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
The Spanish Civil War 1936-39

Background

By the spring of 1936 it was becoming increasingly evident that Spain was heading for an armed clash between the forces and of the extreme Right and the extreme Left. The moderate Republican government of Madrid was helpless to curb the activities of militants of opposing factions, or to check the tide of political assassinations. Over the period of 16 June to 13 July, terrorists murdered 61 people and wounded a further 224. There were 132 bomb incidents, ten churches and nineteen public buildings were destroyed or badly damaged by fire, ten newspaper offices sacked. Between 15 February and 15 June, 113 general strikes were staged. On 12 July Calvé Sotelo, a well-known monarchist was

murdered by Republican storm troopers, and passions were roused to even greater fury when, at the funeral, police opened fire killing four of the mourners.

The dominant figure of the extreme Left, known as 'Largo Caballero' (the Spanish Lenin), enjoyed the full confidence of the Anarchists, and planned to stage a *coup d'état* in late July; and, backed by the ultras and their militia groups, he intended to impose a Stalin-type Communist government. To thwart such a take-over, a clique of high-ranking army officers, calling themselves the *Unión Militar Española* (U.M.E.), whose nominal head was the veteran General Sanjurjo, planned a similar *coup* and counted on the support of anti-Communist, Catholic and traditionalist elements of all classes of society. Indeed by mid-July the only question was, which of the two factions would strike first.





General Francisco Franco y Bahamonde inspects a guard of honour at Burgos in October 1936, following his appointment to the supreme command of the insurgents. Franco had enjoyed rapid promotion, founding his reputation for professional competence and personal coolness under fire in the savage Moroccan campaigns of the early 1920s. (Keystone)

Under the circumstances, it was the right wing, spurred to action by Calvé Sotelo's murder, that made the opening moves. The weekend of 17/18 July military uprisings broke out, with varying success, in all the main garrison towns of the Spanish mainland.

In the north, monarchist Navarra rallied to General Emilio Mola. In Andalucía, in the south, the capital, Sevilla, was taken over by a handful of troops led by the swashbuckling General Queipo de Llano y Sierra, himself a Republican at heart but violently anti-Communist. Córdoba and Granada also declared for the rebels who would be known as the Nationalists, but in Jaen and Málaga the movement was suppressed, both centres voting solidly for the existing government. Most of Castilla, as well as the cities of Burgos, Salamanca

and Avila, embraced the revolution, as did much of Galicia. Though predominantly Catholic, the Basques supported the Republic hoping thereby to achieve a measure of autonomy; their example was followed by the Catalans, who were the most left-wing people of the peninsula. In both Madrid and Barcelona, insurgent officers and troops were soon isolated by Communist mobs, and liquidated. Those who surrendered were speedily brought to trial—a mere formality—and as speedily executed.

Escaping by plane, piloted by an Englishman, Captain Bebb, General Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, leading member of the U.M.E., reached Tetuan, capital of Spanish Morocco on 19 July, and there, with the wholehearted support of the highly professional 'African Army' proclaimed the Revolution, receiving also the full backing of the Khalifa, the local Moorish governor.

These turbulent mid-July days marked the beginning of a civil war, which was to last two years and nine months, a war to be remembered not so much for the brilliance of any individual campaign

or commander, but rather for its appalling ferocity, and for fanatical, crusader-like belief, held by participants, in the justice of their own cause. Left and Right, alike, were convinced that they were fighting for civilization against the powers of darkness. This fanaticism led to heavy losses, and many of the battles compared for sheer butchery with those of the Western Front of 1914-18.

The Republican Army

It is a common, but erroneous, belief that the Spanish Army joined solidly with the insurgents, just as it is equally erroneous to state that the war was waged between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'. Though in Morocco the troops were almost unanimous in supporting their leader, General Franco, this was far from being the case in metropolitan Spain.

On 17 July the mainland army consisted of eight infantry divisions centred on Corunna, Saragossa, Burgos, Valladolid, Sevilla, Valencia, Barcelona, and Madrid, and one cavalry division, whose headquarters was also in Madrid. An infantry division was made up of two brigades (or regiments), each of two battalions.

Loyalties and ideals caused men of similar rank, from general to private soldier, to oppose each other, and the confusion and bloodshed of the first weekend was great. By the Monday, however, the situation had largely sorted itself out. It has since been estimated that—with the exception of the African Army—33,000 stood by the government, while 23,600 went over to the insurgents (Nationalists). On 17 July the officer corps totalled 8,500. By the 19th, some 3,500 had been killed or imprisoned by the Republicans, 2,000 had declared for the government, 3,000 for the Nationalists.

The para-military *Guardia Civil*, *Asaltos* and *Carabineros*, also split. The Nationalists were able to count on 14,000 *Guardia Civil*, 6,000 *Carabineros* and 500 *Asaltos*, while the Republic counted on nearly 20,000 *Guardia Civil*, 3,500 *Asaltos*, and 8,750 *Carabineros*.

Republicans could also muster groups of armed militia, men trained in urban and guerilla terrorist tactics who, by July 1936, had reached the

impressive total of 15,000 Trotskyists and Anarchists, and 12,000 Communists. It did not help the Republic's cause, however, that the militia were usually at daggers drawn with the para-military forces, even when these latter were amalgamated and renamed the *Guardia Republicana*. After some months, warring factions were once more re-organized, this time into a single body, known as the *Ejército Popular Republicana* (People's Republican Army), but this was achieved only with great difficulty, clashes occurring between Anarchists, who bitterly resented any form of regimentation or rank privilege, and Communists, who based their concept of service on Russian standards of iron discipline.

When it eventually took shape, the E.P.R. had three units of command: the section consisting of thirty men, the *centuria* of a hundred men, and the column of six *centurias*. However, by the end of 1936, this clumsy organization was superseded by the classic formations of the battalion, brigade, division, and eventually corps, the one variation being the 'Mixed Brigade' of four infantry battalions, each battalion comprising three rifle companies and one medium machine-gun company, with its own artillery arm and supply and medical services.

Foreign aid for the Republicans came principally from Russia, from Mexico, and from Left-wing France. By October 1936 Russian freighters had unloaded nearly a hundred tanks (mainly T-26 nine-tonners with 45mm main armament, which were to dominate Nationalist armour till the end of the war), 400 trucks, and 50 fighter planes. Accompanying this material were a number of volunteers, mostly pilots and tank crews, as well as a batch of senior serving officers to play the role of 'advisers', among whom was the tank general Pavlov. France also sent heavy equipment, as well as Potez and Dewoitine planes which, if not ultramodern, were highly serviceable, especially when handled by the small group of 'anti-Fascist flyers', the most well known being the author André Malraux, later to become an ardent Gaul-list.

The ranks of fighters were swelled by the mass of non-Spanish and Communist sympathizers who flocked into Spain from almost every country in Europe and the United States as soon as fighting



A



B



C

Nationalist divisional insignia, occasionally worn on the upper left sleeve of tunics. (A) 11th Division: red, black inner edge, black eagle, yellow disc and legend 'Franco', white crescent. Shield is red above yellow above red on left, green on right, with black '11' and 'D'. (B) 13th Division, serving with the Army Corps of Morocco and largely composed of native troops: red shield edged yellow, black hand, white '13' and Arabic script. (C) 105th Division, which also served in the Moroccan Army Corps: shield white above blue, yellow edge, yellow legend, yellow sword hilt, white blade, red lion.

broke out. Small foreign units, of which the British 'Tom Mann' *Centuria* was one, had been in action since August, but by October the number had increased so rapidly that it was decided they would be organized into two, three or four battalion formations, to be known as 'International Brigades', and incorporated into the Republican line; the first was designated the XIth. By February 1937 five such brigades (XIth–XVth) had been raised from a total of eighteen battalions; the first all-British battalion was the 2nd Battalion of the XVth Brigade—it was called the 'Saklatvala' after the Indian revolutionary. Of the other battalions, four were all French, three mixed French and Belgian, two German, two American, one Italian, one Polish, one Scandinavian; the remainder were of mixed central and eastern European nationals, with Yugoslavs predominating.

Altogether some 40,000 men saw service in the ranks of the International Brigades, a quarter of whom were French. The British totalled 2,000 and suffered heavy casualties: 500 killed and 1,200 wounded. American losses were equally heavy: of 2,800 engaged, 900 were killed and 1,500 wounded.

Before supplies began to arrive regularly from abroad, arming the Internationals was almost as great a problem as arming the Home Guard was to be in the summer of 1940. Rifles issued included the French Lebel, the Canadian Ross 301, 1914 models, and even a 1907 Japanese Arisaka.

Neither side could claim an outstanding commander—the Spanish Civil War failed to produce a Slim, Guderian, Patton or Yamashita—nevertheless many general officers displayed a high level of all-round competence. For the Republicans, the senior professional officers, General Miaja and Colonels (soon to be generals) Vicente Rojo and Hernandez Sarabia were towers of strength. Miaja, politically left of centre and a staunch freemason, was not young (he had fought in the 1920–25 Riff War) and did not possess the quick brain needed to direct a war of movement, but he was impervious to adversity and proved the ideal chief to animate a prolonged defence.

When 'Largo Caballero', fearing Madrid would fall, moved to Valencia, he appointed Miaja to hold the capital 'as long as possible' obviously foreseeing an early collapse. Miaja, however, had no intention of giving up. His first order on taking over was simply, 'Resist'. When asked where to retreat if necessary, he replied, 'To the cemetery.' Portly, bland-faced, bespectacled, he soon became the paternal figure symbolizing the 'family of the people' image of the *Ejército Popular*.

Rojo was a brilliant staff officer, playing Weygand to Miaja's Foch. Sound but imaginative plans came from Rojo's headquarters, only to fail because there was no one to carry them out—despite the emergence from the non-professional ranks of numbers of Wingate-type geniuses. Best known were Enrique Lister, who was a dedicated Communist; 'El Campesino', who had been a terrorist from the age of sixteen when he had blown up a country police post killing all four occupants; and José Modesto, ex-*Tercio* (Spanish Foreign Legion) sergeant. All three rose to be division and corps commanders, Lister in particular distinguish-

ing himself in all major battles of the war, though they were at their best as guerillas. They lacked the basic training and instruction necessary to make the best use tactically of such complicated machinery as the modern corps or division. Moreover the general inefficiency of battalion and company commanders was so marked that faulty leadership at all levels could be said to be the cause of the Republican defeat.

The Nationalist Army

The main Nationalist striking force was the African Army stationed in Spanish Morocco. On 17 July, this army consisted of six *banderas* (battalions) of the *Tercio*, ten *tabores* (half battalions) of *Regulares*, native Moroccans officered by Spaniards, seven

Spanish infantry battalions, six squadrons of Spanish cavalry, and six field artillery batteries—in all, 24,000 seasoned troops. In addition, the Moroccan governor of the zone, the Khalifa, once assured that the rebellion was anti-Communist, placed his Mehalla (para-military native gendarmerie) at Franco's disposal to act as local garrisons, thus freeing the regular army for operations on the mainland.

The *Regulares* could be compared with the old British Indian Army or the French *Tirailleurs Marocains*. All the men were volunteers, recruited almost entirely from the Berber hill tribes; they were hardy and courageous though perhaps unimaginative—excellent fighting material when

Milicianas receive basic instruction during the defence of Madrid. They wear the ubiquitous mono or overall, with Army caps and leather equipment. Their sergeant instructor, left, has NCO ranking sewn to a civilian jacket, and some kind of inscription embroidered on the front of his cap. (Keystone)



The Government had very few armoured vehicles in the early months of the war, and improvised armour of many kinds was pressed into service. This armoured truck is liberally decorated with political and trade-union slogans.

well-led by officers who had gained their confidence.

Founded in 1920 for service in Morocco, the *Tercio* was immediately blooded in the savage 1920–25 Riff War. Unlike its French counterpart, which officially allowed no Frenchmen to serve in the ranks, the *Tercio* included a bare 10 per cent of foreigners in its personnel. The idea of a Spanish Legion was the brain child of a fanatical ultra Right-wing officer, Colonel Millan Astray; he sought to create a corps of equally fanatical, dedicated soldiers from the bunch of misfits, social outcasts and petty criminals who were the first to sign on in the 'Legion'. With the young Major Francisco Franco as his second-in-command, he achieved a considerable degree of success. Believing that death in battle was the highest honour and that 'the Legionaries' standard was the most glorious because it was dyed with the blood of the Legionaries', they called themselves *Los Novios de la Muerte* (the Betrothed of Death). By 1936 the Legion had become an elite corps by any standards, and by the end of the war their numbers had been increased from six to eighteen *banderas*, and they had an armoured unit as well as a flame-thrower company.

To begin with, the Spanish army, both in Africa and on the mainland, was totally lacking in armour and was weak in artillery. This weakness dated back to 1926 when a group of senior artillery officers made a blundering attempt to stage a *coup d'état*. Little blood was spilled but, as a result, the infantry was ordered to take over all artillery barracks while the Spanish Royal Regiment of Artillery was declared 'suspended and under arrest'. From then on, instead of being an independent and elite arm, the artillery was considered as a subsidiary service to the infantry.

Two groups of armed militia, the *Falangists* and *Requetés*, also rallied to the Nationalist flag, the traditional red and gold (*Sangre y Oro*) of monarchist Spain. Ideologically there was almost as wide a gulf separating these two groups as there was between Right and Left. Neo-Fascist, inclined to anti-clericalism, basically anti-monarchist, the



Falange movement was founded in 1931 by two young intellectuals, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos and Onesimo Redonda Ortega as the J.O.N.S. (*Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista*). Their programme was based on a strange mixture of nationalist and anarchist ideals. Later the movement was taken over on more positive lines by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the ex-Dictator, and a brilliant airman, Ruiz de Alda; it was renamed the *Falange Española*, and its programme was national, rather than international, socialism.

There was soon war between the blue-shirted Falange and the various extreme Left-wing militants. Between November 1933 and January 1934, eight Falangists were shot down by Communist gunmen. In March, the Falangists formed their own gangs of *pistoleros*. In October José Antonio, by then undisputed leader, claimed that his adherents numbered 40,000. Large numbers of Falange votes were polled at the February 1936 elections, and in April the government outlawed the party and arrested most of the leaders including José Antonio.

Until then the U.M.E. had viewed the Falange with suspicion, but its combat potential was at least making itself evident. Finally, it was at Franco's suggestion that Colonel Yagué, then *Jefe* (Chief) of the Legion, was asked to act as liaison officer between the Army and the Falange. Though he was a rabid anti-Communist, he was a Republican at heart.

In marked ideological contrast were the *Requetés*, militant wing of the extreme Right-wing Carlists whose stronghold was the ultratraditionalist province of Navarre. Theirs was no modern political party. The Carlists had been in opposition to every


government sitting in Madrid since 1833 when, on the death of Ferdinand VII, his infant daughter Isabella was proclaimed queen in defiance of the Salic law. Appalled at any digression from established tradition, the Navarrese supported the claims of Isabella's uncle, Don Carlos, from then on styling themselves Carlists. In 1834 they started a bloody civil war which was to drag on for six years, and they repeated their insurrection in 1870.

Unlike the *Falangists*, the Carlists were ardent Catholics. In the 1930s their horror of anything that smacked of socialism led them to detest both Hitler and Mussolini as much as they abhorred Stalin. Indeed the Carlists who were represented in all strata of society had, by 1936, been preparing themselves actively for an anti-Republican war under the direction of their tough and able leader Fal Condé.

Their extremism made them difficult to integrate in any form of coalition. To begin with they would not admit that a non-Carlist could have honest

intentions. Now, calling themselves the *Comunión Tradicionalista*, they demanded in return for their support, 'absolute guarantees that the planned new State would be anti-democratic'. Even the staunch monarchist, General Mola, was heard to declare in a moment of exasperation, 'The traditionalist movement is ruining Spain by its exigencies as surely as is the Popular Front!' But, as late as 12 June 1936, Fal Condé was telling his followers they should 'not second a movement that is not exclusively our own'. It was not in fact till 15 July that he finally agreed to call up his militia, the 8,400 strong *Requetés*, and to place them under the local army commander, and then only on the condition that his official letter of accordance be

Navarrese Carlist troops marching to the Bilbao front. The officer wears a sidecap and a *mono* of some kind, with the brass grenades of the artillery branch pinned to the collar points. The men wear red Carlist berets and light khaki clothing. In the right foreground are two sergeants, both wearing conventional Nationalist Army rank devices on their berets, and small 'detente'—Sacred Heart—badges on the left breast. (Keystone)





Another home-made Government 'tank'—a heavy agricultural tractor with an improvised armoured superstructure, reminiscent of World War One in outline but of dubious effectiveness in combat.

countersigned by the Carlist Pretender, Don Xavier de Borbón Parma.

Reaching a total of 42,000 at one period, the *Requetés* fought supremely well; together with the *Tercio*, they were usually assigned the toughest tasks. As a result their casualties were such that when hostilities ceased in April 1939 their overall strength had been reduced to 23,000.

Foreign aid to the Nationalists came principally from Germany and Italy. Generally speaking Mussolini supplied men known vaguely as the *Corpo Truppo Volontarie*; the Germans supplied material and specialists.

Shrewd in many ways, yet an abysmal judge of character, Mussolini had formed a poor opinion of the Spaniard as a fighting man, convincing himself that the Nationalists would be able to triumph only if they were backed by massive manpower aid from Italy. By January 1937, 35,000 Italians were in Spain under the command of General Mario Roatta, former head of Italian Military Intelligence, but Franco did not really welcome their presence. He was well aware that the Italians—the majority of them 'Blackshirt' Fascist militia rather than regulars—would be no match for Spanish units or the International Brigades. On the other hand he desperately needed the equipment that Italy could supply, of which the most important element was aircraft. Italian fighter and bomber

units played an increasingly important part in the war, and Franco purchased Fiat CR.32 fighters in large numbers for his own squadrons.

The German contribution proved of the highest value. Hitler did not send infantry, but machines and instructors—particularly tanks and aircraft. The first contingent of what would become a powerful and balanced air force, the *Legion Condor*, comprised twenty transport/bombers and six bi-plane fighters which played a great part in the airlift of men and material from Africa to Spain. Thereafter the *Legion* was steadily increased to three squadrons of bombers, three of fighters, three reconnaissance squadrons, and six anti-aircraft batteries with signals elements and staff. Spanish pilots flew with Germans beside them until they were trained; then they took over the various aircraft as new types were sent for the German squadrons. (For a detailed account of the air war over Spain, see Christopher Shores, *Spanish Civil War Air Forces*, Osprey AIRWAR series.) The same process was followed on the ground. At least 120 PzKw I Ausf.A and B tanks were sent to Spain, the majority being handed over to German-trained Spanish crews when they went into action. Apart from aircrew, German manpower in Spain was minimal, and total casualties were only about 300; nevertheless the technical superiority of German equipment in most fields made a significant, though not decisive, contribution to Franco's victory. (It should be remembered, however, that for long periods the Russian pilots and aircraft dominated the skies over the front, just as the T-26 tank proved superior on the ground—a bounty was offered for each T-26 captured, and by 1938 at least sixty were serving in Nationalist units.)

Generally speaking, the Nationalists had the better leaders; Franco himself was a sound strategist and tactician. Though not a man to take major risks, he would never allow himself to be diverted from his main objective, nor was he ever known to waver, let alone weaken, in the face of adversity. Calm, cool and collected, he was the antithesis of the ebullient Spaniard of popular imagination. Brave and talented Emilio Mola might have proved an eventual rival for Franco but for his untimely death in a flying accident in the summer of 1937. Other generals, and in particular Yagué of the *Tercio*, José Iglesias Varela, who rose

from bugler, Moscardo, hero of the Alcázar siege, the fire-eater Aranda, and Fidel Davila commanding the northern army after Mola's death, were all capable of handling a major formation in the field, if not with outstanding brilliance, with a solid capability and steadfastness. The highly individual Queipo de Llano who staged and got away with such a brilliant *coup de main* in Sevilla was not of the same professional calibre. Lazy and overfond of the pleasures of the flesh, he soon made it clear that his ambition was to sit back in Sevilla, relaxing and resting on his laurels for the rest of the war, rather than to risk his person or reputation on the battlefield.

The Campaign

1936 Once the fog surrounding the confused and bloody events of that first weekend of 17/18 July began to clear, the balance of power seemed heavily weighted in favour of the Republicans. Their forces of trained men, both regular and militia, outnumbered those of their opponents. Most of the main cities and all the industrial areas were in their hands. Leading members of the U.M.E., among them Generals Goded and Burriel, were in their hands, soon to be executed. José Antonio Primo de Rivera, leader of the *Falange*, languished in a Republican jail. The Nationalist trump card, the African Army, was blocked in Spanish Morocco and seemed likely to remain there since most of the fleet was in Republican hands after sailors had seized the ships, shooting or throwing overboard any officer suspected of Nationalist sympathies. Even in Rome and Berlin the general consensus was that the rebellion had begun so disastrously that it was bound to collapse prematurely.

The prognostication of failure was reinforced by the crash on 20 July of the Puss Moth carrying the leader of the movement, General Sanjurjo, to Spain shortly after taking off from Lisbon. The general was killed instantly and the rebellion was left without a head. There were three rivals for the position, Franco, Mola and Queipo de Llano; but the matter was not resolved until October, after a meeting in Burgos of leading insurgents, which was often acrimonious and which lasted several days.



Nationalist divisional badges. (A) *17th Division*: a black shield with a red-yellow-red centre stripe, the number in white on a black patch enclosed by a yellow 'D'. The small insignia identify the branches represented in the formation: top, left to right, the regular infantry badge in yellow, with red showing in the loop of the horn; the red Falangist emblem; and the badge of the *Tercio* in full colour. Bottom, left to right: the white tower of the regular engineers, the yellow grenade of the artillery, and the yellow rifles and white crescent of the Moroccan regular infantry. (B) *23rd Division*: yellow edge, yellow (left) and blue halved shield, yellow infantry badge, red legend. (C) *74th Division*: red disc, yellow rim with green motif, central device all yellow except grey helmet.

Franco was eventually invested with the supreme civil and military power.

The outlook changed dramatically when, contrary to all studied opinion, the African Army was ferried across the Straits of Gibraltar, and in Spain itself the Republicans failed utterly to exploit their initial successes.

By a combination of audacity, sound planning and luck, 80 per cent of the 23,000 men making up the African Army were regrouped in the Sevilla area by the first week in September. A major airlift—the first in military history—of 800 men had reached the mainland by 2 August. Then, on 5 August, doubting the operational efficacy of the practically officerless Republican fleet, Franco took

the biggest risk of his career. Three thousand men, a number of horses, fifty tons of ammunition and twelve field guns, were packed onto two small steamers and two cargo boats which were then in Ceuta harbour and, protected only by an ancient gunboat, the *Dato*, were ordered to make a dash for the Spanish coast. Half way across, the convoy was intercepted by the Republican destroyer *Alcala Galiano*. A running battle, lasting the best part of an hour, followed. The *Dato* did not hesitate to engage the larger, faster and more heavily armed *Galiano* to such good effect that the latter failed to score a single hit on what should have proved a sitting target; she finally turned tail when 14 planes of the tiny Nationalist Air Force joined in, dropping bombs which, though wide of the mark, produced the desired effect.

Legionnaires of the Tercio move up a communications trench during the attacks on Madrid. They wear regulation early service and combat dress—long tunic, flared gaiter-trousers, light canvas shoes and gorillo cap. Note that one has single rear Y-strap, another double shoulder-braces crossed at the rear. (Keystone)

Even before these reinforcements arrived the Nationalists were making determined attempts to seize the initiative. On 3 August a column consisting of the 4th *Bandera* of the *Tercio* and a *tabor* of *Regulares*, with half a field battery under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Asensio, headed north from Sevilla to link up with General Mola in command of insurgent forces in Navarre and to bring him urgently needed ammunition. After a rapid advance the column ran into organized opposition on the 6th. The ensuing battle, the first of the war properly speaking, lasted seven hours. There were heavy casualties on both sides before the Republicans withdrew, only to make a stand the following day at Almadralejo, a hundred miles north of Sevilla. Here, though they fought well, they were pushed out of the town by evening, but unshaken by these initial reverses, they prepared to defend Mérida.

Asensio's column was weakened by these two engagements, and he was ordered to wait for reinforcements; these arrived in the form of a



second column commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Castejón. Mérida fell to this combined force on 11 August, and Yagué arrived that same evening to assume overall command.

Due west of Mérida, and astride the road from Portugal (along which the Nationalists were hoping promised supplies would soon be arriving), was the walled town of Badajoz of Peninsular War fame. It was strongly held by a force of 5,000 Republican militia, and constituted a major threat not only to the much needed supplies but also to the tenuous Nationalist line of communications; Yagué therefore ordered a general assault for the 14th.

The Republicans outnumbered their attackers by two to one and had the advantage of fighting from prepared and well-constructed positions. But though they did not lack courage, the raw militiamen were no match for Yagué's legionaries. Led by the 16th Company, commanded by Captain Perez Caballero, the *Tercio* stormed through a breach in the Puerta de la Trinidad. By evening the citadel had been stormed, and all Republicans either killed or taken prisoner.

Yagué's ultimate objective was now Madrid, and, by the end of August, he had reached Talavera de la Reina. There his columns were heavily counter attacked. Fighting continued throughout the daylight hours before the Republicans withdrew, leaving behind 500 dead, 1,000 prisoners and 42 guns. Nationalist casualties totalled over 1,000 and, despite Franco's exhortations to press on, Yagué called a halt for twelve days after clearing the town. Yagué's hesitation at this critical stage is difficult to understand. When eventually he did resume his advance, he took seventeen days to progress sixteen miles against negligible opposition and then 'collapsed with exhaustion'.

In the meantime Spanish attention, and indeed that of the world, had been diverted to the Nationalist defence of the Alcázar of Toledo held by 600 *Guardia Civil*, 242 officers, NCOs, and cadets of the military academy, and 60 *Falangists*, commanded by Colonel Moscardo. Besieged since 20 July, the defenders were in a desperate state as September drew to a close, their plight made worse by the fact that some 500 women and children were also within the walls and being given priority where the rapidly diminishing food supply was concerned. The very considerable besieging force, anxious to



At the time of the outbreak of war a left-wing 'Olympiad', organized in Barcelona in competition with the official Berlin Olympic Games, had brought many foreigners sympathetic to the Republic to Spain. Some of these at once formed volunteer units, the first to aid the Republic. Prominent was the mainly German 'Thaelmann Centuria', which saw action on the Aragon front. This illustration, by Embleton after Bueno and Norman, shows a Thaelmann volunteer in light khaki *mono* with regulation infantry equipment, and the limp khaki sun-hat used by Spanish troops in Morocco. Both sides used this headgear during summer campaigns. When the Internationals were re-organized into a brigade structure the survivors of this Centuria joined the XIth Brigade, also mainly German, and also using the title 'Thaelmann'.



Republican prisoners being marched in by Nationalist infantry in the Somosierra sector. The Republicans wear civilian clothing, the Nationalists gorillo caps and what appear to be khaki monos. (Keystone)

score a spectacular success, kept throwing in repeated round-the-clock assaults.

Franco was now faced by a momentous choice: should he march on Madrid abandoning the Alcázar to its fate, or should he turn aside, bowing to the dictates of humanity rather than to those of operational exigencies? Despite warnings that by so doing he might well be throwing away the chance of occupying the capital, he chose the latter course. A relief force was entrusted to the ex-bugler Varela, the most dynamic of the Nationalist commanders. He was given six days to accomplish the mission; he had routed both besiegers and nearby Republican reinforcements within three. On 27 September, the siege was over; it had lasted sixty-eight days.

In the north, Mola had been making equally solid, if less spectacular gains. One of his main objectives was the closure of the French frontier in the Hendaye/Irun area, across which substantial aid was flowing into the Republican camp. The Nationalists occupied Irun itself but not before Anarchist militia fighting a rearguard action with

Mola's *Requetés* had gutted the city on 4 September. At the same time the important centres of Oviedo and Gijón were also seized by Nationalist forces in surprise attacks. Brilliantly defended by Aranda, Oviedo held out successfully for several months against a series of determined attempts on the part of Asturian militia to regain the city. Gijón, with a garrison of only 180, fell after a four-week siege, but not till the commander, Colonel Pinilla had sent a dramatic message to the captain of the Nationalist cruiser *Cervera* which was at that time off the coast, 'Fire on us. We have the enemy inside. Fire on us, I repeat.'

Thus, by the end of October, the Nationalists held all western Spain. In the south their territory included Sevilla, as well as the historic towns of Córdoba and Granada, but none of the coast east of Gibraltar. Indeed all of eastern Spain formed a solid keep, stretching from Gibraltar to Port Bou, seeming to defy all Nationalist aspirations. In the north the Nationalists had gained territory but had failed to occupy the much prized industrial area round Bilbao. They had also failed to subdue the independent-minded Basques; the Basques' position was, however, dangerous, for though they held the vital coastal strip which included both

Bilbao and Santander, they were cut off from the rest of Republican territory, the sea their only access to supplies.

On 6 October Franco, deciding that the time was ripe for the attack on Madrid, confided the operation to Varela, fresh from his Toledo triumph. His force of 10,000 men was to be divided into four columns, the two main axes of their thrust to be the Toledo-Madrid and the Mérida-Madrid roads. A subsidiary force of 5,000 men under General Valdes Cabanillas was ordered to make a diversionary attack from the west across the Sierra Guadarrama, while Yagué, now recovered, was given command of the two columns of Varela's force operating along the Toledo road.

To begin with, progress was deceptively rapid; by the 29th all roads, except those from the east, leading to Madrid had been cut. Thinking the final stage was about to begin, Franco sent Mola to assume overall command.

By then, however, massive material aid had



Russian BT-5 light tanks of the Republican Army captured by the Nationalists. They seem to be finished in standard Soviet forest-green, with white turret numbers.

reached the defenders. Reinforcements had poured in. The defence had been allowed the time to put itself on a sound military and political footing. Professional officers and raw militiamen had been welded into a cohesive fighting force known as the 5th Regiment, its political reliability guaranteed by the introduction of political commissars. For the Nationalists there was an ominous warning of the pattern of things to come when, on the 28th, Republican nine-ton Russian tanks wiped out, without loss, a squadron of Nationalist Fiat 'tankettes', whose only armament was a machine



gun. The Nationalists again delayed, and it was not till 7 November that Varela's offensive got under way.

Some 50,000 Republicans were preparing themselves, and, in order to eliminate any possible disruption, on 6 November anyone suspected of rightist sympathies was taken from the jails into which they had been flung in July and summarily executed. Morale soared. The Spanish version 'No Pasarán' of the Verdun battle cry 'Ils ne passeront pas' was resuscitated and on everyone's lips.

In the face of such determined and unexpectedly powerful resistance, Varela's vanguard was unable to cross the Manzanares river, and when later in the day a *tabor* of *Regulares* broke through the defence line, it was halted, then flung back thanks to the personal gallantry of Miaja who led the counter-attack, revolver in hand. Returning to the attack the next day, Varela's leading battalion reached the University City, there to run into the withering fire of the first-formed of the International Brigades, the 'Rusos', which was a mixture of Germans and central Europeans. The battle lasted till the 18th. The *Tercio* overran the strongly-held Casa Velasquez, the School of Architecture and the *Instituto de Higiene*, but was unable to push on to the city centre, bombed during this time by *Legion Condor* planes. There was a critical moment for the defence when a Catalan Anarchist unit, holding the Hall of Philosophy, lost their nerve and ran, but the gap was eventually plugged by the Internationals and a Basque battalion.

Leaving his Salamanca headquarters, Franco moved up to Madrid. By the 17th he had come to the decision that the capital was too strongly held to fall to the direct assault of the comparatively small force at his disposal; he decided instead to try to starve the city into subjection. Calling off the direct attack, he ordered the main effort to be switched to the principal supply line, the Madrid-Valencia road, which was protected on its exposed flank by the Jarama river.

The weather had by then deteriorated, snow and bitter cold prevailing. Mola returned to the north and Varela, his army swollen to 20,000, again took over local command after recovering from a slight wound received on Christmas Day. The struggle to gain control of the Valencia road continued till mid-February, and ended, as the battle of Madrid



Nationalist Army Corps insignia, occasionally worn on the left sleeve of the tunic. (A) C.E. de Castilla: red shield edged yellow, yellow castle, yellow hilt, white blade. (B) C.E. de Aragon: shield halved blue (left) and white, yellow rim, yellow lion, red cross. (C) C.E. de Urgel: gold crown with silver balls, red interior, alternate red and green jewels; gold-rimmed shield striped yellow and red, outer stripes yellow each side; black and white checkers.

had, in a setback for the Nationalists. Despite the suffering and casualties amounting to several thousands, the Republicans were able to deny the vital communication to their enemy. Thus 1936 ended with the tide of battle turning suddenly in favour of the Republic, though, only a few months before, it had seemed to be running inexorably in the direction of the Nationalists.

1937 Having failed not only to take, but to isolate Madrid, Franco decided to maintain the threat to the capital, but with a much reduced force, and to concentrate on the northern industrial areas. Nevertheless, being much in need of the logistic aid offered by Italy, he allowed himself to be badgered by Mussolini into staging an offensive in Andalucia in order to allow the Italian *Volontarie* to show their

combat-worth for international propaganda purposes.

Though Málaga, the major urban centre of the area, was held in great force, the local Andalucian militia had little battle experience and was considered to be poorly led. On 14 January under the not very enthusiastic overall command of Queipo de Llano, three columns led by the Duke of Sevilla, Colonel Gonzalez Espinosa, and General Roatta, whose column consisted of nine Italian Blackshirt battalions, a brigade of Falangists and a brigade of *Requetés*, launched a triple pronged drive towards the coast. By 5 February, the ring had closed round Málaga, which fell after sporadic resistance on the 8th.

Encouraged by this early success, the delighted Mussolini now urged that his 'victorious' Black-shirts be employed in the Madrid area.

On 7 March the Italians, now formed into two divisions supported by 250 light tanks and 180 guns, their right flank covered by a mixed brigade of *Regulares*, *Requetés* and *Falangists*, began their advance aiming for Guadalajara to the north-east of Madrid on the main Madrid-Saragossa highway. Though allotted the road as their main approach axis, the Italians made abnormally slow progress, thereby giving Miaja time to race some of his best troops, including Enrique Lister's Communist Battalion, the Mera Anarchist Battalion, and the XII International Brigade, to the threatened area.

The Republican air force gained local air superiority, and at the first encounter, Russian tanks again defeated the numerically-superior Italian armour. The advance ground to a halt. On the 13th the Republicans counterattacked, and by the 18th, after a first show of resistance, the Italians were in a precipitate retreat that savoured of *saute qui peut*; their losses were estimated at 6,000 including 2,000 dead. For Mussolini it was a humiliating defeat which was aggravated by the fact that the mixed Spanish brigade, commanded by Moscardo of Alcázar fame, had, alone, stopped the Republican pursuit; and that, almost to a man, the Nationalists hailed the Italian rout as a triumph of fellow Spaniards over the 'foreigner'.


On hearing the news, Franco is supposed to have said, 'Splendid! We can now begin the strategically important northern operation.' This was planned

to take place in three phases: the capture of Bilbao, the capture of Santander, the reduction of the Asturias. It was a gruelling campaign. The Nationalists seem to have committed a grave error in not offering some form of political compromise to the Basques who, at heart, had little in common with the anti-clerical Marxist-Leninists who formed the bulk of the Republic's supporters. Their goal was autonomy, but this was anathema to Franco, obsessed by the ideal of '*España, Una y Grande*', whereas Madrid had let it be known that a comprehensive measure of autonomy was contemplated for the Basque province, as it was for the Catalans.

On 26 April, the *Legion Condor* bombed the Basque town of Guernica, providing a curtain raiser to the horrors of Rotterdam, Coventry and Dresden, and killing or maiming some 30 per cent of the town's civilian population. Though it has since been established that neither Franco nor Mola knew the attack was contemplated—the *Legion Condor* commander was subsequently recalled on Franco's insistence—the bombing did immense harm to the Nationalist cause throughout the world; it also stiffened, rather than softened, Basque determination to fight.

Bilbao was protected by an 'iron ring' of fortifications against which initial Nationalist attacks made little impression. There was further disarray in the Nationalist ranks when, on 3 June, Mola was killed in a plane crash, on his way to a conference with the Generalissimo in Burgos. Franco immediately took over the direction of the offensive, inaugurating a new technique; this involved throwing in his infantry only after the enemy had been subjected to a violent initial artillery bombardment, followed if possible by an aerial bombardment. Thus nibbled away, the 'iron ring' disintegrated. Unable to stand up to the weight of metal directed against them, the defenders of Bilbao surrendered on 19 July, having lost over 20,000 battle casualties; another 14,000 surrendered. For the Nationalists, it was a victory of considerable import, as they now held their first major industrial centre.

Before General Davila, to whom Franco had handed over command on the eve of the final assault on Bilbao, could regroup for the second phase, the Republicans had launched the first of



Moorish infantry, photographed in northern Spain early in the war. They wear the small white turban or *rexa*, 'lentil'-coloured cotton uniforms with brass collar badges, and brown leather equipment of the type normally worn by troops of the African Army—the *Tercio* was often observed wearing the same equipment in black. (Keystone)

their powerful counter-offensives. Till then Republican successes had been largely of a defensive nature, but from the beginning of the year the build-up of their forces had proceeded so rapidly that both Miaja and Rojo were of the opinion that the time had arrived to seize the initiative. By 1 July, the *Ejército Popular* was approaching the half million mark, its main striking force organized into four corps, the II, III, V, and XVIII. Miaja decided to employ two, the V and XVIII for a blow at the weakest part of the Nationalist lines encircling Madrid, which was that in the area of Brunete, twelve miles west of the capital.

Commanded by Juan Modesto, V Corps was made up of three divisions: the 11th, 46th and 35th (which included the XIth International Brigade), under Lister, 'El Campesino', and Walter (the future Polish Defence Minister, whose real name was Karol Swierczewski). XVIII Corps under Colonel Jurado, a regular officer, also comprised three divisions: the 34th, 10th and 15th—the 15th being made up of XIIIth and XVth International Brigades—under Galan, Enciso, and Gal. This hand-picked force, 65,000 strong, was to be supported by 60 tanks, a cavalry regiment, and 102 guns. In addition, Miaja constituted an army

reserve of two divisions, those of Kléber and Durán, which contributed 20,000 men, 47 tanks, and 92 guns, and which Miaja kept under his direct control. He was also able to concentrate 150 planes to give him immediate air superiority, since the *Legion Condor*, grouped in the north, would take three to four days to redeploy.


Rojo's plan, drawn up after consultations with the head of the Russian Military Mission, Gregori Kulik, was that this powerful striking force should deliver a massive blow on a thirteen-mile front, then close in to cut the Madrid-Navalcarnero road, the only supply route for Yagué's strung-out division holding the Brunete sector between the Rio Guadarrama in the west and the Rio Perales in the east.

Before dawn on 6 July, the Republicans, spearheaded by Lister's 11th and 'El Campesino's' 46th divisions, punched a jagged hole in Yagué's thinly-held line. Lister surrounded Brunete, while 46th Division stormed the village of Quijorna. By

midday the vital position of Villanueva de la Canada was isolated and under heavy attack by the British Battalion of the XVth International Brigade. That evening Madrid celebrated a major victory.

The general euphoria was not shared by either Miaja or Rojo. Once reports from the front had been sifted, it was obvious that vital objectives set for the first twenty-four hours had not been attained. The 7th and 8th were days of profound disillusion, the Republic's weakness in trained officers was becoming increasingly evident. Advancing divisions lost touch with each other, collided with each other, mistook each other for the enemy, and were heavily shelled by their own artillery. Confusion led to loss of morale. Threatened mutiny was only quelled by summary executions in the field. There was a crisis in XVIII Corps when Jurado collapsed. His place was taken by Colonel Casado who captured Villanueva, but was then halted, unable, as ordered, to exploit the initial gains made by V Corps. Fearing he would be held responsible for defeat, Casado reported sick, to be replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Fernandez Heredia.

A Government gun-crew photographed during the siege of Huesca. They wear the distinctive Spanish steel helmet, not a very common piece of equipment among Government forces. The rest of their clothing is motley in the extreme. (Keystone)



Meanwhile, unperturbed, Franco halted the move on Santander, switching 30,000 men under Varela to Brunete. By 12 July the Republican advance was stopped dead, and six days later Varela launched his counterattack. By the 24th Brunete, which had fallen to Lister, had been recaptured and the Republicans pushed back almost to their starting line, having lost 24,000 men; Nationalist losses over the same period were 12,000. The Internationals had sustained particularly severe casualties; the British Battalion was reduced to 80 men, while the American 'Washington' and 'Lincoln' Battalions had to be merged, and were known from then on as 'The Lincolns'.

Varela was anxious to follow up his success and make a dash for Madrid, but Franco, refusing to be diverted, ordered the immediate resumption of the second phase in the north.

On 14 August General Davila closed in on Santander, at the same time driving a wedge between the remaining Basque formations and the Asturian militia. With a total of 106 battalions, he enjoyed a two-to-one superiority over his immediate opponent, the Basque General Ulibarri. Depressed by the fall of Bilbao and news of the setback at Brunete, Basque resistance collapsed; senior officers deserted, Ulibarri and several of his staff escaping the tightening net by embarking on a submarine. On 26 August, Davila entered Santander, and 55,000 Basques raised the white flag; contemporary reports stated that 'Enough war material to supply a whole army was captured'.

Nevertheless, two days before Santander fell, the Republicans launched a second offensive south of Saragossa, the main attack falling on Belchite, seventeen miles south of the city, with subsidiary blows directed at Fuentes de Ebro, Codo, and Zuera. Though commanded by General Pozas, chief of the Catalan army, the attacking force was composed largely of the reconstituted V Corps, whose 35th Division had been doubled by the addition of XIth and XIIIth International Brigades, and Kléber's 45th Division. The line to be assaulted ran from Saragossa in the north to Teruel in the south.

Attacking Belchite itself, the XVth International Brigade immediately ran into a determined defence which they did not overcome till 6 September. The story of this second offensive was, in fact, mostly a



Brigada—senior N.C.O.—of Republican artillery, in surprisingly neat and complete summer service uniform; illustration by Embleton after Bueno. The dark khaki peaked cap has a cloth-covered peak, brown strap, brass grenade branch badge, red star, and double red bars of rank each side of the branch badge. The loose trousers are of roughly the same shade of khaki; the shirt is a paler shade, with plastic buttons. A dark khaki patch on the pocket bears a red star above red rank bars. Leather is brown with brass fittings.

repeat of the first. The capture of Belchite represented the high point of the Republican thrust and the end of the battle's first phase; after that both sides began to dig in. Republican losses again had been heavy, particularly in the northern sector where they had run into the 2nd, 5th, and 12th *Banderas* of the *Tercio*. A renewed attack on 22

September was even less successful, with negligible gains. At the end of the month the costly and unrewarding operation was called off.

In the meantime, the third phase of Franco's northern offensive was making steady progress. Opposition inspired by hard-core Communists and Anarchists was stubborn, but, as in the Santander operation, there was a sudden collapse of morale in mid-October. A number of Republican units went over to the enemy with their arms and equipment. Gijón, the last Asturian stronghold, fell on 21 October. This success so elated the usually phlegmatic Franco, that he decided to bring the war to a speedy conclusion with a second attack on what he imagined must be a thoroughly demoralized Madrid.

Pessimism did indeed reign among the capital's population, but neither Miaja nor Rojo were prepared to admit defeat, even though costly

Republican Renault FT.17 tanks of First World War vintage photographed in the streets bordering Madrid's University City, a focal point in the fighting of November 1936. Among the most determined of the attacking units were the legionnaires of the Tercio, while the crisis of the defence was averted by the courage of the Internationals. (Keystone)

reverses in the field had been followed by bitter disputes, clashes and bloodshed between rival extremist left groups. Both senior officers were confident that their battle-trying corps and the Internationals were still full of fight, having gained by their experiences, and that given a minimum of luck they were capable of turning the tables. Above all, however, it was obvious that another quick blow must be delivered to disrupt the Nationalist offensive.

Teruel, a town perched on a rocky promontory dominating the confluence of the Guadalaviar and Alfambra rivers, was finally selected as the main objective, forming as it did a deep salient into the Republican positions. The attack was fixed for 14 December, Rojo's intelligence network having received information that the Nationalists intended to strike on the 18th. General Hernández Sarabia, professional officer and personal friend of Rojo, was given command of the 90,000 all-Spanish force collected for the task, the Internationals being held in reserve. Striking a day late, on the 15th, two corps, the XXII into which Lister's division had



been incorporated, and the XVIII, closed in behind Teruel isolating the town and its garrison of 6,000 commanded by Colonel Rey d'Harcourt.

The weather was appalling; snow lay deep with temperatures falling to eighteen degrees below zero. Taken by surprise, the Nationalists had no immediate reinforcements available. By the 18th, troops of XVIII Corps had occupied the heights of La Muela overlooking the town from the south, and, four days later, they forced a way into the outskirts despite a blizzard covering the battlefield with six feet of snow. Turning every house of every street into a miniature fortress, the garrison put up a resistance comparable with that of the Alcázar, making the attackers pay heavily for every inch gained. When the news reached him, Franco disregarded the advice of his German liaison officer, Colonel Funck, and cancelled the imminent push on Madrid, dispatching two corps, those of Varela and Aranda, to relieve Teruel. These reinforcements stopped the Republican advance, but when they attempted to counterattack, they made little headway. The weather was now playing a major role; frostbite was a problem in both camps, and Nationalists and Republicans alike were engaged in a constant battle to keep lines of communication open. Thus the year ended in stalemate.

Nevertheless the outlook for the Republicans was black. In 1937 vast areas had fallen to the Nationalists. The capture of the industrial north had not only given Franco an industrial base, but, more importantly, had provided him with a bargaining weapon on the international scene, enabling him to adopt a more independent line with Germany and Italy, and at the same time initiate cautious trade negotiations with Great Britain. The numerical balance was now swinging in favour of the Right and, by New Year's Day 1938, their total force was estimated at 600,000—an infantry mass of 650 battalions, a cavalry division, 290 batteries of artillery, and 600 operational aircraft. The weakness was armour; Russian tanks were still superior to the Italian Fiat tankettes and German PzKw Is. Nationalist morale stood high and, as so often happens in civil war, the people not dedicated to either cause were beginning to throw in their lot with those who seemed likely to emerge as the eventual victors.

There had been political as well as military crises for the Republicans during 1937. Bitter quarrels within the hierarchy had forced 'Largo Caballero' to step down in favour of his Minister of Finance, Dr Juan Negrín who, though a favourite of the Communists was viewed with suspicion by the Basques and non-extremists. There had been trouble in the International Brigades; men were sickened by the incompetence of many of their officers and by the brutal discipline (summary execution in the field for hesitance in the face of the enemy was commonplace). The die-hards had lost nothing of their fanaticism, but by January 1938 recruiting had practically ceased and gaps in the ranks were being filled by Spanish nationals known as *Quintos*.

1938 The year opened with a Republican success. On 7 January, after tanks and *dinamiteros* had reduced the defensive perimeter to a few square yards, Colonel Rey d'Harcourt surrendered what was left of Teruel. The success was, however, short-lived; Varela was able to resume his advance, so that by the 10th the captors of Teruel found themselves besieged.

At this stage General Walter's division of four International Brigades was committed, the British Battalion of the XVth Brigade being in the van. But despite their noted courage and pertinacity, they were unable to push back or halt the Nationalists. *Pour encourager les autres*, the battalion commander ordered two young Englishmen suffering from shock and incipient frostbite to be shot for cowardice.

On 17 January the Republicans were driven off the La Muela heights. Exhausted after a month of continuous fighting in dreadful climatic conditions, they cracked, but the gap opened by their retreat was soon plugged by Walter's Internationals.

There followed a comparative lull till 7 February, on which day General Monasterio's cavalry scored a spectacular though anachronistic local victory with a charge after the style of Murat at Eylau. That day and the next the Republicans lost 15,000 killed and wounded, 7,000 prisoners, vast quantities of material and 400 square miles of territory. A week later Yagué, driving from the north, crossed the Alfambra river, while Varela and Aranda completed the investment of the largely razed Teruel.


Seeing the enemy ring about to close, Sarabia ordered 'El Campesino', whose division had stormed and held the town, to make good his escape. When the Nationalists entered the town on the 20th, they took another 14,000 prisoners and 'piously buried' a further 10,000 dead. Humiliated by the defeat, 'El Campesino' protested to Sarabia that throughout the campaign, his two great rivals, Lister and Modesto, had through jealousy been scheming to get him killed.


On 9 March the Nationalists launched a major offensive with the double objective of reaching the Mediterranean near the mouth of the Ebro river, thereby splitting Republican territory and armed forces in two, and of occupying the rest of Aragon. Once more Franco was subjected to strong outside pressure to make Madrid his primary objective. Again he refused to listen either to blandishments

or to veiled threats of withdrawing aid, put out by envoys of both Hitler and Mussolini. To the German von Stohrer he said bluntly, 'I must not exterminate the enemy nor destroy the cities, the countryside, industries and production. . . . If I were in a hurry I would not be a patriot, but would be behaving like a foreigner. No amount of argument will make me depart from the gradual programme. There will be less glory but more internal peace afterwards.'

The drive to the sea, on which he insisted, was typical of his carefully developed, methodically worked-out conception of how the war should be carried on, with the means now at his disposal, to its inevitable conclusion. One of his principal aims was to avoid further heavy losses of men. There were to be no more heroics; no more glorious victories won at the cost of mounds of dead. He counted on destroying enemy morale, sapping all will to resist, thereby hastening eventual capitulation, as Montgomery was to do later in the Western Desert and in

Nationalist infantry in typical summer combat dress search a farmhouse. Note the mixture of puttees and *granadero* trousers. (Keystone)





Normandy, by concentrating the weight of artillery on the preliminary softening up and exploiting his air superiority, then assembling an immensely superior mass of men for an assault on a narrow front.

The Nationalist army had now been regrouped into six corps, each with a regional appellation: Castilla, four divisions under Varela; Galicia, five divisions under Aranda; Marroquí, three divisions composed entirely of the *Tercio* and *Regularés* under Yagué; Navarra, four divisions under Solchaga; Aragon, four divisions under Moscardo; the CTV, two Italian and one Italo-Spanish division under the Italian Berti. Two further divisions were later formed into a 7th corps under General Orgaz.

The opening phase of the offensive was headed by the Marroquí, Galicia, and Navarra Corps, breaking the Republican front at several points in the first few hours. On 10 March, Belchite fell to Solchaga, while on the 13th Aranda overran Montalbán. Yagué then drove on to capture Alcañiz and further to the north, Caspe, temporary headquarters of the Republican Command and 100 miles beyond the starting point. The second

The dominant tank throughout the war was the Russian T-26, one of many variations on a basic Vickers design to see service around the world between the World Wars. This nine-ton vehicle with a 45mm main armament was delivered to the Republic in significant numbers; about 100 are thought to have arrived by the end of October 1936. It was capable of defeating the Italian 'tankettes' and German PzKpfw Is of the Nationalist tank companies without difficulty, when properly employed. A bounty was offered by the Nationalists for every T-26 captured, and several companies of 'turned around' T-26s were in action before the end of the war. This captured tank bears the red-yellow-red Nationalist flag on the hull side. Later, for extra visibility, captured tanks had large areas of the turret walls painted in these stripes, and a black and white St Andrew's Cross painted on the turret roof.

phase, begun on 22 March, sought to exploit the initial gains by pushing north to the French frontier and east towards Lérida. No serious opposition was encountered till Yagué, having entered Catalan territory, fought a savage battle with 'El Campesino' for the possession of Lérida which fell on 3 April; on the same day the important road centre of Gandesa was captured, and a rapid advance followed to the Ebro north of Tortosa. On 8 April, Tremp, the source of Barcelona's water supply was in Nationalist hands, while their advanced elements had reached the French frontier to the west of Andorra, but for a tiny, and totally isolated

pocket defended by an individual popularly known as 'El Esquinazado' (The Dodger). Phase three was marked by the arrival of the Nationalists on the Mediterranean coast south of the mouth of the Ebro. On Good Friday, 15 April, a division commanded by General Alonso Vega, boyhood friend of Franco, captured the fishing village of Vinaroz, fanned out north and south, and seized a coastal stretch of 30 miles. Meanwhile a division under one of the most brilliant of the younger commanders, General Garcia Valiño, was directed back to Tortosa to the aid of the Italians, who were showing signs of cracking. Taking over, Valiño led an assault on the town which was stormed on the 19th. The Italians were then, at their own request, moved 'to a quiet sector of a quiet front'.

Over the next three months the Nationalists continued to make further territorial gains including a long stretch of coast reaching almost as far south as Sagunto. This meant that between 8 March and 20 July they conquered an area the size of the Netherlands. As was pointed out, this was 'no mean feat for an army that still went on foot and whose transport and supplies were almost entirely horse-drawn'.

Though the fall of Barcelona now appeared imminent, Franco once more astonished his enemies and dismayed his supporters by his choice of the next Nationalist objective. Though what was termed the Valencia pocket, had a front of 500 miles, while the Catalan front stretched 200 miles, Franco was convinced that the south presented the softer target. The inhabitants were mainly uncommitted, though many were reported to be waiting eagerly for the moment when they could raise the *Sangre y Oro* standard. As Valencia itself was within thirty miles of the Nationalist front line, Franco was of the opinion that within a week—a fortnight at the most—the city would fall, and all resistance cease. For the eleven divisions earmarked for the operation, it would be what the first Napoleon had termed a *promenade militaire*, and the Marroqui and Navarra Corps, on whom so much of the brunt of the fighting had fallen, would enjoy a well-earned rest in the pleasant surroundings of the Ebro Valley, protected against surprise and possible commando-type attacks by the river barrier.

The Valencia offensive launched on 5 July began

well, the two principal axes being down the coast from Castellón, the first objective Sagunto, and south-east across the sierras from Teruel via Mora de Rubielos. A first defence line, that of the Sierra de Toro, collapsed and for a moment it seemed the fate of Valencia was sealed. Then torrential rain started to fall as the Nationalists reached the second Republican line, that of the Sierra de Espadán, whose fortifications had been cleverly constructed to take every advantage of the tumbled terrain. The main strongpoints were sited so as to be invulnerable to tanks and aerial bombardment, and little affected by shelling. Led by the capable Menéndez, the Republicans threw back every assault. Far from being a *promenade militaire*, the operation proved a costly failure which Franco halted after the Castilla and Galicia Corps had suffered some 17,500 casualties.

By mid-July the position in Madrid looked perilous, but optimism reigned in both Valencia and Barcelona. Republican morale had been boosted by a massive arms flow across the French frontier (reopened on 17 March) totalling 25,000 tons in less than three months and including 300 modern aircraft, mostly I-16 *Ratas* mounting 4 machine guns, and 200 heavy guns. It was also obvious that a major international crisis was looming over Czecho-Slovakia, threatening a total European war, which the Republicans imagined would bring Britain and France into their camp. To prove to these potential allies that the Spanish war was far from entering into its concluding stage, General Rojo was asked by Negrín to prepare plans for a summer offensive whose success would make headlines in the world Press and induce Russia and France to step up their aid. The plan evolved by Rojo and his staff was based on the same principles as the three abortive 1937 offensives, but this time it was felt that the weight of men and material available for the blow could not fail to achieve success.

A force of 120,000 men, designated 'The Army of the Ebro' had been assembled, made up of three completely reorganized corps, but bearing the by now traditional numberings, V, XV and XVIII. Lister was to command V Corps, his 45th Division comprising XIIth and XIVth International Brigades; XV Corps was entrusted to Manuel Taguena, a brave man but dangerously lacking in

military experience, having been the leader of the Communist students at Madrid University before the war. His 25th Division contained three International Brigades, the XIth, XIIIth, and XVth. Heredia's XVIII Corps was the immediate reserve, while the 'Army of the Ebro' was put under the overall command of Modesto. Supporting the infantry were 80 field artillery batteries, a regiment of anti-aircraft guns and 120 fighters and bombers. In addition, the individual fire-power of each battalion had been considerably augmented by the inclusion of complementary mortar and machine-gun companies.

The sector selected by the Republican War Council was that of the Ebro river from Mequinenza in the north to Amposta near the mouth, the main blow to be delivered in the great bulge formed by the river between Fayón and Cherta, known to be held by only a single division of Yagué's Corps, supported by a powerful diversionary attack on a much shorter front from Fayón to Mequinenza. The terrain throughout was mountainous and broken, the Republicans hoping that, should their offensive be slowed, eventual enemy logistic superiority would thereby be nullified. The principal aim was to restore land communications with the Valencia pocket.

Again complete surprise was achieved. At 0.15 hrs on the night of 24/25 July, men who had received intensive training in river crossings were ferried over the Ebro in rubber dinghies at a series of points selected by Michael Dunbar, XVth International Brigade's chief of staff; the first unit to reach the right bank was the Hans Heimler Battalion of the XIth, made up of Scandinavians and Catalans. Yagué's strung-out division was quite incapable of containing an attack of such magnitude. By evening, leading units of the V and XV Corps had established two bridgeheads, one of a depth of five miles from Mequinenza to Fayón, the second, considerably more extended, between Fayón and Cherta; here, having wiped out one of the holding brigades, capturing the heights of Caballs and Pandolls, and pushing right up to the gates of Gandesa, Lister had achieved a penetration of 25 miles. The arrival of Yagué's reserve division only just managed to avert the fall of Gandesa itself, the most important road junction in the area.

At the southern extremity of the line, XIVth

International Brigade crossed the river in the neighbourhood of Amposta, only to run into strong opposition from General López Bravo's division. They had failed to achieve surprise and could make no impression on the *ad hoc* but effective defence. For eighteen hours they made desperate attempts to establish a proper bridgehead, but by dawn on the 26th, after suffering over 600 dead, fell back in confusion to the left bank abandoning the bulk of their equipment.

On 1 August the XVth International Brigade endeavoured to storm a key position, Hill 481, baptized 'The Pimple', overlooking Gandesa. The British Battalion in the van again suffered heavily, among the killed being Lewis Clive, a direct descendant of Clive of India, and David Haden Guest, son of a Labour peer. Even though several assaults were led by Lister in person, they were unable to dislodge Yagué's legionaries.

By the following day, the Nationalists had managed to align seven fresh divisions. The Republicans were faced by the brutal truth that the great offensive on which such high hopes had been pinned had been brought to a halt. They were determined, however, to hang on at all costs to their gains of the past ten days. Their forward posts began to dig in, while their highly efficient engineers set to work preparing a defence network for the area of the Ebro bulge, making full use of the commanding heights which had been overrun in the initial stages.

The fanatical Lister issued an Order of the Day, 'If anyone loses an inch of ground he must retake it at the head of his men or be executed'. Sergeants were authorized to kill any officer who issued an order to retreat without permission from a higher authority. Documents captured by the Nationalists showed that these draconian decrees were often carried out.

Anxious to counteract the swing in world opinion brought about by the Army of the Ebro's deep penetration, the Nationalists threw in their first major counterattack on 6 August, its objective to clear the small bridgehead between Fayón and Mequinenza. The task was allotted to one of the freshly-arrived divisions, that of General Delgado Serrano, which after two days' hard fighting was able to report complete success. By the evening of the 8th, not a man of Taguena's force which had



*Falangista of Falange de Choque, Nationalist 22nd Division; illustration by Embleton after Bueno. Assault Companies were formed inside various Nationalist battalions, including those of the Falange, for raiding and spearheading assaults. Bueno illustrates this member of the assault company of the Falangist *Bandera de Málaga* in the 22nd Division. The jacket is the old Spanish Army *tabarda*, which passed out of general use some time before the Civil War but which was occasionally seen on both sides as old stocks were pressed into service. The black beret with the white death's-head device was typical of these units, and the usual red Falangist breast badge is worn. The white chevron on the left sleeve indicates a combatant (see description of colour plate B2); below it is the yellow shield with black edge and '22a' of the divisional insignia. The jacket, trousers and puttees are khaki, the ankle-socks white, the sweater blue, and the leather equipment—including pouches for Lafitte grenades—brown with brass fittings.*

crossed the river fourteen days previously remained on the right bank, apart from 900 dead and 3,000 prisoners. In their retreat the Republicans had also abandoned 200 machine guns and 1,600 rifles.

Four days later, General Alonso Vega began to nibble at the strong defences thrown up along the Sierra de Pandolls, while on the 19th Yagué's legionaries overran a number of Republican positions on the wooded slopes of Mount Gaeta.

Still greater strain was put on the Republican line when, on 3 September, two corps—those of Yagué and García Valiño—the latter freshly promoted with four divisions under command, mounted an attack to relieve the pressure on Gandesa. In spite of their determined opposition, the Republicans were obliged to give ground relinquishing their stranglehold on the town. The village of Corbera, almost due east of Gandesa and temporary headquarters of Lister, was stormed by Mohammed El Mizzian, commanding one of Galiño's divisions, the only Moroccan to reach general's rank in the Spanish army.

Franco himself had not shared the general dismay on hearing of the Republican offensive. Like Field Marshal Slim after him, he believed that the destruction of the enemy's armed forces was of far greater importance than the loss or gain of territory. On studying the map, he remarked, 'I am inclined to let the enemy penetrate as deeply as possible then draw tight the bag and give battle within it so as to wear out the Red army and finish it once and for all.' It was the plan Slim put into action with such total success at Imphal in 1944, but was too revolutionary for Franco's staff. Instead of drawing the enemy into his net, he found himself obliged to continue the set-piece counterattacks in weather which was causing men to drop—many to die—of heat stroke. Progress in this war of attrition was, inevitably, slow. The Republicans hung on desperately to every trench, either through conviction or fear of execution, while Franco, equally determined not to be profligate with the lives of his soldiers, persisted with his policy of saturation bombardments prior to the least advance, despite forebodings that if he did not speed up operations, he risked eventual collapse of his authority.

It was not till 30 October that Franco ordered a final massive offensive to eliminate what remained of the bridgehead to the south of the Ebro bulge.

This was launched by seven divisions; the attack was preceded by the heaviest bombardment of the war from 500 guns of 87 field, medium and heavy batteries, and 100 aircraft, directed on the Sierra de Caballs. The heights were occupied on the night of 1/2 November by El Mizzian's division, and on the morning of the 2nd General Galera's Navarrese stormed the principal positions of the Pandolls range. By then the defenders were dropping with exhaustion, their failing morale shattered by the relentless bombardments.

Nationalist forces now moved forward steadily as the first winter snows began to fall. Resistance was little more than token. In spite of threats of execution, a number of positions were abandoned without a shot being fired. Ribarroja, the last village to be held by the Republicans, was stormed by Yagué on 18 November, and its capture marked the end of the greatest and bloodiest battle of the war.

Losses had been exceptionally severe: the Republicans, whose effective army had largely ceased to exist, admitted to 70,000, including 30,000 dead, whilst Nationalist casualties, checked by post-war sources, are put at 41,400.

The Ebro battle was also the swan song of the International Brigades; a bare 25 per cent of those who had crossed the Ebro in July returned in November to the left bank. International agreement was reached which aimed at ending 'foreign' intervention in Spain; accordingly, some 10,000 Italians (who were no loss to the Nationalists) returned home. An estimated 6,000 Internationals adopted Spanish nationality in order to fight on—and lose their lives, for the most part, before the war ended five months later.

After the dramatic variations of fortune experienced by both sides, there could now be no doubt that the end, after so many false alarms, was in sight. Nevertheless Franco still refused to be hurried. The offensive to liquidate Red Barcelona and the Catalán pocket was not ordered till 10 December, and then it was postponed till the 23rd because of terrible weather conditions.

The force deployed for this ultimate drive was overwhelming. Twenty divisions were aligned from the Segre river and, from there, down the length of the Ebro to the sea. Sixteen were all Spanish, another three were made up of 80 per



A Republican soldier—a senior N.C.O. or junior officer, judging by his peaked cap—throwing a grenade. Branch badges, apparently of the infantry, are pinned to the greatcoat collar. The leather equipment includes pouches for both rifle ammunition and grenades. (Keystone)

cent Spanish and 20 per cent Italian personnel (Mussolini had not withdrawn all his 'volunteers'), and one division was entirely Italian. This army of 300,000 men was supported by armour and a mass of artillery of all calibres. Though it was calculated that the Republic still had 200,000 men under arms, the series of disastrous defeats had taken their toll. With the exception of a few units commanded by such men as the indomitable Lister, few had any stomach left for the fight. Furthermore since the French frontier had been closed once more, equipment was wearing out and ammunition stocks were low.

1939 By New Year's Day, the Nationalists were moving forward along three main axes, much to the surprise of the Republican command which had lulled itself into a sense of false security by believing that after the gruelling Ebro battle at least two months would be needed before a fresh operation could be mounted. Except for the front held by Lister's battered V Corps to the east of Lérida, defences crumbled before the Nationalist steam roller. Lister hung on for six days, then, on 3 January, the Navarrese attacked the key position of Borjas Blancas which fell on the 4th. With V Corps routed the Republicans could offer no further effective resistance. Their retreat showed every sign of degenerating into a *sauf qui peut*.

Yagué, having crossed the Ebro, moved direct on Tarragona, second largest city of Catalonia, which fell on 14 January. From then on, the advance on Barcelona was limited only by the distance the marching infantry could cover in a day. With the Catalán capital crowded with refugees, and therefore a prey to anarchy, the Republican Government fled to Gerona.

On 24 January the legionaries of the Moroccan Corps stormed the imposing rock citadel of Montjuich overlooking Barcelona, freeing 1,200 political prisoners who had miraculously escaped execution. The following day two columns closed in on the city which they occupied on the 27th without firing a shot.

The fall of Barcelona was the signal for the Government officials to abandon Gerona and set up office, for the last time, in Figueras, near the French frontier, but not before ordering the execution of all Nationalists held in the jail, among them the Bishop of Teruel and Colonel Rey d'Harcourt, the town's gallant defender of twelve months ago. They did not remain long. With the Nationalists hard on their heels, the leaders, Negrín, Azana, and Luis Companys, fled to France to claim political asylum on 6 February.

Two days later the Navarrese entered Figueras, and on the 9th men of both Solchaga and Moscardo's Corps reached the French frontier. Only Madrid and the Valencia pocket now remained under the Republican flag.


Later in February, Negrín fled from France to the capital to urge further resistance, but by then even so dedicated a Republican as Miaja was convinced that a continuation of the blood-letting could serve no further purpose. There were violent disputes, and on 23 February, Colonel Casado, the temporary and unsuccessful XVIII Corps commander at Brunete, staged an uprising against Communist power and formed a Council of National Defence, hoping that Franco would be prepared to discuss terms with a fellow officer and avowed moderate. This resulted in a civil war within the civil war, with over 1,000 deaths on 13 March, before the Casado faction gained the upper hand.

Delegates of the Council of National Defence were invited to Franco's headquarters at Burgos, only to be told that 'though no retribution would be

exacted against those who, obeying the dictates of their conscience, had served with the Republican forces, the only condition offered was unconditional surrender'. Casado had no choice but to accept. On 28 March Nationalist troops entered Madrid.

The south also capitulated without further fighting. The Republican fleet at Cartagena sailed to French North Africa to be voluntarily interned at Bizerta. In Alicante, pro-Nationalist elements refused to obey Negrín's representatives urging a continuation of the struggle. The main Republican garrisons laid down their arms and waited for the take-over as two Nationalist columns began an unopposed advance.


By an irony of fate, Franco was unable to enter Madrid at the head of his troops, being laid low by a violent attack of influenza, after having enjoyed perfect health throughout the campaign. Nevertheless on 1 April, he was able to dictate the last communiqué of the war: 'On today's date, the Red Army having been captured and disarmed, the National troops reached their last objective.'



A



B



C

Legion Condor rank insignia. These were worn on the left breast and cap front. N.C.O.s' ranking (such as that of *Unteroffizier*, 'A') took the form of gold bars on branch-colour backing, worn vertically on the front of the sidecap and horizontally on the breast. Junior officers wore six-point silver stars on branch-colour backing in the same positions; 'B' illustrates the rank of *Oberleutnant*, with local Spanish rank of captain. Field officers wore gold stars with eight points; 'C' shows the insignia of *Major*, with local Spanish rank of lieutenant-colonel.

The Plates

(Uniform research by Martin Windrow. Main sources, apart from photographs in published and unpublished collections, and surviving items of uniform and equipment in the Imperial War Museum, London, were: J. M. Bueno, *Uniformes Militares de la Guerra Civil Española*, San Martin, Madrid, 1971; articles by C. A. Norman in issues 66 and 67 of *Tradition* magazine; and an article on armoured vehicles by Stephen Zaloga in *Model world* magazine, now defunct.)


A1 *Alferez, Tiradores de Ifni, campaign dress*

The junior commissioned ranks in the Spanish Army were open to some long-serving native NCOs; hence this second lieutenant's advanced years. His red *tarbush* was regulation for native officers, and often worn on campaign by Spanish officers. It bears the branch badge of this class of Moroccan infantry—a five-point star in gold above a silver crescent—and the single six-point gold star of this rank below it. The rank is repeated on the left breast of the loose, 'lentil'-coloured *candora*. Officers and men alike often wore this on campaign. It is worn here over a shirt and breeches of light sandy-coloured cloth, with brown leather equipment including the holster of the Astra automatic. The buckled leggings were regulation for native officers. (After Bueno.)

Spanish officers of the *Tiradores de Ifni* initially wore uniforms very similar to that of figure A2. The distinctive colour of the branch was initially red; the peaked cap had a red crown with gold piping, a green band, a brown leather peak and a gold chinstrap. The star-and-crescent badge appeared on the crown, and the rank stars on the band; the latter were repeated on a red strip above the left pocket, and the former was worn on each point of the collar. In 1937 the distinctive colour was changed to bright blue, which thereafter appeared on the crown of the cap and on the chest ranking; brown leatherwork was replaced by black at the same time.

A2 *Capitán, Moroccan Regular Infantry, summer service dress*

Officers of the *Tropas Regulares de Marruecos* wore this smart 'lentil'-coloured uniform with a red-



German 10.5cm leFH.18 howitzers of the Legion Condor artillery element. Germany provided no significant numbers of combat personnel, but her aid to the Nationalists in the form of technical instructors and modern *matériel* was of incalculable value.

crowned cap piped gold (note vertical piping at sides) with a gold chinstrap and cloth-covered peak. Ranking appeared on a *galleta* (biscuit) on the left breast, in the colour of the unit: see caption A3 below. It was also worn in the usual Nationalist Army manner on the tunic sleeves. *Alferez*, *teniente* and *capitán* wore one, two and three six-pointed gold stars above the Polish cuff; *comandante*, *teniente coronel* and *coronel* wore one, two and three larger eight-pointed stars on the cuff itself. The branch badge of the *Regulares*, a numbered crescent in silver superimposed on crossed gold rifles, was worn on the cap crown. The Spanish officers of Moorish units wore a bright azure cloak lined white, which can be seen rolled on this officer's cantle. Bueno shows many officers and occasional enlisted men of the Nationalist forces wearing Army Corps and, less frequently, divisional insignia on the upper left sleeve; that illustrated is the badge of the *Cuerpo de Ejército Marroquí*—a green shield with a red six-point Moroccan star above a white crescent; the gold letters C, E, M in top left, top right and bottom centre; and trimmed overall with gold. (Composite figure, after Bueno.)

A3 *Soldado, Grupo de Regulares de Ceuta no. 3, summer campaign dress*

At the outbreak of the war the Moroccan regular troops comprised five *grupos* (roughly, regiments) each made up of several *tabores* (roughly, half-battalions) including an integral cavalry *tabor*. The soldiers wore sashes in distinctive colours, which



Civilians greeting Nationalist tank crews with the Fascist salute. The vehicles are German PzKpfw I tanks; it is impossible to tell whether they are crewed by *Legion Condor* or Nationalist personnel. The German instruction cadres handed the vehicles over to Spanish crews as soon as they were competent, and generally confined themselves to advisory and command duties in the latter part of the war. On the left rear plate of the nearest tank is the red-yellow-red Nationalist flash, and below its right hand end a tactical marking—apparently a circle divided horizontally, perhaps with red over white.

were repeated in the rank 'biscuits' of the officers. These were: Tetuán no. 1 (red), Melilla no. 2 (blue), Ceuta no. 3 (green), Larache no. 4 (dark blue) and Alhucemas no. 5 (dark red). During the war five more *grupos* were raised, and the colour-coding system broke down. These later units were Xauen no. 6, Llano Amarillo no. 7, Rif no. 8, Arcila no. 9 and Bab-Tazza no. 10. The typical summer campaign dress was a pale shirt and baggy *zaraguelles* trousers, a small white turban, puttees and white canvas shoes—*alpargatas*—with hemp soles. Puttees could be khaki, blue or sandy yellow. The turban—*rexa*—was decorated for parades with cords of the *grupo* colour; on such occasions an elaborately decorated leather wallet—*skara*—took the place of the plain one used on campaign. Leather equipment was often of an outmoded pattern, but this soldier has regulation issue infantry equipment with a brass buckle-plate decorated with the infantry branch badge—crossed musket and sword with a bugle-horn superimposed. The rifle is the '1916 Short' Mauser. Tied to the shoulder brace with a strip of rag is the most commonly used grenade of the war, the Lafitte bomb. Rising behind this soldier is the flag of the 2^a Tabor, *Grupo de Ceuta* no. 3; from illustrations it seems to have been about three feet square, on an eight- or nine-foot pike. (Composite figure, after Bueno.)

A4 Capitán of Republican infantry, service dress

The flat-crowned peaked cap and single-breasted service tunic of the Spanish Army were worn by officers of both sides, with differences of detail. The khaki cloth used by the Republicans tended towards brown, while that of the Nationalists was greener in tone. The Republicans wore the cap with a red star outlined gold on the crown, a branch badge in the centre of the band, and ranking in the form of horizontal bars on each side of this. Both sides used the traditional branch badges: gold bugle-horn and crossed musket and sword for infantry, silver crossed lances for cavalry, gold bursting grenade for artillery, silver castle for engineers, and so forth. Republican officers wore the tunic collar either buttoned closed or open over a khaki shirt and tie; in all cases the branch badge appeared on the collar points. Republican ranking was worn beneath the star on the sleeves: one, two and three thin bars above the cuff for second lieutenants, first lieutenants and captains, and one, two and three thick bars on the cuff itself for majors, lieutenant-colonels and colonels. There seems to have been some variation in details of cut, but the normal tunic had plain shoulder-straps, pleated patch breast pockets with three-point flaps, unpleated bellows skirt pockets with straight flaps, and brown leather buttons in an imitation 'woven' style. Flared khaki breeches were normal, though often replaced in practice by brown corduroy breeches. The high-lacing boots illustrated were very widely worn by Republican personnel. Sam Browne belts and Astra or Star automatics were normal in both armies. Note that a single button often appeared on the rear sleeve seam of the tunic just above the edge of the false Polish cuff. (After Norman.)

B1 Cabo, Nationalist infantry, service dress

This corporal wears absolutely regulation service dress in the greenish khaki of the Nationalist Army. His cap—known as a *gorillo* or '*isabelino*'—is piped in the infantry branch colour, red, and has a tassel of the same shade; a pointed rank device is worn on the front. Branch badges are worn on the collar of the *guerrera*, the thigh-length tunic; and the red ranking of this grade stretches from cuff to elbow. Sergeants wore the same device in gold. Buttons are brown, as is all leather equipment. The distinctive

Spanish *granadero* trousers are flared at the thigh and tight at the calf, with buttons down the outside and a 'spat' foot. The haversack is in neutral-coloured canvas. The weapon is the 'Short 1916' Mauser. (After Bueno.)

B2 Falangist militiaman, 1937

The Falangist militias were territorially raised, and it was some months before their enthusiasm could be channelled into an orderly contribution to the Nationalist cause, under central control. This was reflected in their uniforms, which in 1936 varied widely. Common features were a black or dark blue *gorillo* cap piped white or red, a blue shirt, and the red yoke-and-arrows insignia of the Falange. In the early days they wore their own system of ranking; the breast badge of a *jefe de centuria*, for instance, approximating an Army *teniente*, was three silver arrows horizontally on a black patch, while a *subjefe de bandera*, the next rank up, wore a red yoke in the same position. In 1937 Army ranking was introduced, but for a time both could be seen in use together. One feature which remained constant was the red yoke-and-arrows breast badge, which was retained throughout the war. Our illustration, after Bueno, shows a Falangist in 1937 after a degree of rationalization had taken place. The blue cap is piped red; the blue shirt, highly visible, is now replaced by a khaki one, but blue collars, shoulder-straps and even pocket-flaps were often retained. The rest of the clothing and equipment is Army issue, though various puttee colours were worn according to availability. The white chevrons on cap and sleeve indicate a frontline combatant of the Falange, as opposed to other categories within the organization.

B3 Navarrese requeté, 1936

The *requetés*, the Carlist militia of the monarchist party, were even less uniformly dressed than the Falangists. A red beret was often the only common denominator in a mass of civilian items, but this beret was almost universal. This illustration of a *requeté* of the Navarrese brigades is taken directly from Bueno. He is surprisingly complete in his dress and equipment, wearing jacket and trousers of Army issue and regulation equipment. The short blouse or *cazadora* started to replace the *guerrera* tunic early in the war as campaign dress throughout the Army. It is worn here with the sleeve

badge of the *Cuerpo Ejército de Navarra*. On the left breast are two other cloth insignia; the '*detente*', or Sacred Heart emblem, which was widely worn by devout Catholics (particularly Carlists) in the hope of heavenly protection, and the Cross of Burgundy, emblem of the monarchist cause. The blanket and sandals are typical of the region.

In the background, an officer in shirt-sleeve order carries the colour of *Regimiento de Infantería 'San Marcial' no. 22*; its design, and that of the elaborate red and gold bandolier, are taken from Bueno. The devices varied from unit to unit, but the red and gold tricolour ground was common to all Nationalist forces.

C1 Sargento porta-guión, 2ª Bandera, Spanish Foreign Legion; summer campaign dress, 1936-37

Each *bandera*—roughly, battalion—of the *Tercio* had its own banner; in all, 18 *banderas* saw service during the war. That of the 2ª *Bandera*, carried by this sergeant in typical summer campaign uniform, bears a black double-headed eagle crowned and taloned gold, with a central gold shield bearing the Legion's badge: crossed musket, crossbow and halberd. The distinctive grey-green uniform of the Legion appeared in two weights for winter and summer: the hot weather dress comprised a shirt with rolled sleeves, the usual *granadero* trousers, and white canvas *alpargatas*. The cap was piped red, and differed from that of the rest of the Army in bearing the Legion's branch badge on the front, so ranking was worn on the right side. The Legion badge was



PzKpfw I Ausf. A tank being loaded onto a transporter lorry. The Nationalist flash, in tapered form, can be seen on the rear of the turret. Some of these tanks were finished in plain grey, others in grey with brown shadow camouflage. Local re-paint jobs were not unknown, usually taking the form of shadow camouflage.

also worn in embroidered form on each shoulder-strap of the shirt, by all ranks. Leather equipment was always black, and often of an outmoded pattern.

Officers of the *Tercio* wore grey-green shirts with ranking on a black *galleta* and the Legion badge on the shoulder-straps; the *gorillo* bore the normal infantry ranking and piping. Grey-green breeches were worn with black jackboots, black Sam Brownes, and white gloves—often, even in battle. Gold chevrons trimmed red, as worn by this NCO, indicated wounds in action; they were worn on the left arm by all ranks. (Composite figure, after Bueno.)

C2 Legionario de 1ª Clase, Spanish Foreign Legion, winter campaign dress 1938

Prior to 1938 the *Tercio* had worn *guerrera* tunics similar to those of the rest of the Army, but in that year the uniform illustrated was issued. A short *cazadora* was worn with straight trousers, tucked into high-lacing black boots. The colour remained grey-green and insignia were not affected. The large chevron of Private 1st Class was worn on both sleeves. (The *cabo* wore the three red diagonals illustrated on Plate B, and the *sargento* the same, in gold trimmed with red. The *brigada*, the senior NCO rank, wore a pointed gold device similar to that worn on the *gorillo* cap, but only divided by one vertical red line, sewn to the centre of the cuff at the bottom edge. These rankings were common to the Nationalist regular troops as a whole.) The rifle is the 7.92mm 'Standard Model' Mauser. (Composite figure, after Bueno.)

C3 Teniente, infantry, summer campaign dress

Nationalist officers wore a service dress very similar to that of the figure illustrated as A4, though in greener tones. The peaked cap bore the branch badge on the crown and the rank stars along the band. The tunic, normally worn buttoned to the throat, bore branch badges on the collar points, and ranking on the cuffs as described under figure A2. In the field a wide variety of jackets was worn in winter, and shirt-sleeve order was normal in summer. The *gorillo* of this infantry first lieutenant bears red and gold piping and tassel (these colours varied with branch colour and metal) and the two stars of this rank on the front. The light sandy-

coloured shirt is worn with rolled sleeves and open neck, and the only insignia is the *galleta* in branch colour above the left pocket, with repeated rank stars. The Sam Browne was worn with either one crossed or two vertical braces, and in shirt-sleeve order was buttoned under the belt-loops of the flared greenish-khaki breeches. Brown jackboots; brown leggings and ankle-boots; and brown ankle-boots with khaki puttees, and sometimes white oversocks, seem to have been worn at whim. A popular if unofficial item was the *sahariana* jacket, copied from Italian officers of the CTV; the distinctive cut of this jacket can be seen more clearly on Plate E. It is thrown over this officer's shoulders, and bears the *galleta* and the sleeve patch of the *Cuerpo Ejército de Galicia*. The weapon is the Star RU1935 9mm sub-machine gun; this saw limited service but was never standard issue. (Composite figure, after Bueno.)

Other branch colours worn as *galletas* and cap piping were: light blue (cavalry), with silver metal; dark red (engineers), with silver metal; red cap piping, and black-over-red *galleta* diagonally divided from bottom left to top right (artillery), with gold metal; yellow (medical), with silver metal; grass-green (light infantry—*Cazadores*), with gold metal; and black (tank troops), with silver metal. 'Provisional' ranks, and senior officers commanding units, wore black *galletas* irrespective of branch.

D1 General de Brigada, winter campaign dress

The field service *gorillo* of generals was piped with gold in a distinctive arrangement, as here, and had a gold tassel. On the front is the ranking—a crossed sword and baton with a four-point star superimposed. (The ranking of a *general de división* featured the crossed sword and baton between two smaller four-point stars, one on each side.) This is repeated on the black patch of a senior commander on the left breast of the cold-weather jacket. The jacket is one of several very similar patterns collectively known as the '*canadiense*', much favoured by senior officers. The breeches of the normal service uniform are tucked into high-laced boots and thick socks. (Composite figure, after Bueno.)

D2 Cabo, Nationalist infantry, winter campaign dress

The *capote-manta*, a large, loose cape for winter

campaign wear, was used very widely by both Republicans and Nationalists; it differed in a score of details from batch to batch, but the one illustrated is typical. The shoulders and neck have been doubled for extra protection, and a large vandyked flap allows the neck to be buttoned over the face from either side. Sometimes the cape was worn over, sometimes under the leather equipment; here the corporal has buckled his belt, shoulder-braces and haversack strap over it. (The leather shoulder-braces of the standard Spanish equipment met in a Y-strap arrangement on the back, with a single vertical brace down to the belt. A third ammunition box was worn centrally at the back.) Puttees and ankle-boots with white socks here replace the shaped overall-trousers. The helmet was by no means a universal issue, but it was seen in some numbers on both sides. Of Spanish design, it is based upon, but subtly different from, the traditional German design of World War I. It has a deep domed skull, a steeply-flared brim and neck-guard, and a noticeably shallow 'step' over the ears; there is one in the Imperial War Museum, London, that has a line of small rivets around the mid-point, see D3. It was usually painted a nondescript dark greenish grey. The rifle is the 'Standard Model' Mauser.

On the breast of the cape appear a stylized version of corporal's ranking in infantry red, and the branch badge sewn onto a khaki patch. Branch badges were often seen in this position on protective clothing, either on khaki or patches of branch colour, and officers wore conventional rank 'biscuits' above them. (After Bueno.)

D3 Soldado, Nationalist infantry, winter campaign dress
The *cazadora* blouse bears the branch badge on the collar points, and is worn over a brown sweater. The *granadero* trousers, leather equipment, Mauser and helmet are all standard issue. It was normal for Spanish soldiers of both sides to make a horse-shoe roll of their blanket or cape. Note the large cloth-covered canteen worn on the hip, its base fastening into a metal pot and its neck covered by a metal cup, both painted dull green. A black strap round the body supports this canteen, which is copied from one in the Imperial War Museum. It is the only feature which we have added to this figure, which is otherwise exactly as in Bueno. Bueno



Capitán, Nationalist tank companies. Illustration by Embleton after Bueno. Black beret with white death's-head; dark-brown overall with death's-head repeated on right and silver rank stars on black 'biscuit' on left breast; brown belt and holster. For further comments on Nationalist tank uniforms, see description of colour plate E4.

shows a red crab motif painted on the helmet and sewn on the blouse, and identifies the soldier as a Galician volunteer. Whether the crab motif was common among men from this region is not known.

E1 Staff captain, Division 'Littorio', Italian Volunteer Corps, 1937

The first Italian volunteers were from the MVSN—'Blackshirt'—militias, and served in the Foreign Legion. As more arrived they formed their own units, or *Banderas*. By 1937 an autonomous



Group of Nationalist officers of the 5th Navarrese Division photographed after the capture of Tarragona early in 1939. Note the mixture of uniform items and insignia; the short *cazadora* jacket is worn by several of these officers, and branch badges can be seen on both the collars and the berets. Most wear berets, presumably the red Carlist type, with rank stars. In April 1937 the Falangist and J.O.N.S. militias were amalgamated by Franco, new units wearing the red beret and blue shirt in combination. These officers are identified as belonging to the 1^a Bandera de F.E.T. y de las J.O.N.S. de Navarra—the usual style of title for units of the new combined militia. The *Alférez* on the left wears a *pasamontaña* and a leather jacket. Note both Italian and German steel helmets in use. (Robert Hunt)

became popular among Italian officers in Ethiopia, and spread to virtually every army which they fought with or against. The staff status is indicated by the white collar points edged gold. Rank stars appear on the left breast, and the divisional insignia on the left sleeve. The breeches and boots are normal Italian Army issue. Bueno illustrates a great diversity of Italian, Spanish, winter, and summer uniform items worn by Italian officers in various combinations. The Sam Browne supports the small Beretta holster.

E2 Volunteer, Division 'XXIII di Marzo', CTV, summer 1937

This private of the Blackshirt infantry volunteers is exactly as in Bueno. He wears what is effectively the Italian Army's tropical uniform, with minor distinctions. The Italian M1933 helmet increasingly replaced the Adrian model worn at the beginning of Italian intervention. The shirt is peculiar to the CTV—a light grey-green pullover type with a zipped neck. The double black 'flames' and silver fasces of the MVSN appear on each collar point, and the divisional insignia on the left

corps was in existence: the *Cuerpo de Tropas Voluntarias*, CTV. It was made up of four weak divisions—actually, of brigade strength—and an autonomous combat group. The '*Dio lo vuole*', '*Fiamme Nere*', and '*Penne Nere*' divisions and the group (later, division) '*XXIII di Marzo*' were manned by Blackshirts, and the '*Voluntarii Littorio*' division by Italian Army personnel. In 1938 the last two formations were amalgamated into a mixed MVSN-Army division named '*Littorio d'Assalto*'.

This figure is taken exactly from Bueno. The cap is the Italian *bustina* of officer quality and summer weight, with the three gold stars of this rank on the front flap. The jacket is the *sahariana*, which first

sleeve. Leather equipment, of the unique Italian design involving a loop of strap round the neck to support frontal belt pouches, is in grey-green, and the rifle is the 1891 Mannlicher Carcano.

E3 Leutnant, Legion Condor tank companies, in vehicle overalls

Bueno illustrates this rather exotic outfit, of mixed German/Spanish origin. The dark blue *gorillo* cap is piped in Spanish fashion in German Panzer pink branch colour, with gold rank stars but no tassel. The *mono* or overall has the ranking repeated on a pink 'biscuit' on the left breast, and is worn with German light khaki shirt, black marching boots, and brown field service belt.

E4 Alférez, Spanish Foreign Legion tank companies, 1938-39

The tank commander, who is taken from a similar figure by Bueno, wears a black beret with single gold rank star; a *cazadora* blouse in the *Tercio*'s grey-green, with rank star on a black *galleta*; and black leather equipment. Bueno shows a full-length figure wearing these with flared grey-green breeches and high-lacing black boots with buckled gaiter-flaps at the top, high on the calf. The Spanish tank troops' badge seems to have been worn on the right breast by some tank officers of both sides. It was a silhouette of a stylised Renault tank, facing left; an example on a Republican officer's shirt in the Imperial War Museum is embroidered in gold and black thread on a pale khaki ground, but Bueno states that Nationalist personnel wore the device in silver metal. An unofficial variation was apparently worn by some Legion and other Nationalist tank officers and NCOs, on the beret and/or on the right breast: a skull and crossbones badge in silver or white. Nationalist Army tank companies seem to have displayed great variety in vehicle uniforms. *Mono* overalls appeared in dark blue, light khaki or dark brown: the black beret was common, and the black *galleta* was standard.

The tank itself is taken from a photograph. It is a German Panzerkampfwagen I Ausf.A, finished in the dark Panzer grey and earth brown shadow camouflage employed in the German Army for a time during the mid-1930s. The white '513' is a vehicle number; the red and yellow tricolour flash,

carried on the front plate and on the turret rear, is the Nationalist recognition marking. The halved red and white diamond is a tactical marking of some kind; halved circles were also recorded. The white insignia next to the driver's hatch is the badge of the *Tercio* tank companies, the familiar crossed musket, crossbow and halberd.

E5 Unteroffizier, Legion Condor tank companies

This figure is taken partly from Bueno and partly from a photograph. The service uniform of the *Legion Condor* was this khaki tunic and trousers, light khaki shirt, and black leather equipment. The tank companies wore a black Spanish beret. Officially the ranking was repeated on this, in the form of vertical gold bars on a Panzer pink backing, exactly like the horizontal presentation on the breast. Photos show silver metal beret badges—the Panzer skull and crossbones over a silver swastika. Officers' ranking was worn on the tunic either as individual stars with branch-colour backing, or on a *galleta* of branch colour in the Nationalist manner; stars appeared individually on the headgear.

F1 Anarchist militiaman, 1936

The popular militias which rose spontaneously at the outbreak of the war owed their inspiration to numerous political and trade union organisations. Their clothing was civilian and their arms and equipment were whatever they could lay their hands on. The almost universal garment was the *mono*, the dungaree overall which became the trademark of the workers in arms. It appeared in numerous varieties of cut and colour, but dark blue was predominant. This anarchist wears the halved black and red scarf of the FAI—*Federación Anarquista Ibérica*. He has acquired a set of infantry equipment and a 'Short 1916' Mauser rifle. (Composite figure, after Bueno.)

F2 Cabo, Guardias de Asalto, 1937

Large numbers of security police sided with the Republic, and played an active role during the early periods of confusion when they were one of the few sources of trained and armed men. They also played an important part in the internal fighting against the anarchists in Barcelona. Probably because of the ambivalent feelings of many pro-Republican groups about uniformed security

policemen, the *Asaltos* seem to have abandoned their dark blue service dress early on; and to have adopted the light blue-grey *mono* illustrated. A figure by Bueno, which we follow closely here, retains his dark blue peaked cap with the silver badge of the corps—a mural crown above an ornate escutcheon charged ‘GS’—with white piping, black peak and strap, and the red chevron of corporal’s rank, which is repeated on the breast. He wears the outmoded leather equipment often seen among troops from Morocco, and carries a ‘Short 1916’ Mauser.

F3 Miliciana, 1936

Women fought alongside men in the popular militias, and our figure represents one of the hundreds of Madrid factory-girls who took their places at the barricades. She wears the ubiquitous *mono*, adorned with roughly-stitched initials indicating her particular affiliation: UHP, UGT, CNT, PCE, POUM and FAI were all frequently-seen variations, on home-made insignia and in wall-slogans. The espadrilles are typical. The cap is an Army *gorillo* modified in a common way: the red piping and tassel are removed, the points pushed inwards and sewn across to give a rounder top line, and a red star is roughly stitched to the front. Her weapon and equipment are of cavalry origin: the 1895 carbine, and the belt with single front pouch and silver buckle-plate were standard issue to that branch.

G1 General Miaja, service dress

Uniformity was even less common in the Republican Army than in the Nationalist, but this figure, after Norman, shows Miaja in normal service uniform for a general. Minor details such as pockets, the use of breeches or trousers, and so forth, naturally varied. The khaki cap bears the red star above the special generals’ cap badge in gold—a crowned escutcheon flanked by scrolled pillars. The peak bore gold braid of varying widths for field officers and generals. The tunic collar bears the generals’ crossed baton and sword. On the sleeves above the cuff are two types of ranking. From October 1936 to February 1937, and after October 1938, all grades of general in the Republican Army were amalgamated into a single rank—general. The insignia was as shown: three red stars around



February 1939—foresore and burdened with salvaged kit, Republican soldiers reach the border town of Le Perthus in their retreat from the victorious Nationalists. (Keystone)

the crossed baton and sword. The actual level of command was indicated by the three-pointed stars below this; in this case, the four of an army commander. This separation of rank and function stemmed from the irregular militia backgrounds of some senior commanders; non-regular officers were not allowed to rise above lieutenant-colonel in rank, but some natural talents of this rank in fact commanded divisions and corps. One three-point star indicated command of a brigade, two a division, three a corps and four an army.

G2 Teniente Coronel Vladimir Čopic, commanding XVth International Brigade

This figure, after Norman and various photographs, is typical of the campaign dress of Republican officers. The khaki peaked cap has the narrow gold peak braid of a field officer; the Republic’s red star trimmed gold; and the infantry branch badge flanked by the two thick horizontal stripes of his rank. Various privately acquired leather jackets and coats were much in evidence, and on every type of coat, jacket and blouse apart

from the service dress tunic the ranking was worn on a breast patch, usually of khaki cloth. The red star appeared on this above the ranking, and below these, where appropriate, three-pointed 'command stars'—here, the single star of a brigade commander. Choice and arrangement of such accessories as boots, belts and sidearms was a matter for the individual in the Republican Army. Political commissars wore a red star in a red circle above horizontal red bars indicating grade (one for company commissar, two for battalion commissar, etc.) on cap and breast.

G3 Cabo, infantry, service dress

A composite figure based on the differing interpretations by Norman and Bueno of a surviving colour plate believed to show the official uniform authorized in October 1936. To what extent this was actually issued is unclear; parts were observed, but it is unlikely that the whole outfit was supplied in significant numbers. The cap is a khaki cloth version of the *pasamontaña*, which was a popular Republican headgear. Its classic version was a wool balaclava with a peak, which could be worn rolled into a sort of peaked cap-comforter of the outline illustrated here. Bueno shows it in its cloth form with a rank chevron, a branch badge, and a brown chinstrap; Norman shows it without badge or strap. The tunic is shown here exactly after Norman; Bueno shows no skirt pockets, and with the buttoned cuff tab at the bottom edge of the sleeve. Both show the laced and buckled boots with ankle-flaps, and the straight trousers. Standard belt and pouches are worn with an infantry buckle-plate,


but in this case without the shoulder-braces. The weapon is the 'Mexicanski', the most common rifle among many different types acquired by the Republic; it is a Russian Moisin-Nagant supplied via Mexico. Note the archaic socket bayonet, worn fixed at all times but sometimes reversed.

In the background is the Russian T-26 tank, most numerous of the types used by the Republic, and most effective on either side; the Nationalists offered large bounties for captured ones, and formed whole companies of them. The colour scheme is from a photo: basic Soviet forest-green with a drab brown streak-pattern over the upper hull and turret, the streaks edged with an indeterminate light shade. Turret markings in the Republican tank companies were restrained, seldom going beyond a simple number. The commander wears the typical nondescript clothing of most Republican personnel. His shirt, with tank badge on the right breast (see under E4) and rank patch on the left, is taken from one in the Imperial War Museum. A khaki beret was very widely worn in the Republican Army, and not infrequently in the Nationalist forces as well.

H1 Infantryman, winter campaign dress

A composite figure assembled from many typical features, after Norman and Bueno. One can only generalize when discussing Republican combat troops, whose equipment came from many different Spanish and overseas sources, and who never achieved any real uniformity of clothing.

The headgear is the woollen *pasamontaña*, pulled down to protect the face. The khaki greatcoat was



Nationalist ranking on tunic cuffs.



(A) *General de Brigada*

(B) *Coronel*

(C) *Capitán*

(D) *Alférez*

(E) *Brigada*—gold, trimmed red.



Left: the 'detente' or Sacred Heart emblem; details varied but this presentation is typical. Black backing, red and yellow riband, red patch with scalloped edges, yellow vertical centre stripe, red heart and cross with details trimmed black. **Right:** the red yoke-and-arrows device of the *Falange Española*.

much more common on the Republican than the Nationalist side, which seems to have favoured the *capote-manta*. Republican stocks came from many sources, and many were of French origin. In the absence of coats, rough ponchos or *capote-mantas* were made from blankets or canvas. Khaki trousers or corduroys were worn either loose, or with puttees, with ankle- or high-laced boots, or even with sandals. Rolled blankets of civilian origin were common. Standard infantry equipment is worn here, with two noteworthy additions. The tin plate slung from the belt was very common in the Republic, and served as a mess-tin. The grey or khaki Adrian helmet was imported from France in large numbers at the beginning of the war and was by far the most common helmet used by the Republic—although helmets were by no means a universal issue at all. Some Spanish helmets were used towards the end, but most seem to have been captured from Nationalist stocks. Sometimes a red star was painted on the front.

H2 Brigada, infantry, campaign dress

The khaki beret was widely worn; here it bears a typical rank patch, with the two red bars below a red star of the senior NCO rank. (The *cabo* wore the chevron shown in G3, the *sargento* a red star above a single red bar.) This is repeated on a chest patch on the khaki *cazadora*, which in various slightly differing forms was the commonest type of jacket in the Republican Army; it appeared in cloth of many shades, in leather, with zips and plastic or leather buttons, with or without branch insignia on the collar, and in various civilian materials and

patterns. Trousers were as heterogeneous; cloth of khaki or brown shades, flared or straight in cut, of corduroy, of light striped ticking—all were to be seen in the ranks. The high-laced boots were common, as stated earlier. Shirts and sweaters of every colour and type were worn indiscriminately. Many old French Army uniforms were acquired and worn complete or in part. The *mono* never entirely disappeared, and was worn in various light grey, green and khaki shades. A floppy khaki cotton sun-hat of army origin was seen on both sides during summer fighting. The oval metal canteen carried on this NCO's belt was sometimes, but not often observed covered in khaki felt. The weapon is interesting; never a regular issue, it was occasionally seen in the hands of junior leaders or security forces. It is the Astra Model 902, a 7.63mm selective-fire copy of the 1932 Mauser 'broom-handle' pistol, with a wooden holster-stock. The fixed magazine required an extra cut-out in the rear face of the holster-stock, covered with a leather stall. (Composite figure, after Norman.)

H3 Capitán, Ejército Nacionalista Vasco, campaign dress
The 'gudaris' or Basque soldiers who supported the Republic served in their own autonomous units; they were an important source of spirited manpower, numbering some 25,000 in November 1936. Uniforms were minimal, but the common feature was the black Basque beret. Ranking generally followed Nationalist Army practice, with officers' stars worn, as here, on beret and breast, and NCO's distinctions similar to the pointed patches worn by Nationalists. The leather jacket was very common among Basque officers. Trousers of white and grey or blue ticking were apparently much in evidence in Basque units. (After Bueno.)

H4 Soldado, Grupo de Regulares de Alhucemas no. 5, winter campaign dress

In winter the Moorish troops of the Nationalist Army were usually issued a *cazadora* in greenish khaki. The baggy sand-coloured trousers, khaki puttees and white canvas boots seem to have been retained, according to Bueno. Overgarments varied, but the *chilaba* or native cape-coat was not uncommon. Bueno shows some Moors retaining the *tarbush*, others in woollen *pasamontañas*. This figure is from Bueno; note the red cord decoration on the

loose, hooded *chilaba*. This cording extended round the edge of the hood, down the front, down the outside of the loose sleeves, and round the edges

of the split at elbow level which allowed free movement. It also edged the patch bearing the unit number and crescent in white.


Notes sur les planches en couleur

A1 Le tarbuch et le candora étaient souvent portés par les officiers espagnols en campagne. Le tarbuch a l'attribut de l'arme de service au-dessus de l'étoile unique de ce rang commissionné subalterne; l'étoile figure aussi sur la poitrine. Pistolet Astra. **A2** Sur la casquette vous voyez l'attribut de l'arme de service au-dessus des étoiles de ce rang, les étoiles portées aussi sur la poitrine. La couleur des insignes sur la poitrine changeaient selon l'unité,—voyez aussi A3. La cape bleu vif d'officier est enroulée sur la selle et les insignes du Corps de l'Armée du Maroque se portent sur la manche gauche. **A3** Les cinq grupos d'avant-guerre s'identifiaient par les couleurs rouge (1), bleu (2), vert (3), bleu foncé (4), et rouge foncé (5); encore cinq grupos se formaient pendant la guerre et cette série de couleurs cessa de constituer un moyen sûr d'identification. Observez le fanion d'un Tabor Grupo No. 3, et la grenade Lafitte faisant partie de l'équipement du soldat. 1916 Fusil Mauser. **A4** Tenue de service d'ordonnance des officiers républicains avec l'attribut de l'arme de service porté sur le col et sur le bandeau, et les galons de rang avec l'étoile rouge sur la casquette et sur la manche.


B1 Tenue de service d'ordonnance; passepoil rouge sur la casquette identifie l'infanterie; observez l'attribut de rang sur la casquette. Fusil Mauser—porté par toutes les trois figures sur cette planche. **B2** Au début la milice falangiste portait les chemises bleues, mais en 1937 le kaki avec détails en bleu les remplaça. L'attribut du Falange se porte sur la poitrine à gauche et les chevrons blancs à la casquette et à la manche indiquent un soldat du front. **B3** D'habitude ces milices carlistes s'habillaient en civil et ne portaient qu'un beret rouge comme marque d'identification. Ce soldat est en tenue complète, y inclus la chemise cazadora que l'on portait souvent en campagne au lieu de la tunique plus longue. A la poitrine se voit l'attribut du Coeur Sacré au-dessus de la Croix de Bourgogne, celui-ci étant l'attribut de la cause carliste. L'attribut de manche est celui du Corps de l'Armée de Navarre. Dans le fond le fanion régimental de l'Infanterie Nationale, Régiment No. 22. 'San Marcial'.




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
B



C



E



D

Examples of flags and guidons carried during the war. (A) Typical standard of a Republican brigade, the 124th Mixed Brigade of the 27th Division. Red over yellow over purple stripes. White lettering. Central motif: white columns with white ribands bearing black 'PLUS ULTRA', gold capitals and bases, gold crown with red interior, green foliate sprays. First quarter of shield red with gold tower, second white with red lion, third red with gold 'chained' shield device, fourth yellow with red stripes; small pointed area at bottom centre, white. (B) Flag of machine-gun company of American 'Lincoln' Battalion, XVth International Brigade: yellow on dark blue, yellow fringe. (C) Guidon of a *tabor* of Moroccan regular cavalry: light blue with red saltire, white number, white crescent and lances. (D) Standard of a *tabor* of Moroccan regular infantry: yellow, black hand, white crescent, number outlined black. (E) Flag of the Euzkadi—the Basque Republican units: red, white cross, green saltire.

Nationalist Army:

- 1 Native Alférez, Tiradores de Ifni, campaign dress
- 2 Capitán, Moroccan Regular Infantry, summer service dress
- 3 Soldado, Grupo de Regulares de Ceuta no. 3, summer campaign dress

Republican Army:

- 4 Capitán, infantry, service dress





Nationalist Army:

- 1 Cabo, infantry, service dress
- 2 Falangist militiaman, summer campaign dress, 1937
- 3 Navarrese requeté, winter campaign dress, 1936

Background: Colours of Regimiento de Infantería
'San Marcial' no. 22

Nationalist Army:

- 1 Sargento porta-guión, 2ª Bandera, Spanish Foreign Legion; summer campaign dress, 1936-37
- 2 Legionario de 1ª clase, Spanish Foreign Legion; winter campaign dress, 1938
- 3 Teniente, infantry, summer campaign dress





Nationalist Army:
1 General de Brigada, winter campaign dress
2 Cabo, infantry, winter campaign dress
3 Soldado, infantry, winter campaign dress

- 1 Staff captain, Div. 'Littorio', Italian Volunteer Corps
- 2 Volunteer, Div. 'XXIII di Marzo', Italian Volunteer Corps, 1937
- 3 Leutnant, Legion Condor tank companies
- 4 Alférez, Spanish Foreign Legion tank companies, with Pzkwf. I Aus. A
- 5 Unteroffizier, Legion Condor tank companies



Republican forces:

- 1 Anarchist militiaman, 1936**
- 2 Cabo, Guardias de Asalto, 1937**
- 3 Miliciana, 1936**



Republican Army:

- 1 General Miaja, service dress**
 - 2 Teniente Coronel V. Copic, XVth International Brigade**
 - 3 Cabo, infantry, service dress**
- Background: T-26 tank**



Republican Army:

1 Soldado, winter campaign dress

2 Brigada, campaign dress

3 Capitán, Ejército Nacionalista Vasco, campaign dress

Nationalist Army:

4 Soldado, Grupo de Regulares de Alhucemas no. 5, winter campaign dress

