
# orgotten Korea: 1950-1953 War While Wan Publishing, Inc. Forgotten War is not a complete game. Ownership of the Advanced Squad Leader Game System is required for play.

























"I shall go to Korea." For the first time, an Advanced Squad Leader module steps outside the traditional World War II era to bring you FORGOTTEN WAR, covering the Korean War of 1950-1953. Called by some a "police action," this fierce conflict showed what could happen when the Cold War turned hot. FORGOTTEN WAR provides the ASL player with new rules and counters for the armed forces of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (the nom de guerre of China's People's Liberation Army), and the other engaged United Nations countries (troops from nations such as the Netherlands, Ethiopia, France, Thailand, and Turkey). The Korean People's Army (North Korea), equipped and trained by the Soviet Union, uses the standard Russian counters and rules with which all ASLers are familiar, with a few unique twists. U.S. Army, U.S.M.C., and British Commonwealth Forces in Korea are represented mostly by existing counters from (respectively) YANKS, RISING SUN, and FOR KING AND COUNTRY, but new Korean-era weapons and detailed Chapter H notes are provided for all these forces.

New Chapter W rules in FORGOTTEN WAR cover these combatants, including (on the UN side): Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) troops, Human Bullet Heroes, Korean Marine Corps, Royal Marine Commandos, proximity-fuzed artillery, and bayonet charges. The UN forces also enjoyed enhanced air support featuring Tactical Air Control Parties, airborne Forward Air Controllers, and the jetpropelled aircraft of the era such as the F-80C Shooting Star and the F-84D Thunderjet. For the CPVA, there are special grenadier squads, commissar-like Political Officers, infantry platoon movement, half-squad overruns, and bugles. Both sides would encounter paddy fields, light woods, and steep hills-reflecting the difficulties of movement and combat in the rugged Korean terrain.

Whipped up by propaganda and well-trained and well-equipped by the Soviet Union, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950 to reunite the peninsula. Facing them were the ill-prepared forces of the Republic of Korea and a U.S. Army weakened and dispirited by years of post-war demobilization and occupation. Before long, however, the defenders were reinforced by units of the U.S. Marine Corps, British Commonwealth, and a number of other UN countries. FORGOTTEN WAR follows these troops south to the Pusan Perimeter, back to the Inchon landings, north to Yalu River and the Chinese border, and back south again to a stalemate leading to an uneasy ceasefire. FORGOTTEN WAR allows the ASL player to explore new situations and utilize new tactics and weapons, supported as always by the detailed research and attention to detail they have come to expect.





























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MUNSAN-NI, SOUTH KOREA, 25 June 1950: 100,000 troops of the Korean People's Army surged across the 38th Parallel and southward toward Seoul. They were led by 150 Soviet-made T-34/85 tanks, against which the Republic of Korea had no effective defense. Tough resistance was offered in a number of places, however, including the village of Munsan-ni, about 35 miles northwest of Seoul, where the 11th Infantry Regiment made a stand along the Imjin River, using satchel charges, some placed on poles, to try to stop the T-34s.

HILL 1282, YUDAM-NI, NORTH KOREA, 27 November 1950: The 1st Marine Division had been cut off by tens of thousands of Chinese regulars who had infiltrated into North Korea and closed the main supply road to the south. Now the Chinese moved swiftly to overwhelm the high ground around the Chosin Reservoir held by elements of the 7th Marine Regiment. With the Chinese about to break through to regimental command posts, one company commander rallied his troops, declaring "This is Easy Company and this is where we stand!"

IMJIN RIVER, SOUTH KOREA, 25 April 1951: In the face of the largest Chinese attack of the war, the UN forces withdrew south of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers. There, two battalions of the British 29th Brigade were supported by the formidable Centurion tanks of the Kings Royal Irish Hussars. Exploiting cover afforded by early morning mist, Chinese infantry launched suicidal charges against the tanks, attacking with pole charges. The British fended off the assault with "de-lousing" - spraying each other's tanks with machine gun fire. Despite heavy losses six tanks and a quarter of the front line infantry strength in this sector alone—the 29th Brigade lived to fight another day.

HILL 58A, near MUNSAN-NI, SOUTH KOREA, 11 August 1952: Prior to the 1st Marine Regiment attacking Hill 112 ("Bunker Hill"), D Company was assigned to a night attack against the Chinese entrenched on Hill 58A ("Siberia") as a diversion. As four M46 Patton tanks equipped with searchlights lit up the positions with light and HE, D Company waited for two flame tanks to attack their way up the hill, followed by two more when the first pair ran out of fuel. With the Chinese well suppressed, the flame tanks withdrew, and D Company moved in to root out the last of the defenders and set up a hasty defense. The M46s remained to cover the assault force and break up Chinese counterattacks. D Company held the crest until withdrawing at midnight, diversion complete.

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**CONTENTS:** 

8"×22" Maps (80-83)

Countersheets

- 16 **ASL Scenarios**
- Chapter W
- UN Forces and Communist Forces Chapter H 1
- **Chapter Divider**

TIME SCALE: 2 minutes per Game Turn

MAP SCALE: 40 meters per hex

PLAYERS: 2 (suitable for team or solitaire play)

UNIT SCALE: 5 to 10 men with individual leaders, vehicles, and guns

PLAYING TIME: 2 hours (or more depending on scenario)

#### WARNING • CHOKING HAZARD

W.7B

# W. KOREAN WAR

#### ORDER OF PRESENTATION

- 1. KW Terrain
- 2. The Americans
- 3. The South Koreans
- 4. British Commonwealth Forces Korea
- 5. Other UN Forces
- 6. The North Koreans
- 7. The Communist Chinese
- 8. KW Air Support
- Forward Air Controllers & Close Air Support
- 10. Searchlights

W.1 KOREAN WAR (KW) RULES: Chapter W applies to scenarios that take place in Korea from 1/45 through 7/53. The rules in Chapters A-J apply in conjunction with those in Chapter W.

W2 ALLIANCES: The various KW combatants are commonly referred to by the two alliances involved: United Nations (UN) Forces and Communist Forces. Refer to the KW National Capabilities Chart for details on each available KW combatant.

W2A UNITED NATIONS (UN) FORCES: American, Australian, Belgian, British, Canadian, Colombian, Dutch, Ethiopian, Filipino, French, Greek, Luxembourger, New Zealander, South African, South Korean (Republic of Korea), Thai, and Turkish forces are collectively referred to as the United Nations (UN) Forces. British Commonwealth Forces Korea (BCFK) include Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealander forces.

**W.2B COMMUNIST FORCES:** North Korean (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and People's Republic of China forces are collectively referred to as Communist Forces.

**W2C ALLIED TROOPS:** The different nationalities within both alliances are treated as Allied Troops (A10.7) [EXC: U.S.-Armed KMC (3.32) and RM/U.S.M.C. (4.2)] and thus treat no Allied weapons as captured (even for British using U.S. MTR/BAZ).

W.3 KW TERRAIN: KW scenarios use Chapter B rules in conjunction with the following:

- All woods are Light Woods (B35.);
- All grain and rice paddies are Paddy Fields (1.2);
- All roads are dirt (B3.1);
- All bridges are One-Lane (B6.431) and of stone construction;
- Cellars (B23.41) do not exist;
- Crag (B17.) is Concealment Terrain (A12.12) and Ambush terrain (A11.4).

#### W.4 KW MISCELLANEOUS:

- During Extreme Winter (E3.74), all motorized vehicles are assumed to have their MP allotments printed in red (D2.5-51) and are thus subject to Mechanical Reliability DR. In addition, the B#/X# of all weapons are reduced by one, and all SL Reliability DR (10.45) incur a +1 DRM.
- Extreme Thaw may be specified by SSR as being in effect in March or November; during Extreme Thaw, if the Original colored dr of the IFT DR for an A-P/A-T minefield [EXC: Daisy Chain; B28.531] attack is a 1, the result is no effect.<sup>4</sup>
- Gyrostabilizers (D11.1; H1.42) are NA for U.S.-built AFV.5



**W.5 WP GRENADES:** WP grenades are available to KPA (6.1) and CPVA (7.1) Assault Engineer squads and to all UN Forces squads as per A24.3.



W.6 BAYONET CHARGE: A Bayonet Charge may be conducted by UN Forces, but only when specified by SSR. A Bayonet Charge uses all rules applicable to a Banzai Charge (G1.5) except as stated otherwise. The "target" of a Bayonet Charge

must be a Known enemy Infantry unit. Only armed, unpinned, Good Order Infantry units may conduct a Bayonet Charge, and *all* units must be predes-

ignated prior to the required leader NTC (W.6A) in order to participate. A unit that conducts a Bayonet Charge is *not* marked as Lax at the end of its MPh

W.6A NTC: Unless a Bayonet Charge is composed entirely of Heroic SMC(s), one participating leader must pass a NTC for the Bayonet Charge to occur [EXC: Ethiopian, French, and Turkish; 5.2]. The only DRM that apply to all such NTC are the heroic DRM of all participating Heroes/Heroic-leaders. If the leader fails the NTC, he is pinned and is no longer considered to be participating in the Bayonet Charge; should this occur, another participating leader must attempt the NTC. If no leader is participating, the Bayonet Charge does not occur, and all other predesignated units may move no more than one Location [EXC: Berserk; Straying] in that MPh, and must do so before any other units move.



W.6B HAND-TO-HAND CC: Whenever ≥ one unbroken Infantry unit that has conducted a Bayonet Charge in the current Player Turn enters into CC, that CC automatically becomes Hand-to-Hand (J2.31) unless every such unit partici-

pating in it was Ambushed in that phase and/or is pinned. Hand-to-Hand CC cannot be declared by/vs vehicle(s)/PRC/pillbox-occupant(s).



W.7 VARIABLE TIME (VT) FUZES: Proximity fuzes, known during the Korean War as Variable Time (VT) fuzed HE rounds, are available beginning 9/50 for U.S. OBA modules of ≥ 100mm and beginning 1/52 for all UN Forces OBA modules of ≥ 80mm. [EXC: VT is NA for all

mortar OBA.] The only types of Fire Missions (C1.7) that may use VT are HE Concentration and Harassing Fire. The option to use VT must be declared when the FFE:1 counter is placed onboard, and is indicated by using a VTE:1 counter.

W.7A VT TEM: A target attacked by a VT FFE is subject to an additional TEM per the VT TEM Table. All other TEM/DRM apply normally [EXC: W.7B].

#### VT TEM TABLE

Terrain	Infantry/ Cavalry/Gun	PRC/OT & unarmored vehicles	CT vehicles
Building, Pillbox, Cave, Culvert, beneath Bridge	+1*	+1*	
Rubble, Crag, Hut, Roofless Building	0	-1†	+1
All other terrain	-1		

- \* Not reversed when resolving a Critical Hit (C3.71).
- † Treated as Air Bursts (B13.3) for the purpose of D5.31-.311.

EX: The CE crew of a CT AFV in Open Ground attacked by a VT FFE would receive a -1 VT TEM to the General Collateral Attack in addition to the normal CE DRM. The AFV would receive a +1 VT TEM in addition to DRM per C1.55.

EX: The crew (whether CE or BU) of an OT AFV in Open Ground attacked by a VT FFE would receive a -1 VT TEM to the General Collateral Attack in addition to the normal CE DRM, causing it to be treated as unprotected and the AFV to be attacked as an unarmored vehicle (A7.308; D5.311). No VT TEM would apply vs the vehicle.

W.7B TERRAIN & WEATHER: The FP of a VT FFE is *not* halved vs targets in Marsh (B16.31), Sand (F7.4), or Irrigated paddies (G8.12); nor vs Boats (E5.5), Wading targets (G13.421), or Beach Obstacles (G14.56). The -1 TEM for Air Bursts (B13.3) and Hammada (F3.4) is NA, as is the +1 TEM for Mud (E3.62) and Deep Snow (E3.731). The use of VT is NA if Heavy Rain (i.e., rain of increased intensity as per E3.51) is falling. If Heavy Rain occurs, it causes the *immediate* Cancellation (C1.35) of all VT FFE counters.





#### W.7C



### W.7C EFFECTS ON TERRAIN & FORTIFICATIONS:

Unless stated otherwise, the effects vs terrain and Fortifications from a VT FFE are identical to those from a normal HE FFE. Attacks by a VT FFE can never create Shellholes (B2.1), destroy a Bridge (B6.33) [EXC: pontoon (B6.41) and

foot (B6.44) bridges], remove Ice (B21.6), rubble a building (B24.11), cause a Flame (B25.13; G5.6), eliminate/reduce a minefield (B28.62), remove a Roadblock (B29.5), eliminate a Pillbox (B30.92), eliminate a Sangar (F8.41), remove a Panji hexside (G9.72), eliminate a Cave (G11.88), Breach a Seawall (G13.624), or eliminate a Tetrahedron (G14.56).



W.8 HEAT VS AF ≥ 6:8 If the colored dr of any non-Dud HEAT Final TK DR is  $\geq$  6 when resolved vs an AF (D1.6) of  $\geq$  6, the result is a Dud (C7.35) [EXC: Critical Hit (C3.7) and/or the Original TK DR is < Final TK#, the result is Possible Shock (C7.41) and the FP of any Collateral Attack is halved].



W.SA BAZOOKA:9 BAZ 44 and BAZ 45 incur a +2 drm to the colored dr of the Original To Kill DR for both To Kill and W.8 purposes. The BAZ 50 and Type 51 may be fired at Infantry/Cavalry not receiving a wall/building/rubble/pillbox TEM

with a 1 FP HE Equivalency (C8.31) [EXC: vs units in Marsh-(B16.)] Deep-Stream-(B20.43); vs Fording-(B21.41)/Wading-(G13.42) units; vs units receiving Deep Snow TEM (E3.731); vs units IN an Irrigated paddy (G8.12) and not receiving bank-hexside-(G83)/hedge-(B93) TEM].



W.9 RCL: A possessed RCL set up in an OB-provided Entrenchment may fire from that Entrenchment (contrary to C12.23) and may do so without Backblast or Desperation penalties (C13.8-.81). Once such a RCL is moved from its

setup Location, this ability is forfeited for that RCL and cannot be regained during that scenario.



W.10 TRIP FLARES: Trip Flares (E1.95) are only available to UN Forces and come with the possibility of being Pop-Up flares (W.10A). In addition to jungle/bamboo/wire/panji Locations, trip flares may also be assigned to brush/woods/

scrub/Drained-paddy and Open Ground [EXC: Paved-Road-(B3.)/Runway-(B7.) Locations.




W.10A POP-UP FLARES:10 After a trip flare has been successfully set off [EXC: in a jungle/bamboo/woods Location], the owning player immediately makes a subsequent dr  $(\Delta)$ . If the subsequent dr is a 1, a Pop-Up flare has been set off in lieu of a normal trip flare, and the Trip Flare counter is placed on a ½" parachute counter.

W.10B EFFECT & DURATION: A Pop-Up flare Illuminates in the same manner as a Starshell (E1.923), but is removed as a normal trip flare (E1.951).


#### 1. KW TERRAIN

1.1 NON-GEOMORPHIC MAPBOARD ENTRY/EXIT: All rules pertaining to mapboard entry/exit/offboard-movement (e.g., A2.51, A2.6, E8.221, E9.41) are applicable to entry/exit along the non-geomorphic edges of the KW boards (defined as those numbered 80-83) except as modified below. All offboard hexes are considered to be at the same elevation as the lowest level depicted along the map edge in the abutting onboard hex in the same lettered hexrow (or with the same hex coordinate); therefore offboard movement, per A2.51, might entail moving to lower/ higher elevation. Contrary to A2.51, all offboard hexes with a coordinate of 4 or 7, where applicable, are considered road hexes.




EX: Level 3 is the lowest level depicted along the map edge in hex 82K1. Offboard hex "K0" (and all offboard hexes in the "K" hexrow) are considered to be at Level 3. The same is also true for hexrows J, L, M, and N. A unit exiting the map from hex O1 would be entering an offboard Level 4 crag hex. A unit entering hex K1 from offboard is moving to a higher elevation across a Double-Crest hexside, making such entry NA for most vehicles.

EX: Level 2 is the lowest level depicted along the map edge in hex 82A4. All offboard hexes with hex coordinate 4 are considered to be at Level 2. Likewise all offboard hexes with hex coordinate 7 are Level 1 road hexes.



1.2 PADDY FIELDS: Whenever KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect, all grain and rice paddies become Paddy Fields. Paddy Fields are treated as Rice Paddies (G8.) except as stated otherwise. Every hexside of a paddy field hex is a bank hexside (G8.21) [EXC: 1.21]. If undefined by SSR, paddy fields are Drained (G8.11) during the months of October through March, Irrigated (G8.12) April through June, and In-Season (G8.13) July through September.

1.21 WALLS & HEDGES: Each hexside of a paddy field hex with a playable wall/hedge is not a bank hexside. Instead all rules pertaining to



walls/hedges are applicable [EXC: it costs an additional 1 MF/MP to cross such a wall/hedge hexside; B9.4].

EX: The 5-5-8 squad moving from 18AA5 to BB5 pays 2 MF (instead of the normal 1 MF per B9.4) + COT. The cost for a fully-tracked vehicle would likewise be 2 MP + COT.




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**1.3** STEEP HILLS:<sup>11</sup> An SSR may specify that Hills (B10.) are Steep Hills. Steep Hills are treated as Hills except as stated otherwise. The effects of Steep Hills also apply in offboard hexes per 1.1. Vehicles may not set-up-in/enter Steep Hill hexes [EXC: Steep Hills Road; 1.33].



**1.31 CONCEALMENT:** Open Ground Steep Hills hexes *[EXC: Steep Hills Road; 1.33]* are considered Concealment Terrain for Infantry (and their possessed SW), Dummy stacks, entrenchments, and Emplaced Guns. An Open Ground Steep

Hills hex is *not* considered an Open Ground (A10.531) hex for concealment gain/loss purposes (even though FFMO might apply).



EX: With Steep Hills in effect, if the concealed 4-2-6 squad Assault Moves into 81D6, it does *not* lose concealment, even though FFMO still applies should it be fired on by the 6-6-6-squad in D3.



**1.311 NIGHT:** Despite being Concealment Terrain, the MF entry cost of Open Ground Steep Hills hexes is not increased (as per E1.51) at night.

**1.32 FIRING RESTRICTIONS:** All fire to/from a Steep Hills hex to/from an adjacent hex is treated as if occurring across a cliff hexside (B11.31-.32) if the target is at a different elevation than the firer [EXC: if either firer/target is in an upper-level-(B23.421)/rooftop-(B23.8) Location; if firing across a road hexside; by/vs Aerial units].

**1.33 STEEP HILLS ROADS:** Steep Hills Roads are treated as Roads (B3.) and are One-Lane (i.e., the restrictions of B6.43-.431 apply) except as stated otherwise. The *maximum* stacking capacity for unhooked Guns is one in a Steep Hills Road hex [EXC: Mortars do not count towards this limit].




**1.331 VEHICLES:** A vehicle may only enter a Steep Hills Road hex across a road hexside and using the road. The following movement costs apply to vehicles entering a Steep Hills Road hex (whether BU or not): Wagon/sledge, 1 MF; fully-tracked vehicle, 2 MP; halftrack, 2

MP; armored car, 3 MP; truck, 3 MP; motorcycle, 1 MP. An Aerosan (D17.) may not enter a Steep Hills Road hex.


**1.332** VCA CHANGE: The following apply in Steep Hills Road hexes. Contrary to B6.431, the VCA does not always have to contain an adjacent road hex. The following costs apply to vehicles that change VCA across a non-road hexside: motorcycle, 1 MP; vehicles with a +2 Target Size (D1.75), 4 MP; all other vehicles, 8 MF/MP (Minimum Move [D2.15] allowed). Additionally, a VCA change across a non-road hexside requires a Bog Check (D8.2) with an additional +3 DRM [EXC: the +3 DRM is NA for a vehicle with a +2 Target Size or for a Wagon/Sledge]. A vehicle towing a Gun or trailer may not change its VCA across a non-road hexside.

1.333 "L"/"LL" FIRING RESTRICTIONS: A vehicle [EXC: SPA; if the MA/SA is capable of using AA fire] with an "L" or "LL" Barrel Length (C4.1) MA/SA in a Steep Hills Road hex may not fire that MA/SA at a higher-level target if the LOF crosses any hill terrain in the hex adjacent to the firer that is of a higher elevation than that occupied by the firer. This restriction also applies to all other turret-mounted weapons within the same TCA. These restrictions do not apply if firing across a road hexside [EXC: if the LOF lies exactly along a hexspine and the other hexside is not a road hexside].



EX: The T-34/85 in 9V8 cannot fire any weapons at V7/W8 due to the cliff-like nature of Steep Hills (1.32) and cannot fire its MA/CMG at W7/X7, since the LOF crosses hill terrain (that is of a higher elevation than hex V8) in adjacent hexes V7 and W8.

EX: The T-34/85 in 9BB6 can fire its MA/CMG/BMG at AA7 since such fire is across a road hexside. It cannot fire its MA/CMG at Z6 since the LOF lies exactly along the hexspine and the AA6-BB6 hexside is not a road hexside.



2 HD BU: +1 \* CT: +2 **1.334 HULL DOWN:** HD Maneuver Attempts (D4.22) are NA in Steep Hills Road hexes.



**1.335 SIGHTING TC:** An additional -1 DRM applies to a Sighting TC (E7.3) vs a target in a Steep Hills Road hex.

**1.336 STEEP HILLS RAILROAD:** Steep Hills Railroads are treated as Railroads (B32.) except as stated otherwise. All rules pertaining to Steep Hills Roads are applicable to Steep Hills Railroads. All vehicular MF/MP costs (B32.3) for crossing a RR Hexside are increased by one when entering a Steep Hills Railroad hex.


**1.34 INFANTRY PORTAGING** ≥ ITS IPC: The following apply to an Infantry unit/stack *entering* a Steep Hills hex if any unit is carrying ≥ its IPC (A4.42). If crossing a Crest Line into higher terrain (B10.4) it must pay *triple* the COT of the hex entered. If crossing a Crest Line into lower terrain it must pay *double* the COT of the hex entered. These increased COT are NA if any of the following apply to the unit/stack:

- it is using a road or path; or
- it is moving between connecting trenches/sangars/bunkers (B27.54; B27.6; B30.8); or
- it is the RtPh; or
- it is Berserk (A15.4); or
- it is a DC-Hero-(G1.424)/Human-Bullet-Hero-(3.23)/Suicide-Hero-(6.4).

The cost for intermediate levels when making an Abrupt Elevation Change  $(B\,10.51)$  is not altered in Steep Hills.



1.35



EX: If the 6-6-6 in 15K6 moves alone to K5, the cost is 3 MF ( $3 \times COT$ ), or 2 MF ( $2 \times COT$ ) x COT) to move to K7, since in both cases it is carrying ≥ its IPC and crossing a Crest Line. If it moves in a stack with the 8-1 leader, normal MF costs apply since the leader increases the squad's IPC by one per A4.42. The 6-6-8 squad in M7 moves into M6 at a cost of 3 MF, even if it moves with the 8-0 leader, since it is carrying 4 PP.




1.35 CAVALRY & HORSES: Cavalry is NA in Steep Hills, except in Steep Hills Road (1.33) hexes, which can only be entered across a road hexside and using the road (but Cavalry Wave [A13.62] is not allowed). Infantry/Cavalry may still "lead" Horses (in allowable Steep Hills

hexes), but the COT is doubled when "leading" a Mule (G10.1) that is carrying a Gun/SW [EXC: if using a road or path].



1.36 GUNS: Non-vehicular Guns may set up in a Steep Hills hex if otherwise allowed. Manhandling (C10.3) into/from a Steep Hills hex is NA [EXC: if using a road; from a building/road hex into a building/road hex if both hexes have the same Base Level; to/from a cave per G11.76].



EX: A Gun in 8bX4 can only be pushed into X3 and X5. It cannot be pushed into Y5 since road hex X4 does not have the same Base Level as building hex Y5. A Gun in Y5 can only be pushed into Z4 and Y6, and into road hex X5.

1.37 FORTIFICATIONS: The following apply in Steep Hills hexes:

- There is a +2 DRM to all Entrenching attempts;
- Minefields are NA [EXC: Steep Hills Road; 1.33];
- A pillbox may only set up in such a hex if ≥ three adjacent hexes have a lower Base Level than the Pillbox's hex.




1.38 PARATROOPS & GLIDERS: A %"parachute landing in a Steep Hills hex must take a NMC as per E9.42 [EXC: if landing in a Steep Hills crag hex it receives an extra +2 DRM]. Even a 1/2" parachute must take a Landing MC

(E9.42) using a Morale Level of 7 when it lands in a Steep Hills crag hex, and is eliminated (along with its contents) if it fails the NMC. A glider that lands in a Steep Hills hex is eliminated with all of its contents.

1.39 REVERSE SLOPES: Reverse Slopes (G14.66) apply to non-mortar OBA [EXC: VT FFE; W.7] in Steep Hills hexes. An SSR will specify a hex from where the LOF (per G14.62) is traced.

#### 2. THE AMERICANS

2.1 U.S. ARMY:12 KW U.S. Army MMC types are listed on the KW National Capabilities Chart. A25.3-.34 apply normally.







2.11 AIRBORNE: Airborne squads/HS (6-6-7/ 3-4-7) are elite Class troops with underlined morale, differentiated by a parachute symbol on the counter. Neither Heat of Battle nor ELR Replacement can transform an Airborne MMC into a non-Airborne U.S. Army MMC or vice-versa (hence an Airborne squad whose ELR is ≤ 4 still becomes its two broken HS if it fails a MC by > its ELR).





2.12 RANGERS:13 Ranger squads/HS (6-6-8/ 3-4-8) are elite Class troops with underlined morale, differentiated by a circled "E" on the counter. Contrary to A25.3, the broken-side Morale Level of Ranger squads is not one > that on their Good Order side. Neither Heat of Battle nor ELR Replacement can transform a Ranger MMC into a non-Ranger U.S. Army MMC or vice-versa (hence a Ranger squad whose ELR is

≤ 4 still becomes its two broken HS if it fails a MC by > its ELR). Ranger Personnel may attempt Self-Rally during any RPh, are immune to Cowering results, may use RCL (C12.2) without Non-Qualified Use penalties (A21.13), may use Communist (W.2B) SW without Captured Use penalties (A21.11-.12), and are Commandos (H1.24). In addition to Deploying normally, a Ranger squad may Deploy without a leader by passing a 1TC instead of a NTC (A1.31). A leader is not required in order to Recombine (A1.32).

2.13 KATUSA:<sup>14</sup> Republic of Korea (ROK) personnel assigned to U.S. Army units were known as Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KA-TUSA). Unless noted otherwise, KATUSA MMC are considered U.S. Army MMC; however, neither Heat of Battle nor ELR Replacement can transform a KATUSA MMC into a non-KATUSA MMC or vice-versa (hence, a KATUSA 4-4-6, or its HS, that Battle Hardens becomes Fanatic [A10.8]). KATUSA MMC have a Heat of Battle DRM of +3 and a Leader Creation drm of +1.





2.131 EARLY KW KATUSA: In scenarios set in 9/50 through 10/51, KATUSA MMC are represented by 3-3-6 squads (and their 1-2-6 HS). They have an ELR of 2 [EXC: 1 at Night; E1.22] (re-

gardless of that specified for other UN Forces in the OB). Early KW KA-TUSA MMC and U.S. leaders are Allied Troops (A10.7).





2.132 LATE KW KATUSA: In scenarios set in 11/51 through 7/53, KATUSA MMC are represented by 4-4-6/3-3-6 squads (and their respective HS).



# W

**2.14 EARLY KW U.S. ARMY:**<sup>15</sup> The following Early KW U.S. Army rules apply to U.S. Army units (and all U.S.-built SW/Guns possessed by them) in scenarios set in 6/50 through 8/50:

- All Personnel [EXC: Heroes] are Lax (A11.18);
- Ammunition Shortage (A19.131) is in effect;
- SW have a Repair Number of "1" regardless of what is printed on the counter"
- OBA batteries have Normal Ammunition (A25.33; C1.211);
- Radios and Field Phones have a Radio Contact value one < that printed on the counter;
- Vehicles/ordnance [EXC: MG] use red To Hit numbers;
- Inherent crews of AFV have a Morale Level of 7:
- All motorized vehicles are assumed to have their MP allotments printed in red (D2.5-51) and are thus subject to Mechanical Reliability DR.



**2.2 U.S. MARINE CORPS:** <sup>16</sup> KW U.S.M.C. MMC are listed on the KW National Capabilities Chart. G17.1-.13 apply. The 5-5-8 squad and its 2-3-8 HS should only be used for re-armed MMC (2.21), rear-echelon troops, or other special situations. <sup>17</sup>



**2.21 RE-ARMED:** Any Unarmed U.S.M.C. squad/HS that becomes re-armed (A20.551-.552) is exchanged for a U.S.M.C. 5-5-8 squad or 2-3-8 HS respectively.

**2.22 GROUND SUPPORT:** Ground Support (E7.4) attacks receive an additional -1 Sighting TC DRM (E7.3) if the Majority Squad Type (E.4) of the entire U.S. OB is U.S.M.C. See also 9.113.





**2.3 INHERENT CREWS:** Inherent crews of U.S. AFV have a Morale Level of 8 [EXC: Early KW U.S. Army; 2.14] and Inherent crews of U.S. unarmored vehicles have a Morale Level of 7.

#### 3. THE SOUTH KOREANS




**3.1** South Korean units in the Korean War are represented by the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and Republic of Korea Marine Corps (KMC). The term "ROK" refers to both collectively. ROK counters have a unique two-tone color.

ROK Personnel have a Heat of Battle DRM of +3 [EXC: Early KW ROK; 3.11] and a Leader Creation drm of 0.

**3.11 EARLY KW ROK:** The following Early KW ROK rules apply to ROK units (and all SW/Guns possessed by them) in scenarios set in 6/46 through 4/51 [EXC: NA for KMC beginning 9/50]:

- All Personnel have a Heat of Battle DRM of +4, and treat all Heat of Battle "Surrender" results as "Berserk" instead;
- All BAZ and RCL are considered crew-served weapons (A21.13; C2.1);
- SW have a Repair Number of "1" regardless of what is printed on the counter:
- Radios and Field Phones have a Radio Contact value one < that printed on the counter;
- No vehicle/ordnance has any Special Ammunition (C8.);
- Inherent crews of AFV have a Morale Level of 7;
- All motorized vehicles are assumed to have their MP allotments printed in red (D2.5-51) and are thus subject to Mechanical Reliability DR.

**3.2 REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY (ROKA):** ROKA MMC types are listed on the KW National Capabilities Chart. A ROKA 1st Line MMC that Battle Hardens becomes Fanatic (A10.8); one that is designated/purchased as an Assault Engineer (H1.22) may use FT and DC as if Elite (A22.3; A23.2). ROKA 2nd Line and Conscript MMC are Lax (A11.18) and may not Deploy [EXC: A20.5; A21.22].



**3.21 ROKA ORDNANCE:** ROKA vehicles/ordnance [EXC: MG] use **red** To Hit Numbers prior to 5/51 and black To Hit Numbers thereafter.



**3.22 ROKA OBA:** ROKA OBA uses a Draw Pile (C1.211) of six black and three red chits if the scenario is set in 6/50 through 8/50, and ten black and three red (Plentiful Ammunition included) thereafter, and achieves Accuracy (C1.3) on a Final dr of  $\leq 1$ .





**3.23 HUMAN BULLET (H-B) HEROES:** In scenarios set prior to 11/50, armed, Good Order ROKA squads/HS may attempt to create "Human Bullet" (H-B) Heroes per G1.421-425

(no PAATC required), and follow all rules pertaining to such [EXC: MMC may not detonate DC like a DC Hero]. The total number of H-B Heroes allowed per scenario may not exceed 50% (FRU) of the number of ROKA squads (only) in the OB. Any number of allowed H-B Heroes may set up using HIP per G1.422.

3.3 REPUBLIC OF KOREA MARINE CORPS (KMC):<sup>19</sup> KMC MMC are Elite, normally have an ELR of 5, and do not Disrupt. Neither Heat of Battle nor ELR Replacement can transform a KMC MMC into a ROKA MMC or vice versa (hence a KMC squad whose ELR is ≤ 4 still becomes its two broken HS if it fails a MC by > its ELR). KMC MMC types are listed on the KW National Capabilities Chart, and depending on the scenario date, KMC squads/HS are either represented by Japanese-Armed (3.31) or U.S.-Armed (3.32) KMC. Any Unarmed KMC squad/HS that becomes re-armed (A20.551-552) is exchanged for a Japanese-Armed 4-4-8 squad or 2-3-8 HS respectively.





**3.31 JAPANESE-ARMED KMC:**<sup>20</sup> In scenarios set in 4/49 through 7/50, KMC MMC are represented by Japanese-Armed 4-4-8 squads (and their 2-3-8 HS).





**3.32** U.S.-ARMED KMC: In scenarios set in/after 8/50, KMC MMC are represented by U.S.-Armed 5-5-8 squads (and their 2-4-8 HS). A Good Order 5-5-8 may Deploy freely during

setup (i.e., the normal 10% limit does not apply), or in its RPh by passing a NTC (A1.31), regardless (in both cases) of the presence of a leader. The leadership modifier (A10.7) of U.S.M.C. leaders is not worsened when influencing KMC units in scenarios set in/after 8/50.



**3.33 CREWS:** The 2-2-8 is the KMC infantry-crew, and KMC vehicle-crews are represented by the 1-2-6 ROKA counter, to which it is equivalent in all respects.



**3.34 SUPPORT WEAPON USE:** In scenarios set prior to 2/51, a ROK or U.S. MMG/HMG/LtMtr/FT/BAZ being fired by a KMC squad/HS has its B#/X# and Multiple ROF lowered by one (A.11 applies). However, these SW are not con-

sidered crewed weapons for Captured Use penalties (A21.13).


**3.35 KMC ORDNANCE:** KMC vehicles/ordnance [EXC: MG] use **red** To Hit Numbers prior to 8/50 and black To Hit Numbers thereafter.

**3.36 KMC OBA:**<sup>21</sup> KMC OBA uses a Draw Pile (C1.211) of ten black and three red chits (Plentiful Ammunition included), and achieves Accuracy (C1.3) on a Final dr of  $\leq$  2. KMC OBA is available beginning 1/51 [EXC: only 60+/80+mm battalion mortar OBA (C1.22) is available 1-9/51] (see KMC OBA Availability Chart).



4. BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES KOREA

**4.1 BRITISH & COMMONWEALTH ARMIES:**<sup>22</sup> All BCFK (Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealander) MMC types are listed in the KW National Capabilities Chart; there are no Green MMC, and 2nd Line MMC that suffer ELR Replacement are Disrupted. A25.4 BRITISH rules and A25.44-.46 apply normally to BCFK units.







**4.2 ROYAL MARINE COMMANDOS:**<sup>23</sup> Royal Marine (RM) Commando squads/HS (6-6-8/3-4-8) are British, elite Class troops with underlined morale, differentiated by a Royal Marine

symbol on the counter. Neither Heat of Battle nor ELR Replacement can transform a RM MMC into a non-RM MMC or vice-versa (hence a RM squad whose ELR is  $\leq 4$  still becomes its two broken HS if it fails a MC by > its ELR). Any Unarmed RM squad/HS re-arms (A20.551-.552) as a 6-6-8 squad or 3-4-8 HS respectively. RM Personnel may use RCL (C12.2) without Non-Qualified Use penalties (A21.13), may use Communist (W.2B) SW without Captured Use penalties (A21.11-.12), and are Commandos (H1.24). In addition to Deploying normally, a squad may Deploy without a leader by passing a 1TC instead of a NTC (A1.31). A leader is not required in order to Recombine (A1.32). The leadership modifier (A10.7) of RM/U.S.M.C. leaders is not worsened when influencing U.S.M.C./RM units.

**4.3 CANADIAN ASSAULT FIRE:** In scenarios set in/after 1/52, Canadian squads have Assault Fire (A7.36) capability.

#### 5. OTHER UN FORCES




**5.1 OTHER UN COMMAND (OUNC) ARMIES:**<sup>25</sup> Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey are the UN countries that supplied the ground forces in the Korean

War that are collectively referred to here as "Other UN Command" armies. OUNC counters have a unique two-tone color. OUNC MMC types are listed on the KW National Capabilities Chart, and squads/HS are grouped into two categories: those armed with bolt-action rifles (5.12) and those armed with semi-automatic weapons (5.13), although both types share the same 2nd Line MMC. OUNC 2nd Line squads/HS (4-4-7/2-2-7) Battle Harden to 4-5-7/2-4-7, or to 5-5-7/2-4-7 if there is any semi-automatic weapon armed squad (5.13) in the UN OB. OUNC Personnel have a Heat of Battle DRM of 0 [EXC: Turkish; 5.11] and a Leader Creation drm of 0. Any Unarmed OUNC squad/HS that becomes re-armed (A20.551-552) is exchanged for a 2nd Line 4-4-7 squad or 2-3-7 HS respectively.


**5.11 TURKISH UNITS:** Turkish Personnel have a Heat of Battle DRM of +3, never surrender by the RtPh (A20.21) method, never become Disrupted, and become Berserk (A15.4) on a Final Heat of Battle DR of  $\geq$  9 [EXC: if in a pillbox they Battle Harden (A15.3) instead].

**5.12 BOLT-ACTION RIFLE ARMED:** OUNC MMC armed with bolt-action rifles represent the Colombian, Ethiopian, Thai, and, in scenarios set in 1/51 through 8/51, Belgian and Luxembourger armies. There are no Conscript/Green MMC, and 2nd Line MMC that suffer ELR Replacement are Disrupted.





**5.13 SEMI-AUTOMATIC WEAPON ARMED:** OUNC MMC armed with semi-automatic weapons represent the Dutch, Filipino, French, Greek, Turkish and, in scenarios set in/after 9/51, Belgian and Luxembourger armies. There are no Conscript/Green MMC, and 2nd Line MMC that suffer ELR Replacement are Disrupted [EXC: Turkish; 5.11].







**5.14 CREWS:** The 2-2-8 is the OUNC infantrycrew and the 1-2-7 is the OUNC vehicle-crew.



**5.2 BAYONET CHARGE:** Ethiopian, French, and Turkish leaders are exempt from the Bayonet Charge NTC (W.6A).




**5.3** OUNC OBA: OUNC OBA is only available to Filipino and Turkish forces, uses a Draw Pile (C1.211) of nine black and three red chits, and achieves Accuracy (C1.3) on a Final dr of  $\leq 1$  (see OUNC OBA Availability Chart).

#### 6. THE NORTH KOREANS



**6.1 KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (KPA):** North Korean ground forces in the Korean War were referred to as the Korean People's Army (KPA). KPA are considered Russians (A25.2) for all purposes unless specified otherwise but are

never Elite (C8.2) and may conduct Human Wave (A25.23) only when specifically allowed by SSR.<sup>27</sup> KPA MMC types are listed on the KW National Capabilities Chart. KPA Personnel have a Heat of Battle DRM of +2 and a Leader Creation drm of +1. Elite KPA squads may Deploy (A1.31; A2.9), and all Good Order elite KPA Personnel are Stealthy (A11.17). A non-KATUSA-(2.13)/non-ROK-(3.) Interrogating (E2.) a KPA prisoner must add an additional +1 DRM to any Interrogation DR.





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**6.2 COMMISSARS:** KPA may use Commissars just as if they were 10/42 Russians (A25.22-.223). The 8+1 leader is treated as a Commissar [EXC: A KPA leader may never be replaced with an 8+1 Commissar].

**6.3 MASSACRE:** \*28 KPA may conduct Massacres (A20.4).





**6.4 SUICIDE HEROES:** If specified by SSR (only), armed, Good Order KPA squads/HS may attempt to create "suicide" Heroes per G1.421-.425 (no PAATC required), and follow all rules

pertaining to such (including the ability of any KPA Infantry unit to detonate a DC per G1.424). The total number of "suicide" Heroes allowed per scenario may not exceed 25% (FRU) of the number of KPA *squads* (only) in the OB. Any number of allowed "suicide" Heroes may set up using HIP per G1.422.



**6.5 COMMUNIST GUERILLAS:**<sup>29</sup> Communist Guerilla squads, HS, and SMC use Partisan counters while their crews use Russian crew counters. All Communist Guerillas are considered Partisans (A25.24) for all purposes.



**6.6 NIGHT:** KPA/Partisan MMC [EXC: Infantry crews] may not fire Starshells (E1.92).

#### 7. THE COMMUNIST CHINESE<sup>30</sup>

**7.1** CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER ARMY (CPVA):<sup>31</sup> The People's Republic of China armed forces employed in the Korean War were referred to as the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA). CPVA counters have a unique two-tone color. CPVA MMC types are listed on the KW National Capabilities Chart, and squads/HS are grouped into two categories: Initial Intervention (7.12) and Soviet-Armed (7.13). A CPVA 1st Line MMC that Battle Hardens becomes Fanatic (A10.8). There are no Conscript/Green MMC, but 2nd Line squads that suffer ELR Replacement are *not* Disrupted.

**7.11 EARLY KW CPVA:** The following Early KW CPVA rules apply to CPVA units (and all SW/Guns possessed by them) in scenarios set in 10/50 through 3/51:

- Ammunition Shortage (A19.131) is in effect;
- SW have a Repair Number of "1" regardless of what is printed on the counter.





**7.12 INITIAL INTERVENTION:** In scenarios set in 10/50 through 3/51 CPVA squads/HS should generally be represented by Initial Intervention MMC.





**7.121 GRENADIERS:**<sup>32</sup> Grenadier squads/HS are MMC differentiated by having a Range factor (A1.22) of "(1)". They may not use their inherent FP as Long Range Fire (A7.22), their inherent FP is

not doubled when making PBF (A7.21) attacks, and their inherent FP is doubled (not tripled) when making TPBF (A7.21-212) attacks (A7.212 still applies normally). Grenadiers may not use/repair any SW/Gun [EXC: SW Self-Destruction (A9.73), MOL (A22.6), DC (A23.), Daisy Chain (B28.531)]. A Grenadier MMC may not Interdict (A10.53).





**7.13 SOVIET-ARMED:** In scenarios set in/after 4/51, CPVA squads/HS should generally be represented by Soviet-Armed MMC.



**7.2** MMC: A CPVA squad has no Broken side. Instead it has a *Full-Strength* side and a *Reduced-Strength* side, both of which are normally in Good Order. The Reduced-Strength side is distinguished by a horizontal red stripe.

**7.21 STEP REDUCTION:**<sup>33</sup> Whenever an armed, non-berserk CPVA squad fails an IFT/Collateral-Attack/Bombardment/FPF MC or suffers a dr "1" sniper attack, it undergoes *Step Reduction* (7.221-.222) [EXC: if 2nd Line and it exceeds its ELR (7.225); if it suffers Casualty Reduction (7.24)]. Unless it becomes broken, a unit that undergoes Step Reduction retains any pinned/TI/CX status it has, and also maintains any Fire-Lane/Target-Acquisition it can currently claim. Only CPVA squads (and infantry-crews; 7.28) can suffer Step Reduction.

**7.22** ATTACK BREAK: An armed, non-berserk CPVA squad that fails an IFT/Collateral-Attack/Bombardment/FPF MC (but does not suffer Casualty Reduction), or "breaks" due to a KIA result (A7.301), or suffers a dr "1" sniper attack is always affected in one of the following ways (7.221-225):

**7.221** If *Full-Strength* it is Step-Reduced—i.e., is flipped over to its Reduced-Strength side, which is still considered an unbroken squad.

**7.222** If *Reduced-Strength* it is Step-Reduced—i.e., is exchanged for one of its *unbroken* HS.

**7.223** If 1st Line and *Full-Strength*, and it exceeds its ELR, it is Replaced (due to ELR failure) by a Full-Strength 2nd Line squad which is then Step-Reduced (due to MC failure) as per 7.221.

**7.224** If 1st Line and *Reduced-Strength*, and it exceeds its ELR, it is Replaced (due to ELR failure) by a Reduced-Strength 2nd Line squad which is then Step-Reduced (due to MC failure) as per 7.222.

**7.225** If 2nd Line (regardless of whether Full- or Reduced-Strength) and it exceeds its ELR, it is Replaced by one of its *broken* HS.

**7.23 OTHER BREAK:** An armed, non-berserk CPVA squad that suffers a break result directly due to a cause *other than* those listed in 7.22 (e.g., due to its Bailing Out, voluntarily breaking, Wreck Check, para landing, WP MC, OVR Prevention MC, or Panji MC) is always affected in ≥ one of the following ways (unless it suffers Casualty Reduction; 7.24):

7.231 If Full-Strength it is exchanged for its two broken HS.

7.232 If Reduced-Strength it is exchanged for one of its broken HS.

**7.233** In addition, if it breaks by an amount > its ELR (but does not roll an Original 12), the one or two broken HS for which it is exchanged will be 2nd Line (if the squad was 1st Line) or Disrupted (if the squad was 2nd Line).

**7.24 CASUALTY REDUCTION:** All Casualty Reduction results, regardless of how they were caused, apply in the normal manner (i.e., as per A7.302) to *all* types of CPVA Personnel. A berserk or Unarmed CPVA squad that suffers any type of break result suffers Casualty Reduction instead of Step Reduction.



**7.25 UNARMED:** A Full- or Reduced-Strength CPVA squad that becomes Unarmed is exchanged for a normal Unarmed squad. Any Unarmed CPVA squad/HS that becomes re-armed (A20.551-552) is exchanged for a *Full-*Strength 2nd Line 3-3-7


squad or 1-2-7 HS respectively.





7.26

**7.26 DEPLOYING:** A CPVA squad Deploys in the normal manner [EXC: if Reduced-Strength, it is exchanged for just one of its HS]. See also 7.5.



**7.27 HS:** All armed CPVA HS break (and if 2nd Line it becomes Disrupted when suffering ELR Replacement) and rally in the normal manner (A8.31, A10.3, A10.4, A10.6, etc.; see also 7.24). Two Good-Order, same-Class CPVA HS Recombine (A1.32) into a *Full-*Strength squad of that Class.







**7.28 CREWS:** CPVA infantry-crew counters have Full- and Reduced-Strength sides like CPVA squad counters (7.2). A Full-Strength CPVA infantry-crew that fails an IFT/Collateral-Attack/Bombardment/FPF MC, or "breaks" due to a KIA result (A7.301), or suffers a dr "1" sniper attack is Step-Reduced in the same manner as a Full-Strength CPVA squad (7.21-221). A Reduced-Strength infantry-crew that suffers such a result is likewise Step-Reduced—but to a *broken* vehicle-crew. A Full- or Reduced-Strength infantry-crew that suffers a break result as per 7.23 (including breaking voluntarily) is exchanged for a broken vehicle-crew. [EXC to all: if it suffers Casualty Reduction; see 7.24.] No infantry-crew may Deploy, nor may vehicle crews Recombine.

A CPVA vehicle-crew breaks and rallies in the normal manner (A8.31, A10.3, A10.4, A10.6, etc.; see also 7.24). A CPVA vehicle-crew counter that did not set-up/enter as an *Inherent* crew is considered an infantry-crew for purposes of A21.22; therefore, an Inherent CPVA vehicle-crew that becomes an onboard Personnel unit should have its ID recorded on paper if A21.22 could come into effect during the scenario. CPVA *Inherent* crews function in the standard manner (D5., etc.).



**7.3 LEADERS:** The rank structure of CPVA leaders is as follows (in descending order): 10-1, 10-0, 9-1, 9-0, 8-1, 8-0, 7-0, 6+1. An unpinned, Good Order CPVA Infantry/Cavalry leader increases the Morale Level of all other non-berserk

CPVA Infantry/Cavalry MMC in his Location [EXC: if a unpinned, unbroken Political Officer (7.31) is present] by one (A.18 applies).



**7.31 POLITICAL OFFICERS (PO):** CPVA treat Political Officers (PO) as Commissars just as if they were 10/42 Russians (A25.22-.223) unless specified otherwise. Political Officers have a **red** Strength Factor (A10.7). A unit is *not* immune

to DM status while being rallied by a PO, but the DRM is +2 instead of the normal +4 (A10.62), and a unit which fails to rally under the direction of a PO is *not* Replaced/Casualty-Reduced/eliminated per A25.222. No leader may be exchanged for a PO, which must be specifically assigned in the OB.

**7.4 COMMAND & CONTROL:** The provisions of both Restricted Fire (7.41) and Infantry Platoon Movement (7.42) apply to all Good Order CPVA squads/HS [EXC: Recon Units; 7.5].

**7.41 RESTRICTED FIRE:** Each attack conducted by a Good Order CPVA squad/HS vs a non-ADJACENT target during the PFPh or when

using Opportunity Fire (A7.25) is treated as Area Fire (A7.23; C.4) [EXC: if a leader directs that attack; A7.53].

**7.42 INFANTRY PLATOON MOVEMENT (IPM):** During the MPh, a Good Order CPVA *Infantry* squad/HS may move *only* in an IPM Group (7.421) [EXC: Entry (7.4222); if using Non-IPM Movement; (7.423)]. Dummies and other Good Order CPVA Infantry units not normally subject to IPM (e.g., crews, SMC, Recon Units [7.5]) may be declared as participating in an IPM Group.

**7.421 IPM GROUP:** A CPVA ATTACKER may declare an IPM Group during the MPh by selecting ≥ one participating MMC and ≥ one leader, all of which must be in a contiguous chain of ADJACENT Locations, in Good Order, free to move, and cannot have started *their* MPh yet. Leaders may either participate in an IPM Group or a single leader may initiate an IPM Group. A leader may only initiate or participate in one IPM Group per MPh. A *participating* leader provides the leader bonus (A4.12) to *all* units in the IPM Group, even if the leader ceases to be part of the IPM Group. Initiating an IPM Group is not a concealment loss action (A12.141) and does not in any way limit the leader's movement during the MPh. Once an IPM Group is formed, a participating unit can only cease being part of the IPM Group per 7.4221.

**7.422 MECHANICS OF INFANTRY PLATOON MOVEMENT:** An IPM Group uses Impulse Movement (D14.3). All rules for Impulse Movement apply unless specified otherwise. Each unit in an IPM Group must move so that (if possible) at the end of each Impulse (but not during the Impulse) the *entire* IPM Group consists of a single contiguous chain of adjacent hexes/Locations. Assault Movement (A4.61) and Double Time (A4.5) may be declared normally for an IPM Group, but only for the group as a whole and affects all units in that group. Units in an IPM Group attempting to move beneath Wire (B26.4) make individual Exit drs.

A unit in an IPM Group may not:

- · Mount/load-onto any form of conveyance;
- Declare a Dash (A4.63);
- Search (A12.152);
- Set a DC (A23.7);
- Enter a Sewer-(B8.1)/Tunnel-(B8.6)/cave/Cave-Complex-(G11.);
- Climb (B11.4);
- Attempt any type of Clearance (B24.7);
- (Un)hook a Gun (C10.11; C10.12);
- Push a Gun (C10.3);
- Swim (E6.).

**7.4221** GAPS: A unit in an IPM Group that is eliminated, breaks, or becomes pinned or Berserk is no longer considered part of the group at the end of the current Impulse. If the remaining units of the IPM Group do not fulfill the requirements of 7.422, they must move to do so at the end of the next Impulse (unless they end their MPh in their current hexes); should they fail to do so the group immediately ceases movement, and all participating units end their MPh in their current Location [EXC: Entry; 7.4222]. A SMC that becomes Wounded (A17.) while using IPM has the option to voluntarily cease being part of the IPM Group at the end of the current Impulse and end its MPh in its current Location.

7.4222 ENTRY: A Good Order CPVA Infantry unit is not required to use IPM during the Player Turn it enters the mapboard, although it may choose to do so. For purposes of 7.422, offboard units of an IPM Group are considered adjacent to other units of the group as if all units were onboard during the Player Turn they enter the mapboard. Should a gap (7.4221) occur during the turn of entry and the IPM Group does not meet the requirements of 7.422 at the end of the next Impulse, the entire group does *not* automatically cease movement. However, an *onboard* unit that is *not* part of the longest contiguous chain of adjacent hexes/Locations (player's choice it ≥ one such chain exists) ceases being part of the group and must end its MPh in its current Location. A unit still offboard may continue to move (as if it were part of the group), but must end its MPh in the first onboard hex it enters, unless it is now adjacent to another unit in the group, in which case it continues being part of the group.




7.4223 EXIT: A unit in an IPM Group that leaves the mapboard during an Impulse in which other units of the same IPM Group remain onboard is

**7.4223 EXIT:** A unit in an IPM Group that leaves the mapboard during an Impulse in which other units of the same IPM Group remain onboard is assumed to be in its last entered onboard hex [EXC: Overstacking penalties (A5.11) are NA] throughout the MPh for the purpose of 7.422-4221.

BERSERK 8 MF X-X-10 **7.4224 BERSERK:** If a unit in an IPM Group goes Berserk (A15.4), the group's movement is temporarily suspended after the current Impulse. After the Berserk unit has completed its charge (A15.43), the IPM Group's MPh resumes.

**7.423 NON-IPM MOVEMENT:** If at the start of its MPh a Good Order CPVA squad/HS wishes to move without using IPM it must pass a NTC [EXC: 7.4231]. This TC cannot trigger a Sniper-(A14.1)/Booby-Trap-(B28.9) attack, nor is it considered a concealment loss action (A12.141). An additional +1 DRM applies to this TC in night scenarios. See also 7.81. If it fails the NTC, it may move no more than one Location [EXC: Berserk; Straying] in that MPh, and must do so before any other units move.




7.423 NON-IPM MOVEMENT EX: The leader in 19W5 initiates an IPM Group consisting of the 4-(1)-7 squad (7.421), which moves off using one-squad Impulse movement via V4 towards V2. The leader can now neither participate in nor initiate another IPM Group (7.421), so the leader and 4-3-7 squad then move together via X4 towards Y3 (7.4231 bullet #2). The 3-3-7 squad may attempt a NTC to move normally, but if it fails may only move one Location (7.423); it can move one Location in any direction without the need to attempt the NTC (7.4231 bullet #1; although there is no real harm in failing); or it can designate W2 as its "target" hex (since it contains an in-LOS enemy MMC) and move towards that target hex (7.4231 bullet #13a).

U5 U4 U3 6 V2 PIN Half FP No Move No Adv W5 ₹4 W3 X X 6 Y5 76 74 **Z3** 72

7.4221 GAPS EX: During the first Impulse, all units in the IPM Group move one hex for a cost of 1 MF (as shown by the **blue arrows**). Defensive Fire pins the 7-0 leader in 44W5 and breaks the 2-2-7 HS in X4. The pinned leader and broken HS are no longer part of the group after the current Impulse (7.4221). In the next Impulse, the CPVA player must move the group's remaining units so that they form a single contiguous chain of adjacent hexes, e.g., movement as shown by the **red arrows**.

If Defensive Fire had also pinned the squad in V4, it would not be possible to form a single contiguous chain of adjacent hexes at the end of the next Impulse, and the group would immediately cease movement at the end of the next Impulse (7.422). Because it is not possible to form a single contiguous chain of adjacent hexes, the CPVA player is free to move the remaining units in the group in the last Impulse without any IPM considerations.

7.4222 ENTRY EX: All units of this IPM Group enter the map from offboard for a cost of 2 MF (due to the Light Woods in 19Z10) during their **first Impulse**. Defensive Fire breaks both the 8-0 leader in AA10 and the 2-2-7 HS in BB10 and pins the 4-3-7 squad in CC10, after which they are no longer part of the group.



During the **second Impulse**, the remaining five units in the IPM Group move again. If they had been able to re-form into a contiguous group, they would have had to do so. Since that is not possible, they choose to move as shown by the **blue arrows**. If the group had started movement from onboard, all five units would then cease movement, because the group does not form a single contiguous chain of adjacent hexes at the end of the next Impulse after a gap occurred (7.4221). However, since this is their turn of entry not all units are required to cease movement. Only the 4-3-7 squads in Y9 and Z9 must end their MPh, because they are not part of the "longest contiguous chain of adjacent hexes" (7.4222) and thus are no longer part of the group. The other three units can continue moving as a group.



#### 7.4231

**7.4231 EXCEPTIONS:** A Good Order CPVA squad/HS is exempt from the TC per 7.423 if any of the following apply:

- It moves ≤ one Location during its MPh;
- It spends its entire MPh moving in a combined stack with a leader;
- It is entering from offboard (7.4222; A2.5);
- It mounts/loads-onto any form of conveyance as the first MF expended during its MPh;
- It dismounts/unloads from any form of conveyance;
- It possesses ≥ one DC/FT;
- It is an Assault Engineer (H1.22), Sapper (B28.8; H1.23), and/or Commando (H1.24);
- It is Fanatic (A10.8);
- It is Cloaked (E1.4);
- The first Location it enters is a Sewer-(B8.2)/cave/Cave-Complex-(G11.) Location;
- It enters a Tunnel (B8.6);
- It moves such that each new hex entered during its MPh contains an Entrenchment, Pillbox, or a Cave, or is a cave's Entrance Hex;
- At the start of its MPh, it designates a "target" hex. Any new hex entered during the MPh must decrease the range (in hexes) to the "target" hex and/or be adjacent to it (including exiting the mapboard; A26.23). Such a "target" hex must be in its LOS and either:
- a) contain a Known enemy MMC/vehicle within four hexes;
- b) contain a friendly conveyance it could mount/load-onto within three MF;
- c) be a VC hex (or contain a VC Location/building) (A26.1); or
- d) be a board-edge hex off of which it could exit without being considered eliminated (A26.221).



**7.424 IPM AT NIGHT:** CPVA Cloaking counters may participate in an IPM Group, but only if all *participating* units are Cloaked (E1.4). If a unit in an IPM Group loses Cloaking, *all* units in that IPM Group lose Cloaked status (eliminating Dummy Cloaking counters). The individual

units are placed on board concealed [EXC: unconcealed if they would otherwise lose concealment]. See also 7.71.

**7.4241 STRAYING:** Only one Movement DR (E1.53) is made for the entire IPM Group. The E1.531 exceptions apply to an IPM Group if any of them apply to a participating leader and/or to  $\geq$  50% of the participating units. Should any participating unit in an IPM Group become TI (due to E1.53), all participating units in the group become TI. Only Good Order friendly units *not* part of the IPM Group are considered for purposes of E1.532, but once that applies to any participating unit, it applies to them all.

**7.5 RECON UNITS:**<sup>37</sup> CPVA squads/HS may be designated by SSR as "Recon" units, and the following rules apply to such squads/HS:

- In addition to Deploying normally, a "Recon" squad may Deploy without a leader by passing a 1TC instead of a NTC (A1.31);
- A leader is not required in order to Recombine (A1.32);
- A "Recon" HS may not Recombine with a non-"Recon" HS;
- "Recon" squads/HS are not subject to Command & Control (7.4) restrictions;
- A "Recon" squad/HS that becomes Unarmed ceases to be a "Recon" unit.



**7.6 HS INFANTRY OVR:** An armed, non-berserk CPVA Infantry MMC, but at least one *squad* (including any SMC it is stacked with and moves with) may attempt to conduct an Infantry OVR vs a lone Known enemy HS provided the sum

of the *printed* inherent FP (A1.21) of all participating units is  $\geq$  that of the enemy HS; a broken enemy HS retains its printed, unbroken inherent FP value for this calculation. All rules for Infantry OVR (A4.15) apply unless specified otherwise. The enemy HS does not have the option of entering a new hex. Detection (A12.15) applies normally.



**7.7 NIGHT:** CPVA MMC [EXC: Infantry crews] may not fire Starshells (E1.92). CPVA have a Recon drm (E1.23) of +1. CPVA units [EXC: Lax; A11.18] are not subject to Jitter Fire (E1.55). See also 7.96.

**7.71 EARLY KW CPVA NIGHT:** In scenarios set prior to 4/51, contrary to E1.31, a CPVA Infantry unit/stack or IPM Group (7.421) consisting of ≤ four MMC does *not* lose concealment when it uses Non-Assault Movement in a Location that is already Illuminated.

Such units may retain concealment; however, they will not retain their Cloaked status (E1.31; 7.424) and are placed on board concealed instead (or eliminated if a Dummy Cloaking counter). They lose concealment normally if any of the following apply:

- The Location is within the Base NVR and LOS of a Good Order enemy ground unit; or
- A unit uses Hazardous Movement (A4.62); or
- A unit is carrying > its IPC (A4.42); or
- A unit expends MF for activities other than to enter the Location and/or to enter/exit an entrenchment in it; or
- Bugles (7.8) have been sounded this Player Turn.

**7.8** BUGLES:<sup>39</sup> CPVA may sound Bugles if specified by SSR. The CPVA player may sound Bugles at *the start of* any CPVA MPh with ≥ one Good Order CPVA leader on board (or set up offboard to enter; A2.51). The sounding of Bugles is the equivalent of a Gunflash being placed due to an attack vs a CPVA unit for the purpose of Jitter Fire (E1.55), Initial Use of Starshells/IR/Searchlights (E1.91; 10.5). The effects (7.81-.82) of Bugles apply for the remainder of the current Player Turn. Bugles may be sounded again in subsequent Player Turns. Bugles may be sounded in both daytime and night scenarios.



**7.81 CPVA EFFECTS:** During a Player Turn in which Bugles have been sounded, all CPVA squads/HS receive an additional -1 Non-IPM Movement TC DRM (7.423), and all CPVA units receive an additional +1 Concealment drm

(A12.122).



**7.82 UN EFFECTS:** In a Player Turn when Bugles have been sounded, the UN Scenario Defender's best leader may attempt to gain Freedom of Movement per E1.21, with a -1 drm. In scenarios set in 10/50 through 3/51, the following apply to

U.S./ROK/OUNC DEFENDERS in a Player Turn when Bugles have been sounded. In daytime scenarios and in night scenarios when a Movement DR is not initially necessary (E1.531), for each CPVA ground unit/stack wishing to move to a new hex in that MPh, the CPVA player makes a Straying DR at the start of that unit's/stack's MPh for the sole purpose of possible DE-FENDER Jitter Fire; if a moving CPVA unit/stack subsequently becomes subject to a Movement DR (E1.53), Jitter Fire is NA for that DR. For Jitter Fire (E1.55) only, each U.S./ROK/OUNC DEFENDER unit/stack that is Stealthy (E.4; E1.6) is considered to be Normal, and each unit/stack that is Normal is considered to be Lax.

**7.9 MISCELLANEOUS:** Good Order CPVA Personnel are Stealthy (A11.17). CPVA Personnel have a Heat of Battle DRM of +1 and a Leader Creation drm of 0. CPVA Personnel treat all Heat of Battle "Surrender" results as "Berserk" instead, unless they are ADJACENT to a Good Order UN Infantry unit. CPVA units may neither use Riders (D6.2) [EXC: Cavalry; motorcyclists] nor Armored Assault (D9.31). A UN unit Interrogating (E2.) a CPVA prisoner must add an additional +1 DRM to any Interrogation DR. Civilian Interrogation (E2.4) is always in effect for the CPVA. Unless specified otherwise by SSR, the CPVA are in a Friendly country.



**7.91 WEAPONS USE:** CPVA Personnel may use Russian/ Japanese/G.M.D. SW/Guns/vehicles without Captured Use penalties (A21.11-.12). A CPVA MMG/HMG/LtMtr/BAZ/ RCL being fired by a CPVA squad/HS has its B#/X# and

Multiple ROF lowered by one (A.11 applies). However, these SW are not considered crewed weapons for Captured Use penalties (A21.13). A



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CPVA 1st Line MMC that starts a scenario possessing a DC/FT (and/or is designated/purchased as an Assault Engineer [H1.22]) may use FT and DC as if they were Elite (A22.3; A23.2). A 1st Line HS created from such a squad also retains this ability, which it loses if it recombines [EXC: two Assault Engineer HS recombining].

**7.92 ENTRENCHING:**<sup>41</sup> CPVA units are entitled to a -1 DRM when entrenching. This DRM does not apply to prisoners of any nationality.



**7.93 ORDNANCE & OBA:** CPVA vehicles/ordnance [EXC: MG] use red To Hit Numbers. CPVA OBA is available beginning 6/51 and uses a Draw Pile (C1.211) of seven black and three red chits if the scenario is set in 6/51 through 9/52, and seven black and two red thereafter, and

achieves Accuracy (C1.3) on a Final dr of  $\leq 1$ .

**7.94 MORALE:** CPVA are exempt from taking PAATC (inclusive of A12.41) and the NTC for an Infantry OVR (A4.15) [EXC: HS Infantry OVR; 7.6]. Unbroken CPVA treat LLMC as LLTC.



**7.95 CONCEALMENT:** <sup>42</sup> CPVA Infantry receive a -1 drm to their Concealment dr (A12.122). In addition to gaining concealment per A12.122, CPVA Infantry in Concealment Terrain may also attempt to gain concealment via a Concealment via a Concealment.

ment dr even if in LOS of unbroken enemy ground unit(s), provided *all* such enemy units would incur a Hindrance DRM of at least +2 during a hypothetical attack vs the CPVA Infantry.

**7.96 HIP:** The CPVA player in a daytime scenario may always use HIP for  $\leq 10\%$  (FRU) of the MMC squad-equivalents (A5.5) in his onboard-setup OB and any SMC/SW that set(s) up stacked with them. In a night scenario the CPVA player may always use HIP for  $\leq 25\%$  of his MMC squad-equivalents (including crews) that set up onboard, even if he is not the Scenario Defender—and if he *is* the Scenario Defender he also receives Dummy counters equal to the number of MMC squad-equivalents in his OB; otherwise, E1.2 applies unchanged. These HIP capabilities are in addition to HIP granted for any other reason(s) [EXC: E1.2]. In daytime scenarios, E1.16 applies to CPVA Foxholes/Sangars set up in Concealment Terrain.



**7.97 CC:** Whenever ≥ one unbroken CPVA Infantry/Cavalry unit is the ATTACKER in CC/Melee or Ambushes the enemy in CC, that CC/Melee automatically becomes Handto-Hand (J2.31) unless every such CPVA unit participating in

it was Ambushed in that phase and/or is Withdrawing/pinned. However, Hand-to-Hand CC can never be used by/vs any vehicle(s)/PRC/pillbox-occupant(s). Each CPVA Hand-to-Hand CC attack receives an extra -1 DRM unless every CPVA Infantry/Cavalry unit participating in that attack is pinned/Unarmed. A Reduced-Strength CPVA unit retains its Full-Strength CCV.

**7.98 BATTLEFIELD INTEGRITY:** Step Reduction from *Full-Strength* to *Reduced-Strength* never affects the current CPVA Casualty Tally. A Full- or Reduced-Strength infantry-crew that for any reason is exchanged for a vehicle-crew is treated for Casualty Tally purposes like a squad being Reduced to a HS (A16.11).

**7.99 VP:** The opponent does not gain Casualty VP when a CPVA Full-Strength squad or infantry-crew is flipped over to its Reduced-Strength side, nor when a Reduced-Strength infantry-crew is exchanged for a broken vehicle-crew.

#### 8. KW AIR SUPPORT<sup>43</sup>



**8.1** AIRCRAFT:<sup>44</sup> All rules for Fighter-Bombers (E7.) apply to the FB 50 and AD Skyraider except as stated otherwise. The MG Basic To Kill Number for both is "6" as shown on the "44F" column on the AP To Kill Table (C3.71).

**8.11 FB 50 RECALL:** A FB 50 that makes an Original Sighting TC DR  $\geq 11$  [EXC:  $\geq 9$  in scenarios set in 6-8/50] is Recalled (E7.24) at the end of the phase of the TC as per E7.31.



**8.12 AD SKYRAIDER:** Contrary to E7.42, an AD Skyraider is not automatically flipped over to its reverse side after making a bomb attack. If, during a bomb attack, it retains ROF (C2.24; an AD Skyraider has a bomb ROF of "3" as indicated by the black "3" encased in a black square), it is not

flipped over to the reverse side; however, it may not attack with bombs again in the current phase.

**8.2 NAPALM:** Beginning 9/50, Napalm (G17.4) is always [EXC: 8.3] available to UN FB. Upon mapboard entry (E7.2-.21), the UN player secretly records, for each FB, whether that FB is equipped with HE or Napalm bombs.

**8.3** VT-FUZED BOMBS: <sup>46</sup> In scenarios set in/after 9/50, a U.S. FB may be equipped with VT-bombs, but only when specified by SSR. VT-bombs cannot be exchanged for HE or Napalm bombs. Unless stated otherwise, VT-bombs are treated as HE bombs (E7.42) in all respects, except that W.7A-.7C also applies. The Area Target Type must be used at all times by aircraft attacking with VT-bombs; however, contrary to E7.422 any hit is resolved on the IFT one column to the left of the one corresponding to the bomb's full HE equivalency.

EX: A FB 50 conducts a bomb attack (using normal 150mm HE bombs) using the Area Target Type; a hit is resolved (per E7.422) on the IFT with only half the FP of the bomb load (15 FP [the 12 FP column]). The same attack conducted with VT-bombs is resolved on the 24 FP column (one column to left of the bombs normal HE equivalency [30 FP]). Any 150mm VT-bomb CH is resolved on the 36 column of the IFT with a -1 bonus DRM (24 FP  $\times$  2 [CH] = 48; 48 - 36 = 12; 12  $\div$  8 = 1½) (C.7).

**8.4 AFV IMMUNITY ZONE:** In scenarios set in/after 11/50, all hexes in/adjacent-to an unconcealed UN AFV that can theoretically be seen by an aircraft (E7.25) may not be attacked during a Mistaken Attack (E7.32; E7.62). If a Sighting TC results in a Mistaken Attack, the UN player cannot voluntarily remove any concealment until after the Mistaken Attack is resolved. The enemy's non-hidden onboard ground unit that is closest (in hexes) *outside* of all immunity zones become the initial target of the Mistaken Attack. During a Mistaken Attack by an Observation Plane (E7.62), the FFE may not be initially placed so that any hex that is within an immunity zone is part of the FFE's Blast Area (if not accurately [C1.3.-.31] placed, the FFE's final placement may still be within an immunity zone). If the FFE is not accurate and the chosen target moves into an immunity zone, the FFE may still be corrected toward that unit. See the example on the following page; see also 9.114.

**8.5 RESTRICTED AIRSPACE:** <sup>48</sup> A hex that is in/adjacent-to an SR counter, or that is within an FFE's Blast Area may never be one of the 5-8 hexes that an aircraft moves through during a Ground Support attack (including Mistaken Attack; E7.32).

#### 9. FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS & CLOSE AIR SUPPORT<sup>49</sup>

**9.1 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS:** Forward Air Controllers (FAC) represent units specially equipped and trained to direct Ground Support attacks. There are three types of FAC: U.S.M.C. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) (9.11), Offboard U.S.M.C. TACP (9.12), and airborne FAC (9.13); all three operate in a similar manner. Only the UN player may utilize FAC.




**9.11 U.S.M.C. TACP:** A U.S.M.C. TACP is represented by a MMC counter that bears the silhouette of two kneeling men operating a radio. It is considered the equivalent of an infantry-crew except as stated otherwise. A TACP may not possess any

SW/Gun [EXC: its Inherent radio; 9.111], nor may it become an Inherent crew [EXC: TACP Jeep (UN Forces Vehicle Note 31)]. A TACP that sets up onboard may use HIP as if it were manning a field phone. A TACP has a CCV of 3.



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8.4 EX: In a scenario taking place in/after 11/50, the FB in 33S8 attempts to "sight" the concealed KPA 4-4-7 squad in S4. The Original Sighting TC DR is an 11, and the only applicable DRM is +1 (Target is within four hexes of non-HIP vehicle/MMC friendly to and in the LOS of the aircraft), resulting in Final Sighting TC DR of 12 which results in a Mistaken Attack. The 6-6-6 in R3 is the UN player's non-hidden onboard ground unit that is closest (in hexes) to the aircraft's initial target. However, the unconcealed M26A1 in Q3 makes both its hex, and adjacent hex R3 immune to a Mistaken Attack (8.4)—the "immunity zone" indicated by the red outline. The closest target *outside* of all immunity zones is the 1-2-6 vehicle crew in P4. Hex P4 is not immune to a Mistaken Attack since the unconcealed M24 in O5 cannot be seen (E7.25) by the FB and the M3 ht in O3 is concealed, so neither of these AFV "project" any immunity zone.



**9.111 TACP RADIO:** A TACP is assumed to possess a two-PP Inherent radio ( $\Delta$ ) (thus equaling seven PP for Passenger PP purposes), and may neither Transfer nor drop/share possession of that radio; however, if a TACP is captured/eliminated, its In-

herent radio is immediately eliminated. A TACP's Inherent radio (referred to hereafter as a TACP radio) has a Contact value of "9" (G.7 can apply). A TACP radio breaks down on any Original Contact/Maintenance DR of 12; mark the TACP with a Radio Malfunction counter. A TACP radio can be repaired normally per A9.72; a dr of 1 repairs the TACP radio and removes the Malfunction counter, and a dr of 6 disables the TACP radio permanently. A normal radio/field-phone cannot be used by a TACP, nor may a TACP radio make Contact with an OBA/NOBA battery.

**9.112 RADIO OPERATION:** A TACP may only direct Ground Support attacks (9.113) if it currently has Radio Contact. Only a Good Order TACP (including a Passenger) may attempt Radio Contact/Maintenance and does so in the same manner as an Observer (A12.141; C1.2; C1.22; C1.6-.61).

9.113 GROUND SUPPORT DIRECTION: Ground Support attacks (E7.4) receive an additional -2 Sighting TC DRM (E7.3) when directed by a TACP [EXC: -1 if directed by an Offboard U.S.M.C. TACP (9.12) or an airborne FAC (9.13)]. This DRM is reduced by one if there is any applicable LOS/LV/DLV Hindrance along the TACP's LOS between its Location (including such in the TACP's Location) and that of the aircraft's initial target hex. Contrary to E7.3, when directed by a TACP, the aircraft's Sighting TC must be based on the easiest target to spot in the initial target hex to which the TACP has a LOS. However, direction by a TACP is always optional [EXC: Close Air Support; 9.2]. A TACP can only direct an attack if it has a LOS to the aircraft's initial target hex, currently has Radio Contact (9.112), and is either Infantry, or a CE Passenger in an OT AFV, or a Passenger in a truck (D6.7) or the inherent crew of a TACP Jeep. A TACP may only direct attacks vs a single target hex during a Player Turn, but it may direct any number of aircraft towards that hex. An aircraft can only be directed by a single TACP during a Player Turn, but it may be directed by a different TACP in subsequent Player Turns. See also 2.22.

**9.114 TACP IMMUNITY ZONE:** All hexes within two hexes of a TACP (that currently has Radio Contact) may not be attacked during a Mistaken Attack (E7.32; E7.62) as per 8.4 [EXC: regardless of date, aircraft's LOS to TACP, and TACP's hidden/concealment status].

**9.12 OFFBOARD U.S.M.C. TACP:** A SSR may give the UN player a FAC represented by an Offboard U.S.M.C. TACP. The SSR will specify a particular on-board hex and level (even though the listed hex may have no such level), and all LOS checks per 9.113 are taken from this point as if the TACP were located there. Since there is no TACP actually in the designated Offboard TACP hex, any fire or movement into/from/through that hex has no effect on the TACP [EXC: Hindrances affect the Sighting TC DRM from that hex level normally; 9.113]. Even though an Offboard TACP has no Inherent radio, all FAC procedures (9.112-.113) are conducted normally, except that Radio Contact and Maintenance are automatic.



**9.13 AIRBORNE FAC:** An airborne FAC represents an aircraft specifically tasked to function as an observer for ground support aircraft. Only one airborne FAC is available to the UN side in any scenario, and it is subject to normal aircraft rules except where specified otherwise below. An

airborne FAC is considered an Offboard TACP (9.12) [EXC: it is not considered U.S.M.C. unless designated as such by SSR; it has an Inherent radio (with a Contact value of "9") and needs to roll for Radio Contact/Maintenance (but Malfunction is NA)] with the added advantage of being able to make its Aerial LOS checks from any Friendly Board Edge hex of the owner's choice. It may not direct (9.113) a Ground Support attack against a Location in or beneath Fog (E3.31). An airborne FAC does not take counter form, but is considered just offboard until Recalled/eliminated. Heavy AA fire (E7.52) [EXC: an Original 4 DR prevents it from directing a Ground Support attack during that Player Turn (mark it with a TI counter)] is the only way ground units can attack an airborne FAC. Even though technically offboard, an airborne FAC can be attacked in Aerial Combat (although it cannot fire back), and if held in Aerial Melee loses Radio Contact. An airborne FAC is worth three VP.

9.14 DYO: An airborne FAC aircraft has a BPV of "25".

**9.2 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT:** UN aircraft directed by a FAC (9.1; 9.113) may conduct Ground Support attacks in the UN PFPh immediately after resolving all FFE in the same manner as a Ground Support attack in the MPh/DFPh (E7.4), including the placement of Residual FP counters. An aircraft may not conduct Ground Support attacks in two consecutive *Player* Turns.

**9.21 LIGHT AA:** The DEFENDER may use Light AA fire (E7.5-.512) vs ATTACKER aircraft that are conducting Ground Support attacks during the PFPh. A DEFENDER unit that exhausts its full ROF in AA fire is marked with a Final Fire counter as well as retaining the AA marker.

**9.22 MISTAKEN ATTACK:** Should a Mistaken Attack opportunity occur (E7.32) during a Ground Support attack in the PFPh, the *DE-FENDER* moves the aircraft and attacks the *ATTACKER's* the closest (in hexes) eligible (per E7.32; see also 8.4 and 9.114) unit.

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EX: If the FB attacks 4P6 and it is *not* directed by the TACP in M8, its Sighting TC (E7.3) is based on the T-34/85 at ground level since that is the easiest target to spot in the initial target hex. The Sighting TC DRM is +1 (+3 [target is in building] +1 [target is within four hexes of non-HIP MMC friendly to and in the LOS of the aircraft] -1 [target is vehicular] -2 [target is not entirely concealed]). If, however, the TACP directs the attack (e.g., during the PFPh when the FB must be directed by the TACP [9.2]), the Sighting TC is based on the concealed 4-4-7 squad on Level 1 (the only target in P6 that the TACP has a LOS to), and would be +2 (+3 [target is in building] +1 [target is within four hexes of non-HIP MMC friendly to and in the LOS of the aircraft] -2 [TACP direction]). Had there e.g., been a +3 Smoke counter in the TACP's hex, the -2 DRM for TACP Direction would be reduced to -1 (9.113).

#### 10. SEARCHLIGHTS<sup>53</sup>

**10.1 SEARCHLIGHTS:** Searchlights (SL) are only available to UN Forces. There are three types of Searchlights: ground-mounted (10.11), truck-mounted (10.12), and AFV-mounted (10.13).



10.11 GROUND-MOUNTED SEARCHLIGHT: A ground-mounted Searchlight (GMSL) represents a searchlight mounted on a gun carriage and is considered a crewserved (A21.13; C2.1) "weapon". Unless a SL CA counter is placed on the counter, the SL CA (C3.2) is based on the

trailer hitch, pointing to the bottom right corner of the counter as if a gun barrel. A crew/HS manning a GMSL is considered equal to a squad for stacking purposes (A5.5). A GMSL is worth two VP and cannot occupy a building, hut, rubble, jungle/bamboo, Water Obstacle, marsh, or Irrigated-paddy (G8.12). If a GMSL permanently malfunctions it is immediately removed from play. A GMSL may be Pushed (C10.3) and/or towed (C10.1) as a QSU Gun of < 100mm (C10.13) [EXC: Emplaced; 10.111]. A GMSL may not be switched on (10.2) when in tow. A GMSL (and its manning Infantry) loses Concealment as if it were a vehicle.

**10.111 EMPLACED:** A GMSL may set up Emplaced as if a Gun (A12.34; C11.2-.3), manning Infantry receiving the same +2 TEM, etc.

10.112 ATTACKS VS GMSL: A GMSL that is not in tow is attacked as if it were an Immobile (D.7), unarmored vehicle (D1.21) [EXC: Immobilization results has no effect] with an Inherent crew (if manned), but it is not treated as a vehicle for Ambush purposes. When in tow, it may be attacked as if it were a trailer (C10.41). A GMSL is only an eligible Sniper target (A14.2) if it is currently switched on (10.2); a Sniper attack dr of "1" malfunctions the SL, a "2" pins the manning Infantry.

EX: A GMSL (that is manned by a U.S. 2-2-7 infantry crew) and a U.S. 6-6-6 squad are in Melee with a KPA 4-4-7 squad. Since the GMSL is treated as a vehi-

cle, CC is sequential (A11.31). The KPA player chooses to attack the GMSL. The CCV is 5, and the CC DRM is -1 (-1 [no manned usable MG] -3 [unarmored vehicle] +3 [escorting Personnel (2-2-7 crew and 6-6-6 squad)]). A CC DR of  $\leq$  5 eliminates the GMSL, and a DR of  $\geq$  6 has no effect.

10.113 DYO: A GMSL has a BPV of "25" (including an infantry crew; H1.3).



**10.12 TRUCK-MOUNTED SEARCHLIGHT:** A truck (D1.15) with the letters "SL" in the bottom left-hand corner of its counter represents a truck-mounted Searchlight (TMSL). The Searchlight is considered the MA (D1.3) of the truck for all purposes unless specified otherwise. A

TMSL cannot establish an IB Lane (10.2) if the SL CA coincides with the VCA.

10.121 SNIPER: If a TMSL is the target of a Sniper attack and the SL is currently switched on (10.2), the Sniper attacks the SL instead of the truck; a Sniper attack dr of "1" malfunctions the SL, a "2" pins the Inherent crew

10.13 AFV-MOUNTED SEARCHLIGHTS:<sup>54</sup> An AFV may be equipped with a Searchlight only if specified by SSR. An AFV-mounted Searchlight (AMSL) is considered a Secondary Armament (D1.34). A Searchlight on an AFV can be either turret- or bow-mounted. The SL CA (C3.2) is based on the TCA if turret-mounted, or the VCA if bow-mounted.



**10.131 AMSL MALFUNCTION:** A turret-mounted SL that is switched on (10.2) automatically malfunctions if the vehicles fires any turret-mounted weapons (or bow-mounted weapons for a bow-mounted SL) [EXC to both: FT]. For any

IFT attack (including a hypothetical Collateral Attack against a non-vulnerable crew), treat the SL as an unarmored vehicle that becomes malfunctioned rather than immobilized and disabled rather than eliminated. The SL receives an additional +2 DRM to such IFT attacks.

10.132 DYO: An AFV-mounted SL costs four points per vehicle.



10.2 ILLUMINATION BEAM: The beam of light "fired" by a SL is referred to as an Illumination Beam (IB). An IB creates an IB Lane from the SL's Location along the LOF to (and ending in) the target Location. When an IB Lane is suc-

cessfully established (10.4) the SL is considered "switched on", and is indicated by placing an IB Lane counter in the target Location and a SL CA counter (with the "on" side face-up) on the SL (along with the appropriate Prep, First, or Final Fire counter). A SL cannot gain concealment status while it is switched on, and loses any it might have had when it establishes an IB Lane. The maximum range for an IB Lane established by a GMSL/TMSL is 44 hexes, and that of an AMSL is 18 hexes.


**10.21 IB LANE CANCELLATION:** An IB Lane counter is automatically removed (i.e., the SL is "switched off"; flip or remove the SL CA counter) if any of the following occurs:

- The IB Lane is voluntarily cancelled (10.52);
- An enemy unit moves out of LOS/CA during the SL's attempt to "track" it (10.44);
- The IB Lane is not maintained per 10.45;
- The SL is malfunctioned/disabled (10.112; 10.121; 10.131; 10.45);
- The manning-Infantry/Inherent-crew is not in Good Order;
- The vehicle is marked with an Abandoned counter;
- The truck or AFV makes a successful Motion Attempt (D2.401);
- An enemy unit [EXC: unarmed, unarmored vehicle] enters the SL's Location:
- SMOKE exists in the SL's Location.

**10.22 ILLUMINATION ZONE:** All Locations in all the hexes along the *same-level* (B.5) LOF [EXC: hexes that are only intersected through a single vertex] from the SL to the target Location that are in LOS of the SL are Illuminated (E1.9). If the LOF lies along an Alternate Hex Grain, the owning player must declare whether the IB Lane will include the left-

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or right-side hexes as if a Fire Lane (A9.221). If the IB Lane is not placed along a same-level LOF, only Locations in LOS in the target hex are Illuminated. All Locations in a SL's hex are Illuminated when the SL is switched on (10.2). See also 10.221.



EX: The TMSL in hex 44T7 has successfully targeted hex U3. All the hexes along the LOF are now Illuminated, including the TMSL's hex. However, hexes T4 and U6 are not Illuminated since they are only intersected through a single vertex. Likewise, the GMSL in X7 has an IB Lane placed in V3 which Illuminates all the hexes along the LOF, as well as the GMSL's hex. Had there been a +3 SMOKE counter in hex W5, that hex, V4, and V3 would not be Illuminated, but would be treated as being within the NVR of all units with a LOS to them (10.221).

**10.221 HINDRANCE EFFECTS:** All hexes within an IB Lane which would be subject to  $a \ge +3$  Hindrance due to SMOKE/Mist-(E3.32) are *not* Illuminated but are still treated as being within the NVR of all units with a LOS to them.

EX: See the 10.22 illustration. If Smoke grenades were placed in X6 and W5, W6 would still be Illuminated, but W5, V4, and V3—although in NVR of all in-LOS units—would not be Illuminated. A unit in W6 would still suffer the +2 IB Blindness LV Hindrance DRM (10.25) if firing at X6 or X7, but a unit in W5, V4, or V3 would not.

**10.23** SL HEX EFFECTS:<sup>57</sup> The +1 Night LV DRM (E1.7) is never applicable vs units in the same hex as a SL that is switched on (10.2). All TH attempts vs a SL that is switched on receive an additional -1 DRM [EXC: if IB Blindness applies; 10.25]. A SL that is switched on is considered a Known armed enemy unit for routing purposes (A10.51).

**10.24 TARGET HEX EFFECTS:** All Cloaking counters in Illuminated Locations in the target hex are replaced by their concealed [EXC: E1.43] actual contents (if any). A broken unit in an Illuminated Location in the target hex is automatically under DM if the target hex is Open Ground.

10.25 IB BLINDNESS:<sup>58</sup> Each TH (and non-ordnance IFT) DR receives a +2 IB Blindness LV Hindrance DRM, provided all of the following conditions are met:

- The firer and target are in Locations Illuminated by the same IB Lane;
- The LOS to the target only intersects Locations Illuminated by the IB Lane;
- The target is closer (in hexes) to the SL's hex than the firer is.

EX: See the 10.22 illustration. A unit in U4 firing at a unit in T6 or T7 would suffer the +2 IB Blindness LV Hindrance DRM.

**10.3 SL SIGHTING TC:** Before a SL can target a Location, it must first pass a SL Sighting TC by making a Final DR ≤ ML of SL crew/Armor-Leader (see also 10.43) based on the LOF between the target Location and the SL. The TC is subject to the following cumulative DRM:

CAUSE			DRM
Outside CA per hexspine changed[T	: +1/+1/+1] [S7	T: +2/+1/+1] [N	T: +3/+1/+1]
[EXC: +0 for f]	irst hexspine c	hange for a G	MSL/TMSL]
Range0-6: +0	7-12:+1	13-18: +2	≥ 19: +3
LOS/LV Hindrance	per LOS/I	V Hindrance	[EXC: E1.7]
Location contains no Known enemy	y units <sup>1</sup>		+2
Enemy unit in Location subject to F	FMO/FFNAM	[	1 (each)
Enemy unit in Location subject to I	Hazardous Mov	ement <sup>2</sup>	2
Location contains moving/in-Motio	n enemy vehic	le	2
Captured/Non-Qualified Use			+2 (each)
Target Location is Illuminated/Bore	-Sighted		2 (each)
Manning-Infantry/Inherent-crew is	pinned		+2
Encircled			+1
Leadership			+x
Stunned (D5.34)/Buttoned Up AFV			+1(each)
LOF crosses ≥ one Illuminated hex			+1
SL's Location is Illuminated	GMS	*L/TMSL: +1	<i>AMSL</i> : +2

- 1: NA if Location is Bore Sighted (10.43), contains a Gunflash (E1.8), and/or contains a moving enemy unit.
- <sup>2</sup>: NA if enemy unit is beyond SL's NVR.

10.31 If targeting a location outside the firer's CA, the CA is changed regardless of the outcome of the Sighting TC. Making a SL Sighting TC (whether successful or not) is the equivalent of firing (E1.8); however, it is itself not considered a concealment loss action (A12.141). The Gunflash counter is removed normally at the end of the AFPh unless the SL is switched on (10.2), in which case the counter remains in place.

10.4 SL TARGETING: A SL targets Locations rather than enemy units. If the SL Sighting TC (10.3) is passed, place IB Lane and CA SL counters per 10.2. A target Location need only be in LOS (see also 10.42) of the SL as if it were a daytime scenario. If the (free) LOS check determines that the LOS to the target Location is blocked, the SL Sighting TC is automatically failed, and the SL is considered to have fired (mark with counter accordingly). LOS between the SL and the target Location is always traced between the center dots (A6.1).

10.41 TARGETING RESTRICTIONS: A SL cannot target any Location in its own hex, and cannot target *any* Location if there is SMOKE in the SL's Location. A GMSL/TMSL in woods/jungle/bamboo/building cannot target any Location. A TMSL/AMSL cannot target any Location while in Bypass and/or in Motion. If the manning-Infantry/Inherent-crew of a GMSL/TMSL is pinned, the SL's CA may not be changed. See also 10.2 for range restrictions.

10.42 LOS OBSTACLES: For purposes of SL LOS and Sighting TC, the following additional terrain types are also considered to be LOS Obstacles (A6.2): Orchards (B14.2), Olive Groves (B14.8), Light Woods (B35.), Palm Trees (G4.), and non-Collapsed Hut (G5.2).

**10.43 BORE SIGHTING:** A SL may Bore Sight one Location per C6.41-.43 [EXC: the Bore Sighting DRM is also permanently lost if the SL changes CA]. A SL targeting its Bore Sighted Location receives a -2 DRM to the SL Sighting TC (10.3). If a SL's first Sighting TC is for its Bore Sighted Location, the TC is automatically passed. An AMSL cannot Bore Sight a different Location than that of the AFV's MA.



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Footnote 9

10.44 TRACKING:<sup>59</sup> A SL that is switched on (10.2) may "track" an enemy unit as it exits the targeted Location as per C6.51 [EXC: the decision to track must be taken as the enemy unit exits the Location, and if a LOS check reveals that the enemy unit has moved out of the SL's LOS the IB Lane is automatically cancelled (10.21]. The new hex becomes the targeted hex (10.24), and the Location is assumed to be already Illuminated as the enemy unit expends MF to enter it. If the enemy unit moves outside of the SL's CA, the SL must change its CA (as if it were firing a weapon) if tracking. If the CA does not change, the IB Lane is cancelled.

**10.45 MAINTAINING AN IB LANE:** At the start of the friendly-PFPh/enemy-MPh before the ATTACKER commences firing/moving during that phase, a SL with an established IB Lane may attempt to maintain the IB Lane in place, by making a Reliability DR. If the Final DR is  $\leq 10$ , the IB Lane remains in place (mark the SL with a Prep or First Fire counter). A Final DR of 11 malfunctions the SL, and a 12 disables the SL. The only possible DRM is a +1 in Extreme Winter (W.4). See 10.53 for repair of a SL. If no Reliability DR is made, the IB Lane is immediately cancelled, but the SL may attempt to target a *different* Location.

**10.5 SL USAGE:** No IB Lane (10.2) may be established in a scenario until one of the events in E1.91 has occurred and/or Bugles (7.8) have been sounded; treat a SL as the equivalent of a Starshell for this purpose, and for the limitation of one attempt per phase and hex per E1.92.

10.51 SL USAGE RESTRICTIONS: After the Player Turn in which the first Starshell/IR/IB-Lane of the scenario is fired/established, any SL that establishes an IB Lane must do so at the start of the friendly-PFPh/enemy-MPh before the ATTACKER commences firing/moving during that phase [EXC: during the MPh, the DEFENDER may target a Location (10.4) within a SL's NVR (E1.101) if the Location contains a moving enemy unit]. For E1.921 timing purposes, an IB Lane is considered the equivalent of a fired Starshell.

10.52 VOLUNTARY CANCELLATION:<sup>60</sup> An IB Lane may be voluntarily cancelled at any time during the owner's PFPh/DFPh/AFPh, or at any time if there are no enemy units within the IB Lane's Illumination Zone (10.22). Any Gunflash counter is removed per 10.31.

**10.53 REPAIR:** A malfunctioned SL is repaired as per A9.72 [EXC: a malfunctioned SL on a CT AFV can only be repaired if the AFV is CE].

**10.6 SEARCHLIGHT BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION** (SLBI):<sup>61</sup> In a night scenario where the Cloud Cover (E1.11) is Scattered or Overcast, an SSR may specify that SLBI is in effect. SLBI Illuminates (E1.9) all Locations [EXC: subterranean; Interior Building; Dense-Jungle/Bamboo (G2.3)] in all affected hexes. SLBI Illumination is NA in Locations where Heavy-Winds-(A25.63)/Fog-(E3.31)/Mist-(E3.32)/Rain-(E3.51)/Falling-Snow-(E3.71) or any type of Dust (F11.7) is in effect.

EX: An SSR has specified that the Weather is Overcast (E3.5), and that SLBI is in effect for the entire mapboard. Should a Wind Change DR result in Rain (E3.51), the SLBI immediately ceases to provide any Illumination. Similarly, should the rain stop the SLBI immediately provides Illumination again.

#### **CHAPTER W FOOTNOTES**

- 1. W.1 KOREAN WAR (KW) RULES: The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea. Well prior to the invasion, following the liberation of Korea from the Japanese in 1945, a sustained campaign was waged on the peninsula between Communist guerillas and anti-Communist forces. Many of the rules here can be adapted to those actions.
- 2. W2A UNITED NATIONS (UN) FORCES: This list excludes UN members who provided only medical units (India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden) but includes the Republic of Korea, which was not technically a member of the UN at the time. Service dates for UN Combatant Forces were:

Korean National Defense Constabulary: 6/46-8/48

ROK Army: 9/48-7/53

Korean Marine Corps: 4/49-7/53

**United States** 

• Army: 7/50-7/53

• Army Airborne: 9/50-7/53

Army Rangers: 12/50-12/51

• KATUSA: 9/50-7/53

• Marine Corps: 8/50-7/53

British Commonwealth: 9/50-7/53

• 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines: 9/50-12/51

Other United Nations Command: 10/50-7/53

**3. W2B COMMUNIST FORCES:** Service dates for Communist Forces were:

Korean People's Army: 2/48-7/53 Communist Guerillas: 1946-1952

Chinese People's Volunteer Army: 10/50-7/53

- **4. W.4 EXTREME THAW:** The extreme freeze-thaw action of Korea had a detrimental effect on mines, often resulting in their failure to detonate
- W.4 GYROSTABILIZERS: U.S. armor commanders did not emphasize proper use of gyrostabilizers, which were often removed or in poor renair.
- **6. W.6 BAYONET CHARGE:** Despite operating in an era of massive firepower, UN forces conducted bayonet charges on several occasions. French, Ethiopian, and Turkish units were particularly known for closing with the enemy in this manner.
- 7. W.7 VARIABLE TIME (VT) FUZES: Proximity fuzes were referred to as Variable Time (VT) fuzes during WW2 and the Korean War in order to maintain secrecy around the actual technology. Originally developed to shoot down aerial targets more effectively, they incorporate a small sensor that measures distance to a solid object, detonating the warhead at a specified distance above that object. The effect is to optimize the blast and fragmentation pattern, dramatically increasing the lethality of the blast. Proximity fuzes were first available for 105mm howitzer shells, and later for other ammunition.
- 8. W.8 HEAT VS AF ≥ 6: The actual penetration of a HEAT round was particularly susceptible to the slope of the armor it hit. Part of the ineffectiveness of the M9A1 2.36-inch bazooka (BAZ 45) against the T-34/85 was due to this effect. The Dud-effect in this rule reflects additional variability arising from actual round impact point and armor slope, providing results closer to actual accounts of armor engagements without altering the basic HEAT TK structure of the game, which is based on maximum armor penetration.
- 9. W&A BAZOOKA: Rounds for the 2.36-inch bazooka (BAZ 44/45, as well as any BAZ 43 that stray into Korea) came from WW2 stockpiles. The age of these rounds and the resulting degradation contributed substantially to their ineffectiveness against T-34/85s. The additional DRM for these older BAZ provides a simple adjustment. Starting in July 1950, the United States began to introduce the new M20A1 3.5-inch "Super Bazooka" (BAZ 50), which rapidly proved its effectiveness against the T-34/85 and helped to end the KPA's armored dominance.



Footnote 10 W

10. W.10A POP-UP FLARES: When tripped, a Pop-Up flare fired up into the sky and set off a starshell that then floated down by parachute.

11. 1.3 STEEP HILLS: Difficult even for infantry, Korea's steep hills were nearly impassable for vehicles, greatly restricting the role of armored and mechanized formations during the war.

12. 2.1 U.S. ARMY: Between WW2 and the Korean War, the U.S. Army reorganized its infantry platoons. Instead of a platoon headquarters and three 12-man rifle squads, the new organization had a platoon headquarters, three 9-man rifle squads, and a weapons squad with an M1916A6 LMG and a bazooka. This could have been represented by new American squads with less firepower, a new MMC representing the weapons squad, and a special rule allowing an additional half-squad or so in a location without overstacking. For playability purposes, Forgotten War uses the standard Army MMC with the men and equipment of the weapons squad distributed among the three rifle squads of a platoon.

13. 2.12 RANGERS: After the Korean War started, the U.S. Army organized and trained special Ranger units composed of volunteers, often WW2 combat veterans of various elite units, used for raiding and reconnaissance. Generally, a Ranger Company (Airborne) was attached to each Army division. Rangers may also be used to represent certain ad hoc elite units such as the "Wolfhound Raiders," which were raised in-theater. When Rangers are used as line infantry instead of their intended specialized role, they can either be represented by regular Elite Class MMC or their Self-Rally capability should be NA by SSR.

14. 2.13 KATUSA: KATUSA were composed of conscripted (often times press-ganged) personnel placed within U.S. units in order to fill out or augment those units' TOEs. Although numerous examples of outstanding individuals exist, the men composing these units typically did not speak English (interpreters were often not available), were poorly trained, and were poorly equipped. Most U.S. units integrated small numbers of KATUSA (3-6 men) into each squad, but other units (specifically, some combat support and transportation units, the 24th Infantry Division, one regiment of the 25th Infantry Division) created Korean-only squads and platoons typically led by U.S. officers. (During the Chosin Campaign, Regimental Combat Team 31 had about 40-50 percent KATUSA in their rifle battalions.) KATUSA MMC are provided to represent these Korean-only subunits. As the war progressed, natural attrition and proactive selection by U.S. officers produced a solid cadre of ROK soldiers. Because the KA-TUSAs were not rotated out as rapidly as U.S. soldiers, they often were the most veteran troops within a unit. KATUSAs became rare after October 1952 when 8th Army directed that Korean-only units be disbanded.

15. 2.14 EARLY KW U.S. ARMY: The first U.S. Army units to enter the Korean War were woefully unprepared for combat. Oriented towards occupation duty in Japan, they had poor physical fitness, little training, and their equipment was ill-maintained. Materiel and supplies were also often in poor condition; many stockpiles had been sitting around uncovered at various locations in Asia and the Pacific since the end of WW2. These Early KW U.S. Army penalties should probably apply to some units even after 8/50.

16. 2.2 U.S. MARINE CORPS: Late-WW2 and Korean-era Marine rifle squads were designed to break down into three four-man fire teams (see Footnote 43 to G17.11). Players wishing to experiment with this approach despite the additional complexity and effects on balance can consider the following guidelines. When a 7-6-8 squad Deploys (or suffers ELR Replacement), it is exchanged for three 2-4-8 HS (broken if undergoing ELR Replacement). (These are available in RISING SUN.) For stacking and squad-equivalency purposes, a 2-4-8 HS counts as only one-third of a squad and as 3 1/3 PP for Passenger/Rider purposes. An unarmed 2-4-8 HS re-arms as a 2-4-8. If a 7-6-8 squad suffers Casualty Reduction, there is a 50-50 chance it will lose two 2-4-8 HS; determine randomly. Three 2-4-8 HS are necessary to Recombine into a 7-6-8 squad; two 2-4-8 HS may not recombine. Each 7-6-8 squad is worth three VP.

**17. 2.2 REAR ECHELON:** All U.S.M.C. personnel (including pilots) had combat infantry training.

**18. 3.2 REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY (ROKA):** From 1910 to 1945, Korea was a Japanese colony. After WW2 ended, US troops landed in

Korea beginning September 8, 1945 to occupy the area south of the 38th Parallel, while troops from the Soviet Union entered the northern part of the country, to occupy the area north of the 38th Parallel. The stated goal of the American and Soviet occupations was to be temporary, pending the establishment of a permanent national government for the entire country. In brief, what actually happened in 1948 is that a communist regime under Kim Il Sung was established in North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) while an American-leaning government led by Syngman Rhee was formed in South Korea (the Republic of Korea).

The first unit of what became the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) was the 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, Korean Constabulary, which was activated 14 January 1946 and began training at a former Japanese Army barracks on the outskirts of Seoul. Besides the regiment in Seoul, by April 1946, constabulary regiments had been established at Pusan, Kwangju, Taegu, Iri, Taejon, Ch'ongju, and Ch'unch'on-one regiment for each province in South Korea. The Republic of Korea officially proclaimed its establishment on August 15, 1948 and the ROK Department of National Defense, the ROK Army, and ROK Navy became official on December 15, 1948. At this time, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Constabulary Regiments became the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry Divisions. Two months later, the Capital Division was formed from the Capital Security Command. At the same time the 8th and 11th Infantry Divisions were formed from the two remaining constabulary regiments. The American military advisors to the ROK military were United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). The ROKA was poorly armed, partly because of the low priority assigned to Korea by American strategy and partly because of fears that Syngman Rhee would attempt to reunify Korea by force if he could. When the Korea War started on June 25, 1950, the ROKA was unprepared for the relentless North Korean attack. The absence of an Elite Class ROKA squad helps represent this. Largely destroyed in the early battles of the war, it was slowly rebuilt with American assistance. Over the course of the war, the ROKA grew to become a force of three corps, including some armor and artillery.

19. 3.3 REPUBLIC OF KOREA MARINE CORPS (KMC): The Republic of Korea Marine Corps (KMC), established in April 1949, earned a reputation as a tough and highly-motivated unit. Closely associated with its American Marine counterparts, a KMC regiment was attached to the 1st Marine Division and acted as its fourth infantry regiment during part of the Korean War. By 1952, the KMC was operating on its own.

**20. 3.31 JAPANESE-ARMED KMC:** KMC units were initially armed primarily with Japanese equipment. They were rearmed with U.S. weapons and equipment in preparation for the Inchon landing. Beginning in 1951, the KMC underwent a series of major revision and training programs that brought its cadre and weapons up to standards close to the U.S.M.C.

**21. 3.36 KMC OBA:** Initially, the KMC did not have any organic artillery, with its indirect fire provided by the U.S.M.C. Eventually, the Americans supplied the necessary weapons and training for the KMC to form its own artillery units.

22. 4.1 BRITISH & COMMONWEALTH ARMIES: Great Britain and the Commonwealth fielded significant forces in Korea. Although initially still armed with Lee-Enfield rifles, Sten submachine guns, and Bren and Vickers machine guns, these forces (particularly the Canadians) were increasingly armed with American weapons as the war went on. Compared to the early war U.S. Army, the expeditionary forces of the British and Commonwealth troops were better prepared for combat and should ordinarily be represented by Elite and 1st line units or a mix thereof, with 2nd line MMC reserved for ELR Replacement.

23. 4.2 ROYAL MARINES: 41 (Independent) Commando, Royal Marines was the only British Commando unit to see action in the war. It was first used as a raiding force in September-October 1950, before being attached to the 1st Marine Division during the Chosin Campaign in November-December. Thereafter, it returned to its raiding role until it was withdrawn from the war at the end of 1951. Clothed and equipped like an American unit, they nonetheless retained their unique green berets.

24. 4.3 CANADIAN ASSAULT FIRE: One battalion of Canadian infantry began serving in Korea in December 1950, with two battalions



W Footnote 38

(from different regiments) joining them later to create the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Each battalion was specially formed from the Canadian Army Special Force—an all-volunteer mixture of WW2 veterans, career soldiers, and new recruits. The Korean War derailed Canadian plans to completely rearm with U.S. designed weapons, and war stocks of WW2 vintage equipment were hastily taken out of storage. The continued use of bolt action rifles was a severe disappointment to the troops in the face of massed Chinese SMGs, and many M1 rifles (semi-automatic) and M2 carbines (automatic) were unofficially obtained through barter with U.S. units. One battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) in 1952 figured it had roughly 50 percent of its infantrymen armed with U.S. weapons. Starting in May 1953, Korean troops began to be introduced into the Canadian Army in Korea. These troops were known as Korean Augmentation Troops to Commonwealth Division (KATCOMs). KAT-COMs were integrated directly into rifle squads, with three KATCOMs per ten-man squad. While the Canadians found the same difficulties with language, etc., that U.S. troops had encountered, they also found the boost in manpower beneficial, and numerous KATCOMs saw action with their Canadian units, some becoming casualties. Squads with KATCOMs and those without are identical in game terms.

- **25. 5.1 OTHER UN COMMAND (OUNC) ARMIES:** Many nations sent forces to Korea as part of the UN Command (UNC). We use the term Other United Nations Command (OUNC) for those UN forces that are neither American nor British Commonwealth. OUNC forces were generally equipped with American weapons and equipment. Green troops are excluded due to the more veteran nature of these expeditionary forces.
- 26. 6.1 KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (KPA): The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly called "North Korea," called its ground forces the "In Min Gun," best translated as the "Korean People's Army" (KPA), although UN documents (and even some Chinese and Soviet sources) consistently refer to the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The KPA was created in the image of the Soviet Army, which trained, organized, and equipped it (including some instances were Russian advisors on the ground directly led KPA troops in combat). Tough, aggressive, and competent, the KPA was highly successful in its initial attacks. Once the UN began fielding more experienced units and brought their vastly superior resources to bear, the KPA was devastated and played a distinctly secondary role to the CPVA.
- **27. 6.1 HUMAN WAVE:** By the end of WW2, Soviet tactics had evolved such that Human Waves were rare and elite squads were deploying into smaller units. These improved tactics were imparted to the KPA, who often eschewed Human Waves even when presented with the opportunity and whose elite squads may deploy. An SSR should invoke the Human Wave rules (A25.23) when appropriate.
- **28. 6.3 MASSACRE:** The KPA exhibited extreme brutality towards its UN prisoners, with numerous executions and other mistreatments of POWs.
- 29. 6.5 COMMUNIST GUERILLAS: Between the end of WW2 and the start of the Korean War, North Korea supported extensive guerrilla operations in the south. These ranged from minor, disruptive operations to large insurrections such as the Cheju-Do Rebellion (beginning April 1948) in which nearly 60,000 combatants and civilians died. During the rapid withdrawal from the Pusan Perimeter in September 1950, numerous North Korean units completely collapsed, some of which reformed as insurgents and fought a guerrilla war after the UN lines moved north. These guerillas became so problematic that from December 1951 to March 1952, UN Forces conducted a major counterinsurgency operation titled Operation RAT KILLER in which over 25,000 guerillas were killed or captured.
- **30.7. THE COMMUNIST CHINESE:** After the KPA's heavy losses in the initial campaigns, the People's Republic of China (PRC)—encouraged by their recent victory over the G.M.D in the Chinese Civil War—assumed the leading Communist role in the Korean War. Chinese forces were called "volunteers" to avoid the implication that China was directly at war with the United States. A throwback in the era of jet fighters and tanks, the Chinese army was a primitive force that moved on foot and relied on the use of mass bodies. Most often of peasant background, the

Chinese soldier was able to survive with minimal supplies, could endure the most miserable conditions, and was skilled in field craft.

- **31. 7.1 CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER ARMY (CPVA):** The armed forces of the PRC were called the People's Liberation Army (PLA), but the PRC referred to its forces in Korea (all of which came straight from the PLA) as the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA). This is often shortened to Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) or People's Volunteer Army (PVA), although most UN documents refer to them as Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). Fresh PRC units entered Korea at the start of the First Spring Offensive in April 1951, which is the date used here for the transition from CPVA Initial Intervention units to Soviet-Armed units. Force types were often mixed in battle, however, both before and after this date, depending on the units involved, with Initial Intervention units not completely replaced until very late in 1952.
- **32. 7.121 GRENADIERS:** The CPVA was poorly equipped early on, lacking not only heavy weapons but sometimes even rifles. Grenadiers represent troops armed primarily with grenades and edged weapons. They were not organic to the CPVA infantry company but were deliberately organized as lead elements for a planned attack and would rarely, if ever, be found in meeting engagements, ambushes, or on the defense. Grenadiers were assigned to some planned attacks even after the Initial Intervention period but were largely phased out by 1953.
- 33. 7.21 STEP-REDUCTION: The step-reduction mechanic incorporates three separate attributes: the well-documented steadfastness of CPVA units under fire and in the face of high casualties (due in part to the Communist Party's team-member, cowardice-reporting policy); the lack of effective communications to modify or call off attacks once started; and unarmed or poorly armed troops in the unit picking up the weapons of their fallen comrades.
- **34. 7.3 LEADERS:** Prior to 1955 the PLA—in keeping with its revolutionary army organizational culture—did not use the nominal rank structure typically associated with European-style armies. Instead, leaders were identified by the position they held within their unit: assistant squad leader, squad leader, assistant platoon leader, platoon leader, etc. Therefore, leader counters show only a name. During the post-Korean War modernization, a Soviet-style rank system was adopted, only to be eliminated in 1965, and then reintroduced after the Cultural Revolution.
- **35. 7.31 POLITICAL OFFICERS (PO):** Political Officers (PO) were embedded within CPVA units down to the company level. Ordinarily, at least one PO should be in each CPVA scenario.
- 36. 7.42 INFANTRY PLATOON MOVEMENT (IPM): Although Korean War-era press and some popular accounts indicate that Chinese attacks were characterized by massed waves of screaming soldiers, this was not true for the most part. CPVA attacks were, however, characteristically relentless, with the troops moving forward even after suffering high numbers of casualties. The CPVA's lack of electronic communications did result in a general lack of tactical flexibility. Although CPVA units were well briefed on their attack plans (down to the soldier level) and would follow orders to the letter, such orders could only be modified by leaders at the company level or above. Well-planned and well-executed CPVA attacks would break down and lose momentum as the battle progressed or when the situation rapidly changed. Once the lines began to stabilize in early 1951, Chinese infiltration and flanking possibilities were reduced, and the CPVA did conduct some high-profile, massive Human Wave attacks (A25.23) that mostly ended in bloody disasters for the Chinese. An SSR should invoke the Human Wave rules when appropriate.
- **37. 7.5 RECON UNITS:** CPVA attacks were typically preceded by extensive reconnaissance of enemy positions, using specially-trained recon platoons. These units (seldom more than 5 percent of any attacking force) would split into 1-3-man teams as they approached enemy lines, infiltrate between positions gathering intelligence, and then reassemble to return to the CPVA lines to help lead the attack.
- **38. 7.71 EARLY KW CPVA NIGHT:** Early in the intervention, CPVA forces exhibited an uncanny ability to move undetected through the Korean countryside. Not only did Chinese armies and divisions mass undetected before attacking UN forces, but small units were consistently able to



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move rapidly and quietly at night to maneuver and infiltrate close to UN units, surrounding positions and achieving tactical surprise. This ability disappeared as UN lines stabilized, night procedures were upgraded, and communication improved.

- **39. 7.8 BUGLES:** The CPVA used bugles, drums, and other musical instruments to assist in command and control both during the day and at night. These instruments, although giving away the CPVA positions, often signaled an impending mass attack and served to unnerve defenders, particularly at night.
- **40. 7.9 MISCELLANEOUS:** The CPVA extensively used civilians as sources of information to identify enemy positions and commonly used civilians as guides to pick hidden routes through the terrain. The CPVA usually infiltrated as close as possible to enemy positions before a major assault (100-200 meters) and liked to attack at night (primarily to avoid UN airpower), sometimes from within enemy perimeters. A Recon dr (E1.23), or even more than one, with a +1 drm can be used to supplement the CPVA's normal Civilian Interrogation benefits.
- **41. 7.92 ENTRENCHING:** CPVA units were, for the most part, composed of men who had labored manually for a living. They exhibited an aptitude for rapidly digging extensive field fortifications when occupying defensive positions.
- **42. 7.95 CONCEALMENT:** The CPVA hid in terrain in a way that other Korean War era armies did not. At times, CPVA units would appear "from nowhere" out of hidden folds in the terrain or out of crops, woods, or buildings.
- **43. 8. KW AIR SUPPORT:** Although the Korea War was the quintessential infantry war, airpower played a major supporting role. The predominant daylight close air support aircraft used by the UN in Korea were the F-51D Mustang, F4U-4B & AU-1 Corsair, and AD Skyraider. Early in the war, the North Koreans used Yak-9P fighters and Il-10 attack aircraft, before U.S. air power drove them from the skies.
- **44. 8.1 AIRCRAFT:** The advent of the jet transformed the composition of air forces after WW2. While highly successful in the air superiority and deep interdiction roles, the early jet fighters were less successful in providing close air support. Their thirsty jet engines resulted in less endurance over the battlefield. The jets also required long, clean runways, which meant that they were often based farther from the front lines and were less responsive to requests for close air support. Although less suited to the task, the principal jet fighters used in the war for close air support were the F-80C Shooting Star and F9F-2 (and -4 and -5) Panther and later the F-84D (and E and G) Thunderjet. F.8 Meteors and F-86F Sabres also saw service in this role. The Communists (both Korean and Chinese) used their MiG-15 jets (often manned by Soviet pilots) for air defense, not for close air support. The FB 50 counter represents all UN jet aircraft types.
- **45. 8.12 AD SKYRAIDER:** The premier close air support aircraft of the Korean War was the AD-3 and AD-4 Skyraider. Flown by the U.S. Navy and U.S.M.C., it could accurately deliver a massive load of weapons and absorb tremendous punishment.
- **46. 8.3 VT-FUZED BOMBS:** Any general purpose bomb with a VT fuze instead of a standard one is a VT-bomb. It is by design an "area" weapon, using the Area Target Type but with a more powerful effect.
- **47. 8.4 AFV IMMUNITY ZONE:** By November 1950, the great bulk of North Korea's armor had been destroyed, with any remaining self-propelled artillery batteries (SU-76Ms) limited to a more indirect fire role. Since the CPVA never fielded any armored units, the likelihood that UN pilots would engage UN armored vehicles in a mistaken manner was greatly reduced.
- **48. 8.5 RESTRICTED AIRSPACE:** As tactics were developed to coordinate aircraft and artillery attacks, various methods were used to protect aircraft from incoming artillery rounds and to reduce redundant attacks. These methods were eventually consolidated into structured "fire support coordination measures."
- **49. 9. FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS & CLOSE AIR SUP-PORT:** Improvements in technology, techniques, tactics, and procedures during the Korean War enabled a dramatic increase in the ability to coordinate air and artillery support against tactical targets.

**50. 9.1 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS:** During the interwar years and into the Korean War, the U.S.M.C. pioneered the development of a sophisticated system to control close air support, resulting in better responsiveness, fewer mistaken attacks, and increased effectiveness. Specially-trained U.S.M.C. personnel supported U.S., KMC, and OUNC operations.

- 51. 9.11 U.S.M.C. TACP: TACPs consisted of pilots trained as Forward Air Controllers and enlisted communication specialists who coordinated and controlled air strikes in support of ground forces. The U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps employed TACPs differently during the war due to divergent theories of close air support flowing from their WWII experiences. The U.S.M.C. system was conducted at the tactical level, with the TACP attached to the battalion; air support was closely coordinated with front line units, including some Army units. The system of close air support used by the Air Force and Army, on the other hand, was coordinated and controlled at the operational level, with the TACP attached to the division, where they served more as an air liaison—outside the scope of ASL.
- **52. 9.13 AIRBORNE FAC:** Airborne FACs in light aircraft also were part of the air support control system. U.S. Air Force FACs primarily flew in T-6 Texan trainers. Marine pilots and observers in OY-2 Sentinels provided similar missions, as did those in F4U Corsairs. The latter, being an actual FB, could defend itself in Aerial Combat (contrary to 9.13).
- **53. 10. SEARCHLIGHTS:** Searchlights (SL) in WW2 were primarily intended for antiaircraft detection, and searchlight units were assigned to antiaircraft artillery formations. After the Allies achieved air superiority towards the end of the war, SL saw some limited use in ground combat. SL, sometimes operated by engineer units, saw more frequent ground combat use in the Korean War, where UN forces used different types of SL to illuminate the battlefield during night actions.
- 54. 10.13 AFV-MOUNTED SEARCHLIGHTS: To help counter CPVA night attacks, UN forces added SL to certain AFV to supplement the existing truck- and carriage-mounted SL. Thinly-armored 18" SL were mounted on the gun mantel above the main gun of the M46 Patton and the Centurion Mk III tanks, while the Canadian M4A3E8 Sherman mounted a 14" SL. Equipped with a shutter to quickly douse the light, SL proved very effective in illuminating enemy bunkers, MG emplacements, and other suspected positions. U.S.M.C. tankers typically operated in pairs. While one tank spotted and illuminated an enemy position, the second tank, hidden in darkness, would fire several rounds in rapid succession, minimizing the exposure of the illumination tank. The operations utilizing AFV-mounted SL in early August 1952 proved so effective that these tanks became a priority target for Chinese artillery.
- **55. 10.131** AMSL MALFUNCTION: Korean War SL were extremely fragile (especially their filaments). Any severe vibration or abrupt movement could damage the filament or the searchlight mechanism. Firing the MA/CMG/SA on a vehicle equipped with a vehicular-mounted SL inevitably caused the SL to malfunction.
- **56. 10.221 HINDRANCE EFFECTS:** Anybody who has driven at night in heavy snow or fog and turned on the high beams has experienced a version of this phenomenon.
- **57. 10.23 SL HEX EFFECTS:** An operating SL highlights its Location as long as the SL is not pointing directly at the firer.
- **58. 10.25 IB BLINDNESS:** Looking back toward a SL was extremely disorientating and could effectively "blind" firers looking in that direction, both at intervening targets and the SL itself.
- **59. 10.44 TRACKING:** Unlike ordinary weapons, a SL "fires" a continuous beam of light, which maintains illumination on a target.
- **60. 10.52 VOLUNTARY CANCELLATION:** SL typically shut down their lamp in order to regain the protective cover of darkness when under attack (or expecting an attack) and often stopped illuminating an area once all targets were out of commission or LOS.
- **61. 10.6 SLBI:** The concept of "artificial moonlight" was introduced in WW1, and saw some use in both WW2 and Korea. With proper preparation, multiple SL would be arranged to bounce beams of light off low clouds to create a semi-daylight effect over the battlefield.

		W. NATIO	NC	AL CA	APABI	LIT	<b>IES</b>	CHA	ART	Broken	Morale Level is	listed as superscript to Morale Level
								ui u	ORDNANCE			
		NATIONALITY CREW (BPV)	LG	CLASS	SQUAD	BPV	HS	BPV	TH# Color OBA ACCESS FINAL ACC dr	HoB DRM	SMOKE GRENADES	MISCELLANEOUS
-	ME	AMERICAN							6-8/50: <b>Red</b>	0	SMOKE	* Plentiful ammo included (A25.33); deduct one Black for Normal ammo
M	6 <sup>3</sup> -6-8	Army	6	E	¶ <u>6</u> <sup>3</sup> -6- <u>8</u> <sup>8</sup>	17	3-4- <u>8</u> <sup>7</sup>	8	9/50+: <b>Black</b>			¶ Rangers: Self-Rally/Self-Deploy (1TC)/Self-Recombine
		2-2-7 <sup>8</sup> (7) 1-2-6 <sup>7</sup> (6)	5 5.5	♥ (E)	$\frac{\$6^3-6-7^8}{6^3-6-7^8}$	14 14	$3-4-7^7$ $3-4-7^7$	6	6-8/50: <b>9B/3R</b> 9/50+: <b>10B*/3R</b>			(W2.12); no Cowering; Commandos (H1.24); Non-Qualified Use penalty NA when using RCL; Captured Use
	AND	1-2-0' (6)	3.3	1	$6^3-6-6^8$	11	3-4-7 <sup>7</sup>	4	9/30+: 10 <b>b</b> */3 <b>k</b> ≤ 2			penalty NA when using Communist SW
	<u>6</u> <sup>3</sup> -6- <u>7</u>			2	$5^2$ -4-6 <sup>7</sup>	7	$2-3-6^6$	3	_ <b>_</b>			§ Airborne (W2.11) MMC • Early KW U.S. Army rules 6-8/50 (W2.14): Lax; Ammu-
				G	$5^2$ -3-6 <sup>7</sup>	6	2-2-66	2				nition Shortage; SW repair only on "1"; Radio/Phone Contact value one less; AFV Inherent crews ML 7; all
	W. Star 2											motorized vehicles have red MP (D2.551)
	2	KATUSA		2	4-4-67	6	2-3-66	3		+3	, ,	KATUSA have a HoB DRM of +3 and a Leader Creation drm of +1; otherwise, they are U.S. Army MMC for all
	4-4-6			C	3-3-66	3	1-2-65	1				other purposes. Early KW KATUSA (9/50-10/51) are always 3-3-6/1-2-6, have an ELR of 2, and incur Allied
	YAL.	U.S.M.C.	4.5	<b>%</b> (E)	<u>7</u> <sup>3</sup> - <u>6</u> - <u>8</u> <sup>8</sup>	17	3-4-87	7		0		Troop penalties (A10.7) with U.S. leaders
	7 <sup>3</sup> -6-8	2-2-88 (8)		(E)	†5 <sup>2</sup> - <u>5</u> - <u>8</u> <sup>8</sup>	13	2-3- <u>8</u> <sup>7</sup>	5				<ul><li>Disruption NA (G17.1)</li><li>7-6-8 Self-Deploy (G17.11)</li></ul>
	Interest present and the	,										† Used when U.S.M.C ELR Replacement is in effect, or
		TACP								NA		when a U.S.M.C. MMC becomes re-armed (W2.21)  Tactical Air Control Party; Inherent Radio (Contact value)
	1-2-8	1-2-88 (12)										of "9"); may set up using HIP
A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH		SOUTH KOREAN*							Pre-5/51: <b>Red</b>	+3/+4	SMOKE	* Republic of Korea (ROK)
	5 <sup>2</sup> -5-7	Army	6	1	$5^2 - 5 - 7^7$	11	2-4-76	4	5/51+: <b>Black</b>			¶ Plentiful ammo included (W3.22); deduct one Black for Normal ammo
		2-2-7 <sup>7</sup> (6) 1-2-6 <sup>6</sup> (5)		2 <b>C</b>	$4^{1}$ - $4$ - $7^{7}$ $3$ - $3$ - $6^{5}$	7	$2-3-7^6$ $1-2-6^4$	3	6-8/50: <b>6B/3R</b> 9/50+: <b>10B¶/3R</b>			Early KW ROK rules 6/46-4/51 (W3.11)     1st Line ROK Army MMC that Battle Hardens become
		1-2-0 (3)		C	3-3-0	3	1-2-0	L	9/30+. 10 <b>D</b> <sub>3</sub> /3 <b>K</b> ≤ 1			Fanatic; 2nd Line & Conscript MMC Lax, Deploying NA
	<b>安全</b>	KMC†	5									(W3.2) • ROK Army (pre-11/50) "Human Bullets" (W3.23)
	The state of the s	$2-2-8^8$ (8)							Pre-8/50: <b>Red</b>	+3		† Korean Marine Corps—Japanese-Armed KMC: 4/49-7/50; U.SArmed KMC: 8/50+; prior to 2/51 MMG/
	4¹-4- <u>8</u>	Japanese-Armed		<b>♣</b> (E)	4¹-4- <u>8</u> <sup>8</sup>	11	2-3-87	5	9/50+: <b>Black</b>			HMG/LtMtr/FT/BAZ B#/X#/ROF penalty (W3.34)
	ARE T	U.SArmed		<b>€</b> (E)	$5^2 - 5 - 8^8$	13	$2-4-8^{7}$	6	10B@/ <mark>3R</mark> ≤ 2	1		@ Plentiful ammo included (W3.36); deduct one Black for Normal ammo; KMC OBA is available beginning 1/51
	<u>5</u> 2-5- <u>8</u>											[EXC: only 60+/80+mm battalion mortar OBA (C1.22) is available 1-9/51]
	n Amerika	COMMONWEALTH*							Black	-1	SMOKE	* BCFK (British Commonwealth Forces Korea) includes
0	4 <sup>2</sup> -5-8	Army	5	E	42-5-88	13	2-4-87	5	8B/2R		Ŷ	Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealander forces (A25.4 and A25.4446)
	42-5-8	2-2-88 (8)		1	$4^2-5-7^7$	10	2-4-76	4	≤ 2			• 2nd Line MMC: Disrupt (W4.1)
	12 Same of	1-2-77 (7)		2	4-4-77	7	$2-3-7^6$	3				<ul> <li>1/52+: Canadian squads have Assault Fire capability (W4.3)</li> <li>Royal Marines (W4.2) are Commandos (H1.24), use RCL</li> </ul>
	6³-6-8	Royal Marines	6	<b>(E)</b>	<u>6</u> <sup>3</sup> - <u>6</u> - <u>8</u> <sup>8</sup>	16	3-4- <u>8</u> <sup>7</sup>	7				without Non-Qualified Use penalty and Communist SW without Captured Use penalties; RM squads may Self-De-
4	<u>6</u> <sup>3</sup> - <u>6</u> - <u>8</u>	axoj ar iviai illes	0		7 7 7	10	<u> </u>					ploy by passing a 1TC and Self-Recombine
	A CONTE	UNITED NATIONS*		2					Black	0	SMOKE	* Other United Nations Command (OUNC) includes Bel-
	5 <sup>2</sup> -5-8	2-2-88 (8)	5.5	Е	$\frac{5^2-5-8^8}{4^2-5-8^8}$	13	2-4-87	6	9B/3R			gian, Colombian, Dutch, Ethiopian, Filipino, French, Greek, Luxembourger, Thai, and Turkish forces (W5.1)
		1-2-77 (7)		E	$4^2$ -5-88 $5^2$ -5-77	12 11	$2-4-8^7$ $2-4-7^6$	6 4	≤ 1	+3 (Turkish)		Bolt-Action Rifle Armed (W5.12) MMC and Semi-Automatic Weapon Armed (W5.13) MMC
				1	$\frac{5}{4^2-5-7^7}$	10	2-4-7	4		(Turkisii)		• 2nd Line MMC: Disrupt (W5.1213) [EXC: Turkish]
	4 <sup>2</sup> -5-7			2	4-4-77	7	2-3-76	3				Bayonet Charge NTC NA for Ethiopian, French, and Turkish leaders (W.6A; W5.2)
and the second		NORTH KOREAN*							Red	+2		* Democratic People's Republic of Korea/Korean People's
	ANT T	2-2-8 <sup>8</sup> (6)	7	E	<u>6-2</u> -8 <sup>8</sup>	12	3-2-87	5	5B/2R	12		Army (KPA)
E-MANUSCHICK CO.	4-4-7	1-2-77 (5)		Е	4-5-8 <sup>8</sup>	11	2-4-87	5	≤ 1			Considered Russian except as noted (W6.1); Elite Person- nel are Stealthy (A11.17) and elite squads may Deploy
				1	<u>5</u> -2-7 <sup>7</sup>	7	2-2-76	3				(W6.1); Commissars (W6.2); may Massacre (W6.3); Human Wave (A25.23) only via SSR
					4-4-77	7	$2-3-7^6$	3				• "Suicide" Heroes (W6.4)
	angogravoscom			С	4-2-65	4	2-2-64	1				<ul> <li>Restricted Starshell use (W6.6)</li> <li>WP grenades available to KPA Assault Engineers (W.5)</li> </ul>
	WAR-	Communist		†	3-3-77	6	1-2-75	2	Red	+1		† Communist Partisans (W6.5; A25.24); neither Elite nor
	3-3-7	Guerrillas				X			NA			Conscript/Green; Stealthy (A11.17); may Massacre (A20.4); Disrupt and RtPh-Surrender NA
*	Rev 1	COMMUNIST							Red			* People's Republic of China/Chinese People's Volunteer
lacksquare	1	CHINECE*	Q	Î	127	10	2 2 76	2	Dro. 4/51, N.A			Army (CPVA) (W7.1)

	<u>5</u> 2-5-8								≤ 2			Normal ammo; KMC OBA is available beginning 1/51 [EXC: only 60+/80+mm battalion mortar OBA (C1.22) is available 1-9/51]
0	A.Cor E	COMMONWEALTH*							Black	-1	SMOKE	* BCFK (British Commonwealth Forces Korea) includes
	ME	Army	5	E	42-5-88	13	2-4-87	5	8B/2R			Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealander forces (A25.4 and A25.4446)
	4 <sup>2</sup> -5-8	$2-2-8^{8}(8)$		1	$4^2$ -5- $7^7$	10	2-4-76	4	≤ 2			• 2nd Line MMC: Disrupt (W4.1)
		1-2-77 (7)		2	4-4-77	7	2-3-76	3				• 1/52+: Canadian squads have Assault Fire capability (W4.3)
												Royal Marines (W4.2) are Commandos (H1.24), use RCL without Non-Qualified Use penalty and Communist SW
	6³-6-8	Royal Marines	6	<b>(E)</b>	<u>6</u> <sup>3</sup> - <u>6</u> - <u>8</u> <sup>8</sup>	16	3-4- <u>8</u> <sup>7</sup>	7				without Captured Use penalties; RM squads may Self-De-
	2 2 2											ploy by passing a 1TC and Self-Recombine
	A Car E	UNITED NATIONS*							Black	0	<b>SMOKE</b>	* Other United Nations Command (OUNC) includes Belgian, Colombian, Dutch, Ethiopian, Filipino, French,
A STATE OF THE STA	5 <sup>2</sup> -5-8	$2-2-8^8$ (8)	5.5	Е	$5^2$ -5-88	13	$2-4-8^7$	6	9B/ <mark>3R</mark>			Greek, Luxembourger, Thai, and Turkish forces (W5.1)
	2-3-0	1-2-77 (7)		E	$4^2-5-8^8$	12	2-4-87	6	≤1	+3		Bolt-Action Rifle Armed (W5.12) MMC and Semi-Au-
	1 A 1			1	$5^2$ -5-7 <sup>7</sup>	11	$2-4-7^6$	4		(Turkish)		tomatic Weapon Armed (W5.13) MMC • 2nd Line MMC: Disrupt (W5.1213) [EXC: Turkish]
	MA			1	$4^2-5-7^7$	10	$2-4-7^6$	4				Bayonet Charge NTC NA for Ethiopian, French, and
	4 <sup>2</sup> -5-7			2	4-4-77	7	$2-3-7^6$	3				Turkish leaders (W.6A; W5.2)
NATURAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY AND	Aur 1	NORTH KOREAN*							Red	+2	_	* Democratic People's Republic of Korea/Korean People's
	4-4-7	2-2-88 (6)	7	Е	<u>6-2</u> -8 <sup>8</sup>	12	3-2-87	5	5B/ <mark>2R</mark>			Army (KPA)
tatamana anama	4-4-7	1-2-7 <sup>7</sup> (5)		Е	4-5-88	11	2-4-87	5	≤ 1			Considered Russian except as noted (W6.1); Elite Personnel are Stealthy (A11.17) and elite squads may Deploy
		(0)		1	<u>5</u> -2-7 <sup>7</sup>	7	2-2-76	3				(W6.1); Commissars (W6.2); may Massacre (W6.3);
				1	4-4-77	7	2-3-76	3				Human Wave (A25.23) only via SSR
	10			C	4-2-65	4	2-2-64					"Suicide" Heroes (W6.4)     Restricted Starshell use (W6.6)
					The state of the s	hayardan sir		Maria Translati				WP grenades available to KPA Assault Engineers (W.5)
	NAK	Communist		†	3-3-77	6	1-2-75	2	Red	+1		† Communist Partisans (W6.5; A25.24); neither Elite nor
	3-3-7	Guerrillas			) — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —			- <del>-</del>	NA			Conscript/Green; Stealthy (A11.17); may Massacre (A20.4); Disrupt and RtPh-Surrender NA
response and		COMMUNIST							Red	-		* People's Republic of China/Chinese People's Volunteer
$\star$	AKK	CHINESE*	8	1	4-3-7	12	2-2-76	3	Pre-4/51: <b>NA</b>	+1		Army (CPVA) (W7.1)
*	4-3-7	Initial Intervention <sup>a</sup>	0		**3-3-7	12	2-2-1	3	4/51-9/52: <b>7B/3R</b>	T1	_	**Reduced Strength (W7.21; W7.28)
	language and the second	2-2-8 (10)		2	3-3-7	9	1-2-76	2	10/52+: <b>7B/2R</b>			<b>a</b> Initial Intervention (10/50-3/51; W7.12) MMC <b>b</b> Grenadiers (W7.121) MMC
		**1-2-8		2	**2-3-7		1-2-7	2	10/32∓. /B/2K ≤1			c Soviet-Armed (4/51+; W7.13) MMC
		1-2-77 (8)			2-3-7							• Stealthy (A11.17); Restricted Starshell use (W7.7); Ar-
	18-20	Grenadiers <sup>b</sup>		1	4-(1)-7	7	$2-(1)-7^6$	2				mored-Assault/Riders NA (W7.9)  • WP grenades available to CPVA Assault Engineers (W.5)
	THE STATE OF	Gremaners			**3-(1)-7		2 (1)					• 10/50-3/51: Early KW CPVA rules (W7.11)
	3-(1)-7			(2)	3-(1)-7	5	1-(1)-76	1				Leaders (W7.3) and Political Officers (W7.31) increase     ML as if Commissar
					**2-(1)-7		1 (1)					MMG/HMG/LtMtr/BAZ/RCL B#/X#/ROF penalty (W7.91)
					_ (1) /							• Restricted Fire (W7.41) and Inf Pltn Movement (W7.42)
	& 1	Soviet-Armed <sup>c</sup>		1	<u>6-2</u> -7	17	3-2-76	4				Hand-to-Hand CC and -1 H-to-H CC DRM (W7.97)  HOLD G. D. L. (W7.9)
	AAA 1	Sorrer In mou			** <u>4-2-</u> 7					1.00		HS Infantry Overrun (W7.6); Bugles (W7.8)     Entrench -1 DRM (W7.92)
	6-2-7			2	<u>5-2</u> -7	12	2-2-76	3				PAATC and Infantry OVR NTC NA (W7.94)
					**3-2-7				×			• Conceal if +2 Hindrance DRM; Conceal -1 drm (W7.95)

# **W10.3 SL SIGHTING TC**

Successful TC: Final DR ≤ ML of SL crew/Armor-Leader (see W10.43 for first us vs Bore Sighted Location).

CAUSE DRM	CAUSE
Outside CA per hexspine changed[T: +1/+1/+1] [ST: +2/+1/+1] [NT: +3/+1/+1]	Captured/Non-Qualifi
[EXC: +0 for first hexspine change for a GMSL/TMSL]	Target Location is Illu
Range	Manning-Infantry/Inh
LOS/LV Hindrance [EXC: E1.7]	Encircled
Location contains no Known enemy units <sup>1</sup> +2	Leadership
Enemy unit in Location subject to FFMO/FFNAM1 (each)	Stunned (D5.34)/Butto
Enemy unit in Location subject to Hazardous Movement <sup>2</sup> 2	LOF crosses ≥ one Illu
Location contains moving/in-Motion enemy vehicle2	SL's Location is Illum
1 March 1: 1 B Gilla Lawro 42) 1: G G La Gilla (El O) 1/1	

1: NA if Location is Bore Sighted (W10.43), contains a Gunflash (E1.8), and/or contains a moving enemy unit.

<sup>2</sup>: NA if enemy unit is beyond SL's NVR.

IB Lane Maximum Range (W10.2): GMSL/TMSL: 44 hexes AMSL: 18 hexes

#### IB Lane Maintenance (W10.45)†

Final Reliability DR ≤ 10 = IB Lane Maintained Final DR 11 = SL Malfunction; Final DR 12 ≥ SL Disabled †: +1 DRM in Extreme Winter (W.4)

• Civilian Interrogation (E2.4) is always in effect (W7.9)

DRM

W. KOR	EA TER	RAIN C	HART	MF EN	TRANCE	COST		MP EN	TRANCE (	COST			MI	SCELLANEOUS
Terrain (Rule)	Example (original Terrain Type)	LOS Obstacle /Hindrance	TEM /Indirect†	Infantry	Cavalry	Horse- Drawn	Motorcycle	Armored Car	Fully Tracked	Halftrack	Truck	Kindle # /Spread #	Fortifiable	Notes
W.3 Crag (B17.)	80L5	■ Hindrance	+1	2	4 C	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA		Wire only	Ambush terrain (A11.4)
W.3 <u>Light Woods</u> (B35.)	81K1 (Woods)	Level-One* or +2 Hindrance	+1/-1	2 R	4 C R	ALL B R	NA PR	ALL B R	ALLB**/ zDR	ALLB**/ zDR	ALL B R	9/7	Yes	§ Woods *To higher LOS only **If no road, VBM, or TB
W1.2 Paddy Field (Drained) (G8.11)	3508 (Grain) Overlay "G", "RP"	_	+1q/0	1c	1c	NA*	3 cJ	NA*	1 c	NA*	NA*	_	Yes	*Open Ground COT if entering via breach; G8.8
W1.2 Paddy Field (Irrigated) (G8.12)	35O8 (Grain) Overlay "G", "RP"	_	{+1q[+2q]/+1}	3 сј	3 Cc	NA	NA	NA	4 B*c	NA	NA	_	Mines/Wire or Panjis	{DC/HE FP halved; see G8.12} [vs HE; G8.5] *Mud & +2 Bog DRM
W1.2 Paddy Field (In-Season) (G8.13)	3508 (Grain) Overlay "G", "RP"	■ Hindrance*	+1q/0	1½ c	1½ c	NA**	4 cJ	NA**	1 c	NA**	NA**	10/6	Yes	*\$Grain (halved; FRD) **Grain COT if entering via breach; G8.8
W1.2 Paddy Field (Bank) (G8.21)	Counter Overlay "G", "RP"	_	0	[1 *j] {1+COT}	[1 C] {1+COT}	[NA] {NA}	[3 J] {3+COT J}	[NA] {NA}	[NA] {1+COT}	[NA] {NA}	[NA] {NA}	_	No	[Onto Bank counter] *Hazardous Movement applies {Across Bank hexside <i>not</i> onto Bank counter}
W1.3 Steep Hills E	83S4 (Hills)	1-5 Levels	DOT*	DOT s	NAL	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	-	Yes [EXC: Mines]	\$ Hills *+1 HA TEM if no other TEM
W1.33 Steep Hills Road	82X4 (Hills Road)	1-5 Levels	DOT*	1 h	1 h r	1 h r	1 H r	3 H r	2 H r	2 H r	3 H r	_	Yes	§ Hills *+1 HA TEM if no other TEM One-lane (B6.43431)

#### Terrain listed in red is Concealment Terrain (A12.12).

#### Terrain shown underlined confers -1 Rally DRM (A10.61).

- †: Indirect Fire TEM is listed following "/" only if different from Direct Fire TEM.
- \*, \*\*: See Notes Column.
- ■: Whole hex affects LOS (Inherent Terrain; B.6).
- **§:** Except as specified otherwise in rules, treat as the terrain type indicated by the symbol.
- **B:** Requires Bog DR to enter/change-VCA-within unless on road.
- C: Cavalry may not charge.
- c: COT IN Paddy (plus cost to cross Bank if applicable).
- COT: Cost of Terrain; B.2.
- D: All MP penalties for entering hex that contains wreck/vehicle, or for changing VCA, are doubled.
- DOT: Dependent on other terrain in hex.
- E: Concealment Terrain only for Infantry/Entrenchments/Emplaced-Guns; W1.31.

- H: Add 2 MP for each full level higher elevation entered.
- h: MF cost of each full level higher elevation entered is doubled.
- J: Sidecar NA.
- **j:** Manhandling NA (G3.2 [EXC: via TB]; G8.12 [EXC: boat]; G8.21 [EXC: cycle]; G9.5).
- L: Horses may be led.
- P: May be Pushed.
- q: Vs target IN Paddy. Reduce TEM by 1 vs LOF from higher elevation/across non-bank hexside of target Location; G8.3.
- R: Or per road cost if crossing road hexside.
- r: May only enter across a road hexside and using the road; W1.331. VCA across a non-road hexside extra (W1.332).
- s: MF cost of each full level higher elevation entered across Crest Line is doubled [EXC: MF cost is tripled when portaging ≥ IPC; MF cost of each full level lower elevation entered across Crest Line is doubled when portaging ≥ IPC; see also W1.34]; Manhandling NA [EXC: W1.36].
- z: One-third of MP allotment.

C7.31 A			LL'	ГАВ	LE									75L 76L								1		Δ
THE TOTAL OF THE T						37L		37LL		50L				80L			90L							
Maria Carlo		42F			37	40	40L	45LL		75				83L			105L							
		12.7	44F	20LL	47*	57	45L	47L	75*	76L				85L			150				88LL			
	39F	15	ATR	25LL	57*	65 <sup>®</sup>	47	50	76	88	75	57L		150*	77L	90L	152	75LL			100L	150L		128L
GUN SIZE:	@MG	ATR	20L	37*	70*	76*	75*	88*	84*	120*	105	57LI	L 76LL	152*	200L	88L	155	76LL	122L	83LL	120L	155L	140L	170L
BASIC TK#	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	19	20	21	23	25	26	27	28	32	33
NOTES: @: M																				/Japan	iese			
Italian Gran				pdr)															W. B.		w.o			
MODIFICAT Case D TK# (			0-1	2	3-6	7-12	13-1	8 19-	24	25-30	31-3	36 3	37-42	43-48	49-54	55	-60	61-66	67-7	2 73.	-78	79+		
≤ 25mm:			+2	+1	+1	0	0		1	-2	-3		-4	-5	NA	N	IA	NA	NA	N	A	NA		
37-57mm:			+1	+1	0	0	0	-	1	-2	-2		-3	-4	-4		5	NA	NA	N	Α	NA		
≥ 65mm:			+1	0	0	0	0	-	1	-1	-2		-2	-3	-3	-	4	-4	-5	-	5	NA		
UNARMOREI	) TARG	ET: FIN	AL TK	# (Doub	le if Cr	itical H	lit): IFI	E/MG-1	5mm:	★ Vehi	cle line	e on II	T ATR	-28mm:	7 37-5	7mm: 8	65-8	<b>4mm:</b> 9	85-95n	<b>nm:</b> 10	100+m	m: 11		

C8.4 CANI	ISTER FP
Gun Size	IFT FP
37mm	12
57mm	16
75mm	20
105mm	24

<b>C7.32 APCR/A</b>	PDS	TO	KIL	LTA	BLE	2				- (			Δ
ARMORED TARGET:		28LL	45LL	40LL 50		57LL D57L		75L					
GUN SIZE:	37L	45L	47L	76L	50L	76LL	85L	76L	76L	88L	D76LL	90L	D83LL
BASIC TK#:	10	12	13	14	17	18	19	20	22	23	25	27	35
UNARMORED TARGET	: Use AI	To Kil	l Table		Russian		U.S.						
MODIFICATION/RANG	E 0-1	2	3-6	7-12	13-18	19-24	25-30	31-36	37-42	43	-48 49	+	
Case D TK# CHANGE													
APCR ≤ 57mm:	+3	+2	+1	0	-2	-4	-6	NA	NA	N	IA N	A	
APCR ≥ 75mm:	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-3	-4	-5	-6		7 N	A	
APDS (D):	+1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-2	-3		-4 N	A	

					Test in									
<b>C7.33 HEAT T</b>	O K		LT	ABL	E									Λ
												(Sept43)		_
ARMORED TARGET:		57										PSK		
		65		BAZ43		PIAT	BAZ44			<b>TYPE 51</b>		37		
		75		75		105	BAZ45			(Aug43)		40	(Oct43)	
GUN SIZE:	57	94	70	76	100	114	95	122	150	PFk	105	47	PF	BAZ50
RASIC TV#.	0	11	12	12	1.4	15	16	17	21	22	25	26	21	22

	VT TEM TABLE	(W.7A)	
Terrain	Infantry/ Cavalry/Gun	PRC/OT & unarmored vehicles	CT vehicles
Building, Pillbox, Cave, Culvert, beneath Bridge	+1*	+1*	
Rubble, Crag, Hut, Roofless Building	0	-1†	+1
All other terrain	-1		

\* *Not* reversed when resolving a Critical Hit (C3.71).

† Treated as Air Bursts (B13.3) for the purpose of D5.31-.311.

C7.31 A	PTO	KI	LL'	TAB	LE									75L										Λ
ARMORED T	TARGET	Г												76L										
						37L		37LL		50L				80L			90L							- 4
		42F			37	40	40L	45LL		75				83L			105L							
		12.7	44F	20LL	47*	57	45L	47L		76L				85L			150				88LL			
	39F	15	ATR	25LL	57*	65*	47	50	76	88	75	57L		150*	77L	90L	152	75LL			100L	150L		128L
GUN SIZE:	@MG	ATR	20L	37*	70*	76*	75*	88*	84*	120*	105	57LL	76LL	152*	200L	88L	155	<b>76LL</b>	122L	<b>83LL</b>	120L	155L	140L	170L
BASIC TK#	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	19	20	21	23	25	26	27	28	32	33
NOTES: @: M	lust be v	vithin I	Norma	l Range	and	not hal	ved FI	Ru	issian	, Japan	iese; A	Allied &	& Axis	Minor/	Italian/	Finnis	h (20L	only)	Russia	n/Japai	nese			
Italian Gran																								
MODIFICAT			0-1	2	3-6	7-12	13-18	19-	-24	25-30	31-3	36 3	7-42	43-48	49-54	55	-60	61-66	67-7	2 73	-78	79+		
Case D TK# C	CHANG	E																						- 1
≤ 25mm:			+2	+1	+1	0	0	-	1	-2	-3		-4	-5	NA	N	A	NA	NA	N	IA	NA		
37-57mm:			+1	+1	0	0	0	-	1	-2	-2		-3	-4	-4	-	5	NA	NA	N	IA	NA		
≥ 65mm:			+1	0	0	0	0	-	1	-1	-2		-2	-3	-3	-	4	-4	-5		-5	NA		
UNARMOREI	TARGI	ET: FIN	AL TK	# (Doub	le if C	ritical H	lit): IFE	MG-1	5mm:	★ Vehi	cle line	e on IF	Γ ATR	-28mm:	7 37-57	7mm: 8	65-8	4mm: 9	85-951	mm: 10	100+m	m: 11		

C8.4 CANISTER FP							
<b>Gun Size</b>	IFT FP						
37mm	12						
57mm	16						
75mm	20						
105mm	24						

C7.32 APCR/AI	PDS	TO	KIL	1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	BLE	Name and the same of				,			Δ
ARMORED TARGET:		28LL	45LL	40LL 50		57LL D57L		75L					
GUN SIZE:	37L	45L	47L	76L	50L	<b>76LL</b>	85L	76L	76L	88L	D76LL	90L	D83LL
BASIC TK#:	10	12	13	14	17	18	19	20	22	23	25	27	35
UNARMORED TARGET:	Use AF	To Kill	Table		Russian		U.S.						
MODIFICATION/RANGE	0-1	2	3-6	7-12	13-18	19-24	25-30	31-36	37-42	43	-48 49	)+	
Case D TK# CHANGE													
APCR ≤ 57mm:	+3	+2	+1	0	-2	-4	-6	NA	NA	N	IA N	Α	
APCR ≥ 75mm:	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-3	-4	-5	-6		7 N	A	
APDS (D):	+1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-2	-3		4 N	Α	

<b>C7.33 HEAT TO</b>	O K	IL	LT	ABL	E									Δ
ARMORED TARGET:		57 65		BAZ43		PIAT	BAZ44			TYPE 51		(Sept43) PSK 37		
		75		75		105	BAZ45			(Aug43)		40	(Oct43)	
GUN SIZE:	57	94	70	76	100	114	95	122	150	PFk	105	47	PF	BAZ50
BASIC TK#:	9	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	21	22	25	26	31	32
UNARMORED TARGET							-	PVA R		M38A1C				
Case D: NA PF RA	ANGE	: Aug	43+:	1; June 4	4+: 2;	45+: 3	(German	s only):	; Finns	: 1 PFk Ran	ge: 1			



## △ HUMAN BULLET (H-B) HERO (W3.23) & SUICIDE HERO (W6.4) CREATION (KW)



ROKA/KPA squads/HS only

ROKA H-B Hero quantity†	KPA Suicide Hero quantity*
50% (FRU) of the number of <i>squads</i> ( <i>only</i> ) in the ROKA OB	25% (FRU) of the number of <i>squads</i> ( <i>only</i> ) in the KPA OB

- † ROKA H-B Hero creation only allowed in scenarios set prior to 11/50.
- \* KPA Suicide Hero creation only allowed by SSR.

#### Attempt allowed:

- During creating MMC's MPh, provided MMC is within 8 MF of, and has LOS to, enemy AFV;
- At start of creating MMC's APh, provided MMC is ADJACENT to enemy AFV;
- During enemy MPh, provided MMC is able to use CC Reaction Fire vs enemy AFV;
- At start of CCPh, provided MMC is DEFENDER in same Location as enemy AFV.
- ‡ Attempt NA if MMC not armed and in Good Order, or if marked with Prep/Bounding/First/Final Fire or Pin/TI counter.

#### **Successful Creation:**

Final dr  $\leq$  3; Original 6 pins MMC unless making Bayonet Charge

#### drm:

- +2 if Conscript
- +1 if HS
- -2 if MMC possesses DC it will give to H-B/Suicide Hero

Terrain	Infantry/ Cavalry/Gun	PRC/OT & unarmored vehicles	CT vehicles
Building, Pillbox, Cave, Culvert, beneath Bridge	+1*	+1*	
Rubble, Crag, Hut, Roofless Building	0	-1†	+1
All other terrain	-1		

VT TEM TABLE (W.7A)

- \* Not reversed when resolving a Critical Hit (C3.71).
- † Treated as Air Bursts (B13.3) for the purpose of D5.31-.311.

# A18.2 LEADER CREATION (KW) dr follows Original 2 on the first

dr follows Original 2 on the *first*MMC Self-Rally or any MMC CC
DR

Δ	dr ≥ 7 6 4,5 2,3	None 6+1 7-0 8-0	
	≤1	8-1	
drm	Cause		
-1	U.S., BCFF	<	
-1	vs AFV, or	per odds col	lumn < 1-1

# vs AFV, or per odds column < 1-1 Base unit had Morale Level ≥ 8 Base unit had Morale Level ≤ 6 Base unit was broken KPA, KATUSA

# A15.1 HEAT OF BATTLE (KW)

DR follows any Original 2 MC/Rally DR NA to Bayonet Charge, Berserk, Climbing, Crew, Hero, Human Wave, Panji MC, Parachute, PRC, Self-Rally, Swimming, Unarmed, Wading Infantry/Cavalry

	DR	Result	
A	≤6	Hero Creation	•
$\Delta$	5-8	Battle Hardening	
	9-11	Berserk †	•
	≥ 12	Surrender *	

- \* Treat as Berserk if: Partisans, Early KW ROK, UN Turkish, CPVA not ADJACENT to Good Order UN Infantry unit (W7.9), Fanatics, PO, or subject to No Quarter (A15.5)
- Treat as Battle Hardening if: UN Turkish in Pillbox (W5.11)
- † Treat as Battle Hardening if: no Known enemy units in its LOS (A15.44); UN Turkish in Pillbox (W5.11); its closest Known enemy unit is in Ocean (G13.491); Assaulting/Evacuating side in Beach Location or on a Pier (G14.32)

DRM	Cause
-1	Elite, BCFK (each)
+1	Broken, Inexperienced (each)
+1	CPVA, Partisan
+2	KPA
+3	KATUSA, ROK, UN Turkish
+4	Early KW ROK

#### W.3 KW TERRAIN:

KW scenarios use Chapter B rules in conjunction with the following:

- All woods are Light Woods (B35.).
- All grain and rice paddies are Paddy Fields (W1.2).
- All roads are dirt (B3.1).
- All bridges are One-Lane (B6.431) and of stone construction.
- Cellars (B23.41) do not exist.
- Crag (B17.) is Concealment Terrain (A12.12) and Ambush Terrain (A11.4).

# H

# **UN FORCES VEHICLE NOTES**

#### U.S./ROK/OUNC VEHICLE NOTES

Unsuited for occupation duties, large numbers of American armored formations were demobilized in the aftermath of WW2. In a period of low military spending, the funds available for military research, development, and procurement were largely devoted to the new technologies of jet aircraft and nuclear weapons. The tanks and other AFV that remained in service had been produced during WW2, and many-if not most-were unusable at the outbreak of the Korean War due to poor maintenance and lack of parts. On the plus side, the American vehicle inventory in Korea included a variety of types introduced into service slightly too late in WW2 to see combat. These were generally very successful since they utilized proven components and incorporated the lessons of actual combat.

ROK armored forces were essentially nonexistent in 1950, with only a few armored cars and halftracks handed over by the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). The rebuilding of the ROK Army during the Korean War focused on infantry and artillery, with significant ROK armored units only becoming operational towards the end of the war. The Korean Marine Corps had only a small amount of armor.

OUNC contingents in the Korean War were primarily infantry units, with very limited armor forces.





sM8

CS 5



1. M24 Light Tank: The M24 Chaffee (U.S. Vehicle Note 6) was arguably the best light tank of WW2. In lieu of a battalion of medium tanks, American occupation forces in Japan were equipped with only a single company of M24s, since their lighter weight made them better-suited to the relatively poor roads and lightly-built bridges in that country. When American forces were rushed to Korea in July 1950 to counter the KPA invasion, the M24

was the only tank initially available. In the first tank vs tank battle of the war, M24s of Company A, 78th Tank Battalion engaged T-34/85s of the KPA 107th Tank Regiment on 10 July 1950 near the town of Chonui. The 78th destroyed one T-34 at a cost of two M24s. The next day, the KPA destroyed five more Chaffees. These heavy losses pointed out the deficiencies of the M24 when opposed by the more powerful and heavily-armored T-34/85. Once American medium tanks arrived in Korea, the M24 was returned to its intended use as a reconnaissance vehicle. Each U.S. Army infantry division possessed two M24 light tanks in the headquarters company of its tank battalion and seven in its reconnaissance company. The first Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK) deployment, the 10th Battalion Combat Team (Motorized), had a company of M24 tanks.

† This AFV has a very fast and accurate turret traverse and also a betterthan-normal ROF for a MA of its caliber. Therefore, it is allowed the possibility of Multiple Hits (C3.8) even though its MA is > 40mm. Moreover, in a Gun Duel (C2.2401), its total Firer-based TH DRM are halved (FRD) prior to adding any Acquisition DRM. (The final total of all DRM may not be < zero, and applies for Gun Duel calculations only.) These abilities are signified on the counter by the ROF # being printed on a white background.

† RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.3 for 7/50 and 1.5 thereafter; for OUNC, they are 1.6 for 9/50-9/51.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes O, Y.









2. M4A3E8 Medium Tank: Of all the variants of the famed Sherman tank produced during WW2, the U.S. Army preferred the M4A3(76)W (U.S. Vehicle Note 16). The M4A3E8 in this module represents a late production M4A3(76)W, with wide tracks and HVSS (horizontal volute spring suspension) for low ground pressure, plentiful HVAP (high-velocity armor-piercing) ammunition, and the gyrostabilizer removed. After the war,



this version was selected to remain in service, although the M26 Pershing and M46 Patton were intended as replacements once they became available in sufficient quantities. The M4A3E8 proved to be more than a match for the T-34/85 when it employed M93 HVAP (APCR) ammunition. The M4A3E8 remained a useful vehicle even after the KPA armor threat was eliminated. Although not as well armed and armored as its intended replacements, the M4A3E8 was adequate given its mission and the lack of significant numbers of enemy armor and anti-tank guns. It was more reliable than the M26 Pershing, and its narrower width made it better-suited to the poor Korean roads and bridges than the heavier M26 and M46. After the early war period (6-8/50), each U.S. Army infantry regiment had an organic tank company with 22 M4A3E8 tanks (two in company headquarters, plus four platoons of five tanks each). The Korean Marine Corps was assigned, as its only armored unit, one company of M4A3E8 tanks, which entered combat in May 1952.

† RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.4 for 8/50, 1.3 for 9-12/50, and 1.2 thereafter; for KMC, they are 1.6 for 5/52-53.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes A, P.





3. M4A3E8(105) Medium Tank: The M4A3E8(105) was built on the M4A3E8 chassis (UN Forces Vehicle Note 2), providing heavier firepower to complement the standard Sherman. During the Korean War,

105mm Shermans could be found in the HQ section of infantry regiment tank companies during the push out of Pusan, the drive to the Yalu River, and fighting at the Chosin Reservoir. At the latter, 105mm Shermans of the 31st Tank Company participated in two failed attempts to break through to the beleaguered 31st Infantry Regiment. The U.S.M.C. deployed instead the tankdozer variant (UN Forces Vehicle Note 4) of the M4A3E8(105) in Korea, but Marines sometimes removed the dozer blades for mobility purposes, and that field modification is also represented by this counter.

† RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.4 for 9-12/50 and 1.5 thereafter; for U.S.M.C, they are 1.6 for 9-10/50, 1.5 for 11-12/50, and 1.6 for 1-3/51.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes C. M.









4. M4A3E8 Dozer & M4A3E8(105) Dozer: The tankdozer variants of the M4A3E8 and M4A3E8(105) with their HVSS suspensions used the M1A1 dozer blade instead of the M1 dozer blade used on earlier M4 models with their VVSS suspensions. The M1A1 was 14 inches wider than the M1 to accommodate the wider tracks of the M4A3E8. The tankdozers were used to clear obstacles, and to build firing berms and other emplacements.

† RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.5 for 9/50-53; for U.S.M.C, they are 1.6 for 8/50, 1.4 for 9-10/50, and 1.5 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes C and M (both M4A3E8(105) Dozer only), A (M4A3E8 Dozer only), TT.






5. POA-CWS-H5 Flame Tank: The POA-CWS-H5 (Pacific Ocean Area-Chemical Warfare Service-Hawaii Model No. 5) was the follow-on to the POA-CWS-H1 (U.S. Vehicle Note 21). Like other American vehi-

cles, it was built in the final days of WW2 but missed seeing action in that war. In Korea, the 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division had a flame platoon of nine POA-CWS-H5s in its headquarters company. Normally, three tanks were attached to each line tank company. U.S.M.C. tankers gave the H5 the nickname "Flame Dragon." Rather than replacing the gun with a FT as had been the case with the H1, the H5 added a FT to the turret and retained the gun. However, the FT was the tank's MA, accessing 290 gallons of napalm from internal tanks. This came at the price of eliminating the bulk of the gun's ammunition stowage; consequently, the tank had room for only six rounds. In 1952, ad hoc field modifications increased this

(	UNI	FORCES VE	HI			SIINC	j																				
	#*	Name & Type	WGT	BPV	RF	Dates	Size	AF	TA	OT	CS	MP	GP	GT	MA	ROF	В#	IF	BMG	CMG	AAMG	SA	Am	s#	sD#	PP/T#	Notes
	Y/-/3/-	M24 <i>LT</i>	17.5	71	1.3-1.6†	7/50-53†	0	6/3	+SR		5	18		T	T75	1†			2	4	4			5; WP7	sM8		1†, O, Y
	6/3/-/-	M4A3E8 <i>MT</i>	32	80	1.2-1.6†	8/50-53†	-1	11/4	-F/+SR		6	15	L	T	T76L	1			2	4	4		A†¹	5	sM8		2†, A†¹, P
	6/-/-/-	M4A3E8(105) MT	31	74	1.4-1.6†	9/50-53†	-1	11/4	-F/+SR		6	15	L	T	T105				2	4	4		H9; C7	7; WP9	sM8		3†, C, M
	2/-/-/-	M4A3E8 Dozer MTv	32.5	82	1.5	9/50-53	-1	11†/4	-F/+SR		6	14	L	T	T76L	1				4	4		A†¹	5	sM8		4, A†¹, TT†
	3/-/-/-	M4A3E8(105) Dozer MTv	31.5	76	1.6-1.4†	8/50-53†	-1	11†1/4	-F/+SR		6	14	L	T	T105					4	4		H9; C7	7; WP9	sM8		4†, C, M, TT†1
	4/-/-/-	POA-CWS-H5 MTv	31	82	1.4-1.5†	9/50-53	-1	11/4	-F/+SR		6	15	L	T	TF32†		X12/9†		2	4	4	T105†	C5		sM8		5†, C, M
	2/-/-/-	M32A1B3 TRV MTv	31	54	1.6	7/50-53†	-1	11†/4	-F†/+SR		6	14	L		BMG				2		4					†	6†, K, M, P
	6/-/-/-	M26A1 <i>MT</i>	41.5	95	1.6-1.3†	7/50-11/51†	0	18/8	-F		6	12		T	T90L	1			2	4	4		A†1	WP6 <sup>M51+</sup> † <sup>2</sup>			$7\dagger$ , $A\dagger^1$ , $J\dagger^2$ , M
	2/-/-/-	M45 MT	42	91	1.6	8/50-3/51	0	18/8			6	12		T	T105	1			2	4	4		H7	7; WP9			8
	6/-/-/-	M46 <i>MT</i>	44	96	1.4-1.2†	8/50-53†	0	18/8	-F		6	14		T	T90L	1			2	4	4	†1	A†²	WP6 <sup>M51+</sup> † <sup>3</sup>			9†, A† <sup>2</sup> , J† <sup>3</sup> , M, FF† <sup>1</sup>
	-/3/-/-	M36B2 GMC(a) TD	28.5	84	1.5	52-53	0	8/3		•	7	15		T	T90L	2					4		A†		sP5		10, A†, K, UU
	2/-/-/-	M38A1C Jeep TDtr	1.5	36	1.5	53	+2	*			2	32 <sup>t</sup>	L	T	T105†		9						H†				11†
	Y/2/-/-	M3 ht	8	34	1.5-1.6†	6/50-53†	+1	0	+F	•	5	20			AAMG	1					4†					15PP/T6	12†, K, Y
	Y/2/-/-	M3(MMG) ht	8	56	1.5-1.6†	6/50-53†	+1	0	+F	9	5	20			AAMG†	2					12†					10PP†	13†, E†, H, K, Y
	Y/2/-/-	M3(HMG) ht	8	61	1.5-1.6†	6/50-53†	+1	0	+F	•	5	20			AAMG†	2					16†					10PP†	13†, E†, H, K, Y
	4/-/-/-	M19A1 MGMC SPAA	18†	65	1.5-1.4†	7/50-53	0	3/1	-SR	•	4	14†		T	T40L	3 (12)	†				†1						14†, AA†¹
	Y/-/2/-	M15A1 MGMC AAht	9.5	60	1.5-1.6†	7/50-53†	0	0/0/ <b>★</b> T	+F	•	4	18		T	T37L†1	3 (8)				12†1	†2						15†,O,V†¹,Y,AA†²,DD†¹
	2/-/-/-	M15 Special AAht	9.5	57	1.6	7/50-52	+1	0	+F	•	4	19		T	T40L†1	3 (8)	11				†2						16†, AA†², DD†¹
	Y/-/-/-	M16 MGMC AAht	9	66	1.5-1.4†	7/50-52	+1	0	+F		4	19		T	T12.7†1	3 (24)					†2						17†,F†¹,V†¹,Y,AA†²,DD†¹
	3/-/-/-	M16A1 MGMC AAht	9	66	1.4	12/51-53	0	0	+F	•	5	19		T	T12.7†1	3 (24)					†2						18†,F†¹,V†¹,AA†²,DD†¹
	4/-/-/-	M39 AUV APC	16.5	40	1.5-1.4†	7/50-53†	+1	2/1		•	6	25		7	AAMG	2					4†1				2 11 1	9PP/T6	19†, G†¹, M
	2/-/-/-	M39 MC SPA	16.5	55	1.6	11/50-53	+1	2/1		•	5	25		NT	B <del>81</del> *†	3	11							WP8			19†
	Y/-/-/-	M7 HMC SPA	23	50	1.5-1.4†	9/50-53	0	3/1	-F	•	7	14	L	NT	B105	1					4		H7; C7	7; WP8			20†, C, Y
	3/-/-/-	M37 HMC SPA	21	50	1.5	11/50-53	0	3/1	-F	•	7	18		T	T105	1					4		Н9	7; WP9			21
	6/-/-/-	M41 HMC SPA	19.5	48	1.5-1.4†	9/50-53	0	3/1/★	-F/-SR	• †1	9	15		NT	B155		10							7; WP8			22†, S†¹
	2/-/-/-	M40 GMC SPA	37	48	1.5	2/51-53	0	4/1/★	-F	•†	9	13	L	NT	B155L		10	•					AP4	7; WP8			23, S†
	2/-/-/-	M43 HMC SPA	36	53	1.6	10/52-53	0	4/1/★	-F	•†	9	13	L	NT	B <del>203</del>		9										23, S†
	4/-/-/-	LVT(A)5 aLT	18	55	1.4-1.5†	9/50-53	-2	2/0	+F/+SR	•	6	113	†1	T	T75*	2			2†2		2×4†		H8; C7	WP8			24†, H, T†1, X†2
	4/-/-/-	LVT(A)5m aLT	18	56	1.5	52-53	-2	2/0	+F/+SR		6	113	†	T	T75*	2							H8; C7	WP8			24, M, T†
	6/-/-/-	LVT3 aAPC	17.5	50	1.3-1.5†	9/50-53	-1	1/0†		•	7	12 <sup>3</sup>	†1		AAMG†	2			2†2		6; Opt 4†						25†,D†,H,M,T† <sup>1</sup> ,X† <sup>2</sup>
	4/-/-/-	LVT3C aAPC	18	55	1.3-1.5†	9/50-53	-1	1/0†			7	123	†1	T	T12.7	3 (6)			2†2							39PP†/T3	25†,D†,M,T† <sup>1</sup> ,X† <sup>2</sup> ,BB†
	3/-/-/-	M75 APC	21	50	1.5	7/53	0	3/1			6	20			AAMG	2					6†					15PP†¹/T9	26, G†, BB†¹
	2/-/-/-	M29 Weasel PC	2	15	1.6	9/50-53†	+2	*			3	TO THE SHEET	L†¹													AND THE PROPERTY AND TH	27†, B†¹, M, T†¹
	2/-/-/-	M29C Weasel aPC	2	21	1.6	9/50-53†	+2	*	The second sections		3		L†¹	and the same													28†, B†¹, M, T†¹
	Y/-/-/-	M4 hst PC	14.2	26	1.5	7/50-53	+1	*			6	18	L		AAMG	2					4†					13PP/T-4	
- 1	Y/-/-/-	DUKW atr	9	24	1.4-1.5†	9/50-53	-1	*	AND STONE OF THE PARTY.		7†1	27 <sup>3t</sup>			AAMG	2			TANKS OF THE OWNER, LAND		Opt 4†1			estance on the estimate of the same			$30^{\dagger}, D^{\dagger^2}, M, Q^{\dagger^1}, Y$
	2/-/-/-	TACP Jeep trv	1.5	25	1.5-1.4†	9/50-53	+2	*			2†	LINE BE	L†1		†		†									The Party of the P	31†, L†¹, M
	Y/-/-/-	7½-Ton <i>tr</i>	22	20	1.5	7/50-53	-1	*			7	22 <sup>t</sup>	Н						1							29PP/T-4	
		Searchlight Truck trv	7.5	21	1.5	51-53	-1	*			7†	28 <sup>t</sup>			†				7211							Elizabeth California (C.)	33†
		M4A3E8(a) MT	32	80	1.3	5/51-53	-1	11/4	-F/+SR		6	15	L	T	T76L	1			2	4	4	†	A†¹	5	sM8	-3-4-14-014-0-514-0	34, A†¹, FF†, UU
		M4A3E8 Dozer(a) <i>MTv</i>	32.5	82	1.5	5/51-53	-1	11†/4	-F/+SR		6	14	L	T	T76L	1				4	4		A†¹	5	sM8		34, A†¹, TT†, UU
		Cromwell VII MT	28.5		1.4-1.3†	11/50-53	0	8/4	+F/+SR		6	16		T	T75†	1			2	4				8†	7; sM8†1	HOLD IN COMMENTS OF THE PARTY OF THE	35†, N, ZZ†1
		Centaur Dozer MTv	22	51	1.5	11/50-53	0	6†/4			2†1	13													7		36†¹, TT†
		Churchill VII HT	41	A COUNTY	MANAGEMENT TO STREET SE	11/50-10/51	-1	14/11			7	8		T	T75	1			2	4				8; WP6	7; sM8†1	A THE RESERVE AND THE PARTY OF	37†, N, CC, ZZ†1
		Centurion III HT	49		1.3-1.2†	11/50-5/51	-1	18/8			7	12		T	T83LL	1				4			HE8; D†	8; WP6	7; sM8†¹		38†, CC, ZZ†1
		Centurion III(L) HT	49	ALLA (SE)	1.3-1.2†	5/51-53	-1	18/8	183566		7	12		T	T83LL	1				4	2 or 4	†1	D8	8; WP6	7; sM8† <sup>2</sup>		38†, CC, FF†¹, ZZ†²
		Churchill Bridgelayer HTv		50	1.6	11/50-53	-1†	11/8			2	8†			†		X12†								7	and of the same of the latest and the same of	39†, N, CC
	-/-/-2	M4A1 MC(a) ht	8	45	1.5	5/51-53	+1	0	+F	•	4	20		NT	R81*†	2		HV.			2†1			WP8; IR			40†, Q†¹, NN, UU

<sup>\*</sup> In the "#" column, U.S./ROK/OUNC/BCFK #s are shown in the format a/b/c/d respectively, with a "Y" entry indicating that U.S. counters are provided in YANKS and "N" that BCFK counters are provided in FOR KING AND COUNTRY.

	sD# PP/T# Notes	13PP/T6 41, N, UU	42†,N	4PP/T10†1 43†, N, U†1	5 4PP/T10†2 43†, N, U†2, Z†1	4PP/T10†1 44†, N, U†1	1PP† 45†, U, MM†¹, NN	9PP†¹/T6 46†, EE†¹	9PP†\T6 47†, EE†¹	9PP+²/T6 47†, G†¹, EE†²	2PP+2/T6 48†, EE+2, MM+1, NN	4PP 49†, N, W†¹	50†, N, U	51†, N, AA† <sup>1</sup>	9PP/T6 52†, N	14PP/T9 53†, N	36PP/T-4 53†, N	15PP/T6 54†, E†, H, K, Y, Z†¹, UU	5PP†4 55†, D†4, K, Q†2, W†1, Y, Z†3, UU	56†, C, K, W†¹, Y, UU	9PP/T10 57†,K,Lp2,M,N,O,P,Qp1,Y,UU	10PP/T9 57†, K, N, O, Y, UU	29PP/T5 57†, K, M, N, O, P, Y, UU	* In the "#" column, U.S./ROK/OUNC/BCFK #s are shown in the format a/b/c/d respectively, with a "Y" entry indicating that U.S. counters are provided in YankS and "N" that BCFK counters are provided in FOR KING AND COUNTRY.
	D# 1	-	4	5 4P	5 4P	5 4P		16	16	16	2I		5+		6	17	36	1	sP5	sP5	6	1	25	e prov
	s #s																		<i>S</i> 2	S				nters a
																								K cour
	Am				7-													7.	1.3	CJ				t BCF
	SA				BAZ‡		7-				7							BAZ‡	BAZ†3					N" tha
	AAMG			+-	2		2	Opt 2†	4	6†1		2	Opt 2	<del>-</del> -				+9	$6^{+2}$	4	Opt 2 or 4†1			NKS and "
	SMG																			4				d in Y
	ROF B# IF BMG CMG		2	2	4	4																		rovide
	IIF B																							s are p
	B#				11								XII											ounter
	ROF		1	-	1	2	1	-	2	3		_		3 (8)				2	2	2	1 or 2			U.S. c
	MA		BMG	BMG	BMG	BMG	AAMG	AAMG	AAMG	AAMG		AAMG	BF24	T40L†				AAMG	AAMG	T37LL	AAMG			icating that
	GT													H						ST				ry ind
	OT CS MP GP GT		Г	L	L	7	L	L	L	1	Г	<del>-</del>	Г	_	L					T T	L+2			Y" ent
	S MI	19	37	91	16	91	16	. 16	16	16	16	2641	16	24	. 30	261	24'	20	36‡₁	36†1	371	321	281	th a "
	TC	4	2	3	3	3	4	5.	5	5	5	4	9	4	5+	5	7	5	4	4	2+1	4	7	ly, wi
	TA 0	4	中			_		-SR	-SR	-SR		_	牛					4						ective
p,								) +F/+SR	) +F/+SR	) +F/+SR	) +F/+SR		+							I +SR				/c/d resp
ont	e AF	0	1/4	0	0	0	0	1/0	1/0	1/0	1/0	2/1	0	*	*	*	*	0	2/1	2/1	*	*	*	nat a/b
S	Size	3 +1	1 +2	3 +2	3 +2	3 +2	3 +2	3 +1	3 +1	3 +1	3 +1	+	3 +2	51 0	3 0	3 +1	3 -1	+1+1	+	+1+	+ +2	+	0 +	ne forn
STIN	Dates	11/50-53	11/50-51	1 9/50-53	1 9/50-53	1 9/50-53	1 9/50-53	1.4-1.3† 11/50-53	1.4-1.3†   11/50-53	1.5-1.4† 11/50-53	1.4-1.3†   11/50-53	51-53	5/51-53	11/50-6/51	11/50-53	1 9/50-53	1.5-1.3† 9/50-53	1.5-1.6† 6/50-53†	1.5-1.6† 6/50-53†	1.5-1.6† 6/50-53†	1.2-1.5† 6/50-53†	1.5-1.3† 6/50-53†	20 1.5-1.2† 6/50-53‡	shown in th
ELE	RF	1.5	1.5	1.5-1.4†	1.5-1.4†	1.5-1.4†	1.5-1.4†	1.4-1.3	_	1.5-1.4	1.4-1.3	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5-1.3†				100			1.5-1.2	X #s are s
CL	WGT BPV	27	29	21	26	27	35	21	28	31	33	23	45	4	14	13	23	39	39	48	15	13	-	BCF
H	MGT	8.5	3	4	4	4	4	9	9	9	9	9	4.5	6	2	3.5	7	∞	7	8	1.5	3.5	7.5	OUNC
ES VE	Name & Type	) ht	uler SC	er A APC	er C APC	-/-/N Carrier, MMGAAPC	-/-/-3 Carrier, 3-in. Mtr. APC	-/-/6 Oxford Carrier APC	-/-/-2 Ox. Car., MIMG APC	-/-/-2 Ox. Car., HMG APC	-/-/-2 Ox. Car., 3-in Mtr APC	-/-/N IP Carrier AOV APC	sp APCv	-/-/N Morris C9/B AAtr	d FAT ir	swt tr	-/-/-/N 3-Ton Lorry tr	A1 ht	0 SC	AC	on Jeep tr	fon tr	Ton tr	column, U.S./ROK/
UN FORCES VEHICLE LISTING cont'd	#* Name	-/-/N M9(a) ht	-/-/N Daimler SC	-/-/N Carrier A APC	-/-/N Carrier CAPC	/-/-/N Carrie	-/-/-/3 Cami	-/-/- Oxfe	-1-1-12 Ox.	-/-/-/2 Ox.	-1-1-12 Ox.	/-/-/N IPC	-/-/-/N Wasp APCv	/-/-/N Mor	-/-/-/N Quad FAT tr	-/-/N 15-cwt tr	/-/-/N 3-T	Y/2/-/3 M3A1 ht	Y/2/-/2 M20 SC	Y121-12 M8 AC	Y/3/3/N 1/2-Ton Jeep tr	Y/6/4/N 34-Ton tr	Y/4/4/N 2½-Ton tr	In the "#"



# H



to 10-12 rounds, and some resourceful tankers managed to squeeze in 15 to 20. The addition of the FT and associated equipment required the removal of the gunner's position. The tank commander pulled triple-duty, as commander, gunner, and FT operator. Fully fueled, there was enough napalm for approximately 200 bursts, or around 2 minutes of continuous flame.

- † The TCA may not traverse into or through the tank's "rear" VCA (i.e., the VCA emanating from its rear Target Facing)—as signified by "TCA:NA RVCA" on the counter.
- † Because the tank commander served as both principal FT operator and gunner, this AFV cannot fire both its MA and SA in the same Player Turn and cannot fire either while CE—as signified by "CE/both fire NA" on the counter.
- † Beginning in 1952, the B# for the POA-CWS-H5 becomes ①.
- † RF are 1.4 for 9-10/50 and 1.5 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes C, M (only).





6. M32A1B3 Tank Recovery Vehicle (TRV): The M32 TRV series was based on the M4 Sherman, and served as a replacement for the M3-based M31 series. It was intended to repair and recover vehicles in post-combat

situations. The M32A1B3 was the final production version, and the only variant that saw service in Korea. The M32A1B3 used the M4A3E8 hull with its HVSS and BMG. The original turret and gun were replaced with a fixed, boxy oblong-shaped, open-top superstructure, with a ring-mounted .50-cal MG. Earlier versions had a hull-mounted 81mm mortar intended to provide smoke cover, which was removed before the Korean War.

A retracting 18-ft jib-style "A-frame" crane was hinged and fitted to the hull forward of the turret. It could support a stationary load of 30,000 lbs, or 20,000 lbs if the load needed to be moved. A hook and cable port were on the front glacis plate. A similar hook and cable port system was affixed to the lower rear portion of the hull. Both were linked to a 60,000-lb winch located just behind the driver that was coupled to the main drive shaft, enabling the TRV to winch objects from either end. A special locking mechanism for the HVSS prevented the center of gravity from shifting and unbalancing the load during crane operations. Towing heavier vehicles usually required removal of their tracks, a time-consuming process beyond the scope of the game.

The M32 was first used in June 1944 on Saipan and appeared in the ETO in late summer 1944. 1,562 were built by the end of WW2. In Korea, a typical U.S. Army Tank Battalion had five M32s with one in each tank company and two in the service company. The 1st Tank Battalion, U.S.M.C., generally organized TRV in the same manner. Additionally, an infantry regiment and regimental combat team each had one tank company with a M32 assigned to it. Both the ROK Army and KMC also used the M32A1B3, and each Canadian tank squadron in Korea had one as well.

- $\dagger$  The M32A1B3's front turret AF (D1.61) is "4"—as signified by a double-ringed circle encasing the front AF.
- † The inherent crew of a M32A1B3 has the option to (un)load more quickly per D6.4-5 [EXC: the cost to unload is ½ of the vehicle's MP allotment and two MF for the crew] but may not destroy the vehicle (D5.411) if it does so—as signified by "(un)load: 2 MF" on the counter.
- † This vehicle may tow a friendly, Abandoned (even if Immobile) vehicle or non-burning wreck that weighs ≤ 33 tons, is not towing a Gun/trailer/vehicle, and has no Passengers/Riders. Towing/(un)hooking a vehicle/wreck [EXC: fully-tracked] follows the same procedures as Towing/(un)hooking a Gun (C10.1-.12) with a circled M#, but only a vehicle crew can (un)hook a vehicle/wreck. Once a vehicle/wreck is hooked up, its VCA/TCA coincides with that of the towing vehicle.

To (un)hook a fully-tracked vehicle/wreck, a vehicle crew and the M32A1B3 must spend four consecutive friendly MPh (and the time in between) in Good Order and unpinned, while marked TI throughout. Should the vehicle crew become pinned or not in Good Order, the TI counter is removed and the entire process ends and has to be re-started again. Additionally, the M32A1B3 may unhook a vehicle/wreck by spending half its MP allotment, but then loses its vehicle-towing capability for the duration of the scenario; mark it





with a SA Malfunction counter. If the towed vehicle/wreck becomes a Burning Wreck, the *M32A1B3* immediately stops (no Stop MP is needed) and must unhook the Burning Wreck before spending any Start MP.

- † A M32A1B3 may assist (D8.3) another vehicle's Bog Removal attempt regardless of vehicle weight and from an ADJACENT Location; if assisting from the same Location, it provides an additional -1 drm to the colored die.
- † The M32A1B3 pays two extra MP per hex entered when towing a vehicle/wreck, and the D2.14 penalties for entering a hex containing a vehicle/wreck (B6.43; B13.41) are doubled, but the towed vehicle/wreck itself does not invoke those penalties. There is an additional +2 Bog DRM when towing a vehicle/wreck, but the towed vehicle never Bogs.
- † A towed vehicle/wreck is attacked and affected just like a trailer (C10.4) [EXC: its own size modifier always applies to targeted attacks through a side Target Facing; it can be hit in the turret/upper-superstructure Aspect if HD; any hit through the rear Target facing hits the towed vehicle/wreck instead of the vehicle; and a hit through any Target Facing that is missed by 1 automatically hits the "other vehicle" (i.e., the towed vehicle/wreck through the front Target Facing, the M32A1B3 through the rear Target Facing, or the one not targeted through a side Target Facing); and against a towed wreck, ignore any effect other than a Burning Wreck]. Otherwise, normal overstacking attack/defense penalties (A5.12-.132) apply when other friendly vehicles are in the Location, treating any towed wreck as a friendly vehicle.
- † Dates are U.S. Army 7/50-53, U.S.M.C. 8/50-53, ROKA 1952-53, KMC 5/52-53, and Canada 5/51-53.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes K, M, P [EXC: use the U.S.-colored counter to represent this vehicle when used by ROKA, KMC, or Canadian units].





**7. M26A1 Medium Tank:** The M26 Pershing (U.S. Vehicle Note 22) was the replacement for the Sherman. With thicker armor and a powerful 90mm gun, it was intended to be the antidote to the German Panther and Tiger

tanks. Introduced in small quantities in 1945, it proved to be successful and remained in service after the war. However, it was hampered by the same powerplant as the M4A3, which gave the heavier M26 sluggish performance and short range. Originally classified a Heavy Tank in 1945, it was redesignated as a Medium Tank after the war. The first three examples sent to Korea were derelicts scrounged from a Tokyo depot. Used to defend the town of Chinju from the KPA 6th Division on 28 July 1950, these were in such poor condition that all three broke down and were abandoned. By August 1950, more M26s entered combat with both the U.S. Army and U.S.M.C. They proved superior to the T-34/85 and were instrumental in the destruction of the primary KPA armor unit, the 105th Armored Division. M304 HVAP (APCR) ammunition was particularly effective, and was available in adequate quantities. As the Communist armor threat declined, M26s were moved into the fire support role. They served in three U.S. Army tank battalions (the 70th, 72nd, and 89th) that were also equipped with the M4A3E8, and in one battalion (the 73rd) equipped exclusively with the M26, as well as in the U.S.M.C. 1st Tank Battalion. The M26A1 was a post-WW2 modification of the M26 that upgraded its gun to the M3A1 cannon with a bore evacuator. In game terms, the counter represents both the unmodified M26 and the M26A1 in the Korean War. The M26 was replaced by the M46.

 $\dagger$  RF and Dates are 1.6 for 7/50 (U.S. Army only), 1.3 for 8/50-6/51, 1.4 for 7-9/51, and 1.5 for 10-11/51.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes A, J, M.





**8. M45 Medium Tank:** The M45 was a variant of the M26 that replaced the 90mm gun with a 105mm howitzer. It had heavier armor on the front of its turret than the M26, both to provide better protection at the shorter

employment ranges required by the 105mm gun and to keep the turret balanced on its ring. 185 units were built in 1945, but were too late to see service in WW2. A few were sent to Korea and saw action there.





**9. M46 Medium Tank:** The M46 Patton was an upgraded M26, with a more powerful engine and transmission. It initially saw Korean service with the U.S. Army's 6th and 64th Tank Battalions and later replaced the

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M26 in other U.S. Army and U.S.M.C. tank units. The 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division had four line companies (A-D with 17 M26 or M46 tanks; three platoons of five plus two in the company headquarters) plus two M26 or M46 tanks in the Headquarters & Service Company. Each of the three U.S.M.C. infantry regiments had an organic platoon of five tanks, but in practice these operated with the 1st Tank Battalion.

 $\dagger$  RF and Dates are 1.4 for 8/50-6/51 (U.S. Army only), 1.3 for 7-11/51, and 1.2 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes A, J, M, FF.





10. M36B2 GMC(a): After WW2, the U.S. Army abandoned the tank destroyer concept and retired both its towed anti-tank gun units and its tracked armored tank destroyers like the M36 GMC (U.S. Vehicle Note 25). The

M36B2 GMC served in Korea only in ROK Army tank battalions, substituting for true tanks. Its 90mm gun provided useful fire support, but its open top made it vulnerable to infantry close assault.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes A, K, UU.





11. M38A1C Jeep: In 1952, four of the heavier M27 105mm recoilless rifles replaced two M20 75mm recoilless rifles in each U.S. Army infantry battalion's Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). The M27 was

carried by the M38A1C jeep, which was designed for the role. The M27 itself, while unreliable and inaccurate, fired a HEAT round that could penetrate any contemporary armor.

- † The MA of the M38A1C is a Recoilless Rifle, and all the C12. rules apply as if it were a German RCL [EXC: it can only be fired by its inherent crew]—as signified by "MA: RCL" on the counter.
- † The MA uses red TH numbers—as signified by "RED TH#" on the counter.
- † May use neither Bounding First Fire (D3.3) nor Motion Fire—as signified by "No BndFF" on the counter.
- † The MA may not fire at a target that lies within the "rear" VCA (i.e., the VCA emanating from its rear Target Facing)—as signified on the counter by "RVCA NA".
- $\dagger$  HEAT fired by this vehicle is not subject to C8.9 Depletion—as signified by " $\infty$  H" on the counter.

ERRATA: 105mm HEAT of the M38A1C Jeep (only) has a Basic TK# of "25".





\*MA:MMG




**12. M3 Halftrack:** No U.S. Army mechanized or armored infantry units fought in Korea. The U.S. Army and ROK Army used a small number of armored halftracks in support roles, including the M3 (U.S. Vehicle Note 28).

† MA is a MMG for To Kill and Removal purposes—as signified by "MA: MMG" on the counter.

† RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.5 for 7/50-53; for ROKA, they are 1.5 for 6-7/50 and 1.6 for 8-9/50.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes K, Y.

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† This halftrack starts each scenario with an Inherent crew, and also with a U.S. 6-6-6 or ROKA 5-5-7 (or as otherwise specified by SSR) squad, or that squad's two HS (owner's option of squad or HS), as a Passenger that applies to the vehicle's PP capacity (D6.1).

† The AAMG FP actually consists of three MG: one 50-cal HMG (MA; 4 FP), and two secondary 30-cal MG [each a 4-FP MMG in the M3(MMG), or each a 6-FP HMG in the M3(HMG)]. This is signified on the counter by "4MA&4&4" for the M3(MMG), and by "4MA&6&6" for the M3(HMG). The MA 50-cal AAMG may fire normally in any di-

rection. However, neither of the two secondary 30-cal AAMG may fire at a target that lies within the halftrack's VCA. One secondary AAMG may fire at a target that lies either to one "side" of the halftrack or within its "rear" VCA, while the other secondary AAMG may fire in like manner to either the halftrack's "other side" or within its "rear" VCA. See the diagram below. In addition to removal as per D6.631, the AFV's Passenger(s) may remove its secondary AAMG as (a) dm MMG [for the M3(MMG)] or (b) dm HMG [for the M3(HMG)]. The MA of both AFV may be removed (but only as per D6.631) as a dm 50-cal HMG.

 $\dagger$  RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.6 for 7/50 and 1.5 thereafter; for ROKA, they are 1.5 for 6-7/50 and 1.6 for 8-9/50.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes E, H, K, Y.

\*4MA&4&4 \*MA:12.7


\*4MA&6&6 \*MA:12.7

\*4MA&6&6 \*MA:12.7

CS 5

CS 5

CS 5



3 VCA c invel tha 40L(12) Macha 40L(12)

14. M19A1 MGMC: Based on the M24 Chaffee light tank chassis, the M19 MGMC was designed during WW2 to replace the anti-aircraft halftracks but entered service too late to see action. In 1948, the M19 inventory

was modified to the M19A1 configuration with the addition of an auxiliary power unit. In Korea, the M19A1 was not used in its intended role of air defense due to the absence of a Communist air threat over the battlefield. However, its twin 40mm automatic cannon made it a fearsome infantry support vehicle, particularly useful in stopping Communist human wave attacks.

Vehicle 17

† This vehicle is assumed to be towing an armored (0/0 AF) ammo trailer that, by its owner's announcement, can be unhooked at the start of its MPh if it is not in Motion and its crew is CE. Unhooking is accomplished by simply flipping the counter over to the side showing no trailer. Its MP allotment is thus increased to 18 (although the act of unhooking the trailer costs the vehicle one-fourth of this new MP allotment), while its WGT becomes 14 and its B# becomes ①. The trailer is always assumed to be hooked up at the start of a scenario, and an unhooked trailer cannot be hooked up again. A hooked-up trailer is otherwise treated as per C10.4-.41.

† The MA may not fire at a target that lies within the VCA and is at a lower level than the firer—as signified by "VCA < level NA" on the counter.

† To indicate a M19A1 MGMC wreck, use a M24 LT wreck counter (UN Forces Vehicle Note 1) and mark it with a Scrounged counter.

† RF are 1.5 for 7-9/50 and 1.4 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Note AA.




15. M15A1 MGMC Halftrack: The 92nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) (AAA(AW)) Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th AAA(AW) Battalion, 25th Infantry Division were equipped with the M15A1 MGMC (U.S. Vehicle Note 37). In the absence of a Communist air threat, mobile anti-aircraft guns proved to be valuable in the infantry support role. Each Turkish Brigade that rotated in turns through Korea

also had an AAA battery equipped with this vehicle.

- † Normal range of the CMG is 16 hexes—as signified on the counter by "Nml Rng: 16".
- $\dagger$  RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.5 for 7/50-52; for OUNC, they are 1.6 for 10/50-53.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes O, V, Y, AA, DD.



16. M15 Special Halftrack: During WW2, the M15 Special was a local modification unique to the PTO. Eight M15A1 MGMCs had their armament replaced with an M1 40mm automatic cannon (U.S. Ordnance

Note 24). These eight vehicles were used by Battery A, 209th AAA(AW) Battalion, together with eight M16 MGMCs, to support the 32nd Infantry Division in the Philippines. In Korea, these vehicles served in the 76th AAA(AW) Battalion.

 $\dagger$  Due to the height of the gun mount, the crew's CE DRM (D5.31) is only +1—as signified by "CE: +1" on the counter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes AA, DD.



17. M16 MGMC Halftrack: The M16 (U.S. Vehicle Note 38), the "Meatchopper" of WW2 renown, saw extensive action in Korea. When used in the ground support role, its quad .50-cals could cover an area of

terrain with a dense hail of bullets. It was not uncommon for one of these weapons to halt a CPVA assault nearly single-handedly. Four of these vehicles, together with four M19A1s, provided critical support to Task Force Faith on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir during the initial CPVA assaults of 27 November-2 December 1950, enabling it to resist the attacks of a Chinese division for four days. The loss of all these vehicles through a combination of mechanical failure (due to the extreme cold weather) and the expenditure of available ammunition played a large part in the eventu-





al overrunning of Task Force Faith during its breakout attempt. An AAA(AW) (Self-Propelled) battalion consisted of four batteries, each battery with two platoons of four M16 MGMC and four M16A1 MGMC.

† Due to the height of the gun mount, the crew's CE DRM (D5.31) is only +1 when being fired on through the turret's side/rear Target Facingas signified by "CE: +1SRT" on the counter.

† RF are 1.5 for 7-8/50, 1.4 for 9/50-6/52, and 1.5 for 7-12/52.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes F, V, Y, AA, DD.





18. M16A1 MGMC Halftrack: Heavy use in WW2 and later in Korea wore out the M16 MGMC inventory. With no new halftracks having been produced since 1944, the best alternative to quickly rehabilitate the


M16 was to remove the M45 gun mount from war-weary halftracks and install them on overhauled M3 and M3A1 halftracks, which were in better condition. The new vehicles were designated the M16A1 MGMC. The salvaged gun mounts were raised to clear the sides of the replacement vehicles, which did not have the hinged side plates of the original M16. The M16A1 also had taller gun shields for better crew protection.

† The CE DRM (D5.31) against incoming fire through the turret's front Target Facing is +3 instead of the normal +2—as signified by "CE: +3FT" on the counter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes F, V, AA, DD.







19. M39 Armored Utility Vehicle & M39 Mortar Carrier: The initial batches of M18 GMC tank destroyers (U.S. Vehicle Note 24) were returned to the factory to rework their faulty transmissions. 640 were converted to M39 armored utility vehicles by removing their turrets and adding a .50-cal MG on a ring mount. The M39 was originally intended to be the prime mover for towed 90mm anti-tank guns in tank destroy-

er battalions. One serious drawback was its lack of overhead armor. A few M39s saw service in the closing months of WW2. In Korea, M39s were used as transports and to evacuate casualties. A few were also modified to carry weapons such as mortars and quadruple .50-caliber heavy machine guns. These were field modifications and never standardized.

† The mortar can be Removed dm (D6.631) from the M39 MC (only). While removed, it is represented by the M1(L) 81mm Mortar counter (UN Forces Ordnance Note 24), and the AFV retains an Inherent Driver. As signified by "Inf Crew" on the counter, this vehicle starts each scenario manned by an Inherent Infantry (i.e., 2-2-7) crew. When such a crew exits its vehicle, its ID should be recorded since it differs from a normal Infantry crew by having vehicular crew capabilities.

 $\dagger$  M39 AUV RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.5 for 7-8/50 and 1.4 thereafter; for U.S.M.C., they are 1.5 for 1952-53.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes G and M (both M39 AUV only).





20. M7 HMC: The M7 HMC (U.S. Vehicle Note 44), another veteran of WW2, also saw service in Korea. In Korea, troops found that the 105mm howitzer's maximum elevation of 35 degrees was insufficient for

placing rounds on the reverse slopes of the steep Korean hills. To increase the elevation to 65 degrees, some Priests were modified by raising the gun, which allowed it to fire at high elevation without recoiling into the floor plates. These modified vehicles, all based on the M7B1 variant, were designated the M7B2. In game terms, they are identical to the M7.

† RF are 1.5 for 9-12/50 and 1.4 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes C, Y.





21. M37 HMC: Using the engine, powertrain, and suspension of the M24 Chaffee light tank, the U.S. Army developed a "Light Combat Team" series of AFVs to take advantage of common-component pro-

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duction and logistical benefits. Three members of the "Light Combat Team" went into production during WW2: the M37 and M41 HMCs and the M19 MGMC. The production runs of all three vehicles were cut short by the end of the war and none reached operational units in time to see combat service. The M37 had the same general configuration as its predecessor, the M7 HMC, but on a more mobile, less expensive chassis. A total of 316 M37s were manufactured.





22. M41 HMC: Compared to the M37, the M41 carried a heavier weapon (the M1 155mm howitzer) but had less protection for the crew and less ammunition. Sixty M41 HMCs were produced. Both the M37 and

23. M40 GMC & M43 HMC: The M40

GMC was designed to be the successor to

M41 provided excellent service in Korea and were heavily used.


† RF are 1.5 for 9-12/50 and 1.4 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Note S.









factured during WW2. The first combat use of the M40 (actually a T83 as it was called before being type-classified) was with the 991st Field Artillery Battalion in February 1945 during the attack on Cologne. In Korea, the M40 and M43 were invaluable in providing mobile, heavy, and long range firepower.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Note S.









24. LVT(A)5 & LVT(A)5m: The LVT(A)5 was an improved version of the LVT(A)4 (U.S. Vehicle Note 47) that was produced in 1945. The most notable difference between the two was the addition of a gyrostabilizer in the LVT(A)5. In 1949, some LVT(A)5s were revised with a more seaworthy hull shape and armored roof, creating the LVT(A)5 Modified with no MG that only the U.S.M.C. used. LVT(A)5s of the U.S.


Army's Company A, 56th Amphibious Tractor Battalion fought with the 1st Marine Division at Inchon and Seoul in September 1950. Later in the war, U.S.M.C. LVT(A)5s of the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion provided fire support to Marine infantry, often from dug-in positions. LVT(A)5s also supported Royal Marine Commando raids on the North Korean east

† The AAMG FP actually consists of two 4-FP MMG on either side of the LVT(A)5, neither of which can fire to the opposite "side"—as signified by "4&4; NA op side" on the counter. See the diagram on the following page.

† LVT(A)5 RF and Dates are 1.4 for 9-10/50 and 1.5 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes H and X (both LVT(A)5 only), M, T.













25. LVT3 & LVT3C: The LVT3 ("Amtrac") was a competing design to the LVT4 (U.S. Vehicle Note 51). Compared with the LVT4, it was both lighter and could carry more payload, although they are equivalent in game terms. A total of 2,964 LVT3s were built in 1944-45, but only 210 saw combat in WW2, on Okinawa with the 1st and 4th Amtrac Battalions. After WW2, the armament of the LVTs was modified to include a

BMG in a ball mount and one or two pivot-mounted MG with prominent gunshields. Due to their mounting and gunshields, fire from both pivot-mounted MGs was restricted to the LVTs VCA. In 1949, some of the surviving LVT3s were modified to become LVT3Cs ("C" for covered); an armored roof provided overhead protection to passengers. The most notable use of the LVT3 and LVT3C in Korea was during the Inchon landing and the subsequent recapture of Seoul, during which the 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion carried the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 1st Marine Regiment across the Han River to the outskirts of Seoul. Starting in 1951, the 1st Marine Division was used as a line infantry division rather than a specialized amphibious assault formation, so LVT3Cs were used in a logistics role for the remainder of the war.

- † The AAMG FP of the *LVT3* (only) consists of one or two AAMG: one .50-cal HMG (MA; 6 FP), and one optional secondary .30-cal MMG (4 FP). All AAMG may fire only at targets that lie within the VCA *[EXC: during CC]*. This is signified by "MG VCA only" and "MA: 12.7" on the counter and "6MA&4" if armed with the optional secondary AAMG.
- † The CE DRM (D5.31) of the *LVT3* (only) against incoming fire through the front Target facing is +3 instead of the normal +2—as signified by "CE: +3F" on the counter.
- † The MA of the *LVT3C* (only) may not fire at a target that lies within the "rear" VCA (i.e., the VCA emanating from its rear Target Facing) and is at a lower level than the firer—as signified on the counter by "RVCA < level NA".
- † PASSENGERS: The ramp on the LVT3/LVT3C enabled it to carry a vehicle/Gun as well as Personnel, making special rules necessary for their transport. Such a Passenger-Gun/vehicle (including the latter's PRC) may

not attack in any way. An LVT3 (only) must be CE to (un)load any type of Passenger(s). In addition, if an LVT3/LVT3C has (un)loaded Passenger(s) during the current MPh, its rear Target Facing is treated as unarmored vs all Defensive First Fire attacks that can affect it through that Target Facing.

**PP CAPACITY:** The *LVT3/LVT3C* may transport any combination of the following items, with the total indicated PP applying to the LVT's PP capacity (D6.1).

Item	PP Cost
• Vehicle of ≤ 2 tons	15
• Vehicle of > 2 but ≤ 4 tons	30
• Non-MTR Gun with M# of ≥ 10	10
• Gun with M# of 6-9	20
• MTR of 76-107mm	0
Ammunition	4 or 8 1,3
• Inherent vehicle crew	0
All other Personnel/SW	normal <sup>2,3</sup>

- ¹: As per C10.13 (i.e., 4 PP for a Gun of  $\leq$  99mm, or 8 PP for one  $\geq$  100mm). This applicable PP cost is also used for a dm 76-82mm MTR, as well as for a 107mm mortar.
- <sup>2</sup>: As per their normal Passenger/Rider PP cost.
- <sup>3</sup>: EXC: the PP cost of units/SW/ammo are reduced to zero if they are Passengers of a vehicle that is itself a Passenger.

**VEHICLE:** Unloading a Passenger vehicle consists of driving it off the LVT3/LVT3C into the LVT's Location at a cost of one MP for starting, plus one-fourth of the Passenger vehicle's MP allotment, plus COT. There is no MP cost for entering the LVT's Location (D2.14), but Overstacking will apply. Loading is the reverse of this procedure; i.e., the vehicle first enters the LVT's Location if necessary (paying one extra MP; D2.14), and then expends one-fourth of its MP allotment plus one MP for COT to load onto it, plus one MP to stop. Otherwise, the normal principles of D6.4-.5 for (un)loading Passengers apply, including the "simultaneous expenditure" of each 25%-segment of movement allotment by both the Passenger vehicle and the LVT3/LVT3C during the turn of (un)loading. An allowed vehicle can (un)load while towing a Gun (unless using Reverse Movement; C10.1) by paying the extra MP for towing. A Passenger vehicle or Gun may not change its CA relative to that of its LVT. Since the LVT3/LVT3C's ramp is at its rear, a vehicle's VCA must coincide with the LVT's VCA (or "rear" VCA) so that the vehicle is properly aligned for forward or reverse entry/exit onto/from the LVT. Overstacking does not occur due to a vehicle being a Passenger on an LVT3/LVT3C. A vehicle that is also a Passenger cannot claim or retain Motion status independently of the LVT3/LVT3C.

**GUN:** (Un)loading an *unhooked* Gun from/onto an *LVT3/LVT3C* follows the same procedure as (un)hooking it from/to a towing vehicle (C10.11-.12). A Gun may be (un)hooked from/to an allowable vehicle while both are Passengers on the LVT (any resulting TI status does not apply to the LVT).

SURVIVAL: If an LVT3/LVT3C is destroyed (but does not burn) while on land, all unarmored vehicles and Guns aboard it are also destroyed; all such vehicular PRC roll for survival using the LVT's CS#. If an AFV is aboard such a destroyed LVT3/LVT3C, repeat the original attack, using its Original DR but now vs the AFV and adding an extra +2 To Hit (or IFT for non-ordnance) DRM as well as all other DRM applicable to that AFV. If the AFV survives it is bogged but may freely unload in a subsequent friendly MPh if it first passes a Bog Removal DR. The AFV's PRC automatically survive the LVT's destruction, but if the AFV does not survive they must roll for survival using the AFV's CS#; if they survive they are placed on foot in the hex in the normal manner.

† RF are 1.3 for 9-10/50 and 1.5 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes D, H (LVT3 only), M (only), T, X, BB (LVT3C only).







**26.** M75 Armored Personnel Carrier: The M75 was the first mass-produced AFV with the basic configuration later used by most post-WW2 armored personnel carriers: a fully-tracked vehicle with overhead armor

protection that carried one rifle squad. The M75 was used in small numbers in 1953, at first under its development designation of T18E1, mainly as an armored supply vehicle and ambulance. It was an ideal vehicle to support forward outposts in the face of heavy CPVA artillery fire. Although the M75 was designed as a rifle squad carrier for mechanized infantry units, there were no mechanized infantry units in the Korean War.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes G, BB.





27. M29 Weasel: The Weasel, a low ground-pressure fully-tracked vehicle, was designed during WW2 to provide mobility over snow and ice for the 1st Special Service Force, an elite joint American and Cana-

dian unit. American forces widely used the Weasel during WW2, although ironically the 1st Special Service Force did not. The Weasel (M28 version) was first used in the liberation of Kiska in August 1943, but no version saw any combat service to speak of. The M29 was an improved version of the Weasel and can represent either model in the game.

† Dates are U.S. Army 1951-53 and U.S.M.C. 9/50-53.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes B, M, T.





28. M29C Weasel: The definitive version of the Weasel was the amphibious M29C, which was used in Korea to supply units by water as well as over muddy roads that would have bogged down any other vehicles.

† The M29C Weasel is exempt from Bog Checks (D8.21) caused by being adjacent/accessible to Marsh/Mudflat/Swamp (B16.43; G7.31).

† Dates are U.S. Army 1951-53 and U.S.M.C. 9/50-53.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes B, M, T.





**29.** M4 18-Ton High Speed Tractor: The WW2-era M4 high speed tractor (U.S. Vehicle Note 51.1) again saw service in Korea, towing the M2 anti-aircraft gun, the M1A1 155mm gun, and the M1 8-in howitzer. Also

used in Korea were the M5 and M6 tractors. The M5 tractor was slightly smaller than the M4 and was used to tow the M1 155mm howitzer; in game terms, the M5 is essentially similar to the M4. The M6 was a very large tractor used to tow the super-heavy M1 240mm howitzer, which is not represented in the game.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes G, Y.





**30. DUKW:** Another veteran of WW2, the DUKW (U.S. Vehicle Note 52) also served in Korea. One of the most famous actions involving the DUKW was the crossing of the Han River in September 1950 by the

Headquarters and 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, transported by the DUKW amphibious trucks of Marines' 1st Amphibian Truck Company, 1st Motor Transport Battalion.

† RF are 1.4 for 9-10/50 and 1.5 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes D, M, Q, Y.





**31. TACP Jeep:** This is a standard Jeep fitted with radio, transmitter, and receiver used for contacting the Tactical Air Request network: the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) at both the battalion and regiment, and the

H

Air Support Section at brigade and divisional headquarters level. The TACP Jeep carried a second radio to contact aircraft directly once they were on station overhead and had a generator mounted between the driver and passenger seats to charge the two radio batteries. TACP Jeeps worked with the Air Support Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (TACRON-2), part of the 1st Marine Air Wing. Generally, one TACP Jeep was attached to each U.S.M.C. rifle battalion in its Headquarters Company. On rare occasions, U.S.M.C. TACP were assigned to Army units. Some Army units had Air Force TACP, but these operated at the regimental level, beyond the general scope of the game. A TACP generally consisted of 5 men: two air controllers, two radio men, and a driver who doubled as security. Away from the Jeep, the TACP relied on two man-pack radios lashed to a pack board, plus ancillary equipment.



† Although a *TACP Jeep* has no armament, it *does* have an Inherent Crew in the form of a 1-2-8 U.S.M.C. TACP (W9.11), which has the option to (un)load more quickly per D6.4-5 but may not destroy (D5.411) the vehicle if it does so—as signified

by "ML:8" and "(un)load: 1 MF" on the counter. No other type of Personnel counter may become the Inherent Crew or driver of a *TACP Jeep*.

 $\dagger$  All rules for U.S.M.C. TACP (W9.11-.114) apply to a TACP Jeep except as stated otherwise. A TACP Jeep has an Inherent radio with a Contact value of "10" (G.7 can apply) that cannot be Removed/Scrounged. The radio breaks down on any Original Contact/Maintenance DR of 12; mark the vehicle with a MA Malfunction counter. It can be repaired normally per A9.72; a dr of  $\leq$  2 repairs the radio and removes the Malfunction counter, and a dr of 6 disables the radio permanently (but the vehicle is not Recalled). The Inherent crew may operate its Inherent radio (W9.111), but only if the vehicle's radio is malfunctioned/disabled. The Inherent crew may not operate a radio if the TACP Jeep is in-Motion/Non-Stopped. For VP purposes (A26.212) the vehicle's radio is worth two VP if not malfunctioned/disabled.

† The U.N. player may use an unarmed *Jeep* (UN Forces Vehicle Note 57) to represent a *TACP Jeep*, but it cannot tow a Gun or carry any Passengers. The *Jeep* is exchanged for a *TACP Jeep* counter if the Inherent crew abandons the vehicle or operates a radio, while in LOS of a Good Order enemy ground unit within 16 hexes.

† RF are 1.5 for 9-12/50 and 1.4 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes L, M (only).





32. 7 ½-Ton Truck: Representing many different trucks in the "heavy-heavy" class, the large 7 ½-ton truck (U.S. Vehicle Note 58) was relatively rare among American trucks in WW2, but was on hand in numbers at the out-

break of the Korean War where it outlasted many of its smaller brethren. It was the only American truck type not used by fellow UN members in Korea.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Note Y.



\*IB VCA NA
\*Reliability
DR: 10 \*
\*Sighting TC\*
CS 7

33. Searchlight Truck: During the static period of the war, beginning in January 1951, the Army activated three company-sized searchlight units using 60-inch searchlights mounted on trucks. The searchlights were

800-million candlepower units originally used for anti-aircraft target illumination during WW2. One such unit was assigned to each U.S. corps. The searchlight mission was initially assigned to the 61st, 86th, and 92nd Engineer Searchlight Companies. In January 1953, these units were redesignated as the 61st, 86th, and 92nd Field Artillery Batteries (Searchlight). The mission of these units was to provide direct and indirect illumination during night operations. Each battery contained 18 trucks and was organized into three platoons, further divided into six searchlight sections, each with one searchlight. Normally a platoon would support a division.

- † Although a Searchlight Truck has no armament, it does have an Inherent vehicle crew.
- † See W10. for truck-mounted Searchlight usage.

# H

#### BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES KOREA VEHICLE NOTES

The British and Commonwealth contribution to UN armor consisted of a British tank regiment, a British flame tank squadron, and a Canadian tank squadron. During the war, units rotated through the theater, receiving the vehicles of the units that they relieved.





34. M4A3E8(a) Medium Tank & M4A3E8 Dozer(a): A squadron of Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) served as the armored support for the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade and was initially equipped with the M10 Achilles tank destroyer (British Vehicle Note 40). Quickly realizing that the open top turret was a serious liability, they converted to the M4A3E8 Sherman drawn from American stocks (UN Forces Vehicle Note 2) before see-

ing action. All three squadrons that successively rotated through Korea operated as infantry support, indirect artillery, and as mobile pillboxes in defensive positions (C Squadron, 5/51-6/52; B Squadron, 6/52-5/53; A Squadron, 5/53-5/54). A full-strength squadron consisted of four troops of four tanks plus a headquarters troop of four tanks and a dozer tank (UN Forces Vehicle Note 4). A few more tanks were also equipped with dozer blades to help counter the roadblocks that both the KPA and the Communist Chinese used against roadbound UN forces. The Sherman remained in Canadian service with reserve units until the 1970s.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes A, FF (M4A3E8(a) only), TT (M4A3E8 Dozer(a) only), UU.





CS 6

35. Cromwell VII: Cromwell tanks (British Vehicle Note 19) served with the Reconnaissance Troop, 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars and with 45th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery. All 12 Cromwells in Korea were

used as gun tanks and so carried only HE and Smoke ammunition. The Cromwells saw service as part of the ill-fated "Cooperforce" that was destroyed by the Chinese while performing rearguard duties during the withdrawal of 1st Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles from positions northwest of Seoul in January 1951.

- † AP and WP ammunition are NA for Cromwells in KW scenarios (despite this not being indicated on the counter).
- † A Cromwell VII serving as an OP tank (H1.46) (RF 1.5) retains its normal 75mm MA, contrary to H1.4641.
- † RF are 1.4 for 11/50, 1.3 for 12/50-1/51, and 1.4 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes N, ZZ.





36. Centaur Dozer: During WW2, the British converted surplus Centaur AA tanks (British Vehicle Note 60) to armored bulldozers. 87 Assault Squadron, Royal Engineers, of the 79th Armoured Division used

Centaur Dozers to clear rubble in urban areas starting in April 1945. British forces used several Centaur Dozers in Korea for both rubble and roadblock removal.

† Although a Centaur Dozer has no armament, it does have an Inherent vehicle crew and is a Tankdozer (G15.13) with normal Dozer capabilities (G15.2).

See also UN Forces Vehicle Note TT.





37. Churchill VII: C Squadron, 7th Royal Tank Regiment deployed to Korea with Churchill Crocodile flame tanks (British Vehicle Note 38). Since the fuel trailers impeded mobility in Korea's rice paddies and



steep hills, the Churchill Crocodiles actually fought as gun tanks and so are represented by stock Churchill VII tanks (British Vehicle Note 35). The unit fought with distinction at Chunghong Dong in 1951.

† RF are 1.4 for 11/50, 1.3 for 12/50-1/51, and 1.4 for 2-10/51. See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes N, CC, ZZ.









38. Centurion III & III(L): Belatedly produced in WW2 as an answer to the later generation of German tanks, the Centurion was intended as a counterpart to the Panther. In the Centurion Mk III that saw service in the Korean War, a 20-pounder (83.4mm) Ordnance QF Tk Mk 1 gun replaced the 17-pounder gun in the Centurion Mk I. The Centurion was arguably the best tank in the world during the Korean War

era. In Korea, the Centurion was renowned for the accuracy of its gun and its hill-climbing ability. After the experience fighting the Chinese at the Imjin River in April 1951, the Centurion Mk III was re-equipped with more HE ammunition and less APDS, as well as with searchlights and an AAMG (sometimes a .50-cal, although more often a .30-cal Browning). This re-equipped version is designated the Centurion III(L) for game purposes. The Centurions sent to Korea served with the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars (11/50-12/51), the 5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards (12/51-12/52), and the 1st Royal Tank Regiment (12/52-12/53). A regiment consisted of three squadrons, each with four troops of four tanks plus another four in the squadron headquarters. The only confirmed tank vs tank engagement involving Centurions occurred when a captured Cromwell was destroyed by 20-pounder fire in February 1951.

ERRATA: 83LL AP has a Basic TK# of "26" and 83LL APDS has a Basic TK# of "35". The 83LL APDS Basic TH# Modification (C4.3) is -1 for every 18 hexes (or fraction thereof) beyond 18 hexes range.

- † APDS on the Centurion III (but not the III(L)) is not subject to C8.9 Depletion—as signified by "∞ D" on the counter.
- † Despite not having the letter "G" on its wreck side, the Centurion III and III(L) are at all times equipped with a Gyrostabilizer (Stabilized Gun; D11.1).
- † RF is 1.3 [EXC: 1.2 for 4/51, 11/52, and 5/53].

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes CC, FF (Centurion III(L) only), ZZ.





39. Churchill Bridgelayer: These vehicles (British Vehicle Note 36) were converted from Churchill III/IV and carried a rigid, 30foot-long bridge placed via a series of hydraulically actuated pivoting arms. Given

the plethora of unbridged and weakly-bridged streams and gullies encountered, bridgelayers assumed more importance in the rugged Korean terrain than the poor road net might otherwise suggest. The BCFK used three Churchill Bridgelayers during the war in Korea.

- † A bridgeless Churchill Bridgelayer weighs 36.5 tons, has 10 MP, and its Target Size is 0.
- † MOVEMENT: While carrying its bridge, the Churchill Bridgelayer may not use VBM-as signified by "VBM NA" on the counter; if in a Sunken Road hex (B4.), it is treated as being on a One-Lane bridge for VCA-change purposes (B6.431).
- † PRC: Although a Churchill Bridgelayer has no armament, it does have an Inherent Crew and is Recalled per D5.341 if it becomes Stunned-as signified by "Stun=Recall" on the counter. A Bridgelayer may carry neither Passengers nor Riders.
- † WRECK: To indicate a Churchill Bridgelayer wreck, use a Churchill VII wreck counter (UN Forces Vehicle Note 37) and mark it with a Scrounged counter.





† **BRIDGE:** When placed, the bridge is represented by a 5%" Bridge counter. It is One-Lane (B6.43-.431) and has a normal entry cost of one MF or *four* MP for all units. It is neither an obstacle nor a hindrance to LOS, and a unit on it is considered to be in Open Ground as if on a road (with no

B6.31 TEM)

- PLACEMENT: The bridge can be placed "across" only a trench, A-T ditch, canal, the shellholes in a hex, or a gully/stream-and only by a Stopped Mobile Bridgelayer (whose crew is neither stunned nor shocked) during its MPh at a cost of 8 "delay" MP (expended in one MPh) while it is ADJACENT to the Location "across" which it wishes to place the bridge. This Location must also be within the Bridgelayer's VCA. Only one bridge may be placed per hex, and may be placed across neither an unbreached wall/hedge hexside nor a Depression Hexside. A bridge placed "across" a gully/stream is at its Crest Level. A Bridgelayer that becomes immobilized while Non-Stopped (including via an Unbogging DR), or that is Bogged/Mired, cannot place its bridge. The Bridgelayer's owner first announces the placement attempt, then makes an X# DR to check for possible disablement of the bridgelaying mechanism. If this Final DR (see DE-**STRUCTION**) is  $\geq 12$ , the bridge cannot be placed and the Bridgelayer is immediately Recalled; on a Final DR of ≤ 11, placement commences, and only then does the AFV begin expending "delay" MP. After thusly expending the 8 MP the bridge is placed; position it such that its "length" is perpendicular to the hexside common to it and the Bridgelayer. Once the bridge has been placed, the Bridgelayer is flipped over to its "bridgeless" side and is immediately Recalled; the extra MP gained may be used immediately if the Bridgelayer is otherwise allowed to do so (including having not yet expended  $\geq$  its new MP allotment).
- **DESTRUCTION:** A turret hit vs a Bridgelayer that is carrying its bridge is treated as a bridge hit instead. When such a hit is achieved (or when a DC is Placed "on the turret"; C7.346), a dr is made on the following table to see if damage occurs:

TYPE OF HIT:	AP, HEAT,	HE 58-99mm <sup>b</sup> ,	HE 100mm+d,
	HE ≤ 57mm <sup>a</sup>	DC <sup>c</sup>	DCe
DAMAGED ON dr OF:	1	1-2	1-3

- <sup>a</sup> Includes all HE Harassing/Barrage OBA.
- b Includes all HE Concentration OBA.
- c Successfully Positioned (only).
- d EXC: OBA.
- <sup>e</sup> Optimally Positioned (only).

If damage occurs, make another dr, which yields the +DRM that will modify the X# DR made when placement is attempted. All such +DRM are cumulative even if caused by  $\ge$  one hit. A hit (or DC Placed) on the bridge can affect its carrying Bridgelayer only via a Collateral Attack vs its CE crew [EXC: any CH vs the bridge renders it unplaceable and Recalls the Bridgelayer]. Types of attacks not listed herein cannot damage the bridge while it is on the Bridgelayer. Once the bridge has been placed, B6.33 (with a +2 TEM for the bridge) and B6.332 apply to attacks vs it.

• **COLLAPSE:** A placed *Churchill Bridgelayer* bridge can collapse as per B6.42 if the weight of a vehicle on it exceeds 66 tons.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes N, CC.





**40. M4A1 MC(a) Halftrack:** This redesign (U.S. Vehicle Note 32) of the M4 Mortar Carrier survived its WW2 usage to equip Canadian infantry battalions in Korea as the Canadian Army transitioned away from

British equipment and towards American vehicles and ordnance.

† While inherent armament of the halftrack, the mortar can fire only at a target that lies within the halftrack's "rear" VCA (i.e., the VCA emanating from its rear Target Facing)—as signified by "MA:RVCA only" on the counter.

† The mortar can be Removed dm (D6.631). While removed, it is represented by the M1(L) 81mm Mortar counter (UN Forces Ordnance Note 24), and the AFV retains an Inherent Driver.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes Q, NN, UU.





41. M9(a) Halftrack: Having received thousands of Lend-Lease unarmed M5, M5A1, M9, and M9A1 halftracks in WW2 (British Vehicle Note 63), the British used these unarmed halftracks in Korea as ambulances

H

and field repair vehicles. The M9 here stands in for all these similar types, which are all the same in game terms.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes N, UU.





**42.** Daimler Scout Car: The reconnaissance troop of the British tank regiment had nine Daimler Scout cars (the Car, Scout, Mk I, nicknamed the "Dingo"; British Vehicle Note 42) for scouting and liaison. Although

advanced for its time in 1938, armored combat had passed these vehicles by, and they were withdrawn at the end of 1951 due to poor cross-country performance in the rugged Korean terrain.

† If this AFV becomes Stunned, it may not gain CE status again, may not fire its MA, and is Recalled as per D5.341. These are signified by "Stun=Recall & CE/FP NA" on the counter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Note N.









43. Carriers A & C: Although no longer a mainstay of the infantry battalion, the tracked armored carrier (British Vehicle Note 64) was still prevalent in British service, and the British and Australians (but not the Canadians, who preferred American equipment) used all types of Universal Carriers in Korea for multiple purposes, including recon, liaison, and artillery observation. Although some Carriers were originally shipped with PIATs,

those were quickly swapped for Bazookas. British Carriers were phased out in 1952 due to their poor performance in rough terrain, but, the Australian version (indistinguishable in game terms) was used throughout the war.

- † The Carrier A's 2 FP BMG MA may be repositioned as a normal MA AAMG. This can be done only by placing an AA counter on the Carrier at the end of any friendly fire phase (not MPh) in which the BMG has not fired and the Inherent MMC is not stunned, shocked, broken, or in Melee. As long as the AA counter remains on the Carrier, its FP is assumed to be "-/-/2" with a zero Multiple ROF. The AAMG may be repositioned as the BMG MA by using these same principles to remove the AA counter.
- † The Carrier C's MA may not be Removed, as signified by "Rmvl NA" on the counter, and may be Scrounged only as a British LMG.
- † RF are 1.5 for 9-10/50, 1.4 for 11/50-52, and 1.5 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes N, U, Z (Carrier C only).





**44.** Carrier, MMG A: A number of Universal Carriers built in Australia had factory-installed Vickers water-cooled BMG. The Australians used these, which the game calls the Carrier MMG A (British Vehicle Note

65), in Korea in addition to the more standard Carriers.

† RF are 1.5 for 9-10/50, 1.4 for 11/50-52, and 1.5 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes N, U.

# H





**45.** Carrier, 3-in. Mortar: Initially, these Universal Carriers (British Vehicle Note 67) were the standard mode of transport for 3-in. (81mm) mortars (UN Forces Ordnance Note 16) and were used by both British and Aus-

tralian units in Korea. Eventually, however, they were supplanted in British units by Oxford mortar carriers, as the British transitioned away from Universal Carriers.

These counters can be used in WW2 scenarios. As discussed in **ASL JOURNAL 7**, the correct Caliber Size of the *3-in.* mortar is 81mm, not the 76mm indicated by the name "3-in." and originally assigned to them.

† This vehicle may carry as a Passenger one (only) SMC and/or 1PP SW as signified by "1PP" on the counter. This PP capacity may not be used for carrying ammunition (C10.13).

 $\dagger$  RF are 1.5 for 9-10/50, 1.4 for 11/50-52, and 1.5 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes U, MM, NN.





**46.** Oxford Carrier: This was a larger and more powerful carrier than the Universal Carrier (UN Forces Vehicle Note 43) and was first used by units of the 29th Infantry Brigade to tow 17-pdr AT guns. After it was deter-

mined the 17-pdrs were too cumbersome for the battlefield, Oxford Carriers were re-purposed as armed personnel carriers and other combat roles normally associated with the Universal Carrier. In 1952, the British replaced all Universal Carriers with Oxford Carriers. The Oxford Carrier proved useful in liaison and armed reconnaissance roles in the rugged Korean terrain, especially when equipped with an AAMG.

- † Although a Oxford Carrier has no armament [EXC: optional AAMG], it does have an Inherent vehicle crew.
- † The optional AAMG represents a Bren LMG added via field modification.
- † RF are 1.4 for 11/50, 1.3 for 12/50-1/51, and 1.4 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Note EE.









47. Oxford Carrier, MMG & Oxford Carrier, HMG: The crews of some Oxford Carriers mounted .30-cal Browning MG acquired from the Americans, Vickers water-cooled MG, or even an M2 .50-cal MG in unofficial field modifications. For game purposes, the first two are designated as Oxford Carrier, MMG and the third as Oxford Carrier, HMG. After abolishing its AT Platoon, 1st Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles mounted the .30-cal

Browning MG on their Carriers and combined them with their Assault Pioneer Platoon to create a new Battle Patrol, which saw significant action during the Rifles' withdrawal from positions northwest of Seoul in January 1951.

† Oxford Carrier, MMG RF are 1.4 for 11/50, 1.3 for 12/50-1/51, and 1.4 thereafter. Oxford Carrier, HMG RF are 1.5 for 11/50-51 and 1.4 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes G (HMG only), EE.





**48.** Oxford Carrier, **3-in.** Mortar: As the British transitioned away from Universal Carriers, another variant of the Oxford Carrier replaced the Universal Carrier mortar transport. Starting with the 29th Infantry

Brigade, Oxford Carriers assigned to Battalion Support Companies were also used to transport the 3-in. (81mm) mortar (UN Forces Ordnance Note 16).

† RF are 1.4 for 11/50, 1.3 for 12/50-1/51, and 1.4 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes EE, MM, NN.



#### Vehicle 53





**49. IP Carrier AOV:** The IP Carrier's official designation was "Armoured Carrier, Wheeled, Indian Pattern" and saw wide use in WW2 performing the same duties as the Universal Carrier. The AOV (Armoured Ob-

servation Vehicle) (British Vehicle Note 70) featured a roof-mounted Bren LMG with a turret-like shield. After removing the standard bow-mounted anti-tank rifle, the 16th Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery used the IP Carrier AOV to transport forward observers.

† Of the special rules for Carriers, only D6.82-.83 apply to this vehicle and its Inherent HS; for all other purposes, this is a non-Carrier wheeled OT AFV that may retain any unpossessed SW aboard it (D6.4).

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes N, W.





**50. Wasp:** The Wasp (British Vehicle Note 72) was a Carrier with a FT mounted in place of the BMG and saw wide use in WW2 despite their open-topped vulnerability. Canada sent 18 Wasps to Korea, but the

terrain and tactical situation, coupled with the vulnerability of their crew, meant they saw little use.

† When successfully fired, the sD allows the placing of a Smoke counter in both hexes that are adjacent to the *Wasp* and in its VCA. Any VCA change pertinent to using the sD is treated as per D13.32.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes N, U.





**51. Morris C9/B:** Known officially as the "Carrier, SP, 4×4, 40mm AA", this vehicle (British Vehicle Note 78) comprised a Bofors AA gun on a chassis derived from the Morris Quad FAT. The 11 (Sphinx) Inde-

pendent Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, Royal Artillery used six of these SPAA from November 1950 to June 1951. At the Imjin River, 11 (Sphinx) Battery provided valuable fire support against CPVA troops. In June 1951, the unit was reequipped and redesignated as a heavy mortar battery.

† May use neither Bounding (First) Fire nor Motion Fire—as signified by "No Bnd(F)F" on the counter.

**ERRATA:** The *Morris C9/B* (British Vehicle Note 78) may use neither Bounding (First) Fire nor Motion Fire.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes N, AA.






**52.** Quad FAT: The official designation of the Quad FAT (Field Artillery Tractor) was "Tractor, 4×4, Field Artillery" (British Vehicle Note 80). Both British and New Zealand artillery units used the Quad FAT to tow

their 25-pounder guns.

† Although the *Quad* is not an AFV and has a cs# rather than a CS#, any Effects Final DR vs it receives a -1 DRM for Burning Wreck determination (only).

See also UN Forces Vehicle Note N.



**53. 15-cwt Truck & 3-Ton Lorry:** Many WW2 trucks remained in service and ended up in the Korean War used by British and Australian troops. The 4×2 15-cwt truck (British Vehicle Note 81) was one of the most common, followed by the 3-Ton Lorry (British Vehicle Note 83), which in its 4×4 version had mostly supplanted the 30-cwt by the end of WW2.

† RF are 1.5 for 9-10/50 and 1.3 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Note N.





#### COMMON VEHICLE NOTES

CS 5

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Neither the ROK nor the OUNC employed any British vehicles, but some of the American vehicles they utilized were also used by the BCFK, especially the Canadians who were transitioning away from British vehicles. Listed here in the Common Vehicles section then are those AFV used by the Americans, the ROK, *and* the BCFK, along with those vehicles (such as the Jeep) used by almost every UN combatant.



₩ T6


\*AAMG -/-/6\*

**54. M3A1 Halftrack:** The U.S. Army and ROK Army both used a small number of armored halftracks in support roles, including the M3A1 (U.S. Vehicle Note 29). Following the pattern of increasing use by the Canadian Army of American rather than British equipment, each Canadian infantry battalion also had several armored halftracks, used as prime movers for AT guns and in other support roles.

† The AAMG FP actually consists of two MG: one .50-cal HMG (MA; 4 FP) and one secondary .30-cal MMG (2 FP)—as signified by "4MA&2" on the counter. Each MG may be Removed (D6.631) as this given type (i.e., as a dm .50-cal HMG or dm MMG respectively). See also UN Multi-Applicable Vehicle Note E.

 $\dagger$  RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.5 for 7/50-53; for ROKA, they are 1.5 for 6-7/50 and 1.6 for 8-9/50; for Canada, they are 1.5 for 5/51-53.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes E, H, K, Y, Z, UU.




**55.** M20 Scout Car: Along with the M8 armored car, this WW2-vintage wheeled AFV (U.S. Vehicle Note 40) soldiered on in Korea. Limited cross-country mobility, thin armor, and light armament made them both ineffective on the front lines. However, they proved to be useful for rear area security, convoy escort, and military police duties, and they were sometimes the only AFV available to the ROK Army. The Canadians

also used them as liaison, security, and command vehicles.

 $\dagger$  RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.5 for 7/50-53; for ROKA, they are 1.5 for 6-7/50 and 1.6 for 8-9/50; for Canada, they are 1.6 for 5/51-53.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes D, K, Q, W, Y, Z, UU.



**56. M8 Armored Car:** In October 1949, the ROK Army received 37 M8 armored cars (U.S. Vehicle Note 42) that equipped the 1st Cavalry Regiment, Capitol Division. These were the closest equivalent to an armored unit in the ROK Army when the war broke out in 1950. Like the M20 scout car, the M8 also saw liaison and security use in rear areas by both the U.S. and Canadian Armies.

† RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.5 for 7/50-53; for ROKA, they are 1.5 for 6-7/50 and 1.6 for 8-9/50; for Canada, they are 1.6 for 5/51-53.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes C, K, W, Y, UU.

\* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \* 37 | \*







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57. Jeep, 3/4-Ton Truck, & 21/2-Ton Truck: At the outbreak of the war, American and South Korean forces used WW2-era trucks (U.S. Vehicle Notes 54, 55, and 57). Over the course of the war, these vehicles were replaced with more modern designs such as the M38 jeep, M37 3/4-ton truck, M34/M35 and M135/M211 series of 2 ½-ton trucks. and M39 series of 5-ton trucks. In game terms, they are similar to the WW2-era trucks. The British and Commonwealth forces used Jeeps (British Vehicle Note 84) heavily in Korea, often as a replacement for Universal Carriers. The Canadians almost exclusively used American trucks (British Vehicle Note 85) (many produced by Canadian manufacturers) in all roles, including towing the 25-pounder guns of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.

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† U.S. Dates are 7/50-53 [EXC: U.S.M.C. starts 8/50]; RF for Jeep is 1.2, RF for ¾-Ton Truck [EXC: U.S. Army only] is 1.4, and RF for 2½-Ton Truck is 1.3.

† ROKA RF and Dates for *Jeep* and 2½-*Ton Truck* are 1.3 for 6-7/50, 1.4 for 8/50, 1.5 for 9/50-6/51, 1.4 for 7-9/51, 1.3 for 10-12/51, and 1.2 thereafter; for ½-*Ton Truck* they are 1.5 for 6/50-53.

† KMC Dates are 1951-53; RF for *Jeep* is 1.3, and RF for 2½-Ton Truck is 1.5.

† OUNC Dates are 9/50-53; RF for *Jeep* is 1.2, RF for *½-Ton Truck* is 1.5, and RF for 2½-Ton Truck is 1.4.

† BCFK [EXC: Canada] RF and Dates for Jeep are 1.4 for 9-10/50 and 1.2 thereafter; for 2½-Ton Truck they are 1.4 for 1951-53.

† Canada RF and Dates for *Jeep* are 1.3 for 11/50-4/51 and 1.2 thereafter; for *¼-Ton Truck* they are 1.4 for 11/50-4/51 and 1.3 thereafter; for 2½-*Ton Truck* they are 1.4 for 11/50-4/51 and 1.3 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Vehicle Notes L and Q (both *Jeep* only), M and P (both *Jeep* and 2½-Ton Truck only), K, N, O, Y, UU.

#### UN FORCES MULTI-APPLICABLE VEHICLE NOTES

A. APCR fired by this vehicle is not subject to C8.9 Depletion—as signified by " $\infty$  A" on the counter.

**B.** This vehicle is exempt from Bog Checks (D8.21) caused by Mud (D8.23), Deep Snow (D8.23), Drift (E3.752), Sand (F7.31), or Rice Paddy (G8.12).

C. 37mm canister has 12 FP; 75mm has 20 FP; 105mm has 24 FP; see C8.4.

**D.** The vehicle's high hull made exit and entry difficult for Personnel who had to climb over the sides. Therefore, the costs to (un)load (D6.4-.5) is doubled to ½ of the vehicle's MP allotment and two MF for the Personnel—as signified by "(un)load×2" on the counter [EXC: normal cost applies to the LVT3/LVT3C]. In addition, all attacks made by the Passengers of this vehicle are halved (or receive a +2 To Hit DRM) as Mounted Fire (D6.1). This vehicle can retain any unpossessed SW aboard it (D6.4), and its crew may Remove its MG armament (D6.631).

E. The Inherent crew may fire only the .50-cal MA unless it is malfunctioned or disabled, in which case the Inherent crew may fire a secondary AAMG instead. Otherwise, only a Good Order Passenger may use a sec-





ondary AAMG (as signified on the counter by printing such FP in red). If such a Passenger is a lone SMC, it can fire one secondary AAMG; if  $\geq$  two SMC or a MMC, all secondary AAMG can be fired. Assuming they are properly manned, the MA AAMG and any/all secondary AAMG may be fired together as a FG or at separate targets (as per D3.5 and within any applicable field of fire restrictions). Each secondary AAMG, when being fired by a Passenger, counts as use of a SW by that Passenger. See also UN Multi-Applicable Vehicle Note H.

- **F.** Make four To Kill DR when using the 12.7 column of the AP To Kill Table; only one DR (firer's choice) is used. This is signified by "4 TK DR" on the counter. Maximum range for To Hit purposes (A9.61) is 16 hexes—as signified by "[16]TH" on the counter.
- G. MA is a 12.7mm MG—as signified by "MA: 12.7" on the counter.
- **H.** Each AAMG malfunctions and is repaired or disabled independently of the others. If a vehicle's MA AAMG malfunctions, mark it with a "MA Malfunction" counter to show that its non-MA AAMG FP is still usable. Whenever all of a vehicle's non-MA AAMG malfunction, indicate this by using an "AAMG Malfunction" counter. If a vehicle has more than one non-MA AAMG and one of them malfunctions, mark the vehicle with a "One AAMG Malfunction" counter; thereafter, in each friendly fire phase in which that AAMG is not repaired, the remaining still-usable non-MA AAMG may fire in its own allowed direction or in the malfunctioned AAMG's direction at no extra penalty.

Since the ROF applies only to the MA (A9.2), the owner must announce before he fires that he is using the MA if he wishes to possibly retain a Multiple ROF. An Armor/Passenger leader may direct the fire of more than one vehicular-mounted/Passenger-fired MG only if those MG are firing together as a FG.

- **J.** WP6 becomes available in March 1951—as signified by the superscript "M51+" on the counter.
- K. Used by ROK Army forces in KW scenarios.
- L. This vehicle has Low Ground Pressure (D1.41). Moreover, when it is bogged, one (only) CX squad (even a Prisoner—but not a Guard) on foot expending ≥ four MF in the vehicle's Location (and declared to be assisting its unbogging) thereby allows the owning player to subtract two (one per crew or HS) from the colored die of its immediately subsequent unbogging DR.
- M. Used by the U.S.M.C. in KW scenarios.
- N. The British-colored counter is provided in FOR KING AND COUNTRY, but the Vehicle Listing and Notes herein apply in all cases.
- O. Used by one or more OUNC contingents in KW scenarios.
- P. Used by the Korean Marine Corps in KW scenarios.
- Q. The AAMG is a .50-cal HMG if 4 or 6 FP, or a MMG if 2 FP—and may be Removed (D6.631) as such. If the MG is optional, its RF is 1.3 if 4 FP or 1.1 if 2 FP. If armed, this vehicle has an Inherent crew and thus a CS# instead of a cs# (D5.6).
- **S.** Due to the configuration of this AFV, most of the crew actually stood outside of and behind them while serving the gun. Therefore, one side of the counter shows the AFV "limbered" while the other side shows it "unlimbered". To change modes the counter is flipped over during any friendly PFPh/DFPh, provided its Inherent crew is not stunned, shocked, pinned, or broken, and neither the crew nor the MA has fired; both the crew and AFV then become TI. The MA may not fire while "limbered". While "unlimbered," the AFV may not expend MP, is treated as an RFNM Gun (C10.25) for To Hit purposes, and its crew is always CE as per D6.84 (but with only a +1 CE DRM [0 DRM if attacked through its unarmored Target Facing; D5.311])—as signified by "CE: +1" on the counter.
- T. The Bog DRM for ground specified as "soft, mud, or snow-covered" (D8.21) does not apply to this vehicle.
- U. See D6.8-.84 for the basic rules pertaining to Carriers. The MF expenditures given in C10.11 and C10.12 for (un)hooking a Gun apply unchanged if the MMC performing that action is simultaneously (un)loading from/into this Carrier.

- V. Even though the IFE (or CMG for the M15A1 MGMC) FP actually comprises more than one MG, it is treated as a single weapon for malfunction/repair purposes. Neither the MA nor CMG may be Scrounged or Removed—as signified by "MA [or CMG] Rmvl NA" on the counter.
- W. Reverse Movement costs this vehicle four times its normal hex entry cost—as signified by "REV × 4" on the counter.
- X. The BMG can fire while the vehicle is HD across its VCA—as signified by "BMG HD FP ok" on the counter.
- Y. The U.S.-colored counter is provided in YANKS, but the Vehicle Listings and Notes herein apply in all cases.
- **Z.** This vehicle starts each scenario carrying one BAZ (signified by "BAZ" or "PIAT" on the counter). This is the BAZ 45 through 7/50 for the U.S., and the BAZ 50 thereafter; the BCFK use the BAZ 50; the ROK use the BAZ 50, but only beginning 5/51. The BAZ does apply to the vehicle's PP capacity (D6.1) when it takes counter form. (Thus it must remain inherent if the vehicle currently has no unused PP capacity.) In a single Player Turn the Inherent crew may fire either the vehicle's normal armament or the BAZ (as per C13.8-.81). Otherwise, the BAZ may only be Removed (D6.631) by the crew or a Passenger (who can claim possession of it automatically), or Scrounged (D10.5).
- AA. MA and CMG (if so equipped) have AA capability—signified by "MA:AA" on the counter.
- **BB.** Passengers in this vehicle are always BU, and thus may not fire, Spot/Observe for Indirect Fire, or attack in CC, or even provide a Personnel Escort DRM for vehicles being attacked in CC (A11.51). This is signified by "Pas: BU" on the counter.
- CC. This vehicle [EXC: while the Churchill Bridgelayer is carrying a bridge] pays only 2 MP when ascending each intermediate level of an Abrupt Elevation Change (B10.51) instead of the normal 4 MP, and can cross a Double-Crest (or Crest-line slope; Q3.53) hexside (B10.52) but must check for Bog (D8.21) with a +3 DRM.
- **DD.** Neither the MA nor CMG may fire at a target that lies within the VCA and is also at the same or a lower level than the firer [EXC: during CC]—as signified by "VCA  $\leq$  level NA" on the counter.
- EE. Although this vehicle is a carrier by name, it is not considered a Carrier (D6.8) in game terms, but is rather a normal fully-tracked OT AFV. However, it may retain any unpossessed SW aboard it (D6.4) and is always CE (D6.84).
- FF. Beginning 9/52 [EXC: 4/52 for the M46], this vehicle may be equipped with a turret-mounted Searchlight (W10.13)—but only by SSR.
- **MM.** The vehicle starts each scenario Inherently carrying a dm OML 3-in. Mortar (UN Forces Ordnance Note 16) and its ammo. This is signified on the counter by "dm  $\overline{81}$ \* MTR". For Removing and restowing the MTR, see D6.82-.83. To indicate that the MTR has been Removed, place a "SA disabled" counter on the Carrier. The MTR must be dm to be restowed.
- **NN.** As signified by "Inf Crew" on the counter, this vehicle starts each scenario manned by an Inherent *Infantry* (i.e., 2-2-8) crew. When such a crew exits its vehicle, its ID should be recorded since it differs from a normal Infantry crew by having vehicular-crew capabilities.
- TT. Due to the extra protection afforded by the dozer blade, a special +2 To Hit DRM applies to the calculation of a Direct Fire *front-hull* hit vs a Dozer unless the firer is at least one full level higher than the target. This is signified by "+2 for HH" on the counter. See G15.13 for tankdozer usage.
- UU. When present, "(a)" in the piece name stands for "American" for ESB (D2.5), Scrounging/Removal (A25.35), Hammada Immobilization (F3.31), and Sand Bog (F7.31) purposes.
- **ZZ.** This AFV has both a sD and a sM. The owning player may make a usage attempt (D13.2) for either (but not for both) during a Player Turn, after declaring which one he will attempt to fire. All other Smoke Dispenser rules also apply unchanged.

UN Forces Ordnance Notes

#### UN FORCES ORDNANCE NOTES

#### U.S./ROK/OUNC ORDNANCE NOTES

American ordnance, fire control, and artillery doctrine in WW2 were generally excellent and were used with few changes in the Korean War. The U.S. Army lost large quantities of artillery pieces during 1950 when infantry units crumbled, leaving their artillery units to be surrounded and infiltrated by the KPA and later in the year by the CPVA. Throughout the war, the combination of difficult terrain and primitive infrastructure made it difficult to supply field artillery units with sufficient ammunition.

The ROK Army had only a trivial artillery capability in 1950, and the KMC had none at all. When the ROK military was rebuilt starting in 1951, it was equipped with field artillery weapons according to the U.S. model, with three 105mm and one 155mm howitzer battalion per division. Throughout the war, American non-divisional artillery battalions supported not only American forces but also ROK and other United Nations contin-

OUNC contingents in the Korean War were infantry units, generally equipped with the same quantity and types of crew-served weapons as their U.S. Army counterparts. OUNC had very limited field artillery.





1. Type 89 Heavy Grenade Launcher: At the close of the WW2, stockpiles of Japanese small arms were confiscated by the Allied forces then occupying the Korean peninsula. While the ROK

Army became equipped along U.S. Army lines, the fledgling KMC had to scrounge for every weapon it could lay its hands on until re-equipped by the U.S.M.C. in the run up to the Inchon landing. The KMC was initially armed with Japanese rifles, light machine guns, and the Type 89 Japanese "knee mortar" (Japanese Ordnance Note 1). Once the KMC was rearmed along U.S.M.C. lines in August 1950, this weapon was replaced with the U.S. M2 mortar (UN Forces Ordnance Note 23).

† At a range of ≤ two hexes, the ROF is lowered to "1" for that shot and Air Bursts are NA.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes A. P.









2. M2 4.2-in. Mortar: During WW2, the U.S. Army assigned its 4.2-inch mortars (U.S. Ordnance Note 4) to chemical mortar companies, whose primary mission was offensive chemical warfare. Since chemical weapons were not used in WW2, the chemical mortar companies were employed for fire support. By the Korean War, the U.S. Army replaced its regimental cannon company with a heavy mortar company that had three

platoons each with four 4.2-inch mortars. In addition to the regimental heavy mortar companies, the independent 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion (redesignated the 461st Infantry Battalion (Heavy Mortar) on 22 January 1953) had 24 4.2-inch mortars. The U.S.M.C. infantry regiment was similarly equipped. The typical ROK Army infantry regiment had only a platoon of four 4.2-inch mortars until the last year of the war. The KMC fielded a company of 12 of these weapons, and their first fire missions took place in October 1951 in the "Punchbowl." Starting in 1952, the WW2vintage M2 was partially replaced by the M30. This counter also represents the M30 4.2-in. mortar, which first entered U.S. service (only) in 6/52; the M30 mortar has a maximum range of 170 hexes.

† This mortar fired an exceptionally potent round for its caliber; therefore, its Area Target Type FP is "12" (rather than "8"). This is signified by "12 Area FP" on the counter.

† RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.3 for 7/50, 1.2 for 8/50, and 1.1 thereafter; for U.S.M.C., they are 1.2 for 8/50-53; for ROKA, they are 1.5 for 7-12/51, 1.4 for 1-6/52, and 1.3 thereafter; for KMC, they are 1.3 for 10/51-53; for OUNC, they are 1.2 for 10/51-53.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes K, M, O, P, Y.





3. M3A1 37mm AT Gun: After WW2, the U.S. military quickly retired its towed antitank guns that had been inadequate as far back as 1944. As of 20 August 1949, the ROK Army had 21 M3A1 37mm AT guns

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(U.S. Ordnance Note 6). The KMC received four of these AT guns in the spring of 1950.

† RF and Dates for ROKA are 1.4 for 6/50, 1.5 for 7/50, and 1.6 for 8-9/50; for KMC, they are 1.6 for 6-7/50.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes C, K, P.





4. M1 57mm AT Gun: As of 20 August 1949, the ROK Army had 117 M1 57mm AT guns (U.S. Ordnance Note 7) in its inventory. In theory, each 1950 ROK Army infantry regiment had an anti-tank company

with six M1s, which proved to be nearly useless against KPA T-34/85s.

† RF are 1.4 for 6/50, 1.5 for 7/50, and 1.6 for 8-9/50.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Note K.







5. M18(L) 57mm Recoilless Rifle: Although rare in WW2, by 1950 the M18 (U.S. Ordnance Note 10) was standard issue within the U.S. Army. Each rifle company had a section of three 57mm recoilless rifles in its weapons platoon. The U.S.M.C. did not use the M18. The ROK Army did not receive it until after its units were rebuilt following the shattering defeats of early

1950. The M18 was ineffectual against the T-34/85 but had some value when used against buildings and light fortifications.

† In KW scenarios, the M18(L) is not considered a crew-served weapon (A21.13; C12.2) [EXC: Early KW ROK; W3.11].

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes C, K, O.









6. M2A1 105mm Howitzer: The outstanding M2A1 105mm howitzer from WW2 (U.S. Ordnance Note 14) remained in service in the Korean War, with three field artillery battalions in each U.S. Army, U.S.M.C., and rebuilt ROK Army division. Whereas in WW2 each battalion had three firing batteries of four howitzers, in Korea the batteries each had six. The 647th Airborne Field Artillery Battalion, 187th Air-

borne Regimental Combat Team also used the M2A1 (with 12 in the battalion, increased to 18 in 1953). The paratroopers switched from the M1A1 75mm pack howitzer (U.S. Ordnance Note 12) to the larger M2A1 because by the time of the Korean War, the C-119 "Flying Boxcar" cargo aircraft could transport and airdrop it. The KMC 1st Artillery Battalion had two batteries equipped with M2A1s, which executed their first fire missions in January 1952. The only OUNC field artillery units were a battery of M2A1s in the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK) 10th Battalion Combat Team (Motorized) and a battalion of M2A1s in the Turkish Brigades that rotated through Korea.

† RF and Dates for U.S. are 1.3 for 7/50 [EXC: U.S. Army only], 1.2 for 8-9/50, 1.1 for 10/50, 1.3 for 11-12/50, 1.2 for 1/51, and 1.1 thereafter; for ROKA, they are 1.4 for 7-12/51 and 1.3 thereafter; for KMC they are 1.4 for 1952-53; for OUNC, they are 1.4 for 10/50-53.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes C, K, M, O, P, Y.





7. M3 105mm Howitzer: In WW2, the M3 105mm howitzer (U.S. Ordnance Note 15) equipped the cannon companies of U.S. Army infantry regiments. By the Korean War, cannon companies had been replaced by



## Ordnance 9

#### UN FORCES ORDNANCE LISTING

#*	Name	Туре	CSize	ROF (IFE)	В#	Range	M#	TSize	Dates	Special	BPV	RF	Notes
U.S./R	OK/OUNC												
-/2/-/-	Type 89 Heavy Grenade Launcher	MTR	50*	2†	11	1-16	_		6-7/50	4PP	-	_	1†, A, P
Y/2/2/-	M2 4.2-in. Mortar	MTR	107*†	2	11	14-100	10	+1	7/50-53†	NT, QSU, WP10	26	1.1-1.5†	2†, K, M, O, P, Y
-/2/-/-	M3A1 37mm AT Gun	AT	37LL	2		292	12	+1	6-9/50†	NT, QSU, C7	30	1.4-1.6†	3†, C, K, P
-/3/-/-	M1 57mm AT Gun	AT	57L	3		247	10	+1	6-9/50	NT, QSU, HE7, D4	33	1.4-1.6†	4†, K
6/2/2/-	M18(L) 57mm Recoilless Rifle	RCL	57	1	11	110	=	-	7/50-53	3PP, H7, WP6, C7, non-crewed†	-	_	5†, C, K, O
Y/2/2/-	M2A1 105mm Howitzer	ART	105	1		286	7	0	7/50-53†	NT, H6, s7, WP8, C7	34	1.1-1.4†	6†, C, K, M, O, P, Y
-/2/-/-	M3 105mm Howitzer	ART	105*	1		166	10	0	6-9/50	NT, H7, s7, WP8, C7	35	1.4-1.6†	7†, C, K
Y/2/-/-	M1 155mm Howitzer	ART	155			372	3	-1	7/50-53†	NT, s7, WP8	40	1.2-1.5†	8†, K, M, P, Y
Y/-/-/-	M1A1 155mm Gun	ART	155L			584	-3	-1	52-53	NT, RFNM, AP4, s7, WP8, no IF	34	1.5	9, Y
Y/-/-/-	M1 8-in. Howitzer	ART	203			421	-4	-1	9/50-53	NT, RFNM, no IF	36	1.6-1.5†	10†, Y
Y/-/-/-	M51 Multiple 50-cal MG Carriage	AA	12.7	3 (24)		†	9	0	7/50-53†	T,4 TK DR†, LF [2 ROF, 20 IFE, B11]	51	1.5	11†, M, Y
Y/-/-/-	M1 40mm AA Gun	AA	40L	3 (8)		247	8	0	7/50-53	T, LF [40†, 2 ROF]	40	1.5	12, B†, Y
Y/-/-/-	M2 90mm AA Gun	AA	90L	2		454	-3	-1	7/50-53†	T, LF [90†1, 1 ROF, B11]	53	1.5	13†, B†¹, M, Y
BRITIS	SH COMMONWEALTH FO	RCES	KOR	EA									
-/-/N	OML 2-in. Mortar	MTR	51	2		2-11	-	-	9/50-53	4PP, s7, IR	-		14, A, N
-/-/-2	M19 60mm Mortar	MTR	60*	2	11	2-18	-	-	51	4PP, WP6, IR	_	_	15, A, R
-/-/-4	OML 3-in. Mortar	MTR	81*	2		3-63	11	+1	9/50-53	NT, QSU, s8, WP7, IR	30	1.0	16, A
-/-/N	OSB 4.2-in. Mortar	MTR	107*	2		24-98	10†	+1	11/50-53	NT, s8, WP7, Towed†	21	1.4	17†, N
-/-/N	OQF 17-Pounder	AT	76LL	2		263	6	0	11/50-53	NT, HE8, D6	41	1.5	18, N
-/-/N	OQF 25-Pounder	ART	88	1		335	8	0	11/50-53†	ST, s8, LF [NT, 0 ROF]	42	1.2	19†, N
-/-/N	OQF 40mm AA	AA	40L	3 (8)		247	8	0	11/50-53	T, LF [40†, 2 ROF]	40	1.5	20, B†, N
COMN	ION												
Y/3/-/2	M9A1 Rocket Launcher				X11	5	_	-	6/50-53	1PP, WP6	-	_	21, K, R, Y
8/4/4/4	M20 Rocket Launcher	_			X11	5	-	-	7/50-53	1PP, WP6 <sup>2+</sup> †	-	_	22†, K, M, O, P, R
Y/4/4/4	M2 60mm Mortar	MTR	60*	3		3-45		-	6/50-53	5PP, WP7, IR, OBA†	-	_	23†, A, K, M, O, P, Y
4/4/3/4	M1(L) 81mm Mortar	MTR	81*	3		3-75	11	+1	6/50-53†	NT, QSU, WP8, IR	30	1.4-1.0†	24†, A, K, M, O, P, R
6/2/2/2	M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle	RCL	75	1		160	-		7/50-53†	5PP, H†, WP7, crewed†	39	1.4-1.2†	25†, K, M, O, P, R

<sup>\*</sup> In the "#" column, U.S./ROK/OUNC/BCFK #s are shown in the format a/b/c/d respectively, with a "Y" entry indicating that U.S. counters are provided in YANKS and "N" that BCFK counters are provided in FOR KING AND COUNTRY.

regimental heavy mortar companies. The M3 only saw service in the Korean War with the ROK Army, which had 85 in its inventory on 20 August 1949. In 1950, there were five battalions of these howitzers in the ROK Army, each organized into three firing batteries of five howitzers each. The 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions each had a battalion of the howitzers. A sixth battalion was being formed when the war began. Many of these weapons were quickly lost as the ROK Army retreated in early 1950, and again in late 1950.

† RF are 1.4 for 6/50, 1.5 for 7/50, and 1.6 for 8-9/50.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes C, K.



Limbered



**8.** M1 155mm Howitzer: Renowned for its powerful shell and high accuracy, the M1 155mm howitzer (U.S. Ordnance Note 18) was yet another WW2 veteran used in the Korean War. Each U.S. Army, U.S.M.C., and

late-war ROK Army division had one battalion of M1s, consisting of three batteries with six howitzers each. Some non-divisional Field Artillery Battalions were equipped with the M1 and assigned to corps-level field artillery groups, which were used in a general support role. The KMC 1st Artillery

Battalion had two batteries, which first appeared in combat in January 1952.

- $\dagger$  The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines used unarmored bulldozers (G15.11) to tow their Ml howitzers. In scenarios where this unit is assigned bulldozers, they have a Towing Number (D1.5) of T3.
- † RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.4 for 7/50, 1.3 for 8-9/50, 1.2 for 10/50, 1.4 for 11-12/50, 1.3 for 1/51, and 1.2 thereafter; for U.S.M.C., they are 1.3 for 9/50-53; for ROKA, they are 1.5 for 7-12/51 and 1.4 thereafter; for KMC, they are 1.5 for 1952-53.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes K, M, P, Y.





**9. M1A1 155mm Gun:** Having become the standard U.S. heavy artillery weapon in WW2, the "Long Tom" M1A1 (U.S. Ordnance Note 20) and the improved M2 (equivalent in game terms) were quickly called

upon for use in Korea. They equipped at least one non-divisional Field Artillery Battalion, which was organized into three batteries with four weapons each. The M4 High Speed Tractor was generally used as their prime mover, and the M1A1 took about 20-30 minutes to unlimber.

See also UN Forces Note Y.







10. M1 8-in. Howitzer: One of WW2's most accurate long-range artillery pieces, the 8-in. howitzer (U.S. Ordnance Note 21) was built on the same carriage as the Long Tom and was also organized into batteries of four

weapons. In Korea, they equipped some non-divisional Field Artillery Battalions with three batteries each. They also used the M4 High Speed Tractor as prime movers, and it took about 30-60 minutes to unlimber the M1 8-in. under normal conditions.

† RF are 1.6 for 9-12/50 and 1.5 thereafter.

See also UN Forces Note Y.





11. M51 Multiple 50-cal MG Carriage: The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was the only American maneuver unit to have towed AAA weapons. Non-divisional U.S. Army AAA(AW) battalions had four

batteries each with eight towed quad .50-cal MG Carriages (U.S. Ordnance Note 22) and the 1st AAA Gun Battalion, 1st Marine Air Wing also had the weapon. These units defended fixed rear area installations such as airfields.

- † Make four To Kill DR when using the 12.7 column of the AP To Kill Table; only one DR (firer's choice) is used.
- † Maximum range for To Hit purposes (A9.61) is 16 hexes—as signified by "[16]TH" on the counter.
- † U.S.M.C. use is 9/51-53.

See also UN Forces Notes M, Y.





12. M1 40mm AA Gun: The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was the only American maneuver unit to have towed AAA weapons. Non-divisional AAA(AW) battalions had four batteries each with eight towed

M1 40mm AA guns (U.S. Ordnance Note 24). These units defended fixed rear area installations such as airfields.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes B, Y.





13. M2 90mm AA Gun: As was the case with all American AAA weapons used in the Korean War, the M2 90mm AA gun (U.S. Ordnance Note 27) was a veteran of WW2. Each non-divisional AAA Gun battalion had

four gun batteries, each with four M2s and four towed quad 50-cal MG mounts. Like the non-divisional AAA(AW) battalions, the AAA Gun battalions defended rear area targets, although the 90mm guns were occasionally used in the field artillery role. The 1st AAA Gun Battalion, 1st Marine Air Wing was assigned 12 of these guns to defend its airbases, with some pieces later being shifted to island batteries off the west coast.

† U.S.M.C. use is 9/51-53.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes B, M, Y.

## BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES KOREA ORDNANCE NOTES

Each of the three British/Commonwealth brigades in Korea had an artillery regiment armed with 25-pounder weapons. When the 1st Commonwealth Division was formed in July 1951 as a parent formation for the three brigades, the three regiments were transferred from the brigades to the divisional artillery. American corps-level field artillery units provided heavy artillery support to British/Commonwealth units.





**14. OML 2-in. Mortar:** Having performed well in WW2, the 2-inch mortar (British Ordnance Note 1) continued to provide fire support for British and Australian rifle platoons in Korea,

with its ability to fire smoke helping offset its short range. The Canadians generally preferred their M2 60mm mortars, but usually also had a 2-in

mortar in each rifle company for when a lighter mortar was useful for firing smoke and illuminating rounds. The absence of parachute infantry no doubt accounts for the Airborne version not being used in Korea.

See UN Forces Ordnance Notes A, N.





**15. M19 60mm Mortar:** Beginning in 1951, the Royal Marines used American M19 60mm mortars (U.S. Ordnance Note 2) without the bipod. These had a longer range than the 2-inch mortar,

while retaining the reduced weight important for the RM raiding mission.

See UN Forces Ordnance Notes A, R (only).





**16. OML 3-in. Mortar:** Like their late-war WW2 counterparts, British and Australian infantry battalions in the Korean War had a mortar platoon with six OML 3-in. mortars (British Ordnance Note 2).

These counters can be used in WW2 scenarios set after August 1942; prior to then, these counters can be used after making the appropriate adjustments to range and IR availability per British Ordnance Note 2. As discussed in ASL JOURNAL 7, the correct Caliber Size of these guns is 81mm, not the 76mm indicated by the name "3-in." and originally assigned to them.

See UN Forces Ordnance Note A.





**17. OSB 4.2-in. Mortar:** The 170 Independent Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery (originally assigned to the 29th Brigade) had three troops of three 4.2-inch mortars (British Ordnance Note 3), as did (begin-

ning July 1951) the 11 (Sphinx) Independent Battery, Royal Artillery. The heavy HE load and high trajectory of the 4.2-inch made it especially useful in the hills of Korea.

† The 42-in. is towed by a vehicle—not carried in it like other 107mm mortars (C10.1 and footnote C26)—as signified by "Towed" on the counter.

See UN Forces Ordnance Note N.





**18. OQF 17-Pounder:** BCFK infantry battalions officially had AT platoons with six 17-pounder AT guns (British Ordnance Note 8). In Korea, the guns were unwieldy and had few suitable targets, so the platoon was

often eliminated, with the soldiers and towing vehicles being used for other duties. During the static war, these guns were occasionally used as field artillery and as bunker busters.

See UN Forces Ordnance Note N.






**19. OQF 25-Pounder:** The WW2-era 25-pdr Mk II gun/howitzer (British Ordnance Note 13) remained the mainstay of British and Commonwealth field artillery in the Korean War. Each regiment had three batteries

of eight weapons each, with each battery divided into two four-gun troops. The 25-pounder equipped 16 Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery; 45 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, which was relieved first by 14 Field Regiment and then by 20 Field Regiment; and 2 Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, which was relieved first by 1 Regiment and then by 81 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery.

† Canadian use is 5/51-53.

See UN Forces Ordnance Note N.







20. OQF 40mm AA: The Bofors 40mm AA gun (British Ordnance Note 21) provided defense against nearly non-existent Communist air strikes, so it soon became obvious that the Bofors was very effective in the

ground role. There were several occasions when the guns were so used, including at Imjin with the 11 (Sphinx) Independent Battery Troop, which reorganized into three troops each of three 4.2-inch mortars and one troop of six Bofors in July 1951. The 42 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, Royal Artillery and 120 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, Royal Artillery also fielded Bofors; in 1952, both batteries were assigned to 61 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery.

See UN Forces Ordnance Notes B, N.

#### **COMMON ORDNANCE NOTES**

Unlike the ROK and the OUNC, who used only American ordnance, the BCFK had their own British-built ordnance. Even so, all BCFK components, not just the Canadians, used American pieces as well. Listed here are those Common Ordnance pieces used both by the BCFK and the American, ROK, and OUNC forces.



₩P6

21. M9A1 Rocket Launcher: Both the U.S. and ROK Armies used the 2.36-inch bazooka when the war broke out, as did the Royal Marines. In combat, it proved to be generally ineffective against the T-34/85 tanks of the KPA. The M6A3 rockets did not have particularly good penetration due their small diameter, degradation from having been stored since WW2, and poorly-trained U.S.

Army troops that were not proficient in their use. After the M20A1 bazooka replaced the M9A1 as the infantry's primary light anti-tank weapon, many of the latter were retained for use against emplacements and to fire its M10 WP (white phosphorus) rockets. Each U.S. Army rifle platoon was equipped with one bazooka.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes K, R (only), Y.



22. M20 Rocket Launcher: In 1945, a 3.5-inch version of the bazooka was introduced with much greater armor penetration capability, but it did not see service in WW2 and was barely deployed in the lean years that followed. After the 2.36-inch bazooka proved to be generally ineffective, the 3.5-inch bazooka was rushed to Korea and first saw combat in late July 1950. When the 1st Provi-



sional Marine Brigade landed in the Pusan perimeter in August 1950, it was already armed with the 3.5-inch bazooka. Initially, the only ammunition for the M20 was the M28A2 anti-tank rocket, but the M30 white phosphorus rocket was later de-

ployed. All BCFK units also used the M20. The 3.5-inch "super bazooka" proved effective against the T-34/85 and remained in American service into the Vietnam War era.

† WP6 becomes available for the M20 in 1952—as signified by the superscript "2+" on the counter.

ERRATA: BAZ 50 HEAT has a Basic TK# of "32".


See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes K, M, O, P, R.














Note 2) with conventional baseplate and bipod, and this counter represents both weapons.

† The M2 had a longer range than most light mortars because its primary role was not as a "direct support" weapon for the

platoon/company, but rather as the company's on-call "OBA". Therefore, for every three M2 mortars (of the same nationality) the UN player receives in his OB, he may exchange those three for a radio (or field phone) and a 4-FP OBA battery that can fire only HE/WP Concentrations/IR. This battery receives the -2 Radio Contact Maintenance DRM of C1.22, and uses the standard (A25.33; C1.211) Access draw pile of the nationality [EXC: if the UN force is suffering from Ammo Shortage, this battery has Scarce Ammo]. When used as OBA, the M2 is treated as having a maximum range of 40 hexes, which is counted from the center road hex of the UN player's Friendly Board Edge (i.e., as per B11.42). An AR/SR/FFE counter of this OBA cannot be placed/Corrected beyond this range of 40 hexes, and any direction/extent-of-error dr that would place such a counter beyond this range is void and must be rerolled. If the UN force has no Friendly Board Edge, or all hexes of its Friendly Board Edge are OCEAN (G13.12) hexes, or any of the three mortars enters as a reinforcement [EXC: if all three mortars enter on the same turn and non-OCEAN edge of the playing area, they may be exchanged at the start of the Player Turn], this OBA option cannot be used.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes A, K, M, O, P, Y.









WP8

USO





mortars in lieu of the British 3-inch version. This counter also represents the M29 81mm mortar, which first entered U.S. service (only) in 6/52; the M29 mortar with a BPV of 33 has a maximum range of 110 hexes, a Manhandling Number (C2.27) of 12, and a 360° mount with Slow Turret Traverse (C2.3; D1.32).

24. M1(L) 81mm Mortar: Just as the M2

60mm mortar provided organic fire support

for the rifle company, so did the M1 81mm mortar (U.S. Ordnance Note 3) for the in-

† RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.2 for 7/50, 1.1 for 8/50, and 1.0 thereafter; for U.S.M.C., they are 1.0 for 8/50-53; for ROKA, they are 1.4 for 6/50, 1.2 for 7/50, 1.1 for 8/50, and 1.0 thereafter; for KMC, they are 1.0 for 1951-53; for OUNC they are 1.0 for 9/50-53; for Canada, they are 1.0 for 11/50-53; for Royal Marine Commandos, they are 1.3 for 10/51-52.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes A, K, M, O, P, R.



d 1





25. M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle: Another WW2 rarity, by the Korean War the M20 (U.S. Ordnance Note 11) had completely replaced the towed M1 57mm AT gun as the standard battalion-level infantry anti-tank weapon in American service. The Heavy Weapons company of a U.S. Army infantry battalion had a platoon of four M20s, as did the ROK Army infantry battalion



after they were rebuilt later in the war. The U.S.M.C. infantry regiment had an anti-tank company with 12 M20s. The KMC received their M20s in August 1951. The combination of M20 bazooka and M20(L) gave the American infantryman portable,



easily concealed, and lethal options to defend against KPA T-34/85 tanks. The Canadians used the M20 recoilless rifle as a battalion-level AT weapon rather than the 17-pounder AT guns that they brought to Korea, although there is no evidence that they actually used them against any AFVs. The British and Australians also adopted this weapon.

- † The M20(L) requires a crew (C12.2) or two SMC (C12.21) in order to be used without penalty—as signified by "crew" on the counter. See A15.23 for hero usage. The BPV of this weapon includes a crew as per H1.3.
- † In KW scenarios, HEAT fired by the M20(L) is not subject to C8.9 Depletion—as signified by "∞H" on the counter.
- † RF and Dates for U.S. Army are 1.4 for 7/50, 1.3 for 8/50, and 1.2 thereafter; for U.S.M.C., they are 1.2 for 8/50-53; for ROKA, they are 1.4 for 7-12/51, 1.3 for 1-6/52, and 1.2 thereafter; for KMC they are 1.4 for 8/51-53; for OUNC they are 1.2 for 9/50-53; for BCFK [EXC: RM] they are 1.2 for 11/50-53; for Royal Marine Commandos, they are 1.3 for 10/51-52.

See also UN Forces Ordnance Notes K, M, O, P, R.

#### UN FORCES MULTI-APPLICABLE ORDNANCE NOTES

A. This weapon may be Animal-Packed (G10.).

B. When using Limbered Fire, the Barrel Length modification (C4.1) on the counter's LF side is used for To Hit purposes; the Basic To Kill number, however, is still determined using the Caliber Size and Length printed on the unlimbered side.

H

C. 37mm canister has 12 FP and 105mm canister has 24 FP; see C8.4.

ERRATA: 57mm canister has 16 FP.

K. Used by ROK Army forces in KW scenarios.

M. Used by the U.S.M.C. in KW scenarios.

N. The British-colored counter is provided in FOR KING AND COUN-TRY, but the Ordnance Listing and Notes herein apply in all cases.

O. Used by one or more OUNC contingents in KW scenarios.

**P.** Used by the Korean Marine Corps in KW scenarios.

R. Used by Royal Marine Commando forces in KW scenarios.

Y. The U.S.-colored counter is provided in YANKS, but the Ordnance Listing and Notes herein apply in all cases.

		E3. KOREAN WAR V	VEATHER CHART			
7	This table is used instead	of the E3. DYO Temperate	Weather Chart for scenario	os taking place in Korea.		
Final dr†	Mar, April, May	Jun, Jul, Aug	Sep, Oct, Nov	Dec, Jan, Feb	Month	drm
≤1	Mud	Overcast	Overcast	Mud	Feb	-2
2	Fog/Mist*	Rain	Overcast & Gusty	Falling Snow	Mar, Sep	-1
3	Wet	Rain	Clear	Ground Snow	May, Aug, Nov	+1
4	Clear	Rain & Mud	Clear & Gusty	Ground Snow & Falling Snow	Jan	+2
5	Clear	Heavy Rain	Dry	Extreme Winter**	Dec	+3
6	Clear	Heavy Rain & Mud	Very Dry	Extreme Winter**		

Ground Snow

Overcast † +1 drm if the scenario is set in North Korea.

\* Make a dr per E3.3.

≥7

\*\* Make a dr on the Extreme Winter Chart.

Extreme Thaw may be specified by SSR as being in effect in March or November (W.4).

Heavy Rain & Gusty

EX	TREME WINTER CHART								
dr	Condition								
1	Falling Snow								
2 Ground Snow									
3	Ground Snow								
4	Ground Snow								
5	Ground Snow & Falling Snow								
6	Deep Snow								

		KW DYO scenario.		
Final dr	EC	EC DRM/drm	Month	drm
≤ 0	Snow	-3	Mar	-2
1	Mud	-3	Apr	-1
2	Wet	-2	Oct	+1
3	Moist	-1	Nov	+2
4	Moderate	0		
5	Dry	+1		


+2

Extreme Winter\*\*

**B25.5 KOREAN WAR EC CHART** 

≥ 6

Very Dry








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VT3C aAPC [U.S.M.C.]																														LVT3C aAPC [U.S.M.C.]	
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129 Weasel PC [U.S. Army]	70																													M29 Weasel PC [U.S. Army]	
//29 Weasel <i>PC</i> [U.S.M.C.]																														M29 Weasel PC [U.S.M.C.]	
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ACP Jeep trv [U.S.M.C.]		$\top$																												TACP Jeep trv [U.S.M.C.]	
½-Ton tr [U.S. Army] *																														7½-Ton tr [U.S. Army] *	
Searchlight Truck trv [U.S. Army]																														Searchlight Truck trv [U.S. Army]	
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-Ton Lorry tr†																														3-Ton Lorry tr†	
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I3A1 ht [ROKA]				N PARTY N	apidan Si	MISSE IN		or other contract of	DAYS BE	1073 650			1000000	oral period	MICHAEL E.		ONL SEPZINI	Ayrick Street, St.	SANGER COL	100000000000000000000000000000000000000	W SAIL	50/845 EX	\$160 (\$25.5K)	is posterior	MARKET AND	mie skapači	ALIES SALE	MODEL OF SE	AND PROPERTY.	M3A1 ht [ROKA]	
//3A1 ht [Canada]		01511E	7 17 17 17 17			+	+		67					380	Signal of			Me A										800		M3A1 ht [Canada]	

<sup>\*</sup> Provided in YANKS. † Provided in FOR KING AND COUNTRY.






<sup>\*</sup> Provided in YANKS. † Provided in FOR KING AND COUNTRY



NAME			19	50								951										1952								1953				NAME
	J	J	A S	0	N	D	J	F	M	A N	1 J	J	A	S	0	N D	) ]	F	M	A I	M J	J	A	S	0	N	D J	F	M	Α	M .	J J		
M2 4.2-in. Mortar [U.S. Army] *																																		M2 4.2-in. Mortar [U.S. Army] *
M2 4.2-in. Mortar [U.S.M.C.] *																																		//2 4.2-in. Mortar [U.S.M.C.] *
M2 4.2-in. Mortar [ROKA]																																	200	M2 4.2-in. Mortar [ROKA]
M2 4.2-in. Mortar [KMC]																																		M2 4.2-in. Mortar [KMC]
M2 4.2-in. Mortar [OUNC]																																		M2 4.2-in. Mortar [OUNC]
M3A1 37mm AT Gun [ROKA]										T	Т						T										T	T					N	M3A1 37mm AT Gun [ROKA]
M3A1 37mm AT Gun [KMC]																											T							M3A1 37mm AT Gun [KMC]
W1 57mm AT Gun [ROKA]																																		M1 57mm AT Gun [ROKA]
M2A1 105mm Howitzer [U.S. Army] *																																	N	M2A1 105mm Howitzer [U.S. Army] *
M2A1 105mm Howitzer [U.S.M.C.] *																	T																N	M2A1 105mm Howitzer [U.S.M.C.] *
M2A1 105mm Howitzer [ROKA]		T	T								T	No.																					N	M2A1 105mm Howitzer [ROKA]
M2A1 105mm Howitzer [KMC]											T																						N	M2A1 105mm Howitzer [KMC]
M2A1 105mm Howitzer [OUNC]																																	N	M2A1 105mm Howitzer [OUNC]
M3 105mm Howitzer [ROKA]																																	N	M3 105mm Howitzer [ROKA]
M1 155mm Howitzer [U.S. Army] *																																	N	M1 155mm Howitzer [U.S. Army] *
M1 155mm Howitzer [U.S.M.C.] *																	T																N	M1 155mm Howitzer [U.S.M.C.] *
M1 155mm Howitzer [ROKA]																																	N	M1 155mm Howitzer [ROKA]
M1 155mm Howitzer [KMC]		$\top$		+							$\top$	BANG 100	1 Lineau and	in and a second																			V	M1 155mm Howitzer [KMC]
M1A1 155mm Gun [U.S. Army] *		$\top$									+				$\top$	1																	N	M1A1 155mm Gun [U.S. Army] *
M1 8-in. Howitzer [U.S. Army] *		$\top$																															N	M1 8-in. Howitzer [U.S. Army] *
M51 Multiple .50-cal MG Carriage [U.S. Army] *																																	N	M51 Multiple .50-cal MG Carriage [U.S. Army]
M51 Multiple .50-cal MG Carriage [U.S.M.C.] *											and some		DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON OF T																				N	M51 Multiple .50-cal MG Carriage [U.S.M.C.]
M1 40mm AA Gun [U.S. Army] *																																	2000	//1 40mm AA Gun [U.S. Army] *
VI2 90mm AA Gun [U.S. Army] *																																	N	M2 90mm AA Gun [U.S. Army] *
M2 90mm AA Gun [U.S.M.C.] *	- 100	20000	EDING MAKES	DO WAS ES		1			1100 100	emi emi	ani tang	1000000	ELECTRICAL PROPERTY.				+										1						DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON NAMED IN	M2 90mm AA Gun [U.S.M.C.] *
OML 3-in. Mortar	_	+						726																									1000	OML 3-in. Mortar
OSB 4.2-in. Mortar †	$\top$	+	910																														O	OSB 4.2-in. Mortar †
OQF 17-Pounder †	_	$\top$	+	_																													O	OQF 17-Pounder †
OQF 25-Pounder [EXC: Canada] †	$\top$	+	+	+																														OQF 25-Pounder [EXC: Canada] †
OQF 25-Pounder [Canada] †	_	+		+	200520	200000		33003	35.9 193																									OQF 25-Pounder [Canada] †
DQF 40mm AA †	$\top$	+	+	+																														OQF 40mm AA †
M1(L) 81mm Mortar [U.S. Army]					200200																						+						1202	M1(L) 81mm Mortar [U.S. Army]
M1(L) 81mm Mortar [U.S.M.C.]	- 8								+	-					+	+				+			-			+	+					+	SEC. 01993	M1(L) 81mm Mortar [U.S.M.C.]
M1(L) 81mm Mortar [ROKA]																											+							M1(L) 81mm Mortar [ROKA]
M1(L) 81mm Mortar [KMC]	oszak (o				6556																						+							M1(L) 81mm Mortar [KMC]
M1(L) 81mm Mortar [OUNC]	+	+							+											+			+			1	+			+		+	and the same	M1(L) 81mm Mortar [OUNC]
M1(L) 81mm Mortar [Canada]	+	-	200					+	+											+							+					+		M1(L) 81mm Mortar [Canada]
M1(L) 81mm Mortar [RM]	+	+	+																EXTENS 2					0.5	NAME OF		-	0,70			107	100		M1(L) 81mm Mortar [RM]
(-) C. T.				0	1000	02118	19000	1000			54 (10)	10 10 1	1889	020612	2000	100							1					1						

<sup>\*</sup> Provided in YANKS. † Provided in FOR KING AND COUNTRY.



UN FORCES ORDNANC	E	R	A	R	IT	Y	F	40	T	O	R	C	H	A	27	_						.9	9			0.1			1.1			1.2	[		1.3	1.4 1.5 1.6	
NAME			1	1950								1	951											1952								19	53			NAME	
NAME	J	J	Α	S	0	N	D	J	FN	I A	M	J	J	A	S	0	N	D	J	F	M	A N	1	J	A	S	0	N	D	J	F	M	A N	I J	J	NAME	
M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [U.S. Army]																																				M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [U.S. Army]	
M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [U.S.M.C.]																																				M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [U.S.M.C.]	
M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [ROKA]						T	T				Τ	Τ																								M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [ROKA]	
M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [KMC]																																				M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [KMC]	
M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [OUNC]																																				M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [OUNC]	
M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [BCFK] [EXC: RM]					200																															M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [BCFK] [EXC: RM]	
M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [RM]							T																										T			M20(L) 75mm Recoilless Rifle [RM]	
NAME	J	J	Α	S	0	N	D	J	FN	I A	M	J	J	A	S	0	N	D	J	F	M	A N	η,	J	A	S	0	N	D	J	F	M /	A IV	J	J	J	
IVAIVIE			1	1950			$\perp$					1	951											1952					1953 NAME		IVAIVIE						



1.83 U.S	S/ROK	OUNC	SW AI	LLOTM	MENT C	CHAR	$\mathbf{T}^1$		
	LMG	MMG	HMG	.50-cal HMG	M2 LT. MTR <sup>2</sup>		M18(L) RCL	FT	DC
U.S. Army	44	10	20	13	6	55	6	36	16
Ranger	84	_	_	_	6	47	10	_	38
U.S.M.C.		4	10	20	7	87	_	36	16
# In Game	12	0	0	0	0	0/8	6	0	0
# In YANKS	0	6	6	4	6	8/0	0	4	6
Early KW ROK Army	6	12	25	20	18	109	_	-	16
ROK Army (5/51+)	44	10	20	13	6	5 <sup>5</sup>	6	36	1 <sup>6</sup>
Japanese-Armed KMC	5(j)	9(j)†		_	6(j)†	_	<u> </u>	_	-
U.SArmed KMC (8/50-1/51)	3	8†	_	_	-	_	_	_	_
U.SArmed KMC (2/51+)	3	4	10	20	7	87	-	310	110
# In Game <sup>11</sup>	8/4	6/2	6	3	4/2	3/4	4	2	6
OUNC	44	10	20	13	6	5 <sup>5</sup>	6	36	16
# In Game	8	6	6	3	4	4	2	2	6

- 1: SW allotted according to Equivalent number of squads.
- 2: Each three M2 MTRs received may be exchanged for an OBA module (see UN Forces Ordnance Note 23).
- 3: "# In Game" is shown as "BAZ 45/BAZ 50".
- 4: May substitute MMG for ≤ half of the allotted LMG.
- 5: Make a dr for each allotted BAZ on the U.S./ROK/OUNC Bazooka Table to determine the type of BAZ allotted.
- 6: Allotted according to Equivalent number of Assault Engineer squads; see 1.22.
- 8: Allotted according to Equivalent number of Ranger squads.
- 9: Make a dr for each allotted BAZ on the EARLY KW ROK ARMY Bazooka Table to determine the type of BAZ allotted. BAZ is crew-served prior to 5/51 (W3.11). For each BAZ allotted to the Early KW ROK force, replace one squad with a ROKA 2-2-7 infantry crew.
- 10: Available to KMC Assault Engineers beginning 9/51.
- 11: # after "/" represents "(j)"-type SW (allotted to pre-8/50 KMC).
- †: B#/X#/ROF penalty prior to 2/51 (W3.34). For each such Early War SW allotted, replace one squad with a KMC 2-2-8 infantry crew.
- (j): LMG(j), MMG(j), or Type 89 50mm MTR as appropriate.

	S/ROK/OUN ZOOKA TAB	
Date	BAZ 45	BAZ 50
6-7/50*	1-6	_
8/50	1-3	4-6
9/50-52	1	2-6
1953	-	1-6

1-6	
1-5	
1-3	
1	
	1-5

EARLY KW ROK ARMY **BAZOOKA TABLE BAZ 45 BAZ 50** 6 4-6 2-6


OBA A	VAI	OUNC LABILITY ART <sup>1</sup>
YEAR		10/50+
DR: BPV:	2	150+ <sup>2</sup> 248 S‡
	3	100+ 145 S*†
	4	100+ 138 W
	5	100+ 145 S*†
	6	80+ M 120 W*
	7	80+ M 120 W*
	8	80+ M 120 W*
	9	80+ M 120 W*
	10	100+ 145 S*†
	11	100+ 138 W
	12	NA
MAX. Bl	PV:	145

- 1: Only available to Filipino and Turkish forces. Other OUNC forces use U.S. Army OBA.
- 2: Uses a Draw Pile of 10B/3R (Plentiful ammo included).
- M: Battalion mortar OBA (C1.22).
- S: Can fire SMOKE.
- W: Can fire WP but not Smoke.
- †: VT available beginning 1/52 (W.7).
- ‡: VT available (W.7).
- Can fire IR (E1.93).

1.531 UN AII	R SUPPORT A	IRCRAFT TY	YPE TABLE*
Availabilit	y DR: $\leq$ 7 (+5 I	ORM for Early	KW ROK)
Date/	AII	RCRAFT TYPE	DR
FB type	1950-51	1952	1953
FB 44	2-7	2-6	2-5
FB 50	8-10	7-10	6-10
AD Skyraider	11-12	11-12	11-12

<sup>\*</sup> If Aircraft are received via the Availability DR, make a subsequent DR to determine aircraft type. All UN FB are armed with bombs or Napalm (G17.4; W8.2).

<sup>\*</sup> U.S. player can use 8/50 row beginning 7/20/50.



OML 51mm M2 60mm

LT. MTR

86

89

4

0

M19 60mm

89

2

LT. MTR

BAZ

54

54

610

2/413

#### H



6

	The state of the s		The second second second			the part of the same of the part of the same of the	THE RESERVE OF THE PARTY OF THE		
1: SW allotte	d according to	Equivalent n	umber of	squads. LM	IG/MMG/HMG	, 51mm MTR,	and DC allotm	nent #s	[EXC:
Royal Mar	ines] represen	t British-colore	ed SW from	n FKaC. M	IG(a), 60mm M	TR, and BAZ a	allotment #s rep	resent E	British-
colored, A	nerican-made	SW contained	in FORG	OTTEN W	AR.		_		

1.83 BCFK SW ALLOTMENT CHART<sup>1</sup>

6

6

MG(a)<sup>2</sup> LT. MTR

5

12

6

- <sup>2</sup>: When the BCFK is the Scenario Defender in scenarios set in/after 1/52, they receive additional British-colored 2-8 LMG, 4-10 MMG, 6-12 HMG, and .50-cal HMG. They may choose the mix of weapons, subject to the following constraints:
  - the quantity of 2-8 LMG must be greater than the quantity of 4-10 MMG; and
  - the combined quantity of 2-8 LMG and 4-10 MMG must be more than *twice* as much as the combined quantity of 6-12 HMG and .50-cal HMG.
- 3: 9/50-7/51 and 8/51+.

British, ANZAC

Canadian

Royal Marines

# In Game<sup>11</sup>

# In FKaC<sup>14</sup>

- 4: BAZ 50.
- <sup>5</sup>: Allotted according to Equivalent number of Assault Engineer squads; see 1.22.
- 6: 2-8 LMG.
- 7: 4-10 MMG.
- 8: dr 1-5: 6-12 HMG, 6: .50-cal HMG.

LMG

 $5/3^{3}$ 

 $5/3^{3}$ 

46

4

10

MMG

7

7

67

3

5

**HMG** 

11

11

138

2/212

5

- 9: M2 9-12/50; M19 in 51
- 10: Make a dr for each allotted BAZ on the U.S./ROK/OUNC Bazooka Table to determine the type of BAZ allotted.
- <sup>II</sup>: British-colored, American-made SW contained in FORGOTTEN WAR. SW from FKaC designated "(a)" are equivalent to these in every way.
- 12: HMG/.50-cal.
- 13: BAZ 45/BAZ 50.
- 14: British counters from FKaC.

1.43 UN FORCES ARMOR LEADER DRM (	CHART
NATIONALITY	DRM
Early KW U.S. Army	+2
U.S. Army, U.S.M.C.	-1
Early KW ROK Army	+3
ROK Army, KMC	+1
OUNC	+3
BCFK	-1



OBA AVA	1.5 BCFK OBA AVAILABILITY CHART						
YEAR	9/50+						
DR: 2 BPV:	100+ 140 S						
3	150+ <sup>1</sup> 248 S‡						
4	80+ M 106 S*						
5	80+ M 106 S*						
6	80+ M 106 S*						
7	80+ 115 s*†						
8	80+ 115 s*†						
9	100+ 140 S						
10	100+ <sup>1</sup> 165 S*‡						
11	80+ 115 s*†						
12	200+ <sup>1</sup> 355 ‡						
MAX. BPV:	355						

- Uses a Draw Pile of 10B/3R (Plentiful ammo included).
- M: Battalion mortar OBA (C1.22).
- S: Can fire SMOKE.
- s: Can fire Smoke.
- †: VT available beginning 1/52 (W.7).
- ‡: VT available (W.7).
- \*: Can fire IR (E1.93).

1	1.28 UN FORCES ELR CHART									
TIMEFRAME/ NATIONALITY	6/50-8/50	9/50-4/51	5/51-10/51	11/51-7/53						
U.S. Army	2	3	3	3						
KATUSA	·	2	2	3						
ROK Army	2†	2	3	3						
OUNC	<u> </u>	4	4	4						
BCFK	_	4	4	4						

<sup>†</sup> Also applies to ROK Army prior to 6/50.



#### 1.5 U.S./ROKA **OBA AVAILABILITY** CHART1 YEAR 6/50 +DR: 2 $100 + R^2$ BPV: 66 † $200+^{2}$ 3 355 † 100 +4 153 W $80 + M^3$ 5 134 W\* $80 + M^3$ 6 134 W\* 150 +7 248 S† $100 + ^3$ 8 165 S\*† 9 100 +153 W 10 100 + 3165 S\*† $200+^{2}$ 11 355 † $80 + M^3$ 12 134 W\* MAX. BPV: 355

- 1: All BPV are for Plentiful Ammo. Decrease BPV by 10% (FRD) for Normal Ammo, or by 25% (FRD) for Scarce Ammo.
- <sup>2</sup>: Treat as "80+ M" (BPV: 96 W\*) with Scarce Ammo in 6-8/50 [EXC: BPV is 64 for ROKA;
- Decrease BPV by 40% (FRD) for ROKA in 6-8/50; 6B/3R.
- M: Battalion mortar OBA (C1.22).
- R: Rocket OBA (C1.9).
- S: Can fire SMOKE.
- W: Can fire WP but not Smoke.
- †: VT available beginning 9/50 [EXC: 1/52 for ROKA] (W.7).
- \*: Can fire IR (E1.93).

15 U.S.M.C. OBA AVAILABILITY CHART <sup>1</sup>								
YEAR		8/50	9/50+					
DR: BPV:	2	100+ 158 S*	100+ 165 S*†					
:	3	100+ 158 S*	150+ 248 S†					
4	1	60+ M 94 W*	100+ 165 S*†					
:	5	100+ 158 S*	100+ 165 S*†					
	5	80+ M 134 W*	80+ M 134 W*					
7	7	80+ M 134 W*	80+ M 134 W*					
8	3	80+ M 134 W*	100+ 153 W					
9	)	100+ 153 W	100+ 153 W					
10	)	60+ M 94 W*	100+ 165 S*†					
11	L	100+ 158 S*	150+ 248 S†					
12	2	100+ 158 S*	100+ R 66†					
MAX. BPV	:	158	248					

- All BPV are for Plentiful Ammo. Decrease BPV by 10% (FRD) for Normal Ammo, or by 25% (FRD) for Scarce Ammo.
- M: Battalion mortar OBA (C1.22).
- R: Rocket OBA (C1.9).
- S: Can fire SMOKE.
- W: Can fire WP but not Smoke.
- †: VT available (W.7).
- \*: Can fire IR (E1.93).

1.5 KMC OBA AVAILABILITY CHART <sup>1</sup>								
YEAR	1-9/512	10-12/51	1952+					
DR: 2	80+ M	100+	150+					
BPV:	134 W*	153 W	248 S†					
3	80+ M	100+	100+					
	134 W*	153 W	165 S*†					
4	60+ M	80+ M	100+					
	94 W*	134 W*	165 S*†					
5	60+ M	60+ M	100+					
	94 W*	94 W*	153 W					
6	80+ M	80+ M	80+ M					
	134 W*	134 W*	134 W*					
7	60+ M	80+ M	100+					
	94 W*	134 W*	165 S*†					
8	80+ M	80+ M	80+ M					
	134 W*	134 W*	134 W*					
9	60+ M	60+ M	60+ M					
	94 W*	94 W*	94 W*					
10	60+ M	100+	100+					
	94 W*	153 W	165 S*†					
11	80+ M	100+	150+					
	134 W*	153 W	248 S†					
12	80+ M	100+	150+					
	134 W*	153 W	248 S†					
MAX. BPV:	134	153	248					

- All BPV are for Plentiful Ammo. Decrease BPV by 10% (FRD) for Normal Ammo, or by 25% (FRD) for Scarce Ammo.
- 2: Use U.S.M.C. OBA prior to 1/51.
- M: Battalion mortar OBA (C1.22).
- S: Can fire SMOKE.
- W: Can fire WP but not Smoke.
- †: VT available (W.7).
- \*: Can fire IR (E1.93).

## COMMUNIST FORCES VEHICLE NOTES

#### KPA VEHICLE NOTES

The tanks of the KPA 105th Armored Brigade spearheaded the initial attack into South Korea in June and July 1950. Used aggressively and facing no effective ROK anti-tank weaponry (only the 37mm and 57mm guns, the 2.36" bazooka, and Human Bullet squads), the T-34/85s of the brigade invariably carried the day in each engagement in which they participated. The 105th Armored Brigade was composed of the 107th, 109th, and 203rd Armored Regiments and the 206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment. Each armored regiment was approximately equivalent to a U.S. armored battalion. In July, the 105th Armored Brigade was designated as the 105th "Seoul" Division, adding the 308th Self-Propelled Gun (SPG) Battalion (with SU-76Ms). Starting in late July 1950, the introduction of the 3.5" bazooka, the appearances of the M4A3E8 Sherman and the M26 Pershing, and the increase in U.S. airpower put an end to KPA armored dominance; few T-34/85s survived the retreat from the Pusan Perimeter during September-November 1950. Although the KPA armored force was eventually reconstituted, U.S. airpower prevented it from being effectively employed for the remainder of the war; the brigade's tanks were deployed as small elements in support to KPA infantry divisions and regiments. The KPA also made use of the numerous American-made trucks they captured during the UN retreat in 1950, most especially the ubiquitous "deuce-and-a-half" (U.S. Vehicle Note 57). Players should use the Chinese version of the 2 ½-ton truck (Chinese Vehicle Note 16) to represent these.





1. T-34/85: At the time of the invasion, the Soviet Union had supplied 258 T-34/85 tanks of WW2 fame (Russian Vehicle Note 18) to the KPA. Forty were assigned to each of the 107th, 109th, and 203rd Armored

Regiments of the 105th Armored Brigade, with additional units still being organized at the outbreak of the war. Three battalions of 13 tanks were in each armored regiment; battalions were composed of three tank companies of four tanks each. A number of T-34/85 tanks remain in KPA service to the present day.

- † This AFV may possibly carry Smoke Dischargers (sD). Use rule D13. [EXC: they are usable only once per scenario].
- $\dagger$  RF are 1.2 for 6-7/50, 1.3 for 8/50, 1.4 for 9/50, 1.5 for 10/50, and 1.6 thereafter.





**2. SU-76M:** The 308th Self-Propelled Gun Battalion of the 105th Armored Division had 13 SU-76M assault guns (Russian Vehicle Note 30). Many KPA infantry divisions in 1950 also had an assault gun battalion (13

SU-76Ms) within their artillery regiments. Few SU-76Ms survived the retreat that began in September 1950; thus, the self-propelled artillery battalion was removed, and the artillery regiment was reorganized. The "Suka" was built upon a much-modified T-70 hull and chassis. In contrast to its Soviet WW2 crews, North Korean SU-76M crews liked the vehicle due to its simplicity, reliability, and ease of use.

† RF are 1.2 for 6-7/50, 1.3 for 8/50, 1.4 for 9/50, 1.5 for 10/50, and 1.6 thereafter.






**3. BA-64B:** The KPA used small numbers of BA-64B armored cars (Russian Vehicle Note 40) for scouting and security duties.

Vehicle 6

- † All 1MT restrictions apply normally [EXC: the crew must be CE to fire the CMG].
- † CMG has AA capability—signified by "MA:AA" being printed on the counter.
- † RF are 1.3 for 6-7/50, 1.4 for 8/50, 1.5 for 9-10/50, and 1.6 thereafter. See also Communist Forces Vehicle Note B.



- **4.** GAZ-67B, GAZ-MM, ZIS-5, & IAG-6: The KPA used WW2-era GAZ-67B "Jeeps" (Russian Vehicle Note 46) and various other Soviet trucks (Russian Vehicle Note 47), most frequently in the 105th Armored Brigade. Many were lost during the fall 1950 retreat.
- † The *GAZ-67B* has Low Ground Pressure (D1.41). Moreover, when it is bogged, one (only) CX squad (even a Prisoner—but not a Guard) on foot expending ≥ four MF in the vehicle's Location (and declared to be assisting its unbogging) thereby allows the owning player to subtract two (one per crew or HS) from the colored die of its immediately subsequent unbogging DR.
- $\dagger$  RF are 1.3 for 6-7/50, 1.4 for 8/50, and 1.5 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Vehicle Note B.





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**5. GAZ-51:** The first prototypes of the Soviet GAZ-51 were produced before the end of WW2, and mass production started in 1946. The 4×2 GAZ-51 was joined in 1947 by the similar 4×4 GAZ-63, which this

counter also represents. The GAZ-63 was manufactured with some changes until 1968, and production of the GAZ-51 continued until 1975. The trucks were manufactured under Soviet license in Poland, North Korea, and China. The vehicle was often used as a prime mover for lighter artillery pieces.

† RF are 1.3 for 6-7/50, 1.4 for 8/50, and 1.5 thereafter.





**6. ZIS-151:** The ZIS-151 was the first major Soviet military all-wheel drive truck built following WW2. It was essentially an evolution of the Studebaker 2 ½-ton truck supplied under Lend Lease.

† RF are 1.3 for 6-7/50, 1.4 for 8/50, and 1.5 thereafter.

#### KPA VEHICLE LISTING

#*	Name & Type	WGT	BPV	RF	Dates	Size	AF	TA	OT	CS	MP	GP	GT	MA	ROF	B#	IF	BMG	CMG	AAMG	SA	Am	s#	sD#	PP/T#	Notes
6	T-34/85 MT	32	76	1.2-1.6†	6/50-53	0	11/6	+SR		6	16		T	T85L	1			2	4			A6		6†		1†
2	SU-76M AG	10.5	46	1.2-1.6†	6/50-53	+1	4/1	-F	•	4	16	L	NT	B76L	2							A7				2†
В	BA-64B AC	2.5	25	1.3-1.6†	6/50-53	+1	1/0	+SR		2	30 <sup>t</sup>		1MT†	CMG	1				4	1						3†, B
В	GAZ-67B tr	1.5	13	1.3-1.5†	6/50-53	+2	*			2	33 <sup>t</sup>	L†													9PP/T10	4†, B
В	GAZ-MM tr	3	15	1.3-1.5†	6/50-53	+1	*			6	25t														21PP/T8	4†, B
В	ZIS-5 tr	6	17	1.3-1.5†	6/50-53	0	*			7	21 <sup>t</sup>	Н													29PP/T4	4†, B
В	IAG-6 tr	10	19	1.3-1.5†	6/50-53	-1	*			7	15 <sup>t</sup>	Н													33PP/T-4	4†, B
2	GAZ-51 tr	6	18	1.3-1.5†	6/50-53	0	*			6	29 <sup>t</sup>														23PP/T6	5†
2	ZIS-151 tr	8	18	1.3-1.5†	6/50-53	0	*			7	28t														29PP/T5	6†

<sup>\*</sup> In the "#" column, "B" indicates that the counters are provided in BEYOND VALOR.



#### **CPVA Vehicle Notes**

#### **CPVA VEHICLE NOTES**

The Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) contained a negligible number of motor vehicles when it first entered Korea. CPVA units walked, carrying their equipment and supplies and foraging. This non-reliance on vehicles allowed the CPVA to get off the roads and generally avoid detection by UN surveillance, resulting in the complete surprise achieved against UN forces in November-December 1950. A 1950 CPVA infantry division had few or no trucks. Even by 1953, little to no organic transport was assigned to non-motorized units; independent truck regiments provided logistical support, but most units remained dependent upon cart transport pulled by people and draft animals. No accounts exist of CPVA AFVs used in combat. During the initial CPVA attack in late 1950, there is one recorded situation where the CPVA was supported by a handful of KPAoperated AFVs. Starting in March 1951, some CPVA units were equipped with Soviet-supplied AFVs, but these units were typically kept in reserve (and hidden from UN aircraft) against the threat of a UN landing or breakthrough. The Chinese official history of the Korean War relates that these vehicles were used in combat, but corresponding U.S. unit records do not report the presence of any CPVA armor. At most, CPVA AFVs may have been used in a fire support role (i.e., SU-76Ms as OBA) or in reserve. As the war progressed, the CPVA did employ an increasingly large number of trucks for theater-level supply. These soft-skinned vehicles would have rarely been involved in front-line combat, however, although UN air interdiction activities caused heavy losses. Generally speaking, therefore, CPVA vehicles did not appear in combat in the Korean War, and thus are not provided in this module.

The CPVA utilized a wide variety of Soviet-supplied trucks, including the GAZ-MM, ZIS-5, IAG-6, GAZ-51, and ZIS-151; their use increased as the war progressed through its static phase (mid-1951-1953). The GAZ-51 (as the Yuejin NJ-130) and the ZIS-150 (represented by the ZIS-151 counter) were manufactured in China throughout the 1950s. (See Russian Vehicle Note 47 and KPA Vehicle Notes 4, 5, and 6.) Additionally, the Chinese truck inventory incorporated a diverse assortment of non-Soviet vehicles obtained (and captured) from G.M.D., Japanese, and UN forces such as the Jeep(a), and 2 ½-Ton(a). (See Chinese Vehicle Note 16.) Use Russian, KPA, and Chinese counters as appropriate.

## COMMUNIST FORCES MULTI-APPLICABLE VEHICLE NOTES

**B.** The Russian-colored counter is provided in **BEYOND VALOR**, but the Vehicle Listing and Notes herein apply in all cases.

## COMMUNIST FORCES ORDNANCE NOTES

#### **KPA ORDNANCE NOTES**

In general, the KPA was equipped similarly to late-WW2 Soviet forces. The KPA infantry division order of battle and table of organization and equipment (TO&E) was comparable to a late-WW2 (1945) Soviet rifle division. There were several exceptions, specifically with 2nd-line infantry divisions. These notably included several divisions transferred directly from the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA); the equipment in these units varied widely and included weapons from the Chinese Nationalist Army (including weapons originally supplied by the U.S.), from the Imperial Japanese Army, and older Soviet weapons.

KPA ordnance was generally modern (i.e., produced within the previous 5-10 years), although some categories of weapons included older models; these included some older 45mm AT guns and 76.2mm regimental and divisional artillery. Given the extremely secretive nature of the North Korean regime, detailed KPA-sourced OBs and TO&Es are unavailable. Existing U.S. (and Chinese) sources do not in most cases indicate which models were in use by specific units, or by date. For such weapons (a good exam-

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ple being 76.2mm regimental guns), it is reasonable to assume that early-Korean War (June-September 1950) KPA units were equipped with a mixture of the older and newer models. As KPA units were reconstituted (and as new units were established) after the near-complete loss of all heavy equipment during the retreat of September-November 1950, they would have received the newer models.

Captured U.S. equipment was used on an *ad hoc* basis; unlike with the CPVA, such weapons never became standard TO&E items. Many units picked up and used U.S. bazookas, recoilless rifles, and mortars abandoned by ROK and U.S. units as the KPA pressed south during June-August 1950; a small number of these weapons might be expected to be seen in any KPA infantry division during July-September 1950. Such captured weapons are not included here; players should use CPVA counters when needed.





1. 50mm RM obr. 40: Most KPA infantry divisions were organized along the lines of late-WW2 Soviet infantry divisions; such units were not assigned company-level mortars, relying instead on

their 82mm battalion mortars and other artillery assets for fire support. This 50mm mortar (Russian Ordnance Note 1) was used, however, by some 2nd-line KPA units, such as the 19th Regiment, 13th KPA Infantry Division during the battles around Taegu in September 1950.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Notes A, B.





**2. 82mm BM obr. 37:** The Soviet 82mm mortar (Russian Ordnance Note 2) was the standard battalion support weapon for the KPA during the Korean War. The KPA used the BM obr. 37, BM obr. 41, and BM obr.

43, with this counter representing the latter two models. Each infantry battalion had one mortar company with nine of these weapons. KPA doctrine emphasized centralized control of mortar fire as per Soviet tactics; in practice, however, decentralized control and fire by mortar companies was widespread, with mortar platoons allocated as direct fire support to individual infantry companies.

 $\dagger$  This mortar can be fired once in the same phase either prior to becoming dm or after reverting to non-dm status.

† RF are 1.0 for 6-9/50, 1.1 for 10/50-6/51, and 1.0 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Notes A, B.





**3. 120mm PM obr. 38:** This represents both the PM obr. 38 (Russian Ordnance Note 4) and the PM obr. 43 Soviet 120mm mortar versions in KPA service; the 1943 model differing in only minor details. In 1950, each

infantry regiment had one heavy mortar company with six of these weapons. After the winter of 1950, the divisional artillery regiment was reorganized and a battalion (12 tubes) of 120mm mortars was added. The light, easily attached transport limber and the light-weight baseplate made the 120mm mortar highly mobile despite its size.

† RF are 1.2 for 6-9/50, 1.3 for 10/50-6/51, and 1.2 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





**4. 14.5mm PTRD-41 ATR:** The most successful Soviet LATW of WW2, the Protivotankovoe Ruzhyo Degtyarova (PTRD) obr. 1941 fired a tungsten-cored 14.5mm round that was capable

of penetrating 25mm of armor at up to 500m. Although single-shot, the spent case was automatically ejected, and all the operator had to do was to insert another cartridge and close the bolt. Simple to produce, the PTRD lingered on throughout WW2 if only because the Soviets never produced a hollow-charge AT weapon during the war. After the war, it was adopted by several Communist bloc armies; in Albania it remained in service until the late 1960s. In the KPA it was the company-level LATW. In addition to



## Ordnance 6

#### COMMUNIST FORCES ORDNANCE LISTING

#* Name	Туре	CSize	ROF (IFE)	В#	Range	<b>M</b> #	TSize	Dates	Special	BPV	RF	Notes
KPA												
B 50mm RM obr. 40	MTR	50*	3		3-20	-	-	6-12/50	4PP	-	-	1, A, B
B 82mm BM obr. 37	MTR	82*	3		3-78	11	+1	6/50-53	NT, QSU, s8, IR	28	1.0-1.1†	2†, A, B
B 120mm PM obr. 38	MTR	120*	2		12-151	9	+1	6/50-53	NT, QSU, s8	24	1.2-1.3†	3†, B
B 14.5mm PTRD-41	ATR				12	_	-	6/50-53	1PP	-	_	4, B
2 14.5mm PTRS-41	ATR		1	11	16†	_		6/50-53	2PP, TK#: 6†	-	<u> </u>	5†
B 45mm PTP obr. 37	AT	45L	3		110	11	+1	6/50-53	NT, QSU, A7	29	1.3-1.4†	6†,B
B 45mm PTP obr. 42	AT	45LL	3		138	11	+1	6/50-53	NT, QSU, A7	30	1.2-1.3†	6†, B
B 76.2mm PP obr. 27	INF	76*	2		214	8	+1	6/50-53	NT, QSU, H6, s8	30	1.3-1.4†	7†, A, B
B 76.2mm obr. 02/30	ART	76	1		310	7	0	6/50-53	NT, QSU, s8, h-d	27	1.3-1.4†	8†,B
B 76.2mm obr. 42	ART	76L	2		332	9	0	6/50-53	NT, QSU, A7, s8	35	1.5-1.3†	9†,B
B 107mm Pobr. 10/30	ART	107	1	11	409	7	0	6/50-53	NT, s8, h-d	27	1.6	10, B
B 122mm G obr. 38	ART	122	1		303	6	0	6/50-53	NT, H6, s8	34	1.4-1.5†	11†, B
B 122mm obr. 31	ART	122L	1		522	2	-1	6/50-53	NT, s8	44	1.5	12, B
B 152mm GP obr. 37	ART	152			432	2	-1	6/50-53	NT	44	1.5	13, B
B 37mm ZP obr. 39	AA	37L	3 (8)		200	8	0	6/50-53	T	30	1.4-1.5†	14†, B
B 85mm ZP obr. 39	AA	85L	2		391	5	-1	6/50-53	T	44	1.5	15, B
CPVA												
4 M1A1 Rocket Launcher	-			X11	4	_		10/50-53	1PP	_	-	16
4 Type 51 Rocket Launcher	_			X10	5	_	_	9/51-53	1PP	_	_	17
4 50mm Type 89 Heavy Grenade Launcher	MTR	50*	2†	11	1-16	_		10/50-3/51	4PP	_	-	18†,A
4 60mm Type 31 Mortar	MTR	60*	3	11	3-45	_	_	10/50-53	5PP	_	-	19, A
4 82mm Type 20 Mortar	MTR	82*	3	11	3-75	11	+1	10/50-53	NT, QSU	23	1.1-1.3†	20†,A
4 82mm Type 53 Mortar	MTR	82*	3		3-78	11	+1	6/51-53	NT, QSU, s6	27	1.29†	21†,A
2 120mm PM obr. 38	MTR	120*	2		12-151	9	+1	6/51-53	NT, QSU, s6	23	1.4-1.2†	22†
3 45mm PTP obr. 42	AT	45LL	3		138	11	+1	6/51-53	NT, QSU, A7	30	1.4-1.3†	23†
2 47mm Type 1 Machine-Moved Gun	AT	47L	3	11	191	11	+1	51-53	NT, QSU	33	1.4-1.5†	24†
2 57mm PTP obr. 43	AT	57LL	3		210	10	+1	6/51-53	NT, QSU, A6	36	1.4-1.3†	25†
3 57mm Type 36 Recoilless Rifle	RCL	57	1	10	110	_	_	10/50-53	3PP, H6, WP5, crewed†	26	1.4-1.3†1	26†¹,R†
3 75mm Type 52 Recoilless Rifle	RCL	75	1	11	160	_	_	6/52-53	5PP, H6, WP5, crewed†	33	1.4	27, R†
2 70mm Type 92 Infantry Gun	INF	70*	1	11	(3)†-70	12	+1	51-53	NT, QSU, AP3, H3, h-d	29	1.3-1.4†	28†,A
2 76.2mm PP obr. 27	INF	76*	2		214	8	+1	6/51-53	NT, QSU, H6, s6	29	1.4-1.3†	29†,A
2 Year-38 Type Field Gun (Improved)	ART	75*	1	11	265	9	0	4/51-53	NT, QSU, h-d, "12" AP TK#†	29	1.4-1.5†	30†
2 76.2mm obr. 42	ART	76L	2		332	9	0	6/51-53	NT, QSU, A7, s6	34	1.5-1.4†	31†
2 Type 93 Twin-Mount High-Angle Machine Gun	AA	12.7	3 (12)	11	†	7	+1	10/50-53	T, 2 TK DR†, Towing NA†	33	1.6-1.5†	32†. A

<sup>\*</sup> In the "#" column, "B" indicates that the counters are provided in BEYOND VALOR.

its use against lightly-armored vehicles, it was used for long-range sniping against personnel. Eighteen of these weapons were in the TO&E of a KPA infantry regiment in 1950.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





**5. 14.5mm PTRS-41 ATR:** The Protivotankovoe Ruzhyo Simonova (PTRS) obr. 1941 was an alternative Soviet LATW design. This semi-automatic weapon used a gas piston to open the bolt,

eject, and reload. The gas regulator could be adjusted to give sufficient force to overcome dirt or freezing conditions. Five-round clip magazines were used. Although semi-automatic, the PTRS was considerably more complex, less robust, and six pounds heavier than the PTRD. It was also considerably longer, resulting in a much-extended effective range. The range and semi-automatic nature of this weapon helped compensate for its reduced reliability and heavier weight, but most KPA units were outfitted

with the more common PTRD-41 (Communist Forces Ordnance Note 4).

- † Contrary to C13.22, this ATR has a maximum range of 16 hexes.
- † This ATR uses the Russian AP To Kill values, i.e., "6".







6. 45mm PTP obr. 37 & PTP obr. 42: The KPA used both the obr. 37 (represented by the existing Russian obr. 32 counter; Russian Ordnance Note 7) and the obr. 42 (Russian Ordnance Note 8). In 1950, each infantry division had one AT gun battalion with 18 45mm anti-tank guns; each infantry regiment had an AT gun company with 12 more 45mm guns; and each infantry battalion had one AT gun platoon with two guns.

Although both guns were marginally effective when employed against heavier KW-era armor, they were still of value as close-in support



#### Ordnance 6

weapons in attacks against pillboxes and field fortifications.

† *PTP obr. 37* RF are 1.3 for 6-9/50 and 1.4 thereafter. *PTP obr. 42* RF are 1.2 for 6-9/50, 1.3 for 10/50-6/51, and 1.2 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





7. 76.2mm PP obr. 27: This sturdy and reliable howitzer (Russian Ordnance Note 12) provided inherent fire support to rifle regiments; each regiment had one battery of four howitzers. Its range was adequate for its

close support role, but by Soviet standards it was heavy for its purpose. This counter also represents the 76.2mm PP obr. 43, mounted on a modified 45mm PTP obr. 42 anti-tank gun carriage, which was designed to replace the obr. 27.

† RF are 1.3 for 6-9/50 and 1.4 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Notes A, B.





**8. 76.2mm obr. 02/30:** Each KPA infantry division included one artillery regiment containing two battalions of 76.2mm guns (12 guns per battalion). After the winter of 1950, the divisional artillery regiment was reor-

ganized and one 76.2mm battalion was removed. The obr. 02/30 (Russian Ordnance Note 14) was one of two common types of 76.2mm divisional guns used by the KPA during the Korean War. This gun existed in two barrel lengths, which to all intents and purposes were ballistically identical. In spite of its age (it was produced from 1931-1937), this gun's range was adequate for its support role.

† RF are 1.3 for 6-9/50 and 1.4 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





**9. 76.2mm obr. 42:** The obr. 42 (represented by the existing Russian obr. 39 counter; Russian Ordnance Note 15) was the second type of 76.2mm gun used within the artillery regiments of KPA infantry divisions. The

obr. 42 (also known as the ZIS-3) differed from the obr. 39 by incorporating a new carriage and a double-baffle muzzle brake, the latter providing its most obvious recognition feature; it was also lighter, designed to facilitate rapid displacement in tactical situations. In 1950, each rifle division's artillery regiment contained two battalions of 76.2mm guns (12 guns per battalion). After the winter of 1950, the divisional artillery regiment was reorganized and one 76.2mm battalion was removed.

† RF are 1.4 for 6-9/50, 1.5 for 10/50-6/51, and 1.3 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





10. 107mm P obr. 10/30: This older Soviet gun (Russian Ordnance Note 18), also known as the 107-10/30, saw only limited service within the KPA. Seventeen were recorded within the order of battle of the

24th Mechanized Artillery Brigade after its reorganization in October 1951.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





11. 122mm G obr. 38: Throughout the Korean War, each KPA infantry division's artillery regiment included one battalion of twelve 122mm howitzers. The obr. 38 howitzer (Russian Ordnance Note 20) was used

within infantry divisions in the same role as U.S. 155mm howitzers. An effective weapon, it was fitted with split trails and a large, sloped gun shield.

† RF are 1.4 for 6-9/50, 1.5 for 10/50-6/51, and 1.4 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





**12. 122mm obr. 31:** This 122mm corps gun was a powerful, long-ranged field piece. It was mounted on the same split trail carriage as the 152mm obr. 37 howitzer. Its primary recognition feature was its long slender tube.

The 122-31 (Russian Ordnance Note 21) also represents the later-model 122-37 or A-19.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





**13. 152mm GP obr. 37:** The KPA initially used the obr. 37 (Russian Ordnance Note 23) in a coastal defense role. Also known as the 152-37 and the ML-20, it was later deployed within independent artillery regi-

ments in corps and higher fire support roles, although it remained rare throughout the war. The obr. 37 was one of the more modern guns used by the KPA; it possessed a novel, easily-identifiable, 12-baffle muzzle brake and was noteworthy for its relatively long range.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





**14.37mm ZP obr. 39:** The obr. 39 (Russian Ordnance Note 25) was also known as the 61-K and was an automatic weapon mounted on a four-wheel carriage with a pedestal mount. Firing jacks lifted the wheels off the

ground when the gun was in its firing position. The weapon was fed with 5-round clips. Initially deployed only within independent anti-aircraft regiments to protect major military and industrial assets, by July 1952 a KPA infantry division had twelve obr. 39s assigned to its AA battalion. Throughout the war, however, the KPA's primary AA weapon was the 12.7mm Degtyarova-Shpagina Krupnnokalibyerni (DShK) obr. 38g represented by the .50-cal HMG SW. The mount was dual-purpose (with detachable wheels) and could be adjusted for use against ground or aerial targets. It was gas-operated, belt-fed, and air-cooled. A KPA infantry division's AA battalion had 18 of these weapons and each infantry regiment had an additional six in its anti-aircraft machine gun platoon.

† RF are 1.4 for 6-9/50, 1.5 for 10/50-6/51, and 1.4 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B.





**15. 85mm ZP obr. 39:** The 85mm anti-aircraft gun (Russian Ordnance Note 27) was deployed only within independent anti-aircraft artillery regiments on or near critical military, transportation, and industrial sites.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note B

#### **CPVA ORDNANCE NOTES**

CPVA forces entered the Korean War with a diverse array of ordnance, mostly of American, Japanese, or Chinese manufacture. American equipment had been supplied to the G.M.D. government and entered the Communist inventory when captured in combat or after the G.M.D. defeat. In fact, some Nationalist units were incorporated directly *en masse* into the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Japanese equipment had been captured directly from Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) units, indirectly obtained from the G.M.D., or handed over by the Soviet army that disarmed large numbers of IJA forces at the end of WW2. Both the G.M.D. and Communist China also manufactured previously-licensed copies of foreign equipment.

The large-scale retreats precipitated by the initial series of CPVA offensives (25 October 1950 - 24 January 1951) and, to a lesser degree, during the CPVA's "Spring Offensive" (22 April - 8 July 1951) resulted in the capture of large quantities of U.S. equipment from UN and ROK forces. Copies or derivative designs based on some of these captured weapons (specifically bazookas, mortars, and recoilless rifles) were developed and manufactured extensively in China. Chinese weapons designations utilized two methods:

a) weapons adopted prior to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 continued to be designated using the G.M.D. system (with year 0 equating to the Gregorian year 1911 in which the Republic of China, was established, e.g., a weapon adopted in 1942 was designated the "Type 31" (1942 = 1911 [year 0] + 31); and

b) weapons adopted in/after 1949 were designated by the Gregorian year (e.g., Type 51 = 1951).

Almost all CPVA support weapons in 1950 and early 1951 were transported by people or draft animals. CPVA tables of organization and equipment (TO&Es) generated by U.S. intelligence list the weapons allocations for units; and those numbers are listed in each ordnance note below. In most cases, however, the listed weapons were not actually available to CPVA units during this period or were only available in limited quantities. An important example is the artillery ordnance listed; very little of any type, in any quantity at all, was available during 1950 and early 1951 (with the exception of light and medium mortars). Both direct-fire guns and offboard artillery were very rare during this period.

As the war progressed, the substantial amount of Soviet artillery provided to the CPVA was used with effect during the static phase of the war. By early 1952, some level of uniformity had been established in those units that had been equipped by the Soviets. Even through the end of 1952, however, full standardization in equipment did not exist; divisional and regimental artillery battalions remained equipped with a wide range of Chinese, U.S., Japanese, and Soviet-manufactured weapons. Later in the war, field artillery was more plentiful but kept behind the lines and most likely to be represented in the form of OBA.

CPVA infantry divisions were generally organized as one of two types. The Type I infantry division contained an organic artillery battalion, (total strength of 1,414 officers and 10,990 enlisted). The Type II infantry division was identical to the Type I except that the artillery battalion was replaced by an organic artillery regiment (total strength of 1,580 officers and 11,984 enlisted). Type II divisions first appeared during the winter of 1952-53.

The ordnance notes listed here consist primarily of weapons that were widely available and organic to infantry regiments. Other weapons were used in smaller quantities; many SW were present in significant numbers only during the CPVA's early participation in the conflict (i.e., October 1950 - July 1951).



**16. M1A1 Rocket Launcher:** CPVA troops did not have a modern, portable anti-tank weapon, so at first they had to rely on these older bazooka models captured from the G.M.D. during the

Civil War. Subsequently, they captured a large quantity of later model bazookas (UN Forces Ordnance Notes 21 and 22) from U.S. and ROK forces during the retreats of November 1950 - January 1951. In a scenario, those would be represented by captured SW in the CPVA OB. Bazookas (whether ex-G.M.D. or ex-U.S./ROK) are listed in 1950 CPVA TO&Es, four in the anti-tank company of each infantry regiment.



17. Type 51 Rocket Launcher: The Type 51 was a Chinese-manufactured version of the M20 bazooka (UN Forces Ordnance Note 22), but with shaped charge warheads that were not as ef-

fective as the U.S. originals. A 1953 CPVA infantry division's reconnaissance company carried three bazookas on the books of its heavy weapons platoon, and each infantry company had two 3.5" bazookas in its weapons platoon.

ERRATA: Type 51 has a Basic TK# of "22".





**18. 50mm Type 89 Heavy Grenade Launcher:** This simple, and light weapon was ideal for an army that had to carry its weapons and ammunition. The Type 89 (Japanese Ordnance Note 1)

was primarily used during the Initial Intervention period (October 1950-March 1951; W7.12), rarely from April 1951 onward. CPVA TO&Es list



Ordnance 23

anywhere from two to five light mortars in each infantry company mortar platoon in mid-1951, a mix of 50mm and 60mm weapons (Communist Forces Ordnance Note 19).

 $\dagger$  At a range of  $\leq$  two hexes, the ROF is lowered to "1" for that shot and Air Bursts are NA.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note A.





**19. 60mm Type 31 Mortar:** The CPVA used 60mm mortars for company-level fire support. By July 1953, each infantry company mortar platoon was assigned two or three, and the heavy

weapons platoon in the division reconnaissance company had two more (about 50-80 total per division). This counter represents both the Chinese-manufactured Type 31 mortar and the M2 mortar (UN Forces Ordnance Note 23) captured from UN forces, which are identical in game terms.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note A.





**20. 82mm Type 20 Mortar:** The 81/82mm mortar was the standard battalion-level support weapon for CPVA infantry battalions. During the early part of the Initial Intervention period, most such weapons were deriva-

tives of the French 81mm Brandt mortar (itself derived from the First World War British "3-inch" Stokes trench mortar). This counter represents the Chinese-manufactured Type 20 (82mm caliber), the U.S. M1 mortar (UN Forces Ordnance Note 24), the Japanese Type 97 Curved-Fire Infantry Gun (Japanese Ordnance Note 3), and various similar mortars (Chinese Ordnance Note 4); all such weapons shared the same basic Stokes-Brandt design and were functionally equivalent. Estimated CPVA TO&Es up to mid-1951 list three 81/82mm mortars in each infantry battalion's heavy weapons company; TO&Es for later periods list four in each weapons company.

† RF are 1.1 for 10/50-51, 1.2 for 52, and 1.3 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note A.





**21. 82mm Type 53 Mortar:** The Soviet-supplied BM obr. 37 (Russian Ordnance Note 2) became more common after mid-1951 but did not completely replace other 81/82mm mortars in CPVA service, especial-

ly the Chinese-manufactured Type 20. The Type 53, a Chinese-manufactured copy of the BM obr. 37, entered service in April 1953. This counter represents the Soviet-supplied mortars as well as the Type 53. The heavy weapons company of a Soviet-armed CPVA infantry battalion had three medium mortars. Each infantry regiment in 1953 had an additional six 82mm or 120mm mortars in its heavy weapons battalion's mortar company. † RF are 1.2 for 6-12/51, 1.1 for 1-6/52, 1.0 for 7-12/52, and .9 thereafter. See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note A.





22. 120mm PM obr. 38: The most common CPVA heavy mortar was the superb Soviet-produced PM obr. 38 (Russian Ordnance Note 4). The Chinese-manufactured version (the Type 55) entered service after

the Korean War ended. This counter with a Breakdown Number of 11 can also represent the Type 33, a Chinese copy of the French 120mm Brandt heavy mortar, seen rarely only in the Initial Intervention period.

† RF are 1.4 for 6-12/51, 1.3 for 1-6/52, and 1.2 thereafter.





23. 45mm PTP obr. 42: CPVA units armed with Soviet weapons were commonly equipped with these light AT guns (Russian Ordnance Note 8) rather than Japanese ones. Infantry regiments appear to have had an or-

ganic AT company only during the Initial Intervention period, after which AT guns were replaced in regimental TO&Es by recoilless rifles. When



#### Ordnance 23

present, six AT guns were assigned to each infantry regiment's anti-tank company. Starting in 1951, AT guns along the static front were concentrated in anti-tank divisions, which distributed their subordinate battalions and companies to the infantry divisions.

† RF are 1.4 for 6-12/51 and 1.3 thereafter.





**24. 47mm Type 1 Machine-Moved Gun:** The CPVA used a range of light anti-tank guns of Japanese and U.S. origin, with the Type 1 (Japanese Ordnance Note 8) being relatively common. The first CPVA anti-

tank units arrived in Korea in January 1951 and saw service during the Initial Intervention period. Weapons of this type were obsolete by 1950 but could still present a threat to UN tanks at close range from the side or rear.

† RF are 1.4 for 1-6/51 and 1.5 thereafter.

ERRATA: The 47mm Type 1 Machine-Moved Gun should not have "h-d" on the back of the counter.





**25.57mm PTP obr. 43:** Still in active Soviet service during this period, the PTP obr. 43 (Russian Ordnance Note 9) was a valued addition to the CPVA anti-tank arsenal. The 31st and 32nd Anti-tank Divisions were

equipped with these guns (and with 76.2mm anti-tank guns). Each AT regiment (of three) in a 1953 (motorized) AT division lists 12 57mm AT guns, four in each of three companies.

† RF are 1.4 for 6-12/51 and 1.3 thereafter.





**26.57mm Type 36 Recoilless Rifle:** The Americans provided the G.M.D. government with the blueprints for the M18 (UN Forces Ordnance Note 5), and the factory continued production

under Communist rule. The Chinese-manufactured Type 36 was more accurately a derivative of the M18 rather than a straight copy. CPVA infantry regiments were assigned six 57mm RCLs in their heavy weapons battalion's recoilless rifle company. Chinese HEAT ammunition had notably less penetration than U.S. HEAT ammunition of the same caliber.

ERRATA: 57mm HEAT of the Type 36 (only) has a Basic TK# of "9".

† RF are 1.4 for 10/50-6/51 and 1.3 thereafter.

See also CPVA Ordnance Note R.





**27. 75mm Type 52 Recoilless Rifle:** The Type 52 was the Chinese-manufactured version of the U.S. M20 75mm recoilless rifle (UN Forces Ordnance Note 25). The CPVA used this weapon in

limited quantities.

**ERRATA:** 75mm HEAT of the *Type 52* (only) has a Basic TK# of "11". See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note R.





**28. 70mm Type 92 Infantry Gun:** Each CPVA infantry regiment contained an artillery battery (sometimes listed as part of the regiment's heavy weapons battalion) with three or four 70mm or 75mm how-

itzers; 1953 infantry regiment TO&Es list four 70mm howitzers. Both Japanese-manufactured weapons and Chinese-manufactured copies were used. The 470-pound Type 92 (Japanese Ordnance Note 10) was light enough to manhandle with relative ease, allowing the transport-poor CPVA of the Initial Intervention period a nominal level of fire support.

† This Gun may also use Indirect Fire, for which purpose its range is "3-70" hexes (if using Direct Fire it has no such minimum range). All rules applicable to firing a MTR (including the possibility of Spotted Fire and of retaining Multiple ROF) apply to this Gun for Indirect Fire purposes.

However, it may not use both Direct and Indirect Fire in the same phase (treating the MPh and DFPh as one). Switching from Direct to Indirect Fire or vice-versa does not cause loss of Acquisition.

† RF are 1.3 for 1-6/51 and 1.4 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note A.





**29. 76.2mm PP obr. 27:** The venerable 76.2mm PP obr. 27 (Russian Ordnance Note 12) served as the regimental gun (replacing the 70mm Type 92; Communist Forces Ordnance Note 28) in some Soviet-equipped di-

H

visions.

† RF are 1.4 for 6-12/51 and 1.3 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note A.





**30.** Year-38 Type Field Gun (Improved): The 75mm Year-38 Type Field Gun (Japanese Ordnance Note 12) was the mainstay of the CPVA (Type I infantry) divisional artillery battalion during the Initial Interven-

tion period. A Type I infantry division's artillery battalion had three batteries, each with four howitzers. In practice, many CPVA divisions early in the Korean War had no artillery battalions at all. The CPVA also used the comparable M1A1 75mm Pack Howitzer obtained from G.M.D. sources (Chinese Ordnance Note 10). As late as fall 1952, 75mm howitzers (presumably Japanese, possibly some U.S.) constituted the bulk of the CPVA divisional artillery. The artillery regiment in a 1953 Type II infantry division contained 12 75mm guns (four in each of three batteries) in its pack howitzer artillery battalion. Independent CPVA artillery regiments were also equipped with 75mm guns; the 1953 TO&E for a (horse-drawn) artillery regiment lists 12 of these guns (24 total) in each of its two field gun battalions; four in each battery.

 $\dagger$  This Gun's AP Basic To Kill Number is "12"—as signified by the "AP TK#: 12" on the counter.

† RF are 1.4 for 4-6/51 and 1.5 thereafter.





**31. 76.2mm obr. 42:** The 76.2mm obr. 42 (Russian Ordnance Note 15) was the standard CPVA divisional field gun within Soviet-equipped divisions. A Type II infantry division's artillery regiment contained 12

76.2mm guns in its field gun battalion; four in each of its three batteries. This gun also served as an anti-tank gun within CPVA AT divisions; 12 are listed in a 1953 TO&E for a (motorized) AT division's AT regiment; four in each of three batteries.

† RF are 1.5 for 6-12/51 and 1.4 thereafter.





32. Type 93 Twin-Mount High-Angle Machine Gun: Chinese anti-aircraft capability in the Initial Intervention period was very limited, with the primary method of defense being concealment from UN aircraft. Mak-

ing a virtue of necessity, the small number of vehicles and heavy weapons used by the CPVA during this period greatly facilitated concealment. The Type 93 (Japanese Ordnance Note 20) was a typical CPVA anti-aircraft weapon during the Initial Intervention period; a small number of heavier anti-aircraft guns like the Bofors 40mm L/60 were also in CPVA service during the period. A 1953 infantry regiment's heavy weapons battalion contained an anti-aircraft battery with nine 12.7mm AA machine guns. A Type II infantry division's artillery regiment had an additional 12 12.7mm AA machine guns in its anti-aircraft battalion; four each in three platoons.

 $\dagger$  Make two To Kill DR when using the 12.7 column of the AP To Kill Table; only one DR (firer's choice) is used. Maximum range for To Hit purposes is 16 hexes.



† As signified by "Tow NA" on the counter, this Gun cannot be towed. However, it may be carried on a vehicle in the same manner as a 76-107mm MTR (C10.1). It is (un)loaded using normal (un)hooking procedures [EXC: the vehicle need not have a T#; ignore its T# if one is present], and reduces that PP capacity by 8 PP while loaded. Section C10. applies otherwise unchanged.

† RF are 1.6 for 10/50-4/51 and 1.5 thereafter.

See also Communist Forces Ordnance Note A.

#### COMMUNIST FORCES MULTI-APPLICABLE ORD-NANCE NOTES

A. This weapon may be Animal-Packed (G10.).

**B.** The Russian-colored counter is provided in **BEYOND VALOR**, but the Ordnance Listing and Notes herein apply in all cases.

**R.** CPVA RCL follow the rules for U.S. RCL (C12.) [EXC: they use red To Hit numbers].

		A OBA ITY CHART
YEAR		1950-53
DR: BPV:	2	70+ 42 s
	3	70+ 42 s
	4	70+ 42 s
	5	70+ 42 s
	6	80+ M 62 s*
	7	80+ M 62 s*
	8	120+ 84 s
	9	70+ 42 s
	10	80+ M 62 s*
	11	120+ 84 s
	12	150+ 103
MAX. BI	PV:	103

1.	531 KPA A	AIR SUPP	ORT
A	VAILABI	LITY TAB	LE*
6/50	7/50	8/50	9/50-53
54	3 <sup>2</sup>	2 <sup>2</sup>	NA

\* All KPA air support is in the form of 1944 FB; the exponent is the dr the aircraft player must roll  $\leq$  in order to have bombs on his aircraft (see E7.21).

1.28 F	KPA ELR CI	HART
6-9/50	10/50-51	1952-53
3	2	3

1.43 KPA ARM DRM C	
1950	1951-53
0	-1

- M: Battalion mortar OBA (C1.22).
- s: Can fire Smoke but not WP.
- \*: Can fire IR (E1.93).

	1.8	3 KPA S	WALLO	TMENT	CHART	1	
	LMG	MMG	HMG	.50-cal HMG	ATR	FT <sup>2</sup>	DC <sup>2</sup>
	6	9	14	20	73	6	1
# In Game	_	_	_	_	0/2	_	_
# In BV	11	6	4	2	5/0	4	6

- 1: SW allotted according to Equivalent number of squads.
- <sup>2</sup>: Allotted according to Equivalent number of Assault Engineer squads; see 1.22.
- 3: Make a dr for each ATR allotted; a Final dr ≤ 1 results in a PTRS-41; otherwise, a PTRD-41 is received.

																				C.									1			
NAME	H		19	1950						1951	-							1952	2						1953		_			MAN	<u> </u>	
WAIVIE	7	J J A S O N D J F M	A	S O	z	0	٦ ٦	Σ	A	7	J A	S	M J J A S O N D	0	7	F	A	7	J J A S 0	S	0	0	7	Σ	F M A M J J	7	-			MAINIC	¥	
T-34/85 MT																											T-34	T-34/85 MT				
SU-76M AG																				-			7				SU-	SU-76M AG				
BA-64B AC *																											BA-(	BA-64B AC *	*			
GAZ-67B tr*																											GAZ	GAZ-67B tr*	*			
GAZ-MM tr*																											GAZ	GAZ-MM tr*	4			
ZIS-5 tr *																											ZIS-	ZIS-5 tr *				
AG-6 tr*																											IAG	IAG-6 tr*				
GAZ-51 tr																											GAZ	GAZ-51 tr				
ZIS-151 tr																											ZIS	ZIS-151 tr				
MAME	7	J J A S O N D J F M A	A	S 0	z	0	4	Σ	-	7	J A	s	M J J A S O N D	O I		J F M A	-	M J J A S O	A	S	0	0	7	Σ	N D J F M A M	7	7			MANIE	<u></u>	
INVINE			19	1950		_				1951	-							1952	2						1953					MAIN	<u>⊔</u>	

COMMUNIST FORCES (	OF	RD			IC	E	RA	\R			T	DR	C	H	AF	<b>3</b> T			.9		1.0		1	 	1.2	1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
NAME	J	J	199 A S		N	D	J F	M	A I	19 VI J	 S	0	N D	J	F	M A	M	1952 J J		S	) N I	D J	F	 153 A M	J,	NAME
82mm BM obr. 37 *																										82mm BM obr. 37 *
120mm PM obr. 38 *																										120mm PM obr. 38 *
45mm PTP obr. 37 *																										45mm PTP obr. 37 *
45mm PTP obr. 42 *																										45mm PTP obr. 42 *
76.2mm PP obr. 27 *																										76.2mm PP obr. 27 *
76.2mm obr. 02/30 *																										76.2mm obr. 02/30 *
76.2mm obr. 42 *																										76.2mm obr. 42 *
107mm P obr. 10/30 *																										107mm P obr. 10/30 *
22mm G obr. 38 *																										122mm G obr. 38 *
22mm obr. 31 *																										122mm obr. 31 *
52mm GP obr. 37 *																										152mm GP obr. 37 *
37mm ZP obr. 39 *																										37mm ZP obr. 39 *
35mm ZP obr. 39 *																										85mm ZP obr. 39 *
32mm Type 20 Mortar		T																								82mm Type 20 Mortar
32mm Type 53 Mortar																										82mm Type 53 Mortar
120mm PM obr. 38																										120mm PM obr. 38
15mm PTP obr. 42				I																						45mm PTP obr. 42
7mm Type 1 Machine-Moved Gun																										47mm Type 1 Machine-Moved Gun
57mm PTP obr. 43																										57mm PTP obr. 43
57mm Type 36 Recoilless Rifle																										57mm Type 36 Recoilless Rifle
75mm Type 52 Recoilless Rifle						T																				75mm Type 52 Recoilless Rifle
70mm Type 92 Infantry Gun																										70mm Type 92 Infantry Gun
76.2mm PP obr. 27																										76.2mm PP obr. 27
Year-38 Type Field Gun (Improved)																										Year-38 Type Field Gun (Improved)
76.2mm obr. 42																										76.2mm obr. 42
Type 93 Twin-Mount High-Angle Machine Gun																										Type 93 Twin-Mount High-Angle Machine Gu
NAME	J	J	A S		N	D	J F	M	A	VI J 19	S	0	N D	J	F	M A	M	J J		S	) N	D J	F	A M	J,	NAME

<sup>\*</sup> Provided in **BEYOND VALOR**.



1.82 CPVA LEADER EXCHANGE TABLE	$(\Delta)$	
---------------------------------	------------	--

DR	New Leader
2	10-1
3	10-0†
4	9-1
5	9-0†
6-7	8-1
8-9	8-0
10-11	None
12	6+1*

† Any 10-0 or 9-0 received is *not* a Political Officer. After the Leader Exchange DR, exchange any *one* leader for a Political Officer (of the same Morale Level if possible, or otherwise as close as possible).

1.28 CPVA ELR CHART	
Unit Type	ELR
Initial Intervention (W7.12) (1950)	3
Initial Intervention (1951+)	2
Soviet-Armed (W7.13)	3

CPVA	LIGHT MO	ORTAR TABL	E
MTR Type	1950	1-3/51	4/51-53
Type 89 50mm	1-3	1	_
Type 31 60mm	4-6	2-6	1-6

	CPVA BAZOO	KA TABLE	
BAZ Type	1950-8/51	9-12/51	1952-53
BAZ 44	1-6	1-5	1-2
Type 51	_	6	3-6

YEAR	6-7/51	8/51-9/52	10/52-4/53	5-7/53
NORMAL CHITS	7B	3/3R	7B/	2R
DR: 2	100+	70+	80+ M	150+
BPV:	75	50	75	120
3	120+	100+	100+	100+
	90 s	75	95	95
4	80+ M	80+ M	70+	120+
	60	60	67 s	105
5	80+ M	60+ M	60+ M	100+
	65 s	40	50	95
6	60+ M	70+	100+	60+ M
	40	50	95	50
7	NA	80+ M 65 s	80+ M 80 s	80+ M 80 s
8	70+	60+ M	120+	70+
	55 s	40	105	62
9	60+ M	120+	70+	120+
	40	85	62	105
10	70+	70+	60+ M	120+ R
	50	55 s	50	80
11	80+ M	120+	120+ R	70+
	60	90 s	80	67 s
12	70+	120+ R	150+	150+
	50	64	120	120
MAX. BPV:	90	90	120	120

<sup>1:</sup> Make a subsequent DR on the CPVA OBA AMMUNITION SUPPLY CHART to determine Draw Pile (C1.211).

s: Can fire Smoke but not WP.

CPVA O	BA AMMUNI	TION SUPPLY	CHART <sup>1</sup>
6-7/51	8/51-9/52	10/52-4/53	5-7/53
≤ 6 Scarce	≤ 3 Scarce	≤ 6 Normal	≤ 3 Normal
≥ 7 Normal	≥ 4 Normal	≥ 7 Plentiful	≥ 4 Plentiful

<sup>1: +2</sup> DRM if the CPVA is on the offensive.

	1.8	3 CPVA S	SW ALLO	OTMEN	T CHAR	$\mathbf{T}^1$		
Unit Type	LMG	MMG <sup>2</sup>	HMG <sup>2</sup>	.50-cal HMG <sup>2</sup>	LT. MTR <sup>2</sup>	BAZ <sup>2</sup>	FT <sup>3</sup>	DC <sup>3</sup>
Initial Intervention	104	174	254	-	12 <sup>5</sup>	15 <sup>6</sup>	_	1
Soviet-Armed	67	97	147	20	75	11 <sup>6</sup>	6	1
# In Game	8/88	6/68	6/68	2	4/49	4/410	2	6

¹: Allotted according to Equivalent number of Initial Intervention squads (10/50-3/51; W7.12) or Soviet-Armed squads (4/51+; W7.13) [EXC: Grenadier/Recon MMC (W1.121; W7.5) NA].

<sup>\*</sup> Replaces 8-0 (or any other leader if no 8-0 is present).

M: Battalion mortar OBA (C1.22).

R: Rocket OBA (C1.9).

 $<sup>^2</sup>$ : Each MMG/HMG/LtMTR/BAZ comes with a 2-2-8 crew to man it, just as if it were a Gun (1.212; 1.3; W7.91).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>: Allotted according to Equivalent number of Assault Engineer squads; see 1.22 & W7.91.

<sup>4:</sup> Use non-"(r)"-type MG.

<sup>5:</sup> Make a dr for each allotted mortar on the CPVA Light Mortar Table to determine the type of light mortar allotted.


<sup>6:</sup> Make a dr for each allotted BAZ on the CPVA Bazooka Table to determine the type of BAZ allotted.

<sup>7:</sup> Use "(r)"-type MG.

 $<sup>^8</sup>$ : Non-"(r)"-type/"(r)"-type MG.

<sup>9: 50</sup>mm MTR/60mm MTR.

<sup>10:</sup> BAZ 44/Type 51.



Credits H

#### FORGOTTEN WAR: KOREA 1950-1953 CREDITS

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## HARD ROK

ASL SCENARIO 203

Scenario Design: Michael J. Puccio






VICTORY CONDITIONS: The North Koreans win at game end by having ≥ 15 VP (calculated as Exit VP, and including ≥ 8 VP of Infantry) [EXC: prisoners/captured-equipment/Immobile-AFV-(D.7) do not count] south of the canal.

MUNSAN-NI, SOUTH KOREA, 25 June 1950: At 0400, a thunderous barrage began along the rain-soaked 38th parallel; war had come to the Korean peninsula. Despite assurances from American military advisors in South Korea, the Republic of Korea's army was no match for the forces of the north. A Korean People's Army force totaling 100,000 troops surged southward toward Seoul, led by 150 Sovietmade T-34/85 tanks, against which the South Koreans had no effective defense. The U.S. had been unwilling to provide the government of Syngman Rhee with armor amid fears he would use it to launch an invasion of the North. World War II-era 2.36inch bazookas and light anti-tank guns proved nearly worthless against these armored spearheads. The South Koreans, however, did not disintegrate in the face of the Communist onslaught; tough resistance was offered in a number of places, one being the village of Munsan-ni, 35 miles northwest of Seoul.

#### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

#### **BALANCE:**

- Add one 9-1 leader to the South Korean board 23 force.
- Add one 8-1 armor leader and one DC to the North Korean OB.



and B-P on board 23 are playable)

#### TURN RECORD CHART

SOUTH KOREAN Sets Up First [108]

NORTH KOREAN Moves First [168]

5

6

**END** 



Elements of 11th and 12th Infantry Regiments, 1st Division [ELR: 3] set up as noted: {SAN: 3}

Set up on board 10 in hexes numbered  $\geq 4$  and  $\leq 7$ :



2-2-7











**BAZ 45** 3 E WP6 60\* [3-45] 8-5

M 2 



Set up on board 23 (see SSR 2):













M2 3 60\* [3-45]

**5**PP



3

3

2



Elements of 3rd Division [ELR: 4] enter on Turn 1 along the north edge (see SSR 4): {SAN: 4}





2









2







2





16 16 6 2 1 85L 76L

10

2 2

#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- 1. EC are Wet, with no wind at start. Weather is Overcast (E3.5). KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect. The bridge in 23P7 does not exist. All buildings are wooden. Rowhouse black bars and printed stairwells do not exist.
- 2. The South Koreans may use HIP for ≤ two squad-equivalents (and any SMC/SW stacked with them) that set up on board 23.
- 3. Inexperienced PAATC/CCV penalties (A19.34) are NA to South Korean Con-
- 4. North Korean units entering on Turn 1 have already expended half their inherent-MF/printed-MP. North Korean Infantry which declare Double Time (A4.5) at any point on Turn 1 will increase their available MF by only one.
- 5. DC may not be Set in a bridge Location.

AFTERMATH: The South Korean 1st Division was not arrayed effectively to receive the invaders and the South Korean command decided to retreat the division south of the Imjin River. The 12th Infantry Regiment at Kaesong was almost immediately shattered by the sledgehammer blow of the KPA 1st and 6th Divisions and the 40 T-34s that accompanied them. The 11th Infantry Regiment was ordered to Munsan-ni to try to stem the North Korean advance. The North Korean troops followed so closely that only two companies of the 12th Infantry were able to cross the bridge. To make matters worse, the bridge demolitions failed to detonate. The South Korean infantry, realizing the T-34s were the decisive weapon, attempted to destroy them with satchel charges, some placed on poles. The 1st Division acquitted itself well, holding its position along the Imjin for nearly three days until events unfolding further east in the Uijongbu corridor forced it to retreat toward Seoul.

## **HUMAN BULLETS**

**ASL SCENARIO 204** 

Scenario Design: Rick McKown





VICTORY CONDITIONS: The North Koreans win immediately upon exiting ≥ 15 Exit VP [EXC: prisoners/captured-equipment do not count] off the south edge; vehicles may only exit through hexside 82R3-Q3 (see SSR 6).

On the INJE-HONGCH'ON road, SOUTH KOREA, 28 June 1950: As the

morning fog lifted on the fourth day of war, motorized elements of the KPA 7th Division, supported by armor, rolled down the Hongch'on road, intent on overrunning the defenders of the South Korean 6th Division. In the pass, a ROK company from the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment, supported by two batteries of the 16th Field Artillery Battalion and elements of the 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment, were waiting and ready.

#### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

**BALANCE:** 

- Add two 4-4-7 squads to South Korean Group A.
- Delete the last sentence of SSR 4.



82 (Only hexrows A-P on board 24

#### TURN RECORD CHART

SOUTH KOREAN Sets Up First [81/95/109]

NORTH KOREAN Moves First [168]

6

8

**END** 

and R-GG on 82 are playable)




Group A: Elements of 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment [ELR: 4] set up on board 24 in non-road hexes on/between hexrows A and H, concealed if in Concealment Terrain (see SSR 2): {SAN: 4}





Group B: Special Anti-tank Attack Unit, 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment; 2nd Platoon, Anti-tank Gun Company, 2nd Regiment; and Special Anti-tank Attack Unit, 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment: secretly select one Option and set up using HIP on board 82 in non-road Steep Hills hexes on/between hexrows R and BB (see SSR 3):






Elements of 7th Division and Independent Armored Regiment [ELR: 4] set up as noted: {SAN: 2}


3

Set up on board 24 on/between hexrows L and P, in/adjacent-to road hexes (see SSR 4):



Set up on board 82 (see SSR 5):

3



## **HUMAN BULLETS**





#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- 1. EC are Wet, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) and Steep Hills (W1.3) are in effect [EXC: the Steep Hills Road on board 82 is not considered One-Lane; however, all MP penalties for entering a Steep Hills Road hex that contains a wreck/vehicle are doubled as if it were a Sunken Road hex (B4.42), and any vehicle entering a Steep Hills Road hex containing a wreck/vehicle must also check for Bog with an additional +1 DRM for every wreck/vehicle present]. Ground is soft (D8.21). Bore Sighting (C6.4) is NA.
- 2. The South Koreans may use HIP for  $\leq$  two Group A squad-equivalents (and any SMC/SW stacked with them).
- 3. South Korean Group B units are Fanatic (A10.8) and have MOL (A22.6) capability. The number of H-B Heroes (W3.23) that may be generated (or set up) by Group B squads/HS is based on the number of squads in the selected Option.
- 4. SW in the North Korean OB are CPVA (W.2C). North Korean Infantry must set up with ≤ one MMC, ≤ one SMC, and ≤ one SW per hex. After setup, but prior to the start of play, each North Korean Infantry unit must take a PTC.
- 5. All North Korean AFV must set up in Motion as a single Convoy (E11.) in road hexes on/between 82Y5 and 82CC4; VCA must include a road hexside "towards" 82X4. Until disbanded, the Convoy *must* move ≥ one hex per Game Turn along the road towards hex 82R3 and cannot expend a Stop MP. Any AFV that suffers Recall (D5.341) must still attempt to exit off the south edge through hexside 82R3-Q3 and counts normally for Exit VP. AFV crews may not voluntarily Abandon (D5.4) their vehicles.

AFTERMATH: The ROKs had prepared a kill zone in the open terrain north of the Low Malgogae and successfully separated the North Korean armor from its accompanying truck-borne infantry from the 7th Division, an ethnic Korean unit in the People's Liberation Army that the Chinese transferred to the KPA. The ROKs made good use of the restrictive terrain to ambush the armor on the narrow, twisting road through the pass. The first shot from a 57mm anti-tank gun bounced off the lead AFV, and that gun and its crew were promptly destroyed by the following vehicle. At the next "S-turn" in the road, a second 57mm gun stopped the lead AFV with one shot, then killed the second. This was quickly followed by a "human bullet" eliminating the lead AFV, while a bazooka round killed the rear vehicle, trapping the rest on the narrow road, where they were destroyed by "Special Anti-Tank Units" using close assault with grenades and Molotov cocktails. The destruction of more than ten North Korean AFVs in one action was a big morale boost for the ROK.

## SUPER BAZOOKA

#### ASL SCENARIO 205

Scenario Design: Thomas Meier






VICTORY CONDITIONS: The North Koreans win immediately upon exiting ≥ two AFV off of the east edge on/between H10 and J10 or at game end by amassing more VP than the Americans. CVP are earned normally, and the North Koreans also receive Exit VP for AFV exited off the east edge on/between H10 and J10.

West of TAEGU, SOUTH KOREA, 20 July 1950: The 24th Infantry Division's defense at Taejon was collapsing. As battle-hardened units of the KPA 3rd Seoul Division, 4th Seoul Division, and 105th Seoul Armored Division enveloped the city from the north, west, and south, American units fought desperate delaying actions and began to withdraw to the east. One serious problem encountered by both American and South Korean units in the early stages of the war was a lack of effective anti-tank weapons. The available 57mm anti-tank guns, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, and 2.36-inch bazookas were not able to penetrate KPA T-34/85s. This deficiency was reported up the chain, and the U. S. Army sped delivery of the new 3.5-inch "super bazookas" to Korea. The first of these weapons reached American units on 19 July. The next day, Colonel Charles E. Beauchamp, CO of the 34th Infantry Regiment, was having difficulty communicating with his units. When told that contact with 1st Battalion could not be restored, Beauchamp decided to review the situation in person. He mounted a jeep with his driver and sped west along the main road. Approximately ½ mile west of Taejon, he came to the Nonsan-Kongju road junction. As the jeep approached the crossroads, a T-34/85 lumbered into view and immediately opened fire.

#### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

#### **BALANCE:**

Add one roadblock to the American OB.





TURN RECORD CHART

(Only hexrows G-GG are playable)

I CILL LIBOURE CITATION						
☆ AMERICAN Sets Up First	<b>②</b>	2	2	1	5	FND
NORTH KOREAN Moves First		_	3		3	END



Elements of 24th Infantry Division [ELR: 2] set up as noted: {SAN: 0}

2nd Platoon, G Company, 19th Infantry Regiment set up ≤ 4 hexes from R3:



Engineer Section, C Company, 3rd Combat Engineer Battalion set up ≤ 3 hexes from N8:





Bazooka Section, 24th Reconnaissance Company set up using HIP anywhere:





Elements of 107th Armored Regiment, 105th Seoul Armored Division enter on Turn 1 on GG5: {SAN: 0}





#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

**1.** EC are Dry, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect. Place overlay **RP2** on L10-M10. Place a *T-34/85* wreck in O5. All buildings are wooden. Paddy Fields (W1.2) are Irrigated (G8.12).

AFTERMATH: Beauchamp dove from his jeep as the tank sprayed the vehicle with its machine guns. He was wounded and the jeep was set on fire. He crawled back eastwards from the engagement site and encountered a 3.5-inch bazooka team from Charlie Company, 3rd Combat Engineer Battalion. This team destroyed the T-34/85 with their newly-acquired "super bazooka," captured its crew, and secured the road junction. Later that morning, this team plus another from the 24th Recon Company destroyed two more North Korean tanks; the first three "super bazooka" kills in the theater. The brief dominance of North Korean armor had come to an end.

## HEY, THAT AIN'T A ROK!

**ASL SCENARIO 206** 

Scenario Design: Paul Works





VICTORY CONDITIONS: The North Koreans win at game end by amassing more VP than the Americans. CVP are earned normally, and both sides earn Exit VP for units exited off the east edge of board 50. Prisoners/captured-equipment do not count for CVP or Exit VP purposes.

Near HADONG, SOUTH KOREA, 27 July 1950: The 29th Infantry Regiment arrived at Pusan on 24 July, just four days after receiving 400 new recruits in Okinawa. On 25 July, Colonel Harold W. Mott, the Regimental Commander, received orders to seize Hadong, a road junction 35 miles southwest of Chinju, and gave the task to the 29th Regiment's 3rd Battalion. Major General Chae Byong Duk, formerly ROK Army Chief of Staff, offered to accompany the force to act as an interpreter, guide, and advisor. The 3rd Battalion moved out and arrived at the summit of Hadong Pass, 1.5 miles east of Hadong, on 27 July. The lead companies were ordered to deploy along the road and to move to the higher ground to the north. The battalion command group moved to the front of the column to observe. As the command group arrived, they witnessed a column of soldiers approaching from the west, some dressed in South Korean uniforms, some sporting the KPA its

astard brown. When General Chae called out in Keelf, the troops responded by scattering to the sides	
OARD CONFIGURATION:	
<b>A</b>	

# 37

#### **BALANCE:**

☆ American ELR is "3".

Exchange the 9-1 leader with a 9-2 leader in the North Korean at-start OB.

TURN RECORD CHART

AMERICAN Sets Up First [223] 6 8 **END** NORTH KOREAN Moves First [428]


B

Elements of 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division [ELR: 2] set up as noted: {SAN: 2}

Battalion Command Group set up within 1 hex of 50G9 (see SSR 2):



L Company and Anti-tank Platoon, M Company set up on/between hexrows H and O in hexes numbered  $\geq 9$  on board 50 and  $\leq 2$  on board 37, with  $\leq$  one MMC per hex:



K Company set up on board 50, on/between hexrows Q and U at Level 1/2, with ≤ one MMC per hex:



I and M Companies set up on/adjacent-to the 50V5-Y5-CC5 road, with ≤ one MMC per hex:



## HEY, THAT AIN'T A ROK! ASL SCENARIO 206 (continued)








Elements of 6th Division [ELR: 4] set up as noted: {SAN: 4}

Lead Divisional Elements set up on board 50 on/west-of hexrow E:



Set up on board 50 at ≥ Level 3 (see SSR 3):



Enter on Turn 1 along the west/south edge(s) on/between 50A1 and 37O10:



#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- 1. EC are Very Dry with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect. Paddy Fields (W1.2) are Irrigated (G8.12). The stream is Dry (B20.41).
- 2. Only one SMC of the Battalion Command Group may set up as a Passenger in the Jeep. The 9-1 leader in the Battalion Command Group begins the scenario
- 3. The at-start North Korean BM obr 37 MTR may place a -2 Area Acquisition (C6.521) counter in any hex in its LOS at setup.

AFTERMATH: As the now-identified North Korean troops scattered, American machine guns opened fire. As the now-identified North Korean troops scattered, all hell broke loose as the KPA sprang its trap. North Korean rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire swept over the pass from the high ground to the north. In the first fusillade, General Chae was struck in the head and killed instantly. Colonel Mott and several other staff officers were wounded by the same fire. In moments, the 3rd Battalion's command group had been put out of action. Pre-registered mortar fire landed on the roadway and among the American soldiers and vehicles. The green American troops were initially able to hold off the aggressive North Korean attacks, but within an hour the battalion began to disintegrate. By nightfall, it had ceased to function as an effective force; only 345 men reported for duty on 28 July. It would be up to other American units to halt the North Korean envelopment and prevent the capture of Pusan.

## **BULLETS FOR BREAKFAST**

**ASL SCENARIO 207** 

Scenario Design: Paul Works






VICTORY CONDITIONS: The North Koreans win at game end by having ≥ 1 Good Order squad-equivalent in hexes 44R7/S7 *and* at least as many as the Americans have altogether in hexes 44R7-S7.

CHINDONG-NI, 8 km west of MASAN, SOUTH KOREA, 3 August 1950: During late July and early August 1950, the UN Eighth Army commander, General Walton Walker, desperately sought to establish a defensive perimeter around Pusan to stem the tide of the North Korean onslaught. As July drew to a close, the elite KPA 6th Division moved rapidly to the southern coast in order to slip around the UN left flank, punch a hole through the anticipated weak American defenses, and occupy Pusan in a lighting stroke that would end the war in dramatic fashion. Unaware of the North Korean movements, Colonel John Michaelis, commanding officer of the 27th Infantry Regiment ("Wolfhounds"), had established his rear Regimental HQ in a schoolhouse on the outskirts of the fishing village of Chindong-ni, astride the most southern coastal road. On 3 August, Michaelis awoke to the sound of gunfire peppering the building.

#### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**



#### **BALANCE:**

- Add two 6-6-6 squads and two 1S Foxholes to the A Company force.
- 2nd Battalion enters on Turn 2.

#### TURN RECORD CHART

AMERICAN Sets Up First [285]

NORTH KOREAN Moves First [300]

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 END




Elements of 27th Infantry Regiment, 11th Field Artillery Battalion and 8072nd Tank Battalion, 25th Infantry Division and 8th Field Artillery Battalion, 24th Infantry Division [ELR: 3] set up as noted, with ≤ one squad/HS per hex: {SAN: 2}









B Company, 27th Infantry Regiment set up in non-road hexes ≤ 2 hexes from 44O2:




27th Infantry Regiment Perimeter Security set up on board 9 in ≥ Level 2 hill hexes (see SSR 4):



Elements of 8th Field Artillery Battalion set up  $\leq$  4 hexes from 44H2 (see SSR 5):




2nd Platoon, Detachment A, 8072nd Tank Battalion set up in non-road hexes ≤ 3 hexes from 44S2; AFVs set up Abandoned (D5.4) (see SSR 6):



## **BULLETS FOR BREAKFAST**

ASL SCENARIO 207 (continued)





#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

1. EC are Dry, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect [EXC: woods remain woods]. Place overlay RP5 on 44W8-V7. All walls are hedges. All buildings have a ground level only [EXC: building 9DD3 does not exist]. Paddy Fields (W1.2) are Irrigated (G8.12).

3

2. Contrary to W2.14, American Personnel are Lax (A11.18) only during Game Turns 1-4.

2

- 3. The 10-2 leader may not set up in the same hex as a SW. The Jeep sets up Abandoned (D5.4). M1 ART Guns must set up unpossessed in 44Q8/44R8, and all A Battery and HQ crews must set up in buildings.
- **4.** Each Perimeter Security HS must set up beneath a separate 1S Foxhole counter with a LOS to hex 44S8. All Foxholes must be set up ≥ 2 hexes from all other Foxholes. After American setup, but prior to North Korean setup, each Perimeter Security HS must take a NTC. A HS that fails its NTC is immediately removed from play.
- 5. M2A1 ART Guns must set up unpossessed ≥ 2 hexes apart, and 8th Field Artillery Battalion crews must set up in/adjacent-to 44F2.

3

- **6.** During setup, the American player secretly designates two *M4A3E8* MTs as being Immobilized (D8.1). After North Korean setup, but prior to the start of play, the American player places "Immobilized" counters on the two designated tanks.
- 7. The North Koreans are Elite (C8.2). Captured SW in the North Korean OB have no WP ammunition. The North Korean player may designate ≤ three 6-2-8 squads as Assault Engineers (H1.22).
- 8. Use any Russian truck counters to represent the extra ZIS-5 trucks. A ZIS-5 is Recalled (D5.341) as if an AFV when it is no longer transporting Passengers.

AFTERMATH: The KPA 14th Regiment, 6th Division, launched its assault at dawn. During the night, lead elements of the 14th Regiment had infiltrated the ridgeline to the north and scattered the lax perimeter security troops. The North Koreans expected to encounter only American regimental staff elements and rear-area troops at Chindong-ni. By a string of fortuitous events and well-considered planning, the 27th Infantry Regiment staff had bedded down surrounded not only by rear-area troops, but also by the entire 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment and a regimental gun battery. In addition, a battery of 105mm howitzers from the 8th Field Artillery Battalion was emplaced just across the road, and Shermans from the 2nd Platoon, Detachment A, 8072nd Tank Battalion were parked nearby. After a few initial minutes of chaos, Michaelis established an effective defense around the schoolyard. The green but well-trained Wolfhounds, led by capable officers and NCOs, and supported by direct fire from the guns and tanks, counterattacked and drove the North Koreans from the village and the surrounding terrain. The KPA 6th Division had encountered its first well-trained American unit and suffered its first defeat. The 6th Division's bold plan to drive into Pusan along the road through Masan had failed, leading to Chindong-ni being called the "high water mark" of the North Korean invasion.

## THE GRIST MILL

ASL SCENARIO 208

Scenario Design: Thomas Meier





VICTORY CONDITIONS: The North Koreans win at game end by Controlling building R9.

SOESIL, SOUTH KOREA, 6 August 1950: A line around Pusan was hastily established during the first few days of August. The American 34th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division defended a sector on the east side of the Naktong River directly opposite Yongsan. Here the Naktong swung to the west and created a bulgesoon to be known as the "Naktong Bulge" - in the 8th Army's line, an area that would become the scene of furious fighting over the next six weeks. During the night of 5 August, the KPA 4th Guards Seoul Division made its initial assault into the bulge. Using effective reconnaissance, 800 North Korean troops of the 3rd Battalion, 16th Regiment waded across the river at the Ohang ferry crossing directly between the 34th Regiment's I and L Companies. The North Koreans pressed forward nearly two miles before the 34th's commander, Colonel Charles E. Beauchamp, realized what was happening and ordered the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Harold "Red" Ayres, to counterattack and restore the regiment's position. The next morning, Ayres led C Company forward, where they encountered North Korean positions in the vicinity of Soesil village.

#### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

**BALANCE:** 

Add one MMG to the American OB.

Add two 4-4-7 squads to the North Korean OB.

18


TURN RECORD CHART

☆ AMERICAN Sets Up First	4	2	2	/	5	END
NORTH KOREAN Moves First [98]			J	4	3	END



Elements of C Company, 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division [ELR: 3] set up  $\leq$  6 hexes from R9 (see SSR 2): {SAN: 3}








Elements of 3rd Battalion, 16th Regiment, 4th Guards Seoul Division [ELR: 3] set up ≥ 8 hexes from R9: {SAN: 4}









#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- 1. EC are Dry, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect. Place a scrounged M4A3E8 wreck in hex Q9.
- 2. The .50-cal HMG must set up in hex Q9 and may not be moved from that

AFTERMATH: Col. Ayres ordered C Company to seize a series of hills occupied by the KPA northwest of Soesil while he directed 60mm mortar fire in support. As enemy fire increased and casualties mounted, C Company was forced to break off the attack and fall back. The remnants of C Company took refuge in an abandoned grist mill while Col. Ayres and his staff frantically rushed back on foot to bring up the rest of the battalion. The company fought tenaciously in and around the grist mill, utilizing the .50-cal machine gun mounted on a nearby wreck to spray the surrounding hills. The company held out until late in the day when a column of A Company troops, supported by tanks and AAA vehicles, finally arrived on the scene and relieved the 35 survivors.

## A LINE TOO THINLY HE

ASL SCENARIO 209

Scenario Design: Thomas Meier





VICTORY CONDITIONS: The North Koreans win immediately if there is no Good Order American MMC at ≥ Level 1 on board 17 and/or if no American AFV remains in play.


KIHANG FERRY CROSSING, AGOK, SOUTH KOREA, 31 August 1950: When the recently arrived 2nd Infantry Division relieved the battered 24th Infantry Division west of Taegu on 29 August, it was required to defend 20 kilometers of rough terrain. This resulted in the division not presenting a continuous line but rather a number of scattered defensive positions and observation posts. On the night of 31 August, the North Koreans launched a multi-division attack aimed at Taegu. The bulk of the KPA 9th Infantry Division attacked the line of the 9th Infantry Regiment that roughly followed the Naktong River, with an immediate objective of Yongsan, eight miles to the east. At the Kihang ferry crossing near Agok, A Company, supported by two tanks and two AAA halftracks, prepared to receive

#### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

#### BALANCE:

Add one 6-6-7 squad and one 7-0 leader to the first group in the American OB.

The Base NVR is 4 hexes.



(Only hexrows L-GG are playable)

#### TURN RECORD CHART

AMERICAN Sets Up First

ONORTH KOREAN Moves First [199]

6

**END** 



Elements of A Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, 72nd Tank Battalion and 82nd Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division [ELR: 3] set up as noted; OB-given "?" counters may be set up in non-Concealment Terrain: {SAN: 3}

Set up in hill hexes on board 17; each MMC must set up

≥ 2 hexes from all other MMC in this group:





Set up ≤ 4 hexes from 17BB5:









6



9





2

2

2

2



Elements of 9th Division [ELR: 3] set up as noted: {SAN: 5}

1st Battalion set up on board 8, east of the river:





15















1st Company set up concealed on board 17 on/south-of hexrow X, ≥ 2 hexes from all American units:





Regimental weapons set up west of the river; AA Guns may not set up in buildings:





4

2

#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

1. EC are Very Dry, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect. Place overlays as follows: OG2 on 8T1-U1; OG5 on 8N1-O2; and Hi7 on 17N3-O3. All single-hex buildings are Huts (G5.); all other buildings have a ground level only. Despite the date, Early KW U.S. Army rules (W2.14) are not in effect.

- 2. Night rules (E1.) are in effect. The Base NVR is 6 hexes. The Majority Squad Type for both sides is Normal.
- 3. The first CC requiring an Ambush dr is an automatic North Korean Ambush.
- 4. The North Koreans receive one module of 80mm+ OBA (HE only; Harassing Fire is NA) with one Pre-Registered (C1.73) hex, directed by an Offboard Observer (C1.63) at Level 3 in any west-edge hex recorded secretly prior to setup.

AFTERMATH: During the night, North Korean infantry infiltrated through gaps in the American lines and, once the main assault began, numerous 2nd Infantry Division units found themselves attacked from the flanks and the rear. Despite fierce resistance, the American line was too thin and the North Koreans too many, forcing the American units to withdraw to the east. At the Kihang ferry crossing, North Korean infantry waded the river covered by mortar fire hitting previously-identified American positions. As elsewhere, North Korean infiltrators slipped between the American positions; together with the battalion river assault, this was too much for the American infantry, who began to redeploy east along the road to Yongsan through what had effectively become enemy lines. AFVs were used to cover this movement; the Pershings occupied dominant terrain locations and effectively inhibited the North Korean advance. One M26 tank commander, Sergeant Ernest Kuomo, kept his tank in position, without infantry support, for nine hours at the Kihang ferry crossing before he was finally forced to withdraw. Kuomo's actions on 31 August, enabling numerous American soldiers to make an orderly withdrawal and stabilizing the local situation in the face of overwhelming enemy forces, earned him the Medal of Honor.

## THIS IS WHERE WE STAND

**ASL SCENARIO 210** 

Scenario Design: Keith Dalton





VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Communist Chinese win at game end by Controlling all Level 3 hexes.

HILL 1282, YUDAM-NI, NORTH KOREA, 27 November 1950: The 1st Marine Division had been cut off by tens of thousands of Communist Chinese regulars who had infiltrated into North Korea and closed the main supply road to the south. Now the Communist Chinese command moved swiftly to overwhelm the high ground around the Chosin Reservoir held by elements of the 7th Marine Regiment. On this night, the CPVA 1st Battalion, 235th Regiment came calling on Easy Company in a bid to break through to the command posts of the 5th and 7th Marines.

#### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

#### **BALANCE:**

Add three Trip Flares to the American OB.

Delete the last sentence of SSR 5.



(Only hexrows A-V are playable)

#### TURN RECORD CHART

AMERICAN Sets Up First [198]

COMMUNIST CHINESE Moves First [480]

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 END



Elements of E Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division [ELR: 4] set up on Hill 621; MMC (and any SMC/SW stacked with them) in suitable terrain may set up Entrenched (B27.1): {SAN: 2}





Elements of A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment enter on Turn 4 along the east edge:





Elements of 235th Regiment, 79th Division [ELR: 3] enter on Turn 1 along the west edge: {SAN: 3}





#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- **1.** EC are Wet, with no wind at start. Ground Snow (E3.72) and Extreme Winter (E3.74; W.4) are in effect [EXC: American radio]. Steep Hills (W1.3) are in effect. Roads and cliffs do not exist.
- 2. Night rules (E1.) are in effect. The Base NVR is 3 hexes. The Communist Chinese are the Scenario Attacker and the Americans the Scenario Defender. The Majority Squad Type for the Communist Chinese is Stealthy and for the Americans is Normal.
- **3.** The Americans receive one module of 80+mm battalion mortar (C1.22) OBA (HE/IR; Harassing Fire is NA). Battery Access is never permanently lost when the second non-*extra* red chit is drawn; instead, return it to the draw pile along with an *additional* red chit.
- **4.** *M2 60mm* mortars suffer from Ammunition Shortage (A19.131).
- **5.** The Communist Chinese may sound Bugles (W7.8) and have Winter Camouflage (E3.712). Communist Chinese may only Throw DCs (A23.6).

AFTERMATH: Preceded by the eerie sound of bugles, the Communist Chinese charged up the hill in a series of human wave assaults, throwing grenades as they went. Witnesses reported seeing Communist Chinese soldiers carrying whole baskets of grenades. The Marines fought back fiercely despite weather-induced weapon jams, but were about to falter when the company commander, Captain Walter Phillips, drove an M-1 rifle bayonet into the ground and screamed "This is Easy Company and this is where we stand!" Platoon leader 1st Lieutenant John Yancey moved along the perimeter and steadied the Marines despite his several wounds, including having one eye dislodged from its socket. Neither Phillips nor company executive officer, 1st Lieutenant Raymond Ball survived the attack, but Easy Company, although nearly wiped out, held long enough for reinforcements from A Company, 5th Marines, to secure Hill 1282.

## TASK FORCE FAITH BREAKOU





VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Americans win immediately upon exiting ≥ 9 trucks off the west edge of board 18.


East of CHOSIN RESERVOIR, NORTH KOREA, 1 December 1950: During the nights of 27 and 28 November 1950, the separated elements of the 31st Regimental Combat Team were surrounded and nearly destroyed by elements of the 80th and 81st CPVA Divisions. On 29 November, the regimental units were consolidated on the south side of the P'ungnyuri River Inlet on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir and reorganized as Task Force Faith, named after the newly-appointed commander, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith. Following four nights of continuous attacks, and warned with dire information from reconnaissance and support aircraft, Faith received permission to organize a breakout south toward Hagaru-ni. The key component of the breakout was a convoy carrying over 600 wounded soldiers. The trucks were completely filled with the seriously wounded, while those with lesser injuries walked beside the vehicles. The most cohesive remaining companies led the way along the only road to safety. As the convoy formed up, sporadic mortar fire landed in the assembly area and, as the lead units exited the perimeter, Communist Chinese infantry attacked, threatening to halt the breakout five minutes after it had started.

#### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

#### **BALANCE:**

Exchange one 60mm MTR with one 82mm Type 20 MTR in the Communist Chinese OB.

☆ Delete the last sentence of SSR 3.



#### TURN RECORD CHART COMMUNIST Sets Up First [184]

CHINESE AMERICAN Moves First [0]

6

8

**END** 



Elements of 241st Regiment, 81st Division, 20th Army [ELR: 3] set up as noted: {SAN: 5}

8th Company, 3rd Battalion set up on/between hexrows S and BB:















OVR, OBA: Other: +2

6

Elements of 3rd Battalion set up on/west-of hexrow R:











Elements of 3rd Battalion, 242nd Regiment, 81st Division enter on Turn 6 along the south edge on/between 18A10 and 18Q10:
















3


Elements of A Company, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 31st Regimental Combat Team, Task Force Faith [ELR: 2]






enter on Turn 1 along the east edge of board 19 (see SSR 4): {SAN: 2}

Headquarters Company enter on/after Turn 1 along the east edge; all units



B Company enter on Turn 2 along the east edge of board 18:



Convoy enter on/between Turns 3 and 5 on 19GG5; all units must enter on the same turn [EXC: E11.7] (see SSR 8):





37

★ ★ T10

\*AAMG -/-/4





2

## TASK FORCE FAITH BREAKOUT

ASL SCENARIO 211 (continued)

#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

1. EC are Snow, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect. Ground Snow (E3.72) and Extreme Winter (E3.74; W.4) are in effect. Only road 19GG5/GG6-M8-18I1-18A5/A6 exists and is plowed (E3.723). A two-lane stone bridge that connects to the road in hexes X5 and Z5 exists in hex 19oY6. All streams are Dry (B20.41). All buildings are Huts (G5.). Place overlays as follows: St3 on 19Y3-Y4; OW1 on 18DD6-CC6; and Hi7 on 18R7-Q8.

- 2. In addition to HIP granted by W7.96, the Communist Chinese may use HIP for ≤ three MMC (and any SW/SMC stacked with them).
- 3. Both sides suffer from Ammunition Shortage (A19.131). The M19A1 MGMC and M16 MGMC begin play with Low Ammo counters (D3.71).
- 4. The A Company 9-1 leader begins play Wounded (A17.).
- **5.** The Americans receive one module of 100+mm OBA (consisting of only *one* HE Concentration Fire Mission) directed by an Offboard Observer (C1.63) at Level 0 in any east-edge hex recorded secretly prior to setup. No Battery Access draw is required for this Fire Mission [EXC: any extra draw required per C1.21].
- 6. The Americans automatically receive Air Support (E7.) in the form of:
  - Turn 1: two '44 FB with Napalm (G17.4)
  - Turn 5: one '44 FB with Napalm (G17.4)

Each aircraft is limited to a maximum of four Game Turns onboard.

- 7. The American Friendly Board Edge (A20.53) is the west edge of board 18.
- 8. Use any American truck counters to represent the extra 2½-Ton trucks. All Convoy 2½-Ton trucks must enter as a single Convoy (E11.) and must remain in Convoy until ≥ three trucks have been immobilized/eliminated/captured. Trucks must remain in/adjacent-to a road hex at all times. Contrary to E11.3, a truck that leaves its Convoy is assumed to have 1 PP.


AFTERMATH: Just as the breakout began to stall, Marine Corsairs roared over the heads of the lead American units and pounded Communist Chinese positions with machine guns and napalm. Aircraft rotated on station throughout the day, providing air cover engaging with and without tactical air control. By nightfall, however, the convoy had advanced as far south as it ever would; the aircraft could no longer provide effective support, the supporting MG halftracks had run out of ammunition, and a Communist Chinese roadblock was encountered. The convoy disintegrated and the encircling Communist Chinese forces overran the Task Force. Of the 2,500 men in the RCT, an estimated 1,000 were killed or captured. Task Force Faith did not go out with a whimper, however; the ad hoc Army regiment so decimated the 80th and 81st CPVA Divisions that they could not support the attempted encirclement of the 1st Marine Division and were out of action until the next spring.

# FIRST BAYONET CHARGE

ASL SCENARIO 212

Scenario Design: Laurent Closier





VICTORY CONDITIONS: The OUNC win at game end by Controlling all Level 3 hexes.

HILL 247, south of WONJU, SOUTH KOREA, 10 January 1951: The Bataillon Français de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (BF/ONU, or French Battalion of the United Nations) was created on 1 October 1950 after a brief period of recruitment and amid a difficult political and economic environment. Constituted entirely of experienced volunteers and placed under Lieutenant-Colonel Raoul Magrin-Vernerey Monclar (in reality, a Lieutenant General), the 1,000-strong battalion arrived in Pusan on 29 November, moving to Camp Walker at Taegu to receive weapons and equipment and undergo specialized training. The unit then left for Suwon to begin a difficult integration into the 23rd Infantry Regiment under Colonel Paul Freeman, becoming its 4th Battalion. In addition to the language barrier, the Americans had a low opinion of the French soldiers, having just liberated their country a few years earlier. But courteous relations were maintained by their respective unit commanders, and the first engagements against the enemy quickly erased any negative feelings between the allies. The fighting around Wonju, about 145 km east of Seoul, was the first battle in which the Bataillon Français participated.

### BOARD CONFIGURATION:

### BALANCE:

- Add one 4-4-7 squad to the North Korean reinforcements.
- 2 Exchange two 5-5-7 squads with two 5-5-8 squads in the OUNC OB.



(Only hexrows A-V are playable)

### TURN RECORD CHART

NORTH KOREAN Sets Up First [0]

OUNC Moves First [140]

6

**END** 



Elements of 2nd Division [ELR: 2] set up in hill hexes: {SAN: 3}

















Enter on Turn 5 along the north/west edge(s) on/between Q1 and V5:









Elements of 3ème Compagnie, Bataillon Français, 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division [ELR: 3] enter on Turn 1 along the south/east edge(s) on/between A5 and G10: {SAN: 2}





### **SPECIAL RULES:**

1. EC are Snow, with a Mild Breeze from the northwest at start. Weather is Overcast (E3.5), with Snow (E3.71) falling at scenario start. Extreme Winter (E3.74; W.4) and Ground Snow (E3.72) are in effect [EXC: Deep Snow (E3.73) in ≥ Level 2 hill hexes]. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect. Place overlays as follows: OG4 on G9-H8; and OG5 on E8-E7. All buildings are Crag. Bore Sighting (C6.4) is NA.

2. The OUNC are French, and may conduct Bayonet Charges (W.6).

AFTERMATH: The village of Wonju, located in a valley, was an important crossroads in central Korea, controlled by the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division when two battalions of the KPA's V Corps attacked on 7 January. The attack was quickly repulsed, but the position was judged indefensible by General Robert McClure, commanding the 2nd Division. He abandoned the village to the Communists and repositioned 8 miles further south-too far away to threaten the enemy with his artillery. McClure was sacked on 8 January, and the division was ordered to retake Wonju. Three miles south of the village, the 23rd Regiment took Hill 247 by surprise, but was forced to abandon the hill again in the face of Communist counterattacks. During three days of combat amid terrible conditions of wind, snow, and frost, the 23rdsupported by the Bataillon-continued its attempts to retake the hill. Out of ammunition, a group of 25 French soldiers commanded by Lieutenant Gildas LeBeurrier conducted a bayonet charge on 10 January, leading to eventual control of Hill 247, and cementing the Bataillon's reputation for the duration of the war. Finally, on 12 January, Hill 247 came under UN control, after which Wonju became a sort of no man's land, subjected to artillery fire from both sides.

### IT'S SO EASY!

### ASL SCENARIO 213

Scenario Design: Laurent Closier





VICTORY CONDITIONS: Provided the Communist Chinese amass ≤ 6 CVP, the Americans win at game end by amassing ≥ 9 VP. VP are earned as follows: 1 VP for each Communist Chinese MMC that loses hidden or Concealed status for the first time during the game (1 VP maximum per MMC; record their IDs) and VP for Prisoners exited off the east edge (see SSR 5).


West of CHIPYONG-NI, SOUTH KOREA, 10 February 1951: For a week, the 23rd Infantry Regiment improved its positions on the low hills surrounding the road hub of Chipyong-ni, amid reports that the Communist Chinese were moving in force both to the east and west. Lacking information on communist objectives, the American commander was ordered to take prisoners for interrogation. The night of 10-11 February was chosen by the 1st Ranger Company for a raid. The battle-hardened men of the 23rd Infantry disliked the Rangers for their cockiness. They "talked a good fight" but had yet to produce in battle. According to the Rangers, this night raid would be simple. One platoon would infiltrate to a position just south of Changdae, a small town about three miles west of Chipyong-ni. Another would infiltrate to the north edge of the town. This platoon would then "shoot up" Changdae, driving frightened Communist Chinese into the hands of the other platoon waiting at the south edge of town. It sounded so easy that a French newspaper correspondent, who had just arrived in the perimeter that day, was granted permission to accompany the Rangers. They left the perimeter around 2000 hours.

### BOARD CONFIGURATION:

### **BALANCE:**

Delete the last sentence of SSR 3.

☆ Delete SSR 4.



### TURN RECORD CHART

COMMUNIST CHINESE Sets Up First [132]

AMERICAN Moves First

6

**END** 



Elements of 126th Division [ELR: 3] set up on/west-of hexrow C (see SSR 3): {SAN: 3}





















Elements of 1st Ranger Company [ELR: 3] enter on Turn 1 along the east edge: {SAN: 2}









### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- 1. EC are Wet, with no wind at start. Weather is Ground Snow (E3.72) and Overcast (E3.5) [EXC: Falling Snow [E3.71] rather than Rain can occur]. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect.
- 2. Night rules (E1.) are in effect. The Base NVR is 1 hex. E1.15 and NVR change (E1.12) are NA. The Americans are the Scenario Attacker and the Communist Chinese the Scenario Defender. The Majority Squad Type for both sides is Stealthy.
- 3. The Communist Chinese *must* set up at least one MMC (and *may* set up  $\leq$  three non-hidden MMC) on/between hexrows C and H. Hidden/Dummy units may set up on/west-of hexrow C. A maximum of one MMC (and any SMC/SW stacked with it) may set up per hex. All SMC/SW must set up on/west-of hexrow I.
- 4. Ranger MMC broken morale level is one less than printed.
- 5. American units exited off the east edge on/after Turn 6 do not count for CVP.

AFTERMATH: At about 2140, a great din of machine guns and small arms reports broke the silence of the night; the battle lasted for about thirty minutes. Both platoons had run into strong enemy positions before they reached the town. Numerous Communist Chinese machine guns ripped into the ranks of the Rangers, killing several and wounding many. Among the dead was the French newspaper correspondent covering the Rangers, who were forced to beat a hasty retreat, abandoning their dead and many of their wounded. The Communist Chinese were the only ones that captured any prisoners that night. After this episode, particularly due to the abandonment of the wounded, the Rangers' stock sank lower than ever among the combat infantrymen of the 23rd Infantry Regiment.

## SEOUL SAVING

### ASL SCENARIO 214

Scenario Design: Andrew H. Hershey






VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Communist Chinese win at game end by exiting  $\geq$  55 Exit VP [EXC: prisoners do not count] off the south edge. Beginning on British Player Turn 6, British units may exit off the south edge without being considered eliminated; each such unit exited reduces the Communist Chinese Exit VP total by an amount equal to that British unit's Exit VP value.


HILL 182, east of CHOKSONG, SOUTH KOREA, 22/23 April 1951: Despite repeated probes by British units from their positions along the southern bank of the Imjin River, the Communist Chinese successfully concealed the buildup of their 63rd Army for an attack on Seoul. As the night of 22 April turned into 23 April, the Communist Chinese attacked en masse across the Imjin, fordable in several places at that time of the year, with the aim of seizing the capital city, only a short distance to the south. The enemy was engaged by a patrol from C Company, 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment that spoiled much of the element of surprise by ambushing the Communist Chinese as they waded across the river. Coming under intense fire from the guns of the Royal Artillery, the Communist Chinese pressed on and crossed the Imjin's broad flat flood plain. D Company 1st Battalion was soon brought into action as their perimeter trip flares were set off by lead elements of the Communist Chinese 187th Division. For their part, the Communist Chinese were relentless in their push to break through the British lines and capture Seoul.

### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

### BALANCE:

 In the Victory Conditions, change "≥ 55 Exit VP" to "≥ 60 Exit VP".





### TURN RECORD CHART

BRITISH Sets Up First [145]

COMMUNIST CHINESE Moves First [610]


6

END



Elements of D Company, 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, 29th Independent Infantry Brigade Group [ELR: 3] set up in hill hex(es), with ≤ one MMC per hex, not adjacent to another MMC; ≥ three squad-equivalents, two SW, and one SMC must set up on/west-of hexrow L and likewise on/east-of hexrow X (see SSR 4): {SAN: 3}








Set up in whole hexes of board 81:



20

Patrol section from No. 12 Platoon set up using HIP (with Freedom of Movement), south of the river in any single hex on board 33 that is not adjacent to the river; this HIP does not count against E1.2 allotment:





Elements of 1st Battalion, 559th Regiment, 187th Division [ELR: 3] set up as noted, concealed (see SSR 5): {SAN: 2}



Group 1 set up in river hexes:



Group 2 set up north of the river:



Group 3 set up south of, and adjacent to, the river:



Leadership Pool two SMC must set up with each Group:



Heavy Weapons & Assault Platoon Pool ≥ two MMC and ≥ two SW must be allocated to each Group:



### SEOUL SAVING



### ASL SCENARIO 214 (continued)

#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- 1. EC are Dry, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect [EXC: woods and orchards are brush]. All roads are paths. Grain does not exist. The river is considered to be at Level 0 and is treated as a Shallow (B20.42) stream for movement purposes. Place overlays as follows: Rv1 on 33F6-E7; OG1 on 33I10; and OG2 on 33R8-S8. The Communist Chinese are in a hostile country (W7.9). Kindling (B25.11) is NA.
- 2. Night rules (E1.) are in effect [EXC: Straying, Jitter Fire, and Cloaking are NA]. The Base NVR is 4 hexes. The Communist Chinese are the Scenario Attacker and the British the Scenario Defender. The Majority Squad type for both sides is Normal. The Communist Chinese may sound Bugles (W7.8). The British may Bore Sight (C6.4).
- 3. Only British SMC may fire Starshells. The British receive one module of 80+mm battalion mortar (C1.22) OBA (HE/IR; Harassing Fire is NA) with one Pre-Registered (C1.73) hex. FFE FP is halved.
- 4. The British must set up ≥ six Fortification counters non-hidden on board 81.1S Foxholes may not be exchanged for those of larger capacity.
- **5.** After British set up, each Communist Chinese Group is now assigned to an "Operational Zone": Zone 1: hexrows A-K, Zone 2: hexrows L-V, and Zone 3: hexrows W-GG. Units of each Group may only Set-Up/Move/Rout/Advance within the hexrows of its particular Zone [EXC: SMC, crews, and Berserk units are not restricted. After returning to normal, a Berserk MMC is considered part of the Group assigned to the Zone it is in].
- 6. Use Russian LMG counters to represent the extra CPVA LMG(r)s.

AFTERMATH: Though nearly up to strength, D Company, like the rest of the companies in the battalion, defended a broader front than tactically advisable. This forced Captain Harvey, the acting Officer Commanding to spread out his platoons. Fortunately, the unit was augmented by two machine guns and a forward observer from the mortar platoon who was able to command fire from two 81mm mortars. At 0230, heralded by bugles, human waves broke upon the company and nearly and nearly engulfed a patrol led by No. 12 Platoon's commander. The violent flood tide carried on throughout the night and into the next morning. At 0830, with ammunition running low, depleted in manpower, and with strong Communist Chinese elements having already in infiltrated through to the rear, Captain Harvey was forced to pull D Company back in order to realign to better defend the road to Seoul.

### **RED DEVILS**

### **ASL SCENARIO 215**

Scenario Design: Kenneth P. Katz





South of CHICHON-NI, SOUTH KOREA, 24 April 1951: During the night of 22 April, the Communist Chinese launched their Fifth Phase, First Impulse offensive against UN forces. On the left of IX Corps, the ROK 6th Division collapsed, exposing the flank of the adjacent 1st Marine Division. The "Red Devils" of the

92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Leon F. Lavoie, found themselves the target of a Communist Chinese attack into the rear area of IX Corps.

### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

### BALANCE:

☆ In the Victory Conditions, change "≥ 10 VP" to "≥ 12 VP".

Exchange the Infiltrator 8-0 leader with an 8-1 leader and add one LMG to the Infiltrator force.

OG1 OG4 B2<sub>OG5</sub> **B**1 61

(Only hexrows Z-GG on boards 2 and 15, A-P on board 44, and R-GG on board 19 are playable)

VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Communist Chinese win immediate	ely upon amassing $\geq$ 10 VP, which are earned as follows:
---	--

- +8 VP if a Good Order Communist Chinese MMC occupies hex 44M6;
- +4 VP per M41 HMC eliminated or whose crew is eliminated (maximum of 4 VP per vehicle in this category);
- +2 VP per non-eliminated M41 HMC that became "limbered"/Recalled/Abandoned (maximum of 2 VP per vehicle in this category); and
- +1 VP per M41 HMC that fires per Player Turn.

### TURN RECORD CHART

AMERICAN Sets Up First 6 4 END COMMUNIST CHINESE Moves First [316]



Elements of 92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion [ELR: 3] set up as noted: {SAN: 3}

C Battery set up in hexes 19X4, 19X7, 19X9, 44K8, 44I6, and 44J4, with VCA facing north (see SSR 2):





Headquarters Battery set up ≤ 3 hexes from 44M6 (see SSR 3):



1-2-6

2













6



Infiltrators [ELR: 3] set up on/north-of hexrow 19FF/44B, not adjacent to American units (see SSR 5): {SAN: 5}











Elements of 2nd Battalion, 359th Regiment, 120th Division enter on Turn 1 along the north edge:



16

2

(continued on the back of 216)

### **RED DEVILS**

### ASL SCENARIO 215 (continued)



### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- 1. EC are Moderate, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect. Place overlays as follows: **OG1** on 2EE1; **OG4** on 15FF8-FF9; **B1** on 19X6; **OG5** on 44M3-L2; and **B2** on 44O2-O1. Only the 19Y1-Y6-44K6-P1 road exists. Offboard terrain exists normally along the north edge. A +1 LV Hindrance (E1.7) is in effect during Game Turn 1.
- 2. All M41 HMC must start the scenario "unlimbered". An M41 HMC Inherent crew that voluntarily Abandons (D5.4) its vehicle is replaced by a 5-4-6 squad. Only an original M41 HMC 1-2-6 vehicle crew may become the Inherent crew (D5.42) of an Abandoned M41 HMC.
- 3. Headquarters Battery Personnel may not set up in the same hex as a vehicle. AFV of the Headquarters Battery set up Abandoned (D5.4) and without Passengers; unarmored vehicles may not expend any MP until Game Turn 3. During Game Turn 1, American units [EXC: Perimeter Force] may not perform any voluntary action.
- **4.** An American vehicle may not move into a hex that decreases its range to a Known Communist Chinese Infantry unit *unless* the hex entered also decreases its range to ≥ one Known *American* Infantry unit.
- **5.** MMC of the Infiltrators group are Recon Units (W7.5).

AFTERMATH: Lavoie insisted that the Red Devils construct and man a strong defensive perimeter, with patrols and outposts. At 0520, a soldier stumbled upon a Communist Chinese infiltrator in front of C Battery, commanded by Captain Bernard C. Raftery. Machine guns opened fire and the Red Devils sprinted to their battle positions. Under covering fire from Communist Chinese machine gunners on the hills overlooking the Red Devils' perimeter, the Communist Chinese infantry attempted to destroy the self-propelled artillery and battalion fire direction center. The Red Devils fought back, with Lavoie and the other officers moving from position to position to rally troops and direct fire. As the Red Devils held their position, they still delivered fire missions in support of the 1st Marine Division. The Marines sent tanks to reinforce them, and by 0730 the situation had stabilized. The Red Devils had suffered four KIA and 11 wounded but maintained their unit cohesion and effectiveness.

# CENTURIONS REVERSES

**ASL SCENARIO 216** 

Scenario Design: Shaun Carter






VICTORY CONDITIONS: The British win immediately upon exiting  $\geq 65$  Exit VP off the south edge [EXC: Walking Wounded are worth double Exit VP] (see SSR 5).

IMJIN RIVER, SOUTH KOREA, 25 April 1951: In the face of the largest attack of the war, with five Communist Chinese armies heading toward Seoul, the UN forces under American I Corps were forced to withdraw from their positions on "Line Kansas" south of the Imjin and Hantan Rivers. Only two of the three widely separated battalions of the 29th Independent Infantry Brigade Group could be supported by the formidable Centurion tanks of the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars. Exploiting cover afforded by early morning mist, Communist Chinese infantry launched suicidal attacks on the tanks.

### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

A N



### **BALANCE:**

O In the Victory Conditions, change "≥ 65 Exit VP" to "≥ 58 Exit VP".


Exchange one MMG(r) with one HMG in the Communist Chinese OB.

### TURN RECORD CHART

© BRITISH Sets Up and Moves First

COMMUNIST CHINESE [230]

1 2 3 4 5 6 END






Elements of 188th Division, 63rd Army [ELR: 3] set up as noted: {SAN: 4}

Set up on board 83, on/south of hexrow  $S, \le 4$  hexes from 81T4:





### **CENTURIONS REVERSE!**

### ASL SCENARIO 216 (continued)



#### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- 1. EC are Moist, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect. Mist (E3.32) is in effect. Place overlays as follows: RP3 on 81R2-81S3; and B2 on 81S2-81T1.
- 2. Communist Chinese 6-2-7s/3-2-7s are Assault Engineers (H1.22; W7.91).
- 3. British squads may freely Deploy (A1.31) at setup/entry. The *Carrier, 3-in. Mortar* may set up Abandoned (D5.4), with all its weapons Removed (D6.631). The *OML 3-in. Mortar* may not set up Emplaced. *Carrier C* inherent crews are 2-4-8 HS.
- **4.** British 4-5-7s/2-4-7s entering on Turn 1 are Walking Wounded (WW). A WW MMC has a 3 MF allotment which is never increased for any reason (even while routing or Berserk) [EXC: while being carried by any form of conveyance], its IPC is reduced to 2, and it receives a +1 DRM for all CC attacks it makes, while all CC attacks against it receive a -1 DRM. Two WW HS may Recombine (A1.32) into a WW squad. A non-WW HS and a WW HS may not Recombine.
- 5. For VP purposes, British units may exit only on/after Turn 4 [EXC: Recalled AFV]. The British Friendly Board Edge (D5.341) is the south edge. Recalled AFV that exit (even prior to Turn 4) still count for Exit VP but are worth one Exit VP less than normal. An armor leader in a Recalled AFV is worth 0 Exit VP.

AFTERMATH: The Communist Chinese attacked the British tanks with pole charges, causing several casualties. The British fended off the attack with "de-lousing"—spraying each other's tanks with machine gun fire. With great skill, a tactical withdrawal was conducted in the face of repeated Communist Chinese attacks. British losses were heavy: five Centurions, a Cromwell, and two carriers destroyed, along with a quarter of the front-line infantry strength. Without the covering fire of the Centurions, however, it is likely the remainder of the brigade would have suffered the fate of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment further to the west, which was encircled and destroyed by overwhelming numbers of Communist Chinese troops.

### **GLOSTER HILL**

### **ASL SCENARIO 217**

Scenario Design: Andrew H. Hershey





VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Communist Chinese win at game end by Controlling hex E4 *and* having more Good Order squad-equivalents at Level 5 than the British, provided the British have exited ≤ 6 Exit VP [EXC: prisoners do not count] off the south edge (see SSR 5).

HILL 235, near SOLMA-NI, SOUTH KOREA, 25 April 1951: Vastly outnumbered, the remnants of 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment (the Glosters) held out in the vicinity of Hill 235, from where they continued to block the main Communist Chinese avenue of advance on Seoul. However, the repeated and relentless Communist Chinese assaults had exhausted the men and almost all of their ammunition. Efforts by a UN relief force, including tanks, to break through to the surrounded Glosters failed, as the Communist Chinese ambushed the column at a critical juncture on the narrow mountain road. Even air drops failed, as supplies missed the confined British perimeter. The Glosters, still under orders "to hold in place," prepared for what must be the final blow. This began on the night of 24

April, but by daybreak the last of the Glosters were still barely in possession of the hill. As the Communist Chinese launched a morning attack, a lone bugler, Drum Major Philip Buss, stood atop a rocky outcrop and sounded off on the orders of

Lieutenant Colonel James Carne, the battalion commanding officer.

### **BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

### BALANCE:

• Add one 4-5-7 squad to the British OB.





(Only hexrows A-P are playable)

### TURN RECORD CHART

© BRITISH Sets Up First

COMMUNIST CHINESE Moves First [331]

1 2 3 4 5 6 END



Elements of A, D, and Support Companies, 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, 29th Independent Infantry Brigade Group [ELR: 3] set up at  $\geq$  Level 3 in hexes numbered  $\leq$  7, with  $\leq$  one MMC per hex; no MMC may set up adjacent to another MMC, nor in hex E4 (see SSRs 3 and 4): {SAN: 2}





5 4



? MPh/RtPh: dr = MF CC: +1/-1



4 3

**Drum Major Buss** set up unconcealed in hex E4 (see SSR 2):

DC ≜ △ x12

2

7 morale

8





Elements of 1st and 9th Companies, 560th Regiment, 187th Division [ELR: 3] enter on/after Turn 1 along the north/east/west edge(s) on/between A6 and P6: {SAN: 2}

LMG(r)

≘ 1 B11 **2PP** 



Elements of 2nd Company, 561st Regiment, 187th Division enter on Turns 1/2 along the south edge:



### GLOSTER HILL

### ASL SCENARIO 217 (continued)



### **SPECIAL RULES:**

- 1. EC are Dry, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) and Steep Hills (W1.3) are in effect. Roads do not exist. Kindling (B25.11) is NA.
- 2. The 1-4-9 hero in the British OB (use a counter of some nationality that is not in play) has no FP (hence it cannot Interdict, but is still considered armed) or Heroic DRM, but provided it is in Good Order and has not left hex E4 (at any time), all British MMC ≤ 4 hexes from hex E4 are considered Fanatic (A10.8). Should the Hero leave hex E4 or become engaged in CC, it is immediately exchanged for a non-heroic British 8-0 leader (wounded if applicable).
- 3. 1S Foxholes may not be exchanged for those of larger capacity. Infantry/SW Smoke are NA. *All* British Personnel are immune to Cowering. Beginning on Game Turn 3, the British suffer from Ammunition Shortage (A19.131).
- **4.** At setup, the British player must secretly designate two MMC squad-equivalents as Walking Wounded (WW). A WW MMC has a 3 MF allotment which is never increased for any reason (even while routing or Berserk), its IPC is reduced to 2, and it receives a +1 DRM for all CC attacks it makes, while all CC attacks against it receive a -1 DRM. Two WW HS may Recombine (A1.32) into a WW squad. If a non-WW HS and a WW HS Recombine, the resulting squad is considered WW. This status may remain secret until these penalties must be applied, when such unit should be appropriately marked (use any suitable counter).
- 5. For VP purposes, British units may exit only on/after Turn 4.
- 6. The Communist Chinese may sound Bugles (W7.8). The captured OML 2-in. Mortar in the Communist Chinese OB has no Smoke ammunition.

AFTERMATH: For an instant, the Communist Chinese seemed to pause in their attack, as every bugle call used by the British Army other than "Retreat" rang out from Buss' instrument. The action soon resumed its crescendo, however, as the sounds of close quarter fighting and exploding napalm overtook the Drum Major's notes as UN air cover did its best to stem the attack. At 1030, with the Communist Chinese poised to overrun what had become known as "Gloster Hill," Lieutenant Colonel Carne, the battalion commanding officer, finally received permission to withdraw. With medical personnel left behind to tend to the more than 150 wounded, most of the battalion attempted to break out and reach UN lines by moving to the southwest, with all of these men being captured. Captain Harvey took 81 men of D Company over a circuitous route north and then west, leading over half of them to safety. Of the nearly 750 Glosters and supporting troops on line on 22 April, fewer than 50 returned to friendly lines, while 56 were killed and most of the rest were taken prisoner, of whom 26 died. The Glosters' stand along the Imjin River had served to save Seoul, but at a great cost to the battalion. For their bravery and gallantry along the Imjin, 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, and C Troop, 170 Independent Mortar Battery were awarded a U.S. Presidential Unit Citation.

# SIBERIA DIVERSION

ASL SCENARIO 218

Scenario Design: Pete Dahlin





VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Americans win at game end by Controlling all Level 2 hexes on board 61 [EXC: Blazing Terrain].


HILL 58A, near MUNSAN-NI, SOUTH KOREA, 11 August 1952: Hill 58A, or "Siberia" as it was commonly known, was a squad-sized outpost a quarter of a mile forward of the American main line of resistance. Since 9 August, the outpost had changed hands twice with deadly fighting under heavy artillery and mortar fire. Colonel Walter F. Layers, the 1st Marines' Regimental Commander, was convinced that Siberia could not be held if Hill 122, or "Bunker Hill" to the west of Siberia remained in Communist Chinese hands. Layers and his staff planned to take Bunker Hill. Its possession would enable the Marines to dominate Siberia and observe enemy movement. In order to disguise the true objective, D Company was ordered to assault Siberia as a diversion. Four M46 Patton tanks mounting searchlights and four flame tanks of 1st Tank Battalion supported D Company.

### BOARD CONFIGURATION:

### **BALANCE:**

Delete two M46 MTs.

☆ Delete one 6-2-7 squad from the Turn 5 reinforcements.



(Only hexrows A-P on board 61 and R-GG on board 80 are playable)

### TURN RECORD CHART

COMMUNIST Sets Up First [0] 8 6 END AMERICAN Moves First




Elements of 63rd and 65th Armies [ELR: 3] set up in hill hexes on board 61: {SAN: 2}



Enter on Turn 5 along the west edge of board 61:



Enter on Turn 7 along the west edge of board 61:





Elements of D Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, and C Company, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division [ELR: 5] set up on board 80 (see SSRs 3 and 4): {SAN: 2}



MMG △ X12 de 2 М 4-10 90L 30-1

Turn 1



Group 2: Turn 2



Flame Platoon, Headquarters Company, 1st Tank Battalion enter on the indicated turn along the east edge on/between 61P9 and 80R9 (see SSR 5):

#### SPECIAL RULES:

1. EC are Dry, with no wind at start. KW Terrain (W.3) is in effect [EXC: all woods and grain are Brush]. All orchard is Crag.

2. Night Rules (E1.) are in effect. The Base NVR is 3 hexes and will not change for the duration of the scenario. Despite setting up on board, the Americans are the Scenario Attacker and may use Cloaking; the Communist Chinese are the Scenario Defender [EXC: Communist Chinese reinforcements may enter using Cloaking as if a Scenario Attacker]. The Majority Squad Type for both sides is Normal.

3. D Company Personnel [EXC: Berserk] may not enter board 61 prior to Game


4. M46s may not enter board 61 and are equipped with turret-mounted Searchlights (W10.13), which may be used as if a condition of E1.91 has already been met.

5. Group 1 AFV are automatically Recalled (D5.341) at the start of American Player Turn 4, and Group 2 AFV are automatically Recalled at the start of American Player Turn 5 [EXC: the D5.34 + 1 DRM is NA to AFV of both groups]. Each Recalled AFV must exit via its entry hex. A POA-CWS-H5 with a permanently malfunctioned FT is automatically Recalled in the manner described above. A bogged/Immobilized AFV is immediately flipped to its wreck side with no Crew Survival (D5.6).

6. AFV crews may not voluntarily Abandon (D5.4) their vehicles.

AFTERMATH: At 2100, the M46s illuminated enemy positions and opened fire on the hill. Two flame tanks threaded their way to the base of Siberia. They moved cautiously up the southern slope and partially down the northern side, burning off dense vegetation and attacking Communist Chinese positions as they drove forward. After the first two flame tanks exhausted their fuel, a second pair completed the job. With the Communist Chinese well suppressed, the flame tanks withdrew, and D Company moved in to root out the last of the defenders and set up a hasty defense. The M46s remained to cover the assault force and break up Communist Chinese counterattacks. D Company held the crest until withdrawing at midnight, diversion complete.


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6³-6-7к 6³-6-7к 6³-6-7к 6³-6-7к 6³-6-7к 6³-6-7к 6³-6-7к 6³-6-7к 6³-6-8к 6³-6-8к 6³-6-8к	63-6-8N 63-6-80 63-6-8P 3-4-8 A 3-4-8 B 3-4-8 C 3-4-8 D
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
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	<u>5</u> <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> м	52-5-8 N	<u>5</u> 2-5- <u>8</u> 0	5 <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> p	5 <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> a	5 <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> R	5 <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> s	<u>5</u> ²-5- <u>8</u> ⊤	<u>5</u> ²-5- <u>8</u> ∪	5 <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> v		1-2-6	1-2-6	1-2-6	1-2-6	1-2-6	1-2-6	1-2-6	1-2-6	1-2-6	1-2-6		
	5 <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> w	5 <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> ×	5 <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> v	5 <sup>2</sup> -5- <u>8</u> z	4'-4- <u>8</u> A	4'-4- <u>8</u> B	4'-4- <u>8</u> c	4'-4- <u>8</u> p	4'-4- <u>8</u> E	4'-4- <u>8</u> F		2-2-8	2-2-8	2-2-8	2-2-8	2-2-8	2-2-8	2-2-8	2-2-8	2-2-8	2-2-8		
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
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
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