

Modern African Wars (I): Rhodesia 1965-80



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Colour plates by
MIKE CHAPPELL

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

1759 152

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Nil H B. 94.1.1
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OSPREY PUBLISHING LONDON

g/217 830

Katalog

Published in 1986 by
Osprey Publishing Ltd
Member company of the George Philip Group
12-14 Long Acre, London WC2E 9LP
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Abbott, Peter

Modern African wars.—(Men-at-arms series; 183)

Rhodesia 1965-80

I. Africa—History, Military—20th century

I. Title II. P. Botham III Series

960'.32 DT21.5

ISBN 0-85045-728-9

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to John Bennett, Bryan Petrie, Pete Turner, Nigel Thomas, John Pittaway and W. F. Wilberforce in all his guises.

Filmset in Great Britain

Printed through Bookbuilders Ltd, Hong Kong

Modern African Wars (1): Rhodesia 1965-80

The Rhodesian War


It could be argued that in one sense the Rhodesian War really began in 1890. Cecil Rhodes knew that the territory which later bore his name was not only suitable for European settlement, but rich in gold and other minerals as well. He obtained a mining concession, and formed the British South Africa Company to exploit it (the Company's crest, an Imperial lion firmly grasping an African elephant's tusk, was to remain the symbol of white Rhodesia right through to 1980). The Company sent a military-style Pioneer Column to occupy its claims. It reached its destination unopposed; but the Pioneers knew that armed conflict with the local Africans could not long be delayed.

Imperialism was not new to Central Africa. The Shona-speaking groups who made up some 75 per cent of the African population of what came to be called Southern Rhodesia had their own history of inter-group struggles and dynastic warfare. It was they who had been responsible for the elaborate stone 'Zimbabwes' whose ruins were so impressive that later Europeans refused to believe that they had been built by Africans at all. (The carved stone 'Zimbabwe bird' from those ruins became a symbol for the later African nationalists).

The wealth that these imposing buildings represented had been the bait which attracted two unsuccessful 16th-century Portuguese expeditions. The real menace, however, came from the south, in the form of the *Mfecane* or 'Crushing': a great disruptive wave of Southern Bantu groups fleeing northwards away from the Zulu menace in the early 19th century. They had adopted Zulu organisation, weapons and tactics, and were militarily superior to the Shona who lay in their path. In 1834 one group stormed the stone fortress of Great Zimbabwe and killed the last Shona emperor. The Ndebele, another such group, settled in the western part of

the country, and either killed or assimilated the Shona there. By 1890 they and their Shona clients accounted for 20 per cent of the African population.

The Ndebele regarded themselves as overlords of the whole country, and their warriors watched the European incursions with growing anger. In 1893 they took on the settlers in what the latter called the Matabele War. Zulu-style weapons and tactics proved no match for European firepower: the Ndebele were defeated, and 'Matabeleland' was annexed. Three years later they rose again in revolt. Again they were defeated; but no sooner had this



The stick leader of a Police Support Unit patrol moves warily through an African village. Generally, Police units carried more kit than their Army counterparts, and paid closer attention to dress regulations.



Bush—with Alouette . . . The start of a 'contact' in the Darwin/Marymount area.

rising been quelled than the Shona in eastern 'Mashonaland' also rose. Since the Shona were less centralised than the Ndebele, their rebellion had more of the character of a guerrilla war, and the Company's forces found it correspondingly more difficult to suppress; but by 1897 all was calm again. This Shona rising came to be known as the 'First Chimurenga' or Liberation Struggle (*murenga* meaning rebels or fighters in ChiShona), and was to prove an inspiration for the later nationalists.

The settlers were now firmly in control. Company rule ended in 1923, and a new constitution granted representative government to an almost wholly white electorate. Although it remained staunchly British in sentiment, the new government's native policy of 'parallel development' resembled that of South Africa. It was enshrined in a Land Apportionment Act, which allocated half the land to a European community estimated at the time to be some four per cent of the total population; and in Native Registration and Native Passes Acts which gave it the power to enforce segregation. Nevertheless, the undoubted benefits of increased personal security and improved public health led to a rapid rise in the African population, which helped to offset increased European immigration. By 1965 there were

some 228,000 Europeans and 4,847,000 Africans, together with 23,000 Asians and Coloureds (people of mixed race).

The Africans slowly began to organise themselves politically. Up to the 1950s their efforts were limited to issues such as wages and equal opportunities; but an ill-fated British attempt to amalgamate settler-controlled Southern Rhodesia with the more orthodox colonial territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the so-called Central African Federation led to a rise in militant African nationalism and a call for 'one man, one vote'. The writing was on the wall, and in 1956 the Federation's army was quietly reorganised to give priority to counter-insurgency.

African opposition to the Federation became so violent that it broke up in 1964. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became fully independent black states under the new names of Zambia and Malawi, leaving Southern Rhodesia still technically subject

Fireforce, waiting for take-off. Note mixture of British steel parachute helmets, and locally-acquired 'bone domes' of commercial origin: there was a good deal of laxity about such matters when on operations. The FN-MAG light machine gun carried by the trooper in the foreground is—as was common—daubed with green and brown paint. The ratio of MAGs to rifles in combat sections was usually one to four—higher than in European armies. The soldier carrying it wears a one-piece camouflage jump suit. Not much equipment is slung under the ventral reserve pack, and full battle webbing is worn: fireforce troops more often than not jumped into 'hot' DZs and went straight into action, and there was no time for unpacking jump-bags or equipment covers.



to Britain. The Rhodesian African nationalists pressed for independence and black majority rule. The British were sympathetic, but the white Rhodesian electorate (which had scarcely been reassured by recent events in the Congo) was united in its opposition under its new leader, Ian Smith.

Affairs had reached an impasse. The British government refused to give Southern Rhodesia independence under the kind of constitution acceptable to the white Rhodesians. The Rhodesians saw only one way out of the dilemma. In May 1965 they issued their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), and renamed their country simply 'Rhodesia'.

The British government refused to intervene militarily, and put its trust in economic and diplomatic sanctions. Since Rhodesia's links with the outside world ran through friendly South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique (where a white colonial power was fighting its own anti-guerrilla war), these sanctions proved ineffective, and the Rhodesians were able to get enough arms, equipment and fuel to sustain their forces during the now-inevitable struggle.

The African nationalists were also receiving outside help. Newly independent black African states like Zambia and Tanzania felt a natural affinity for their oppressed 'brothers' in what they called 'Zimbabwe', and did what they could to help them. Equipment and more specialised training in sabotage and the general techniques of rev-

olutionary warfare were supplied by both Russia and Communist China, who had their own reasons for wanting to embarrass the West. This Communist assistance further alarmed the white Rhodesians, and stiffened their resolve.

The diplomats made a series of attempts to resolve the escalating dispute. Shortly before the first shots were fired on what later came to be commemorated as 'Chimurenga Day' (22 April 1966), Smith met Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, on board HMS *Fearless*. The talks proved abortive. Two years later, in 1968, Smith and Wilson met again, this time on HMS *Tiger*; but they were still unable to bridge the gap between British insistence on majority rule, and the white settlers' reluctance to plunge Rhodesia into what they saw as Communist-inspired chaos.

In 1970 Rhodesia declared itself to be a republic. A new British government tried yet again: this time Britain's Pearce Commission got as far as submitting its compromise proposals to the Rhodesian Africans, only to have them decisively rejected.

The struggle began once more. By now the guerrillas had gained in experience, and the Rhodesian forces began to be stretched. Their situation worsened dramatically when the Portuguese withdrew from Mozambique in 1974, and opened up a new and extensive frontier to guerrilla infiltration. The Rhodesians remained defiant; but in 1975 joint South African/Zambian pressure forced both sides to accept a ceasefire, followed by a meeting between Ian Smith and the nationalist leaders on the railway bridge spanning Victoria Falls. This proved abortive, however, and fighting was resumed.

In 1976 the Americans added their weight to British efforts, and the hard-pressed Smith was finally persuaded to accept the principle of majority rule. The Rhodesians rejected the detailed Anglo-American proposals, however, and instead began negotiations with some of the more moderate nationalist leaders. In 1978 these led to a so-called 'internal settlement', which introduced universal suffrage and re-named the country 'Zimbabwe-Rhodesia'. Bishop Muzorewa won the subsequent election and became the new Prime Minister, though control of the security forces remained firmly in white hands. The international community refused to recognise this settlement,

'Troopies' canteens'—this one at Bindura—were supplied and run by civilian volunteers, and were popular watering-stops.




however; and guerrilla warfare continued, despite amnesty offers and the activities of the new black government's own Security Force Auxiliaries.

The end was now in sight. Isolated diplomatically and overextended economically, its small white population exhausted by the ever-increasing demands for military service, the Rhodesian government agreed to another constitutional conference. The guerrillas were tired, too, and were finding it increasingly difficult to motivate their men to fight what was now a black government. In

1979 both sides met at Lancaster House in London. In what turned out to be a belated triumph for British diplomacy, an agreement on a new constitution was signed and a ceasefire agreed.

In 1980 a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (composed of men from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji) arrived in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to supervise the ceasefire and the new elections. To the surprise of many of the white Rhodesians (who retained their own reserved Parliamentary seats) the militant Patriotic Front



won a clear victory over Muzorewa's collaborationist party; and Robert Mugabe, leader of the Shona-dominated ZANU (PF), became Prime Minister of what was now to be called just plain 'Zimbabwe'. The war which the nationalists had called 'Second Chimurenga' was over at last.

The Patriotic Front Forces

The development of the African nationalist organisations is difficult to follow in detail as government banning orders, coupled with a series of schisms, led to their operating under a variety of titles and a veritable 'alphabet soup' of initials. Essentially, however, there were two main movements: ZAPU (the Zimbabwe African People's Union), and ZANU (the Zimbabwe African National Union), to which must be added an assortment of more moderate 'third force' groups.

ZAPU was the successor of the original nationalist movement. It was led by Joshua Nkomo, an Ndebele-speaker, and although it claimed to represent all Rhodesian Africans it came increasingly to be identified with the Ndebele. Its military wing was known as ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army), whose commander 'Nikita' Mangena was killed in 1978 and succeeded by Lookout Masuku.

ZANU originated in 1963, when a number of more radical nationalists left ZAPU to form their own movement. Its leadership was more 'collective' than ZAPU's, but it came to be led by Robert Mugabe (a Shona) after 1975. Like ZAPU, it contained representatives of both major groups, but became increasingly identified with the Shonas. Its military wing, or ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) was controlled by a political committee until 1974, when Joseph Tongogara was appointed commander. He was killed in 1979, and replaced by Rex Nhongo.

The chief 'third force' movement was FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe), formed in 1970 by breakaway sections of both ZAPU and ZANU. It tried to operate its own guerrilla groups, but could not compete with the bigger movements, and disappeared after 1974.

The divisions within the African liberation

movements were clearly counter-productive, and the 'Front Line' African states made a number of attempts to impose a degree of unity. In 1972 ZAPU and ZANU were persuaded to establish a Joint Military Command, but this proved abortive. A much more determined effort was made in 1975, when the military wings were forced to unite as ZIPA (Zimbabwe People's Army), with a joint military committee headed by ZANLA's Nhongo and a ZIPRA deputy. Attempts were made to integrate the two forces, but there were difficulties from the start. Some ZIPRA recruits were even killed by their ZANLA comrades, and by 1977 ZIPA was effectively ZANLA-controlled.

This attempt at military integration was accompanied by moves towards creating a degree of political unity. In 1976 ZAPU and ZANU agreed to combine within an umbrella organisation known as the Patriotic Front. The need for greater unity was clearly demonstrated when two of the leaders of

Rainy season: railway sleepers form an improvised hard surface on the worst spots of the approach road to Joint Operations Centre (JOC) Rutenga.



the earlier ANC front, Muzorewa and Sithole (the latter recently deposed as main leader of ZANU) returned to Rhodesia and participated in Smith's 'internal settlement'.

Both ZIPRA and ZANLA operated in very similar ways during the late 1960s. Recruits were smuggled out of the country and sent in small groups to Ghana, Tanzania, Cuba, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, China or Eastern Europe for training, before returning to Zambia to try to re-enter Rhodesia across the inhospitable Zambezi Valley. The arrival of Chinese instructors at ZANLA's main Tanzanian camp led to a change of emphasis, however, and thereafter the two forces developed along differing lines. (This is, of course, a simplification: both organisations had their tribalists and their pan-Zimbabweans, their militarists and their political activists, their pro-Westerners and their pro-Communists, and even their pro-Russians and pro-Chinese.)

ZANLA adopted Chinese theories of revolutionary warfare, and came to see itself as a movement of 'armed militants rather than militarists'. Its cadres worked ceaselessly to politicise the rural Africans in the Tribal Trust Lands through a combination of night-time *pungwes* (political meetings), and exemplary punishments for 'enemy collaborators'. The Rhodesians called this intimidation; but although some ZANLA groups certainly got out of control, the fact that they were generally known as *vakomana* ('the boys') suggests that the majority observed ZANLA's three rules: namely '(1) obey all orders; (2) do not take so much as a single needle or piece of thread from the masses; (3) turn in everything captured'.

Initially ZANLA continued to operate from Zambia, but after 1968 it moved closer to FRELIMO, the liberation movement in Portuguese Mozambique. When Portuguese rule collapsed in 1974, ZANLA was already well entrenched there, and able to intensify its operations in Eastern Rhodesia. ZANLA's difficulties with the Zambian government came to a head in 1974-75, when a series of events starting with an attempted revolt by disaffected ZANLA members (the Nhari Rebellion), and culminating in the assassination of a ZANU politician, led the Zambians to detain most of the ZANU leaders. After this, ZANLA operated entirely from Mozam-



In terrain like this it was inevitable that the Security Forces took casualties on sweep and patrol operations; however, they consistently demonstrated that they had the tactical 'edge', with kill/loss ratios of around ten to one in contacts with the PF.

bique, where it continued to enjoy Chinese and Tanzanian support. Because its sponsors were relatively poor, ZANLA remained short of arms and other equipment as compared with ZIPRA. As one ZANLA guerrilla said, 'We needed rifles; they wanted tanks'. This was one of the grievances behind the Nhari Rebellion. ZANLA was stronger in manpower, however, especially after 1974, and maintained many more guerrillas in the field inside Rhodesia.

ZIPRA remained more 'regular' than its rival. It continued to be based in Zambia, and to a lesser extent in Botswana, giving its guerrillas access mainly to Matabeleland or Western Rhodesia. It received Soviet recognition and support, and was consequently more lavishly equipped. Rural Africans in disputed areas observed that ZIPRA combatants wore camouflaged uniforms, and depended less on the local population for supplies than the civilian-clad ZANLA. ZIPRA also seems to have made less use of exemplary terror as a tactic.

ZIPRA also played a relatively minor rôle in the fighting during the 1970s. By mid-1977 there were only 100–200 ZIPRA actually operating in Rhodesia, compared with some 3,000 ZANLA. This was partly because Nkomo was more committed to a negotiated settlement; but it was also suspected that he hoped ZANLA and the Rhodesian security forces would fight each other to a standstill. Many of the ZIPRA combatants were held back in Zambia, where they built up a conventional mechanised brigade with a Soviet-style command structure and Soviet T-34 tanks, BTR-152 APCs, field guns, transport, and increasingly formidable anti-aircraft equipment, including SAM-7s. Nkomo has since confirmed that by 1979 ZIPRA was planning to launch a full scale assault across the Zambezi supported by its own Soviet-trained air force—though the Rhodesians were prepared for this, and confident of their superiority in conventional warfare.

The Rhodesians made much of the differences between ZANLA and ZIPRA, and there were certainly reports of fighting between rival bands. However, there were also instances of one group coming to the aid of the other, and there was never any question but that both saw the Rhodesians as the main enemy.

Prime Minister Ian Smith visiting the Army stand at the 1979 Bulawayo Trade Fair. The officer on the right is wearing green service dress, with miniatures of the corps cap badge on the lapels, captain's stars, a lanyard in corps colours (here the light and dark blue of the Educational Corps), and the 1st Brigade black and scarlet shoulder patch on the left sleeve only.



ZANLA was organised into 'theatres' corresponding to the Mozambique provinces (Tete, Manica and Gaza) which acted as their bases. These theatres were subdivided into sectors named after national heroes, such as the famous spirit-medium Nehanda. ZIPRA followed a broadly similar system.

Tactically, guerrillas of both forces operated in sections of approximately ten men, each armed with an RPG-7 or light mortar, a light machine gun and half a dozen automatic rifles. The guerrillas used a remarkable assortment of small arms, including Russian grenades, Tokarov pistols, PPSH SMGs and SKS carbines, Czech M52/57, French MAS and even old German Mauser rifles and MP40 SMGs; but AK-47s or AKMs from either China, Russia or other East European countries were by far the most common weapons. Soviet-pattern mines and some 75mm recoilless rifles were also used, but the problems of transporting them limited their use.

Each section would have a commander and his deputy, a political commissar and his deputy, medical, supply and security specialists, and about three ordinary guerrillas. Reconnaissance was the responsibility of the *mujibas*, boys of school age who hung around the army camps and passed on details of what they saw, sometimes by the traditional drumbeat. Other services were provided by *chimbwidos*, female helpers who cooked and carried supplies and messages for the guerrillas.

The Rhodesian security forces did not have a very high opinion of the guerrillas' combat effectiveness, and their 'kill ratio' seems to confirm this view. Of course, like all guerrillas, the Patriotic Front's aim was to avoid regular troops rather than fight it out with them; but even against relatively 'soft' targets such as isolated white farms their attacks were seldom pressed home. However, they were fighting a different kind of war to the professionals. As one ZANU leader explained in 1973, their strategic aim was to attenuate the Rhodesian forces by causing them to be deployed all over the country, forcing the régime to mobilise large numbers of its white civilians. They calculated that this cumulative pressure would ultimately have a devastating effect on white morale. By the later 1970s it was clear that all the efforts of the superbly professional Rhodesian forces could not prevent the guerrillas from achieving their aim.

The Course of the War

The years preceding UDI saw ZAPU and ZANU fomenting civil disorder, trying to draw Britain's attention to the struggle for independence. As early as 1962, ZAPU was sending men for training in China and elsewhere; ZANU followed suit in 1963, and began its campaign of rural intimidation in the same year. In 1964 both parties put into effect long-laid plans for infiltration, sabotage and attacks on white-owned property. The Rhodesian authorities responded by detaining the prominent nationalist leaders—Nkomo, Sithole and Mugabe—but internal security at this time was still largely the responsibility of the Police, whose authority was enhanced by the 1964 Law and Order (Maintenance) Act.

UDI gave a fresh impetus and a colour of legitimacy to guerrilla activity. In April 1966 a ZANLA group was eliminated at Sinoia, *en route* to attack Kariba. May saw a second incursion, tasked with sabotaging the Beira-Umtali pipeline, liberating Sithole and attacking white farmsteads; all but one of the group were killed or captured after murdering a white couple.

In late 1967, ZIPRA guerrillas crossed into northern Matabeleland via the Zambezi in the Victoria Falls area, backed up by ANC. Rhodesian security forces mounted Operations 'Nickel' and 'Cauldron', a series of running battles stretching over several weeks. The infiltrators were eliminated, but eight members of the Security Forces were killed and more injured; the calibre of the opposition had been higher than anticipated.

One result was that South African para-military units entered the fray, ostensibly to deal with guerrillas from the South African ANC. In early 1968 guerrillas entered the Sipolilo area and established base camps, with the intention of provoking a local uprising. The group was discovered and destroyed. After these reverses ZANLA and ZIPRA would wage a more traditional, 'swim in the sea of the people' war rather than risking confrontation, and would seek easier ways of crossing undetected into Rhodesia.

In 1970 FRELIMO successes made vulnerable a long stretch of Rhodesia's north-eastern border with Mozambique, and FRELIMO gave ZANU

permission to mount attacks through Tete province. In December 1971, with a secure base south of the Zambezi, ZANLA began crossing the valley and escarpment to gain access to the unprotected white farmlands. The Rhodesians began operations with the Portuguese in Mozambique, and an SAS strike on Matimbe in March 1972 provided proof of the ZANLA presence.

After 12 months of 'winning hearts and minds' and using local people to porter in weapons and supplies to establish caches, ZANLA resumed operations in late 1972. Infiltrating into the Mtoko area through Tete, they aimed to destroy the morale of the farmers and to win over local tribesmen, or to terrify them into submission by

Lt.Gen. G. P. Walls, GLM, DCD, MBE, wearing a camouflage shirt with black-on-khaki ranking loops on the shoulder straps, and his medal ribbons. Peter Walls was a veteran of the Second World War, and was an officer in the Black Watch in the post-war period. Resigning his commission, he joined the Southern Rhodesia Army as a corporal; was re-commissioned; and fought in the Malayan Emergency, commanding C (Rhodesia) Sqn., SAS. The commanding officer of IRLI from November 1964, he was appointed General Officer Commanding the Rhodesian Army in 1972, and in early 1977 took over as Commander of Combined Operations – the professional head of the Rhodesian armed forces.




atrocities; December 1972 is generally taken as the start of the war 'proper', with the attack on the Altena farm near Centenary, and the death of one SAS trooper by landmine as Security Forces responded. To contain the new threat, Operation 'Hurricane' commenced.

For three years the war was largely confined to the north-east; increasingly determined, experienced and disciplined, the guerrillas exploited the authority wielded by spirit-mediums, abducted children for 're-education' in Mozambique, and laid landmines. To deprive the enemy of his support and protection, Security Forces countered with a variety of measures, including the imposition of fines, the creation of buffer zones of 'no-man's land', the manipulation of friendly mediums, and the establishment of protected villages.

1974 saw an escalation as Mozambique and Angola fell. Guerrilla communication and supply problems were greatly eased, and Rhodesia now had four fronts on which to fight and an additional 700 miles of border to defend. South Africa initiated a ceasefire which, unintentionally, allowed the guerrillas to regroup, and the same exercise prompted the release of the detained nationalist leaders.

In 1975 South Africa withdrew her police from Rhodesia. However, the war slowed down; during 1974 and 1975 ZANU and ZAPU spent as much

The impressive impact of an RPG round in the wall of a concrete building at Villa Salazaar; the central crater is about six inches across.



time fighting each other as the Security Forces—in the camps, in the field, and even in prison. Leaders were not exempt, and several were assassinated. Zambia, increasingly disinclined to play host, imprisoned some ZANLA leaders, and ZANLA transferred its operations to Mozambique. Rhodesia imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew along much of the Mozambique and Botswana borders.

In early 1976 ZANLA resumed the war on the Tete, Manica and Gaza fronts, concentrating on soft targets and avoiding confrontations. To counter the growing incursions, new operational areas were set up—'Thrasher', in the Eastern Highlands; 'Repulse', primarily to protect the vital rail link with South Africa; and 'Tangent', covering Victoria Falls, Wankie and the Botswana border. The Security Forces kept up a good 'kill ratio'—ten enemy for every own loss—by early 1977—but, in addition to 268 Security Force casualties, almost 1,500 civilians had also died.

Mozambique closed her border in early 1976, and Soviet arms began to flow into Beira; later in the year FRELIMO and Security Forces were to clash. Following the deaths of four South African civilians in a main road ambush, Police-protected convoys ran between major centres; urban terrorism became a reality with a grenade attack on a Salisbury restaurant, and it became essential to sweep unsurfaced roads for landmines. Security Forces countered with 'hot pursuit': an attack on the Nyadzonya camp in Mozambique accounted for at least 300 guerrilla dead, and the tons of weaponry and intelligence brought back belied the claim of 'refugee camp'.

In 1977, COMOPS¹ was set up to streamline the war effort, and strategy changed: pre-emptive strikes were launched, designed to cripple the guerrillas in their forward staging areas and training camps before they could enter Rhodesia. But guerrillas still got through; a ZANLA bomb in Salisbury's Woolworth's store killed eleven. More pre-emptive strikes followed, this time into Zambia, in August. August also saw the setting up of Operational 'Grapple', a tacit admission area (see map) that the guerrillas had established a presence throughout Rhodesia.

¹A co-ordinating combined services operations HQ, which prevented the kind of duplication, and even contradictory effort which had sometimes arisen before this date.

In November, Smith conceded the principle of universal suffrage which would lead to interim government; at the same time, to emphasise that the decision was not prompted by weakness, some 1,200 guerrillas were killed in strikes on the Chimoio and Tembue camps in Mozambique—only one Rhodesian died; and in a notable five-day operation, Security Forces cleared the Mapai area.

In 1978 ZIPRA began to take a more active rôle in the war, Nkomo being stung by Mugabe's accusations that ZANLA was doing all the fighting. Nkomo favoured a more conventional, Cuban-assisted thrust into Matabeleland with his forces, but decided that his enemy was still too strong. However, ZIPRA now stepped up guerrilla activity: in September, using a Russian-supplied SAM-7, they brought down a civilian Viscount airliner and then murdered ten of the survivors. Overall, average casualties rose to 30 a day, and guerrillas were now crossing the border in larger groups than ever. A new operational area—'Splinter'—opened to monitor Lake Kariba; and martial law was proclaimed in some areas.

The problem was tackled at source. Zambia had hitherto been subjected to only small-scale Rhodesian incursions; this time the target was ZAPU's 8,000 men in the Chikumbi, Mkushi and Mborama camps, the first only 19km north of Lusaka. The Rhodesian Air Force took control of Zambian air space for 48 hours (19 October) while the Zambian Air Force prudently obeyed the broadcast advice of the Rhodesian forward controller and stayed grounded; and for three days Rhodesian ground forces put in assaults which killed more than 1,500 guerrillas.

Political necessity again neutralised military success; a delayed election allowed regrouping, and in December the guerrillas struck their most telling blow of the war, destroying a quarter of Rhodesia's fuel in a rocket attack on Salisbury's oil storage depot.

1979 opened with the downing in February of a second civilian Viscount, again by SAM-7; this time there were no survivors. A week later, Rhodesia exacted revenge on ZIPRA with an air attack on a base at Luso in Angola, 1,000km from the Rhodesian border. Retaliatory raids were also launched into Zambia and, in Mozambique, Rhodesian-backed and -trained National Resistance fighters took the war to FRELIMO.



An extraordinary survival, of unknown origin! This Second World War vintage Universal Carrier, fitted locally with a tall armoured superstructure and two twin-MAG mountings, was used for convoy escort in rough terrain.

In April the elections were mounted, their validity ensured by the deployment of 70,000 men. Immediately beforehand, an attack was mounted on Nkomo's HQ in Lusaka; the Kazenguela ferry (being used to carry ZIPRA supplies) was sunk; and ZAPU personnel were 'lifted' from Francistown in Botswana. Despite its threats, the PF failed to disrupt the election process, and Bishop Muzorewa came to power on a wave of optimism. With mixed feelings, the Security Forces took on strength large numbers of 'auxiliaries'.

The war intensified and entered a new phase, with economic as well as military targets being hit. In September Security Forces launched a successful attack against the ZANLA/FRELIMO build-up in Mozambique's Gaza province; in October, Zambia's desperately-needed maize supplies were cut; and in November key bridges were destroyed to forestall a ZIPRA invasion.

The crippling blows dealt to neighbouring economies and heavy losses inflicted on both ZIPRA and ZANLA were not enough. Rhodesia, though far superior tactically, and undefeated in the field, had no realistic strategic aim: she was faced with a future of escalating war and dwindling resources. External pressure was brought on all parties for a return to the conference table; a ceasefire agreement was signed on 21 December 1979; and the result was Mugabe's election in April 1980, after a campaign noted for its intimidation despite the best efforts of the monitoring force.

The Security Forces

The Rhodesian Army

Rhodesia on the eve of war was a typical 'colonial' country, with a tiny regular Army, a small Air Force, a Police force jealous of its ability to maintain order, government departments reluctant to yield authority, and a population not prepared for conflict. Yet, from these unpromising beginnings, within a few short years the Rhodesian Security Forces would become the equal of any counter-insurgency force in the world.

Rhodesia's most pressing problems were always lack of manpower, and the sheer size of the area and borders to be defended; and solutions had to be found in terms of quality rather than quantity. Accordingly, the bottom of the pyramid was continually broadened and strengthened to push more skilled troops towards the apex. Duplicated effort and inter-service bloody-mindedness were a problem at times, but generally the larger objective was kept in view.

The development of the Army provides perhaps the best example; 'teeth' arms were expanded, new units such as the Selous Scouts were created for specific tasks, and the service elements were kept lean to get the maximum number of bayonets into the field. As the war escalated, conscription and

A soldier of the Rhodesian African Rifles displays captured ZIPRA clothing and equipment, including 'rice fleck' camouflage-cap and trousers, khaki shirt, and a mixture of Warsaw Pact and 'ChiCom'-style personal equipment.



Territorial commitment were extended, and units at the cutting edge expanded in proportion.

The war in Rhodesia was not fought as a series of campaigns, nor did set-piece confrontations take place. The Security Forces evolved, rapidly, as the war progressed, and any attempt to present a formal 'order of battle' would be meaningless. What follows is very much a skeleton outline of each major unit's history, organisation and contribution, not ranked in order of importance but rather grouped according to rôle.

The Rhodesian African Rifles

The 1st Bn., Rhodesian African Rifles was formed in Salisbury in 1940 and constituted the oldest regular battalion in the Rhodesian Army. Committed to the war from start to finish, RAR accounted for 400 guerrillas between 1966 and 1975 alone. Three battalions saw service, and, in conjunction with the Independent RAR Companies, were deployed all over Rhodesia. It was traditionally a white-officered unit, but black officers began to serve in 1979. Rhodesia Regiment and RAR integrated training began at Depot RR in late 1977.

RAR established its first training depot in Salisbury in 1941, and shipped out to Burma in 1944, to serve with the King's African Rifles in 22 (East African) Independent Brigade; the unit first saw action in April 1945, and earned the battle honours 'Taungup'; 'Arakan Beaches' and 'Burma'. The regiment returned to Rhodesia in 1946, and was effectively disbanded. However, a nucleus was retained, and by 1949 A, B, and C Coys., were again operational as demo companies; in 1951 B Coy. became support company. The regiment served in the Suez Canal Zone; and in 1953 the Queen's Colour and Regimental Colour were presented by the Queen Mother. Between 1956 and January 1958 RAR were committed to Malaya, where they were known as RhAR to distinguish them from the Royal Australian Regiment.

After Malaya came deployment in Nyasaland (1959), N. Rhodesia and the Congo Border; and finally, within Rhodesia in 1966. The first contact was in the Zambezi Valley in September, resulting in one guerrilla killed; it was the first of many. (The star of one encounter was a private who, in mid-

contact, found time to yell 'I am the OC's driver, and if you fire that bazooka at me, I'll call the helicopters and you will surely die!')

Recruitment was never a problem, and A Coy., 2 Bn. was raised on Fort Victoria in January 1975, with NCOs drawn from 1RAR. It deployed to the border for six weeks from early December 1975. B Coy. deployed early in 1976 to 'Thrasher', and C Coy. was formed from the disbanding of E Coy. 1RAR that April. Training, initially six months, was later reduced to three, and was followed by operational attachment with 1RLI or 1RAR. Depot RAR (Balla Balla) was formed in January 1976 to serve as the regiment's home and main training establishment.

Para-training was introduced in 1978, and RAR were actively involved in 'fireforce' operations, gaining a reputation for jumping from minimum heights. For obvious reasons, the regiment was not deployed outside Rhodesia, but notched up a considerable tally on internal operations—one of which featured the following exchange:

'Alpha 2, this is Alpha 1—Stop shooting! That

movement in front of you is only a flock of goats.'

'Alpha 1, this is Alpha 2—Reference that goat I just killed, it was wearing chest webbing and carrying an RPK'.

As in most units, the standard weapon was the NATO 7.62 FN (or the identical South African R1). The MAG LMG was carried as a section weapon, though in a higher ratio than in Europe, and heavier support was provided by 81mm mortars. The West German G3 rifle was seen in increasing numbers towards the end of the war; and regular issue was often supplemented by local products, liberated weapons, and a variety of personal sidearms.

The Rhodesia Regiment

The first unit to bear the title 'Rhodesia Regiment' was raised in 1899 and took part in the relief of

Heavy mortar crew of Support Coy., 2nd Rhodesian African Rifles deploy in the Shamva area in response to increased attacks on local farms. Note the latitude allowed in combat uniform: 'cammie' shirts and jackets, olive green T-shirt, long trousers worn loose at the ankle, or shorts. The combat caps bear the regimental badge woven in white on a halved green-over-black rectangular patch.




Mafeking. In 1914 the 1st and 2nd Rhodesian Regiments were formed from the SRV and volunteers, the original RR having been disbanded in 1900. 1RR saw service in German South-West Africa before being dispersed throughout the British Army, while 2RR was disbanded in 1917 after taking heavy casualties in German East Africa. In 1926, 1st and 2nd Bns. RR were formed in Salisbury and Bulawayo respectively. In 1929 the Colours and battle honours ('Great War 1914-18', 'South West Africa 1914-15', 'Kilimanjaro, Beho Beho and East Africa 1915-17') of 1RR and 2RR were transferred to the new regiment.

Some 4,000 members of RR saw service in the Second World War in all theatres, and the prefix 'Royal' was granted to the regiment in 1947, being dropped only in 1970. In 1955, national service was introduced, the training depot being established at Llewellyn; 1RR and 2RR saw service in the Nyasaland emergency. Between 1956 and 1964 eight more battalions were formed, but the 3rd and 7th were disbanded in 1963 on the break-up of the Federation.

Throughout the war, Depot RR was the clearing house for white 'national service' conscripts, providing basic training before recruits were posted to their particular units. By the mid-1970s, however, national servicemen were being posted

Recruits undergoing basic training, 1976; they wear one-piece khaki overalls and camouflage caps. The officer on the right (note 1 Bde. shoulder patch and corps-coloured lanyard and hose-top flash) wears the uniform later replaced by 'sands'—cf. Plate D1.



There were lighter moments: men of RAR at Grand Reef brace up for an inspection by Miss South Africa 1977, Lynn Massyn, who seems to have acquired an RLI stable belt. Note 'miniature' rank chevron on shortened shirt sleeve of the soldier talking to her. RAR berets were Rifle green.

into Independent Companies, which operated in set areas; although never operating together, a number of these companies would officially form a battalion of the RR, these nominal battalions acting as holding units. Command in the Independent Companies was held by regulars, NCO posts by national servicemen.

In 1977, to ease demands on Territorial members¹, and to increase the regular component, the Independent Companies became 'Independent RAR Companies', their ranks swelled by newly-trained African RAR recruits, and the NS element was redeployed to the Territorial battalions; black soldiers, still badged RAR, also began to be posted into the Territorial battalions.

1RR set up a motorcycle troop in 1977, which operated independently in groups seven or eight strong, and could provide mortar and MG fire support, or act as a mobile stop group. The unit soon proved vulnerable on routine patrols, and concentrated instead on quick reaction or reinforcement, and recce missions, often in support of armour. On follow-up operations, the troop would work with both dogs and human trackers.

¹The distinction here is between 'national servicemen', white conscripts undergoing their long initial period of training and service; and 'Territorials'—civilians who had completed national service but remained liable for recall temporarily, for terms of service which varied widely as the war went on, but which became onerous enough to effect local industry and commerce through the repeated absence of key staff.

The Rhodesian Light Infantry

The 1st Bn., The Rhodesian Light Infantry was officially established in February 1961, as the regular European infantry battalion in the order of battle of the Army of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The battalion was initially established in Bulawayo, its personnel drawn from No. 1 Training Unit which also provided the manpower for C Sqn. SAS and the Selous Scouts reconnaissance squadron. The battalion moved to its permanent base at Cranborne Barracks, Salisbury in 1961 on its return from operations on the Rhodesia-Congo border.

In 1964 the battalion's rôle was changed from conventional infantry to commando. On completion of training, recruits were assigned to Troops (platoons) within Commandos (companies) with the rank of trooper rather than private. Support Cdo.—previously Support Group—functioned in many ways as a 'normal' commando but specialised in mortars, reconnaissance and tracking; all its personnel were qualified mortarmen. Operational commitment was heavy, a typical tour of duty being five weeks, followed by two weeks R&R; in the early days of the war, 30 days in and 20 days out was the norm.

A highly decorated unit, RLI was very much led from the front by company commanders, usually in their early thirties. *Esprit de corps* was always high, and the unit caught the imagination of the public—sufficiently to earn two nicknames: 'the Incredible', and the 'Saints', from their regimental march. The battalion's mascot—a cheetah—made relatively few public appearances.

RLI 'troopies' formed the backbone of the fireforce effort¹, and saw deployment throughout the country; fireforces operated in all operational areas, ideally with a minimum of three four-man heliborne sticks and 16 paras. On one memorable occasion, 1 Cdo. fireforce paras made three jumps into contacts on the same day. In addition, RLI played a major rôle in external operations—invariably outnumbered, and invariably successful.

¹A scheme under which companies of the RLI and RAR served rota tours as quick-reaction units, with their own helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft, and ready to intervene anywhere. The scheme began in 1973 as a strategic grouping of troops and helicopters, and became more flexible and aggressive as the war progressed.



Fireforce personnel: ammunition was always hand-checked before combat. The African soldier wears a paint-camouflaged 'bone dome' as a parachute helmet, and standard two-piece camouflage uniform. The white soldier wears the one-piece lightweight camouflage flying overall/jump suit. Originally worn by helicopter crews, it proved comfortable and practical, and was soon seen in use by all kinds of troops, including combat infantry. The four-pocket camouflage jacket of the standard combat uniform came with an uncomfortably stiff oversewn reinforce on the elbows, which troops usually removed.

The importance of the rôle played by the RLI can perhaps best be seen from figures: the four Commandos—1, 2, 3 and Support—had over 1,700 attributed kills in 1979 alone, Support Commando accounting for 470.

1 RLI was one of only two units (the other was the SAS) not to be racially integrated. The unit acquired an enviable reputation and attracted veterans of other armies, mainly British, American and Australian, in addition to Rhodesian career soldiers.



The New Sarum para school put many hundreds of troops through airborne training, and recorded some 45,000 jumps in all. The soldier in the left foreground of the photo of this particular training stick, so noticeably older and more war-worn than his young comrades, was a veteran of the French Foreign Legion.

The Special Air Service

Founded as C Sqn., Malayan Scouts (SAS) in 1950, the SAS was recruited from volunteers solicited by Brig. Michael Calvert, then the driving force behind British irregular operations in Malaya. The unit's first commander was Maj. Peter Walls. The unit was re-organised on its return from Malaya and in 1961, based in Ndola in Northern Rhodesia, it mustered some 200 officers and men in six combat troops. As part of the forces of the Federation it was deployed on the Congo border during the troubles.

The SAS provided Rhodesia's first airborne troops, beginning training in 1961 at New Sarum Para Training School, which was eventually to process more than 45,000 jumps. The first operational deployment was into the eastern districts in 1962 against arsonists; and in that year the unit trained in Aden with Britain's 22 SAS Regiment.

The collapse of Federation in 1963 meant manpower cuts, and the Squadron, now in Salisbury, was reduced to approximately 25 officers and men. But as guerrilla incursions increased the unit expanded again, recruiting men familiar with the bush. The early rôle emphasised reconnaissance, but the absence of effective back-up to capitalise on discovery was frustrating.

From 1970 the unit mounted joint operations with the Portuguese in Mozambique, and cross-border raids into Mozambique and Zambia to secure prisoners, arms and information—and to inflict casualties. From the very beginning the SAS was heavily committed to external operations, but

always tried to maintain a low and professional profile, adopting a less flamboyant style than, for example, the Selous Scouts.


Until 1977, the squadron was administered by the HQ of the brigade in whose area they were based¹, but for operational purposes by the Army Commander in Salisbury. Despite close liaison with Special Branch and CID, it was at best a clumsy arrangement. After the establishment of COMOPS, support and intelligence were found easier to come by.

By 1978 unit strength was again up to approximately 250, and 1 SAS Regiment (Rhodesia) was created in June. Troops became Squadrons, Sections became Troops. From experience, it was found that four-man teams worked ideally, although two- and eight-man teams were not uncommon. SAS recruits underwent rigorous and extensive training, and selection standards were exacting, including the usual ration of 'sickeners'. In addition to a high degree of competence in infantry skills, recruits were expected to master diving, small boat handling and free-fall jumping. Operational experience was a prerequisite of 'badging'; outstanding soldiers were allowed to wear SAS wings on the chest, rather than on the right arm, as a mark of excellence. Recruits came from two sources; volunteers gleaned (or poached) from other units and, after 1973, youngsters from the national service intake. Standards were not lowered, and it was proved that training could follow selection rather than the reverse. Despite misgivings, the SAS remained an élite unit—with an average age of under 21 years.

The Selous Scouts

The idea behind the Selous Scouts was conceived in 1973, as it became increasingly apparent that conventional methods could not control in-

¹Rhodesia's geography and historical tradition dictated that the brigades were headquartered in the larger towns—Salisbury, Bulawayo and Umtali. As the war progressed, while supply, training etc. remained the responsibility of the brigade rear element, an increasing degree of control 'moved forward' and down the deliberately short chains of command to the brigade's units, committed to the field. The chain led from COMOPS to brigade to unit; but at an operational level a considerable degree of autonomy was enjoyed by the JOCs (Joint Operations Centres)—local headquarters where Army, Airforce, Police and Special Branch would all be represented, co-ordinating local operations.



filtration. The need for 'pseudo-ters'¹ was perceived by, among others, Brig. Hickman, later Army Commander. SB, SAS and RAR teams carried out inconclusive experiments before Gen. Walls tasked Ron Reid-Daly, who had served under him as RSM in the Rhodesian Light Infantry, with forming the Scouts.

The unit was given high priority and barracks were rapidly established at Inkomo; as the Scouts were ostensibly a tracking unit, the Army tracking school at Kariba was also taken over. The real brief was simple: to eliminate ZANLA and ZIPRA inside and outside Rhodesia by 'clandestine' means.

A company-strength unit was envisaged (about 120 men), divided into troops each of three eight-man 'tracker combat teams' or sections. Each section would have a European colour sergeant as section commander, and each troop a lieutenant and a WOII. Even when the unit grew beyond all expectations the same loose structure was retained, though the ranks differed.

Working closely with Special Branch, and briefed to track, infiltrate, recce and guide-in conventional attacks, the Scouts soon achieved results, and the unit expanded to include 'turned ters', who were paid out of SB funds. By the end of 1974 the Scouts had 221 kills and captures to their credit (very few ters 'turned' a second time). Their usefulness proven, the next step was to expand the unit further and commit it to external operations. Para training, hitherto an SAS preserve, was given, and attacks against ZANLA in Mozambique were sanctioned.

A fireforce emplanes. The aged but marvellously reliable DC-3 provided the lift for all Rhodesian paratroop operations; after the shooting down of the civilian Viscount the camouflage scheme was changed to non-reflective grey. Troops often jumped from extremely low altitude, sometimes right into the middle of a major 'contact'. On several occasions combined ground and airborne assaults on major PF camps across the border achieved remarkable results, with almost incredible disparities between Rhodesian and enemy casualties.

In 1976 a Scouts column hit Nyadzonya camp in Mozambique, and accounted for at least 300 guerrillas. This was the first of many such attacks; Scouts columns, equipped with everything from jeeps to vehicle-mounted AA guns, made many forays across the borders. Column strength never exceeded 72 men, and the results achieved were out of all proportion. In 1976 alone the Scouts notched up 1,257 kills, only 180 of them internal.

Recruitment was never a problem, despite selection tests rigorous even by SAS standards; in fact, several units complained of poaching. By definition, the unit was fully integrated, and probably 80 per cent black; at one time there were more than 1,000 'tame ters' on the books. The Selous Scouts were undoubtedly an élite unit—and they showed what could be achieved in COIN warfare by a unit unhampered by restraints and led with imagination. The figures speak for themselves; though it was not in the Scouts' brief to initiate contacts, for fear of compromise, they are credited with involvement in nearly 70 per cent of all internal kills.

The Scouts stayed operational until early 1980, when they were quietly disbanded. Despite near-suicidal tactics on some occasions, the unit had taken less than 40 casualties.

¹Ters = 'terrorists', in Rhodesian parlance.

Grey's Scouts

The Mounted Infantry Unit, conceived and formed in July 1975, grew out of an experiment with pack animals in the Eastern Highlands. MIU was never more than a 'working title', and the unit officially became Grey's Scouts in 1976. (The original Grey's Scouts were a volunteer unit raised during the Matabele rebellion.)

Based outside Salisbury, at Inkomo, Grey's Scouts snowballed from an idea to a 1,000-man unit in a relatively short time. Surprisingly, in view of the unit's size, the commanding officer was only a major. Establishment allowed for one support and three combat squadrons, with three troops per squadron and four eight-man units per troop. The support squadron included a mortar section (60mm and 82mm), recce and dog elements (one of several units to experiment with dogs, the Scouts used foxhounds in a tracker rôle).


'The Greys' were mounted infantry rather than cavalry, using horses only for the mobility they afforded; the unit was used extensively in patrolling, recce and follow-up rôles. An average day's patrolling would cover around 40km, the riders


alternating between a 7km walk and a 12km trot, occasionally using an 18km canter. Mounted on smallish, mature crossbreeds rather than thoroughbreds, patrols could 'self-supply' for up to ten days, supplementing available fodder with concentrated 'horse cubes'. Advantage was taken of the unit's unique ability to move easily across terrain impassable to vehicles, as when Greys assisted the Engineers in the construction of border defences, their horses—or mules—being used as pack animals.

Troops were drawn from both Regular and TF sources, the idea being to train soldiers to be riders rather than vice versa. Height and weight were the only limiting factors; while the horses could and often did carry loads in excess of 150kg, riders had to weigh 80kg or less. Horses were 'untaught' before being retrained as 'gun-proof' cavalry mounts, then transported to deployment areas in specially adapted trailers.

The unit was largely self-sufficient, down to its own smithy, farrier and equipment manufacture. Many of the horses were donated by South African sympathisers, and horse and rider generally stayed together through training (four and a half months) and beyond. In action, even the horses were camouflaged—after numerous experiments with

Grey's Scouts on parade—they were seldom seen in this 'non-tactical' guise. The horse furniture was generally of local manufacture.





dyes and paints, which produced some odd results. Despite their high profile and sheer bulk, very few horses entered the casualty lists.

The Armoured Car Regiment

The Rhodesian Reconnaissance Regiment was formed in 1941, then posted to East Africa and re-formed as the Southern Rhodesia Armoured Car Regiment. Disbanded in 1942, it was re-established in the late 1940s with the same name, equipped with Staghound armoured cars. Again disbanded in the mid-1950s, the unit was re-formed on Federation as A Sqn., the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regt. (Selous Scouts). Disbanded on break-up, it was resurrected for a last time in July 1972.

Based at King George VI Barracks, Salisbury from 1973, the Armoured Car Regt. and its depot were formed essentially as a TF unit. The first intake completed a year's training in March 1974—infantry skills followed by 26 weeks of 'special to arm' instruction. The regiment was equipped primarily with Eland 90 and Ferret armoured cars, but the Ferrets had updated turrets and heavier weaponry. The RhACR also boasted a huge collection of 'funnies'—home-made vehicles tailor-made to suit particular rôles. Common features were mine protection, and the incorporation of 'acquired' armaments.

The regiment fielded four operational squadrons, with an approximate strength of 300–500. Each brigade nominally had a squadron attached—'A' Sqn. was based at Brady from late 1975. Troop leaders were responsible for four crews and cars, and regimental training was given in both conventional and COIN rôles. The regiment played a key part in over-the-border operations. Other main duties, in



Working in close contact with the Engineers, Grey's Scouts provided an ideal 'labour force' for inaccessible terrain; here, they help strengthen Mozambique border defences, and their harness has been modified for packing in barbed wire. Note camouflaged T-shirt.

the COIN rôle, included convoy escort, guarding vulnerable points, direct fire support, road blocks, cordons, and simply 'showing the flag'. 'Classical' tactics were not neglected, especially as there was a real threat from enemy armour across the borders, and regular exercises practised the traditional light armour skills.

1 Field Regt., Rhodesian Artillery

The corps' origin can be traced to the artillery troop that accompanied the Pioneer Column, and the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers organised artillery sections in Bulawayo and Salisbury; during the Second World War a Light Battery, essentially a training unit, was set up in Salisbury and provided personnel for service on all fronts. While the unit was disbanded during Federation, a nucleus remained in a voluntary Governor-General's saluting troop. The unit was re-formed just before the dissolution of Federation, and the depot was established at Cranborne, Salisbury, in 1963. In October 1976 the Corps of Artillery came into being, and authority was given to raise a regular troop as the nucleus of a regular battery.

1 Field Regt. Rhodesian Artillery proved flexible enough to adapt to the COIN rôle demanded of it. The guns were deployed, by mine-protected gun tractors, at strategic points—Kariba Dam and Victoria Falls, for example—and were used to neutralise pre-selected targets. Artillery duels, however, were uncommon, mainly because of the Rhodesians' accuracy and effectiveness.

Equipped with Mk III 25-pounders, with a maximum range (on supercharge) of over 13,000 yards, and a number of 105mm and 155mm howitzers, the RhA could provide formidable fire support. Despite the transportation problems posed by terrain (the 25-pdr. weighs in at 4,000lb) and logistics, the corps acquired an enviable reputation for manoeuvrability and resupply, and provided direct support on external and internal operations.

The regiment was largely a TF unit, and Depot Artillery trained national servicemen after first-phase training at Llewellyn. Infantry skills were taught as well as gunnery, and 1FR also operated as an infantry unit.

Maj. Bill Ellis of the Armoured Car Regt., a veteran of the Royal Air Force in the Second World War. The regimental stable belt has a silvered buckle plate bearing the cap badge motif: cf. Plate D3.



The Corps of Engineers

The Corps had a forerunner in a voluntary unit known as Military Engineers, raised within 2RR, and in 1939 a training depot was established. In 1949 the Southern Rhodesia Engineers, a Territorial unit, was formed, and by 1952 the unit could muster three field Squadrons and a field park troop—400 all ranks. In 1956 all Territorial specialist units were placed in suspended animation; but a year later the decision was revised, and personnel from the newly created Corps of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Engineers were attached to barracks throughout Federation.

In 1961, 2 Field Sqn. was formed to meet a need for combat engineers; and at the end of Federation the Corps (now SR Corps of Engineers) was reorganised into two engineer squadrons. The unit was finally renamed in 1965 as the Rhodesian Corps of Engineers, and by 1974 could boast a directorate at AHQ, a School of Military Engineering, a National Service Field Troop, three Engineer Squadrons (later expanded to six), and a complement of 30 officers and 675 ORs.

In addition to standard RE duties, the Corps controlled all boat operations; 5 Engr. Spt. Unit controlled Army and Police activity on Kariba until the formation of Boat Squadron in 1979; vessels ranged from two-man boats to an armoured ferry mounting 12.7mm AA guns.

The favourite guerrilla weapon was the landmine; Rhodesia's roads were particularly vulnerable, even the tarred surfaces having no hard shoulder, and at one stage two vehicles a day were being lost to mine blasts. To aid detection the engineers came up with the 'Pookie', a vehicle based on a VW chassis which could detect landmines at speed without triggering the mines themselves.

A dog troop was introduced in 1975 for mine detection. Labradors were usually used, working in pairs, and showed an unusual ability to detect hidden objects—although they did require retraining after four- to six-week stints in the bush.

The Engineers' biggest achievement remains the establishment of Corsan—the 'Cordon Sanitaire' devised to inhibit movement across the border. Corsan did account for almost 1,000 enemy fatalities and uncounted casualties; but it proved a hindrance to movement by friendly forces as well, especially when secondary seedings and replace-

ment devices were added to the general design. The 800km minefield (mainly anti-personnel) has yet to be cleared, and probably never will be.

Reinforcement Holding Unit

The year 1973 marked the first call-up of the 38–50 age group and the beginning of RHU, created to take on to a paper strength Coloured and Asian personnel who had completed their liability for TF service with the supply and transport platoons, and older whites who had finished their service with RR. Some of the latter were posted to the Zambezi Valley to release younger men for 'more exacting work'. Commitment consisted of two brief, non-combatant call-ups per year.

Initially, 1 and 2RHU were completely European, 3RHU completely Coloured. Integration rapidly followed, however; 2RHU was disbanded, and multiracial units based on Salisbury and Bulawayo resulted. RHU was tasked with the training of all Coloured personnel (at Inkomo Garrison), and as such was one of the largest units in the Security Forces. Personnel were posted to the operational area, but generally to static guard positions. In late 1974 this duty became the

responsibility of the Protection Companies, primarily formed to fill a more mobile rôle; manpower was drawn from Coloured, Asian and Eurasian national servicemen, and a small number of continuously embodied volunteers (effectively, regulars). These units were mainly officered by TF members, but some regular white officers also served.

Both units expanded rapidly as more and more men finished their initial TF commitments, and merged in January 1978, with a total strength approaching 6,000, to become the Rhodesian Defence Regiment (RDR). The two battalions (No.1 Mashonaland Bn. and No. 2 Matabeleland Bn.) could field seven active companies, and provided their own support elements. At the same time, the unit's rôle was formally extended to railway patrolling, convoy protection and a 'normal' infantry rôle.

The unit's stable belt (red for infantry, black and white for race) was unique—all other reserve

Ubique, a ferry boat renamed, refitted and re-armed for service on Lake Kariba. She bore a motley collection of weapons, many of them captured, like the pair of 12.7mm Russian heavy AA machine guns on the forward superstructure.





Land mines were a favourite guerrilla weapon, and Rhodesia's roads were highly vulnerable: many had no tarmac surface, and even the metalled stretches had soft shoulders. Note the roll-over bars fitted to the cab of the Police Land-Rover; and the Hippo, one of a number of special mine-protected vehicles devised and produced locally during the war.

elements wore Rhodesia Regiment colours. The Protection Companies' stable belt had been a plain dark green.

The Rhodesian Air Force

The Rhodesian Air Force came into being—officially—in November 1947, but could trace its origins to 1934, when an Air Unit was established on a Territorial basis as part of the Rhodesia Regiment. In 1936 it became possible for airmen to join the Southern Rhodesian Defence Force (Permanent Staff Corps) as regulars, and by 1937 a military airfield was taking shape at Cranborne, Salisbury.

TF personnel were called up for full time service in August 1939, and one month later the Air Unit officially became the Southern Rhodesia Air Force. The following year, SRAF personnel were taken under the RAF umbrella; Rhodesia remained a primary training area, however—Thornhill, opened in 1941, trained almost 2,000 pilots during the war years. In all, Rhodesian aircrew saw service in three squadrons in the Second World War: No. 237 in Abyssinia, North Africa and Europe; No. 266 in the Battle of Britain and Europe; and No. 44,

within Bomber Command, in Europe. Of slightly more than 2,300 Rhodesians who served, one in five died and one in ten was decorated.

Nos. 237 and 266 Sqns. were disbanded at the end of the war, and No. 44 Sqn. remained as an element of the RAF's Strike Command, still bearing on its badge the Rhodesian elephant; but pressure from ex-servicemen led directly to the establishment of the Air Force as a permanent unit in November 1947. Expansion was rapid; the Air Force moved to its permanent base at New Sarum in 1952, and was renamed the Rhodesian Air Force on Federation. Shortly thereafter the prefix 'Royal' was added, and the RRAF took on an identity of its own, shedding Army ranks and khaki uniform and adopting ones similar to those borne by the RAF. The RRAF was responsible for the defence of the Federation, and acquired a variety of aircraft for the purpose, including Canberras in 1959; in addition, fighter squadrons regularly served with the RAF in the Middle East. In 1962 a squadron of Alouette helicopters came on strength, and was joined by a squadron of Hawker Hunter jet fighters the following year.

On the breakup of Federation control of the RRAF reverted to Southern Rhodesia, and a pattern of close liaison with Police and Army was set up in anticipation of COIN operations. UDI brought sanctions which hit the RRAF harder than the other services. However, improvisation and

1: Deputy Commissioner, British South Africa Police, 1975

2: Constable, Support Unit, BSAP, 1965

3: Constable, South African Police, 1975



1: Lance-Corporal, Rhodesian African Rifles, 1968
2: Lieutenant-General; No. 1 Blues, 1979
3: Sergeant, Rhodesian Light Infantry; Dress Greens, 1965



- 1: Private, Royal Rhodesia Regt., 1968
2: Private, Rhodesian African Rifles, 1979
3: Trooper, Selous Scouts, 1977





1: Captain, Rhodesian Medical Corps, 1974
2: Corporal, Grey's Scouts, 1977
3: Trooper, Armoured Car Regt., 1977

- 1: Air Marshal, Rhodesian Air Force, 1975
2: Private, Rhodesian Women's Service, 1977
3: District Security Assistant, Internal Affairs, 1976





1: Lieutenant, Special Air Service, 1976
 2: Soldier, Mozambique FPLM, 1978
 3: Private, Zambia Regiment, 1976



1: ZANLA guerrilla
2: Joshua N'Komo as ZIPRA C-in-C, 1979
3: ZIPRA 'regular', 1978

- 1: Security Force Auxiliary, 1979
2: Sgt., Royal Anglian Regt., Commonwealth
Monitoring Force, 1980
3: Private, Zimbabwe Army, 1981



local manufacture gradually took the place of imported skills and equipment; the RAF was to maintain an 85 per cent serviceability record, notably higher than that of many European air forces, and achieved it with an incredibly low man-to-aircraft ratio of 1:25.

In 1970 the 'Royal' prefix was dropped, roundels were changed, and the Rhodesian lion theme was incorporated in badges of rank. The Air Force was completely multiracial, though slower than the Army to accept women; the first woman officer, an air sub-lieutenant, was commissioned in December 1979.

The nature of operations undertaken by Security Forces meant that a variety of aircraft, either helicopter or fixed-wing, could take part in any given operation; firepower, for example, would utilise helicopters, Lynxes and Dakotas, while

A 25-pdr. of 1st Field Regt., Rhodesian Artillery deployed in the neighbourhood of Villa Salazaar, scene of frequent border clashes between the Security Forces and FRELIMO.

Hunters might provide direct fire support. However, the RAF's command organised squadrons more systematically:

No. 1 Sqn. Based at Thornhill, Gwelo and equipped with elderly but potent Hunter FGA.9s, used with deadly effect for close ground support and against static targets.

No. 2 Sqn. Also based at Thornhill, equipped with even more elderly Vampire fighter bombers, vintage 1956. Called upon, on occasion, for operations; more often used as the training cadre for No. 1 Sqn. The unit also provided advanced weapon training and flying instruction.

No. 3 Sqn. The transport squadron, equipped with DC-3s—one, at least, had seen service in the Second World War. The Dakotas were the chief means of resupply, but also carried personnel or served as a vehicle for 'psyac' operations. They also provided the lift for all parachute operations. One 'VIP' Dakota was equipped as a flying command centre





The Rhodesian Defence Regiment—created in January 1978 by the amalgamation of the two Reinforcement Holding Units—was a two-battalion racially integrated unit which guarded potential guerrilla targets from prepared positions. This patrol is operating at Ruya high level bridge.

and served as an aerial command post on external operations.

No. 4 Sqn. Equipped with 'Lynxes'—the local euphemism for light aircraft of many shapes and sizes, including Cessna 337s—this unit provided the Security Forces' 'eyes', being used extensively in the reconnaissance rôle; in addition, their short landing capability made the aircraft ideal for casualty evacuation. Armament, if carried, ran to a 7.62mm MAG and small calibre rockets.

No. 5 Sqn. Equipped with Canberra B.2s and T.4s, this bomber squadron was used extensively on cross-border operations in conjunction with Nos. 1 and 2 Sqns.; maximum bomb load was 10,000lb (and the bombs were often 'home-made'). In addition, Canberras served in a reconnaissance rôle.

No. 6 Sqn. Equipped with Percival Provosts, this was the basic training squadron; successful personnel proceeded to No. 2 Sqn. for jet conversion and

advanced training, and thence to operational conversion.

No. 7 Sqn. Based at New Sarum and equipped with 40 or so ageing but serviceable Alouette IIIs and, after 1978, with 12 larger, longer-ranged Bell 205s which were frequently used on 'externals'. The Alouettes were the backbone of Fire Force, being used for troop deployment, fire support and command. The command chopper ('K car') generally carried 20mm cannon or quadruple MAGs, the accompanying 'G cars', twin MAGs or 50mm Brownings. Heavier armament was precluded by its effects on the airframe. In the early years of the war, 40 helicopters were 'on loan' to Rhodesia from South Africa; 26 of the machines, and 40 pilots, were recalled in 1976.

While the RAF could and did operate independently, it was most commonly used in close support of ground forces, either on 'externals' or in the fireforce rôle, a concept which provided an unusual example of Air Force/Army co-operation—there were few instances of the inter-service rivalry that usually bedevils combined operations. Fireforce was essentially a self-



contained operation which could transfer its base within 24 hours. Responsibility for such a move fell on to a Camp Commandant, usually a Volunteer Reserve Officer trained specifically for the task. The camp, generally under canvas, would be protected by earth ramparts.

Instant access to any and all refuelling sites allowed for extended operating times; simultaneous refuelling could be accomplished at any site provided with bladders—heavy duty rubber fuel containers delivered empty and filled by bowser. Lubrication was a perennial problem in Rhodesia's climate, and was the responsibility of the technicians. In fact technicians, usually young but always highly trained, carried a great deal of responsibility, from being able to install a replacement chopper engine in two hours, to operating the craft's armament in contacts. If a 'tech' couldn't remedy a problem, he could usually diagnose it accurately. Technicians served a five-year apprenticeship before qualifying; pilots, for their part, were expected to have a general familiarity with the mechanics of all aircraft and detailed knowledge of the peculiarities of their own.

A mixed crew of the Police Reserve, with the type of vehicle used to head up civilian convoys; a wide variety of civilian pick-up trucks were modified, in this case by the addition of rear seats and a .30-cal. Browning mounting. The 'flooded road' ahead of them is in fact a low level bridge over the Gwaii River.

Crews spent up to eight months a year on operational duty, flying an average two missions a day. In the monotonous African landscape, accurate map reading was an essential skill.

British South Africa Police

The BSAP dated back to 1889, when the BSA Company Police were raised, as mounted infantry, to escort the Pioneer Column to Salisbury, and then to introduce a system of law and maintain it. Initially 500 strong, the unit was reduced in 1891 and a new force, the Mashonaland Mounted Police, came into being. In the years following the Matabele and Mashona rebellions the force adapted to an increasingly civil rôle. In 1896 the name changed to BSAP, and African recruitment began in 1903; all local police forces amalgamated in 1909. Members served in the East African campaign of the First World War, seconded to the



The Police Support Unit had a reputation for extreme fitness and fast cross-country movement in rough terrain. Training included firing the FN-MAG from the shoulder—not the easiest of skills to master.

Rhodesian Native Regt. and the Southern Rhodesia Service Column. Some expansion and reorganisation took place between the wars, and in anticipation of the Second World War the Police Reserve was established in 1939. For many years the force doubled as an unarmed civil police force and a trained standing army; military responsibilities were only relinquished in 1954, on Federation.

1954 saw a general review of the Police Reserve, and the C Reserve was set up; while this was very much a 'paper' unit, members had to be available for call-out in an emergency. Uniform was strictly utility—blue battledress-type riot kit or, rarely, camouflage. All recruits joined as Field Reservists.

In contrast, the A Reserve continued voluntary monthly training and assisted Regular Police in

times of pressure, wearing Regular Police uniform. 1957 saw the opening of an Air Wing (PRAW), manned by reservists owning aircraft which were hired out to the Police. Members were generally pilots or well-qualified navigators, and wore their own distinctive uniform. Primarily used for recce, radio relay, observation and courier duties, the PRAW later extended its rôle to include spotting, casevac and personnel lift.

In 1960 the African Police Reserve was set up to counter civil disturbance, and the unit's limited duties included patrolling and guarding installations. Blue riot dress was worn, as in the case of the C Reserve. A Women's Field Reserve was set up in the same year, operating radios and control rooms to release men for other duties.

1960 also saw the creation of the Special Reserve, designed to relieve police from static duties such as residential area and key point protection. Un-uniformed, unpaid, and largely untrained, it accommodated older men unable to join the other

reserve forces. In 1974 it was re-organised into a properly constituted and uniformed volunteer force.

Late in 1966, as the Police were reluctant to hand over responsibility to the Army, Police Anti-Terrorist Units were formed to combat increased guerrilla activity in the border zones. A normal 'stick' consisted of four Europeans and one African, all volunteers, both Reserve and Regular, self-supplied for up to a week or more. Primarily a recce unit, they generally operated on foot, although they did have their own transport and prided themselves on speed of deployment. Standard Army uniform was worn with the PATU emblem—leopard's pugmark—worn as a shoulder flash. Usually in their thirties, personnel generally came from the same area and were called up together for two-week stints four to six times per year. Prior to the South African pull-out, SA PATU units also operated in Rhodesia. Intelligence was provided by SB and CID personnel attached to the JOCs.


In 1971 a Women's A Reserve was established, drawn largely from volunteers from the Women's

Field Reserve, to perform the same duties as their male counterparts. Women police were completely mixed in race; three months' training formed the first part of a two-year initial stint, and training was identical to that given to the men except for active combat skills. The highest ranking woman officer was an inspector.

European training was the responsibility of Morris Depot, Salisbury, set up in 1903; African training was the responsibility of Tomlinson Depot. (Perhaps inevitably, serving Africans in the early days were generally referred to as the 'Black Watch'.) Africans became eligible for the rank of patrol officer in 1976, and racially integrated training began at Morris Depot in 1979.

In July 1973 the BSAP was offered for the first time as a choice for national servicemen, who would receive three months' training and a nine-month posting followed by commitment to the Police Reserve. Referred to as patrol officers, they wore a uniform identical to that of regulars, but with an

Men of the 'Blackboots'—the Police Support Unit—sweep through a kraal.





Security Force Auxiliaries, the 'returned' fighters who were ostensibly incorporated into the Security Forces after the 'internal settlement'. The peaked cap worn by the man immediately left of the white officer was the mark of a 'coordinator'—in effect, an SFA officer. These auxiliaries are armed with G3 rifles, and display the spear badge of the SFA on their headgear: see Plate H1 caption.

'NS' shoulder flash. Green shirts were introduced for members serving in the districts. Police Reservists were committed to between 42 and 190 days' service per year. Call-up was extended to Africans in the latter days of the war, but few actually served. As the war escalated, recruits were steered directly into the Support Unit, while from 1979 on the bulk of national servicemen went into the Army.

By 1975 the Special Reserve was increasingly relied upon by the Regular Police. Now blue-uniformed, helmeted and equipped with baton and cuffs, they were used for anti-bomb patrols, roadblocks, and communications duties within stations. Some firearms training was given, and men between 18 and 65 were accepted. This force was supplemented by Key Point Specials, non-

uniformed and drawn from employees at guarded locations. The Special Reserve was open to Coloureds but not to Africans, as the African Field Reserve filled the same rôle in the townships.

The most overtly military unit fielded was the Support Unit, which could trace its origin to the Askari troop which had existed only for ceremonial duties. (The wheel turned full circle when Support Unit began to supply the ceremonial guards for Government House.) Created in the early 1960s as a 'fireforce' to assist Districts under pressure from riots and civil disturbance, it was first deployed in Bulawayo, and was christened 'Blackboots' by locals who were used to the ubiquitous brown Police boot. Support Unit operated in all areas, troop members being black and white in the ratio one to eight. Blacks were recruited at 18-plus, trained, and posted to Support Unit; whites were volunteers, from either the regulars or national service intake. National Servicemen served two years with Support Unit to ensure continuity, and six-week call-ups with 'normal' units thereafter. The unit was based at Tomlinson depot before moving to a

custom-built Salisbury HQ in 1979. Thorough training was given in battle camp, with the emphasis on aggression, featuring a live ammo 'battle inoculation', which led to some casualties. The 12kg MAG was carried without a sling, and fired from the shoulder.

The unit earned a reputation for tracking ability and stamina—running 30km a day was not uncommon; one case is recorded of a member running 40km in one day to take part in five contacts. The unit's own transport section included Hyenas, Kudus and Rhinos, and the unit was backed by a special Police Reserve section working as drivers and radio ops to free men for the field.

The towns were not forgotten; a Police Urban Emergency Unit was set up around 1975 to counter urban terrorism. Based in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Gwelo and Umtali, it was closely modelled on SWAT. Close-quarter and specialist weaponry was carried in addition to sniper weapons, Uzi SMGs and automatic shotguns. Dress included parach helmets and combat caps without flaps.

Like the Army, the Police saw the potential of a mounted unit and formed the Mounted Police (Equus) in 1977. Based at Plumtree under Insp. Peter Coombes, its main concern was the Botswana border. Trained in COIN techniques, it also achieved considerable success against rustlers.

Internal Affairs


The Ministry of Internal Affairs (Intaf) played a very real part in the battle for 'hearts and minds', being closest to the rural African throughout the war, and being traditionally regarded as the link between government and people in developing the Tribal Trust Lands. But Intaf personnel were especially soft targets, travelling as they did in remote areas, and this led to the formation of a para-military wing, initially for self-protection. The unit was expanded by an allocation of national servicemen, who were required to serve the standard 18 months, after which they were ranked as 'vedettes'. Recruitment of African District Assistants, who always formed the bulk of Intaf personnel, was also stepped up.

Basic training was given at the Chikurubi depot and included a grounding in local customs and language. Intaf regulars were required to learn a local language fluently, and personnel were

returned to areas they knew during secondary call-ups. Intaf was divided into Echelons, including an Engineering Department; back-up and administration was almost entirely a TF province. Following the example of Army and Police, a mounted unit was set up in 1977, operating from Mount Darwin.

Most Intaf personnel were deployed in Protected Villages, which were each designed to accommodate 2,000 people. The intention was two-fold; to protect the population from intimidation, and to deprive the guerrillas of local support. The first PV was set up in October 1973 at Mukumbura, less than a mile from the Mozambique border, at the behest of the locals. The intention was that the villagers move back to their 'frozen' land after the war, but in the meantime Intaf endeavoured to

The 'dress greens' uniform, in this case worn by a senior NCO of the Education Corps. The national patch in white on green, outlined red, is absent from the right shoulder for some reason: cf. Plate B3.



create new permanent farms, water supplies, and educational and medical facilities.

Platoon-strength groups of African District Assistants, under white officers, guarded the protected villages against guerrilla attack. District Officers were generally young, often no more than a couple of years out of school. The PVs were backed by 'keeps', earth-rampart forts, off limits to civilians. Keeps and villages were generally sited together for mutual protection, although some forts were strategically placed in relative isolation in the midst of existing kraal systems. The forts were frequently attacked; and on more than one occasion, fire was returned from within a PV. PVs did record some notable successes in stabilising the population, and in many instances stopped the flight to the urban areas.

Guard Force

When it became evident that Intaf's role was becoming aggressively protective rather than administrative, the decision was taken to create a new force which could assume the military rôle and

'Private N'duna', the RAR's goat mascot, whose taste for cigarette ends was to be his undoing, photographed during a night parade with his handler, who wears the regimental band's version of dress green uniform. See caption, Plate B1.



allow Intaf to return to normal duties; accordingly, Guard Force was fielded in early 1976.

The Guard Force Commander was Maj.Gen. G. A. D. Rawlins, brought in from retirement, and indeed all officers and most instructors, initially, were ex-Army. Recruitment was aimed at ex-RAR men in particular, as the intention was to have African commanders for units within the PVs. White members came from among national servicemen and the D category call-up group. The unit, while predominantly black, was completely multi-racial, even at officer level. Training was carried out at the Guard Force Depot, Chikurubi, while HQ was in Salisbury.

Guard Force was deployed throughout Rhodesia, its administration partly eased by its static rôle. Each area was controlled from a Group Headquarters (usually sited by the local JOC and DC's camp) by a commandant and assistant commandant. As the PVs and keeps were widely dispersed, Forward Command Posts, commanded by junior officers, were sometimes used for local co-ordination. Individual keeps were manned by Guard Units, Guards and NCOs under a Keep Commander, who was eligible for a commission if he showed promise.

Rank structure was similar to the Army's, but the nomenclature was different; officers, for example, ranked as commander, deputy commander, commandant and assistant commandant. NCO ranks included junior corporal, keep corporal, keep or guard sergeant, keep or guard senior sergeant, keep sergeant major, keep or guard warrant officers classes II and I.

Guard Force activities were largely confined to the PVs, but local patrols were mounted and convoys guarded, and keeping the roads open and mine-free were Guard Force responsibilities. Smaller contingents were also posted to protect individual farms, especially as the PVs began to wind down towards the end of the war. The Guard Force rôle further expanded, around 1978, to the protection of urban key points and rail lines.

Security Force Auxiliaries

The internal settlement, and subsequent amnesty campaigns, meant the return to Rhodesia of thousands of 'private soldiers', most of whom were channelled into the Security Force Auxiliaries in

1978. SFA 'units' were either deployed into the Tribal Trust Lands under their own commanders to 'spearhead reconstruction and development of the tribal areas', or slotted into retraining programmes. The auxiliaries were viewed with suspicion, which increased with evidence of faction-fighting, mutiny and poor discipline. By the end of the year the organisation was regarded as Muzorewa's private army.

In 1979 the unit was renamed as *Pfumo re Vanhu* (Spear of the People), and fleshed out with new recruits. Recruits came from all Rhodesia's major tribes, and served in their local areas after rudimentary drill and weapons training. Attempts were made to instil better discipline, and the first official intake passed out in February 1980. Logistics and some administration were provided by regular forces, but SFA were left much to their own devices. At best, an SFA presence in an area hampered ZANLA and ZIPRA activities and restored a measure of security to isolated tribal areas.

Men of 1RAR exercise their right to march through Bulawayo with bayonets fixed (TC Day, 1977). The company-coloured scarves (here yellow; there were also blue and red examples with a black-printed regimental badge motif) were a seldom-seen parade embellishment; Support Coy. opted for the traditional camouflaged face veil. Note 'R.A.R.' title on upper sleeves, in black on a variety of shades of drab.

Training was provided by detached regulars until Special Forces was up to strength. NCO and command positions were filled in the field by veterans of 'the struggle', and discipline was maintained with a heavy hand. Personnel, in theory, were between 18 and 45 and fit; in practice, few were turned away. A Central Training School was set up at Domboshowa, near Salisbury, to provide one-month training courses in basic infantry skills, and was administered by SFA instructors and advisers.

The Plates

A1: Deputy Commissioner, British South Africa Police, 1975

The BSAP had a distinguished military record and ranked as Rhodesia's senior corps. Moves towards making the force less military included the abolition of the last vestiges of military ranks in 1958, but it continued to provide Guards of Honour, as well as being actively involved in the anti-terrorist campaign. Ceremonial uniforms included a dark blue high-collar patrol dress with gold braid and black leather, together with the so-called 'greens' illustrated here. This uniform had been adopted in 1928, though the open collar was not extended to





Members of 3 Independent Coy. off-duty at Inyanga in the Eastern Highlands—'3 Indep's' home for much of the war.

other ranks until 1948. The Mounted Troop wore the same tunic with a white Wolseley helmet mounting a brass badge and spike, pale cord breeches, and brown leather belt, gauntlets and gaiters.

A2: Constable, Support Unit, BSAP, 1965

Like its forerunner, the Askari Platoon, the BSAP's para-military Support Unit provided the Guard at Government House (with a short break immediately after UDI). The unit's full dress included a long-sleeved version of the 1948 Rhodesian 'universal tunic', together with the same gold-tasselled blue fez as the Police Band, but it was distinguished by its black leather. Black gaiters were adopted in 1969. The Lee Enfield was used for ceremonial duties until 1970. In the field the men carried FN rifles and wore standard camouflaged fatigues, with 'BSAP' shoulder titles, and a drab sleeve patch showing a black falling eagle with 'SUPPORT UNIT' above. The unit's motto *Pamberi ne Gondo* meant 'Forward with the Eagle'.

A3: Constable, South African Police, 1975

Following an alliance between Rhodesian and South African black nationalist movements, SAP units were deployed in Rhodesia in 1967. They were officially withdrawn in 1975, but some are alleged to have continued to operate in the border

areas afterwards. This para-military policeman wears the SAP's camouflaged field uniform, originally developed for use in the semi-desert scrub of the Caprivi Strip rather than the greener bush of Rhodesia. South Africa continued to provide both official and unofficial help. Logistic assistance during the 1979 elections involved considerable numbers of South African Police, Army and Air Force personnel, all of whom wore their own uniforms; and many South African volunteers served in Rhodesian units.

B1: Lance-Corporal, Rhodesian African Rifles, 1968

The dark green fez, green and black stable belts and hose tops were adopted during the 1950s and worn with the 1948 pattern Rhodesian 'universal tunic' and shorts. In the later 1960s RAR officers began to appear on parade in greens and slouch hats, and all ranks received these in about 1972. The Regimental Band had already adopted a green Wolseley-pattern helmet with a black pagri and silver spike, together with black and white bandsmen's 'wings'. The slouch hat was green with a black pagri and black badge-backing. Officers and WOs also had a black ox-hair hackle. (The black facings commemorated King Lobengula's Inbizo Regiment.) 'Private N'duna', the regimental mascot, died from a surfeit of cigarette ends: his successor, Private Magoda, managed to shed his coat during a parade rehearsal and was sentenced to three weeks deprivation of sugar.

B2: Lieutenant-General, No. 1 Blues, 1979

Although the Federal army adopted a new 'tartan green' service dress in the early 1960s, it retained the older British pattern No.1 dress as well, and this continued to be worn by senior Rhodesian officers up to 1979, with appropriate alterations to the insignia. No sleeve titles or formation signs were worn with this order of dress. Some field officers continued to wear the Territorial Rhodesia Regiment's rifle green version, adopted when the regiment was allied with the King's Royal Rifle Corps. This had black buttons, pouch belt and shoulder cords, and a miniature cap badge worn on the traditional crimson boss.

B3: Sergeant, Rhodesia Light Infantry, Dress Greens, 1965

The RLI was the first unit to receive the new green uniform in 1962 (according to the regimental

history, too much of the green material was ordered, and it was decided to use it for the rest of the army as well). The green beret was adopted when the regiment became a 'Commando' unit in 1964. The dress greens were also issued to officers of the Permanent Force, and eventually to all regulars, whether white or black. The national lion-and-pickaxe patch was worn on the right sleeve and the brigade patch on the left. The tradition whereby warrant officers' and NCOs' rank devices were worn on the right sleeve only stemmed from the British South Africa Police.

C1: Private, Royal Rhodesia Regiment, 1968

The essentially British drab bush hat, shirt and denim battledress trousers of the Federation Army were retained for some time after its dissolution, particularly by Territorial units such as the Rhodesia Regiment, though they gave way in due course to the new camouflaged uniforms. The regiment had to relinquish the title 'Royal' when Rhodesia became a republic in 1970, but it kept the crown in its badge as a reminder of the honour, simply moving it from the top to the centre. In service dress it wore blackened belts and rifle green berets with the badge mounted on a red diamond: some of the later battalions added distinctions such as coloured hackles.

C2: Private, RAR, 1979

The Rhodesian 'cammies' introduced during 1965-66 were probably inspired by the use of similar fatigues by the Portuguese in neighbouring Mozambique. They were first issued to the regular infantry and Police operating in the Zambezi valley. The original outfit seems to have included a plain khaki shirt worn with camouflaged field cap, trousers and combat jacket (the latter often discarded), but by 1969 the shirt, too, was being made from camouflaged material. RAR soldiers wore the full regulation outfit shown here more frequently than most units. The brown combat boots and the French OTAN-pattern steel helmet were standard South African issue: on the field cap the RAR wore a green-over-black printed patch with the regimental badge in white.

C3: Trooper, Selous Scouts, 1977

The rugged individualism of the Rhodesian soldier soon showed itself in all manner of field modifica-

tions. Shirt sleeves were cut back or removed altogether, and the trousers were turned into shorts, or discarded in favour of lighter and briefer civilian models. The camouflaged material was also used for T-shirts and floppy bush hats. Net face veils often replaced the orthodox headgear, and 'takkies' (canvas boots) or 'fellies' (veldshoen) the regulation combat boots. The Scouts had even more latitude than the average 'troopie', often wearing the same clothing and equipment as the guerrillas. European members affected piratical beards, and 'blackened up' for operations. Their green stable belts and distinctive dusty brown berets symbolized the bush which was their chosen environment.

D1: Captain, Rhodesian Medical Corps, 1974

The old Federation Army's greenish shirt and sand-colour shorts remained in use as barracks and training dress for Territorials and national servicemen until the mid-1970s, and continued to be worn subsequently by many regulars for undress. They were worn with hose tops or sand-coloured stockings, the latter frequently having corps-colour tops. Some officers and WOs, especially those of the corps and services, also retained the older British pattern khaki service dress cap, tunic and trousers. More senior officers continued to wear a sand-coloured short-sleeved bush jacket, shorts and plain long stockings right through to 1979, though after 1977 undress 'sands' more commonly consisted of a shirt and slacks.


D2: Corporal, Greys Scouts, 1977

By the later 1970s 'cammies' were standard dress for all but the most formal of occasions. They were used

Headgear, like footwear, was extremely diverse, but the combat cap, with its distinctive fold-and-button neck flap, was a consistent favourite.



by all arms, necessitating the introduction of 'ARMY' flashes in black on khaki, worn either on the chest or the upper sleeve. Miniature chevrons became common: this corporal's two white chevrons are hidden here, being worn only on the right arm. Individual units were distinguished by their badges, coloured berets and stable belts. This mounted unit adopted a distinctive grey beret (initially bearing the Rhodesian service lion-and-tusk badge) which recruits received as part of the passing-out parade. With the dress 'greens' the Greys wore a grey slouch hat with a maroon band and flash (officers also had a black hackle).



D3: Trooper, Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment, 1977
Armoured vehicle crews frequently wore these one-piece overalls, which were made in both black and the ubiquitous Rhodesian camouflage material: the former may have been the hallmark of the regular squadron, though in practice both types seem to have been worn side by side along with the orthodox camouflaged fatigues. The Armoured Car Regiment used the same black beret and badge (apart from the legend on the scroll) as its illustrious predecessors, together with a red and yellow 'flash' which echoed South African practice. The crimson and yellow stable belt perpetuated the affiliation with the 11th Hussars. In the later 1970s some officers seem to have adopted dark blue leather jackets with ranks embroidered in yellow.

E1: Air Marshal, Rhodesian Air Force, 1975

Rhodesian Air Force uniforms followed RAF models very closely, and most ranks were distinguished only by the style of the cap insignia and the 'RHODESIA' flash at the top of the sleeve. Senior officers, however, adopted South African-style gorget tabs with one to three stylized eagles according to rank: these were worn on both tunic and shirt collars. NCO's ranks resembled the Army pattern except for an additional master technician rank, who wore a miniature cap badge; and a master sergeant, who had a lion and tusk in a 'frame' formed by the continuation of the topmost chevron. These chevrons were generally printed in white on light blue patches. Air Force personnel often wore camouflage fatigues.

E2: Private, Rhodesia Women's Service, 1977

The RWS was formed in 1975 as a multi-racial unit. Its members were distributed throughout the Army in clerical, communications and intelligence duties. A rank structure was introduced in 1977. It was originally intended to provide a sand-coloured jacket and skirt for summer wear, but eventually it was decided to economise by using the original drill uniform for summer and the standard fatigues for drill. The male members of the joint services panel formed to approve the new uniforms were reported to have wanted black stockings, but brown was

Rhodesian insignia, post-1970: (1) General officer's cap badge (2) Lt.Gen. rank insignia (3) WO1 rank insignia (4) WOII rank insignia (5) Rhodesian Army right shoulder patch (6) 1st Brigade (7) 2nd Bde. (8) 3rd Bde. (9) 4th Bde. (10) Special Forces—all worn on left shoulder of dress greens.

eventually adopted as more suitable. RWS members wore Staff Corps stable belts with the 'cammies'. Women members of the Air Force wore a similar uniform in Air Force blue.

E3: District Security Assistant, Internal Affairs, 1976

The Security Forces contained a number of specialised counter-insurgency units. Members of the Ministry of Internal (later Home) Affairs' paramilitary units wore sand-coloured shirts, khaki V-neck sweaters, and either long trousers and combat boots or shorts with long khaki socks and veldschoen. Their distinctive crimson pagris and flashes caused them to be nicknamed 'cherry-tops'. The white national service recruits wore crimson berets. As the war progressed, Army-style olive drab or camouflaged fatigues became increasingly common. The actual defence of the Protected Villages was handed over to the new Guard Force in 1975: members wore camouflaged uniforms with a badge consisting of a keep superimposed on an upright sword, worn on either a khaki képi or camouflaged combat cap.

F1: Lieutenant, SAS, 1976

This officer wears the Rhodesian pullover, which dated back to the mid-1960s. It often bore cloth insignia such as 'wings' and formation patches. British-pattern 'woolly pullies' came in about 1979. It got cold in the bush, and the mittens, balaclavas and even tights supplied by voluntary organisations were much appreciated. Epaulette slips bearing printed rank insignia and (frequently) the corps or unit initials were worn by many units, though practice varied. The SAS's sand-coloured beret was identical to that of the parent British regiment, but the badge was in gilt metal like the Australian pattern. During the 1960s SAS members also wore British-style Denison smocks and Mk2 paratroop helmets, though later standard Rhodesian 'cammies' became universal.

F2: Soldier, FPLM (Mozambique Army), 1978

Rhodesian troops sometimes came into conflict with soldiers of the FPLM or Mozambique People's Liberation Forces, formed in 1975 from FRELIMO guerrillas and ex-Portuguese colonial troops recruited under a 'no reprisals' policy. It was trained by Tanzanian, Warsaw Pact, Cuban and Chinese instructors, and equipped with standard Soviet Bloc



Dress in most units was governed by its effectiveness rather than its regulation uniformity. Shop-bought or 'liberated' chest webbing was a common supplement to regular issue; it came in two weights, of which this webbing is the heavier.

arms. The usual uniform was a field cap, shirt and trousers in the East German 'rice fleck' pattern; plain olive green and ex-Portuguese camouflaged fatigues were also common, together with East German helmets. The original revolutionary ethos was retained, and a formal rank structure was not introduced until 1981, though 'officers' sometimes wore Sam Brownes. Because of Rhodesian infiltration, the 'Freddies' often wore coloured brassards as identification marks.


F3: Private, Zambia Regiment, 1976

The Zambian Army had to intervene on more than one occasion to stop factional fighting between Patriotic Front insurgent groups: it also suffered casualties during Rhodesian 'hot pursuit' operations. The army had been formed from units of the ill-fated Central African Federation Army and still retained many 'British' features, including the old Northern Rhodesia Regiment cap badge worn by the Zambia Regiment, and 'Commonwealth' pattern rank insignia (the crown was replaced by the Zambian fish-eagle but the 'pip' remained practically unchanged). At first troops continued to wear the old Rhodesian 'universal tunic', shorts and slouch hat, but this smarter, British style service dress was introduced in the early 1970s, along with a camouflaged field dress.

G1: ZANLA Guerrilla

The Chinese-trained ZANLA made little effort to ensure uniformity. They commonly wore civilian clothing and were recognisable as guerrillas only by

virtue of their Soviet bloc small arms and Chinese-style chest pouches. Nevertheless, sympathetic Communist states did supply combat clothing of various types, and this was certainly worn, more especially in the later stages of the struggle. However, there was no such thing as a standard uniform, and plain khaki shirts and trousers were worn side by side with camouflaged items of various patterns, or jeans and windcheaters, with badgeless berets or plain peaked field caps. Some items were made of 'chimurenga cloth'—a mixture of red (symbolizing blood), black (for invisibility) and white (to intensify the wearer's vision).



G2: Joshua Nkomo as ZIPRA CinC, 1979

ZIPRA were more 'regular' than ZANLA, and while they do not seem to have developed standard uniforms or insignia, Nkomo frequently wore this military-style outfit during the later stages of the conflict. His Russian-pattern peaked cap bore a national device: earlier photographs of him show the coloured wreath without the leftward-facing Zimbabwe Bird. These Russian-style peaked caps seem to have been a hallmark of the senior ZIPRA officers; Nkomo's lieutenant wore a similar model with red band and piping and gold chin cord but a plain peak, together with Angolan camouflage fatigues. Uniforms made from Warsaw Pact 'rice fleck' material were also common among the ZIPRA regular forces.

G3: ZIPRA 'Regular', 1978

This guerrilla commander wears Angolan-pattern camouflaged fatigues with a field cap of an entirely different pattern, a type of combination which appears to have been quite common. Even the 'rice fleck' material appeared in different guises within the same unit, being made into either shirts or jackets, and peaked field caps or floppy berets. Other camouflaged fatigues were also used, including olive green on sand, or early Soviet 'leaf' pattern, together with yellowish khaki shirts and trousers with plain brass buttons worn with a Russian-style tropical 'sun hat'. Soviet belts and canvas pouches were common among ZIPRA combatants. However, the reliable AK-47 was by far the most uniform feature of guerrilla equipment.

H1: Security Force Auxiliary, 1979

The SFA were given a brown denim uniform consisting of belted overalls and a floppy bush hat bearing the upward pointing spear patch of the

Rhodesian regimental and corps cap badges, with stable belt colours, 1979; note that in those units which did not have special 'tribal' berets, as mentioned in the text and colour plate captions, the norm was the British-style midnight blue general issue beret: (1) Rhodesian Armd. Car Regt. (2) Rhodesian Artillery (3) Rhodesian Corps of Engineers (4) Rhodesian Corps of Signals (5) Rhodesian Staff Corps and Rhodesian Women's Corps (6) Rhodesian African Rifles (7) Rhodesian Light Infantry (8) Rhodesian Special Air Services Regt. (9) Selous Scouts (10) Grey's Scouts (11) Rhodesia Regiment (12) Rhodesian Defence Regiment (13) Rhodesian Intelligence Corps (14) Psychological Operations Unit (15) Rhodesian Army Service Corps (16) Rhodesian Army Medical Corps (17) Rhodesian Corps of Military Police (18) Rhodesian Army Pay Corps (19) Rhodesian Army Educational Corps (20) Rhodesian Corps of Chaplains.



Security Force Auxiliaries in buoyant mood, thanks to the activities of a foreign camera crew. Cf. Plate H1; this is the issue brown denim overall uniform of the SFA, with the brown-on-khaki *Pfumo re Vanhu* spearhead badge on the headgear.

Pfumo re Vanhu in dark brown on khaki. A T-shirt with the same title and device was often worn underneath or in lieu. In practice many continued to wear their civilian clothes or ex-guerrilla outfits. Ranks above senior NCO wore green berets. They formed part of Special Forces, and were supposed to wear the sleeve patch introduced for the latter late in the war (a black scorpion on a white shield), though it is doubtful whether many actually did. The SFA were equipped with a miscellany of weapons, including many AK-47s.

H2: Sergeant, Commonwealth Monitoring Force, 1980

This NCO of the Royal Anglian Regiment displays the lightweight shirt and trousers generally worn by British members of the Force, with the regimental beret and stable belt (dark blue, the red central band with a narrow yellow stripe). The white Monitoring Force brassard bore a pangolin, and a yellow sunrise on red, white and blue. The

pangolin was chosen because its appearance was held to bring good luck: the brassard's designers presumably did not know that the animal curled into a ball and emitted an unpleasant smell when attacked, or that the local Africans killed it on sight for their chiefs to eat.

H3: Private, Zimbabwe Army, 1981

The Patriotic Front guerrillas integrated into the new national army were initially given the same brown denim outfits as the SFAs. Later, however, they were issued with ex-Rhodesian uniforms, including camouflaged combat dress (often worn with the old Staff Corps stable belt) and the 'greens' worn here. A new national patch has replaced the old lion and pickaxe (its presence on the left sleeve indicates Army HQ; other troops retained the old Rhodesian brigade patches); the sleeve top title now reads 'ZIMBABWE', and the beret now bears the new Infantry Corps badge. Ex-RAR units continued to wear their old regimental badge for some time. The rank structure remained unchanged, though the insignia substituted the new state's coat of arms and Zimbabwe bird for the Rhodesian symbols.

Notes sur les planches en couleur

A1 Le corps d'armée de la Rhodésie, le BSAP, formait des gardes d'honneur et du personnel de combat. Il existait également un uniforme de cérémonie bleu foncé. Cet uniforme fut daté, en ce qui concerne ses principales caractéristiques, de 1948. **A2** L'unité de soutien de la police para-militaire gardait la Government House dans la brousse, les soldats portaient des treillis standard, un titre d'épaule 'BSAP' et un écusson brun en forme de bouclier avec l'inscription 'Support Unit', en-dessous de laquelle figurait un aigle noir en vol. Le fusil FN remplaça le Lee Enfield pour les opérations. **A3** Un important contingent de la police sud-africaine servait en Rhodésie, et ses membres continuèrent de porter leur uniforme de camouflage habituel.

B1 La tenue de parade, avec ses détails vert foncé, noirs, blancs ou argent, rappelait l'association avec la tradition des 'Rifles' britanniques. Vers 1972, le couvre-chef fut remplacé par un grand chapeau mou vert orné de pagri noirs et d'insignes. **B2** Même après l'adoption du nouvel uniforme de service vert au début des années soixante, les officiers supérieurs continuèrent d'utiliser la tenue britannique bleu foncé No. 1 Dress. **B3** C'est en 1964 que fut adopté le bérêt vert indiquant le grade dans le commando. Les soldats portaient l'écusson national—qui représente un lion et une pioche—sur la manche droite et l'écusson de la brigade sur la gauche; les membres du NCO ne portaient les signes distinctifs de grade que sur le bras droit.

C1 Tenue de combat tropicale en grande partie britannique conservé pendant quelque temps, avant d'être remplacé par une tenue de camouflage standard durant les années soixante-dix. Cette unité portait également des bérêts vert foncé, l'insigne étant placée sur un losange de tissu rouge. **C2** 'Cammies' standard, qui s'inspirent probablement de celles des troupes portugaises voisines; elles furent introduites à partir de 1965/66. Les bottes marron et le casque en acier français provenaient de sources sud-africaines; le couvre-chef le plus courant était le képi réalisé dans le même tissu que la tenue de camouflage, les RAR portant leur insigne blanche sur un rectangle vert sur fond noir. **C3** Un grand relâchement régnait dans la tenue des différents membres de cette unité de reconnaissance clandestine. Le bérêt de la tenue de service était couleur de poussière.

D1 L'uniforme de caserne constitué d'une chemise verte et de shorts couleur sable a survécu jusqu'au milieu des années soixante-dix, et plus tard sous la forme d'une 'tenue légère'. Par la suite, les soldats portèrent une chemise, des pantalons d'uniforme, une veste de brousse à manches courtes et des shorts de couleur sable selon différentes combinaisons. **D2** A ce moment-là, la plupart du personnel portait un uniforme de camouflage, de sorte que des insignes devinrent nécessaires à l'identification: bérêts de couleur (gris dans ce régiment d'infanterie à cheval), 'ceintures d'écurie' de couleur hors des périodes de combat (consulter à ce propos le tableau qui figure dans le livre), titres 'Army' sur le haut de la manche, etc. Des chevrons de petite taille indiquaient souvent le grade. **D3** Dans la tradition britannique, on portait le bérêt noir, avec l'insigne du régiment placée sur un petit 'flash' rouge et jaune à la manière sud-africaine. Les combinaisons étaient soit noires, soit en tissu de camouflage, et on les portait sans distinction de grade.

E1 Assemblage réalisé à partir d'un uniforme en grande partie de la RAF, avec, au col, l'insigne d'officier supérieur dans le style sud-africain; képi et insigne d'épaule rhodésien. **E2** Avec la tenue de camouflage, les RWS portaient des ceintures d'écurie Staff Corps. La tenue de service du nouveau corps d'armée fut décidée par une commission mixte dont les membres masculins votèrent—mais sans succès—l'adoption de bas en nylon noirs... **E3** Le rouge cramoisi était la couleur distinctive du personnel de contre-révolution du ministère de l'intérieur. Habillés tout d'abord en kaki, ses membres adoptèrent progressivement la couleur verte ou les 'cammies' pendant le courant de la guerre.

F1 L'insigne en tissu et les écussons des épaulettes avec l'insigne du grade et les initiales de l'unité imprimées étaient couramment portés sur le pull-over. Le bérêt rhodésien SAS était identique à son modèle britannique, mais il était orné d'une insigne dorée au lieu d'une insigne en tissu. **F2** Soldat du Mozambique en tenue de camouflage est-allemande au motif de riz; les tenues de camouflage portugaises et les tenues vert uni étaient courantes elles aussi. **F3** On reconnaît immédiatement ici le style britannique.

G1 Les ZANLA portaient rarement un type particulier de tenue; des modèles kaki, verts, des tissus de camouflage et de nombreux vêtements civils étaient portés avec les petites armes du pacte de Varsovie, très fréquentes, et l'équipement personnel. **G2** N'komo affectionnait cette tenue, avec son képi russe en pointe, article populaire parmi ses officiers. **G3** Cet uniforme de camouflage angolais ne montre que l'un des nombreux styles de tenue que portaient les membres de la guerrilla de la principale force armée.

H1 Les anciens membres de la guerrilla recevaient quant à eux une combinaison en denim brun et un chapeau de brousse souple orné d'une insigne brun foncé sur kaki en forme de fer de lance. Voir photos. Les officiers portaient des bérêts verts. Ils devaient porter également l'insigne d'épaule en forme de scorpion des Special Forces. **H2** NCO britannique du Royal Anglian Regt. portant son bérêt et sa ceinture d'écurie régimentaire, ainsi que le brassard de la Monitoring Force, qui représente un pangolin et un lever de soleil, et dont les couleurs sont le rouge, le blanc et le bleu. **H3** Les anciens membres de la guerrilla intégrés dans la nouvelle armée du Zimbabwe portent des insignes légèrement différentes, mais l'aspect général de l'uniforme est toujours le même.

Farbtafeln

A1 Rhodesians führendes Corps, das BSAP, umfasste sowohl Soldaten für Ehrenwachen als auch Kämpfer. Die Einheit hatte auch eine dunkelblaue Paradeuniform. Diese grüne Uniform stammt in den wesentlichen Einzelheiten aus dem Jahr 1948. **A2** Die paramilitärische Polizei-Hilfsinheit bewachte das Government House. Im urwald trugen die Männer die übliche Arbeitsbekleidung mit einem 'BSAP' Schulterzeichen und einem grauen, schildförmigen Abzeichen mit einem schwarzen Adler unter den Worten 'Support Unit'. Das FN Gewehr ersetzte im Einsatz die Lee Enfield. **A3** Ein grosses südafrikanisches Polizeikontingent wurde in Rhodesien eingesetzt, mit eigenen Tarnuniformen.

B1 Die Paradeuniform mit dunkelgrünen, schwarzen oder silbernen Details erinnerte an die Verbindung mit der britischen 'Rifles'—Tradition. Um 1972 wurde die Kopfbedeckung geändert: ein grüner Krempenhut mit schwarzen 'pagri' und verstärktem Abzeichen. **B2** Selbst nach der Übernahme der neuen grünen dienstuniformen in den frühen 60er Jahren trugen höhere Offiziere noch weiterhin das dunkelblaue britische No. 1 Dress. **B3** Das grüne Barret, ein Zeichen für Commando-Status, wurde 1964 eingeführt. Das Landesabzeichen (Löwe und Spitzhacke) wurde auf dem rechten Ärmel getragen, das Brigadeabzeichen auf dem linken. Unteroffiziere trugen Rangabzeichen lediglich auf dem rechten Arm.

C1 Überwiegend britische tropische Kampfkleidung wurde eine Zeitlang beibehalten und in den 70er Jahren durch die übliche Tarnbekleidung ersetzt. Diese Einheit trug ausserdem dunkelgrüne Barretts, mit dem Abzeichen auf einem roten Stoffkaro. **C2** Standard-'cammies', wahrscheinlich durch die benachbarten portugiesischen Truppen inspiriert, wurden 1965/66 ausgegeben. Die braunen Stiefel und französischen Stahlhelme stammten aus südafrikanischen Beständen, eine verbreitete Kopfbedeckung war die Kappe aus Tarmaterial, wobei die RAR ein weisses Abzeichen auf einem grünen Rechteck vor schwarzem Hintergrund trug. **C3** Den Mitgliedern dieser heimlichen Aufklärungseinheit war bei der individuellen Bekleidung grosse Freiheit gestattet. Das Dienstbarrett hatte eine staubbraune Farbe.

D1 Kasernenuniformen mit grünem Hemd und sandfarbenen Shorts sah man noch Mitte der 70er Jahre und noch später als ausserdienstliche Bekleidung. Danach folgten sandfarbene Hemden, lange Hosen, kurzärmelige Buschjacken und Shorts in verschiedenen Kombinationen. **D2** Inzwischen trugen die meisten Soldaten Tarnuniformen, daher waren Abzeichen zur Identifizierung nötig: farbige Barrette (grau im Fall dieses berittenen Infanterieregiments) und 'Stallgürtel' (wenn ausserhalb des Gefechts) werden an anderer Stelle in diesem Buch systematisch aufgeschlüsselt, dazu kamen schwarze 'Army'-Zeichen auf khakifarbenem Hinterground am Oberarm usw. Kleine Rangwinkel waren weit verbreitet. **D3** Schwarze Barretts in der britischen Tradition wurden mit einem Regimentsabzeichen über einem rot-gelben 'flash' nach südafrikanischem Muster getragen. Jacken waren entweder schwarz oder in Tarnfarben und wurden ohne Rücksicht auf den jeweiligen Rang getragen.

E1 Eine Kombination der RAF-Grunduniform mit Rangabzeichen höherer Offiziere im südafrikanischen Stil und rhodesischer kappe und Schulterabzeichen. **E2** Mit Tarnbekleidung trugen die RWS-Frauen Staff-Corps-Gürtel. Die Dienstbekleidung des neuen Corps wurde von einem gemischten Komitee festgelegt, dessen männliche Mitglieder vergeblich für die Übernahme von schwarzen Nylonstrümpfen stimmten. **E3** Dunkelrot war die spezifische Farbe für die Aufstandsabwehr-Streitkräfte des Innenministeriums. Die Männer trugen ursprüngliche Khaki, übernahmen aber nach und nach grüne Bekleidung oder 'cammies'.

F1 Stoffabzeichen und Schulterstreifen mit aufgedruckten Rangabzeichen und Einheitsziffern waren häufig auf Pullovern zu sehen. Das rhodesische SAS-Barrett war identisch mit dem britischen Modell, hatte aber ein vergoldetes anstatt eine gewobenen Abzeichens. **F2** Soldat aus Mosambik mit Reismuster-Tarnung aus der DDR; einfache grüne und portugiesische Tarnung waren ebenfalls üblich. **F3** Der britische Stil ist hier sehr deutlich.

G1 Die ZANLA trugen selten ein bestimmtes Muster, dafür verstreute Stücke mit khakifarbenen, grünen und verschiedenen tarmustern sowie einen Grosse Zivilbekleidung mit gelegentlichen kleinen Waffen und Ausrüstungsgegenständen der Warschauer Pakt-Staaten. **G2** N'komo beeinflusste diese Bekleidung persönlich, mit einer russischen spitzen Mütze, einem bei Offizieren beliebte Stück. **G3** Diese Tarnuniform aus Angola war nur ein Beispiel für verschieden Stile unter den ZIPRA Guerillas.

H1 Ehemalige Guerrillas erhielten eine braune Denimjacke und einen weichen Buschhut mit einem dunkelbraunen Speerspitzenabzeichen auf Khakifarbenem Grund (s. Fotos). 'Offiziere' erhielten grüne Barretts und sollten das Skorpion-Schulterabzeichen der 'Special Forces' tragen. **H2** Britischer Unteroffizier der Royal Anglian Regiment mit seinem Regimentsbarrett und 'Stallgürtel' sowie der Armbride der Monitoring Force—ein Pangolin und ein Sonnenaufgang in den Farben rot, weiss und blau. **H3** Die ehemaligen Guerrillas, nun in die neue Armee von Zimbabwe integriert, trugen etwas andere Insignien, aber die Uniform ist im grossen und ganzen unverändert.