111 LL 4
HTH 97 SV153 S M H L

Description. Age: 47 Ht: 6′ 1″ Wt: 150 Hair: brown Eyes: brown Glasses: yes, cannot wear contacts, Coordination 44 without glasses

Languages. English*: 67 German: 44 Russian: 47 Swedish: 65

AOKs. Computer Science: 130 Economics/Finance: 62 Education/Indoctrination: 66 Engineering, Electrical: 93 Engineering, Mechanical: 53 Law: 123 Mathematics/Accounting: 127 Physics: 78 Political Science/Ideology: 53 World History/Current Affairs: 66

Daymonde is a computer expert, specializing in tiger teams (groups that test the security of supposedly safe computer systems). His record has been excellent, and is marked by only one failure. Disenchanted with Western politics that almost cost him his job, he has decided to defect to the East. Daymonde fully knows what will happen when he gets to the East, but he cannot be dissuaded. He boards the train disguised as an old man.

GRU Agent #1

PS 58 CH 77 W 31 CO 30 K 43 CD 99
OF 65 DP 54 EV 88 DA 71 MV188 LL 9
HTH146 SV142 S M H R

Description. Age: 26 Ht: 5′ 9″ Wt: 140 Hair: blond Eyes: gray Glasses: no

Languages. Russian*: 68 English: 45

AOKs. Military Science/Weaponry: 126



Administrator's briefing

This is a RED EMERGENCY ALERT. Samuel Daymonde, section leader of Tiger Team Alpha, has not reported to work for 24 hours. Administrations assumes Daymonde has defected. An emergency search has been instituted. Daymonde's probable destination is thought to be Budapest, via Vienna. Daymonde must be returned or eliminated. His defection will affect security of NATO for an indefinite amount of time.

Use any and all agents available, organized into teams of 2-4 agents each. The following agent from the Recommended agents list is available: Luke Zabronski. His use on this mission is strongly advised.

Weapon. .357 snub-nose
PWV 31 RM 0/-50/-160/X WS VF
ROF 1 AMMO 5 HWV 4
combat stiletto HWV 14

You have been contacted by direct method, which is only done in RED EMERGENCY ALERT situations. The information given says you are to proceed immediately to Geneva by the fastest possible method. From Geneva, you are to travel by train from Geneva to the Hungarian border. While on the train, you are to locate the man whose description is included. This man is to be taken to the nearest American Embassy. He must not cross the Hungarian border alive. You can expect no help from local authorities. If you are caught or arrested, the agency will provide no legal help. Furthermore, the agency cannot afford undue attention that might be created if there is major destruction; hence, blowing up the train or causing major damage is out of the question.

This man is a level 3 Assassin. Although he appears to be slight and puny, he has been trained as a professional killer in close combat. He carries a .357, and he straps his stiletto to his leg. He also carries a diplomatic passport giving him diplomatic immunity.

KGB Agent #2

PS 82 CH 87 W 62 CO 90 K 86 CD 84
OF 87 DP 89 EV 86 DA 85 MV228 LL 14
HTH168 SV175 S M H L


Description. Age: 39 Ht: 5′ 10″ Wt: 155 Hair: brown Eyes: blue/gray Glasses: no
Languages. Russian*: 83 English: 81 German: 72 Turkish: 38

those who board, they see normal passengers, including one group of four men who apparently know each other. None of these men matches the description of Daymonde. The men are actually the GRU and KGB agents assigned to get Daymonde into Hungary.

Just before the train leaves, one of the agents looks out the window and notices the headline of a newspaper hanging on the station newsstand. The headline is in German, and says (if anyone can read it), **"INTERNATIONAL MANHUNT!"** If the agents buy a copy of the paper, they learn that Interpol and local authorities are searching for an embezzler who made off with millions.

After 10 minutes, the train leaves the station. The GRU and KGB agents take seats in a second class coach car.

TRAIN NO. 3



GRU Agent #2

PS 81 CH 55 W 62 CO 60 K 85 CD 89
OF 75 DP 58 EV 72 DA 87 MV232 LL 14
HTH153 SV130 S M H R

Description. Age: 22 Ht: 6′ Wt: 185 Hair: black Eyes: green Glasses: no
Languages. Russian*: 87 English: 56 German: 72 Japanese: 52
AOKs. Military Science/Weaponry: 99
Weapon. 7.62 AKM Assault Rifle
PWV 75 RM 0/-20/-100/-300 WS BA
ROF 4 AMMO 20 HWV 10

This level 4 Investigator's job is to determine the true usefulness of Daymonde as a defector. His rifle has been modified so that it is lighter, a little smaller, and fully automatic. He carries it unassembled in his briefcase. It takes the agent 3 turns to assemble the weapon. He also carries a diplomatic passport identifying himself as a military attache from the Geneva embassy. Therefore, he does not imperil his cover by using the assault rifle. One of the two KGB agents uses the rifle in combat.

KGB Agent #1

PS 48 CH 89 W 95 CO 42 K 81 CD 93
OF 68 DP 66 EV 91 DA 87 MV236 LL 14
HTH139 SV156 S M H R

Description. Age: 33 Ht: 5′ 6″ Wt: 140 Hair: gray Eyes: brown Glasses: no
Languages. Russian*: 92 Bulgarian: 54 English: 39 Polish: 34
AOKs. Military Science/Weaponry: 115
Weapon. .357 Police Magnum
PWV 40 RM 0/-40/-135/X WS F
ROF 1 AMMO 6 HWV 4

This agent is a level 3 Confiscator. He carries his Magnum in a shoulder holster. Both KGB agents are traveling under the cover of a visiting trade mission.

AOKs. Military Science/Weaponry: 89
Weapon. 9mm Walther P-38
PWV 42 RM 0/-60/-160/X WS VF
ROF 1 AMMO 8 HWV 4

This man is a level 2 Investigator. He carries his Walther in his coat pocket.

Operation procedure

1. Day 1, 1600 hours:

The agents arrive at the Geneva station in time to get tickets on the Geneva-Vienna-Budapest train. The agents may purchase any type of ticket (first class sleeper, second class sleeper, or coach).

2. Day 1, 1630 hours:

The train leaves the station. If the agents watched as people boarded, they would have seen one man behaving suspiciously. The man was apparently watching all others who boarded the train. If the agents follow the man, they see him take a compartment on a second class sleeper. The man does not match the description of Daymonde. He is Herzog Wozzek, a fleeing embezzler. He is carrying the number of a computer account in his head and a $50,000 bundle of securities in his briefcase. Wozzek is deathly afraid that the police have discovered him. If the agents tail him, he assumes they are undercover police. Wozzek tries to avoid the agents at all costs (he even hides in cupboards). If confronted by the agents, Wozzek immediately breaks down and confesses. If he does not learn that the agents are not police until after he confesses, he tries to buy them off with $5,000 worth of securities. If the agents accept these securities, they must take special precautions to ensure that the securities are not traced back to them.

3. Day 1, 1830 hours:

The train arrives at Bern for a 10-minute stop. If the agents watch

4. Day 1, 2000 hours:

The train arrives in Zurich. Only a few passengers board at this late hour. None of the new passengers looks suspicious. By now, the train is fairly crowded.

The conductor comes around at this time to collect passports. With him is a quiet man who looks into every compartment, comparing against a photograph. This man is a plainclothes railway policeman, who is searching for Wozzek. If the agents are in the same compartment as Wozzek, the policeman forces his way in and tries to arrest Wozzek. The policeman does not carry a gun.

5. Day 2, 0100 hours:

The train arrives in Munich. Again, only a few passengers board, and none seems suspicious.

6. Day 2, 0700 hours:

The train arrives in Vienna. Many passengers disembark at this point. If the agents watch the platform while new passengers board, they see only a few: three men in suits (none matching the Daymonde description), two families with small children, ten Turkish guest workers, four single women of various ages, and an old man. The old man is actually Daymonde in disguise. Only agents who state they are using their Perception trait (and do so successfully) notice something unusual about the old man. Do not tell the agents why they notice the man or if it is important. The agents must deduce from

what little information they have. If the agents compare the old man to Daymonde, they should notice slight similarities. One of the two KGB agents greets Daymonde and takes him to their compartment.

If the agents go to the Soviets' compartment and confront them, the Soviets use whatever force is necessary to keep Daymonde in their custody. If the situation erupts into gunplay, the Soviet agents (holding Daymonde) try to commandeer the engine and reach the Hungarian border. The Soviet agents surrender only if Daymonde is killed and if they are outnumbered.

7. Day 2, 0800 hours:

The train arrives at the Hungarian border and stops for customs. All passengers are required to detrain and take their luggage through customs. The customs officials search all bags. Daymonde and the Soviet agents do not get back on the train. If the agents have not located Daymonde by this time, they have failed their mission. The only thing they can do is finish the train ride to Budapest and then return to their home base.


Post-operation report

If the agents manage to capture Daymonde without creating attention, they may disembark with him at the next station. An agency car will be waiting for the agents. The driver takes them to a hotel, pays them $2,000 each, and leaves. Daymonde is then turned over to U.S. authorities.

If Daymonde has been killed, but no one witnessed the execution, a conductor discovers the body. The train then stops at the nearest station, where the body is removed. All passengers are detained by the police for questioning and searches. If the agents have disposed of all incriminating evidence (such as weapons and photographs), the police do not suspect them. If the agents are found holding any evidence or suspicious items, the police arrest them. The agents must manage their own arrest and trials as explained in the rule book. Payment of $1,000 is made to each agent's account. If released, each agent is reassigned to the Orient. The enemy agents will have disposed of their items, and are not suspected.

If the agents fail to stop Daymonde, they receive no payment. The agency immediately begins plans to assassinate Daymonde behind the Iron Curtain. This task may be assigned to the agents. However, it is more likely that the agents will be assigned the task of guarding the Administrator's private dog kennel.

Proposed operation 3: The big haul (Bordeaux to Istanbul)



Administrator's briefing

To prepare for certain covert operations in the Middle and Far East, the agency must transport a dangerous item to Istanbul. Air travel is unacceptable because of the risk involved. Movement by sea is too slow for the necessary time frame of operations. The agency has therefore decided to transport the material by train.

To prevent detection of the material during shipment, it is to be carried in a closed coffin. A suitable body is being provided for cover. The material is hidden in the lining of the coffin. Because of the extreme importance of the material, the coffin must be guarded at all times. This is the agents' duty.

The material carried in the coffin is Compound X10, a highly lethal biological toxin. The toxin is packed in temperature-controlled, pressurized canisters. These canisters must not be ruptured in any way. If they are, the U.S. government will be faced with an "embarrassing" international incident, and the agency will suffer severe policy setbacks. See the attached DoD report on Compound X10.

Attachment: **MOST SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

RE: Effectiveness analysis of Compound X10

Testing has shown that prototype biological toxin, classified as X10, is unsuitable for military needs. In accordance with limitations set, the toxin has a lethal effectiveness of 97% at one part per million as absorbed through the skin. However, the onset time is 24 hours, during which an antidote is effective. The compound is also highly unstable and may only be transported outside special containment equipment safely for 72 hours. Transport beyond this time results in release of the toxin.


In conclusion, although the compound kills 97% of the time, transportation problems and rate of lethality make the toxin unsuitable for military applications.

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY: This operation has major complications. During the first part of the trip, the agents must deal with a drug investigation and a terrorist. When the train enters the Eastern bloc countries, the agents may discover that someone has tipped off the local authorities that they are on board the train.

This operation is best suited for 3-4 agents. All agents given on the Recommended agents list are available for this operation, except for Luke Zabronski.

The operation's objective is as follows:

1. **Deliver the material to the destination without damaging the contents or compromising agent covers.**



Agents' briefing

At your office, you receive the following telephone call:

"Hi, Moe Green here. I just got into town. Do you think you can spare a few minutes and come down to the bar to see your old buddy? I'll be waiting for you. Just ask at the bar."

You go down to the bar and ask the bartender for Moe Green. He says, *"Oh, he had to step out. But he left you a drink."* The bartender hands you a drink and a napkin. The napkin has an address on it. You finish your drink and go.

You find an empty apartment at the address. Searching around, you find a briefcase in a closet. The briefcase is unlocked. In the briefcase is a passport, a train ticket, and a sheet of paper. The passport identifies you as a Turkish emigrant. The ticket is for a train leaving from Bordeaux to Istanbul. The sheet of paper says that you and a team of agents (to be met on the train) are to transport a coffin from Bordeaux to Istanbul. A body (your "brother") has been provided for the coffin. You and the other agents will be posing as the grieving members of the deceased's family. You are required to maintain a watch over the coffin so that it is not stolen or damaged. The coffin must arrive in Istanbul within 72 hours of its leaving Bordeaux. It is imperative that this deadline be met. The coffin (and the proper papers for it) will be at the Bordeaux train station.

The train leaves the next morning. That night, you pack. You head for the station the next afternoon.

Target personnel

Dirk Marchand

French Railway Police

PS 79 CH 73 W 44 CO 92 K 58 CD 86
OF 89 DP 83 EV 80 DA 72 MV209 LL 12
HTH159 SV163 S M H R

Description. Age: 43 Ht: 5′ 4″ Wt: 110 Hair: gray Eyes: green Glasses: yes, cannot wear contacts, Coordination 60 without glasses
Languages. French*: 82 English: 47 German: 59
AOKs. Criminology: 99 Engineering, Transportation: 125 Law: 114 Physical Education: 70 Physics: 68 Social Sciences: 82

Weapon. 9mm PPK

PWV 37 RM 0/-45/-145/X WS VF
ROF 1 AMMO 7 HWV 4

Marchand is a member of the French Railway Police. He has full investigative and arrest powers on any railroad in France, and he is equal to a level 3 Investigator. Marchand carries his identification with him at all times. His I.D. has no picture. He carries his Walther PPK in a shoulder holster.

Marchand is on the train because he has a tip that a large drug shipment is being carried from some stop along this line. The police are being discreet, and are trying not to scare the drug dealers away, since they hope for a big arrest.

Also on the train, under Marchand's orders, are six plainclothes policemen. They all have the same statistics:

PS 65 CH 46 W 56 CO 72 K 44 CD 64
OF 68 DP 56 EV 56 DA 55 MV185 LL 12
HTH121 SV112 S M H R

Each officer is armed with a billy club (HWV 6). The officers do not throw these.

Luigi Dorfman

drug smuggler

PS 34 CH 96 W 92 CO 85 K 50 CD 46
OF 66 DP 91 EV 71 DA 48 MV176 LL 13
HTH105 SV162 S M H L

Description. Age: 26 Ht: 5′ 11″ Wt: 160 Hair: black Eyes: gray Glasses: no
Languages. Italian: 93 French: 74
AOKs. Botany: 99 Chemistry: 77 Economics/Finance: 118 Law: 103 Medicine/Physiology: 95

Weapon. .357 Police Magnum

PWV 40 RM 0/-40/-135/X WS F
ROF 1 AMMO 6 HWV 4

Dorfman is a professional drug smuggler and dealer. He dresses conservatively and appears to be a young executive. He carries his Magnum in the pocket of his overcoat.

Dorfman is an "international citizen," having gone to great pains to hide his true identity and nationality behind many aliases. In his luggage are several business journals and, carefully hidden, three false passports. He is equal to a level 2 Confiscator.

Le Chat

terrorist

PS 75 CH 62 W 42 CO 61 K 76 CD 94
OF 78 DP 62 EV 78 DA 85 MV193 LL 12
HTH153 SV 140 S F H R

Description. Age: 30 Ht: 5′ 9″ Wt: 130 Hair: brown Eyes: green Glasses: yes, can wear contacts, Coordination 85 without glasses
Languages. Italian*: 83 Arabic: 54 English: 67 Russian 56
AOKs. Chemistry: 66 Computer Science: 75 Education/Indoctrination: 100 Engineering, Mechanical: 68 Medicine/Physiology: 53 Military Science/Weaponry: 108 Political Science/Ideology: 74 World History/Current Affairs: 52

Weapon. .45 self-load

PWV 45 RM 0/-45/-145/X WS F
ROF 1 AMMO 8 HWV 4

Le Chat (proper name unknown) is a member of the Red Brigade. She is equal to a level 4 Assassin. She has been told that an official of the French nuclear program is on board the train. Le Chat intends to eliminate the man as a "public protest."

Besides her .45, Le Chat is carrying a 2-hour timer-detonated bomb made of 4 ounces of plastique.

Operation procedure

The times given for the following events do not take into account any delays that might occur due to police investigations and agent activities. Keep careful track of how much time has passed in the course of the operation. The agents have until 1700 hours on Day 4 to deliver the coffin. After this time, the canisters contain-

ing the compound rupture, causing an international incident (and a great deal of death).

1. Day 1, 1700 hours:

The agents board the train at Bordeaux. Give the agents compartments near the center of the first second class sleeping car. No more than two agents should be in a single compartment. One of the compartments to one side of the agents is empty. Another of the compartments near the agents is occupied by Luigi Dorfman.

Any agent who checks the baggage car finds the coffin and the necessary papers already on board. The guard in the baggage car allows one agent to remain in the baggage area to pray or grieve over the coffin. There are no other coffins in the car.

One plainclothes detective also comes to the baggage car, secretly identifies himself to the guard, and remains. He tries to strike up a conversation with the agent in the car, hoping to learn the agent's purpose.

2. Day 1, 1900 hours:

Dinner is served in the dining car. The agents may take either the first or second seating. A meal may be sent to the baggage car. During dinner, Marchand casually starts a conversation with the agents. He has a complete list of all passengers and freight, and he is suspicious of the agent. He tries to learn any information about the agents that he can. After talking to the agents, he orders a plainclothes officer to shadow the agents.

3. Day 1, 2000 hours:

Two plainclothes officers arrive at the baggage car, saying they must search all freight. They explain that it is a necessary health inspection. If the agent in this car refuses to let the officers search the coffin, they summon Marchand. He orders the agent to allow the inspection. If the agent still refuses, Marchand has the agent restrained and gives the coffin (and body) a very thorough inspection. Marchand has a 20% chance of noticing something unusual about the coffin if he makes a thorough inspection. If he does find anything, he immediately arrests any agents present and begins dismantling the coffin. He orders the plainclothes officers to occupy one of the empty compartments next to the other agents. From there, the officers use a wired drop microphone to eavesdrop on the agents.

4. Day 1, 2330 hours:

The train arrives in Marseilles. If the police have learned anything illegal or suspicious about the agents from the shadowing, inspection, or eavesdropping, they make an arrest. Marchand and the officers go to the compartments where the agents are staying and, using a passkey, break in on the agents. If the agents resist, the police react in a like manner. If the agents use guns, Marchand summons 10 Marseilles policemen (same statistics as given for the railway police). Each of these policemen is armed with a 9mm PPK **(PWV 37; HWV 0/-45/-145/X; WS VF; ROF 1; AMMO 7; HWV 4).**

During this time, Dorfman goes to the baggage car. He stays clear of the car if arrests are being made. Otherwise, Dorfman appears in the baggage car to oversee the arrival of his drug-filled coffin on the train. He looks as if he is grieving, just as the agents do.

Meanwhile, Le Chat's target boards the train. The attendant shows the man to one of the empty compartments near the agents. Seeing that it is a second class car, the man becomes upset and demands a first class compartment. After a brief but noisy argument with the attendant, he is given a first class compartment.

5. Day 2, 0500 hours:

The train reaches the Italian border. The attendant and a customs official go through the cars checking passports. There is a 20% chance that the official asks to search the luggage of one of the agents (one roll per compartment). If the agents act suspiciously, or if they have illegal materials in sight, the official searches all luggage in the compartment. If the official finds anything illegal, he confiscates it and arrests the person who was carrying it. Agents are required to fill out currency declaration forms at this time.

Two plainclothes officers are in the baggage car at this time. They search any new freight taken on in Marseille. They have a 70% chance of finding the drugs hidden in the coffin Dorfman is transporting. If they do find the drugs, the officers immediately stop the train and notify Marchand. Dorfman knows he has been discovered if the train stops. He opens the window to his compartment and climbs onto the roof of the train. He hides there until the train starts moving again. The police do not find him.

6. Day 2, 0530 hours:

The train, if stopped, begins moving again. Dorfman climbs off the roof and enters one of the compartments occupied by the agents. Dorfman breaks a window to get in, if necessary. If the agents capture him, Dorfman offers to cut the agents in on his deal. If either Dorfman or the agents fire unsilenced guns in their "meeting," the attendant summons the Italian Railway Police, and then uses his passkey to enter the agents' compartment.

7. Day 2, 1030 hours:

The train arrives in Milan. If the agents are holding Dorfman pirsoner, they may turn him over to the Italian police. The Italian police delay the agents for 1-3 days. The coffin then goes to Istanbul, unescorted.

The terrorist Le Chat boards the train at this station. Marchand and the plainclothes officers get off the train to return to France.

8. Day 2, 1130 hours:

If an agent is in the hall, he sees a ski-masked woman step from a restroom and grab the attendant. The woman is Le Chat. She is holding her .45. She threatens the attendant, forcing him to open one of the compartments near the agents (where her target was supposed to be). If she discovers the compartment is empty, she shoots the attendant. If all the agents are in their compartment when this is happening, they hear a loud scream from a nearby compartment, followed by two gunshots.

Le Chat then uses the passkey to enter the agents' compartment. She forces the agents to kneel away from her with their hands on their heads. She then binds their wrists and ankles together. Once this is done, she searches their luggage. If she finds anything unusual, she questions the agents, using force as needed. If Le Chat learns that the agents are transporting something, she executes the agents (muffling the shots with a pillow) and waits until the train reaches Venice. She then steals the agents' coffin and escapes before anyone realizes what has happened.

If Le Chat learns nothing about the agents, she gags them and leaves. The police are waiting when the train arrives in Venice. The police detain and question the agents for several days, unless the agents have escaped their bonds before the train reaches Venice.

If the agents defeat Le Chat and dispose of her body, nothing more happens until the train reaches Venice. The train is delayed there while the police question everyone about the murder of the attendant (if this has occurred). After 1 hour, everyone is released.

No matter what happens, make sure that you let the agents know that Le Chat planted a bomb on the train. How you present this information to the agents is up to you. If the agents dig for information, they learn that Le Chat has been in their car, the other first class sleeping car, and the dining car. The bomb is hidden in the waiters' buffet in the dining car. It is set to explode in 1 hour. If the authorities are notified about this, they stop the train and evacuate it.

9. Day 2, 1200 hours:

Lunch is served in the dining car.

10. Day 2, 1230 hours:

The bomb, if not already found, explodes in the waiters' buffet. Any person in the buffet takes 24 points of damage. Any person in the hall next to the buffet doors takes 18 points of damage. Those sitting at the tables adjacent to the buffet (on both sides of the aisle) take 12 points of damage from flying glass and metal. These people also suffer concussions. People adjacent to these tables take 4 points of damage from flying glass. The train is stopped for 1 hour. Everyone is questioned, and the dining car is removed. The bomb has no effect on the toxin in the agents' coffin.

11. Day 2, 1330 hours:

The train arrives in Venice. The dining car (if not already removed) and the first class sleeping cars are removed. No new cars are added to the train.

12. Day 2, 1600 hours:

The train arrives in Trieste. Another second class coach car is added.

13. Day 2, 1630 hours:

The train arrives at the Yugoslavian border. All passengers must detrain and go through customs. The customs officials find nothing suspicious about the agents' coffin. Customs officials arrest and charge with smuggling any agent caught carrying contraband.

14. Day 3, 0430 hours:

The train arrives in Belgrade. Nothing unusual happens.

15. Day 3, 1130 hours:

The train arrives at the Hungarian border and stops for customs. The customs search takes 1 hour and is very thorough. The guards require every passenger on the train to disembark with his or her luggage. There is a 50% chance that each agent is strip-searched. If any agent can understand Bulgarian, he hears the guards talking about "capitalist spies." If the agents are carrying nothing unusual, and if there is nothing unusual in their luggage, they are not discovered. The Bulgarian officials immediately arrest any agents carrying suspicious materials.

16. Day 3, 1400 hours:

The train arrives in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria. Any agent watching the platform may notice that four dark-suited men board the train (the agent watching should make a Perception roll). The men are Bulgarian secret police. They have been informed that Western agents are on the train. During the trip to the Turkish border, the police enter all the sleeping compartments on the train, explaining that they are searching for currency smugglers. If the agents have anything hidden in their compartment, there is a 40% chance that the police find it. No one on the train knows the police are on board. If the agents eliminate the police, no one notices their absence. You may determine the policemen's weapons and statistics.

17. Day 3, 1900 hours:

The train arrives at the Turkish border. The Turkish customs officials check everyone's passports and spot check luggage (40% chance per compartment). The Bulgarian secret police (if alive) get off the train.


18. Day 4, 0400 hours:

The train arrives in Istanbul. Three men meet the agents and present a voucher for the coffin. If asked, the men identify themselves as employees of the agency. The mission is over.

Post-operation report

If the agents succeed in their mission and deliver the coffin before the required deadline, they each receive $2,000 (delivered by any method you wish). If the agents do not deliver the coffin before the time limit, the pressurized canisters hidden in the bottom of the coffin rupture, releasing the toxin. Everyone on the train, and everyone in the area through which the train passes while the toxin is escaping has a 97% chance of dying in 24 hours. Furthermore, the toxin spreads, causing a minor plague at the point of outbreak. Any agent who survives discovers that the agency secretly provided complete backgrounds for the agents' fake passports. These backgrounds (carefully hidden by the agency for realism) link the agents to an international terrorist organization (your choice). To prevent international disaster for the agency, the surviving agents are then treated as dangerous terrorists. The agency also assigns its own operatives the task of eliminating the surviving agents to prevent any disclosure of agency involvement. You may want to use these complications in future adventures involving these agents.

Proposed operation 4: The moving drop (Copenhagen - Hamburg → Munich - Vienna)



Administrator's briefing

For the past several years, a severe security problem has existed in the northern nations, involving both friendly neutral nations and members of the NATO alliance. Several embassies' classified materials have been passed into the hands of Eastern bloc operatives and carried into the Warsaw pact countries. An apparently efficient operation has been formed to do so.

One month ago, an agency operative installed into the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen provided information on the first link of the operation. The operative determined that a code clerk who has a photographic memory is passing information on cables to an outside source. Close observation of the code clerk indicates that the likely receiver is a cut-out between the clerk and a resident elsewhere. This information is supported by the fact that the cut-out travels once a month to various places in Italy, always by train. Agents in Italy have determined that no information is passed in their country; similarly, the agency's man in Copenhagen is certain that the cut-out passes no information before leaving for Italy. It is therefore necessary for an agent or team of agents to observe the cut-out on the train and locate the next link in the chain. The agents will be backed up on the train by an agency contact.

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY:
Unknown to the agents or even the cut-out, the spy ring has special security measures. A two-man interference team whose job is to remove any opposition travels on the train, protecting the cut-out. Also, unknown to the agency, their contact on the train is a double

agent working for the other side. This contact does his best to prevent the success of the agents' operation. Finally, just as the operation is wrapping up, the agency discovers that the information being passed by the cut-out in this specific operation is a list of many agents currently operating in Europe. The agents must stop the information.

The following agents from the Recommended agents list are available for this mission: Gyorgy Borvan, Ruth Montiverdi, and Juan Matthews.

The agents are required to change trains several times during this operation. Each time the agents change trains, the organization of the new train will be listed. The train shown on this page is for the first leg of the journey.

The operation's objectives are as follows:

1. **Determine how the cut-out passes her information.**
2. **Determine who receives the information from the cut-out.**
3. **Obtain a copy of the passed information to determine its form.**

Agents' briefing

In the morning when you report to work at International Trade and Lending, Inc., your boss calls you into his office. Passing through the pair of steel-lined doors, you are x-ray scanned and voice identified. Behind the desk, the head case officer waits for you. He shoves a photograph across the desk toward you.

"Sit down, and look at that carefully. Know her? Of course you don't. Her name's Lisbeth Magnusson. Lives in Copenhagen, works as a travel agent. Copenhagen's placed her as the runner for an information pipeline. The info gets collected from embassies in town, they pass it onto her, and she carries the stuff out somehow. She travels from Copenhagen to places in Italy on a fairly regular basis, but she's clean when she arrives, so she's dropping the facts on the train.

"Your job's simple. Follow her, find her drop, get into it, learn what form the info's in and if it's coded, and see who picks it up. We've been after this pipeline for years now, so whatever you do, don't scare them off.

"Here's a ticket to Copenhagen. You'll be contacted there about what train to take. There'll be a contact on the train to double you up. He'll signal you by dropping his lighter at your feet and asking you to pick it up. Any questions?"

Allow the agent to ask whatever questions he wishes, but you should keep most facts general. If the agent asks for more clarification about the mission, you should give very clear instructions. If the agent still does not understand, consider assigning the agent a simpler job, like doorman.




Target personnel

Lisbeth Magnusson

PS 18 CH 78 W 49 CO 70 K 46 CD 23
OF 47 DP 74 EV 51 DA 35 MV 90 LL 7
HTH 69 SV 125 S F H R

Description. Age: 28 Ht: 5′ 10″ Wt: 130 Hair: brunette Eyes: green Glasses: no
Languages. Danish*: 93 German: 83
AOKs. Architecture: 93 Arts/Crafts: 56 Economics/Finance: 87 Geography: 32 World History/Current Affairs: 68

Magnusson is not an actual agent. She works as a courier to earn a little extra money. She carries the information in a paperback book. The book is a science fiction novel and means nothing in itself. The information is hidden on a microdot fixed on the cover. After dropping the information as instructed, Magnusson uses the rest of the trip to gather information for her travel agency. She carries no weapon and does not know how to use one effectively.



Harold Johan Triske

PS 75 CH 31 W 93 CO 74 K 90 CD 93
OF 84 DP 53 EV 62 DA 92 MV 261 LL 17
HTH 137 SV 115 S M H L

Description. Age: 38 Ht: 6′ 6″ Wt: 200 Hair: blond Eyes: brown Glasses: no
Languages. Danish*: 93 German: 59 Italian: 63 Swedish: 46
AOKs. Military Science/Weaponry: 123
Weapon. Scorpion Air Pistol
PWV 18 RM 0/-40/X/X WS BA
ROF 1 AMMO 5 HWV 10

Triske is a level 3 Assassin working for the HUA. His assignment is to tail Magnusson and make sure that no one follows her or interferes with the drop. If anyone does, Triske and his partner are to eliminate the opposition in a clean manner, preferably so that it looks like an accident. Triske carries a Scorpion Air Pistol loaded with five special nerve agent pellets. These pellets cause death in 15 seconds unless the victim successfully rolls below half his Willpower. The death appears to be a heart attack, unless sophisticated tests are made to detect the toxin used. Triske carries the pistol in his briefcase.

Triske's passport identifies him as a Danish wine and liquor exporter. He has nothing else incriminating on him. If captured and forced to talk, he identifies his contact as a loan officer of a German banking house in West Berlin.

Sigfried Karlson

PS 29 CH 84 W 49 CO 79 K 30 CD 96
OF 88 DP 82 EV 90 DA 63 MV 174 LL 8
HTH 69 SV 125 S M H R

Description. Age: 26 Ht: 5′ 11″ Wt: 140 Hair: brown Eyes: brown Glasses: yes, wears contacts, Coordination 67 without contacts
Languages. German*: 83 Danish: 56 Spanish: 47
AOKs. Physical Education: 115
Weapon. 9mm P-38 (silenced)
PWV 32 RM 0/-60/-160/X WS VF
ROF 1 AMMO 8 HWV 4

Karlson is a level 1 Assassin working directly under Triske. He poses as (and is) Triske's personal business assistant. He carries no other items that would reveal him as an agent. If the agents capture and force Karlson to talk, he can identify only Triske.

Hermann Paulus

PS 51 CH 45 W 64 CO 73 K 46 CD 73
OF 73 DP 59 EV 59 DA 60 MV178 LL 12
HTH110 SV118 S M H R

Description. Age: 33 Ht: 5′ 8″ Wt: 165 Hair: black Eyes: blue Glasses: no
Languages. German*: 75 English: 58
AOKs. Chemistry: 81 Education/Indoctrination: 97 Fine Arts: 111 Military Science/Weaponry: 117 Photography: 79

Weapon. 9mm Luger (silenced)
PWV 37 RM 0/-55/-145/X WS VF
ROF 1 AMMO 8 HWV 4

Paulus is the agents' contact on the train. He poses as an attendant and is on the train when the agents leave Hamburg. Paulus is also a double agent working for the other side. He is a level 4 Investigator. He carries no weapons on him, but he keeps his Luger hidden near his station at the end of the car.

Paulus works in whatever car the agents use. As soon as Paulus learns the agents' identities, he passes this information on to the interference team.

In his role as double agent, Paulus continues to be helpful to the agents, while setting them up to be killed by Triske and Karlson. If the agents capture Paulus and force him to talk, he reveals that he has been a double agent for several years. He receives his instructions over the phone and passes information by writing letters to a "girlfriend" in Paris. He is able to give the address. Paulus also knows the location of four other agents working for the other side.

Amarak Ketal

PS 45 CH 63 W 70 CO 61 K 32 CD 55
OF 58 DP 62 EV 59 DA 44 MV170 LL 12
HTH104 SV121 S M H R

Description. Age: 42 Ht: 5′ 8″ Wt: 180 Hair: black/gray Eyes: gray Glasses: no
Languages. Turkish*: 78 German: 56 Spanish: 47
AOKs. Botany: 43 Fine Arts: 109 Law: 87 Physics: 121

Ketal is the "mailman" who collects the drop on the train. Like Lisbeth, he is not really an agent, but he is aware of the risk that he takes. To protect himself, he carries a straight-edge razor (HWV 10) in his shoe and a commercial tear gas pen in his jacket pocket. If captured and forced to talk, he is only able to name the next drop point for the package: a tobacconist's shop in Vienna. He receives his instructions and payment by mail. His passport identifies him as a Turkish booking agent.

Operation procedure

1. Day 1, 0500 hours:

The agents get a call while staying at the Albert Magnus Hotel. The caller uses all of the proper passwords identifying herself as an agency operative. She tells the agents to be at the Copenhagen station for the 0630 train to Hamburg. Tickets will be waiting for them.

2. Day 1, 0630 hours:

The train leaves Copenhagen. The agents have tickets for one second class compartment. If they search the train, they find that their target (Magnusson) is staying in a different car. If the agents pay the attendant of their car at least $30, he arranges for them to have a compartment in the same car as Magnusson.

Any agents observing Magnusson notice that she shares her compartment with a man, woman, and small child. During the trip to Hamburg, she does not give the family anything.

3. Day 1, 1200 hours:

The train arrives in Hamburg. The agents must go through West German customs. Unless they have something obviously illegal on them, or unless they behave in a suspicious manner, they have no problem passing through customs.

The agents must change trains in the Hamburg station. They are taking the train to Munich, which leaves at 1230. If any agent shadows Magnusson in the station, he sees her eat lunch in the station restaurant, buy a paper at a newsstand, and go to the ladies' room. During this time, she talks to several people, but she does not make the drop.

4. Day 1, 1230 hours:

The Hamburg to Munich train leaves the station. This train is 10 cars long (from front to back): engine, second class coach, dining car, first class sleeping car, first class sleeping car, second class sleeping car, second class sleeping car, two more second class coaches, and a baggage car.

Magnusson takes a private compartment in a second class coach. The agents have a compartment in the same car. Paulus is the attendant for the car. Shortly after the train leaves the Hamburg station, Paulus comes to the agents' compartment for tickets. While he is here, he drops his lighter and asks one of the agents to pick it up. After identifying himself as the agents' contact, Paulus leaves to finish his duties. He returns in 15 minutes, and answers the agents' questions as best he can (remember that he is a double agent). He is not able to assist in shadowing Magnusson.

5. Day 1, 1330 hours:

Any agent in the hall at this time notices Paulus giving a message to the attendant of the next car. If any agent questions Paulus about the message, he reluctantly explains that it was a confirmation of their arrival on the train that he was to send to the agency. The message is actually a request for the interference team that protects Magnusson. The message says,

ARRIVED

TO

The telegram (to be sent by radio-telephone) is addressed to the Bonn office of Koenig Liqueur Importers.

6. Day 1, 1530 hours:

The train arrives in Bonn for a 1-minute stop. The interference team (Triske and Karlson) board the train here. Paulus shows them to their compartment - three away from the agents.

7. Day 1, 1600 hours:

Paulus comes around to tell the agents that Magnusson has decided to take the first seating at dinner. After talking to the agents, Paulus immediately goes to Triske and Karlson and informs them of the agents' dinner plans.

If any agent decides to watch Paulus carefully, secretly make a Perception roll for that agent. If the roll is successful, the agent notices that Paulus adjusts the flower in one man's lapel before talking to him. The other man appears to light a cigarette for Paulus. This is their identification procedure.

8. Day 1, 1700 hours:

Magnusson goes to the dining car and takes a table in the nonsmoking area. She is carrying a purse and her book. Magnusson shares her table with an unknown man. The agents manage to get a table in the area.

Triske and Karlson also have a table in the area. The dinner is uneventful.

The unknown man (an ordinary passenger) finishes his dinner and leaves the table before Magnusson. Nothing will have been passed between them. Magnusson leaves the dining car a few moments later. If any agent follows her, Triske also follows. Magnusson goes to one of the washrooms at the end of the dining car, where she tapes the book to the underside of the sink. Then she returns to her compartment.

If the agents miss the drop and continue to watch Magnusson, she does not leave her compartment except to go to the washroom. The interference team tries to eliminate the agents, preferably one at a time.

If any of the agents becomes involved in a gun battle, the attendants summon the two railway policemen on the train. Each of these men is armed with a 9mm PPK **(PWV 37; RM 0/-45/-145/X; WS VF; ROF 1; AMMO 7; HWV 4).** They attempt to arrest everyone involved in the shootout. If successful, the police hold the suspects until the next stop, where they turn them over to the local police.

GUESTS HAVE

STOP LOOK FORWARD

HAPPY VISIT.

If a lone agent searches the washroom, Triske, using his air gun, tries to assassinate the agent. (If the agent closes and locks the washroom door, Paulus uses his passkey to open the door for Triske.) If the hit is successful, Triske has Paulus lock the door from the outside. Paulus then "discovers" the victim when someone complains about not being able to get into the washroom. The train radios ahead, and the police meet and board the train at the next station. The train then continues on its journey. The police think the agent's death is due to natural causes, and they have the body and possessions removed at the next stop.

If any agent follows the unknown man, the man goes in the opposite direction of Magnusson. He goes to a second class sleeping car (shared with another man) and remains there until the train reaches Munich. At Munich, he gets off and goes into the city.

If all of the agents leave the dining car when Magnusson does, Triske and Karlson follow at a distance. They take no action against the agents at this time, even if the agents find the book in the washroom.

The agents have 30 minutes to examine and replace the book, if they find it. The microdot is hidden on the cover as the dot of a large exclamation point. Its information is in a simple cipher.

9. Day 1, 1900 hours:

Amarak Ketal goes to the washroom to collect the book. He carries it out in his inside jacket pocket and returns to his second class coach compartment. He then packs the book in his suitcase, and remains in his compartment for the rest of the trip to Munich.

Triske attempts to assassinate any lone agent who either follows Ketal or watches the washroom. Triske comes up behind the agent and uses his air gun.

Triske, Karlson, and Paulus do nothing if the agents continue to act as a group.

10. Day 1, 2000 hours:

If the agents are still alive, Triske and Karlson now make a deliberate attempt to kill them. Because the agents may be in different places or situations, any of the following plans may be used (or one appropriate to the situation may be created):



Lone agent: Either Triske approaches the agent in a friendly manner and fires his air gun at point blank range (hiding it under his overcoat), or Karlson tries to kill the agent using his bare hands. Karlson, with Paulus' help, throws the body off the train. If only one agent remains, the interference team tries to take him alive. If the team succeeds, Triske radios ahead for a car to meet them at the next stop. When the train stops, the team and Paulus force the agent off and take him to a place where he can be interrogated.



Small group of agents: Triske, with Paulus' help, enters the agents' compartment. He and Paulus keep the agents covered while Karlson acts as lookout. Paulus forces one of the agents to write a suicide note. Triske then uses Paulus' gun to shoot the agents. Triske removes the gun's silencer and wipes the gun clean, finally pressing it into the hands of the agent who was forced to write the note.



Large group of agents: Paulus knocks at the agents' compartment. When he is let in, he informs the agents that they have been spotted by the enemy. According to Paulus, the agents should strike before the enemy does. He points out that the agents have the advantage of surprise if they act now. Paulus offers to help, and strongly suggests that some of the agents remain to watch the courier or the drop (whichever applies). Then he tells the rest of the agents to come with him. Paulus lets the agents into an empty compartment in another car, explaining that the enemy is in the next compartment. He tells the agents that he will enter the enemy compartment for some reason and unlock the dividing wall. The agents may then make their surprise attack. Actually, Karlson is the only person in the next compartment. Triske is standing guard in the hall. As soon as Paulus steps out the door of the compartment, he turns and fires at the agents. At the same time, Karlson opens the dividing wall and fires. Paulus and Karlson intend to trap the agents in the crossfire. Any remaining agents elsewhere on the train are dealt with as explained above.

11. Day 1, 2130 hours:

The train arrives in Munich. Magnusson goes to the platform to catch the train from Munich to Milan. Nothing happens for the rest of the trip if the agents continue to follow her. Amarak Ketal goes to the station bar to wait for the next train to

Vienna. He talks to many people during this time, but he does not pass the book.

12. Day 1, 2330 hours:

Amarak Ketal boards the train from Munich to Vienna. The train has nine cars (from front to back): engine, first class sleeping car, second class sleeping car, second class sleeping car, four second class coach cars, and a baggage car. The agents are only able to get seats in one of the coach cars.

Just as the agents board, an attendant hands one of them a telegram, which says,

"URGENT SALES STOP CANCEL SHIPMENT CHANGE STOP COULD BE SERIOUS LOSS STOP TO COMPANY STOP MOE GREEN.

Ketal takes a seat in a different second class coach car. He is sharing the compartment with four other passengers (select these randomly from the Passenger list. The agents must try to get the microdot away from Ketal before the train arrives in Vienna. The microdot is still on the book, which is stored in Ketal's luggage.

13. Day 2, 0100 hours:

Customs officials come around to check passports. The officials do not search any of the agents' luggage.

14. Day 2, 0600 hours:


The train arrives in Vienna. If the agents have not secured the microdot by this time, it is too late. Ketal gets off the train and is immediately met by three men who show him to a waiting auto. Ketal will have escaped.

Post-operation report

If the agents successfully recover the microdot, they are each paid $2,000. If they do not recover the microdot, but do manage to learn the drop procedure, they are paid $500 each. If they capture Paulus, Triske, or Karlson alive, the agents are paid an extra $1,000 per man captured.

If Ketal escapes with the microdot, the agency is forced to go through a shake-up of its European organization. Any agent currently assigned to a European post must be moved, probably to another continent. The agency must create and assign new covers to all affected agents. All contacts the agents may have had are lost, and the agents must find new contacts at their new posts.

Proposed operation 5: The hostages



Administrator's briefing

The following operation has been prepared for an emergency terrorist situation. The situation described here has occurred in the past and is likely to occur again. The agency feels it is wise for your and your agents to be prepared for this situation.

A group of terrorists has boarded a train on which the agents are traveling. The agents are not aware that the terrorists are on board. The terrorists intend to stop the train and hold the passengers and crew hostage until their demands are met. The terrorists have enough ammunition for a long siege.

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY: The agents are out of contact with the agency and do not receive any instructions about this situation. They must rely on their own initiative.

Any of the agents from the Recommended agents list may be used for this operation, as it is a test of each agent's individual abilities.
The operation's objectives are as follows:

1. **Ensure the survival of all agents involved in the operation.**
2. **Preserve agent covers.**
3. **Free other hostages held by the terrorists.**
4. **Capture or kill terrorists involved.**

Agents' briefing

Following the failure of a recent operation by the agency in India, certain important information has come into the hands of the opposition. Because the agency is unsure of just what the opposition has learned about the agency's set-up, emergency reassignment procedures are underway. You have been ordered to a new base of operations and have also been assigned a new case officer. The agency is preparing a new cover for you. Now, you must travel to your new base in Amsterdam. You have your train ticket and are packed and ready to go. However, your case officer warns you to be on your guard, because enemy agents may have already been briefed on the identities of agency operatives.

Target personnel

Boris Maltien

PS 33 CH 68 W 94 CO 56 K 94 CD 28
OF 42 DP 62 EV 48 DA 61 MV155 LL 13
HTH 81 SV 110 S M H L

Description. Age: 28 Ht: 5′ 11″ Wt: 155 Hair: black (dyed blond) Eyes: green Glasses: yes, cannot wear contacts, Coordination 16 without glasses
Languages. Dutch*: 93 English: 78 French: 69 Nepali: 35
AOKs. Agriculture: 54 Chemistry: 96 Education/Indoctrination: 126 Engineering, Construction/Civil: 67 Geography: 85 Law: 58 Political Science/Ideology: 127 Psychology: 100 Social Sciences: 80 World History/Current Affairs: 107
Weapon. .45 self-load
PWV 45 RM 0/-45/-145/X WS F
ROF 1 AMMO 8 HWV 4
three hand grenades

Maltien is the terrorist leader. He claims to be a member of the Anti-Imperialist Army (AIA). Except for his terrorist leanings, he is a friendly and likeable person. He is well-read and is an interesting conversationalist. He is firmly set in his goals, however, and no amount of talking persuades him to change his mind. He ruthlessly carries out what he feels must be done.

Hans Tasman
(real name: *Max Rothman)*

PS 87 CH 40 W 96 CO 61 K 69 CD 62
OF 62 DP 51 EV 51 DA 66 MV210 LL 15
HTH138 SV102 S M H R

Description. Age: 24 Ht: 6′ 1″ Wt: 180 Hair: gray Eyes: blue Glasses: no
Languages. Dutch*: 81 French: 57 Danish: 56
Weapon. 10 guage semi-automatic sawed-off shotgun, full choke, 1-2 shot size
PWV 99 RM +20/-9/X/X WS S
ROF 2 AMMO 5 HWV 13
20 rounds of deer slug ammunition (does +15 points damage if optional shotgun ammo damage is used. PWV of shotgun is 50 when deer slugs are used — deer slugs make fair-sized holes in wood panels and compartment walls).
Weapon. .357 Police Magnum
PWV 40 RM 0/-40/-135/X WS F
ROF 1 AMMO 6 HWV 4

Tasman is inexperienced in this type of operation and is extremely nervous. He compensates by being loud and bullying, and he is prone to fire at the slightest provocation.

Jean Benoit

PS 87 CH 57 W 40 CO 28 K 50 CD 87
OF 58 DP 43 EV 72 DA 69 MV217 LL 13
HTH159 SV115 S M H R

Weapon. 7.62mm AKM
PWV 85 RM +6/-10/-60/-175 WS S
ROF 3 AMMO 20 HWV 14
1 lb. plastique, 3 timer detonators.

Giacometti is a close friend of Maltien and acts as his assistant. Although ineffective as a terrorist, he is very loyal to Maltien. He believes in Maltien more than the AIA cause, and if Maltien surrenders or is killed, he may be persuaded to surrender.



Andrei Tolinkoff

PS 93 CH 75 W 41 CO 78 K 43 CD 61
OF 70 DP 77 EV 68 DA 52 MV195 LL 13
HTH161 SV145 S M H R

Description. Age: 27 Ht: 6′ Wt: 170 Hair: brown Eyes: gray Glasses: no
Languages. German*: 88 Polish: 58
AOKs. Engineering, Transportation: 98 Literature: 67 Military Science/Weaponry: 86 Photography: 46 Political Science/Ideology: 78
Weapon. 7.62mm AKM
PWV 85 RM 6/-10/-60/-175 WS S
ROF 3 AMMO 20 HWV 14
1 lb. plastique, three timer detonators

Tolinkoff is the military leader of the terrorists and assumes command of the group in a firefight. He has planned this operation. Unlike Maltien, Tolinkoff is often an intense, arrogant person. He has no particular dedication to the ideals of the AIA, but wishes merely to destroy or disrupt the fabric of society as much as possible. He is not a talker, choosing instead to read in spare moments.

Description. Age: 22 Ht: 5′ 6″ Wt: 120 Hair: blond Eyes: brown Glasses: yes, Coordination 52 without glasses
Languages. Dutch*: 92 English: 47
Weapon. 9mm Uzi
PWV 78 RM 0/-20/-110/X WS BA
ROF $ AMMO 32 HWV 12

Benoit is the weakest member of the terrorist group. He is not convinced that violence is the solution. If the agents offer him an opportunity to escape, and if they promise him some amnesty arrangement, he does what he can to stop the terrorist raid. He tries to avoid killing anyone.

Antonio Giacometti

PS 53 CH 31 W 70 CO 35 K 90 CD 49
OF 42 DP 33 EV 40 DA 70 MV172 LL 12
HTH 93 SV 73 S M H R

Description. Age: 28 Ht: 5′ 9″ Wt: 145 Hair: black Eyes: gray Glasses: no
Languages. Italian*: 89 French: 58 English: 40 Arabic 63

Operation procedure

For the start of this mission, have the agents board the train at whatever city is most appropriate to your campaign. The first part of the journey is uneventful (unless you choose to add your own complications). Allow the agents to have any type of train compartment available.

1. Day 1, 0930 hours:

The train crosses the Netherlands border and stops at the small station of Arnhem. No customs checks are made at the border. The train stops for only 2 minutes. The six terrorists board the train, carrying their weapons in their luggage. The terrorists move to different positions on the train: Tolinkoff and Tasman go to the car behind the engine; Giacometti takes a position in the first class sleeping car; Maltien goes to the bar car; and Benoit goes to the second class coach at the back of the train.

2. Day 1, 1000 hours:

The terrorists make their move. Tolinkoff, covered by Tasman, enters the engine and captures the engineers. The train comes to a halt. Learn each agent's location now.

3. Day 1, 1005 hours:

While the passengers are recovering from the emergency stop, the terrorists begin to take control of the train. Their faces covered by ski masks, the terrorists produce their weapons and begin forcing open compartments. As each compartment is opened, they say, "Attention! Attention! This train is now under the command of the Anti-Imperialist Army. You are our prisoners. Obey our instructions and you will not be hurt. Please step into the hall. Do not talk. Do not resist or you will die." This part of the operation takes 15 minutes.

If any person reacts too slowly or talks, the terrorist at the scene fires one shot into the roof of the compartment. If the terrorist fires only one shot, the other terrorists do not react. If the terrorist fires more than one shot, those terrorists nearest the source of shooting come running.

They try to kill anyone who resists them.

4. Day 1, 1020 hours:

The terrorists herd the 45 passengers and crewmembers into the bar car. All terrorists are here, except Maltien, who is in the engine. He is radioing the authorities of the situation and the group's demands. While he is doing this, the others order the passengers to strip to their underwear.

If the terrorists find weapons on any passengers, they separate those passengers from the rest of the group. The terrorists tie the hostages' hands behind their backs and order them to stand in front of the window, facing out. The terrorists warn the hostages not to speak or move.

Any passengers separated from the rest of the hostages are taken to one of the compartments in the car and questioned. The terrorists want to know if police officials are among the hostages, and if the terrorists' plans were known. This questioning may be done with rifle butts and pistol barrels if any person refuses to talk. When the questioning is over, the terrorists drag (if necessary) the interrogated passengers into the main hallway of the car and dump them on the floor as an example to the others.

The terrorists shoot to kill any passenger who tries to escape during this part of the operation.

5. Day 1, 1030 hours:

The first of the police arrive. Three squad cars approach the train on a lane that runs parallel to the track. The terrorists fire several rounds of shots in the squads' direction to keep them from coming too close. Maltien then selects one mother and her child and sends them out to the squads, carrying a list of demands and a notice that if the police come any closer, the terrorists will begin killing the hostages.

6. Day 1, 1100 hours:

Maltien orders the engineer and two members of the crew to detach the bar car from the rest of the train. Maltien also tells the crewmembers that they are to then drive the front part of the train away.

7. Day 1, 1110 hours:

The crewmembers unhook the bar car from the train. Each agent should roll against his Perception. Any agent who rolls successfully notices several men edging through the grass toward the front of the train. The men appear to be heavily armed.

8. Day 1, 1120 hours:

The front part of the train begins to pull away. Just as it begins rolling, several canisters of tear gas bounce into the bar car. Over the commotion, a voice cries out in Dutch, "Everyone down!" You should now locate the agents and terrorists on the target map, in case the agents want to do anything.

If the agents do not follow the instructions and remain standing, there is an 80% chance that each is hit by 1-3 bullets. If the agents do get down, each has a 30% chance of being hit by one bullet.

If the agents observe the terrorists, they see that all of them except Maltien are taking cover and firing toward the front of the car. Maltien is about to throw a hand grenade. If the agents do not prevent Maltien from throwing the grenade, Maltien throws it through the front of the bar car and toward the armed men in the grass, where it explodes. The terrorists then win the firefight. If the agents prevent Maltien from throwing the grenade, the police win the firefight.

If the terrorists win the fight and the agents tried to interfere with them, the terrorists shoot one of the agents as an example. The terrorists then release all hostages, except for 10 people and any other agents who interfered. There is a 10% chance (per agent) that the 10 hostages still held include previously unsuspected agents.

9. Day 1, 2100 hours:


The police and terrorists finally negotiate an agreement. The police bring a bus back to the lane; the police then pull back from around the train. The hostages are roped into a circle around the terrorists and are led to the bus. Just as the group reaches the bus, a sniper begins firing at the terrorists. The terrorists pull the hostages down, using them as cover. However, in doing so, they are momentarily off their guard. The agents are able to make a surprise attack at this instant.

If the agents do not attack, the terrorists herd the hostages onto the bus and drive them to an airport. The terrorists are taking the hostages with them to Libya. In Libya, the terrorists turn the hostages over to their respective embassies.

Post-operation report

If the agents manage to escape the train before the police arrive, nothing further happens to them. However (at your discretion), the press broadcasts photos of the agents throughout the world if they escape at a later time or if the terrorists release them in Libya. You may then create a related adventure where enemy operatives identify the agents from their pictures and try to eliminate them.

Proposed operation 6: The hit (Vienna to Prague)



Administrator's briefing

Recent missions in Czechoslovakia have successfully uncovered the existence of a possible double agent in the agency's Prague operations. Fortunately, this information was learned through an absolutely secure source. However, the only information available to the agency about the double agent is his or her codename—Spisovatel (author)— and a list of four possible suspects.

The agents are to personally contact each suspect and determine which one is the double agent. Once this is done, the agents should eliminate the double agent. Normally, the agency would keep the suspect alive and use him or her to pass false information, but in this case, the agency fears that the double agent may already know too much damaging information.

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY: At the same time the agents are trying to determine the identity of the double agent, the double agent will be trying to frame the agents. If the double agent succeeds, the Czechoslovakian secret police use this frame to persuade the agents to work for them.

The following agents from the Recommended agents list are available for this operation: Gyorgy Borvan and Thomas Rinkman. Do not use Tokubei Tsuyu or Luke Zabronski for this mission.

Agents' briefing

In the morning, when you check into your office, a message from the receptionist is waiting on your desk. It says that a Mr. Engre would like to see you as soon as

possible. This is a signal that the agency wants you to collect some information at a predesignated drop site.

You leave the office and go to the drop to pick up a slim envelope in a batch of papers. After you return to your office, you read about your new assignment. You are to go to Vienna and board the train for Prague. Travel arrangements have already been made through a travel office maintained as a front by the agency. While on the train, you are to make contact with four Czech agents. Your purpose is to determine which agent is working for the other side. You should then eliminate that agent.

The Administration Bureau has prepared the following plan for you to use. You are to let each agent know that you have important information about a big upcoming operation in the area. The target date is only a few days away. The agent should be prepared to receive your orders then.

After you have passed this false information, you are to observe the agents and determine, by their actions, which is the double agent. You only have a few hours in which to do this. After you have identified and terminated the double agent, you are to leave the country as quickly as possible.

Your information packet also contains the following items: a train ticket from Vienna to Prague, a train ticket from Prague to West Berlin, a passport identifying you as a dealer in farm implements, a valid visa to enter Czechoslovakia, a transit visa to cross East Germany (to reach West Berlin), a reservation and travel form from CEDOK (Czech State Tourist Organization), photographs of the Czech agents, and the contact procedures to be used for each. The operation instructions, photographs, and contact procedures are all marked, "Memorize and Destroy." You must use CEDOK's reservation and travel form once you enter Czechoslovakia. You must also travel and stay at the places listed on the form to avoid suspicion.

If you want to carry legal weapons into Czechoslovakia, the agency is able to provide papers. These are only provided if the agents request them.

Create your own passwords to give agents for the operation.

Target personnel

Agent #1

Codename: ***Uhor (Eel)***

PS 62	CH 48	W 36	CO 30	K 26	CD 63
OF 47	DP 39	EV 56	DA 45	MV161	LL 10
HTH118	SV 95	S M	H 8		

Description. Age: 39 Ht: 5′ 10″ Wt: 210 Hair: brown Eyes: gray Glasses: no
Languages. Czech*: 98 Russian: 68
AOKs. Engineering, Civil: 98 Metallurgy: 54 Physical Education: 76

Uhor (currently traveling under the name Jaros Skrivanjek) is an agent in place. He is a minor official in the State Public Works Committee, where he has access to files and papers concerning major construction. He passes this information to the West in the form of plans and mental notes. He has had direct contact with agents only once before. He will seem very nervous, talkative, and unsure of himself. He carries no weapon. Uhor is not the double agent.

Agent #2

Codename: ***Obchodnik (Merchant)***

PS 71	CH 31	W 59	CO 70	K 65	CD 95
OF 83	DP 51	EV 63	DA 80	MV225	LL 13
HTH134	SV114	S F	H R		

Description. Age: 54 Ht: 5′ 9″ Wt: 170 Hair: blond Eyes: blue Glasses: yes,Coordination 73 without glasses
Languages. Czech*: 93 English: 72 Polish: 40 Russian: 48
AOKs. Animal Science: 39 Arts/Crafts: 89 Biology/Biochemistry: 49 Economics/Finance: 85 Fine Arts: 124 Physical Education: 99 Psychology: 98 Social Sciences: 69

Obchodnik (real name Deborah Sluka) operates a popular meeting place for men and women in Prague (a barely legal business). Through this, she has made contact with a large number of people who work in sensitive positions. She blackmails many of these contacts into cooperation. She is a naturally suspicious woman, who does not reveal her emotions or thoughts to anyone. She is used to dealing with people like agents, and she comes across as very hard and tough. She carries no weapons. She is not the double agent.

Agent #3

Codename: ***Lekar (Physician)***

PS 92	CH 41	W 97	CO 58	K 63	CD 96
OF 77	DP 50	EV 69	DA 80	MV295	LL 19
HTH159	SV119	S M	H L		

Description. Age: 34 Ht: 6′ 2″ Wt: 180 Hair: black Eyes: brown Glasses: no
Languages. Czech*: 84 French: 67 German: 82
AOKs. Botany: 79 Chemistry: 116 Law: 89 Military Science/Weaponry: 69 Photography: 67 Religion: 78 World History/Current Affairs: 68
Weapon. .22 Beretta

PWV 35	RM 0/-50/-150/X	WS VF			
ROF 1	AMMO 6	HWV 4			

Lekar (real name Anton Slezak) is a roving operative in Czechoslovakia. His cover is that of a professional photographer. The agency uses him for missions throughout the country, especially bag jobs and information gathering. He is very cold-blooded and professional. If the possibility of a double agent is mentioned, he says that he has always suspected someone in the local agency. Lekar has his Beretta on him at all times.

Agent #4


Codename: ***Vojak (Soldier)***

PS 92	CH 74	W 88	CO 65	K 63	CD 55
OF 60	DP 70	EV 60	DA 59	MV235	LL 18
HTH152	SV130	S F	H L		

Description. Age: 28 Ht: 5′ 7″ Wt: 120 Hair: red Eyes: hazel Glasses: no
Languages. Czech*: 78 English: 54 Russian: 72
AOKs. Chemistry: 38 Computer Science: 95 Geography: 121 Literature: 94 Military Science/Weaponry: 83 Political Science/Ideology: 45 Social Sciences: 67

Vojak is Spisovatel (the codename for the double agent). Her real name is Tanya Capek. She works as a personal secretary for a member of the Czechoslovakian Presidium. She supposedly passes information of importance to the agency. However, she has been secretly working for the Czechoslovakians (and therefore, the Russians) for some time now. She is a very pleasant person, seemingly concerned and willing to help. She does not carry a weapon.





Col. Uldrich

Czech Secret Police

PS 43	CH 84	W 79	CO 92	K 96	CD 69
OF 81	DP 88	EV 77	DA 83	MV191	LL 12
HTH120	SV165	S M	H R		

Description. Age: 35 Ht: 5′ 4″ Wt: 125 Hair: black Eyes: gray Glasses: yes, Coordination 60 without glasses
Languages. Czech*: 89 English: 54 German: 58 Russian: 73
AOKs. Military Science/Weaponry: 89

Col. Uldrich is an interrogator for the Czech secret police. His duty on the train is to provide assistance to Spisovatel, in her attempts to compromise any of the agents. Uldrich carries his snub-nose on him at all times.

Working for Col. Uldrich are six secret policemen. Each carries a .357 snub-nose in a shoulder holster. The policemen's statistics are:

PS 50	CH 30	W 65	CO 65	K 30	CD 70
OF 68	DP 48	EV 50	DA 50	MV185	LL 12
HTH100	SV100	S M	H R		

Languages. Czech*: 82 Russian: 40
AOKs. Military Science/Weaponry: 97
Weapon. .357 snub-nose
PWV 31 RM 0/-50/-160/X WS VF
ROF 1 AMMO 5 HWV 4

Operation procedure

1. Day 1, 0400 hours:
The train leaves Vienna. The agents may take a compartment anywhere on the train.

2. Day 1, 0700 hours:
The train stops at the Czechoslovakian border. All passengers are required to detrain.

The Czech border officials thoroughly search all luggage. The agents must fill out currency declaration forms. If the agents are carrying any weapons other than hunting rifles or match pistols (with proper permits), the customs officials confiscate the weapons and arrest the agents. The agents are taken by car to a secret interrogation center at Ceske Budejovice. Czech secret police torture the agents there, working on them until the agents give any information they know. If the agents do talk, the Czech secret police give them the opportunity to become double agents. See entry 3 for details on how this should be handled.

If their weapons are accompanied by the proper papers, the agents are allowed to bring them through customs. After they leave, however, the customs officers pass the agents' names to the secret police. A Czech agent casually observes the agents from that time on.

3. Day 1, 0800 hours:
The customs officials finish their search, and the train leaves the station. At the town of Jindrichuv-Hradec, the train stops again. A private first class sleeping car is added to the rear of the train. If the agents ask an attendant about the car (and if they give him a small gift other than money), the attendant tells the agents that the car is for an important government official who does not like to travel by plane.

The private car has actually been added to the train by the orders of Col. Uldrich, who is traveling in it. He intends to use the car as an interrogation center once the agents have been found and captured. He remains in the car, out of sight from the agents.

Also boarding the train at this time (along with several non-agent passengers) are the four operatives the agents are to contact. Each operative takes a different compartment somewhere on the train. It is now up to the agents to contact each operative before the train reaches Prague.

The agents should have memorized the contact procedure, and each Czech agent will know his or her procedure. The contacts may be made in any order the agents wish. Once contact is made, each Czech agent talks guardedly to the agents.

The first three Czech agents (Uhor, Obchodnik, and Lekar) react according to their personality descriptions as given in Target personnel. Each listens to the agents' information and then returns to his or her compartment. These agents do nothing more for the rest of the trip except make an occasional trip to the washroom.

The fourth agent (Vojak) has a compartment to herself. This compartment has been bugged by Uldrich, who listens to all conversations held there. Vojak tries to detain the agents in her compartment. While she is doing this, Uldrich orders two of his men to bug the agents' compartment. These men order the attendant to open the agent's compartment. If any agents are in the compartment, Uldrich's men claim that there has been a mix-up in seating reservations. After arguing with the agents and the attendant, Uldrich's men leave. One of the men will have slipped a microphone transmitter under the arm of one of the seats while they were in the compartment.

Col. Uldrich enters Vojak's compartment just as the agents are leaving. Vojak introduces Uldrich as her traveling companion, and he shakes hands with the agents. He is holding an envelope in his left hand. While this is going on, a man passes by the open door. The man uses a microcamera to photograph the agents shaking hands with Uldrich. Allow any agent who asks to make a Perception roll at this point. A successful roll means that the agent notices something suspicious about the meeting with Uldrich and the man in the hall.

As the agents return to their compartment, they are met in the hall by four of Uldrich's men. The men politely, but forcefully, indicate that the agents are to come with them. To make sure the agents understand, the

men use their concealed weapons to gently prod the agents along. The men take the agents to Uldrich's private car. Each agent is placed in a separate compartment and searched; at least one empty compartment separates each agent (if possible). The windows cannot be opened. Each agent is guarded by one man standing outside the door.

Uldrich arrests only those agents he suspects. If other agents are waiting in the compartment of the arrested agent(s), Uldrich's men take them to the private car for questioning. If these agents have said nothing that could be heard over the bug, and if they have nothing incriminating in their luggage (which is searched), Uldrich eventually releases them.

Uldrich then visits each of the captured agents. He tells the agent that he knows who they are and that he has an offer from them: they may work for him as double agents. If an agent refuses, Uldrich begins by using the soft approach. He shows the agent a photograph of the agent and Uldrich together, apparently passing an envelope while shaking hands. He shows the agent an account book from a Swiss bank. The account is registered under the agent's name and contains $5,000. Uldrich explains that the deposits are easily traceable to a known Czechoslovakian agent in Switzerland. Finally, Uldrich tells the agents that he has some bit of inside agency information that the agent could easily have leaked. If the agent refuses to cooperate with Uldrich, the colonel makes it clear that his information about the agent will surely find its way to the agency. The agent would then naturally be accused of selling out (and would most likely be terminated). Of course, if the agent cooperates, nothing like that would happen. Besides, as Uldrich explains it, he wouldn't be asking the agent to do much.

If the agent still refuses, Uldrich leaves the agent to think about things. Thirty minutes later, Uldrich returns and begins the hard approach. This approach is a combination of torture and kindness; Uldrich uses this method until the agent cracks. This process could last for several days (if so, Uldrich takes the agent to a house in Prague). The offer will always be the same: cooperate and nothing bad has to happen. During the torture, the interrogators try to get as much information from the agent as possible. The more the agent talks, the more the interrogator uses that information to persuade the agent to join the other side.

If the agent still refuses to cooperate after three days of interrogation, he is imprisoned. You may decide to hold a public trial (to embarras the western nations), or you may simply have the agent executed. If a trial is held, the agent is found guilty. Later, the agent may or may not be traded back to the other side.

Any agent who agrees to work for Czechs is given medical attention and is turned over to a case officer. This officer briefs the agent on how orders will be sent to him, and how information should be passed back to the Czechs. If the agent has been beaten or injured, the case officer provides the cover that the agent was attacked by hoodlums in Prague. The case officer also makes it very clear that the agent will be watched closely. If the Czechs believe the agent plans a triple cross, they will release information labelling him as a double agent. They might also simply terminate the agent.

4. Day 1, 1200 hours:

The train arrives in the Prague station. If the agents have not identified the double agent and eliminated that person by this time, they no longer have a chance to do so. They must follow the reservation plans on the CEDOK form. The operation is over for the agents.

Post-operation report

Regardless of whether the agents decide to work for the other side, they are each paid $3,000 if they successfully eliminate the double agent. If the agents learn the double agent's identity, but fail to eliminate her, they are each paid $1,000.

If the agents turn double, you may create missions in which the agents work for the agency, the Czechs, or both sides at once. Furthermore, the risk for each agent is greatly increased, since he or she must avoid detection.

POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS

Administrations has prepared the following list of possible complications to forewarn and prepare you for failures and difficulties that might occur on a mission.

Insert these complications into any proposed operation as you see fit. Feel free to use your own ideas for operation complications as well. Do not use these complications too often, though, as some of them may create serious difficulties for the agents.

1. **Train is delayed from leaving the station by 1d10 minutes.**
2. **Train is delayed from leaving the station by 1-2 hours.**
3. **Train breaks down enroute. All passengers must board a second train sent to pick them up. You should determine the new train's organization. The trip is delayed for 1 hour.**
4. **Many members of an obscure religious cult board the train. They stand in the halls, trying to pass out pamphlets and sell flowers. If they see any violence that does not involve guns, they intervene and try to talk both parties out of fighting.**
5. **A thief tries to pickpocket an agent in the hall. The thief has a 70% chance of success. You should randomly determine what the thief gets if he succeeds. If the thief fails, the agent detects the attempt.**
6. **Someone breaks into the agents' compartment during dinner. The agents' luggage is ransacked, and any valuables are stolen.**
7. **The agents' luggage is lost at a station during a change of trains.**
8. **A passenger sharing the agents' compartment suffers a heart attack.**
9. **The train is overbooked. Several passengers arrive holding seat tickets for the agents' compartment. No other compartments on the train are empty.**
10. **The train comes to an emergency stop to avoid hitting sheep that are crossing the track.**
11. **A tourist of the same nationality as the agent follows the agent around, talking constantly about boring and stupid topics.**
12. **A rude, belligerent drunk tries to pick a fight with one of the agents.**
13. **A somewhat drunk woman tries to pick up one of the agents. She is not easily put off.**
14. **A little boy steps out of a compartment just as an agent passes and squirts the agent with a water pistol.**
15. **Because of an accident, the train is derailed.**
16. **The agent is identified by the enemy as he boards the train. A level 3 Assassin stalks the agent for the rest of the trip (you may determine the Assassin's statistics and weapon).**
17. **A customs officer collects all passports and inspects them closely for forgeries.**
18. **The agent's suitcase springs open as he boards the train.**
19. **The lock on the washroom door jams while the agent is inside.**
20. **All electrical power in the agents' car fails. The lights go out for 10 minutes.**

ADDITIONAL OPERATIONS

The operations presented in this file are by no means the only missions available for your use. You may conduct many other operations on the trains. Manpower shortages at this time do not allow for the further detailing of operations by Administrations. However, at the request of the Office of Administrations, suggestions for further operations have been prepared for this file. These suggestions are not as detailed as the proposed operations given earlier in this file. If you want to use any of these suggested operations, you will have to do the required research and planning work before assigning the mission.

Suggested operation 1: Protection

Monsignor Sanders, archbishop of a U.S. diocese, is traveling by train from Paris to Rome. Several threats have been made on his life. Administrations believes these threats may have been made by a group of urban terrorists operating in France. Some clues as to the extent and locations of this group have been sought for a long time by the French and other authorities.

To prevent an embarrassing incident, the agents have been assigned the duty of protecting the archbishop. Unfortunately, he is a strong-minded man and refuses to have bodyguards around him. The agents must protect the archbishop in a discreet manner and from a distance.

In this operation, the agents must cooperate with the French and Italian police. For this reason, the agents are provided false covers as experts in anti-terrorist activities. The agents are also compelled to try to capture as many of the terrorists as possible, and "debrief" them before allowing the police to question them.

Suggested operation 2: The arms supplier

For several years, the agency has been providing covert support to an underground nationalist group in Hungary. Recent signals indicate that this group has become sufficiently well-established to begin partisan activities within the borders of Hungary. The group must have the guarantee of regular arms shipments from the West, however, before they can begin these activities.

Administration has proposed a method of sending arms supplies by rail from Vienna. The agents are to make the first run of the shipment, to see if the proposed method works.

The agents are transporting weapons disguised and crated as agricultural chemicals. The agents pose as salesmen for the firm that made the chemicals. It is their duty to see that the supplies reach the right source.

Unknown to the agents, the partisan group's plans have been discovered, and the group has gone into hiding. The Hungarian police plan to allow the shipment to enter the country, so that it may be discovered. Such a discovery would seriously discredit the intelligence operations of the West, but only if the agents were captured alive.

Suggested operation 3: The HQ

For many years, the agency has been trying to close down a spy ring operating throughout Western Europe. The spy ring is known as Blackbird and works for no known side. It has been very successful in stealing information from various governments and selling it to the highest bidder.

Several small cells of the ring have been captured; from these cells, the agency has learned some of the headquarters' different locations. Each time the agency moves to grab the HQ, however, it disappears.

Just recently, the agency learned that the ringleader was getting information from inside the agency. By carefully manipulating this inside source, the agency arranged to have the leader on a certain train at a certain time and place. The agents must capture this person. They do not know who he or she is or what he or she looks like.

Unknown to the agency, the ringleader has always managed to escape because his headquarters is a private railway car. By carefully invading the computer systems of the European rail networks, the ringleader arranges to have his private car taken from place to place. The ringleader uses the cover of an important railway official, and no one has questioned his movements thus far.

When the agents board the train, the ringleader's private car will be part of the train. You should prepare a layout for this car; it has a private apartment, kitchen, radio room, guard stations, and security devices. Once the agents locate the ringleader, they must defeat his defenses and prevent him from escaping.

Suggested operation 4: The bag job

A ring of diamond smugglers has been using the trains to carry stones from Amsterdam to other parts of Europe. Diamond smuggling would not normally be the agency's concern, but in this case, the diamonds are being used to pay for enemy agent activities in the United States. If the shipments of diamonds can be stopped, the agency will be able to easily close down the U.S. side of the operation.

The agents are to tail one of the diamond smugglers from the Diamond Exchange in Amsterdam to the point where the diamonds are fenced for cash. The agents should then follow the money wherever it goes. The agents must also get some of the money and replace it with marked bills. The agency then hopes to trace the path of the marked bills.

The agency's plan is complicated by several problems. First, the courier that the agents must trail is armed and will be on his guard at all times. Second, the money from the sale of the diamonds is carried in a security briefcase. Third, a series of cut-outs take the briefcase through a series of blind drops before the case reaches its destinatiton. Finally, each cut-out who carries the briefcase is guarded by two hired killers. The guards always occupy the compartments on both sides of the cut-out.

Suggested operation 5: The big lie

The agent in this operation is given the mission of lying by assignment. The agent's task is simple: he is to contact an enemy agent while on a train. After convincing the enemy agent of his willingness to work as a double agent, the agent must tell the enemy contact certain pieces of false information. This performance must be very convincing, since some of the information the agent will be passing contradicts facts already known by the enemy. It is extremely important that this mission succeed.

Unknown to either the agency or the agent, a counterintelligence organization from the country through which the train is traveling has been observing the enemy agent. The organization identifies the agent making the contact, and reports this information back to the proper authorities. Because of a confusion of information, the counterintelligence organization is ordered to capture or eliminate the agency's man. The death, however, must look accidental.

Suggested operation 6: The game

The agency has targeted the head of a European political party as the agent of an enemy infiltration scheme. The enemy is apparently paying the target, in return for placing its agents in important positions within the political party. No direct action can be taken against the target, as this would create an undesired international incident. Therefore, the agents are assigned the task of planting or gathering some type of evidence that will disgrace the target (the exact nature of the evidence is left up to you). Investigations into the target's past have not revealed any useful information.

The target is not easily reached. He keeps himself well-surrounded by bodyguards and political associates most of the time. Too many risks would be involved in trying to carry out operations in the target's home or place of business. The agency does know, however, that the target will soon be traveling by train to an international conference. At some time during this trip, the agents are to complete the operation.

Two bodyguards always travel with the target. The agents must first devise some method of getting these men out of the way for a short period of time (without arousing their suspicions). Next, the agents must eliminate an enemy agent who has been assigned to shadow and protect the target.

Once the target is unprotected, the agents must plant whatever evidence they have "gathered." Finally, the agents must also make sure that the evidence is discovered by members of the press whose organizations hold generally unfavorable opinions of the target. If the agents are successful, the target should be disgraced enough so that he is removed from power.

APPENDIX PASSENGERS & AGENT PERSONNEL

Non-agent personnel

European trains are noted for their heavy passenger use. Therefore, both you and the agents must take these passengers into account when planning operations. Most passengers are quiet, law-abiding citizens. The last thing these people want is to become involved in a situation of danger and international intrigue. At the same time, these people are not likely to ignore threats or criminal acts. Unless the agents have a reason for wanting to be reported to the police, they should complete their missions discreetly when in the presence of passengers.

When passengers do become involved in a mission, the following general guidelines should be used:


If the situation involves no danger and does not require the passengers to do more than answer a question, they usually try to help as best they can. However, agents may have to overcome language barriers in this case.

If the agents suddenly intrude on passengers, the passengers are likely to be either frightened or hostile. In this case, passengers may call for help or treat the situation as if it were a robbery.

If the situation is obviously dangerous, passengers appear to be frightened or confused. Most passengers try to get out of the way if given any warning, but if they are surprised, they may do nothing. In this case, passengers may find themselves caught in crossfire. Unless noted on the Passenger list, passengers do not help the agents in any way in a dangerous situation. Decide a specific passenger's reaction in each situation according to what is happening at the moment.


It is also up to you to decide which of the following passengers listed will be used in an operation and where they will be located. In general, at least one or two passengers will be in each compartment of a train. Do not place non-agent passengers on the map, however, unless they become directly involved in agents' actions.

The following is a list of 100 passengers, organized by nationality. Each passenger's name, nationality, and occupation is listed. The passenger speaks his or her native language. You may assign other languages to certain passengers. In some cases, special notes are included about the passenger. You may use that information in specific operations, if you want.



Passenger list

1. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Braxton, American (tourists)
2. Mr. Zebulon Jones, American (European sales distributor)
3. Miss Jane Hepplewhite, American (college student)
4. Mr. Marcus Gray, American (art dealer)
5. Mr. and Mrs. Edward Green, American (tourists)
6. Mr. Rolf Adler and family, Austrian (migrant worker traveling with wife and five children to new job)
7. Mr. Henrich Gebhardt, Austrian (attorney)
8. Mis Helen Beres, Austrian (secretary)
9. Mr. Joseph Goldstein, Austrian (undertaker)
10. Mrs. Marie Kloppenburg, Austrian (housewife)
11. Mr. Andre Denys, Belgian (factory manager traveling to plant site with his two sons)
12. Mr. and Mrs. Fredrik Knauss, Belgian (jeweler and wife, carrying $5,000 worth of precious stones)
13. Miss Christine Buhler, Belgian (restaurateur)
14. Mr. August Wiora, Belgian (student)
15. Mr. Pieter DeGroot, Belgian (insurance salesman)
16. Mr. and Mrs. Stephen Tancos, Bulgarian (automobile mechanic, wife and two sons on holiday)
17. Col. Laco Hradek, Bulgarian (Bulgarian air force pilot on leave)
18. Mr. Jan Kyriazis, Bulgarian (television director)
19. Miss Georgia Jeresek, Bulgarian (engineering student)
20. Mr. Alois Formas, Bulgarian (doctor)
21. Mr. Mika Blazej, Czech (reporter for government paper, passes all information gained to police)
22. Mr. and Mrs. Abraham Grosse, Czech (factory manager on holiday)
23. Mr. Kazimierz Nagly, Czech (farmer)
24. Miss Anna Paukstis, Czech (college student)
25. Mr. Stefan Slezak, Czech (construction supervisor)
26. Miss Sarah Hanke, Dane (nurse traveling to accept position as private companion)
27. Mr. Heinz Grote, Dane (investment counselor, carrying $10,000 in stolen securities, which can be traced)
28. Mr. Max Meese, Dane (bonded courier on vacation)
29. Mr. and Mrs. Jan Ohms, Dane (family on holiday with three sons and two daughters)
30. Mr. Manfred Klopsch, Dane (professional lie-detector analyst traveling to give testimony at a criminal trial)
31. Mr. Samuel Kraft, English (wine merchant)
32. Miss Lydia Amelia Blake, English (young socialite on vacation)
33. Mr. and Mrs. Arnold MacMorland, Scottish (geologist traveling with wife and four sons)
34. Miss Trudy Wainwright, English (secretary looking for romance and adventure who follows the agents around if they do anything "terribly interesting"; in a gunfight, however, she panics.)
35. Mr. and Mde. Anton Deville, French (family returning home)
36. Mr. Claude David, French (professional smuggler, carries a .22 Beretta: PWV 35; RM 0/-50/-150/X; WS VF; ROF 1; AMMO 6; does not get involved in anything, if possible)
37. Miss Jeanne Hilarides, French (college student)
38. Mr. Paul St. Clair, French (computer programmer)
39. Mr. and Mrs. Armand Wallenstein, French (author and wife)
40. Mr. Wolfgang Kluge, East German (shoe manufacturer)
41. Mr. Johann Tazik, East German (dentist)
42. Miss Annetta Rosecrans, East German (state tourist guide)
43. Mr. and Mrs. Hermann Gniadecki, East German (professional escape guides who help those who wish to defect to the West. Agents assist as much as possible.)
44. Mr. Warner Busa, East German (veterinarian)
45. Mr. Willian De Haan, Dutch (plumber)
46. Miss Emily Koenig, Dutch (clothing designer)
47. Mr. and Mrs. David Copernicus, Dutch (astrologer, wife, and two daughters on vacation)
48. Mr. Jacob Holtz, Dutch (publisher)
49. Mr. Karl Leopold, Dutch (drug courier, carries a 9mm Browning: PWV 47. RM 0/-50/-150/X; WS VF; ROF 1; AMMO 13; HWV 4)
50. Mr. Anton Pasternazy, Hungarian (Communist Party member returning from international conference)
51. Mr. Jaros Gawdzik, Hungarian (farmer)
52. Mr. Mortiz Fritzsche, Hungarian (dissenter whose movements are watched by secret police)
53. Mrs. Josephine Bezouska and children, Hungarian (housewife, one son, and two daughters)
54. Mr. and Mrs. Jon Marcowka, Hungarian (minor bureaucrat and wife)
55. Mr. Peter O'Creagh, Irish (liaison between Irish terrorists, and terrorists and gun dealers on the Continent; he carries no weapons, but has Military Science/Weaponry AOK of 98. He fights barehanded if discovered or threatened.)
56. Mr. Isak Belmonte, Italian (bank officer)
57. Mr. and Mrs. Peter Brenza, Italian (stage actors traveling to a new production)



58. Miss Maria Colantuono, Italian (college student)
59. Mr. Salvatore Spicuzza, Italian (blackmailer, carries a .22 Beretta: PWV 35; RM 0/-50/-150/X; WS VF; ROF 1; AMMO 6; HWV 4; also carrying compromising photographs of Italian politician)
60. Mr. Marco Gatta, Italian (importer/exporter)
61. Mr. Henrik Dekker, Norwegian (clerk on vacation)
62. Mr. Mark Jylland, Norwegian (private investigator, carries no weapon but can be hired by agents as a cut-out)
63. Miss Elizabeth Bjorlokken, Norwegian (antique dealer)
64. Mr. Roland St. Marie, Norwegian (college professor)
65. Mr. Hans Sognesand, Norwegian (computer programmer)
66. Miss Lisa Adamczyk, Polish (tour guide)

67. Mr. Ignace Sobczak, Polish (customs inspector returning to work, reports to authorities any violations of customs he observes)
68. Mr. Wenceslaus Vladesov, Polish (cabinetmaker)
69. Mr. and Mrs. Zaven Yergovich, Polish (steel plant supervisor and his wife)
70. Mr. Josef Antunovich, Polish (truck driver)
71. Mr. Manuelo Augustine, Portuguese (stock broker)
72. Mr. Arturo Ortiz, Portuguese (fisherman)
73. Mr. and Mrs. Emilio Aispura, Portugese (vintner and his wife)
74. Mr. Juan Frias and Mis Carbonne Aguilira, Portugese (realtor and his secretary)
75. Mr. Phillip Favela, Portugese (pickpocket, carries no weapons,



has a 60% chance to pick the pocket of an unsuspecting person)
76. Mr. Radu Bogdan, Romanian (bookseller)
77. Mr. Ioan Conduratu, Romanian (railway inspector, riding the train to determine quality and safety)
78. Miss Liona Giurescu, Romanian (office clerk)
79. Mr. Michel Cazacu, Romanian (Romanian secret police, does not carry a weapon, but reports any suspicious looking foreigners on the train)
80. Mr. Christos Karaj, Romanian (professional opera singer)
81. Mrs. Inga Delorme, Spanish (travel agent)
82. Mr. Jesus Ponce, Spanish (fruit grower)
83. Mr. and Mrs. Rudolfo Gomez Munoz, Spanish (mayor, wife, three sons, and four daughters returning from meeting)
84. Capt. Isaias De La Mora, Spanish (naval commander on leave)
85. Miss Rosalio Montalvo, Spanish (cocktail waitress)
86. Mr. Adam Coutre, Swiss (professional photographer)
87. Miss Anna Carrera, Swiss (fashion model)
88. Mr. Adolph Schneider, Swiss (watchmaker)
89. Miss Ramona Stein, Swiss (professional dancer)
90. Mr. Hassan Abdul-Waarith, Tunisian (produce dealer)
91. Mr. Karl Seifried, West German (orchestra conductor)
92. Mrs. Anna Buelow, West German (grandmother going to visit children)
93. Mr. Leo Graf, West German (criminal attorney)
94. Mr. and Mrs. Otto Stetenfeld and family, West German (pharmacist traveling with wife and two daughters)
95. Mr. Jon Mathurian, West German (police inspector, carries a 9mm PPK: PWV 37; RM 0/-45/-145/X; WS VF; ROF 1; AMMO 7; HWV 4; he becomes involved in any violent action on the train, trying to arrest and hold all involved until the authorities arrive)
96. Mr. Vladislav Stanos, Yugoslavian (artist)
97. Miss Evaldas Lavinskas, Yugoslavian (sales clerk)
98. Mr. Radu Antonesque, Yugoslavian (doctor)
99. Mr. Stefan Czabal, Yugoslavian (college student)
100. Miss Monika Deszo, Yugoslavian (college student)

RECOMMENDED AGENTS LIST

Administrations has determined the following personnel would be suitable for the operations proposed in this file. The information given here provides you with statistical data, as well as short career backgrounds for each agent. Pay special attention to the mode of operation favored by each agent.

The agents listed do not have values assigned for their Perception, Observation, or level. You or the player may calculate Perception and Observation when they are needed. Choose the agent's level based on the difficulty of the operation, and the skill and experience of the player.

Gygorgy Borvan

Codename: ***Hunchback***

PS 95	CH 56	W 26	CO 92	K 59	CD 78
OF 85	DP 74	EV 67	DA 69	MV209	LL 12
HTH162	SV141	S M	H L		

Description. Age: 35 Ht: 5′ 11″ Wt: 190 Hair: **gray** Eyes: **brown** Glasses: **no**
Languages. Hungarian*: 92 English: 56 Spanish: 46
AOKs. Engineering, Transportation: 57 Geography: 129 Military Science/Weaponry: 86 Photography: 129 Physics: 125 Religion: 67
Nationality: Naturalized British

Born Januray 1948 in Varpalota, Hungary. Father killed in Hungarian uprising, 1956. Mother defected to Austria. Emigrated to great Britain, 1958. Attended Cambridge, 1967 (physics). Obtained position as research assistant at Maidenhead Research Station. Approached by KGB for use as agent in place. Contacted Special Branch, 1975. Recruited by DI-5, 1976. Transferred to DI-6, 1979. Assigned N.Y. office, 1980. Liaison to agency. Assigned to Investigation Bureau.

Has performed well in operations requiring scientific expertise. Shows restraint in use of violence.

WARNING: Eastern European background indicates potential vulnerability through coercion of relatives in Communist-controlled countries.

Juan Matthews

Codename: ***Technician***

PS 77	CH 90	W 71	CO 88	K 83	CD 94
OF 91	DP 89	EV 92	DA 89	MV242	LL 15
HTH169	SV181	S M	H L		

Description. Age: 35 Ht: 5′ 11″ Wt: 160 Hair: **red** Eyes: **brown** Glasses: **no**
Languages. Basque*: 82 English*: 70 Irish: 54 Italian: 41
AOKs. Architecture: 76 Botany: 98 Education/Indoctrination: 60 Engineering, Electrical: 57 Transportation: 67 Metallurgy: 56 Military Science/Weaponry: 51 Photography: 93 World History/Current Affairs: 101
Nationality: American

Born May 1948 in Arizona to Basque father and Irish mother. Parents divorced, 1960. Attended University of Arizona (no major declared), 1966. Served in 1st Cav. Div. in Vietnam, 1969. Wounded in left arm, transferred to G-2. Received Honorable Discharge. Recruited by agency, 1972. Currently assigned Confiscation Bureau.

Specializes in infiltration and penetration of high security systems. Prefers not to carry weapons.

WARNING: Testing shows agent to be quick-tempered and argumentative.

Ruth Montiverdi

Codename: ***Petri***

PS 27	CH 94	W 81	CO 91	K 42	CD 81
OF 86	DP 93	EV 88	DA 62	MV189	LL 11
HTH114	SV179	S F	H R		

Description. Age: 35 Ht: 5′ 11″ Wt: 190 Hair: gray Eyes: brown Glasses: no
Languages. Italian*: 79 English: 56
AOKs. Animal Science: 65 Biology/Biochemistry: 126 Medicine/Physiology: 73 Military Science/Weaponry: 69 Political Science/Ideology: 107
Nationality: Italian

Born November 1961 in Torino, Italy. Entered University of Rome, 1978 (pre-med). Recruited by agency, 1979. Currently assigned to Investigation Bureau.

Has been used successfully in the past for sister operations. Is extremely competent in high risk and charm situations.

WARNING: Testing indicates that agent may form emotional attachments to strong father figures. Such attachments may pose complications for agents in field.

Thomas Rinkman

Codename: ***Three-Piece Suit***

PS 89	CH 80	W 79	CO 51	K 64	CD 52
OF 52	DP 66	EV 66	DA 58	MV220	LL 17
HTH155	SV132	S M	H R		

Description. Age: 37 Ht: 6 Wt: 180 Hair: blond Eyes: blue Glasses: yes, cannot wear contacts, Coordination 22 without glasses
Languages. English*: 89 Czech: 42 Bulgarian: 66
AOKs. Animal Science: 68 Botany: 55 Engineering, Industrial: 115 Geography: 90 Military Science/Weaponry: 117 Religion: 51 World History/Current Affairs: 64
Nationality: British

Born April 1946 in Manchester, England. Entered Army service, 1964. Military aide Northern Ireland, 1968 Recruited DI-6, 1971. Received Assassination training. Assigned to Bulgarian office, 1975. Transferred to Special Status, 1978. Assigned to agency, 1980. Currently assigned to Assassination Bureau.

Cautious, practical agent. Specializes in high-level assassination, personally favors ultra-clean operations.

WARNING: Dependency on corrective lenses may present risk to success of field operation.

Tokubei Tsuyu

Codename: ***Spirit Guide***

PS 50	CH 61	W 36	CO 99	K 35	CD 99
OF 99	DP 80	EV 80	DA 67	MV185	LL 9
HTH130	SV160	S F	H R		

Description. Age: 40 Ht: 5′ 5″ Wt: 110 Hair: black Eyes: gray Glasses: no
Languages. Japanese*: 80 English: 60
AOKs. Computer Science: 123 Medicine/Physiology: 117 Military Science/Weaponry: 76 Religion: 120
Nationality: Naturalized Canadian

Born September 1943 in Osaka, Japan. Parents emigrated to Vancouver, Canada in May 1951. Studied at University of Vancouver (pre-med). Returned to Japan, 1964. Attended Tokyo Free College (religion). Returned to Canada, 1965. Active in underground network aiding American draft resistors, 1967. Recruited to Canadian Service, 1970, through coercion. Assigned special duty to agency, 1978.

Favors covert, nonviolent operations. Currently assigned to Confiscation Bureau.

WARNING: Testing indicates agent unreliability in situations involving injury to innocents. High violence situations may present risk to herself and other agents.

Luke Zabronski

Codename: ***Mohawk Orange***


PS 77	CH 43	W 45	CO 81	K 59	CD 91
OF 86	DP 62	EV 67	DA 75	MV213	LL 12
HTH144	SV147	S M	H R		

Description. Age: 28 Ht: 6′ 1″ Wt: 235 Hair: brown Eyes: gray Glasses: no
Languages. English*: 76 French: 40 Arabic: 40
AOKs. Animal Science: 99 Arts and Crafts: 58 Economics/Finance: 60 Engineering, Industrial: 70 Religion: 51 Military Science/Weaponry: 62
Nationality: American

Born June 1955 in Lawton, Oklahoma. Attended Oklahoma State University (civil engineering), 1973-1975. No degree obtained. Worked as wildcatter, 1976. Served in U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, 1977-1979. Received Honorable Discharge. Joined Friends of Freedom (ultra-right paramilitary organization), 1979. Recruited by agency. 1980. Currently assigned Assassinations Bureau.

Favors operations posing great personal risk. Rated by Personnel as loyal and reliable. Has received training in demolitions, and arctic and jungle survival.


WARNING: Testing and field experience indicate agent prone to high violence behavior. Observation of behavior indicates possible homicidal tendencies. Prefers action over subtlety, and may pose risk to agents and success of operation.




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
MAP A


FIRST CLASS SLEEPING CAR






MAP 'B'
FIRST CLASS
DINING
CAR





MAP 'C'
BAR &
SNACK
CAR




MA
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
SEATING
CAPACITY
36

D'
D
INC-

MAP 'E'
SECOND CLASS COACH CAR




MAP 'F'
BAGGAGE CAR





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
MAP 'C'
ENGINE




TURBINE NOT ELECTRIC










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

STOOLS
C4
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C9
C1



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TITLE: ORIENT EXPRESS	FILE NO. TS-005
	DRAWING NO. 7604XXX0701
DESIGNER David Cook DATE 10/14/83	DRAFTSMAN J. DIESEL DATE 10/14
PURPOSE: OPERATIVE INFO	SCALE 1SQ=1'

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A
B
C
D
BERLIN
110 KMS
EUROPEAN TRAIN SYSTEM MAP
CAPITAL CITY
CITY
TRAIN ROUTE
The number before the slash along the routes is the approximate ticket cost (second class) in U.S. dollars.
The number after the slash is the travel time (in hours) between the two cities.
Scale: Miles
0
100
200
300
SCOTLAND
N. IRELAND
IRELAND
ENGLAND
WALES
NORTH SEA
ENGLISH CHANNEL
ATLANTIC OCEAN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
NETHERLANDS
Amsterdam
London
WEST GERMANY
BELGIUM
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Bordeaux
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PORTUGAL
SPAIN
CORSICA
SARDINIA
MOROCCO
56/6
33/2.5
15/3.5
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48/8
56/5
84/4
56/4
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25/2
17/3
45/4
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63/7
90/21
65/12
55/7
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42/11
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50/8
63/15



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TOP SECRET®

ESPIONAGE GAME

OPERATION ORIENT EXPRESS

AGENT FIGURES

HOW TO SET UP YOUR AGENT FIGURES

1 Cut out the 24 figures shown here. Cut only on the solid line.


2 Bend the figures at the dotted lines.

3 Cut small slits (along the lines) in tabs A and B. Don't cut any further than the black line on the tab.

4 Fold the tabs under the figure and push together tabs A and B at the slits.

5 If your figures don't stay standing, put a small piece of tape at the bottom of each figure where the tabs come together.





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AGENCY COMPUTER PRINTOUT 005

BEGIN MESSAGE
TO: Local Administrators
RE: European Train System

SITUATION: Agency seeking new methods of running international operations throughout Europe and the Balkans.

PROPOSAL: Utilize European train system as a means of carrying out operations. Runs between major European cities would be suitable for transferring information, sealing compromised channels of communication, and relegating undesirables to nonperson status.


OBJECTIVE: Successfully complete the six major on-train operations included in this file. Failure by agents to do so will result in a vigorous reassessment of their value to the agency.

ENCLOSURES: a 32-page operations file, a large-scale, full-color map of train targets, a map of the European train system, and 24 cutout agent figures.

Proceed with operations at your earliest convenience, and don't catch the measles.

END MESSAGE

FOR USE WITH THE TOP SECRET® ESPIONAGE GAME



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