

INTRODUCTION:

Welcome to DIEN BIEN PHU, the beginning of our exploration into the Vietnam conflicts dating from 1954 to 1975. In this module you will find the rules and counters to depict actions from the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Later modules will cover the Second Indochina War, known more commonly as The Vietnam War.

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DIEN BIEN PHU is designed specifically for the student of military history wishing to use his existing game system to explore this fascinating time in military history, using our new counter presentation, rules and scenarios. If you play CDG (or any of the other modules needed to use this product) as *games only*, the new approach found in DIEN BIEN PHU may not be for you. If your interest lies in the study of history through the simulation metaphor, we trust you will appreciate the depth of research in this creative work and the ease of use of its components with your existing rulebook.

HISTORY:

Prelude:

When the French high command decided to drop three elite parachute battalions into the valley of Dien Bien Phu on November 20th,1953, the French Indochina War had already been in progress for eight years. On that day in 1953 when these battalions dropped onto the 148th Independent Infantry Regiment of the PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam), a series of events were set in motion that would culminate in the epic siege of Dien Bien Phu. It was a battle which would spell the end of France's Indochina colonial empire and have far reaching repercussions for the rest of the world.

The paradrop, code named Operation *Castor*, was undertaken for three separate reasons:

Gain control of the valley for the French, due to its proximity to Laos;
 Provide a mooring point for the numerous T'ai guerrillas the French had trained in the region;

3. Provide a base for mobile operations for the French in northwestern Vietnam.

The valley had an old airstrip located near the village of Dien Bien Phu, as well as an auxiliary strip some 6 kilometers or so to the south. As the French had experienced some success with the air-land base theory in the past, they persuaded themselves that the same could be done here at Dien Bien Phu, even though it was at the far end of a very tenuous and overtaxed aerial supply line.

Before going further into the battle itself, it is useful to digress and briefly cover the events of the war to this point.

Following WW II, the French returned to Indochina to re-establish their control over the region. French Indochina consisted of the modern day countries of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. However, an organization having its roots in the early 1930's, the Vietnam Independence League, or 'Viet Minh' as they became known, had grown in influence and power during the French absence.

The Viet Minh enjoyed the support, at various times, of the Soviet Union, Mao's Red China and even the U.S.A. (a policy that did not endear the U.S.A. to the French). The Viet Minh were technically a United Front in that all organizations in Indochina dedicated to the ouster of foreign influence were welcome. In fact it was Communist dominated, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. The Viet Minh military was in large part based on the model of the Red Chinese army under Mao.

When the French returned it wasn't long before guerrilla warfare broke out. The French lacked the means to "pacify" the countryside and the Viet Minh lacked the means to evict the French. Therefore a stalemate ensued, which was to last from 1946, when hostilities began in earnest, until 1949.

In 1949, the Red Chinese defeated the Nationalist Chinese and forced them off the mainland to the island of Formosa. This success gave the Viet Minh the impetus for action and a powerful ally just over their northern border.

The strategic situation in Vietnam at this point was that the French held all

the major cities, including Hanoi and Haiphong, while the Viet Minh had strong influence in the villages and countryside. They had the majority of their regular forces carefully hoarded in the northeastern part of the country in a sector called the Viet-Bac. This part of the country directly abutted China's border.

Within a short time the Viet Minh, who previously had been armed with Japanese, French and U.S. weapons of mixed vintage, began to receive large quantities of Chinese and Soviet weapons as well as weapons from the old Nationalist Chinese armories that the Communists had overrun.

For their part the French were mostly financing the war themselves. They did receive a fair amount of aid from America that would increase as the war progressed. The U.S., which would soon have Communist problems of its own in Korea, had re-assessed its position in the region.

As the war progressed in Indochina, the Viet Minh became increasingly well-supplied with more modern weapons, both captured from the French, and American weaponry, which the Chinese had procured from the Korean conflict.

Bernard B. Fall, in his book *Street Without Joy*, estimates that by late 1952 the weaponry and fire-power of a standard Viet Minh Battalion was at least the equivalent of its French counterpart. That said, when war came to Dien Bien Phu in November of 1953, the French had better fire discipline and tactical doctrine for the prosecution of a stand up fight than did the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh were masters of camouflage and jungle fighting. They faced the drawback of a logistical system that was dependent almost entirely on manual labor, a mixture of weaponry, (despite the modernization that was taking place), and a difficult time, managing adequate supplies of ammunition and other essentials for prolonged operations. These problems were somewhat overcome by the set-piece nature of the battle for Dien Bien Phu (and by having the strategic initiative at the battle).

Returning to Dien Bien Phu, the airdrop of November 20 was a success. The airstrip and surrounding valley were quickly secured (6 hours) and the 148th driven into the bush (**Castor's Opening Act**). All this was accomplished at a relatively low cost of 11 dead and 52 wounded. The French could confirm 90 dead Viet Minh, with a suspicion that actual losses were a bit higher. The Viet Minh removed their dead from the field after the battle as a matter of doctrine.

In the weeks following the drop, the French were to lose Lai Chau, a T'ai capital in the Highlands some 60 miles from Dien Bien Phu. While most of the regular troops stationed there were successfully extricated, the T'ai irregulars and their French officers were left to fight their way out. It was a disaster and the majority of them were lost to the Viet Minh 316th Division.

As this was happening the French were building a series of positions around the main airfield and auxiliary strip and around the village of Dien Bien Phu itself. The valley and the village of Dien Bien Phu were lightly vegetated and bisected by the Nam Yum river, a small river which tended to flood its banks during the rainy season, fast approaching. This valley was surrounded by a series of hills, almost all of which were covered by thick jungle.

Contrary to popular belief, the French understood the importance of these surrounding hills, and launched several sorties against them between December 1953 and March 1954 (Langlais on Hill 781 and Route 41). During this period the French positions in the valley took shape and were reinforced.

The Viet Minh led by their CIC Vo Nguyen Giap began to concentrate four infantry divisions supported by a heavy weapons division of artillery around Dien Bien Phu. They were the 304th, 308th, 312th and 316th Infantry Divisions. The artillery division was the 351st Heavy Division. Also present was the 148th independent Infantry Regiment.

Let us briefly digress to the French position and its nature. Throughout the battle the French were plagued by manpower shortages. Once the siege began, this was due to the airstrip being rendered useless, so that all reenforcements and supplies had to be airdropped in. The French lacked engineering equipment, engineers, and raw materials needed to construct bunkers and fortified positions, and to some degree, even adequate amounts of wire and land mines were absent. To offset the shortage of materials, the French tore down virtually every building within their perimeter for use as building blocks for pillboxes and bunkers. They also cleared all vegetation within their perimeter to gain as clear a field of fire for their weapons as possible. The French decided to bring armor into the airhead in the form of ten M24 'Chaffee' tanks. However, they did not have transport aircraft large enough to handle one fully assembled Chaffee. They disassembled the Chaffee's, flew them out to Dien Bien Phu, and then reassembled them there. This was prior to the siege portion of the battle.

The French positions sat in the Dien Bien Phu valley proper and to the north and east rested on the hills that were closest to Dien Bien Phu. To the north, the hill position was dubbed Gabrielle. It was the best defended post in the French position. It was defended by the 5/7 Algerian Rifles, and was backed by a Legionnaire Mortar Company. A contest was held just prior to the siege beginning to see which position was the best constructed, and to the Algerians delight, Gabrielle was the winner.

Northeast of the main airfield was Beatrice. This strongpoint was held by the men of the 3/13 Demi Brigade of the Foreign Legion. To the southwest of Beatrice, but still northeast of the airfield were the Dominique positions, held by Algerians. The position dead east of the airfield were the Elaines. These were initially held by Moroccan and T'ai units. Both of these positions had a series of strongpoints within it resting on small hills. Six kilometers south of the nearest French position, and at the extreme southern end of the valley was Isabelle and its small outcropping position,

Wieme. This was in the possession of Legionaries and Algerians.

Coming north back up the valley to the west/ southwest of the airfield was the Claudine strongpoint. This was held by the troops of the Foreign Legion also. Next to the north of Claudine and west of and encompassing the airfield were the Huguette positions held by still more Legionaries. Both these positions were in flat valley land. Anne-Marie

was a small position located on a hill to the north of and overlooking the Huguette position. This was manned (until they fled *en masse*) by a T'ai battalion.

In the center was Sparrowhawk, east of and abutting the airfield, wedged between the Elaines and the Dominiques to the east and the Huguette and Claudine positions to the west. It housed two of the superb parachute battalions in reserve, seven of the ten tanks, (the remaining three being on Isabelle) and facing in various directions a present from the Americans, suggested by an American observer who had visited the base, four deadly quad 50 anti-aircraft guns.

Running through the heart of the French positions was the Nam Yum river. Being as the French were in the middle of a valley with the monsoon season about to set in, this would have unfortunate consequences. When the rains did come in force through March to May, many French positions were literally flooded. Surrounding the valley was the type of triple canopy jungle and high hills associated with this region of the world. It was here that the Viet Minh would slowly gather the large force that would engage, and eventually destroy the French, holding Dien Bien Phu.

While the French understood the need for holding the hills surrounding their position, they did not have the manpower to take and hold them. Numerous sorties were launched against them during the period between December and mid March. Some were successful, others less so, in taking these positions, but the manpower was never there to hold them, and the French would repair back to Dien Bien Phu. Why launch these attacks at all one might ask?

One of the avowed reasons for the position to exist in the first place was as a base for offensive operations. Accordingly, 50% of the base strength was to be actively engaged in offensive operations at all times. This too was unfortunate. While sometimes inflicting significant loss on the enemy, the numerous raids also whittled down French manpower. They could not af-

ford such attrition, even at a somewhat favorable ratio in 'body count'. Also, this took away from the manpower needed to build, maintain and improve the French positions.

The second and most important reason was to try to neutralize the single most brilliant achievement of the Viet Minh in the battle. The massing of their artillery in sufficient numbers and with enough ammunition to effectively close down the French airstrips to traffic, neutralize the French artillery, and lay down devastating, pre-registered barrages on French positions about to be directly assaulted.

The Viet Minh dug their ordnance into the surrounding hills with a tenacity and genius that was amazing. "Dug in" not being used lightly in this case. Many times the guns being literally buried into the sides of the hills with only enough space showing for a fairly limited traverse of the barrel. While this greatly hampered flexible use of the artillery, it had no serious effect on set-piece assaults with pre-registered targets, and made the guns impervious to counter-battery fire. The French had their artillery spread out inside their perimeter, in plain view (due to the afore mentioned lack of vegetation), in sandbagged positions. The Viet Minh were able to preregister them with great effect.

How could the French overlook such a thing? We view the battle with 20/ 20 hindsight. The French decided (rightly so) that a modern army would have trouble massing and supplying a large artillery presence that far from their bases (the Viet Minh were somewhat extended at Dien Bien Phu also, though not as badly as the French). Much less a primitive army (logisti-

cally speaking) that relied on manual labor for almost all its supply needs. The Viet Minh had some Russian trucks, the French knew, but that was a comparative handful compared to what would be needed for such an undertaking. The Viet Minh succeeded in bringing large quantities of guns to the battlefield using largely (though not exclusively) animal transport and manpower. They further were able to keep supplies flowing to this artillery presence and feed and supply over 50,000 men

while under constant air harassment from the French.

The system had its limits, but the Viet Minh stayed within those limits and as a result, ultimately won the battle. The French on the other hand had to rely on air supply from an understrength overtaxed airforce operating at long range. As soon as the Viet Minh put the airfield out of operation, the French began to rely on airdropped supplies and re-enforcements. This by its nature is difficult. This difficulty was made even greater when the Viet Minh succeeded in placing sizable quantities of *Flak* guns ringing the valley.

In all the Viet Minh had on hand for the fight 144 artillery and 180 antiaircraft guns of various sizes and calibers. Late in the siege they also brought to bear 12 Soviet *Katyusha* rocket-launchers. The French had 28 artillery pieces to combat this with. Mostly 105's and a battery of 155's. The French had 16 supporting heavy mortars; the Viet Minh 60. The French infantry strength in the valley at the time of the siege was 12 battalions.

The commanders for the two sides respectively were Vo Nguyen Giap for the Viet Minh, and Colonel Christian Marie Ferdinand De Castries for the French.

The Main Battle:

The main battle of Dien Bien Phu was begun by General Giap on the night of March 13, 1954. The target was the northeastern most post held by the French. Beatrice was held by the men of the 3/13 Demi Brigade of the Foreign Legion. The attack was launched with the forces of the Viet Minh 312th Division, backed by all the artillery support Giap could muster. The fighting was savage, but the French were overwhelmed and Beatrice lost, at huge cost to the Viet Minh. The French lost the Demi Brigade, virtually annihilated. Only 192 of 750 from this unit made it out. Some 590 Viet Minh were killed in the assault. Wounded can only be estimated.

The French artillery failed to adequately support the Legionnaires due to

"A year ago none of us could see victory. There wasn't a prayer. Now we can see it clearly, like light at the end of a tunnel." Lieutenant General Henri Navarre French CIC IndoChina 9/53 the heavy suppressing fire laid down on them by the Viet Minh. Despite firing their missions bravely, it was not enough and heavy losses were suffered among the crews. The attempts to re-enforce the garrison of the post were also bungled. By 2:30 AM on the 14th, it was over at Beatrice.

That very night (March 14), the attack on Gabrielle began. She was held by the 5/7 Algerian rifles, and a Legion mortar company. The attackers were men of the 308th Division, the best troops in the PAVN. Once again the attack was presaged by a vicious and effective barrage. This time the Viet Minh were repelled the first time they attacked.

A second attack began in the early morning hours of the 15th. This time, there would be no stopping it. The French artillery, though heavily battered, did manage an effective fire vs. The onrushing enemy infantry, inflicting heavy losses. However, the French guns continued to be woefully ineffective in counter-battery mode.

A counter-attack was mounted at Gabrielle. The troops picked for the job were new arrivals, the 5th BPVN. They were Vietnamese paratroopers who had dropped on Dien Bien Phu the day before, dropping into the teeth of enemy *Flak* and artillery. After suffering casualties, the survivors marched ten miles to a site where they were told to entrench. The Vietnamese were under artillery fire the entire time, and rain now began drenching them. In the early morning hours of the 15th, word that they would be thrown into the Gabrielle situation to try and relieve the garrison was passed down the line. They would march a considerable distance, provided with some tank support and Legion guides. They were exhausted and being asked to attack into a position that was a maze of wire and mines. In the dark over unfamiliar ground. To make matters worse, a monsoon soon began, limiting visibility.

The counterattack was a failure. Though it did succeed in reaching Gabrielle, it was only to help the survivors of the battle escape. Another key French position in the valley was lost. Morale on the French side began to plummet.

Following the loss of Gabrielle, Colonel Piroth, the commander of Dien Bien Phu's artillery committed suicide. Piroth was despondent over his inability to suppress the Viet Minh artillery and over the rosy reassurances he had given his men before the battle. He lay down on his cot, pulled the pin from a grenade, placed it on his chest, and ended his life.

The battle for Gabrielle cost the Viet Minh between 3-5 thousand casualties, including at least 1,000 KIA. The French lost the services of nearly 1,000 men during the fighting and their supply situation for artillery shells was becoming critical. After the fight, the French managed to pick up signals from General Giap's HQ, requesting more men for his depleted forces. The French too, were suffering greatly: between the Viet Minh artillery rendering the airstrip untenable and the large quantities of light and medium *Flak* that was criss-crossing the air over the valley, resupply was becoming extremely difficult.

The issue of leadership in the valley soon reared its ugly head. Dien Bien Phu was a pressure cooker now, and it began to boil over. On March the 24th, Colonel Langlais marched into DeCastries bunker, flanked by armed subordinates, and informed DeCastries that he was taking over command in the valley. DeCastries would continue to be in command to the outside world, and continue to be the liaison with Hanoi. However, the day-to-day decisions and conduct of the battle would now be in Langlais' hands.

There seems to be no evidence that DeCastries opposed Langlais' usurping of his power. There can be little doubt that the local French command was energized by this: they became much more effective and aggressive at launching counter-attacks and in general, better organized. Oddly enough, DeCastries maintained a large degree of clout, figuring into some major decisions, including sending Bigeard out after the Viet Mihn *Flak* on the 28th of March.

The French had by now lost their two northern-most strong-points. The Viet Minh succeeded in taking them despite horrific casualties. The French garrison needed a boost to their sagging morale. They soon received one.

The Viet Minh *Flak* had begun encroaching on the approach runs for aerial supply drops, to the extent that they were becoming too risky. On the 28th

Decastries asked Bigeard to "go out and get the Viet Minh *Flak* to the West" (Bruno's Flak Attack). He gave him *carte blanche* to carry out the operation as he saw fit. He did. The result was a combined-arms masterpiece that surprised the Viet Minh and achieved all its major objectives. French morale shot up again. Both sides now settled in for the long haul.

Giap soon adopted a new tactic to fit the necessities of the situation. He had already done a fair amount of digging approach trenches toward the French positions as a means of reducing casualties. He would now take this tactic to its logical conclusion. Giap ordered the digging of approach trenches to within a few meters of the French positions as a means to minimize his casualties.

The French were not ignorant of this tactic, and counter-attacked the approach trenches frequently and vigorously. Sometimes they used tank support. The French would clear as much of the trench as they could, and then fill in as much as they could, but they lacked the Viet Minh manpower. The progress of the trenches remained steady, if bloody.

In early to mid-April the fighting shifted to the Elaines and Dominiques in the east, and the Huguettes in the west. The fighting was now a seesaw affair: the Viet Minh attacking a position and the French counter-attacking immediately to drive them from their lodgement. In the south too, Isabelle, isolated and miserable, was feeling increasing pressure. Despite losing some of the Dominique and Huguette positions during this time period, the French managed to continue to hang on.

The real problem for them was manpower, supply, and combat fatigue. It was during this period that the French paratroopers, and their Vietnamese counterparts, showed the stuff they were made of. Holding positions against long odds, sometimes counterattacking at odds of 10:1 and winning. The problem for the Viet Minh was that the casualties they were suffering had begun to erode the quality of their forces. They began to scrape deeper and deeper into the manpower barrel. To add to the misery, monsoon season had now come to the valley, turning the battlefield into a rain-drenched, mud-caked, lunar landscape. This was of particular distress to the French, as the Nam Yum river ran through the heart of their positions and flooded them out in many cases. French soldiers held positions in knee deep water at times.

In early May, under increasing pressure, and with The French supply and manpower shortage at the breaking point, the Viet Minh landed the knockout blow. Attacking from all sides, the main center of resistance at Dien Bien Phu collapsed on May 7th. Orders for a breakout from Isabelle were given, but only a very small number of troops made it out to safety. The battle was over.

Aftermath:

The French lost some 13,000 men KIA/WIA/MIA. A staggering defeat. The Viet Minh had paid dearly for their victory, losing some 22-23 thousand, or almost 50% of the original attacking ground forces. Their losses almost entirely comprised of KIA/WIA, as opposed to French losses, which also included a fairly large number of prisoners taken during the final collapse.

For the defeated French, it was the end of an empire. To the Viet Minh, it was the precursor to a long and bitter struggle that would claim another 4 million Vietnamese lives and involve a war against another Western power even more formidable than the French before ending 21 years in the future. An almost unimaginable struggle for so small a country.

I highly recommend Bernard B. Fall's excellent book, *The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place*. It is a must for the library of any military historian. Several other fine works are mentioned in the bibliography as well. Together they provide many insights, not only to what the French experienced in Vietnam and Indochina, but what America would and did later.

Panhard P178B



DBP1. French Infantry Rules And DYO Notes:

1.1 Free French Counters: The French forces, including their Allies are represented by Free French counters, values, and capabilities, with the exception of the T'ai units. Use Free French MMC/SMC/SW counters (in British tan colors), plus the new MMC/SMC/SW counters provided. See the DBP Standard Special Rules for the details of their usage.

1.1 The French Colonial Military: The French military structure during the Indochina War truly reflect the nature of a post-WW II colonial power. The forces arrayed at Dien Bien Phu were no exception. Soldiers from the following colonies or erstwhile allies were present: Algerians; Moroccans; T'ai; and Vietnamese. In addition, French Foreign Legion troops and elite French paratroops were on hand. The following is a brief description of how each of the Nationalities fared at Dien Bien Phu, followed by how they are represented in the module.

1.12 The Algerians: These were the most solid of the French Allies at Dien Bien Phu. Certainly the performance of the Algerians on Gabrielle was exceptional. Later in the battle, as the presure was turned up, they performed significantly worse, especially during the fighting on the Dominique strongpoints. Therefore, during the early battles of the siege the Algerians are represented by 4-5-8 squads exclusively. By the end of March, around the time the 'Battle for the Five Hills' began, they begin to be represented by 4-5-7 squads and their ELR drops.

1.13 The Moroccans: These were also reliable troops. While they did not show the flashes of excellence that the Algerians did, they were largely dependable. It should be noted that while they had some bad outings, overall they deserve a 4-5-7 treatment throughout the battle. Pretty much everyone at Dien Bien Phu had their bad moments, with the exception of the French paratroops.

1.14 The Ta'i: The Ta'i troops at Dien Bien Phu have the dubious distinction of performing uniformly the poorest of all the French/ Allied troops present. To be fair, they were trained in guerrilla warfare, at which they were fairly adept. However, fighting from a

trench in a stand up fight was simply not their *forte*. There were mass desertions and panic on more than one occasion. From time to time they put up a good fight, but could usually be counted on to cave-in without other steadier units in support. The rules and rationale for them are provided in the DBP Standard Special Rules.

1.15 The Vietnamese: The Vietnamese paratroops present at Dien Bien Phu were actually very good soldiers. Their reputation suffered from their failed attempt at relieving Gabrielle. There were, however, mitigating circumstances in that situation. While it could also be said they suffered in comparison to the French paratroopers, this could be said of all units on both sides. It is also not entirely fair, as in almost all cases the Vietnamese paratroopers got the job done that they were asked to do. It is also interesting to note that the French paratroop units had large numbers of Vietnamese in them. The French paratroopers supplying the *glue* and "*esprit de corps* and the Vietnamese the local knowledge, as only they could have. It was found to be a most satisfactory solution by the French and one the U.S. did not learn from.

1.16 The French Foreign Legion: For the most part, the French Foreign Legion lived up to its sterling reputation. However, there were some cases of desertion not usually expected of elite units. Overall, however, they were still more than good enough to deserve a 5 ELR and a 4-5-8 counter treatment.

1.17 The French Paratroops: Truly outstanding! It is seldom one could read so many diverse accounts of a battle and come away with the impression of such universal praise. For units under such adverse conditions, no

less. Frequently, the paratroopers were called upon to counter-attack at odds of 1-5, or worse, and came away winning. I have chosen to represent them with new 6-4-8 squads (and 3-3-8 HS), with an increased broken morale and some HOB benefits, and no cowering penalty, there are several instances where they will be given Fanatic status on top of that.

1.18 French SW: The French SW are Lend-Lease and are already provided in the proper Free French colors (British tan).

French Ordnance Notes:

1. M2 60MM MTR: The standard 60mm mtr from WW2, the M2 soldiered on through the Indochina War. The French also had many Mortier de 60 mle 35 60mm mortars, but seem to have been mostly using the American version by the time of Dien Bien Phu. Use the Free French version of this weapon during the game. The French soldiers opponents had the Type 31, the Chinese knock-off of the same weapon. The French had 8 of these to a Battalion in Indochina. The French may not use the option listed in American Ordnance note one, substituting 3 of these for OBA, unless specifically allowed by Scenario Rule

2. M18 AND M20 RCL: The U.S. 57mm M18 and 75mm M20 RCLs are provided for French use (see U.S. ordnance notes 10 and 11).

French Vehicle Notes:

1.M24 'CHAFFEE' LIGHT TANK: The French Garrison at Dien Bien

"Viet Minh": Pronounced as v-et min, officially Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh [League for the Independence of Vietnam], a coalition of Communist and nationalist groups that opposed the French and the Japanese during World War II. The Viet Minh spearheaded Vietnamese resistance to French rule in the French Indochina War (1946-54). The organization was soon dominated by Communists, and in 1951 its Communist elements were absorbed by the Communist party of North Vietnam. Phu had ten of these tanks, supplied to them by the U.S.. Nicknamed the "Bison" by the French and the "Oxen" by the Viet Minh, they had an impact on the battle far out of proportion to their numbers. Flown in disassembled , and reassembled at Dien Bien Phu, the Chaffee's spelled the difference between success and failure for many a French counterattack.

The MA of the piece has been given a B# of 11, due to problems the French had with the recoil mechanism. Also, due to the lack of spare parts, the MP has a red asterisk next to it. See note B for more details. The ten tanks were divided up into 3 platoons, one each

under Aristide Carette, Sergeant Guntz and Henri Preaud. The command of the squadron was in the hands of Capt. Yves Hervouet.

Despite a lack of spare parts and being at the end of a very tenuous supply line, all of which did have its impact on the tank's performance, the tanks held up quite well. Most suffered some form of battle damage, as detailed below:(Please note the French crews were just as fond of naming their vehicles as the Americans). Though in most French squadrons this was a matter of policy with all tanks name's beginning with the same letter (not the case here though).

2. M5A1 LIGHT TANK: The French Expeditionary Corps arrived in Indochina with a collection of WW II wartime AFVs. The standard tank at the beginning of the conflict in Indochina was the M5A1. Even after the M24 Chafee was supplied via American aid, the M5A1 continued in service against the Viet Minh.

3. M8 HMC SPA: Another WW II-era American AFV, the M8 HMC was brought to Indochina by the French Expeditionary Corps. The diminuative M8 Howitzer Motor Carriage was used in support of infantry, including use during the battle of the Black River in December 1951 (in support of 56me Battalion Parachutistes Coloniaux).

4. M8 AC: Another American AFV of WW II vintage, the M8 'Greyhound' was brought to Indochina by the French. M8 armored cars saw action along Route Coloniale near Xom Pheo during the battle of the Black River, December 1951.

5. M36B2 TD: These tank destroyers, along with M4A1 Sherman tanks, were sent to French Indochina to provide some anti-tank firepower in the event the newly-victorious Chinese Communists attacked across the bor-

der. The M36B2 'Jackson' was used for fire support and were assigned to units including the *Régiment Blindé Colonial d'Extrême-Orient*.

6. P-178B AC: Despite the development of a 47mm version, the WW IIera 'Panhard' armored car was armed with a 25mm gun. After WW II production of the 'B' model was resumed. In game terms, the 47mm gun is equipped with HE ammunition as well as AP. Panhard P-178B armored cars of 1er *Battalion Parachutiste Vietnamien* (Vietnamese parachutists allied with France) supported French operations during Operation *Chaumiére* in 1952. The post-war British Coventry Mk. 1 AC was also introduced to Indochina by the French, but was just as quickly withdrawn from service as unsuitable to the region.

7. M29C "*CRABE*" WEASEL APC: The M29C Weasel (known as the *Crabe* [or crab] to the French) was used to equip some units in an attempt to increase mobility across inundated rice paddies, swamps and along rivers. The *Crabers* were armed with a variety of weapons, including machine-guns and recoilless rifles.

8. Other AFVs used by the French in Indochina:

8A. M4 SHERMAN IN VARIOUS MARKS: The French used a variety of other AFVs, already in the system in Lend-Lease (i.e., British, or Free French) colors. The M4A1 (see British vehicle note 12) was provided to cope with the possibility of a Chinese incursion following the *Chicom* victory in 1949. These saw action around Tonkin in 1951. Note also other M4 marks may be used, including British vehicle notes 13 and 14 for the M4A2 and M4A4.

8B: THE LVT4 'ALLIGATOR' (WATER BUFFALO): Crabe units were reinforced with LVT4 'Alligators' from 1950 on. These provided important troop-transport capabilities. The LVT4 saw action during Operation *Quadrille* in July, 1952. See British vehicle note 73. Note also some LVT(A)4 amphibious AFVs were also sent to the French (see U.S. vehicle note 51 for the LVT(A)4).

8C. SCOUT CARS AND APCS: The French used the American M2 and M3 half-tracks (see British vehicle note 63 and ignore British nomenclature) in Indochina. A variety of machine-gun armed WW II Universal Carriers were also used. The WW II Humber III Scout Car (see British vehicle note 45) was on hand in the form of some 78 on French roles in 1946. The initial elements of the French Expeditionary Corps also included a quantity of machine-gun armed US M3 Scout Cars.

8D. ARMORED TRUCKS: The French sent the self-propelled 40mm Bofors mounted on GMC 2.5 ton truck, a conversion that had been carried out by the unit during WW2. Due to the absence of enemy air power, these were quickly given armored sides and used for fire support. Some armored trucks were also used as personnel carriers for escorting convoys. The latter can be depicted via Scenario Rule by making some or all of the trucks in the OB considered as having 0 AF (i.e., instead of un-armored).

THE FATE OF DIEN BIEN PHU'S TANKS:

Conti:

Headquarter tank of Hervouet, seriously damaged by a mine on April 5th during a counterattack on H6.It was recovered and used as a pillbox South of the airstrip.

Platoon Carette:

Mulhouse:

Hit by a Bazooka on 31 March during fighting for the Five Hills, but remained available for service until the end of the fight.

Bazeilles:

Hit by a Bazooka round in the same engagement as Mulhouse, it was burnt out and abandoned. It was the only "Bison" to be out right wrecked in the fighting.

Douaumont:

Sustained a direct hit from a 105mm shell which killed 3 crewman on April 29th.Used as pillbox until the end near H3.

Platoon Guntz:

Smolensk:

Hit by Bazooka fire on March 15th killing Sergeant Guntz but the tank was undamaged. Hit twice by 57mm recoilless rifle fire March 31st.Suffered gearbox failure and was immobile at battles end. **Posen:**

Posen:

Hit in turret by Bazooka on March 24th while helping clear the road to Isabelle. In action to the end.

Ettlingen:

Hit 6 times by 57mm recoilless rifle fire on 31st March, hit by a Bazooka 5th of April 2 WIA, Hit by Bazooka 15th April 2 KIA. Tank however remained serviceable until the battle's end.

Platoon Preaud:

Auerstaedt:

Undamaged during battle.

Neumach:

Hit in turret by Bazooka 31st March. Available until the end.

Ratisbonne:

Sustained 2 105mm shell hits April 29th, available until the end. Notes:

In addition to the battle damage sustained above, two tanks sustained Bazooka hits on March 28th and remained in service. Tank names were unavailable.

The French made an effort to camouflage the tanks at Dien Bien Phu and painted them with an earth yellow striped scheme.

Despite some problems with the recoil system of the guns, a problem exacerbated by the tenuous supply line, the Bisons more than earned their keep.

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FRENCH VEHICLE LISTING:

Notes	1, A, B	2	m	4	5	9	7, C	7, C	7, C	8, D	8	8	8	
Special	S5, WP7, SM8	C7	No AP, C5, WP9, H9	C7	A6, SP5		360° FOF, 8PP, T10	360° FOF, 8PP, T10	360° FOF, 8PP, T10	CE +1	MA .50 cal.; 15PP, T6	No AP; H8; C7; WP9	39PP	
GР	,	,	ı	,	,	τ		<u> </u>		x		*	-	
AAMG	4	2	4	4	4		3		4		G	4	14	
CMG	4	4	, .	4	,	4	,	1	, ,	,				
BMG	5	2			2			1			2	,	OPT2	
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ROF	*	-	5	2	2	*	۲.	τ		e	-	2	7	
MA	T/5	137LL	T75*	T37LL	1061	175LL	57 RCL	75 RCL	AAMG	T40L	AAMG	T/5*	AAMG	
GT	н	ST	F	ST	⊢	ST	÷				T	Ť	1	
MP	18	17	17	œ	14	28	263	26 ³	263	24	20	¥ 13	123	
cs	S	4	£	4	7	4	4	4	4	4	4	G	-	
ы	z	z	\succ	Y	\succ	Z	\succ	\succ	7	Υ	۲	Υ	~	
TA	+SR	+SR	ų,	+SR	FSR	+SR	,		7		Ļ	+FSR		
AF	6/3	6/3	6/3	21	11/4	2/1	· 0	0	0	0	0	2/0	1/0	
Size	0	+	+1	¥	5	0	+2	+2	+2	0	÷	-2	-1	
WGT	17.5	15.5	15.5	ß	31	8.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	8	18	15	
Type	ы	5	SPA	AC	β	AC	APC	APC	APC	APC	APC	APC	APC	
Name	M24 Chafee	M5A1	M8 HMC	M8 AC	M36B2 GMC	P-178	M29C	M29C	M29C	GMC 2.5	M3	LVT(A)4	LVT4	

FRENCH MULTI-APPLICABLE VEHICLE NOTES:

7

A. This AFV had a very fast and accurate turret traverse, and also a better than normal ROF for a MA of its caliber. Therefore this AFV is allowed the possibility of Multiple Hits (C3.8) even though its MA is > 40mm. Moreover in a Gun Duel (C2.2401) its total Firer-based TH DRM are halved (FRD) prior to any Acquisition DRM. (The final total of DRM may not be< than zero, and applies for Gun Duel calculations only). This is signified on the counter by the ROF being printed on a white background.

B. The Chaffee was an extremely reliable tank. However, at the end of such a long supply line, maintenance suffered badly. Therefore whenever a Chaffee pays a MP to start up, or make a motion attempt dr, make a DR. On a 12 the vehicle stalls. During its movement phase this means another DR and losing that many MP. For a motion attempt it means the motion attempt failed.

C. The M29C is an Amphibian (D16). No CA change is paid for RCL-armament (i.e., there is no Covered Arc for such weaponry). D. The Inherent Crew only receives +1 for CE for this OT AFV.

FRENCH ORDNANCE LISTING:

	┡							
C size ROF		IFE	#8	Range	#W	T size	Special	Notes
60* 3		-	12	3-45	3	'	5PP, IR, WP7, No OBA	1, A
57 1		1	11	110	3	1	5PP, HE only, H7, Crew-served	2
75 1		1	'n	160	3	ı	5PP, HE only, H7, Crew-served	2



¢7

M24 'Chafee' AFV

M36B2 'Jackson' TD



FRENCH MULTI-APPLICABLE ORDNANCE NOTES:

A. This weapon may be animal packed (G10).

DBP2. PAVN INFANTRY RULES AND DYO NOTES:

2.1 PAVN Infantry Counters and SW: Viet Minh infantry, known by the acronym PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam), consisted of three distinct groups of forces. In ascending order of proficiency they were:

- 1. Village Militia
- 2. Regional Forces
- 3. Regular Forces (the Chuc Luc in Vietnamese)

2.11 Axis Minor Usage: Use Axis Minor '?', LMG, MMG, HMG, DC, and Radio counters for PAVN. All MMC/SMC and new RCL/BAZ/Ban-galore/Lt MTR SW counters for the PAVN are provided.

2.12 Village Militia: The Village Militia are best represented by Conscripts, with a smattering of 2nd Line troops. The ratio of rifle to SMG-armed troops here should be at least 5:1. These troops should almost always suffer Ammunition Shortage and should be using the most antiquated weaponry (i.e., few RCL or BAZ), as their weapons were mainly hand-me downs from the Regional Forces. The leadership of the Village Militia should also be pretty spotty and something like 1:8 for leader to squad ratio.

The Village Militia was not a force intended to stand toe-to-toe with the French. They were used in sabotage, ambush and in facilitating the movement, supply and lodging of the Regular and Regional forces.

Initially the Village Militia was a mixed bag of forces run by anything from loyal Viet Minh to bandits who were throwing in with the side that could benefit them the most at the time. As time went on and Ho Chi Minh consolidated his hold on power in Indochina, the militias became a useful third tier in the military ladder of the PAVN.

2.13 Regional Forces: The Regional Forces represented the next step up in quality. The responsibilities of the Regional Forces were correspondingly larger than that of the Village Militia. Whereas the Village Militia seldom traveled far from the villages that produced them, the Regional Forces were expected to operate anywhere within their designated region of origin and to co-operate more closely with the *Chuc Luc*.

The Regional Forces are best represented by 2nd Line troops with some 1st Line troops on the order of a 2:1 ratio. Their equipment should be a mixture of the latest from the *Chuc Luc* along with some older weaponry. The ratio of leaders to squads should be on the order of 6:1 (and still somewhat of a mixed lot in terms of quality). The ratio of rifle-armed to SMG-armed should be 3:1 during and after 1952; 4:1 prior to 1952.

The Regional Forces were frequently called upon to provide both troop and leader replacements for the *Chuc Luc*.

2.14 PAVN Regulars: PAVN regulars formed the backbone of Giap's army. They were expected to, and did, bear the brunt of the fight against the French in the final and decisive phase of the war (1950-1954). They were originally formed into companies, then battalions and finally regiments and divisions. Giap trained these units in the northeast sector of Vietnam known as the *Viet Bac*. He jealously hoarded and protected these units through the early period of the war, until 1950 when they began to be more lavishly equipped. There were four regular divisions of PAVN regulars present at Dien Bien Phu, as well as a heavy division for extra artillery support. These were the 304th, 308th, 312th, and 316th Divisions in addition to the 351st Heavy Division.

Of the four divisions, the 308th was the elite formation, considered by both sides to be the best the PAVN had to offer. The 308th should be represented by Elite squads with a rifle to SMG ratio of 2:1. Their leadership should be considered good with a 4:1 (and occasionally 3:1) squad to leader ratio. The other three divisions were fairly equivalent in terms of quality. They are best represented by a 2:1 ratio of rifle-armed squads to SMG squads. They should be largely 1st Line troops, with a leader to squad ratio of 4:1. As the battle wore on, heavy casualties necessitated the drafting of many replacements from the Regional Forces, and combat effectiveness correspondingly diminished.

2.15 Radio Usage: PAVN use Axis Minor radios. Radios in Viet Minh hands were a mixed lot, and communications training wasn't all it could have been throughout the French Indochina War.

2.16 Bazooka and Bangalor Torpedo Use: Viet Minh use of Bazookas and Bangalore torpedos is covered in the Standard Special Rule section. The Bangalore is used as a wire and mine clearing weapon only.

2.17 PAVN Capabilities: The capabilities of PAVN soldiers are presented in Standard Special Rule #2. A few points for designers are found below.

2.17.1 Stealth: The PAVN reputation for stealth speaks for itself. In Simpson's book *Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot* the author details an account of a Frenchman that narrowly averted capture. Before breaking cover and moving out onto a road, the road, in the soldier's words, "got up and moved". Apparently a Viet Minh unit was taking a march rest by the side of the road and was so well camouflaged that they couldn't be seen from a short distance away. In many of the narratives on the Indochina war, the ability of the Viet Minh to camouflage themselves masterfully is noted. Perhaps the ultimate compliment was paid by a French pilot who had flown in WW II and Korea. He had flown over the troops of many different nations, but never had he felt he was flying over the 'empty battlefield' as much as when over Viet Minh-controlled territory.

2.17.2 No Multi-Location FG: I expect this to be the most controversial rule in Dien Bien Phu. However, when one looks at the number of times French troops or their Allies held off Viet Minh units, even when heavily outnumbered and without air support or appropriate artillery support, one comes away with the impression that French fire discipline was vastly superior to that of even the Viet Minh regulars. This was the case not just at Dien Bien Phu, but also throughout the Indochina War. Giap himself had a standing order to never engage at less than 3:1 superiority in numbers, and at least a 5:1 superiority in firepower. Even when these odds were attained (and even exceeded), success was not guaranteed. The most revealing point is to take a look at the preferred means of fighting by the Viet Minh—jungle fighting and night combat. Both of these are instances in game terms where NO unit can form multi-location Fire Groups. Maybe Giap read his rulebook!

2.17.3 'Kinder, Gentler' Commissars: The Viet Minh Commissars were more like 'cheerleaders with combat boots' compared to the Russian model. Executions in the field were quite rare and 're-education' and shaming one in front of one's peers was a preferred method for dealing with those reluctant to do their duty. The Commissar question gives rise to the 'expert vs. the reliable amateur' argument. As the conflict wore on and the need for military knowledge began to outweigh the importance of political reliability, this argument heated up. In fact, a suitable balance between political overseer, i.e., commissar, and military commander on the scene was not really worked out in the time-frame of the French Indochina war, to the detriment of both functions.

2.17.4 Hand-to-Hand CC: Simply put, the Viet Minh were not slow to close with the enemy and in fact preferred to do so. Many a French soldier was despatched by the bayonet.

2.17.5 Absence of No Quarter: When reading the accounts I was struck by the amount of respect and chivalry existent between the two sides, qualities almost totally lacking in America's Vietnam War. Apparently the Vietnamese, with their long history of wars with colonial powers, could understand the thinking of a group of people who intended to keep their land if they won. They could not, however, understand why someone would fight to keep them from controlling their own country if they didn't want it themselves. When rear area administrative troops moved in to handle POWs this civility broke down. It may seem odd to have H-t-H CC and an absence of No Quarter. However, the fact is that surrender was accepted despite the frequency of close-quarters fighting.

2.17.6 PAVN Inability to Deploy: See the discussion of the relative lack of fire discipline between the combatants in 2.3.2 above.

PAVN ORDNANCE NOTES:

1. TYPE 31 60MM MORTAR: This is a Chinese knock off-of the U.S. M2/French mle 35. These were sent in large quantities to the Viet Minh once the Chinese border opened up with the fall of Nationalist China. Between 6-9 of these weapons could be found in a regular infantry battalion. This piece is also used to represent captured French and U.S. pieces.

2. DKZ 57MM RECOILLESS RIFLE: Referred to by the Vietnamese as

"Sung Khung Dat" exact translation, unknown. A knock-off of the U.S. M18 was produced locally by the Viet Minh and was referred to as the 'DKZ'. For game purposes there is no significant difference between this piece and the US M18 RCL. By 1952 a large number of captured U.S. ordnance pieces and munitions had been funneled to the Viet Minh through Communist China. This weapon was used extensively at Dien Bien Phu, both for infantry support and in attempts to ambush and destroy tanks. It had considerable success against the former, virtually none against the latter. Note rule C12.2 does not apply to Viet Minh use of the weapon. A Viet Minh battalion could be expected to have three of either these or the SKZ 75mm RCL, or some combination thereof amounting to three, depending on availability.

3. SKZ 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE: Still another weapon that came to the Viet Minh via the Korean War. Also used at Dien Bien Phu though it appears mostly in the infantry support mode. There are no known recorded 75mm recoilless rifle hits on any of the French tanks present. As with the 57mm version the Viet Minh produced their own variant of the U.S. M20 RCL called the 'SKZ'.

4. DSHK 38/46 12.7MM AA HMG: This weapon is a single-mount 12.7 HMG of Soviet manufacture. In the ground support mode it was wheeled and had a seat for the gunner. For the AA mode the wheels could be taken off. It was used successfully by the Viet Minh in both a ground support and AA Mode. It can be Limbered or dismantled. A dismantled counter has been provided.

5.OERLIKON FF 20MM AA: These Chinese supplied weapons helped form part of the Flak envelope around Dien Bien Phu that eventually made re-supply and re-enforcement of the French garrison impossible. It was guns such as these that were the target of Bigeard's attack to the West. See Chinese ordnance note 15.

6. BM OBR 37: This is the venerable WW II Soviet mortar. See Russian ordnance note 2. Counter for dismantled 82mm mortars are provided.

7. 76.2mm PP obr.27: This piece generically represents several animalpacked weapon types that the PAVN used for support. See Russian ordnance note 12 and note Man-Pack capabilities and AP/APCR TK#'s listed on the PAVN Ordnance Table.

8. ZP OBR 39: This is the hardy Soviet WW II AA-gun, used by many nations after the Second World War (including Germany during WW II). See Russian ordnance note 25.

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Name	Туре	C size	ROF	IFE	B#	Range	M#	T size	Special	Notes
Type 31	MTR	60*	3	-	12	3-45	-	0	5PP, IR, WP7, No OBA	1, A
DKZ	RCL	57	1	-	11	110	-	0	No AP, H7	2, B
SKZ	RCL	75	1	-	11	160	-	0	No AP, H7	3, B
OSHK 38/46	AA	T12.7	3	6	11	16	12	+1	QSU	4, A, C, D
Derlikon FF	AA	T20L	3	4	11	125	12	+1	Limber: NT 20; 2 ROF; B10	5, E
BM obr 37	MTR	82*	3	-	12	3-78	11	+1	No AP, S8, IR, QSU	6
PP obr 27	ART	76*	2	-	12	214	8	+1	QSU, Animal Pack; dm capable; H6; S8	7
ZP obr 39	AA	T37L	3	8	11	200	8	0	Limber	8

PAVN MULTI-APPLICABLE ORDNANCE NOTES:

A. This weapon may be Animal Packed (G10).

B. Non-crew PAVN MMC use RCL only pay a +1 TH DRM for A21.12 (EXC: Conscripts pay +2). All other A21.13 penalties apply for non-Crew use.

C. This weapon may dismantled into a 5PP DM counter, and re-assembled as per A9.8.

D. Maximum range of this weapon for To Hit purposes is 16 hexes.

E. When using Limbered Fire, the Barrel Length modification(C4.1) on the counter's LF side is used for TH purposes but the AP Basic TK# is still determined by using the Caliber Size and Length printed on the unlimbered side.

22

CHAMPS ELYSEES



DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA 30 MARCH 1954: In desperate need of a spectacular victory after a long, bloody, eight year conflict, the French High Command established a fortified hedgehog at Dien Bien Phu in Tonkin in November 1953. Overconfidence, and poor strategic planning on the part of the French led them to believe that they could hold this ten-mile long by six-mile wide valley through a series of fortified strongpoints. Furthermore, this base was intended to lure the Vietminh army to attack and expose their forces to swift decimation by highly mobile French units. The French were unaware that they were vastly outnumbered in both men and artillery by General Giap's Vietminh. They failed to forsee that the Vietminh would occupy the surrounding hills and use these observation sites to shell the airfield with artillery, effectively isolating the garrison to resupply. General Giap planned the battle in stages. In Phase One the battle which began on March 13, four Vietminh divisions supported by an artillery division (modelled on the SovietWW II division) attacked. The French suffered disastrously: three crucial northern strongpoints fell, a third of their infantry and artillery were lost, all observation points, as well as dozens of aircraft and most cru-

cially, the use of the airstrip. Supplies would now only be delivered by ineffective paradrops, the wounded could not be evacuated, and close air support was severely curtailed. After replacing their own heavy losses, Giap launched Phase Two (the longest and most violent phase of the battle) on March 30.

INITIAL PAVN OB:

ELEMENTS of the 308/316 Peoples Army Division Enter from the east edge, and/or the south edge on/east of TT15, or setup concealed/cloaked in any hex with a coordinate \leq 8: [ELR: 3] {SAN: 3}

18 (PAVN HW Sect.)

2x O1 Div. Artillery

G4 RCL Gun Sect. 1

10 x Trenches

15 CP

2x I1 (PAVN Conscript Inf. Pltn.)

3x I2 (PAVN Rfl. Inf. Pltn.) 2x I3 (PAVN SMG Inf. Pltn.) 2x B1 15 (PAVN Assault/Sapper Pltn.) 16 (PAVN MG Pltn.)

INITIAL FRENCH OB:

ELEMENTS, 6th Parachute Battalion, 13e DBLE, 1/2 REI, and Miscellaneous Garrison set up on hill hexes numbered >9: [ELR: 5/2] {SAN: 2}

3

5

 \mathbf{x}

2 x 11 (Para, Inf. Pltn.) 12 (Leg. Inf. Pltn.) 2 x 13 (Col. Inf. Pltn) 14 (T'ai Rifle Pltn.) 2 x 15 (MG Pltn.) O1 (See RG note 'n') 6 x 1+3+4 Pillboxes 6 x 2+3+4 Pillboxes 30 x Trenches (must be set up in ≤ 5 groups of ≥ 5 adjacent trenches) 10 x Sangars 6 x Wire 32 x Known AP Minefield factors (F.7) 4 x Dummy Minefields (F.7B) 8 CP 60 FP



* CG scenario automatically ends after 2nd PlayerTurn

MAP LAYOUT:

CG Dates: Six scenarios - 30 March 2030 hours - 3 April Dusk.

Initial Firefight Victory Conditions:

Scenario winner is whichever side amasses at least twice as many CVP as their opponent; otherwise there is no scenario winner (and thus no Scenario Winner DRM).



Initial Firefight: PAVN Attack; French Idle

CG Objective: The PAVN win if they Control two of the three French Eliane Strongpoints (See SR #I4) at the CG End.

Terrain Configuration: The entire Champs Elysees Historical map is in play. Terrain is PTO. Light Jungle is in effect. All Bamboo is Brush. All buildings are rubbled. Recommended Redeployment Option: A.

CHAMPS ELYSEES CG INITIAL SCENARIO RULES:

11. EC/Weather are Wet, Overcast, and Mud (D8.23, E3.6), with Heavy Rain (E3.51) and Gusty (E3.4) at start.

12. Night Rules are in effect. The French are the scenario DEFENDER (E1.2). The Base NVR is Two with Overcast/No Moon. The Majority Squad Types for the PAVN is Stealthy, and Normal for the French. Initial Starshell Usage Rules are not used.

13. Prior to French set up, the PAVN player must secretly pre-designate the area of effect for two Bombardments (see RG note 'b'). Conduct both Bombardments (C1.8) after setup but before Turn #1. There must be at least 10 hexes between hexes effected by each area of bombardment (Also see SR DBP 16).

14. French Strongpoints: Control of the Eliane 2 strongpoint is defined as Controlling all building/rubble locations on that hill. Control of Eliane 4 is defined by Controlling both level 4 hexes (ie. J18, J19) on that hill. Control of Eliane 1 is defined by Controlling both level 4 hexes (ie. G13, G14) on that hill.

15. Prior to French setup (and Bombardments), the PAVN player may *secretly* predesignate any six hexes of French Wire as being eliminated. The eliminated wire hexes are not revealed until a PAVN unit (only) enters said hexes.

16. Infiltrators: Up to two PAVN Infantry RG (I-type) may set up anywhere on non-hill map hexes.

CHAMPS ELYSEES CG SPECIAL RULES:

CE1. EC, Weather, Wind, and Visibility are determined as per G16.2, 16.3, and 16.4. PTO with Light Jungle is in effect. All DBP SR are in effect.

CE2. Strategic Terrain Types: All types listed in PL definition that are present [EXC: Military Crest is NA]. In addition a Woods-Line is also considered three Palm Tree hexes.

CE3. If DBP Mist is present, it has an LV hindrance DRM of +1 per hex. At the beginning of each GAME Turn, a dr \leq the turn number results in the Mist beginning to lift. On that turn it becomes a +1 at 1-2 hex range, +2 at 3-4, etc. On the next GAME Turn it becomes +1 at 1-3, +2 at 4-6, etc. On the next GAME Turn it lifts completely. In any firefight in which it is raining, and it ceases to rain (E3.51), DBP Mist goes into effect. The following GAME Turn begin rolling for the Mist to lift. The Mist is immediately dissipated if it begins to rain again (but is subject to returning under the above conditions).

CE4. ELR refers to French/T'ai ELR.

CE5. As an exception to PL 2.3, the PAVN may purchase up to four Infantry RG (i.e., RG beginning with an "I") during the RePh.

CE6. No French Fortification may be HIP (E1.16) [EXC: Foxholes], regardless of being day/nighttime.

CE7. During nighttime firefights, the PAVN may conduct a Recon (E1.23), In which the dr is modified by an additional +5 drm.

Firefight	Time/Date	Attacker	Weather	EC	Wind	Moon	Historic DRM
Ţ	Night 3/30/54	Vietminh	Heavy Rain/Mud (E3.6) NVR: 2	Wet	Gusty	None	-1
2	AM 3/31/54	French	Heavy Rain/Mud (E3.6)	Wet	Gusty	NA	0
3	AM 4/1/54	French	DBP Mist (SR CE #3)	Wet	G16.4	NA	0
4	Night 4/1/54	Dual	Clear NVR: 2	Moist	G16.4	NA	o
5	PM 4/2/54	French	Clear	Moist	G16.4	NA	0
6	Dusk 4/3/54	French	Dusk (E1.7)	Moderate	G16.4	NA	0

CG DRM	French	PAVN
Leader	-1	0
Battle Hardening	o	0
Artillery OBA	۰İ	0
CP Replenishment	+3	+2
Intensity	MID	MID

Fortifications Ava	ilable for Purchase:
Foxhole	Wire ^F
Trench	HIP
Roadblock	איקיוו .
Dummy Mines (F.7B)	Trip Flares ^F
Known Mines (F.7B) ⁵¹	Sangars
F: Only French may purchase	l: May purchase only for Initial scenario of CG (max 60 FP may be spent on mines); 4 FP minefields may be purchased

	Liement		FAVINGIOL		41010		.
RG ID	Description	Quantity	Units Equipment	СР	FF Max	CG Max	Notes
11	PAVN Conscript Inf. Pitn.	4	(3-3-7/3-3-6) MMC	3	з	7	dhlrwf
12	PAVN Rfl. Inf. Pitn.	4	(4-4-8/3-4-7) MMC	4	3	6	dlrwf
13	PAVN SMG Inf. Pitn.	4	(6-3-8/5-3-7) MMC	5	2	4	dirwf
14	PAVN Conscript SMG Pltn.	4	(4-2-7/3-2-6) MMC	3	2	2	dhirwf
15	PAVN Assault/Sapper. Pitn.	4	6-3-8, Bangalore Torpedoes	6	2	2	dgir
16	PAVN MG Pitn.	1,2	HMG/MMG	3	1	3	cdr
17	PAVN Lt. MTR Sect.	2	60mm Type 31 MTR	2	2	3	cdr
18	PAVN HW Sect.	1,1	DSHK38/46 AA/ Oerlikon FF 20mm AA	3	1	2	cdr
19	Regimental HQ	1,1,2	9-2, 9-0, 6-3-8	3	1	1	dr
110	PAVN T-H Sect.	1,2	BAZ 45, BAZ50	3	. 1	3	cdr
01	Divisional Artillery	-	105mm OBA (HE/Smoke)	4	1	3	ор
02	Army Artillery	-	120mm OBA (HE/Smoke)	6	1	3	qo
B1	Bombardment	-	-	7	1	2	ь
G1	PÀVN AA Gun Sect.	2	37mm ZP obr 39	3	1	1	acdt
G2	PAVN INF Sect.	2	76.2mm PP obr 27	5	2	2	acdt
G3	MTR Gun Sect.	2	BM obr 37	2	2	2	acdt
G4	RCL Gun Section 1	2	DKZ 75mm RCL	5	2	2	acdt
G5	RCL Gun Section 2	2	SKZ 57mm RCL	3	2	2	acdt
Mt	Fortifications		20 FP	1	4	24	a
M2	Sniper	-	SAN +1	1	2	12	-
мз	Attack Option	-	-	1	1	5	-
P1	Patrol	-	-	2	1	6	x

Elements of the PAVN 316th Division

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Consolidated RG Notes:

a Available for on-map setup on CG day of purchase.

b Bombardments are resolved as per C1.8 [EXC: the bombardment affects a rectangular shaped area 10 hexes from north to south by 10 hexes east to west. A third die is rolled during each DR. A 6 on that third die results in the hex being immune to that attack].

c Each French Gun/RCL is accompanied by a 2-2-8 Crew; each MMG(a)/HMG(a)/ 50cal.HMG by a 2-4-8 HS MMC. Each PAVN Gun/RCL is accompanied by a 2-2-8 Crew; each MMG/HMG/.DSHK 38-46/60mm MTR by a 2-3-8 HS.

- d These RG may be purchased as Reserves for On-map Set Up as per 2.32-.33.
- f These PAVN RG make a secret dr to determine troop quality. A dr ≤ 4 results in the MMC all being the type to the left of the slash; otherwise, use the MMC type to the right.

g This RG's MMC are all Sappers (H1.24). They are also Fanatic (A10.8). This RG also comes with 2 x DC.

- h This RG has a +1 modifier to its LG DR (2.361).
- 1 Determine Leaders (SMC) as per 2.361. The Legacy drm is NA.
- n This RG comes with either a radio or field phone and a 7-0 leader, and has the option to setup using HIP.
- o Increase CP by one for a Level 7 Off-board Observer.
- p Increase CP by one per Pre-Registered hex (C1.73) purchased with module (no module may have >2 Pre-Registered hexes).

q Fighter-Bomber arrival determined as per E7.2-.21, and arrives with either bombs or Napalm (French player's choice).

- r Must enter as reinforcements if entered on the CG Day of purchase [EXC: 2.32; 2.34]. The RG is available for on-map setup if purchased on any CG Day prior to that of the current scenario.
- s This vehicle comes with a 2 FP AA MG.
- t This RG unit must begin play setup on hill hexes with a coordinate ≤ 6 .
- w This RG arrives with an LMG. French Para. Inf./Leg. Inf. Platoons roll a die. A dr of ≥4 results in that unit arriving with a 60mm MTR(a). French Para Inf. (I1) arrive with 1 x DC.
- x Patrols are OPTIONAL in Champs Elysees. Use the Patrol rules in PL 2.5 (2.7).

Elements of the French 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion; 13e DBLE; 1/2 REI; Miscellaneous Elements of the French 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion

RG ID	Description	Quantity	Units Equipment	СР	FF Max	CG Max	Notes
S1	French Air Support	1.	'51 FB	3	2	3	q
11	Para. Inf. Pitn.	3	6-4-8 MMC.	6	2	3	lrw
12	Legionnaire Inf. Pltn.	3	4-5-8 MMC	5	2	3	lrw
13	Col. Inf. Pitn.	3	4-5-7 MMC	4	2	4	Irw
14	T'ai Rifle Pitn.	3	3-3-6 MMC	3	2	4	lrw
15	Para. MG Pitn	1,1,2	.50 cal. HMG/HMG(a)/MMG(- a)	6	1	1	cr
16	Leg. FT Sect.	2	2-4-8 MMC, FT	3	1	1	lr
17	Battalion HQ	1,1,2,2	10-2, 8-1, 3-3-8 HS, Jeep	6	1	1	rs
A1	Lt. Tank Pltn.	2	M-24	9	1	3	rl
01	Battalion Mortars	-	81mm OBA (HE/SMOKE)	4	1	2	np
02	Medium Artillery	-	75mm OBA (HE)	3	1	2	np
03	Heavy Artillery	-	105mm OBA (HE/SMOKE)	6	1	1	np
G1	RCL Gun Sect	2	M18 57mm RCL Gun	3	1	1	acdr
G2	RCL Gun Sect.	2	M20 75mm RCL Gun	4	1	1	acdr
M 1	Fortifications		20 FP	1	4	24	a
M2	Sniper	-	SAN +1	1	2	12	-
мз	Attack Option	-	-	1	1	5	-
P1	Patrol	-	-	1	1	5/4	x
M2	Sniper	-	SAN +1	1	2	12	-
мз	Attack Option	-		1	1	5	-
P1	Patrol	-	-	2	1	6	×

CONCLUSION: Attacking at dusk, the Vietminh simultaneously concentrated on five French positions. Three of these vital positions were known as Eliane 1, Eliane 4, and Eliane 2 (nicknamed Champs Elysees). After a violent preliminary artillery bombardment by Vietminh recoilless rifle and machinegun fire from a nearby hill, as well as artillery fire from the distant hills leveled fortifications on the Eliane strongpoints, elements of the 316 PAVN Division quickly scrambled up the two hills, seizing Eliane 1 and 2 from the stunned defenders. French paratroopers counterattacked the Eliane 1 strongpoint the next day, and after bitter hand-to-hand fighting, retook the strongpoint. Unfortunately, without receiving the promised reinforcements, they were forced to yield it and retreat. The following day the French Paras and Legionnaires counterattacked 'Champs Elysees' using their M-24 tanks. Repeated assaults over the next two days eventually forced the Vietminh to withdraw from Eliane 2 (Champs Elysees) on April 4. French morale soared when the lost strongpoint was retaken. By April 10 the French retook Eliane 1 and successfully repulsed a concerted Vietminh attack. These hills would eventually fall to the Vietminh during Phase 3 of the battle in early May, and thus seal the garrison's fate. But for now the battle for Eliane and Champs Elysees was over.

VAR1. THE VARIANT COUNTERS

INTRODUCTION: CH uses a VARIANT counter presentation, debuted in GEN-ESIS 48.

VAR1.1 *INFANTRY/SW:* The presentation of infantry/SW counters will be familiar to past CH module customers with a few updates.

VAR1.11 *FIREPOWER/RANGE/MORALE*: The front of the MMC counter presents three identical figures. Below them, Firepower, Range and Morale are arrayed in that order in a large type.

VAR 1.12 ASSAULT/SPRAY FIRE: The availability of Assault Fire + Spray Fire is denoted by a SMG icon to the right of the FP/Range/ML info. If there is a SMG icon, that squad has both Assault and Spray Fire capability. A SMG icon over a white circle indicates *only* Spray Fire is available.

VAR1.13 SPECIAL MORALE CAPABILITIES: 'Underlined' morale on the front of a MMC counter is indicated by an asterisk after the morale factor. On the back, an asterisk indicated self-rally for MMC/SMC.

VAR1.14 *RANGE:* On SW, maximum Range is indicated in a red box. If there is a minimum Range, it is indicated in a Green box (EX: The 2" Israeli Homemade mortar has a minimum Range of '2' and a maximum Range of '10'). Green = minimum 'GO' for Range; Red = 'STOP'.

VAR1.15 *RATE OF FIRE/FIREPOWER*: ROF and FP are indicated on SW under the image of that weapon in a large type in the order [ROF] - [RANGE]. The same presentation is used for ordnance SW, in this case indicating [ROF] - [GUN SIZE]. It should be noted the same presentation is used for vehicle machine-guns that have ROF.

VAR1.16 CLASS: MMC Class is indicated in the upper right-hand corner of the front of the counter in a small type.

VAR1.17 UNRELIABLE WEAPONRY: Any Unreliability (B#) number is found on the front of the counter in red letters on in a white circle.

VAR1.18 *PORTAGE*: The Portage number is found on the front of the counter in a Blue type.

VAR1.19 *TYPE:* The Type of weapon is indicated by standard abbreviations such as ATR for Anti-Tank Rifle, MTR for Mortar, etc.

VAR2.1 AFV/VEH/CLES: The presentation of Vehicles/AFV is new to the CH VARIANT system.

VAR2.11 GUN CALIBER CLASS: Four classes of Gun Caliber are presented, rated from A-D (best to worst). An 'A' rated gun is the equivalent of an "LL" gun; a 'B' to an 'L', and so on. The gun size in millimeters is found on the counter in a large type. The Gun Caliber Class can be found to the right of the gun size, as superscript.

VAR2.12 RATE OF FIRE: The Rate of Fire can be found to the right of the gun size, as subscript.

VAR2.13 TURRET TYPE: Turret Types range from 'fast' to small, one-man turrets. A thin black circle around the gun size denotes the most effective type, a fast turret; a thin white circle a slow turret, with a thick white circle and dashed thick white circle denoting restricted and one-man slow turrets.

VAR2.14 *RELATIVE TARGET SIZE:* On targets that are rated 'smaller' or 'larger' than others, an aiming sight is found on the counter. If the aiming sight has a small white center with a '-' sign in its left-bottom quadrant, the target is 'small'; a large white circle and two '-' signs (in the bottom two quadrants) is small x 2. The same goes for large targets, substituting a red center in the aiming sight. VAR2.15 MACHINE GUNS: Machine guns on a vehicle are denoted by the use

of a 'T' in the lower right of the counter. The 'top' of the 'T' is any Coaxial machine-guns; bottom left is any Bow machine-guns and bottom right is any antiaircraft machine guns. If any of these MG are a Main Armament, they will be printed in white inside a Green circle. Any Rate of Fire for such MG is denoted in the same fashion as on a SW counter (i.e., [ROF] - [FP]).

VAR2.16 ARMOR FACTORS: Armor Factors are presented on the top and bottom of a horizontal line as follows: [FRONT AF] / [SIDE-REAR AF]. Any vehicle that is un-armored is indicated with "UA' on the counter. Increased or decreased armor protection for a particular facing is denoted by the use of an Ù icon for increased armor and Ú for decreased.

VAR2.17 MOVEMENT POINTS: Movement points for a vehicle are found inside a large arrow on the front of the counter. A red '*' inside the arrow indicates an unreliable MP vehicle.

VAR2.18 OPEN/CLOSED TOP AFV: A gray movement arrow = Close Topped; a white movement arrow = Open Topped.

VAR2.19 PORTAGE AND TOWING: The ratings for these capabilities are found on the front or back of the vehicle counter in a large Blue type, presented in the following manner: [Portage] - [Tow].

VAR2.20 NO HE/AP: Any gun lacking a particular ammunition type (or suffering from a limit on that type) has 'HE' or 'AP' noted at about 12 o'clock over the gun size.

VAR2.21 INHERENT FIRE CAPABILITIES: Are noted above the gun size in a large Red type.

VAR2.22 UNRELIABILTY OF GUN: Denoted in the same manner as a SW. A Blue number indicated Low Ammunition. A lower case 'x' after the number indicates it is an elimination number instead.

VAR2.23 NATIONALITY OF MANUFACTURE: A small 'a', 'b', 'f' or 'r' found somewhere on the front of the counter indicates the country of manufacture.

VAR3.1 *GUNS*: The presentation of GUNS is new to the CH VARIANT system. VAR3.2 *PREVIOUS RULES APPLY*: The above-listed rules (VAR1.-3.1) apply to GUNS with the following additions.

VAR3.3 MANHANDLE: This factor is found on the back of the GUN in large Green type.

Spraying Fire (white dot behind SMG icon denotes no Assault Fire)





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MISCELLANEOUS	 All non-Conscript SMG squads are Assault Fire (A7.36) Capable H-t-H CC (G1.64) for ATTACKER or successful ambush Stealthy (A25.7) unless Conscripts 	 May substitute Commissars (see DBP SR#2) as if pre-11/42 Russian No multi-Location FG Sappers (H1.2) may use Bangalore Torpedos (DBP SR#7) Treat Surrender HoB as Berserk (DBP SR#2) unless Conscripts 	 +0 modification for Leader Creation May not Deploy or Recombine Treat as Russian for OBA purposes; Radio Contact 7 May use Human May, (A55, 53) 	 Treat all PAVN infantry as Japanese for G1.424, 1.63, 1.631, and 1.632 A Trashell Usage drm Red TH# used for ordnance 	0 0	4448 b 3-4-7 b 448 b 448 c 3-3-6 c 3-3-6	$ \begin{array}{c} \left(\begin{array}{c} \left(\begin{array}{c} \left(\begin{array}{c} 0\\ 0\end{array}\right) \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3$	4 4 1 4	FRENCH: ● Treated as12/43+ Free French (F.8)	 Use British LMG /DC/?¹ counters and Free French (a) HMG/MMG 4.4.8/3-3-8 Broken side ML 9/8 1 Hob for 6-4-8/3-3-8 in addition to being Elite 6-4-8/3-3-8 have underlined morale 	 6-4-8/3-3-8 ELR always 5 unless stated otherwise H-t-H CC (G1.64) for ATTACKER or successful ambush 	TAI: Considered Conscripts (EXC: 4 MF) as per DBP SR#3 +1+H CC (G1.64) for ATTACKER or successful ambush	 Steamy (Acs.1), rob +z DHM No multi-Location FG May not Deploy or Recombine No Quarter (A20.3) always in effect for Tai 	 ELLI aways Z unless otherwise stated French Leaders not treated as Allied Troops (A10.7) CC DRM for Capture in CC vs. Inexperienced is NA
GRENADES				6 - 5						Smoke				
DRM					⊷ +				- t-					75
UNU 10# OBA ACCESS	Red 5B/2R										Black 8B/2R			Red No OBA
BPV	Q	4	60	~	Q	e	Ś	2	B	g	5	4	ŝ	2
SH	3-3-8′	2-3-7	2-2-Je	1-1-6	2-4-8	1-3-76	1-2-76	1-2-6	3-3-8	2-4-8'	2-4-76	2-3-76	2-2-E	1-2-6'
	ал-8 3-3-8	2-3-7	2-2-7	1-1-6	हैंकी ^E 2-4-8	1-3-7	44 2 1-2-7	2.4°c 1-2-6	3-3-8*	ÅÅ E 2.4-8	傍傍 1 2-4-7	ÅÅ 2-3-7	6 2-2-6	c 1-2-6*
BPV	4	12	в	Q	12	10	ø	ω	16	12	10	8	2	~
squad	6-3-8	5-3-7"	4-2-71	3-2-6	4-4-8°	3-4-77	3-3-7/	3-3-6	<u>6</u> ~4- <u>8</u> °	4²-5-8°	42-5-7/	4-4-77	4-3-6°	3-3-6 ⁵
CLASS	E/SMG	1/SMG	2/SMG	C/SMG	Щ	+	د ی	ు	[E]	LL1		2	9	U
	8-0-8 6-3-8 6-3-8	5-3-7	4-2-7	2-2-6 3-2-6	4-4-8	3-4-7	2-3-7 3-3-7	3-3-6 3-3-6	0.6-4-8"	∰∰ E 4-5-8	负负 1 4-5-7	餐餐餐 244-7	6 4-3-6	12 2-3-6*
CREW (BPV)				PAVN	2-2-8° (8)						FRENCH 2-2-8' (8)			T'AI

<u> (11</u>

BRUNO'S FLAK ATTACK

DBP #1



HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

• French OBA module has Normal ammunition instead of Scarce.

Y French DB may spend ONE Game Turn on board.

BOARD LAYOUT:





(Only hexrows A-P are playable)

SCENARIO RULES:

1. PTO is in effect (EXC: huts, rice paddies (treat as irrigated), kunai, and brush (not bamboo) are the only terrain in effect; treat all woods as brush). EC are wet. Weather is Clear and Gusty with a Mild Breeze from the east at start. The pond in O1 is treated as a dry depression hex (i.e., Level -1). Place overlay V2 on D9-D8. Kindling is NA.

2. Bore Sighting is NA.

3. The French receive one module of 105mm OBA (HE only) with Scarce Ammunition. This module must begin as a Creeping Barrage (E12.7). Because of the radio counter it may later be converted to a non-barrage OBA. 4. The French may receive Air Support (E7) starting on turn three. They will receive ONE French 1951 *Helldiver* DB armed with Napalm as per 17.41. This aircraft is Recalled after two turns in play and is limited to making Point Attacks (E7.402) only when making attacks using Napalm (G17.4).

OBJECTIVES: The French win at Game End if both PAVN Oerlikon FF AND the DSHK 38/46 AA guns are captured *or* eliminated by any means.

DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 28 March 1954: By March 27th, General DeCastries faced a major problem: how to deal with the Viet Minh AA-guns that were seriously hampering his efforts at air resupply for the garrison. He decided that the next day he would send a large strike out to the west of the garrison's position, tasked to capture a nest of AA batteries near the villages of Bang Ong Pet, and Ban Ban. The man he chose for the job was the most respected leader in the French garrison: Major Marcel Bigeard, affectionately known by a nick-name earned during his days in the resistance: *Bruno*. Behind a powerful barrage and ample air support the French attack came in. The 6th BPC (Colonial Parachute Battalion) struck Bang Ong Pet while the 8th BPC struck Ban Ban. The 8th achieved its objectives quickly, but the 6th was pinned down by stiff resistance. Three Chaffee tanks came up to reinforce the latter French assault and Viet Minh resistance soon gave way. When it was over the French were astounded at their success. Not only had they captured five 20mm AA-guns, twelve 12.7 AA MGs, and killed some 350 of the enemy, but they had done it against the elite 308th division, viewed by both armies to be the best unit the Viet Minh possessed.



Original Design: Carl Noguiera



HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

• Reduce the PAVN OBA to normal ammunition.

Add an 8-1 leader to the PAVN turn one force.

BOARD LAYOUT:



OBJECTIVES: The PAVN player wins immediately if he eliminates the two pillboxes OR if he Controls them at Game End.

SCENARIO RULES:

1. EC and Weather are Mud (D8.23, E3.6). PTO is not in effect and there is no wind at start. Place Overlay AF1 on D1 O3-P3. Rule B7.0 pertains to the runway.

2. Prior to all set up, the PAVN player may place four shellhole counters in any wire or trench hex. The shellhole counter eliminates the wire (and its AP mines [see SR #8]) or the trench in the hex.

3. All French units are Fanatic. All PAVN 3-3-8 HS are Sappers (H1.2).

4. Night rules are in effect with No Moon, scattered clouds and gusty wind conditions at start. Base NVR is 2. PAVN majority squad type is Stealthy; French is normal. PAVN is the scenario ATTACKER; French the scenario DEFENDER. Neither side may use use cloaking.

5. Beginning with the first PAVN Prep Fire Phase (and in the Prep Fire Phase of every PLAYER TURN thereafter), place a Starshell in hexes D2 N5, N10, and H10, and roll for scatter as per method three of E1.922. This occurs before any other PFPh action and is NOT considered initial placement of a starshell for the purposes of rule E1.91.

6. After his set up the French player may secretly record two hexes containing wire his units may enter at a cost of +2 MF/+4 MP without having any minefield attack or wire expenditure of MF (or Strayng or Bog). The unit is considered to be moved beneath the wire counter when this extra MF/MP cost is spent. If the extra movement cost is not spent, the mines are treated normally. No trail break is placed for vehicular movement through these hexes.

7. The PAVN receives one 105mm OBA (HE only) with two pre-registered hexes and Plentiful Ammunition directed by an offboard observer at Level 1 secretly recorded before all set up in a north edge hex. The only hexes an AR/FFE may be placed in or corrected to are the pre-registered hexes. The pre-registered hexes MUST be on/within the French wire network perimeter. For the purposes of placing AR/FFE on the pre-regregistered hexes (only), treat OBA LOS as though it were a DAY scenario (i.e., allow the PAVN to place an AR/FFE in a preregregistered hex even if not illuminated; it also eliminates the need for an extra chit draw regardless of the cause).

8. Place trench network counters as follows: Place trench networks in the following hexes (EXC: No trench is placed in a hex with shellholes): Place a trench network in the following hexes (EXC: No trench is placed in a hex with shellholes): D2A7-E9-I7-I1. Place 1+3+4 pillboxes in D2E2 (F1-F2) and D2E4 (E5-F4). Place wire network counters as follows: D2L0-D2L7-D1E1-D2A9-D2A6. Each wire network hex also contains 4 factors of AP mines (EXC: In hexes that also contain trenches). Trench/wire networks exist in printed shellholes.

Positions at 'Hugette 6', DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 3 April 1954: Time after time at Dien Bien Phu, the 'Bison'' of Cpt. Yves Hervouet's tank company would make the difference in the success or failure of a counter-attack. The night of April 3rd at H6 was no exception. A strong Viet Minh attack developed against the Eastern flank of H6. Lt. Col. Langlais decided to throw in his reserve. This amounted to a company of the 8th BPC led by Capt. Desmond and the tanks Smolensk, Posen and Ettlingen now led by Sgt. Ney who had taken over from Sgt Guntz when the latter was killed March 15th. Heavily outnumbered, the French made their way up the bare runway and slammed into the Southeastern flank of the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh caught in the open by the superior firepower of the French tanks, buckled and then gave way as the French armor continued to press the attack. Once the Viet Minh had retreated the three tanks remained until well into the night to guard against counterattack before returning to their revetments in the "Center of Resistance".



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Original Design: Carl Noguiera

DOWNAND DIRTY

$\mathbf{IDRP} #3$



-03

HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

Replace the PAVN 75mm RCL with a 57mm RCL

Replace two 4-5-8 squads with two 4-5-7 to the French at-start OB.

BOARD LAYOUT:

any hex of the network.



SCENARIO RULES:

1. EC and Weather are MUD (D8.23, E3.6), with Heavy Rain (E3.51) and no wind at start. PTO is not in effect.

2. Place trench networks in the following hexes: D3I6-K7-I8-I6; D3U3-W4-End. To Control a trench network, the French must Control the majority of U5-U3; D3AA6-CC7-AA8-AA6; D3DD8-D3FF9-DD10-DD8; D1Q1-Q3-S2-Q1; D1W2-Y3-W4-W2; and D1BB7-DD8-BB9-BB7 (note EE9 does not the trench hexes in that network and no Good Order PAVN MMC may be in receive a trench counter due to shellholes).

Positions at Strongpoint 'Wienne', DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 2 May 1954: By early May the end was near at Dien Bien Phu. The fighting, however, was no less intense. This was certainly true of the battle for the mud-encrusted stretch of land called Strongpoint 'Wieme'. Early in the morning of May 2nd, the 57 Regiment of the 304th division attacked the French positions and gained a significant foothold in the northeastern portion of the position. The French re-grouped and counter-attacked fiercely, with the Legionnaires of the 3/3 REI, Algerians of the 2/1 RTA, and two tanks in support. The first two counterattacks were beaten back, but the third finally pierced the Communist incursion. The Algerians, tired and demoralized (stemming partly from a charge of cowardice by Colonel Lalande), nevertheless fought well alongside Lalande's Legionnaires. The prize they had won, however, was deemed too costly to hold. A patrol was left on Wieme and the main force pulled back to positions on 'Isabelle'. A short time later the patrol left behind followed, unable to remain on the post. The end result of the day's bloody fighting was a stalemate.



Original Design: Carl Noguiera



O Reduce the French VP requirement to ≥ 10 .

Add one LMG to the PAVN OB.

BOARD LAYOUT:



OBJECTIVES: The French must amass ≥ 12 VP by Game End to win. VP are earned by exiting units along the south edge and for *H6 Garrison* units (only) IN trenches on Board D1 in hexes numbered ≥ 8 . Prisoners do not count for VP.

SCENARIO RULES:

1. EC are Mud, with no wind at start. PTO is not in effect. Place overlay AF1 on hexes D1O3-P3. The airfield is treated as in rule B7.0. Mud effects do not apply to such hexes. Airfield hexes with trenches in them are treated as open ground with trenches.

2. To reflect the surprise of the PAVN units, following all set up, but prior to French turn one Rally Phase, all PAVN MMC must take a NMC with results

Positions at 'Hugette 6', DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 18 April 1954: French attempts to break through to the beleaguered strongpoint of 'Huguette 6' on the night of April 17th had fallen short. For a week, nightly breakthroughs had been made to keep Captain Bizard and his polygot garrison supplied. Now the Viet Minh ring around the strong-point had become too tight to pass even patrols through and Bizard was told he was on his own. He faced an unhappy choice. He could make an Alamo-like last stand, surrender, or attempt a breakout. This last seemed a very slim chance at best. Yet Bizard chose to break out. On Easter morning, April 18th, the mixed bag of Vietnamese and French paratroopers and Foreign Legionnaires lined up in their trenches, slung partially filled sandbags over their chests to protect themselves from grenade fragments, and began their advance. The Viet Minh were deployed, expecting another breakthrough attempt from the south. The early morning fog that usually covered the valley was again present. Under cover of automatic weapons fire from a wounded French sergeant, who died at his post, the men were able to dash across and sometimes *over* the Viet Minh in their trenches and make it to friendly lines, some 3-500 meters away. French morale was buoyed that a good percentage of the trapped survivors made it out. It did not remain high for long in the face of the reality that another strong-point had fallen. Original Design: Carl Noguiera

applied normally. The PAVN player may not attempt to Rally units or remove Pin counters during French Player Turn one.

3. There is Mist in effect at start with a +1 LV hindrance DRM per hex. At the beginning of each Game Turn, a dr \leq the turn number (EXC: There is a -1 drm to this roll, i.e., on turn two, a roll of \leq 3 is a result) results in the mist gradually lifting for the remainder of the game. For that Game Turn it becomes a +1 at 1-2 hex range; +2 at 3-4; etc. On the next Game Turn it becomes +1 at 1-3; +2 at 4-6; etc. On the NEXT Game Turn it lifts completely (i.e., no Mist LV modifier at any range).

4. The French that begin on Board D1 must remain UNDER trench counters on Board D1 for the entire game (but may move between such counters, including into a hex where a trench was 'removed' by shellholes).

5. Place trench networks in the following hexes (EXC: No trench is placed in a hex with shellholes): D2A7-E9-I7-II; D1A2-B2-E1-L4-N3; D1G2-II-K2-M1-P2; and D1A10-E8-I10. Note that the trenches in D1H1 and H2 are not connected.

6. All Board D2 at start French units are Fanatic (A10.8).

7. The French receive one module of 80mm Battalion Mortar OBA with Scarce Ammunition (HE only) and an Offboard Observer recorded before all set up at Level 0 along the south edge.

8. The French Hero must start set up with the French MMG and will not relinquish Possession of it until he is eliminated. All H6 Garrision units receive an additional +1 DRM to IFT attacks against them.



LANGLAIS ON HILL 781

DBP #5



HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

O Add 1 x 6-4-8 and 1 x 4-5-7 squad to the French At Start OB.

The PAVN player may set up one additional squad/equivalent (and any SMC/SW stacked with it) using HIP.

BOARD LAYOUT:



(Only hexrows R-EE are playable)

OBJECTIVES: The side with the most CVP at game end, wins. In addition, the French are awarded 4 CVP for each Sangar they Control at game end. The PAVN are awarded 3 CVP for each Foxhole they Control at game end.

SCENARIO RULES:

1. PTO is in effect. EC are Moderate, with no wind at start. All hill hexes containing open ground, bamboo, or palm trees are treated as Dense Jungle instead. All eligible French and PAVN units may set up concealed (i.e., the OB-provided '?' counters are dummies). Entrenching is NA.

2. All French 6-4-8/2-4-8 and all SMC have an ELR of 5. T'ai units have an ELR of 2. All other French have an ELR of 4.

3. Starting on turn two, the PAVN player makes a dr at the start of his Rally Phase. On a dr \leq the Game Turn number he will receive reinforcements that turn. These enter play on Level 3 or 4 hill hexes along the south edge. The reinforcement leaders may not be exchanged for commissars. The PAVN player may not be so-reinforced more than once in a game.

4. The Flamethrower and DC counters must each begin the game Possessed by a 2-4-8 HS. FT/DC may not be Possessed or used by any other French unit [EXC: a leader] until each originally Possessing 2-4-8 HS is eliminated (i.e., not Broken).

5. During the APh, leaders (or units accompanied by leaders) expending ≤ 6 MF are not subject to being CX for Advance vs. Difficult Terrain (A4.72).

DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 6 February 1954: By early February, the French high command at Dien Bien Phu realized the Viet Minh had succeeded in moving large quantities of artillery into the area. The Viet Minh, by the 6th of February, had already brought the airfield at Dien Bien Phu under damaging fire. Contrary to popular belief, the French realized the importance of the hills surrounding the valley of Dien Bien Phu. When French airstrikes and counterbattery fire proved ineffective, an attempt was made to use probes to secure these hills, and most importantly, neutralize the Viet Minh artillery expertly camouflaged on them. On February 6th, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Charles Langlais was instructed by General Armand De Castries to clear Hill 781 (the highest prominence in the valley), of Viet Minh artillery. Langlais took for the mission the paratroops of GAP 2 (2nd Airborne Battle Group), the 2nd BT (a T'ai unit) and the 1st Battalion, 4th Moroccan infantry. He also brought along a Legionnaire flamethrower detachment, and a small detachment of combat engineers with explosives. The Moroccans were placed in the lead and the entire force circled around the rear of the hill to proceed up its reverse slope. Standard artillery doctrine declared this is where they would find the guns. The French forces, however, found



nothing on the reverse slope, and after a pause, were preparing to ascend to the hill summit and sweep the front slopes. At 1300 hours the Viet Minh counterattacked down the hill and slammed into the oncoming attack force. In the heavy fighting that ensued, the Moroccans and French held, but the T'ai, more accustomed to hit-and-run guerrilla warfare, had to be 'corset-laced' between the French and Moroccan soldiers to be kept in the battle line. Finally, at 1820, Langlais gave the order to withdraw. The Viet Minh had protected their artillery, which was dug into the forward slope so thoroughly, that while they had limited traverse, they could pummel pre-selected targets with virtual impunity. The sortie had cost the French 93 casualties, losses they could ill afford.

Original Design: Carl Noguiera

ROUTE 41



HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

• The PAVN must earn 32 CVP to win.

Replace the PAVN 9-1 leader with a 9-2.

BOARD LAYOUT:



SCENARIO RULES:

1. PTO is in effect with Light Jungle. EC are Moderate with no wind at start. Palm trees and building hexes are treated as open ground. Walls and hedges do not exist. The road from 16A5/A6-16GG5/GG6 does exist as an unpaved road.

2. The French receive one module of 105mm OBA (HE only) with Plentiful Ammunition. The PAVN receive one module of 81mm Battalion Mortar OBA (HE only), with one pre-registered hex. The PAVN observer (and radio) may set up utilizing HIP and automatically receives Radio Contact on turn one. Remove one black chit from the battery access pile.

3. French units are allowed to Low Crawl (only) closer to known enemy units without being eliminated for failure to rout, or being forced to surrender, regardless of possible interdiction opportunities, so long as in so doing they do not become/remain ADJACENT to any Known, unbroken, armed, enemy units. All other rout rules remain in effect unchanged.

OBJECTIVES: The PAVN must earn \geq 28 CVP by Game End.

DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 5 December 1953: The mission of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu was not strictly defensive.Indeed, the operational plans for the garrison called for half of its strength to be engaged in offensive operations at all times. On December 5th, the first company of the 1 BPC (First Colonial Parachute Battalion) was to do a simple security mission up Route 41. Not expecting any trouble so close to Dien Bien Phu, they moved along without any extraordinary patrol precautions. At 0945, the peaceful march was rudely interrupted by the enemy. As the company passed between two hills it came under mortar and small arms fire. The lead platoon was cut to pieces in the first moments of the battle. The remainder of 1st Company pulled into a defensive hedgehog to attempt to beat back the onrushing Viet Minh. Artillery support and the timely arrival of reinforcements saved the remainder of the company from annihilation. The Communist troops faded back into the jungle as quickly as they had come. A search of the dead they left behind revealed they were from the 316th Division. The storm clouds were beginning to gather for the garrison of Dien Bien Phu.



Original Design: Carl Noguiera

CASTOR'S OPENING ACT

DBP #7



123

HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

• Add an 8-0 leader to the French OB.

Replace the PAVN 9-1 leader with a 9-2.

BOARD LAYOUT:



(Only hexrows A-P are playable)



1. PTO rules are not in effect. (EXC: all buildings are huts). EC are Moderate, with a mild breeze from the northwest at start.

2. Place overlays as follows: 1 on 38 N8-N9; and OG1 on O1. All woods and marsh are brush. All orchard and grain are open ground.

OBJECTIVES: The French must exit ≥ 8 EVP (EXC: Prisoners do not count for VP) along the south edge by Game End to win.

3. Bore sighting is NA.

DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 20 November 1953: During November 1953, the French High Command in Indochina decided to seize the Dien Bien Phu valley in an operation code named *Castor*. On the 20th of November two battalions of French paratroopers, re-enforced a short time later by a third battalion, descended on Dien Bien Phu. One, the sixth Colonial Parachute Battalion, (French designation 6 BPC) landed near the village of Dien Bien Phu. After regrouping from their drop they began to move on the village. The French were not alone in the valley, however. The 148th Regiment of the People's Army of Vietnam were lying in wait. Operation Castor now began in earnest. After meeting brisk fire while approaching the village, the paratroopers called for air support and then moved into the village. Their aim was to catch the HQ of the 148th Regiment before it could pull out. The Viet Minh deployed a rear guard and bitter hut-to-hut fighting ensued. The French were able to gain firm control of the area by nightfall, but the rearguard had done its duty. The HQ of the 148th Regiment had escaped.



Original Design: Carl Noguiera



12

HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

• Extend game length to 10.5 turns

Extend set up area to include hexrows DD and CC on Board 16.

BOARD LAYOUT:



(Only hexrows R-GG on Boad 16 are playable)

OBJECTIVES: The French win if there are no Good Order PAVN units in the PAVN set up area at Game End. The PAVN wins immediately if ≥ 4 French tanks are wrecked (i.e., permanently eliminated).

SCENARIO RULES:

1. EC are moist with no wind at start. PTO is in effect (EXC: treat all woods and brush as brush). Hedges do not exist. The buildings in 19C3, 1918, 19K7 and 16T9, do exist: treat them as wooden construction. The stream is deep with a ford at oG2. The road from 19110-16R4 is in existence as an unpaved road. There is Mist in effect at start with a +1 LV hindrance DRM per hex. At the beginning of each Game Turn, a dr \leq the turn number results in the Mist gradually lifting for the remainder of the game. For that Game Turn it becomes a+1 at 1-2 hex range; +2 at 3-4; etc. On the next Game Turn it becomes +1 at 1-3; +2 at 4-6; etc. On the NEXT Game Turn it lifts completely (i.e., no Mist LV modifier at any range). Boresighting is NA. All Rice Paddies are irrigated.

Place overlays as follows: V2 on 19V9-V8; and St1 on 19G6-G5.
 All PAVN units are considered Fanatic. They may rout toward Known enemy units, so long as they do not end their rout phase ADJACENT to Known, unbroken, armed, enemy units. All other rout rules apply normally.

BAN KHO LAI, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 22 March 1954: Of all the strong-points the French set up at Dien Bien Phu, the position known as 'Isabelle' was the most isolated. Six kilometers south of the nearest friendly strong-point, the French had fight to keep the road open daily. One such day was the 22nd of March. The news up to that point for the French had been all bad. Strong-points Gabrielle and Beatrice had fallen and the garrison's artillery commander, Colonel Charles Piroth, had committed suicide. On this day, the 1st BEP (1st Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion) was sent south to open the road to Isabelle. The legionnaires advanced through the early morning mist that regularly obscured the valley, meeting no opposition along the way. When they reached Ban Kho Lai, things suddenly changed. The Viet Minh had dug approach trenches all through the valley, including in the south, near Isabelle. The BEP was stopped cold. Tank support was called in to hit the main center of resistance. From Isabelle itself came more armor and men of the 2/1 RTA (2nd Battalion, 1st Algerian Rifle Regiment). Finally, the last of the armor from Dien Bien Phu had to be committed. The Viet Minh were regulars from Regiment 57, 304th division, and they were not to be driven off. The enemy would have to be killed in place and all but nine men of the two PAVN companies committed, were. The French succeeded in winning their first victory since the fighting had begun in the valley. They paid dearly for the victory, suffering



151 KIA, 72 WIA, and 1 MIA. The seriousness of these losses was exacerbated by the meager flow of reinforcements trickling in to French positions at Dien Bien Phy

Original Design: Carl Noguiera



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HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

• Add 2 x LMG to the French H7 Garrison OB.

Add a 9-0 Commissar to the PAVN OB.



OBJECTIVES: The PAVN player wins if he Controls/eliminates ≥ 4 pillboxes at Game End.

SCENARIO RULES:

1. Night rules are in effect with a Base NVR of 3 and No Cloud Cover, No Moon and weather is gusty (E3.4) with no wind at start. EC are wet. PTO is not in effect. PAVN is the scenario ATTACKER (EXC: PAVN may not use Cloaking). The French are the scenario DEFENDER. French re-enforcements may enter

DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 2 April 1954: The northwestern-most strong-point of the network of strong-points that comprised the position known to the French garrison as Huguette, was H7. It had a star-shaped layout and was the strongpoint closest to the now abandoned Anne Marie position. The decision to abandon Anne Marie had come in the wake of the fall of strongpoint Gabrielle. Now with these two positions gone H7 was subjected to increased enemy pressure. At 0400 hours on the 2nd of April, elements of the elite 308th Division launched a determined attack against the bedraggled defenders of H7. The barbed wire entanglements and minefields had been badly shredded by previous Viet Minh assaults and had many gaps. The Viet Minh easily breached the position and soon had the badly outnumbered French, Thai and Vietnamese defenders pushed into a corner of the position in the southeastern portion of the post. Just when all seemed lost, a relief force under Captain Bizard consisting of 100 Vietnamese paratroops and Legionnaires and supported by the two surviving tanks of Platoon *Carette*, now under command of Sergeant Boussrez, and the squadron command tank, *Conti*, arrived and managed to push the Viet Minh out of the position completely. It was all in vain however, as Langlais was forced to make the agonizing decision to abandon the decimated post to the enemy. All that was left of the original garrison was 14 men.

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Cloaked with a total of 10 cloaking counters allowed them.

2. Before the French player sets up any of his units, the PAVN player makes a dr for each wire hex. On a 1-3, place a shellhole and remove the wire from play. If NOT removed, the wire is treated as also having a 4 FP AP minefield. Note that a unit IN a trench may move through such a hex with no effect from the wire OR the mines.

3. At the start of the first Prep Fire Phase and every Prep Fire Phase thereafter, both player turns, place a starshell in each of the following hexes and roll for full scatter, (i.e., 1 die direction, 1 full extent of error up to 6 hexes), D1Q5, D2Q5 and D3Q5. (This represents the French planes that dropped flares all night long). This does not count as initial use of starshells as per E 1.91.

4. All French/Allied units are Fanatic. PAVN 3-3-8 HS are Sappers (H1.2) and Fanatic (A10.8).

5. After his set up, the French player may secretly designate two hexes with wire that friendly units may move through by paying an additional 2 MF/4 MP with no effects from the mines or wire.

6. The Viet Minh receives one module of 105mm OBA and one of 75mm OBA each directed by an Offboard Observer at Level 1 along the north edge. Each module is HE only, receives two pre-registered hexes and Plentiful Ammunition. An extra chit draw is never made for any purpose. The only hexes the OBA can place an AR/FFE in are the pre-registered hexes. For the purposes of LOS to the pre-registered hexes it is considered a daytime scenario.

Original Design: Carl Noguiera



HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

O Replace the PAVN Commissar with a 7-0 leader.

Remove one French 6-4-8 squad and replace the 8-1 leader with an 8-0.

BOARD LAYOUT:



(Only hexrows on/north of hexrow T are playable)

OBJECTIVES: The French win immediately if there are no Good Order PAVN MMC on Level 2 and higher hill hexes of Eliane 1 and 4.

SCENARIO RULES:

1. All DBP Rules are in effect. EC and Weather are Mud (D8.23, E3.6) with no wind in effect at start. PTO with Light Jungle is in effect. All Bamboo is Brush.

2. Fortification/Shellholes are treated as Concealment Terrain for placement purposes (A12.12).

3. After set up, but prior to play, each player *must* alternately place three shellhole counters. Unless 'accurate' on a dr of 1, each counter receives a random direction dr and the counter is moved one hex in that direction. Any fortification in the final placement hex is removed. If the final placement hex is either woods, brush, or rubble, place a Flame counter instead of a shellhole counter. No unit may be directly harmed by placement of a shellhole in its hex.

Positions at 'Eliane 1', DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 31 March 1954: The morning following the opening of the battle for the 'Five Hills' was one of desperation for both sides. The weather temporarily cleared up, allowing both air support and re-supply, but no airborne reinforcements. While both E4 and E2 (*Champs Elysees*) were both secure, the occupation of E1 could not be allowed. It had fallen with barely a fight when its Moroccan garrison deserted. From previous experience, the French knew that they could not allow the enemy to entrench himself on that hill. The 5th Vietnamese Parachute battalion was selected to retake the lost strongpoint. They were especially determined to make up for a failure at the Gabrielle strongpoint, nearly two weeks earlier. By now, E1 was devastated by bombardments. There were no shelters, no dugouts, no barbed wire—just the pockmarks of shells, shattered corpses, and the stench of rotting human flesh. With great élan, the 5th BPVN charged from E4 over to E1. They completely routed the enemy from the heights, suffering



greatly as Viet Minh counter-battery fire slammed into them on the newly reconquered hill. There they endured and awaited relief which never came. When the enemy pressure forced the French to abandon the nearby strongpoint of Dominique 2, Eliane 1 was then outflanked and exposed. Just before dusk, E1 was again abandoned.

Original Design: Dave Lamb



HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

• Add a 9-1 Armor Leader to Platoon Guntz.

Replace one PAVN 57mm RCL with a 75mm RCL.

BOARD LAYOUT:





(Only hexes numbered ≥ 8 and ≤ 25 between hexrows U-MM are playable)

OBJECTIVES: The PAVN must Control *both* the Governor's House (hex CC14) and ≥ 14 Level 3 or higher hill hexes at Game End. The French lose immediately if ≥ 3 AFV are eliminated or permanently immobilized.

SCENARIO RULES:

1. All DBP Rules are in effect. EC and Weather are Mud (D8.23, E3.6), with Rain (E3.51) and Gusty (E3.4) and a Mild Breeze from the east at start. PTO with Light Jungle is in effect. All Bamboo is Brush.

DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 31 March 1954: As dusk fell on the second day of fighting for Eliane, two fresh regiments of the 316th PAVN division were hurled once more upon *Champs Elysees*. Dark-green hordes of Communist infantry arose from behind Old Baldy, and from the approach trenches in front of Champs Elysees, poured over the now largely destroyed barbed wire entanglements at the southern tip of E2, and began to mount the slopes. A mixture of Moroccans, paraatroopers, Legionnaires, and T'ai stood ready. They fought desperately all evening until the PAVN appeared likely to overwhelm them. Then, just before midnight, the combatants on *Champs Elysees* heard the steady rumble of engines. General Langlais had released the *Bison* (or Oxen as the Vietnamese called them) to lead the counterattack up *Champs Elysees*. The Viet Minh had fought these tanks many times before, and were prepared to combat them now. An ambush by bazooka, recoilless rifles, and artillery was unleashed upon them. Three of the tanks were hit multiple times by anti-tank fire but continued on. The tank *Bazeilles* was struck in its vitals and exploded, near the Governor's House—where it would become a permanent fixture and strongpoint for the remainder of the battle. Neverthe-

nole in its hex.

less, the tanks stopped the enemy and partially drove him from the heights. The Governor's House and the summit would, for now, remain in French hands. Original Design: Dave Lamb © 2002 Critical Hit!, Inc.

2. Night Rules are in effect. Base NVR is 2 with Overcast and No Moon. The Majority Squad Types for the PAVN is Stealthy, and Normal for the French. Cloaking/Freedom of Movement/Initial Starshell usage rules are NA. Neither side is the Scenario DEFENDER, and no fortification or unit may be set up HIP.

The French have a west edge, Level 4 Offboard Observer, and receive one module of 105mm OBA (HE only). The PAVN receives one module of 120mm OBA (HE only) with one pre-registered hex and a with a Level 7 Offboard Observer. PAVN OBA may not be used until an enemy tank enters the playing area. French ELR is 2 for T'ai (3-3-6 MMC), and 4 for all other units.
 Any time a French tank moves (or remains in Motion during the PAVN

player turn), the PAVN player may place an IR on top of that vehicle. This special IR may only be placed once per turn, receives full Extent of Error, and is treated normally thereafter (see DBP Standard Special Rule #19).

5. After set up, but prior to play, each player alternately places six shellhole counters. Unless 'accurate' on a dr of 1, each shellhole counter receives a random direction dr and the counter is moved one hex in that direction. Any fortification in the final placement hex is removed [EXC: Pillboxes are immune]. If the final placement hex is either woods, brush, or rubble, place a Flame counter instead of a shellhole counter. No unit may be directly harmed by placement of a shellhole in its hex.



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hex

HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

O Replace the PAVN 75mm RCL with a 57mm RCL.

Replace two French 4-5-7 squads with two 4-4-7s in the At Start OB in the Governor's House.

BOARD LAYOUT:



OBJECTIVES: The French win immediately if they Control the Governor's House (hex CC14) AND have at least a 2:1 ratio of Good Order squadsequivalents more than the PAVN does on hill hexes.

Positions at 'Champs Elysees', DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 30 March 1954: Phase II of the battle for the Five Hills had begun. Nearly an entire division had been flung at the Eliane 2 hilltop-known as Champs Elysees. Bombarded for hours by artillery, recoilless rifles, and machinegun fire buried in the sides of the nearby 'Phony Mountain', Champs Elysees was converted into a wasteland. It's trenches, bunkers, and wire defenses were obliterated, and only a corporal and six Foreign Legion Paratroopers were alive on the southern slopes of E2. A wave of Vietnamese swept up from the no-man's land between Champs Elysees and Old Baldy, sweeping all before them. Only a handful of Moroccans held onto the battalion HQ in the ruins of the French Governor's house. The French commander, Colonel Langlais, ordered an immediate counterattack on Champs Elysees. Failure would result in defeat for the entire garrison. Attacking toward the summit just before midnight, a mixed force of Moroccans, Frenchmen, and Foreign Legion Paratroopers, supported by

4. After set up, but prior to play, each player must alternately place six shellhole counters. Unless 'accurate' on a dr of 1, each counter receives a random direction dr and the counter is moved one hex in that direction. Any fortification in the final placement hex is removed. If the final placement hex is either woods, brush, or rubble, place a Flame counter instead of a shellhole counter. No unit may be directly harmed by placement of a shellhole in its

Rain (E3.51) and it is Gusty (E3.4) with a Mild Breeze from the east at start. PTO with Light Jungle is in effect. All Bamboo is Brush. Building CC14 does

have an intact (RB-style) Cellar (O6) and all rules apply [EXC: despite the

ground level being rubbled any Trenches still "connect" to this Cellar Loca-

2. Night Rules are in effect. The Base NVR is 2 with Overcast and No Moon. The Majority Squad Types for the PAVN is Stealthy, and Normal for the

French. Cloaking/Freedom of Movement/Initial Starshell usage rules are NA.

Neither side is the Scenario DEFENDER, and no fortification or unit may be setup using HIP. Both sides begin play with all units being Concealed. 3. French have a west edge, Level 4 Offboard Observer, and receive one module of 105mm OBA (HE only), which has a maximum of 2 fire missions.

artillery, threw back the enemy and drove them downslope along the Champs Elysees. As the counterattack progressed, two tanks from Platoon Ney and another Foreign Legion paratroop company reinforced them. By the time morning dawned, the exhausted French defenders of Eliane would witness a terrible sight-a carpet of dead bodies covered the slopes and no-man's land between Champs Elysees and Old Baldy. Original Design: Dave Lamb



HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

O Add a Hero to both parts of the French OB.

Replace the PAVN 9-1 leader with a 9-2.



OBJECTIVES: The PAVN must Control either of the French Eliane Strongpoints. Control of the Eliane 2 strongpoint is defined as Controlling all rubble locations on that hill. Control of Eliane 4 is defined by Controlling both Level 4 hexes (i.e., J18 and J19) on that hill.

SCENARIO RULES:

BOARD LAYOUT:

1. All DBP Rules are in effect. EC and Weather are Mud (D8.23, E3.6), with Rain (E3.51) and it is Gusty (E3.4), and a Mild Breeze from the west at start. PTO with Light Jungle is in effect. All Bamboo is Brush. Building CC14 does have an intact (RB-style) Cellar (O6) and all rules apply [EXC: despite the ground level being rubbled any Trenches still "connect" to this Cellar Location].

2. Night Rules are in effect. The Base NVR is 3 with Partial Moon and Scattered Clouds. The Majority Squad Types for the PAVN is Stealthy, and Normal for the French. Cloaking/Freedom of Movement/Initial Starshell usage rules are NA. No fortification may be setup using HIP. Both sides begin play with all units being Concealed. There is no scenario DEFENDER (E1.2).

3. Place an Immobilized M-24 tank ("Bazeilles") in hex CC13 (VCA: CC12-DD12). This AFV's MA and BMG are Disabled. This AFV is not subject to Recall, Immobilization TC, nor may it be voluntarily abandoned by its crew.

4. After set up, but prior to play, each player alternately places ten shellhole counters. Unless accurate on a dr of 1, each counter receives a random direction dr and the counter is moved one hex in that direction. Any fortification in the final placement hex is removed [EXC: Pillboxes are immune]. If the final placement hex is either woods, brush, or rubble, place a Flame counter instead of a shellhole counter. No unit may be directly harmed by placement of a shellhole. 5. Place a Crater counter in hex EE12. Treat a Crater hex as a one hex gully (EXC: Minimum move to enter/exit the hex) for all purposes. Place shellhole counters in all adjacent hexes to the Crater counter.

6. All French infantry units on Hill E2 take an NMC prior to the start of turn one. All French units suffer from Ammunition Shortage (A19.131).

Dien Bien Phu, French Indochina, 6 May 1954: Two fresh and revitalized Viet Minh divisions assaulted the 'Eliane' strongpoints in the third and final phase of the battle. Control of these hills was vital to dominating the entire valley. The elite 308th Division, known as the Iron Division launched its first wave of 1,000 warriors as the sun set. Just as they arose from the approach trenches in front of Eliane, the French artillery suddenly struck with a terrible fury against the nowexposed enemy. The Viet Minh were stopped cold, leaving over 200 bodies in the churned up no-man's land. The Viet Minh artillery and rocket launchers retaliated with an even greater vengeance-obliterating French fortifications and causing irreparable damage to the remaining French artillery. From the slopes of Eliane 1 and the approach trenches at the base of Champs Elysees, the Viet Minh swept into the French positions. On Eliane 4, two weak companies from the 5th Vietnamese Parachute Battalion were barely able to contain and repel their Viet Minh brothers. For Champs Elysees things were much worse. At 2300 sharp, a bunker and its surrounding trenches were destroyed when a massive mine exploded underneath the hill. An already weakened company either disappeared in the blast, or was too stunned to react to the wave of enemies overrunning them. Ironically, the only thing to stop the Viet Minh was the rain-slicked crater that was agonizingly difficult to traverse. Finally, a counterattack by Champs Elysees defenders forced the enemy to rout back into the crater. A handful of wounded and stunned Paras took advantage of this and fired into the mass of humanity stuck inside. Living up to their reputation of being as 'tough as iron', the Viet Minh rallied and surged forward yet again. Running low on both ammunition and men, the French commander on Champs Elysees fought back bitterly while awaiting reinforcements that never came. The survivors of Champs Elysees were eventually overwhelmed by the slowly advancing Viet Minh infantry. Several survivors being led away as prisoners heard the slow cough of a .50 cal. machine gun coming from the hulk of the tank "Bazeilles". They were firing the last cartridges of Champs Elysees. Original Design: Dave Lamb

THE LAST DAY

FRENCH Sets Up First 2 3 1 4 5 m **PAVN Moves First** Elements of 308th and 316th Infantry Division set up on/east of any hex numbered ≤ 15 : i de la come MTBEIT 水 · *75° ① ***** 8-0 **§** 9-2 新8-1 盛秀 9 9.0 3-60[₽] FP:4 B11 Rog: 10 ROF:2 MMG 6-3-8 Rng:7 ROF:1 B≢:11 2-2-8 4.4.8 LMG 2 4 6 3 2 2 4 BAZIN 8AZ 1950 Bangalore Trench ⊕× - 3 ំាំទ 1213 ⁴▲ 0-1 [ELR: 4] 2 12 {SAN: 4} **Remnants of 1st BEP, 5th BPVN** set up on/west on any hill hex numbered ≥ 16 : MTREIS 會加 **AAA** 合合 9-2 8-1 7-0 1-3-8 E 2-4-8 (a) HMG 3-60⁰ E 4-5-8 06-4-8 2 4-4-7 Rof: 10 ROF: 2 MMG Rng: 7 ROF: 1 LMG 2 3* 3 2 3 Trench ٢ Wire * Treat as Walking Wounded (see SR #4) UNX670 ۲ [ELR: 3] 12 3 4 {SAN: 5}

HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

• Reduce scenario length to five turns.

Replace the PAVN 9-2 leader with a 10-3.

BOARD LAYOUT:

(Only hexrows on/north of hexrow T are playable)

OBJECTIVES: The PAVN must Control both Level 4 hexes (i.e., J18 and J19) and \geq 7 Level 3 hill hexes on 'Eliane 4' at Game End to win.

Positions at 'Eliane 4', DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 7 May 1954: As another dreary and rain-soaked monsoon day dawned over Dien Bien Phu, what was left of the French position on E4 was indescribable. All of the surviving heroes of the French paratroops were gathered in the shattered bunkers on the shell-scarred hill. They had barely withstood the last Viet Minh attack earlier that morning at 0530. But now, like their fallen brothers on Champs Elysees, they too were running low on ammunition. Worse yet, they could see a fresh enemy battalion, now dressed in recently captured, brand-new French camouflage paratroop uniforms and U.S. Army-issue steel helmets, forming up. Just before 0900, the northeastern flank of E4 was overwhelmed by hordes of Viet Minh soldiers. The surviving defenders fell back into the communication trenches around the strongpoint's

SCENARIO RULES:

1. All DBP Rules are in effect. EC and Weather are Mud (D8.23, E3.6), with no wind at start. PTO with Light Jungle is in effect. All Bamboo is Brush. 2. After set up, but prior to play, each player must alternately place six shellhole counters. Unless 'accurate' on a dr of 1, each counter receives a random direction dr and the counter is moved one hex in that direction. Any fortification in the final placement hex is removed [EXC: Pillboxes are immune]. If the final placement hex is either woods, brush, or rubble, place a Flame counter instead of a shellhole counter. No unit is affected by placement of a shellhole. All French units suffer from Ammunition Shortage (A19.131). 3. The French receives one '51 DB with Napalm on turn three which may only conduct Point Attacks (E7.402). It is immediately Recalled after that turn. 4. A Walking Wounded (WW) MMC has a 3 MF allotment which cannot be increased for any reason, its IPC is reduced to 2, and it receives a +1 DRM for all CC attacks it makes while all CC attacks made against it receive a -1 DRM. Under no circumstances may a WW MMC become un-wounded. Any HS created from a WW squad is marked with a Walking Wounded MMC counter and suffers all the penalties associated with that status. Any SMC created by a WW MMC is not initially Wounded. Two WW HS may Recombine into a WW squad as per A1.32. If a non-Wounded HS and a WW HS Recombine, the resulting squad is considered WW and is marked as such.



command post at the hill's summit. Unfortunately, there were no reserves available for a counter-attack. The survivors therefore were forced to either fight to the death, surrender, or make the treacherous flight west across the Nam Yum river—only to prolong their agony for a few more hours. There was little left but the ignominy of defeat for the garrison of Dien Bien Phu.

Original Design: Dave Lamb

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DBP #14

AOPPING UP

DBP #15 PAVN Sets Up First 2 3 1 5 **O** FRENCH Moves First Elements of Regiment 98, 316th Infantry Division set up concealed ≤ 4 hexes of HH10 or on/east of any hex numbered ≤ 10 : **春**雪 🖣 9-1 会角 **§** 9-0 ***** 8-1 **Ž 8-0** 1 V V 6-3-8 3-3-7 2-2-8 4-4-8 Rhg: 12 HMG BOF:2 MMG LMG 2 3 4 4 3 3 2 a RCL 🗠 8AZ≔ MTREIS BAZ 1945 Foxhole Trench 9 TX/12 TKH1 F 37. • • • (1)12 F ₩75° 1 ∗≈57° ⊕ FP: 30 Rag: 1 3-60⁰ 7 morale DC 1\$ [ELR: 3] 2 2 2 2 4 4 10 {SAN: 4} Elements of 1 BEP, 1/2 REI, 1/4 RTM set up ≥ 2 hexes away from PAVN set up area [EXC: *Bazeilles* tank – (See SR 2)]: MTREES 自常常 9-2 8-0 倉倉倉 自然 🐩 8-1 窗 , Ø ε 4-5-8 1 4-5-7 E 2-4-8 Rng: 10 ROF: 2 3-60⁵ ... FP: 30 Rng: 1 Rng: 7 ROF: 1 MMG LMG Ang: PP: 1 DC FT cata Radio 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 Trench Foxhole 18€€ Enter on turn one along the -7-0 ÷ 🛞 1 west edge: (a) NOF:2 MMG 1\$ (5)°0 4 **[ELR: 4]** 2 8 4 2 {SAN: 3}

HANDICAPPING PROVISIONS:

Increase scenario length to 5 1/2 turns.

Replace the PAVN 9-1 leader with a 10-2.

BOARD LAYOUT:



OBJECTIVES: The French win immediately if there are no Good Order

PAVN MMC on Level 2 and higher hill hexes of Eliane 2.

(Only hexrows on/south of hexrow V are playable)

SCENARIO RULES:

1. All DBP Rules are in effect. EC and Weather are MUD (D8.23, E3.6) with no wind at start.

2. Place an Immobilized M-24 tank in hex CC13 (VCA: CC12-DD12). This AFV's MA and BMG are Disabled. This AFV is not subject to Recall, Immobilization TC, nor may it be voluntarily abandoned by its crew.

3. French receive one module of 105mm OBA (HE only) with Scarce Ammunition.

4. After set up, but prior to play, each player must alternately place four shellhole counters in hexes numbered ≥ 6 . Unless 'accurate' on a dr of 1, each counter receives a random direction dr and the counter is moved one hex in that direction. Any fortification in the final placement hex is removed. If the final placement hex is either woods, brush, or rubble, place a Flame counter instead of a shellhole counter. No unit may be directly harmed by placement of a shellhole in its hex.

5. The French may roll for Air Support arrival by making a dr \leq Turn #. The French receive two '51 DB with Napalm. They are immediately Recalled after the turn that they arrive and may only make Point Attacks (E7.402).

6. FT in the French OB must begin play possessed by the two OB 2-4-8 HS. FT counters cannot be Possessed or used by other French units [EXC: a leader] until one 2-4-8 per FT is eliminated from play

DIEN BIEN PHU, FRENCH INDOCHINA, 2 April 1954: With little or no reinforcement available to the garrison at Dien Bien Phu, every fighting man was a valuable commodity. Units were shuffled squad by squad to reinforce existing positions. The arrival of the 1/2 REI's flamethrower team on E2, on the night of April 1st, was considered a significant reinforcement. The following day the French artillery and combat aircraft found their marks on suppressing the Viet Minh fire-base on Old Baldy and other nearby hills. The bulk of the 1st BEP was released to reinforce the Moroccans, Legionnaires, and paratroopers still gnawing away at the Communist toehold on Champs Elysees. Supported by napalm-armed aircraft and artillery, they launched a head-on attack against the Viet Minh there. They recaptured nearly all of the hill before dusk, driving the PAVN survivors, under artillery fire, back into the trenches between Phony Mountain and Old Baldy. With the French back in their re-captured positions, the enemy artillery retaliated against the now-exposed French defenders. Once again they were forced to abandon the southern slopes of Champs Elysees, which the Viet Minh promptly reoccupied.



Original Design: Dave Lamb

DBP STANDARD SPECIAL RULES: The following rules apply in all DBP cenarios unless stated otherwise on the scenario card.

1AP NOTES: On overlay V2 and maps D1-3, all dark green terrain is brush. here is no woods. The dark green terrain feature on and around D1C3 is a Level 1 valley (note the brush in D3. Historical map: Note the existence of Hillside ledges in CC14/DD13 and CC14/DD14; P15 is orchard; QQ26 is woods; LL27 ; brush.

DBP 1 Hand-to-Hand Cose Combat: H-t-H CC (J2.31) may be used by both ides if the ATTACKER in that CC/melee or successful in Ambush (A11.4).

BP 2 Viet Minh (PAVN): The Viet Minh are always Stealthy (A11.17) [EXC: onscripts, which are Lax] and may use Human Wave (A25.23). The Viet Minh 1ay substitute Commissars (A25.22) leaders as if pre 11/42 Russians [EXC: igore the penalties of A25.222, i.e., there are no penalties for failure to rally with a 'iet Minh Commissar]. For each Commisar obtained make a dr. If exchanging an -0 leader, a dr 1-3 results in a 9-0; a dr 4-6 results in a 9+1 commissar. Do the ame if exchanging an 8-1 leader, on a dr 1-3 a 10-0 is received; on a dr 4-6 a 0+1. PAVN units are considered Japanese for the purposes of rules G1.424, .63, 1.631, and 1.632 (only). For purposes of G1.424, they may create as many C heroes as they have DC's, in THEIR OB.(i.e., captured DC may not be used or this purpose). PAVN may not form Multi-Location Fire Groups. They are onsidered Stealthy at night, [EXC: Conscripts which are Lax] and apply a +1 rm to Starshell usage dr (E1.92). They have an HoB DRM of +1 and treat Surender HoB results as Berserk instead, [EXC: Conscripts]. They receive a +0 rodification for Leader Creation (A18.1). PAVN may not Deploy (A1.31) or ecombine (A1.32). For all OBA purposes they are treated as Russian, with a idio contact value of 7 (although using Axis Minor radio counters) Viet Minh)rdnance uses Red To Hit numbers.

BP 3 T'ai Irregulars: The T'ai were troops recruited by the French from the digenous T'ai people and used quite successfully in guerrilla warfare. They on tadept in a stand-up fight. T'ai are Conscripts (A19.2-3), with the followug additional rules and exceptions applied: they are considered Stealthy (day or ight), have a normal (ie. 4 MF) movement capability, may not form/participate 1 Multi-Location Fire Groups and may not Deploy or Recombine. In all scearios, No Quarter is in effect for the T'ai (only, i.e., no Viet Minh unit will ever the a T'ai unit prisoner, though vice-versa is allowed [as the French always wanted or receive more information on the Viet Minh]). The CC DRM of Capture Attempt vs. Inexperienced Infantry is NA. All other Conscript penalties apply nornally. T'ai receive a +2 HoB DRM. Unless otherwise stated they have an ELR of and Disrupt upon failing ELR. Full strength T'ai MMC are 3-3-6/1-2-6 with a roken morale of 5 and 4 respectively. They do <u>not</u> treat French leaders as Allied roops(A10.7).

BP 4: Treat the French and all their Colonial troops as 12/43+ Free French for I purposes [EXC: T'ai]. They use British LMG/DC/'?' and 4-5-8/4-5-7/4-4-7/-3-6 squads (and their HS). Use Free French color American MMG/HMG and rovided M2 MTR, RCL, 6-4-8/3-3-8 MMC and SMC.

BP 5 French and Vietnamese National Army Paratroopers: In all cases for ite French, and almost all for the Vietnamese, these troops performed exceptionlly well at Dien Bien Phu. The following rules apply to 6-4-8/3-3-8 MMC. The roken morale of 6-4-8 squads and HS are one higher than normal. They do not lower. They receive an extra HoB DRM of -1. (i.e., in addition to the -1 for lite). They have underlined morale and are always treated as having an ELR of unless stated otherwise in a scenario (or if ELR is reduced in a CG).

BP 6 Bangalore Torpedos: Bangalores are represented by new SW counters nd function exactly as a DC except as stated in the following exception. Bangaore torpedos are 3PP. They may be only used against wire/Known AP minefields, nd receive a -3 DRM to any Clearance (B24.7) DR (this is not modified for Mud, e., ignore E3.62). They may only be used by units designated as Sappers (H1.2). angalores may not be Thrown (A23.6) or Set (A23.7). They have no effect whatsever on units in the Location other than to destroy wire counters, and place a rail Break (B13.421) through an AP minefield, from the hexside they were placed arough, to the directly opposite hexside. A KIA result (after modification) will ear any wire in the hex and/or create a trail break through any AP (only) minefield. nlike DCs they may be PLACED (not thrown) during Prep Fire Phase as well as uring the Movement Phase. If placed during PFPh, they will be resolved as the st act in the phase (EXC: A bangalore torpedo may not be placed during the rep Fire Phase across an abrupt elevation change, in either direction [up/down]). the placing unit is Pinned or Broken before resolution, the Bangalore is not iccessfully placed and is retained by the placing unit. Should the placing unit be iminated normal rules for Random SW Destruction (A9.74) (and SW Recovery (4.44]) apply as if the unit destroyed still had Possession of the Bangalore in its the unit's, not the bangalore's) Location. Use of a Bangalore is treated as SW sage (A7.35) during Prep Fire, for all fire capability purposes, and exactly as a laced DC (A23.3) if placed during the MPh. A unit may place a bangalore toredo in its own Location. In this case, the two hexside Trail Break cleared is cclared by the owning player prior to resolution; it must still be two hexsides rectly opposite each other.

DBP 7 Bazookas: BAZ 45 and BAZ 50 are treated as regular BAZ in all respects except the TK# of a BAZ 45 is an 11 and a BAZ 50 has a TK# of 12. This represents the fact that despite numerous hits only one tank was knocked out by bazooka fire during the battle. Numerous circumstances contributed to this effect. A form of 'tank fright', possible ammunition spoilage, occurances during the heat of battle that some Viet Minh soldiers may have forgotten to remove the safety clips from the nose of bazooka rounds and finally, that the bazooka may just be too effective as depicted in the game system.

DBP 8: Kindling is NA.

DBP 9 French AFV Usage Restrictions: No Mobile French AFV may voluntarily end its Movement Phase in the same Location as a Viet Minh MMC, (Good Order or otherwise) unless the Viet Minh unit was HIP when the French AFV entered its Location. Voluntarily Abandonment (D5.4) is NA. All malfunctioned MA must roll for repair each player turn.

DBP 10 Captured Weapons: Neither side pays Captured Use Penalties (A21) for the following weapons: RCL, Lt MTR, and BAZ.

DBP 11: Wire and Trench networks: For added convenience counters have been provided with trench and wire symbols and an arrow on them. These units are used to mark the boundaries of some of the extensive wire and trench networks covered in the game, reducing the number of wire and trench counters needed. Players may always opt to instead place a wire or trench counter in each hex. When listed in an OB they will appear as follows: trench (or wire) network in O10-O1-09. This means there are trench counters in O10 and O1 and all hexes in between along that hex grain. Should wire be eliminated, place a breach marker (or other handy marker agreed upon by both players), to designate this. If a unit is IN a trench in that location or on top of wire in that location, do not mark it with a regular wire or trench counter. If it moves OUT OF the trench, place it on top of a trench counter until the unit eixts the hex, or is again IN the trench. If a unit is ON TOP of a wire counter in the hex, do not mark it. As soon as the unit moves UNDER the wire, place a wire counter on top of the unit to show it is under the wire, until such time as the unit leaves the hex, or moves back on top of the wire. Trenches in the same hex as a wire counter, are always considered to be under the wire counter, as are any units IN the trench itself.

DBP 12 Minefield: All minefields are considered Known Minefields (F7, F7A & P7). If they are reduced in strength for any reason, they are eliminated. Please note that AP minefield strength is under the minimum of 6 in some cases. This is deliberate and represents the weaker than usual minefields the French laid.

The following rules apply to any firefight played on the *Champs Elysees* (CE) map:

DBP 13 Terrain Modifications: Terrain is PTO (G.1) with Light Jungle (G2.1) in effect. All Bamboo (G3) is Brush (B12). All buildings are rubble.

DBP 14 Trail Breaks: (Unless specifically denied by firefight SR, the following rule applies): Prior to French set up (and any Bombardment resolution) the PAVN player may secretly record any *six* wire hexes as having a Trail Break (B13.421) across any two opposite hexsides. No secretly recorded Trail Break is revealed until a PAVN unit enters the hex along either hexside. Place a Trail Break marker (B28.61) in the hex across the two hexsides recorded, once a PAVN unit has crossed one of the hexsides.

DBP 15 Printed Trenches: Any trenches on a map edge hex are considered connected to hypothetical offboard trenches for movement purposes (EX: hex J0). Trenches connect to Rubble locations as per B30.8 as if the Rubble locations were bunkers (EXC: Building CC14 has an intact RB-style Cellar [O6] and all rules apply normally; despite the ground level of CC14 being rubbled, trenches still "connect" to this Cellar Location [only]). All trenches and foxholes are considered Concealment terrain. (EXC: for MF/MP purposes at night [E1.51] there is no additional cost).

DBP 16 Bombardment Morale Due to shoddy construction of fortifications and the intensity of the PAVN bombardment, Morale (C1.822) during Bombardments is modified as follows: Pillbox: 9; Wire/Roadblock/Mines: 8; Shellhole/Fire Creation: ≥ 10 .

DBP 17 Trip Flares All printed wire hexes (EX: hex G8) have a 2 factor Trip Flare (G.8) in them.

DBP 18 FME: The Friendly Map Edge for the PAVN is along the east and south edge. The Friendly Map Edge for the French is along the west edge.

DBP 19 Special French IR: In any night scenario each Player Turn the French player may fire an IR traced from a hypothetical Level 4 firer in hex M28 to any hex in its LOS (disregading NVR). The Extent of Error for this IR is always halved (FRD) and is subject to a Usage dr of \leq 4 (E1.931), but not the TH/malfunction DR of E1.932.

DBP 20 PAVN Sappers: All PAVN 6-3-8/3-3-8 MMC are Sappers (H1.2). In addition to their normal Clearance benefits, PAVN Sappers may apply an additional -1 DRM per HS (i.e., -2 for a 6-3-8 squad) for all Clearance (B24.73) DR for wire.