Greco-Persian War

Conflicts of Greece and the Persian Empire



WARHAMMER HISTORICAL

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL RULES

ALLIES
Each army only can choose one ally with up to 25%, mixing of different ally contingents is not allowed. Subject alllies have Ld-1 and cost one point less per model, the subject ally-general 130 points with Ld7 only.

CHARACTERS EQUIPMENT
Characters may have the equipment of the unit they join at the start of the battle (free). Any additional equipment available for that unit can also be taken but the points are doubled which have to be paid for the character.

KALLAPANI
Some armies transported their troops with horse or camel drafted platforms across the battlefield before the battles began. Such armies are free to choose a number of units which can be upgraded with "Riding Horses" or "Riding Camels" for 1 point per model. Horse riding infantry units can move up to 8" after deployment and before the first turn, camel riding 6". This cannot be combined with the extra movement allowed for skirmishers in some scenarios.

LIGHT BOLT THROWER (36pts)
(See rulesbook page 180)
Each machine has a two man crew.

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Crew	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	-
Thrower	-	-	-	-	6	2	-	-	-	36

Equipment: Hand weapon.
The crew may have light armour (+4).
Range 36", S4/-1 per rank, no save, D3 wounds per hit
Special Rules: *Bolt Thrower*

STAMPEDING ANIMALS (200pts)
Some armies sent herds of stampeding animals (e.g. camels, cattle) against their foes. Such a herd is a group of animals based on individual or group bases, which will be deployed and move within up to 6"x6". For a stampeding herd the player declare a direction before the game starts, but after deployment. Beginning in round one the herd move 2d6" each turn exactly in that direction, like a stampeding elephant. Starting with round two the player roll additionally to the 2d6" for the distance another d6. On a 2-5 the stampede continues in exactly the same diretion. On a 1 the stampede ends and the animals remain stationary until the battle ends. On a 6 roll the scatter dice for the random direction the stampede goes on. All units touched by a stampeding herd have to flee directly away from it.

SUPERIOR BATTLE STANDARD
Some armies had a special army standard which can be fielded instead of the normal battle standard bearer for the same points if the size of the army is 3000 points or more. Such superior signs are based on a light chariot base (40x80mm), have a movement rate of 4" and cannot march or flee. Whenever they are attacked successfully they are automatically destroyed and the army has to make a panic test similar to the one in case of the generals death. As long as they are on the battlefield the radius of such battle standards is 18" and fleeing troops within 6" are rallying automatically.

UNITS
All units may have a leader, standard and musician for 5pts each.
All limits for units (like 0-1) are written for armies of 2000 points or less. If you play with armies that have more points simply take those units as 0-1 for each 2000 points e.g.. Always round down if you have an odd number. Exception is the wagon tabor which is 0-1 regardless of army size.

UNRULY
Onagers or asses were unreliable draft animals or mounts. Roll a d6 at the begin of each turn for an unruly unit. On a 1 the unit remains stationary that turn. Riders are too busy too shoot then too. On a 2-6 the unit move and act normally.

USED TO ELEPHANTS
As long as an army have access to elephants (not if only via allies) all models are *Used to Elephants*, which means infantry do not fear and elephants cause fear instead of terror for cavalry&chariotry.

WAGON TABOR
See WAB Errata for details:
http://warhammer-historical.com/PDF/WAB2%20Errata.pdf

WARHOUNDS
(See rulesbook page 188)

Warhounds are organised in special units consisting of a packmaster (+8) and up to six warhounds (+5 each). Any hits inflicted by missle weapons should be randomly devided between the packmaster and the hounds.

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Packmaster	5	4	4	3	3	1	4	1	6	8
Warhound	6	4	0	3	3	1	3	1	3	5

Equipment: Packmaster may have javelins (+1) and light armour (+2)
Special Rules: *Warband, Skirmishers*

WAR WAGON
See WAB Errata for details
http://warhammer-historical.com/PDF/WAB2%20Errata.pdf
Some War Wagons may have two war machines with crew instead of 6 missle armed crew members (+80).

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The **Greco-Persian Wars** (also often called the **Persian Wars**) were a series of conflicts between the Achaemenid Empire of Persia and city-states of the Hellenic world that started in 499 BC and lasted until 449 BC. The collision between the fractious political world of the Greeks and the enormous empire of the Persians began when Cyrus the Great conquered Ionia in 547 BC. Struggling to rule the independent-minded cities of Ionia, the Persians appointed tyrants to rule each of them. This would prove to be the source of much trouble for the Greeks and Persians alike.

In 499 BC, the then tyrant of Miletus, Aristagoras, embarked on an expedition to conquer the island of Naxos, with Persian support; however, the expedition was a debacle, and pre-empting his dismissal, Aristagoras incited all of Hellenic Asia Minor into rebellion against the Persians. This was the beginning of the Ionian Revolt, which would last until 493 BC, progressively drawing more regions of Asia Minor into the conflict. Aristagoras secured military support from Athens and Eretria, and in 498 BC, these forces helped to capture and burn the Persian regional capital of Sardis. The Persian king Darius the Great vowed to have revenge on Athens and Eretria for this act. The revolt continued, with the two sides effectively stalemated throughout 497–495 BC. In 494 BC, the Persians regrouped, and attacked the epicentre of the revolt in Miletus. At the Battle of Lade, the Ionians suffered a decisive defeat, and the rebellion collapsed, with the final members being stamped out the following year.

Seeking to secure his empire from further revolts, and from the interference of the mainland Greeks, Darius embarked on a scheme to conquer Greece, and to punish Athens and Eretria for burning Sardis. The first Persian invasion of Greece began in 492 BC, with the Persian general Mardonius conquering Thrace and Macedon before several mishaps forced an early end to the campaign. In 490 BC a second force was sent to Greece, this time across the Aegean Sea, under the command of Datis and Artaphernes. This expedition subjugated the Cyclades, before besieging, capturing and razing Eretria. However, while on route to attack Athens, the Persian force was decisively defeated by the Athenians at the Battle of Marathon, ending Persian efforts for the time being. Darius then began to plan the complete the conquest of Greece, but died in 486 BC and responsibility for the conquest passed to his son Xerxes I. In 480 BC, Xerxes personally led the second Persian invasion of Greece with one of the largest ancient armies ever assembled. Victory over the 'Allied' Greek states (led by Sparta and Athens) at the Battle of Thermopylae allowed the Persians to overrun most of Greece. However, while seeking to destroy the combined Greek fleet, the Persians suffered a severe defeat at the Battle of Salamis. The following year, the confederated Greeks went on the offensive, defeating the Persian army at the Battle of Plataea, and ending the invasion of Greece.

The allied Greeks followed up their success by destroying the rest of the Persian fleet at the Battle of Mycale, before expelling Persian garrisons from Sestos (479 BC) and Byzantium (478 BC). The actions of the general Pausanias at the siege of Byzantium alienated many of the Greek states from the Spartans, and the anti-Persian alliance was therefore reconstituted around Athenian leadership, as the so-called Delian League. The Delian League continued to campaign against Persia for the next three decades, beginning with the expulsion of the remaining Persian garrisons from Europe. At the Battle of the Eurymedon in 466 BC, the League won a double victory that finally secured freedom for the cities of Ionia. However, the League's involvement in an Egyptian revolt (from 460–454 BC) resulted in a disastrous defeat and a further campaigning was suspended. A fleet was sent to Cyprus in 451 BC, but achieved little, and when it withdrew, the Greco-Persian Wars drew to a quiet end. Some historical sources suggest the end of hostilities was marked by a peace treaty between Athens and Persia, the so-called Peace of Callias.

Sources

Almost all the primary sources for the Greco-Persian Wars are Greek; there are no surviving historical accounts from the Persian side. By some distance, the main source for the Greco-Persian Wars is the Greek historian Herodotus. Herodotus, who has been called the "Father of History", was born in 484 BC in Halicarnassus, Asia Minor (then part of the Persian empire). He wrote his 'Enquiries' (Greek—*Historia*; English—*(The) Histories*) around 440–430 BC, trying to trace the origins of the Greco-Persian Wars, which would still have been recent history. Herodotus's approach was novel, and at least in Western society, he invented 'history' as a discipline. As Holland has it: "For the first time, a chronicler set himself to trace the origins of a conflict not to a past so remote so as to be utterly fabulous, nor to the whims and wishes of some god,

nor to a people's claim to manifest destiny, but rather explanations he could verify personally."



Herodotus, the main source for this conflict.

Some later ancient historians, starting with Thucydides, criticised Herodotus. Nevertheless, Thucydides chose to begin his history where Herodotus left off (at the Siege of Sestos) and felt Herodotus's history was accurate enough not to need re-writing or correcting. Plutarch criticised Herodotus in his essay "On The Malignity of Herodotus", describing Herodotus as "*Philobarbaros*" (barbarian-lover) for not being pro-Greek enough, which suggests that Herodotus might actually have done a reasonable job of being even-handed. A negative view of Herodotus was passed on to Renaissance Europe, though he remained well read. However, since the 19th century his reputation has been dramatically rehabilitated by archaeological finds that have repeatedly confirmed his version of events. The prevailing modern view is that Herodotus did a remarkable job in his *Historia*, but that some of his specific details (particularly troop numbers and dates) should be viewed with skepticism. Nevertheless, there are still some historians who believe Herodotus made up much of his story.

Unfortunately, the military history of Greece between the end of the second Persian invasion of Greece and the Peloponnesian War (479–431 BC) is not well supported by surviving ancient sources. This period, sometimes referred to as the *pentekontaetia* by ancient scholars, was a period of relative peace and prosperity within Greece. The richest source for the period, and also the most contemporaneous, is Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, which is generally considered by modern historians to be a reliable primary account. Thucydides only mentions this period in a digression on the growth of Athenian power in the run up to the Peloponnesian War, and the account is brief, probably selective and lacks any dates. Nevertheless, Thucydides's account can be, and is, used by historians to draw up a skeleton chronology for the period, on to which details from archaeological records and other writers can be superimposed.

More detail for the whole period is provided by Plutarch, in his biographies of Themistocles, Aristides and especially Cimon. Plutarch was writing some 600 years after the events in question, and is therefore a secondary source, but he often names his sources, which allows some degree of verification of his statements. In his biographies, he draws directly from many ancient histories that have not survived, and thus often preserves details of the period that are omitted in Herodotus and Thucydides's accounts.

The final major existing source for the period is the universal history (*Bibliotheca historica*) of the 1st century BC Sicilian, Diodorus Siculus. Much of Diodorus's writing about this period is drawn from the much earlier Greek historian Ephorus, who also wrote a universal history. Diodorus is also a secondary source and often derided by modern historians for his style and inaccuracies, but he preserves many details of the ancient period found nowhere else.



Thucydides continued Herodotus's narrative.

Further scattered details can be found in Pausanias's *Description of Greece*, while the Byzantine Suda dictionary of the 10th century AD preserves some anecdotes found nowhere else. Minor sources for the period include the works of Pompeius Trogus (epitomized

by Justinus), Cornelius Nepos and Ctesias of Cnidus (epitomized by Photius), which are not in their original textual form. These works are not considered reliable (especially Ctesias), and are not particularly useful for reconstructing the history of this period.

Origins of the conflict

The Greeks of the classical period believed that, in the dark age that followed the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization, significant numbers of Greeks fled and had emigrated to Asia Minor and settled there. Modern historians generally accept this migration as historic (but separate from the later colonization of the Mediterranean by the Greeks). There are, however, those who believe the Ionian migration cannot be explained as simply as the classical Greeks claimed. These settlers were from three tribal groups: the Aeolians, Dorians and Ionians. The Ionians had settled about the coasts of Lydia and Caria, founding the twelve cities that made up Ionia. These cities were Miletus, Myus and Priene in Caria; Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedos, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea and Erythrae in Lydia; and the islands of Samos and Chios. Although the Ionian cities were independent of one another, they recognized their shared heritage and supposedly had a common temple and meeting place, the *Panionion*. They thus formed a 'cultural league', to which they would admit no other cities, or even other tribal Ionians.

The cities of Ionia had remained independent until they were conquered by the Lydians of western Asia Minor. The Lydian king Alyattes II attacked Miletus, a conflict that ended with a treaty of alliance between Miletus and Lydia, that meant that Miletus would have internal autonomy but follow Lydia in foreign affairs. At this time, the Lydians were also in conflict with the Median Empire, and the Milesians sent an army to aid the Lydians in this conflict. Eventually a peaceable settlement was established between the Medes and the Lydians, with the Halys River set up as the border between the kingdoms. The famous Lydian king Croesus succeeded his father Alyattes in around 560 BC and set about conquering the other Greek city states of Asia Minor.

The Persian prince Cyrus led a rebellion against the last Median king Astyages in 553 BC. Cyrus was a grandson of Astyages and was supported by part of the Median aristocracy. By 550 BC, the rebellion was over, and Cyrus had emerged victorious, founding the Achaemenid Empire in place of the Median kingdom in the process. Croesus saw the disruption in the Median Empire and Persia as an opportunity to extend his realm and asked the oracle of Delphi whether he should attack them. The Oracle supposedly replied the famously ambiguous answer that "if Croesus was to cross the Halys he would destroy a great empire". Blind to the ambiguity of this prophecy, Croesus attacked the Persians, but was eventually defeated and Lydia fell to Cyrus.



The Persian Empire in 490 BC.

While fighting the Lydians, Cyrus had sent messages to the Ionians asking them to revolt against Lydian rule, which the Ionians had refused to do. After Cyrus finished the conquest of Lydia, the Ionian cities now offered to be his subjects under the same terms as they had been subjects of Croesus. Cyrus refused, citing the Ionians' unwillingness to help him previously. The Ionians thus prepared to defend themselves, and Cyrus sent the Median general Harpagus to conquer them. He first attacked Phocaea; the Phocaeans decided to abandon their city entirely and sail into exile in Sicily, rather than become Persian subjects (although many later returned). Some Teians also chose to emigrate when Harpagus attacked Teos, but the rest of the Ionians remained, and were each in turn conquered.

In the years following their conquest, the Persians found the Ionians difficult to rule. Elsewhere in the empire, Cyrus identified elite native groups&nbpsp;- such as the priesthood of Judea - to help him rule his new subjects. No such group existed in Greek cities at this time; while there was usually an aristocracy, this was inevitably divided into feuding factions. The Persians thus settled for sponsoring a tyrant in each Ionian city, even though this drew them into the Ionians' internal conflicts. Furthermore, certain tyrants might develop an independent streak and have to be replaced. The tyrants themselves faced a difficult task; they had to deflect the worst of their fellow citizens' hatred, while staying in the favour of the Persians. In the past, Greek states had often been ruled by tyrants, but form of government was on the decline. Past tyrants had also tended and needed to be strong and able leaders, whereas the rulers appointed by the Persians were simply place-men. Backed by the Persian military might, these tyrants did not need the support of the population, and could thus rule absolutely. On the eve of the Greco-Persian wars, it is probable that the Ionian population had become discontent and was ready for rebellion. Ionia, unlike the many other areas of the empire, did not revolt in the civil war period between the reigns of Cyrus and Darius I of Persia, and it is therefore possible to argue that the Greeks were not so dissatisfied with Persian rule as some historians propose.

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

Warfare in the ancient Mediterranean
In the Greco-Persian wars both sides made use of spear-armed infantry and light missile troops, Greek armies placed the emphasis on heavier infantry, while Persian armies favoured lighter troop types.

Persia

Persian warriors, possibly Immortals, a frieze in Darius's palace at Susa. Silicious glazed bricks, c. 510 BC

The Persian military consisted of a diverse group of men drawn from across the empire. However, according to Herodotus, there was at least a general conformity in armour and style of fighting. The troops were usually armed with a bow, a 'short spear' and a sword or axe, carried a wicker shield. They wore a leather jerkin, although individuals of high stature wore high quality metal armor. The Persians most likely used their bows to wear down the enemy, then closed in to deliver the final blow with spears and swords. The first rank of Persian infantry formations, the so-called 'sparabara', had no bows, carried larger wicker shields and were sometimes armed with longer spears. Their role was to protect the back ranks of the formation. The cavalry probably fought as lightly armed missile cavalry.

Greece
The style of warfare between the Greek city-states, which dates back until at least 650 BC (as dated by the 'Chigi vase'), was based around the hoplite phalanx supported by missile troops. The 'hoplites' were foot soldiers usually drawn from the members of the middle-classes (in Athens called the *zeugites*), who could afford the equipment necessary to fight in this manner. The heavy armour usually included a breastplate or a linothorax, greaves, a helmet, and a large round, concave shield (the *aspis or hoplon*). Hoplites were armed with long spears (the *dory*), which were significantly longer than Persian spears, and a sword (the *xiphos*). The heavy armour and longer spears made them superior in hand-to-hand combat and gave them significant protection against ranged attacks. Lightly armed skirmishers, the psiloi also comprised a part of Greek armies growing in importance during the conflict; at the Battle of Plataea, for instance, they may have formed over half the Greek army. Use of cavalry in Greek armies is not reported in the battles of the Greco-Persian Wars.

Naval warfare
At the beginning of the conflict, all naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean had switched to the trireme, a warship powered by three banks of oars. The most common naval tactics during the period were ramming (triremes were equipped with a ram at the bows), or boarding by ship-borne marines. More experienced naval powers had by this time also begun to use a manoeuver known as *diekplous*. It is not clear what this was, but it probably involved sailing into gaps between enemy ships and then ramming them in the side.
The Persian naval forces were primarily provided by the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Cilicians and Cypriots. Other coastal regions of the Persian Empire would contribute ships throughout the course of the wars.

Ionian Revolt (499–493 BC)
The Ionian Revolt and associated revolts in Aeolis, Doris, Cyprus, and Caria were military rebellions by several regions of Asia Minor against Persian rule, lasting from 499 to 493 BC. At the heart of the rebellion was the dissatisfaction of the Greek cities of Asia Minor with the tyrants appointed by Persia to rule them, along with opposition to the individual actions of two Milesian tyrants, Histiaeus and Aristagoras. In 499 BC the then tyrant of Miletus, Aristagoras, launched a joint expedition with the Persian satrap Artaphernes to conquer Naxos, in an attempt to bolster his position in Miletus (both financially and in terms of prestige). The mission was a debacle, and sensing his imminent removal as tyrant, Aristagoras chose to incite the whole of Ionia into rebellion against the Persian king Darius the Great.

In 498 BC, supported by troops from Athens and Eretria, the Ionians marched on, captured, and burnt Sardis. However, on their return journey to Ionia, they were followed by Persian troops, and decisively beaten at the Battle of Ephesus. This campaign was the only offensive action taken by the Ionians, who subsequently went on the defensive. The Persians responded in 497 BC with a three-pronged attack aimed at recapturing the outlying areas of the rebellious territory, but the spread of the revolt to Caria meant the largest army, under Darius, moved there instead.

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

While at first campaigning successfully in Caria, this army was wiped out in an ambush at the Battle of Pedasus. This resulted in a stalemate for the rest of 496 and 495 BC.
By 494 BC the Persian army and navy had regrouped, and they made straight for the epicentre of the rebellion at Miletus. The Ionian fleet sought to defend Miletus by sea, but was defeated decisively at the Battle of Lade, after the Samians had defected. Miletus was then besieged, captured, and its population was enslaved. This double defeat effectively ended the revolt, and the Carians surrendered to the Persians as a result. The Persians spent 493 BC reducing the cities along the west coast that still held out against them, before finally imposing a peace settlement on Ionia that was considered to be both just and fair.

Map showing main events of the Ionian Revolt.

The Ionian Revolt constituted the first major conflict between Greece and the Achaemenid Empire and represents the first phase of the Greco-Persian Wars. Asia Minor had been brought back into the Persian fold, but Darius had vowed to punish Athens and Eretria for their support for the revolt. Moreover, seeing that the political situation in Greece posed a continued threat to the stability of his Empire, he decided to embark on the conquest of all Greece.

First invasion of Greece (492–490 BC)
After conquering Ionia, the Persians began to plan their next moves: extinguishing the threat to their empire from Greece and punishing Athens and Eretria. The resultant first Persian invasion of Greece consisted of two main campaigns.

492 BC: Mardonius's campaign

Map showing events of the first phases of the Greco-Persian Wars

The first campaign, in 492 BC, was led by Darius's son-in-law Mardonius, who re-subjugated Thrace, which had nominally been part of the Persian empire since 513 BC. Mardonius was also able to force Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia; it had previously been allied but independent. However, further progress in this campaign was prevented when Mardonius's fleet was wrecked in a storm off the coast of Mount Athos. Mardonius himself was then injured in a raid on his camp by a Thracian tribe, and after this, he returned with the rest of the expedition to Asia.
The following year, having given clear warning of his plans, Darius sent ambassadors to all the cities of Greece, demanding their submission. He received it from almost all of them, except Athens and Sparta, both of whom instead executed the ambassadors. With Athens still defiant, and Sparta now also effectively at war with him, Darius ordered a further military campaign for the following year.

490 BC: Datis and Artaphernes' campaign
In 490 BC, Datis and Artaphernes (son of the satrap Artaphernes) were given command of an amphibious invasion force, and set sail from Cilicia. The Persian force sailed from Cilicia first to the island of Rhodes, where a Lindian Temple Chronicle records that Datis besieged the city of Lindos, but was unsuccessful. The fleet sailed next to Naxos, to punish the Naxians for their resistance to the failed expedition the Persians had mounted there a decade earlier. Many of the inhabitants fled to the mountains; those that the Persians caught were enslaved. The Persians then burnt the city and temples of the Naxians. The fleet then proceeded to island-hop across the rest of the Aegean on its way to Eretria, taking hostages and troops from each island.
The task force sailed on to Euboea, and to the first major target, Eretria. The Eretrians made no attempt to stop the Persians from landing or advancing and thus allowed

themselves to be besieged. For six days, the Persians attacked the walls, with losses on both sides; however, on the seventh day two reputable Eretrians opened the gates and betrayed the city to the Persians. The city was razed, and temples and shrines were looted and burned. Furthermore, according to Darius's commands, the Persians enslaved all the remaining townspeople.

Battle of Marathon



The Greek wings envelop the Persians

The Persian fleet next headed south down the coast of Attica, landing at the bay of Marathon, roughly 25 miles (40 km) from Athens Under the guidance of Miltiades, the general with the greatest experience of fighting the Persians, the Athenian army marched to block the two exits from the plain of Marathon. Stalemate ensued for five days, before the Athenians (for reasons that are unclear) decided to attack the Persians. Despite the numerical advantage of the Persians, the hoplites proved devastatingly effective against the more lightly armed Persian infantry, routing the wings before turning in on the centre of the Persian line. The remnants of the Persian army fled to their ships and left the battle. Herodotus records that 6,400 Persian bodies were counted on the battlefield; the Athenians lost only 192 men.

As soon as the Persian survivors had put to sea, the Athenians marched as quickly as possible to Athens. They arrived in time to prevent Artaphernes from securing a landing in Athens. Seeing his opportunity lost, Artaphernes ended the year's campaign and returned to Asia.

The Battle of Marathon was a watershed in the Greco-Persian wars, showing the Greeks that the Persians could be beaten. It also highlighted the superiority of the more heavily armoured Greek hoplites, and showed their potential when used wisely. The Battle of Marathon is perhaps now more famous as the inspiration for the Marathon race.

Interbellum (490–480 BC)

Achaemenid Empire

After the failure of the first invasion, Darius began raising a huge new army with which he meant to subjugate Greece completely; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. Darius died while preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly restarted the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be a full scale invasion, it needed longterm planning, stockpiling and conscription. Xerxes decided the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC while rounding this coastline). These were both feats of exceptional ambition that would have been beyond any contemporary state. However, the campaign was delayed by one year because of another revolt in Egypt and Babylonia.

The Persians had the sympathy of several Greek city-states, including Argos, which had pledged to defect when the Persians reached their borders. The Aleuadae family, who ruled Larissa in Thessaly, saw the invasion as an opportunity to extend their power. Thebes, though not explicitly 'Medising', was suspected of being willing to aid the Persians once the invasion force arrived.

In 481 BC, after roughly four years of preparation, Xerxes began to muster the troops to invade Europe. Herodotus gives the names of 46 nations from which troops were drafted. The Persian army was gathered in Asia Minor in the summer and autumn of. The armies from the Eastern satrapies were gathered in Kritala, Cappadocia and were led by Xerxes to Sardis where they passed the winter. Early in spring, it moved to Abydos where it was joined with the armies of the western satrapies. Then the army that Xerxes had mustered marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges.

Size of the Persian forces

The numbers of troops that Xerxes mustered for the second invasion of Greece have been the subject of endless dispute. Most modern scholars reject as unrealistic the figures of 2.5 million given by Herodotus and other ancient sources because the victors likely miscalculated or exaggerated. The topic has been hotly debated, but the consensus revolves around the figure of 200,000.

The size of the Persian fleet is also disputed, although perhaps less so. Other ancient authors agree with Herodotus' number of 1,207. These numbers are by ancient standards consistent, and this could be interpreted that a number around 1,200 is correct. Among modern scholars, some have accepted this number, although suggesting the number must have been lower by the Battle of Salamis. Other recent works on the Persian Wars reject this number, viewing 1,207 as more of a reference to the combined Greek fleet in the Iliad. These works generally claim that the Persians could have launched no more than around 600 warships into the Aegean.

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

Greek city states

Athens

A year after Marathon, Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, was injured in a minor battle. Taking advantage of his incapacitation, the powerful Alcmaeonid family arranged for him to be prosecuted. Miltiades was given a massive fine for the crime of 'deceiving the Athenian people', but died weeks later from his wound.



Bust of Themistocles

The politician Themistocles, with a power base firmly established amongst the poor, filled the vacuum left by Miltiades's death, and in the following decade became the most influential politician in Athens. During this period, Themistocles continued to support expanding Athenian naval power. The Athenians were aware throughout this period that the Persian interest in Greece had not ended, and Themistocles's naval policies may be seen in the light of the potential threat from Persia. Aristides, Themistocles's great rival, and champion of the *zeugites* (the upper, 'hoplite-class') vigorously opposed such a policy.

In 483 BC, a massive new seam of silver was found in the Athenian mines at Laurium. Themistocles proposed that the silver should be used to build a new fleet of triremes, ostensibly to assist in a long running war with Aegina. Plutarch suggests that Themistocles deliberately avoided mentioning Persia, believing that it was too distant a threat for the Athenians to act on, but that countering Persia was the fleet's aim. Fine suggests that many Athenians must have admitted that such a fleet would be needed to resist the Persians, whose preparations for the coming campaign were known about. Themistocles's motion was passed easily, despite strong opposition from Aristides. Its passage was probably due to the desire of many of the poorer Athenians for paid employment as rowers in the fleet. It is unclear from the ancient sources whether 100 or 200 ships initially authorised; both Fine and Holland suggest that at first 100 ships were authorised and that a second vote increased this number to the levels seen during the second invasion. Aristides continued to oppose Themistocles's policy, and tension between the two camps built over the winter, so the ostracism of 482 BC became a direct contest between Themistocles and Aristides. In what Holland characterises as, in essence, the world's first referendum, Aristides was ostracised, and Themistocles's policies were endorsed. Indeed, becoming aware of the Persian preparations for the coming invasion, the Athenians voted to build more ships than Themistocles had asked for. In the run up to the Persian invasion, Themistocles had thus become the leading politician in Athens.

Sparta

The Spartan king Demaratus had been stripped of his kingship in 491 BC, and replaced with his cousin Leotychides. Sometime after 490 BC, the humiliated Demaratus had chosen to go into exile, and had made his way to Darius's court in Susa. Demaratus would from then on act as an advisor to Darius, and later Xerxes, on Greek affairs, and accompanied Xerxes during the second Persian invasion. At the end of Herodotus's book 7, there is an anecdote relating that in the run-up to the second invasion, Demaratus sent an apparently blank wax tablet to Sparta. When the wax was removed, a message was found scratched on the wooden backing, warning the Spartans of Xerxes's plans. However, many historians believe that this chapter was inserted into the text by a later author, possibly to fill a gap between the end of book 7 and the start of book 8. The veracity of this anecdote is therefore unclear.

Hellenic alliance

In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but deliberately bypassed Athens and Sparta. Support thus began to coalesce around these two states. A congress of states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. This confederation had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. Herodotus does not formulate an abstract name for the union but simply calls them "οἱ Ἕλληνες" (the Greeks) and "the Greeks who had sworn alliance" (Godley translation) or "the Greeks who had banded themselves together" (Rawlinson translation). From now on, they will be referred to as the 'Allies'. Sparta and Athens had a leading role in the congress but the interests

of all the states played a part in determining defensive strategy. Little is known about the internal workings of the congress or the discussions during its meetings. Only 70 of the nearly 700 Greek city-states sent representatives. Nevertheless, this was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states present were still technically at war with one another.

Second invasion of Greece (480–479 BC)

Early 480 BC: Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly
Having crossed into Europe in April 480 BC, the Persian army began its march to Greece, taking 3 months to travel unopposed from the Hellespont to Therme. It paused at Doriskos where it was joined by the fleet. Xerxes reorganized the troops into tactical units replacing the national formations used earlier for the march.

Major events in the second invasion of Greece

The Allied 'congress' met again in the spring of 480 BC and agreed to defend the narrow Vale of Tempe on the borders of Thessaly and block Xerxes's advance. However, once there, they were warned by Alexander I of Macedon that the vale could be bypassed and that the army of Xerxes was overwhelmingly large, thus the Greeks retreated. Shortly afterwards, they received the news that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont. At this point, a second strategy was suggested by Themistocles to the allies. The route to southern Greece (Boeotia, Attica and the Peloponnesus) would require the army of Xerxes to travel through the narrow pass of Thermopylae. This could easily be blocked by the Greek hoplites, despite the overwhelming numbers of Persians. Furthermore, to prevent the Persians bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the Athenian and allied navies could block the straits of Artemisium. This dual strategy was adopted by the congress. However, the Peloponnesian cities made fall-back plans to defend the Isthmus of Corinth should it come to it, while the women and children of Athens were evacuated to the Peloponnesian city of Troezen.

August 480 BC: Battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium
Xerxes's estimated time of arrival at Thermopylae coincided with both the Olympic Games and the festival of Carneia. For the Spartans, warfare during these periods was considered sacrilegious. Despite the uncomfortable timing, the Spartans considered the threat so grave that they dispatched their king Leonidas I with his personal bodyguard (the *Hippeis*) of 300 men. The customary elite young men in the Hippeis were replaced by veterans who already had children. Leonidas was supported by contingents from the Allied Peloponnesian cities, and other forces that the Allies picked up on the way to Thermopylae. The Allies proceeded to occupy the pass, rebuilt the wall the Phocians had built at the narrowest point of the pass, and waited for Xerxes's arrival.


The pass of Thermopylae

When the Persians arrived at Thermopylae in mid-August, they initially waited for three days for the Allies to disperse. When Xerxes was eventually persuaded that the Allies intended to contest the pass, he sent his troops to attack. However, the Allied position was ideally suited to hoplite warfare, the Persian contingents being forced to attack the Greek phalanx head on. The Allies withstood two full days of Persian attacks, including those by the elite Persian Immortals. However, towards the end of the second day, they were betrayed by a local resident named Ephialtes who revealed to Xerxes a mountain path that led behind the Allied lines. Made aware by scouts that they were being outflanked, Leonidas dismissed most of the Allied army, remaining to guard the rear with perhaps 2,000 men. On the final day of the battle, the remaining Allies sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians in the wider part of the pass to slaughter as many Persians as they could, but eventually they were all killed or captured.
Simultaneous with the battle at Thermopylae, an Allied naval force of 271 triremes defended the Straits of Artemisium against the Persians, thus protecting the flank of the forces at Thermopylae. Here the Allied fleet held off the Persians for three days; however, on the third evening the Allies received news of the fate of Leonidas and the Allied troops at Thermopylae. Since the Allied fleet was badly damaged, and since it no longer needed to defend

the flank of Thermopylae, the Allies retreated from Artemisium to the island of Salamis.

September 480 BC: Battle of Salamis

Victory at Thermopylae meant that all Boeotia fell to Xerxes; and left Attica open to invasion. The remaining population of Athens was evacuated, with the aid of the Allied fleet, to Salamis. The Peloponnesian Allies began to prepare a defensive line across the Isthmus of Corinth, building a wall, and demolishing the road from Megara, abandoning Athens to the Persians. Athens thus fell to the Persians; the small number of Athenians who had barricaded themselves on the Acropolis were eventually defeated, and Xerxes then ordered Athens to be razed.



Schematic diagram illustrating events during the Battle of Salamis

The Persians had now captured most of Greece, but Xerxes had perhaps not expected such defiance; his priority was now to complete the war as quickly as possible. If Xerxes could destroy the Allied navy, he would be in a strong position to force an Allied surrender; conversely by avoiding destruction, or as Themistocles hoped, by destroying the Persian fleet, the Allies could prevent conquest from being completed. The Allied fleet thus remained off the coast of Salamis into September, despite the imminent arrival of the Persians. Even after Athens fell, the Allied fleet remained off the coast of Salamis, trying to lure the Persian fleet to battle. Partly because of deception by Themistocles, the navies met in the cramped Straits of Salamis. There, the Persian numbers became a hindrance, as ships struggled to maneuver and became disorganised. Seizing the opportunity, the Allied fleet attacked, and scored a decisive victory, sinking or capturing at least 200 Persian ships, therefore ensuring the safety of the Peloponnessus.

According to Herodotus, after the loss of the battle Xerxes attempted to build a causeway across the channel to attack the Athenian evacuees on Salamis, but this project was soon abandoned. With the Persians' naval superiority removed, Xerxes feared that the Allies might sail to the Hellespont and destroy the pontoon bridges. His general Mardonius volunteered to remain in Greece and complete the conquest with a hand-picked group of troops, while Xerxes retreated to Asia with the bulk of the army. Mardonius over-wintered in Boeotia and Thessaly; the Athenians were thus able to return to their burnt-out city for the winter.

June 479 BC: Battles of Plataea and Mycale

Over the winter, there was some tension between the Allies. In particular, the Athenians, who were not protected by the Isthmus, but whose fleet was the key to the security of the Peloponnesus, felt hard done by, and refused to join the Allied navy in Spring. Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless, while the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponessus. Mardonius moved to break the stalemate, by offering peace to the Athenians, using Alexander I of Macedon as an intermediate. The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was on hand to hear the offer, but rejected it. Athens was thus evacuated again, and the Persians marched south and re-took possession of it. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis. Athens, with Megara and Plataea, sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatening to accept the Persian terms if they were not aided. In response, the Spartans summonded a large army from the Peloponnese cities and marched to meet the Persians.

When Mardonius heard the Allied army was on the march, he retreated into Boeotia, near Plataea, trying to draw the Allies into open terrain where he could use his cavalry. The Allied army, under the command of the regent Pausanias, stayed on high ground above Plataea to protect themselves against such tactics. After several days of maneuver and stalemate, Pausanias ordered a night-time retreat towards the Allies' original positions. This maneuver went awry, leaving the Athenians, and Spartans and Tegeans isolated on separate hills, with the other contingents scattered further away near Plataea. Seeing that the Persians might never have a better opportunity to attack, Mardonius ordered his whole army forward. However, the Persian infantry proved no match for the heavily armoured Greek hoplites, and the Spartans broke through to Mardonius's bodyguard and killed him. After this the Persian force dissolved in rout; 40,000 troops managed to escape via the road to Thessaly, but the rest fled to the Persian camp where they were trapped and slaughtered by the Greeks, finalising the Greek victory.

Herodotus recounts that, on the afternoon of the Battle of Plataea, a rumour of their victory at that battle reached the Allies' navy, at that time off the coast of Mount Mycale in Ionia. Their morale boosted, the Allied marines fought and won a decisive victory at the Battle of Mycale that same day, destroying the remnants of the Persian fleet, crippling Xerxes' sea power, and marking the ascendancy of the Greek fleet. Whilst many modern historians doubt that Mycale took place on the same day as Plataea, the battle may well only have occurred once the Allies received news of the events unfolding in Greece.

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

Greek counterattack (479–478 BC)

Mycale and Ionia

Mycale was, in many ways, the beginning of a new phase in the conflict, in which the Greeks would go on the offensive against the Persians. The immediate result of the victory at Mycale a second revolt amongst the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The Samians and Milesians had actively fought against the Persians at Mycale, thus openly declaring their rebellion, and the other cities followed in their example.

Sestos

Shortly after Mycale, the Allied fleet sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this had already been done. The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held by the Persians. The Persians and their allies made for Sestos, the strongest town in the region. Amongst them was one Oeobazus of Cardia, who had with him the cables and other equipment from the pontoon bridges. The Persian governor, Artayctes had not prepared for a siege, not believing that the Allies would attack. The Athenians therefore were able to lay a siege around Sestos. The siege dragged on for several months, causing some discontent amongst the Athenian troops, but eventually, when the food ran out in the City, the Persians fled at night from the least guarded area of the city. The Athenians were thus able to take possession of the city the next day.

Most of the Athenian troops were sent straight away to pursue the Persians. The party of Oeobazus was captured by a Thracian tribe, and Oeobazus was sacrificed to the god Plistorus. The Athenians eventually caught Artayctes, killing some of the Persians with him but taking most of them, including Artayctes, captive. Artayctes was crucified at the request of the people of Elaeus, a town which Artayctes had plundered while governor of the Chersonesos. The Athenians, having pacified the region, then sailed back to Athens, taking the cables from the pontoon bridges with them as trophies.

Cyprus

In 478 BC, still operating under the terms of the Hellenic alliance, the Allies sent out a fleet composed of 20 Peloponnesian and 30 Athenian ships supported by an unspecified number of allies, under the overall command of Pausanias. According to Thucydides, this fleet sailed to Cyprus and "subdued most of the island". Exactly what Thucydides means by this is unclear. Sealey suggests that this was essentially a raid to gather as much booty as possible from the Persian garrisons on Cyprus. There is no indication that the Allies attempted to take possession of the island, and, shortly after, they sailed to Byzantium. Certainly, the fact that the Delian League repeatedly campaigned in Cyprus suggests either that the island was not garrisoned by the Allies in 478 BC, or that the garrisons were quickly expelled.

Byzantium

The Greek fleet then sailed to Byzantium, which they besieged, and eventually captured. Control of both Sestos and Byzantium gave the allies command of the straits between Europe and Asia (over which the Persians had crossed), and allowed them access to the merchant trade of the Black Sea.

The aftermath of the siege was to prove troublesome for Pausanias. Exactly what happened is unclear; Thucydides gives few details, although later writers added plenty of lurid insinuations. Through his arrogance and arbitrary actions (Thucydides says "violence"), Pausanias managed to alienate many of the Allied contingents, particularly those that had just been freed from Persian overlordship. The Ionians and others asked the Athenians to take leadership of the campaign, to which they agreed. The Spartans, hearing of his behaviour, recalled Pausanias, and tried him on charges of collaborating with the enemy. Although he was acquitted, his reputation was tarnished and he was not restored to his command.

Pausanias returned to Byzantium as a private citizen in 477 BC, and took command of the city until he was expelled by the Athenians. He then crossed the Bosporus and settled in Colonae in the Troad, until he was again accused of collaborating with the Persians and was recalled by the Spartans for a trial after which he starved himself to death. The timescale is unclear, but Pausanias may have remained in possession of Byzantium until 470 BC.

In the meantime, the Spartans had sent Dorkis to Byzantium with a small force, to take command of the Allied force. However, he found that the rest of the Allies were no longer prepared to accept Spartan leadership, and therefore returned home.

Wars of the Delian League (477–449 BC)

Delian League

Athens and her "empire" in 431 BC. The empire was the direct descendant of the Delian League

After Byzantium, the Spartans were allegedly eager to end their involvement in the war. The Spartans were supposedly of the view that, with the liberation of

mainland Greece and the Greek cities of Asia Minor, the war's purpose had already been reached. There was also perhaps a feeling that securing long-term security for the Asian Greeks would prove impossible. In the aftermath of Mycale, the Spartan king Leotychides had proposed transplanting all the Greeks from Asia Minor to Europe as the only method of permanently freeing them from Persian dominion. Xanthippus, the Athenian commander at Mycale, had furiously rejected this; the Ionian cities were originally Athenian colonies, and the Athenians, if no-one else, would protect the Ionians. This marks the point at which the leadership of the Greek Alliance effectively passed to the Athenians. With the Spartan withdrawal after Byzantium, the leadership of the Athenians became explicit.

Map showing the locations of battles fought by the Delian League, 477–449 BC

The loose alliance of city-states that had fought against Xerxes's invasion had been dominated by Sparta and the Peloponnesian league. With the withdrawal of these states, a congress was called on the holy island of Delos to institute a new alliance to continue the fight against the Persians. This alliance, now including many of the Aegean islands, was formally constituted as the 'First Athenian Alliance', commonly known as the Delian League. According to Thucydides, the official aim of the League was to "avenge the wrongs they suffered by ravaging the territory of the king". In reality, this goal was divided into three main efforts—to prepare for future invasion, to seek revenge against Persia, and to organize a means of dividing spoils of war. The members were given a choice of either supplying armed forces or paying a tax to the joint treasury; most states chose the tax.

Campaigns against Persia

Throughout the 470s BC, the Delian League campaigned in Thrace and the Aegean to remove the remaining Persian garrisons from the region, primarily under the command of the Athenian politician Cimon. In the early part of the next decade, Cimon began campaigning in Asia Minor, seeking to strengthen the Greek position there. At the Battle of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia, the Athenians and allied fleet achieved a stunning double victory, destroying a Persian fleet and then landing the ships' marines to attack and rout the Persian army. After this battle, the Persians took an essentially passive role in the conflict, anxious not to risk battle if possible.

Towards the end of the 460s BC, the Athenians took the ambitious decision to support a revolt in the Egyptian satrapy of the Persian empire. Although the Greek task force achieved initial successes, they were unable to capture the Persian garrison in Memphis, despite a 3-year long siege. The Persians then counterattacked, and the Athenian force was itself besieged for 18 months, before being wiped out. This disaster, coupled with ongoing warfare in Greece, dissuaded the Athenians from resuming conflict with Persia. In 451 BC however, a truce was agreed in Greece, and Cimon was then able to lead an expedition to Cyprus. However, while besieging Kition, Cimon died, and the Athenian force decided to withdraw, winning another double victory at the Battle of Salamis-in-Cyprus in order to extricate themselves. This campaign marked the end of hostilities between the Delian League and Persia, and therefore the end of the Greco-Persian Wars.

Peace with Persia

After the Battle of Salamis-in-Cyprus, Thucydides makes no further mention of conflict with the Persians, simply saying that the Greeks returned home. Diodorus, on the other hand, claims that in the aftermath of Salamis, a full-blown peace treaty (the "Peace of Callias") was agreed with the Persians. Diodorus was probably following the history of Ephorus at this point, who in turn was presumably influenced by his teacher Isocrates—from whom there is the earliest reference to the supposed peace, in 380 BC. Even during the 4th century BC, the idea of the treaty was controversial, and two authors from that period, Callisthenes and Theopompus, appear to reject its existence.

It is possible that the Athenians had attempted to negotiate with the Persians previously. Plutarch suggests that in the aftermath of the victory at the Eurymedon, Artaxerxes had agreed a peace treaty with the Greeks, even naming Callias as the Athenian ambassador involved. However, as Plutarch admits, Callisthenes denied that such a peace was made at this point (ca. 466 BC). Herodotus also mentions, in passing, an Athenian embassy headed by Callias, which was sent to Susa to negotiate with Artaxerxes. This embassy included some Argive representatives and can probably be therefore dated to ca. 461 BC (after an alliance was agreed between Athens and Argos). This embassy may have been an attempt to reach some kind of peace agreement, and it has even been suggested that the failure of these hypothetical negotiations led to the Athenian decision to support the Egyptian revolt. The ancient sources therefore disagree as to whether there was

an official peace or not, and if there was, when it was agreed.

Opinion amongst modern historians is also split; for instance, Fine accepts the concepof the Peace of Callias, whereas Sealey effectively rejects it. Holland accepts that some kind of accommodation was made between Athens and Persia, but no actual treaty. Fine argues that Callisthenes's denial that a treaty was made after the Eurymedon does not preclude a peace being made at another point. Further, he suggests that Theopompus was actually referring to a treaty that had allegedly been negotiated with Persia in 423 BC. If these views are correct, it would remove one major obstacle to the acceptance of the treaty's existence. A further argument for the existence of the treaty is the sudden withdrawal of the Athenians from Cyprus in 449 BC, which Fine suggests makes most sense in the light of some kind of peace agreement. On the other hand, if there was indeed some kind of accommodation, Thucydides's failure to mention it is odd. In his digression on the *pentekontaetia*, his aim is to explain the growth of Athenian power, and such a treaty, and the fact that the Delian allies were not released from their obligations after it, would have marked a major step in the Athenian ascendancy. Conversely, it has been suggested that certain passages elsewhere in Thucydides's history are best interpreted as referring to a peace agreement. There is thus no clear consensus amongst modern historians as to the treaty's existence.

If the treaty did indeed exist, its terms were humiliating for Persia. The ancient sources that give details of the treaty are reasonably consistent in their description of the terms:

- All Greek cities of Asia were to 'live by their own laws' *or* 'be autonomous' (depending on translation).
- Persian satraps (and presumably their armies) were not to travel west of the Halys River (Isocrates) *or* closer than a day's journey on horseback to the Aegean Sea (Callisthenes) *or* closer than three days' journey on foot to the Aegean Sea (Ephorus and Diodorus).
- No Persian warship was to sail west of Phaselis (on the southern coast of Asia Minor), nor west of the Cyanaean rocks (probably at the eastern end of the Bosporus, on the north coast).
- If the terms were observed by the king and his generals, then the Athenians were not to send troops to lands ruled by Persia.

Aftermath and later conflicts

Towards the end of the conflict with Persia, the process by which the Delian League became the Athenian Empire reached its conclusion. The allies of Athens were not released from their obligations to provide either money or ships, despite the cessation of hostilities. In Greece, the First Peloponnesian War between the power-blocs of Athens and Sparta, which had continued on/off since 460 BC, finally ended in 445 BC, with the agreement of a thirty-year truce. However, the growing enmity between Sparta and Athens would lead, just 14 years later, into the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War. This disastrous conflict, which dragged on for 27 years, would eventually result in the utter destruction of Athenian power, the dismemberment of the Athenian empire, and the establishment of a Spartan hegemony over Greece. However, not just Athens suffered—the conflict would significantly weaken the whole of Greece.

Repeatedly defeated in battle by the Greeks, and plagued by internal rebellions that hindered their ability to fight the Greeks, after 449 BC Artaxerxes I and his successors instead adopted a policy of divide-and-rule. Avoiding fighting the Greeks themselves, the Persians instead attempted to set Athens against Sparta, regularly bribing politicians to achieve their aims. In this way, they ensured that the Greeks remained distracted by internal conflicts, and were unable to turn their attentions to Persia. There was no open conflict between the Greeks and Persia until 396 BC, when the Spartan king Agesilaus briefly invaded Asia Minor; as Plutarch points out, the Greeks were far too busy overseeing the destruction of their own power to fight against the "barbarians".

If the wars of the Delian League shifted the balance of power between Greece and Persia in favour of the Greeks, then the subsequent half-century of internecine conflict in Greece did much to restore the balance of power to Persia. The Persians entered the Peloponnesian War in 411 BC forming a mutual-defence pact with Sparta and combining their naval resources against Athens in exchange for sole Persian control of Ionia. In 404 BC when Cyrus the Younger attempted to seize the Persian throne, he recruited 13,000 Greek mercenaries from all over the Greek world of which Sparta sent 700–800, believing they were following the terms of the treaty and unaware of the army's true purpose. After the failure of Cyrus, Persia tried to regain control of the Ionian city-states, which had rebelled during the conflict. The Ionians refused to capitulate and called upon Sparta for assistance, which she provided, in 396–395 BC. Athens, however, sided with the Persians, which led in turn to another large-scale conflict in Greece, the Corinthian War. Towards the end of that conflict, in 387 BC, Sparta sought the aid of Persia to shore up her position. Under the so-called "King's Peace" that brought the war to an end, Artaxerxes II demanded and received the return of the cities of Asia Minor from the Spartans, in return for which the Persians threatened to make war on any Greek state that did not make peace. This humiliating treaty, which undid all the Greek gains of the previous century, sacrificed the Greeks of Asia Minor so that the Spartans could maintain their hegemony over Greece. It is in the aftermath of this treaty that Greek orators began to refer to the Peace of Callias (whether fictional or not), as a counterpoint to the shame of the King's Peace, and a glorious example of the "good old days" when the Greeks of the Aegean had been freed from Persian rule by the Delian League. The final confrontation between the Greek world and Achaemenid Persia began just 53 years after that, with the army of Alexander the Great crossing into Asia, marking the beginning of what would result in the razing of Persepolis and the end of the Achaemenid Empire.

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

ARMY LISTS

I/60. EARLY ACHAEMENID PERSIAN 550-420BC

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY&CHARIOTS: Up to 50%
INFANTRY: At least 25%
ALLIES: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	4	4	3	5	2	9	150
Sub-Gen.	4	5	5	4	3	2	5	2	8	85
Ally-Gen.	4	5	5	4	4	2	5	2	8	140

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow, shield, light armour
Special Rules: General is *Army General* and may be upgraded to Ld10 (+50). One sub-commander can be designated as *Army Standard Bearer* (+15) and one as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken. The Ally-General acts as *Army General* but only for units from his allied contingent.). May ride a horse (+8, M8). General may ride a two-horse chariot bought at additional cost.

CAVALRY&CHARIOTS

GUARD CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Guard	8	4	4	3	3	1	3	1	7	24

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow
May have shield (+2), light armour (+2) and thrusting spear (+2)

PERSIAN OR MEDIAN CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	18

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow
May have shield (+2), light armour (+2) and thrusting spear (+2)

KASPIAN OR SKYTHIAN CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	20

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow. May have shield (+2)
May upgrade to *Expert Horsemen* (+2) and *Feigned Flight* (+2)
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

0-1 SAGARTIAN LASSO MEN

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	15

Equipment: Hand weapon, lasso (counts as javelins)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*

CYRUS CAMELRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Camelrider	6	2	2	3	3	1	2	1	6	12

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins.
May have shield (+2) and short bow (+1) or bow (+2)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*, *Camelry*, Only in 546BC

0-2 CYRUS SCYTHED CHARIOTS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Chariot	6	3	3	5	4	1	3	W6+2	7	75

Equipment: Hand weapon shield, light armour
Special Rules: *Scythed Chariots*, Only in 546BC

BACTRIAN CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	20

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow. May have shield (+2) and thrusting spear (+2)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*, Only after 546BC

BEDOUIN CAMELRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Camelrider	6	3	3	3	3	1	2	1	7	16

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins.
May have shield (+2) and short bow (+1) or bow (+2)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*, *Camelry*, Only after 546BC

0-1 LIBYAN CHARIOTS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Chariot	8	3	3	3	4	1	3	2	7	30

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins, shield, light armour
Special Rules: *Light Chariots*, Only after 526BC

0-1 INDIAN CHARIOTS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Chariot	8	4	4	3	4	2	3	2	8	60

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow, shield, light armour
Special Rules: *Heavy Chariots*, Only after 526BC

MEDIZING THEBAN CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	18

Equipment: Hand weapon
May have thrusting spear (+2) and shield (+2).
Special Rules: Only in 479BC

MEDIZING THESSALIAN CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	18

Equipment: Hand weapon
May have throwing spear (+2) and shield (+2)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*, Only in 479BC

INFANTRY

0-1 IMMORTALS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Immortal	4	3	4	3	3	1	3	1	8	14

Equipment: Bow, hand weapon, large shield
May have light armour (+2). May be *Stubborn* (+2) and *Veterans* (+2)
Only from 465-449BC: Downgrade to Ld7 (-2), not longer 0-1
Only from 465-449BC: *Light Infantry*

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

OTHER SPARABARA FOOT

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Trooper	4	3	4	3	3	1	3	1	7	12

Equipment: Bow, hand weapon, large shield
May have light armour (+2).
Only from 465-449BC: Downgrade to BS3 (-3)
Only from 465-449BC: *Light Infantry*

ARMENIANS, PAPHLAGONIANS, BITHYNIANS, THRACIANS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Axeman	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	5

Equipment: Hand weapon. May have shield (+1)

SKIRMISHING ARCHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Archer	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	4

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow
After 546BC: May be upgraded to BS3 and Ld6 (+2)
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

PARTHIAN, BACTRIAN OR SKYTHIAN ARCHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Archer	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	6

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow

LEVIES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Levy	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon
Special Rules: *Levy*

0-1 CYRUS MOBILE TOWER
Special Rules: *War Wagon*, Only in 546BC

SKIRMISHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Spearman	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins
May have shield (+1). May have sling instead of javelins (free)
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*, Only after 546BC

LYDIAN OR IONIAN HOPLITES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Hoplit	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	7

Equipment: Thrusting Spear, hand weapon., shield
Special Rules: *Early Phalanx*, Only after 546BC

ASSYRIAN OR CHALDEAN INFANTRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Trooper	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	7

Equipment: Thrusting Spear, hand weapon. May have shield (+1)
Up to half can have bow instead of spear&shield (free)
Special Rules: *Combined Formation*, Only after 546BC

LYKIAN MARINES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Marine	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	7

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow. May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: Only after 546BC

PHOENICIAN MARINES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Marine	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	6

Equipment: Hand weapon. May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: Only after 539BC

LIBYAN JAVELINMEN

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Libyan	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins. May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*, Only after 526BC

INDIAN ARCHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Archer	4	3	4	3	3	1	3	1	7	10

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow.
Special Rules: Only after 526BC

EGYPTIAN MARINES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Marine	4	4	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	10

Equipment: Hand weapon, throwing spear.
May have shield (+1) and light armour (+2).
Special Rules: Only after 526BC

THRACIANS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Thracian	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	5

Equipment: Hand weapon. May have shield (+1)
May be upgraded to WS4 (+3)
Special Rules: Only from 492-466BC

MEDIZING GREEK HOPLITES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Hoplit	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	7

Equipment: Thrusting Spear, hand weapon
May have light armour (+2) and shield (+1)
Special Rules: *Early Phalanx*, Only in 479BC

MEDIZING GREEK JAVELINMEN

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Javelinman	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins
May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: Only in 479BC

ALLIES

In 550BC: Mede Rebel Allies, I/40
In 530BC Saka Allies, I/43

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

I/40. MEDES, ZIKIRTU, ANDIA OR PARSUA 835-550BC

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ALLIES: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	4	4	3	5	2	9	150
Sub-Gen.	4	5	5	4	3	2	5	2	8	85
Ally-Gen.	4	5	5	4	4	2	5	2	8	140

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow, shield and light armour
Special Rules: General is *Army General.* One sub-commander can be designated as *Army Standard Bearer* (+15) and one as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken. The Ally-General acts as *Army General* but only for units from his allied contingent. May ride a two-horse chariot bought at additional cost. May ride a horse (+8, M8). Only Median Empire from 620BC: The general can be upgraded to Ld10 (+50).

CAVALRY

CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	18

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins.
May have shield (+2) and thrusting spear (+2)

KASPIAN OR PARIKANIAN CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	18

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins.
May have shield (+2) and throwing spear (+2)
Special Rules: *Skirmishers,* Only Median Empire from 620BC

INFANTRY

SPEARMEN

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Spearman	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	5

Equipment: Hand weapon, thrusting spear
May have shield (+1)
Only Median Empire from 620BC: May be upgraded to WS3/Ld7 (+2)
Special Rules: *Combined Formation*

SKIRMISHING ARCHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Archer	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	6	5

Equipment: Bow, hand weapon
Only Median Empire from 620BC : May be upgraded to BS3/Ld7 (+2)
Special Rules: *Skirmishers, Combined Formation*

MEDIAN ARCHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Archer	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	6

Equipment: Bow, hand weapon
Special Rules: Only Median Empire from 620BC

ARMENIANS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Armenian	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	5

Equipment: Hand weapon
May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: Only Median Empire from 620BC

PARTHIANS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Parthian	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	7

Equipment: Bow, hand weapon
Special Rules: Only Median Empire from 620BC

KASPIAN OR PARIKANIAN SKIRMISHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Skirmisher	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon, sling
May have javelins&buckler instead of sling.
Special Rules: *Skirmishers,* Only Median Empire from 620BC

LEVIES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Levy	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon
Special Rules: *Levy,* Only Median Empire from 620BC

ALLIES

Kimmerian or Skythian Allies, I/43
Mannaian Allies, I/37
Only from 733-669BC: Assyrian Allies, I/45
Only Median Empire from 620BC: Neo-Babylonian Allies, I/44

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

I/43. KIMMERIAN, SKYTHIAN OR EARLY HU 750BC-50AD

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: At least 50%
INFANTRY: Up to 25%
ALLIES: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	4	4	3	5	2	9	150
Sub-Gen.	4	5	5	4	3	2	5	2	8	85
Ally-Gen.	4	5	5	4	4	2	5	2	8	140

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow, shield and light armour
Special Rules: General is *Army General.* One sub-commander can be designated as *Army Standard Bearer* (+15) and one as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken. The Ally-General acts as *Army General* but only for units from his allied contingent. May ride a horse (+8, M8)

CAVALRY

HORSE ARCHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	17

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow
May have shield (+2).
May upgrade to *Expert Horsemen* (+2) and *Feigned Flight* (+2)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*

NOBLE CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Noble	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	22

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow, light armour
May have shield (+2) and thrusting spear (+2). May have cloth barding (+2). May upgrade to *Expert Horsemen* (+2)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*

INFANTRY

FOOT ARCHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Archer	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	6

Equipment: Bow, hand weapon
Special Rules: *Light Infantry*

SLINGERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Slinger	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon, sling
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

OTHER TRIBAL OR SUBJECT TRIBE FOOT

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Tribal	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	5

Equipment: Hand weapon and buckler

ALLIES

Only European Skythians from 700-600BC: Kimmerian Allies, I/43
Only Kimmerians from 680-675BC: Lowland Thracian Allies , I/48
Only Kimmerians before 640BC: Mannaian I/37 and Urartian I/39 Allies
Only Massagete from 550-150BC: Mountain Indian Allies, II/2
Only Hu after 400BC: Jung Allies (Early Northern Barbarians), I/14
Only European Skythians in 313BC: Lowland Thracian Allies, I/48 and Black Sea Greek Allies (Later Hoplite Greek,, II/5)
Only Saka in 129BC: Seleucid Allies, II/19

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

I/52. EARLY HOPLITE GREEK 680-450BC

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ALLIES: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	4	4	3	5	2	9	150
Sub-Gen.	4	5	5	4	3	2	5	2	8	85
Ally-Gen.	4	5	5	4	4	2	5	2	8	140

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins, shield, light armour
Special Rules: General is *Army General*. One sub-commander can be designated as *Army Standard Bearer* (+15) and one as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken. The Ally-General acts as *Army General* but only for units from his allied contingent. General have to be Spartan, Thessalian, Phokian/Aitolian/Akarnian, Asiatic Greek/Italiot/Siciliot or Athenian. May have a horse (+8, M), but only Thessalian, Greek/Italiot/Siciliot.
An Athenian general after 511BC may have a Thessalian Ally general.
Only if Spartan: General may be upgraded to Ld10 (+50).

CAVALRY

THEBAN CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	18

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins
May have thrusting spear (+2) and shield (+2).

OTHER MAINLAND GREEK CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	16

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins
May have thrusting spear (+2) and shield (+2).

THESSALIAN LIGHT CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	18

Equipment: Hand weapon,
May have thrusting spear (+2) and shield (+2)
May be upgraded to Nobles (+4, WS4 and light armour)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*, Only with Thessalian general or Athenian General after 511BC

LIGHT CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	18

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins
May have thrusting spear (+2) and shield (+2)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*, Only with Asiatic Greek/Italiot/Siciliot general

INFANTRY

HOPLITES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Hoplit	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	8

Equipment: Thrusting Spear, hand weapon, shield
May have light armour (+2)
Only with Spartan general: May be upgraded to WS4 and Ld8 (+4)
Only with Phokian/Aitolian/Akarnian General: Downgrade to javelinmen with javelins instead of spears and without *Early Phalanx* (-2)
Only with Asiatic Greek/Italiot/Siciliot general: No Early Phalanx (-1)
Special Rules: *Early Phalanx*

SKIRMISHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Skirmisher	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon, sling.
May have bow (+1) instead of sling
Only Athenian general after 490BC: Bow armed skirmishers may be upgraded to *Light Infantry*, BS3 and Ld6 (+3)
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

JAVELINMEN

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Javelinman	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins and buckler
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

PERIOIKOI

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Perioikoi	4	4	3	3	3	1	4	1	7	10

Equipment: Thrusting spear, hand weapon.
May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: *Early Phalanx*, Only with Spartan general

HELOTS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Helot	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	4

Equipment: Thrusting spear, hand weapon.
May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: *Levy*, Only with Spartan general

THRACIANS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Thracian	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	5	5

Equipment: Hand weapon.
May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: Only with Athenian general after 541BC

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

I/54. EARLY MACEDONIANS 650-355BC

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ALLIES: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	4	4	3	5	2	9	150
Sub-Gen.	4	5	5	4	3	2	5	2	8	85
Ally-Gen.	4	5	5	4	4	2	5	2	8	140

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins, shield, light armour
Special Rules: General is *Army General.* One sub-commander can be designated as *Army Standard Bearer* (+15) and one as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken. The Ally-General acts as *Army General* but only for units from his allied contingent. May have a horse (+8, M).
Only after 413BC: General may be upgraded to Ld10 (+50).

CAVALRY

COMPANIONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	18

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins
May have thrusting spear (+2), light armour (+2) and shield (+2).
May be upgraded to WS4 (+3)

MACEDONIAN OR PAIONIAN LIGHT CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	17

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins
May have bow (+2) and shield (+2)
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*

INFANTRY

PEASANT LEVIES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Peasant	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon.
May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: *Levy*

SKIRMISHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Skirmisher	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon, sling.
May have bow (+1) instead of sling
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

ILLYRIAN MERCENARIES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Illyrian	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	5

Equipment: Hand weapon, shield

MACEDONIAN OR COASTAL GREEK HOPLITES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Hoplit	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	8

Equipment: Thrusting spear, hand weapon, shield
May have light armour (+2)
After 498BC: May be upgraded to Pezhetaitoi (+3, WS4)
Special Rules: *Early Phalanx*

HIGHLAND MACEDONIAN PEASANTS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Peasant	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	5

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins, buckler
May have shield (+1)

LYNKESTIAN GREEK HOPLITES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Hoplit	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	7

Equipment: Thrusting Spear, hand weapon, shield
Special Rules: *Early Phalanx*

ALLIES

After 424BC: Spartan Allies, Later Hoplite Greek, II/5
Only 392BC: Thessalian Allies, Later Hoplite Greek, II/5

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

I/62. LYKIAN 546-300BC

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY&CHARIOTS: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 25%
ALLIES: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	4	4	3	5	2	9	150
Sub-Gen.	4	5	5	4	3	2	5	2	8	85
Ally-Gen.	4	5	5	4	4	2	5	2	8	140

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins, shield, light armour
Special Rules: General is *Army General*. One sub-commander can be designated as *Army Standard Bearer* (+15) and one as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken. The Ally-General acts as *Army General* but only for units from his allied contingent. May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY&CHARIOTS

CAVALRY

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Horseman	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	20

Equipment: Hand weapon, thrusting spear.
May have shield (+2)
Special Rules: Only after 500BC

IRREGULAR LIGHT CHARIOTS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Chariot	8	3	3	3	4	1	3	2	7	30

Equipment: Hand weapon, javelins, shield, light armour
Special Rules: *Light Chariots*, Only before 500BC

INFANTRY

WARRIORS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Warrior	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	6	5

Equipment: Hand weapon, shield
May have light armour (+2)

DREPANON WARRIORS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Warrior	5	4	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	8

Equipment: Hand weapon, shield
May have light armour (+2)

ARCHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Archer	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	4

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow. May have shield (+1).
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

PEASANTS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Peasant	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	3

Equipment: Hand weapon, sling.
May have javelins instead of sling (free)
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

MERCENARY HOPLITES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Hoplit	4	4	3	3	3	1	4	1	7	11

Equipment: Thrusting Spear, hand weapon, shield
May have light armour (+2)
Special Rules: *Phalanx*

MERCENARY PELTASTS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Peltast	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	7

Equipment: Hand weapon, throwing spear, buckler
May have shield (+1)
Special Rules: *Light Infantry*

MERCENARY SKIRMISHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Skirmisher	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	6	4

Equipment: Hand weapon, sling.
May have bow instead of sling (+1)
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

THRACIANS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Thracian	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	5

Equipment: Hand weapon.
May have shield (+1)

MARINES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Marine	4	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	7

Equipment: Hand weapon, bow

PIRATES

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Pirate	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	5	4

Equipment: Hand weapon and buckler
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

ALLIES

Asiatic or Greek Allies, I/52 or II/5

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

Battle of Marathon

The **Battle of Marathon** (Greek: Μάχη τοῦ Μαραθῶνος, *Machē tou Marathōnos*) took place in 490 BC, during the first Persian invasion of Greece. It was fought between the citizens of Athens, aided by Plataea, and a Persian force commanded by Datis and Artaphernes. It was the culmination of the first attempt by Persia, under King Darius I, to subjugate Greece. The first Persian invasion was a response to Greek involvement in the Ionian Revolt, when Athens and Eretria had sent a force to support the cities of Ionia in their attempt to overthrow Persian rule. The Athenians and Eretrians had succeeded in capturing and burning Sardis, but were then forced to retreat with heavy losses. In response to this raid, Darius swore to burn down Athens and Eretria. At the time of the battle, Sparta and Athens were the two largest city states.

Once the Ionian revolt was finally crushed by the Persian victory at the Battle of Lade, Darius began to plan to subjugate Greece. In 490 BC, he sent a naval task force under Datis and Artaphernes across the Aegean, to subjugate the Cyclades, and then to make punitive attacks on Athens and Eretria. Reaching Euboea in mid-summer after a successful campaign in the Aegean, the Persians proceeded to besiege and capture Eretria. The Persian force then sailed for Attica, landing in the bay near the town of Marathon. The Athenians, joined by a small force from Plataea, marched to Marathon, and succeeded in blocking the two exits from the plain of Marathon. Stalemate ensued for five days, before the Athenians decided to attack the Persians because, under the cover of night, some of the Persian fleet had set sail for Athens. Despite the numerical advantage of the Persians, the hoplites proved devastatingly effective against the more lightly armed Persian infantry, routing the wings before turning in on the centre of the Persian line.

The defeat at Marathon marked the end of the first Persian invasion of Greece, and the Persian force retreated to Asia. Darius then began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. After Darius died, his son Xerxes I re-started the preparations for a second invasion of Greece, which finally began in 480 BC.

The Battle of Marathon was a watershed in the Greco-Persian wars, showing the Greeks that the Persians could be beaten; the eventual Greek triumph in these wars can be seen to begin at Marathon. Since the following two hundred years saw the rise of the Classical Greek civilization, which has been enduringly influential in western society, the Battle of Marathon is often seen as a pivotal moment in European history. For instance, John Stuart Mill famously suggested that "the Battle of Marathon, even as an event in British history, is more important than the Battle of Hastings". The Battle of Marathon is perhaps now more famous as the inspiration for the Marathon race. Although historically inaccurate, the legend of a Greek messenger running to Athens with news of the victory became the inspiration for this athletic event, introduced at the 1896 Athens Olympics, and originally run between Marathon and Athens.

Background

A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle

The first Persian invasion of Greece had its immediate roots in the Ionian Revolt, the earliest phase of the Greco-Persian Wars. However, it was also the result of the longer-term interaction between the Greeks and Persians.

In 500 BC the Persian Empire was still relatively young and highly expansionistic, but prone to revolts amongst its subject peoples. Moreover, the Persian king Darius was a usurper, and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his rule. Even before the Ionian Revolt, Darius had begun to expand the Empire into Europe, subjugating Thrace, and forcing Macedon to become allied to Persia. Attempts at further expansion into the politically fractious world of Ancient Greece may have been inevitable. However, the Ionian Revolt had directly threatened the integrity of the Persian empire, and the states of mainland Greece remained a potential menace to its future stability. Darius thus resolved to subjugate and pacify Greece and the Aegean, and to punish those involved in the Ionian Revolt.

GRECO-PERSIAN WARS 499 – 449BC

The Ionian revolt had begun with an unsuccessful expedition against Naxos, a joint venture between the Persian satrap Artaphernes and the Milesian tyrant Aristagoras. In the aftermath, Artaphernes decided to remove Aristagoras from power, but before he could do so, Aristagoras abdicated, and declared Miletus a democracy. The other Ionian cities followed suit, ejecting their Persian-appointed tyrants, and declaring themselves democracies. Artistagoras then appealed to the states of Mainland Greece for support, but only Athens and Eretria offered to send troops.

The involvement of Athens in the Ionian Revolt arose from a complex set of circumstances, beginning with the establishment of the Athenian Democracy in the late 6th century BC. In 510 BC, with the aid of Cleomenes I, King of Sparta, the Athenian people had expelled Hippias, the tyrant ruler of Athens. With Hippias's father Peisistratus, the family had ruled for 36 out of the previous 50 years and fully intended to continue Hippias's rule. Hippias fled to Sardis to the court of the Persian satrap, Artaphernes and promised control of Athens to the Persians if they were to help restore him. In the meantime, Cleomenes helped install a pro-Spartan tyranny under Isagoras in Athens, in opposition to Cleisthenes, the leader of the traditionally powerful Alcmaeonidae family, who considered themselves the natural heirs to the rule of Athens. In a daring response, Cleisthenes proposed to the Athenian people that he would establish a 'democracy' in Athens, much to the horror of the rest of the aristocracy. Cleisthenes's reasons for suggesting such a radical course of action, which would remove much of his own family's power, are unclear; perhaps he perceived that days of aristocratic rule were coming to an end anyway; certainly he wished to prevent Athens becoming a puppet of Sparta by whatever means necessary. However, as a result of this proposal, Cleisthenes and his family were exiled from Athens, in addition to other dissenting elements, by Isagoras. Having been promised democracy however, the Athenian people seized the moment and revolted, expelling Cleomenes and Isagoras. Cleisthenes was thus restored to Athens (507 BC), and at breakneck speed began to establish democratic government. The establishment of democracy revolutionised Athens, which henceforth became one of the leading cities in Greece. The new found freedom and self-governance of the Athenians meant that they were thereafter exceptionally hostile to the return of the tyranny of Hippias, or any form of outside subjugation; by Sparta, Persia or anyone else.

Cleomenes, unsurprisingly, was not pleased with the events, and marched on Athens with the Spartan army. Cleomenes's attempts to restore Isagoras to Athens ended in a debacle, but fearing the worst, the Athenians had by this point already sent an embassy to Artaphernes in Sardis, to request aid from the Persian Empire. Artaphernes requested that the Athenians give him a 'earth and water', a traditional token of submission, which the Athenian ambassadors acquiesced to. However, they were severely censured for this when they returned to Athens. At some point later Cleomenes instigated a plot to restore Hippias to the rule of Athens. This failed and Hippias again fled to Sardis and tried to persuade the Persians to subjugate Athens. The Athenians dispatched ambassadors to Artaphernes to dissuade him from taking action, but Artaphernes merely instructed the Athenians to take Hippias back as tyrant. Needless to say, the Athenians balked at this, and resolved instead to be openly at war with Persia. Having thus become the enemy of Persia, Athens was already in a position to support the Ionian cities when they began their revolt. The fact that the Ionian democracies were inspired by the example of Athens no doubt further persuaded the Athenians to support the Ionian Revolt; especially since the cities of Ionia were (supposedly) originally Athenian colonies.

Darius I of Persia, as imagined by a Greek painter, 4th century BC

The Athenians and Eretrians sent a task force of 25 triremes to Asia Minor to aid the revolt. Whilst there, the Greek army surprised and outmaneuvered Artaphernes, marching to Sardis and there burning the lower city. However, this was as much as the Greeks achieved, and they were then pursued back to the coast by Persian horsemen, losing many men in the process. Despite the

fact that their actions were ultimately fruitless, the Eretrians and in particular the Athenians had earned Darius's lasting enmity, and he vowed to punish both cities. The Persian naval victory at the Battle of Lade (494 BC) all but ended the Ionian Revolt, and by 493 BC, the last hold-outs were vanquished by the Persian fleet. The revolt was used as an opportunity by Darius to extend the empire's border to the islands of the East Aegean and the Propontis, which had not been part of the Persian dominions before. The completion of the pacification of Ionia allowed the Persians to begin planning their next moves; to extinguish the threat to the empire from Greece, and to punish Athens and Eretria.

In 492 BC, once the Ionian Revolt had finally been crushed, Darius dispatched an expedition to Greece under the command of his son-in-law, Mardonius. Mardonius re-conquered Thrace and compelled Alexander I of Macedon to make Macedon a client kingdom to Persia, before the wrecking of his fleet brought a premature end to the campaign. However in 490 BC, following up the successes of the previous campaign, Darius decided to send a maritime expedition led by Artaphernes, (son of the satrap to whom Hippias had fled) and Datis, a Median admiral. Mardonius had been injured in the prior campaign and had fallen out of favor. The expedition was intended to bring the Cyclades into the Persian empire, to punish Naxos (which had resisted a Persian assault in 499 BC) and then to head to Greece to force Eretria and Athens to submit to Darius or be destroyed. After island-hopping across the Aegean, including successfully attacking Naxos, the Persian task force arrived off Euboea in mid summer. The Persians then proceeded to besiege, capture and burn Eretria. They then headed south down the coast of Attica, en route to complete the final objective of the campaign – to punish Athens.

Prelude

A picture reconstructing the beached Persian ships at Marathon prior to the battle.

The Persians sailed down the coast of Attica, and landed at the bay of Marathon, roughly 25 miles (40 km) from Athens, on the advice of the exiled Athenian tyrant Hippias (who had accompanied the expedition). Under the guidance of Miltiades, the Athenian general with the greatest experience of fighting the Persians, the Athenian army marched quickly to block the two exits from the plain of Marathon, and prevent the Persians moving inland. At the same time, Athens's greatest runner, Pheidippides (or Philippides in some accounts) had been sent to Sparta to request that the Spartan army march to the aid of Athens. Pheidippides arrived during the festival of *Carneia*, a sacrosanct period of peace, and was informed that the Spartan army could not march to war until the full moon rose; Athens could not expect reinforcement for at least ten days. The Athenians would have to hold out at Marathon for the time being, although they were reinforced by the full muster of 1,000 hoplites from the small city of Plataea; a gesture which did much to steady the nerves of the Athenians, and won unending Athenian gratitude to Plataea.

For approximately five days the armies therefore confronted each other across the plain of Marathon, in stalemate. The flanks of the Athenian camp were protected either by a grove of trees, or an *abbatis* of stakes (depending on the exact reading). Since every day brought the arrival of the Spartans closer, the delay worked in favor of the Athenians. There were ten Athenian *strategoi* (generals) at Marathon, elected by each of the ten *tribes* that the Athenians were divided into; Miltiades was one of these. In addition, in overall charge, was the War-Archon (polemarch), Callimachus, who had been elected by the whole citizen body. Herodotus suggests that command rotated between the *strategoi*, each taking in turn a day to command the army. He further suggests that each *strategos*, on his day in command, instead deferred to Miltiades. In Herodotus's account, Miltiades is keen to attack the Persians (despite knowing that the Spartans are coming to aid the Athenians), but strangely, chooses to wait until his actual day of command to attack. This passage is undoubtedly problematic; the Athenians had little to gain by attacking before the Spartans arrived, and there is no real evidence of this rotating generalship. There does, however, seem to have been a delay between the Athenian arrival at Marathon, and the battle; Herodotus, who evidently believed that Miltiades was eager to attack, may have made a mistake whilst seeking to explain this delay.

As is discussed below, the reason for the delay was probably simply that neither the Athenians nor the Persians were willing to risk battle initially. This then raises the question of why the battle occurred when it did. Herodotus explicitly tells us that the Greeks attacked the Persians (and the other sources confirm this), but it is not clear why they did this before the arrival of the Spartans. There are two main theories to explain this.

The first theory is that the Persian cavalry left Marathon for an unspecified reason, and that the Greeks moved to take advantage of this by attacking. This theory is based on the absence of any mention of cavalry in Herodotus' account of the battle, and an entry in the Suda dictionary. The entry *χωρίς ἱ ππεῖ ς* ("without cavalry") is explained thus:

"The cavalry left. When Datis surrendered and was ready for retreat, the Ionians climbed the trees and gave the Athenians the signal that the cavalry had left. And when Miltiades realized that, he attacked and thus won. From

there comes the above-mentioned quote, which is used when someone breaks ranks before battle"
There are many variations of this theory, but perhaps the most prevalent is that the cavalry was re-embarked on the ships, and was to be sent by sea to attack (undefended) Athens in the rear, whilst the rest of the Persians pinned down the Athenian army at Marathon. This theory therefore utilises Herodotus' suggestion that after Marathon, the Persian army re-embarked and tried to sail around Cape Sounion to attack Athens directly; however, according to the first theory this attempt would have occurred *before* the battle (and indeed have triggered the battle).
The second theory is simply that the battle occurred because the Persians finally moved to attack the Athenians. Although this theory has the Persians moving to the *strategic* offensive, this can be reconciled with the traditional account of the Athenians attacking the Persians by assuming that, seeing the Persians advancing, the Athenians took the *tactical* offensive, and attacked them. Obviously, it cannot be firmly established which theory (if either) is correct. However, both theories imply that there was some kind of Persian activity which occurred on or about the fifth day which ultimately triggered the battle.

Date of the battle
Herodotus mentions for several events a date in the lunisolar calendar, of which each Greek city-state used a variant. Astronomical computation allows us to derive an absolute date in the proleptic Julian calendar which is much used by historians as the chronological frame. Philipp August Böckh in 1855 concluded that the battle took place on September 12, 490 BC in the Julian calendar, and this is the conventionally accepted date. However, this depends on when exactly the Spartans held their festival and it is possible that the Spartan calendar was one month ahead of that of Athens. In that case the battle took place on August 12, 490 BC.

Opposing forces

Athenians
Herodotus does not give a figure for the size of the Athenian army. However, Cornelius Nepos, Pausanias and Plutarch all give the figure of 9,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plateans; while Justin suggests that there were 10,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plataeans. These numbers are highly comparable to the number of troops Herodotus says that the Athenians and Plataeans sent to the Battle of Plataea 11 years later. Pausanias noticed on the monument to the battle the names of former slaves who were freed in exchange for military services. Modern historians generally accept these numbers as reasonable.

Persians
According to Herodotus, the fleet sent by Darius consisted of 600 triremes. Herodotus does not estimate the size of the Persian army, only saying that they were a "large infantry that was well packed". Among ancient sources, the poet Simonides, another near-contemporary, says the campaign force numbered 200,000; while a later writer, the Roman Cornelius Nepos estimates 200,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, of which only 100,000 fought in the battle, while the rest were loaded into the fleet that was rounding Cape Sounion; Plutarch and Pausanias both independently give 300,000, as does the Suda dictionary. Plato and Lysias give 500,000; and Justinus 600,000.
Modern historians have proposed wide ranging numbers for the infantry, from 20,000–100,000 with a consensus of perhaps 25,000; estimates for the cavalry are in the range of 1,000.

Strategic and tactical considerations

Persian infantry (probably Immortals), shown in a frieze in Darius's palace, Susa

From a strategic point of view, the Athenians had some disadvantages at Marathon. In order to face the Persians in battle, the Athenians had had to summon all available hoplites; and even then they were still probably outnumbered at least 2 to 1. Furthermore, raising such a large army had denuded Athens of defenders, and thus any secondary attack in the Athenian rear would cut the army off from the city; and any direct attack on the city could not be defended against. Still further, defeat at Marathon would mean the complete defeat of Athens, since no other Athenian army existed. The Athenian strategy was therefore to keep the Persian army pinned down at Marathon, blocking both exits from the plain, and thus

preventing themselves from being outmaneuvered. However, these disadvantages were balanced by some advantages. The Athenians initially had no need to seek battle, since they had managed to confine the Persians to the plain of Marathon. Furthermore, time worked in their favour, as every day brought the arrival of the Spartans closer. Having everything to lose by attacking, and much to gain by not attacking, the Athenians remained on the defensive in the run up to the battle. Tactically, hoplites were vulnerable to attacks by cavalry, and since the Persians had substantial numbers of cavalry, this made any offensive maneuver by the Athenians even more of a risk, and thus reinforced the defensive strategy of the Athenians.

The Persian strategy, on the other hand, was probably principally determined by tactical considerations. The Persian infantry was evidently lightly armoured, and no match for hoplites in a head-on confrontation (as would be demonstrated at the later battles of Thermopylae and Plataea.) Since the Athenians seem to have taken up a strong defensive position at Marathon, the Persian hesitance was probably a reluctance to attack the Athenians head-on.

Whatever event eventually triggered the battle, it obviously altered the strategic or tactical balance sufficiently to induce the Athenians to attack the Persians. If the first theory is correct, then the absence of cavalry removed the main Athenian tactical disadvantage, and the threat of being outflanked made it imperative to attack. Conversely, if the second theory is correct, then the Athenians were merely reacting to the Persians attacking them. Since the Persian force obviously contained a high proportion of missile troops, a static defensive position would have made little sense for the Athenians; the strength of the hoplite was in the melee, and the sooner that could be brought about, the better, from the Athenian point of view. If the second theory is correct, this raises the further question of why the Persians, having hesitated for several days, then attacked. There may have been several strategic reasons for this; perhaps they were aware (or suspected) that the Athenians were expecting reinforcements. Alternatively, since they may have felt the need to force some kind of victory – they could hardly remain at Marathon indefinitely.

Battle

The distance between the two armies at the point of battle had narrowed to "a distance not less than 8 stadia" or about 1,500 meters. Miltiades ordered the two tribes that were forming the center of the Greek formation, the Leontis tribe led by Themistocles and the Antiochis tribe led by Aristides, to be arranged in the depth of 4 ranks while the rest of the tribes at their flanks were in ranks of 8. Some modern commentators have suggested this was a deliberate ploy to encourage a double envelopment of the Persian centre. However, this supposes a level of training that the Greeks did not possess. There is little evidence for any such tactical thinking in Greek battles until Leuctra in 371 BC. It is therefore probable that this arrangement was made, possibly at the last moment, so that the Athenian line was as long as the Persian line, and would not therefore be outflanked.



First phase of the battle.



Second phase of the battle.

When the Athenian line was ready, according to one source, the simple signal to advance was given by Miltiades: "At them". Herodotus implies the Athenians ran the whole distance to the Persian lines, shouting their ululating war cry, "Ελελευ! Ελελευ!" ("Eleleu! Eleleu!"). It is doubtful that the Athenians ran the whole distance; in full armour this would be very difficult. More likely, they marched until they reached the limit of the archers' effectiveness, the "beaten zone", (roughly 200 meters), and then broke into a run towards their enemy. Another possibility is that they ran UP TO the 200 meter-mark in broken ranks, and then reformed for the march into battle from there. Herodotus suggests that this was the first time a Greek army ran into battle in this way; this was probably because it was the first time that a Greek army had faced an enemy composed primarily of missile troops. All this was evidently much to the surprise of the Persians; "...in their minds they charged the Athenians with madness which must be fatal, seeing that they were few and yet were pressing forwards at a run, having neither cavalry nor archers". Indeed, based on their previous experience of the

Greeks, the Persians might be excused for this; Herodotus tells us that the Athenians at Marathon were "first to endure looking at Median dress and men wearing it, for up until then just hearing the name of the Medes caused the Hellenes to panic". Passing through the hail of arrows launched by the Persian army, protected for the most part by their armour, the Greek line finally collided with the enemy army. Holland provides an evocative description:
"The enemy directly in their path...realised to their horror that the Athenians, far from providing the easy pickings for their bowmen, as they had first imagined, were not going to be halted...The impact was devastating. The Athenians had honed their style of fighting in combat with other phalanxes, wooden shields smashing against wooden shields, iron spear tips clattering against breastplates of bronze...in those first terrible seconds of collision, there was nothing but a pulverizing crash of metal into flesh and bone; then the rolling of the Athenian tide over men wearing, at most, quilted jerkins for protection, and armed, perhaps, with nothing more than bows or slings. The hoplites' ash spears, rather than shivering...could instead stab and stab again, and those of the enemy who avoided their fearful jabbing might easily be crushed to death beneath the sheer weight of the advancing men of bronze."
The Athenian wings quickly routed the inferior Persian levies on the flanks, before turning inwards to surround the Persian centre, which had been more successful against the thin Greek centre. The battle ended when the Persian centre then broke in panic towards their ships, pursued by the Greeks. Some, unaware of the local terrain, ran towards the swamps where unknown numbers drowned. The Athenians pursued the Persians back to their ships, and managed to capture seven ships, though the majority were able to successfully launch. Herodotus recounts the story that Cynaegirus, brother of the playwright Aeschylus, who was also among the fighters, charged into the sea, grabbed one Persian trireme, and started pulling it towards shore. A member of the crew saw him, cut off his hand, and Cynegirus died.
Herodotus records that 6,400 Persian bodies were counted on the battlefield, and it is unknown how many more perished in the swamps. The Athenians lost 192 men and the Plataeans 11. Among the dead were the war archon Callimachus and the general Stesilaos.

Aftermath

In the immediate aftermath of the battle, Herodotus says that the Persian fleet sailed around Cape Sounion to attack Athens directly. As has been discussed above, some modern historians place this attempt just before the battle. Either way, the Athenians evidently realised that their city was still under threat, and marched as quickly as possible back to Athens. The two tribes which had been in the centre of the Athenian line, stayed to guard the battlefield, under the command of Aristides. The Athenians arrived in time to prevent the Persians from securing a landing, and seeing that the opportunity was lost, the Persians turned about and returned to Asia. Connected with this episode, Herodotus recounts a rumour that this manoeuver by the Persians had been planned in conjunction with the Alcmaeonids, the prominent Athenian aristocratic family, and that a "shield-signal" had been given after the battle. Although many interpretations of this have been offered, it is impossible to tell whether this was true, and if so, what exactly the signal meant. On the next day, the Spartan army arrived at Marathon, having covered the 220 kilometers (140 miles) in only three days. The Spartans toured the battlefield at Marathon, and agreed that the Athenians had won great victory.

Hill where the Athenian dead were buried after the Battle of Marathon

The dead of Marathon were awarded by the Athenians the special honor of being the only ones who were buried where they died instead of the main Athenian cemetery at Keramikos. On the tomb of the Athenians this epigram composed by Simonides was written:
Ελλήνων προμαχούντες Αθηναίοι Μαραθώνι
χρυσοφόρων Μήδων εστόρεσαν δύναμιν
Fighting in the forefront of the Hellenes, the Athenians at Marathon
destroyed the might of the gold-bearing Medes.
In the meanwhile, Darius began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece. The epic second Persian invasion of Greece finally began in 480 BC, and the Persians met with initial success at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium. However, defeat at the Battle of Salamis would be the turning point in the campaign, and the next year the expedition was ended by the decisive Greek victory at the Battle of Plataea.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Marathon

Battle of Plataea

Engraving showing the view of Plataea from Mount Cithaeron

The **Battle of Plataea** (Greek: Μάχη τῶν Πλαταιῶν, *Machē tōn Plataiōn*) was the final land battle during the second Persian invasion of Greece. It took place in 479 BC near the city of Plataea in Boeotia, and was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states, including Sparta, Athens, Corinth and Megara, and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I.

The previous year, the Persian invasion force, led by the Persian king in person, had scored victories at the Battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium, and conquered Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica. However, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis, the Allied Greek navy had won an unlikely victory, and therefore prevented the conquest of the Peloponnesus. Xerxes then retreated with much of his army, leaving his general Mardonius to finish off the Greeks the following year.

In the summer of 479 BC, the Greeks assembled a huge army (by contemporary standards), and marched out of the Peloponnesus. The Persians retreated to Boeotia, and built a fortified camp near Plataea. The Greeks, however, refused to be drawn into the prime cavalry terrain around the Persian camp, resulting in a stalemate that lasted eleven days. However, whilst attempting a retreat after their supply lines were disrupted, the Greek battle-line fragmented. Thinking the Greeks in full retreat, Mardonius ordered his forces to pursue them, but the Greeks (particularly the Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians) halted and gave battle, routing the lightly armed Persian infantry and killing Mardonius.

A large portion of the Persian army was trapped in their camp, and slaughtered. The destruction of this army, and the remnants of the Persian navy, allegedly on the same day at the Battle of Mycale, decisively ended the invasion. After Plataea and Mycale, the Greek allies would take the offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars. Although Plataea was in every sense a decisive victory, it does not seem to have been attributed the same significance (even at the time) as, for example, the Athenian victory at the Battle of Marathon or even the Allied defeat at Thermopylae.

Background

The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499–494 BC. The Persian Empire was still relatively young, and prone to revolts amongst its subject peoples. Moreover, Darius was a usurper, and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his rule. The Ionian revolt threatened the integrity of his empire, and Darius thus vowed to punish those involved (especially those not already part of the empire). Darius also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece. A preliminary expedition under Mardonius, in 492 BC, to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the re-conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia. An amphibious task force was then sent out under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, successfully sacking Naxos and Eretria, before moving to attack Athens. However, at the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.

A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle

Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece. However, he died before the invasion could begin. The throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I, who quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece, including building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water as a gesture of their submission, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta (both of whom were at open war with Persia). Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed (hereafter referred to as 'the Allies'). This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since

many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other.

The Allies initially adopted a strategy of blocking the land and sea approaches to southern Greece. Thus, in August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small Allied army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by a mountain path. Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard, formed of the Spartan and Thespian contingents, was surrounded and annihilated. The simultaneous Battle of Artemisium, consisting of a series of naval encounters, was up to that point a stalemate; however, when news of Thermopylae reached them, they also retreated, since holding the straits of Artemisium was now a moot point.

Following Thermopylae, the Persian army had proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae; before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The Allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth. Xerxes wished for a final crushing defeat of the Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning season; conversely the allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy that would guarantee the security of the Peloponnese. The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict.



Movements of the Persian and Greek armies in 480–479 BC

Following the defeat of his navy at the Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with the bulk of the army. According to Herodotus, this was because he feared the Greeks would sail to the Hellespont and destroy the pontoon bridges, thereby trapping his army in Europe. He thus left Mardonius, with handpicked troops, to complete the conquest of Greece the following year. Mardonius evacuated Attica, and wintered in Thessaly; the Athenians then reoccupied their destroyed city. Over the winter, there seems to have been some tension between the Allies. In particular, the Athenians, who were not protected by the Isthmus, but whose fleet were the key to the security of the Peloponnese, felt hard done by, and demanded an allied army march north the following year. When the Allies failed to commit to this, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied navy in spring. The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, thus skulked off Delos, whilst the remnants of the Persian fleet skulked off Samos, both sides unwilling to risk battle. Similarly, Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless, whilst the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponnese.

Mardonius moved to break the stalemate by trying to win over the Athenians and their fleet through the mediation of Alexander I of Macedon, offering peace, self-government and territorial expansion. The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was also on hand to hear the offer, and rejected it:

The degree to which we are put in the shadow by the Medes' strength is hardly something you need to bring to our attention. We are already well aware of it. But even so, such is our love of liberty, that we will never surrender.

Upon this refusal, the Persians marched south again. Athens was again evacuated and left to the Persians. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis. Athens, along with Megara and Plataea, sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatening to accept the Persian terms if not. According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by a guest, Chileos of Tegea, who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered. When the Athenian emissaries delivered an ultimatum to the Spartans the next day, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in fact already *en route*; the Spartan army was marching to meet the Persians.

Prelude

When Mardonius learned of the Spartan force, he completed the destruction of Athens, tearing down whatever was standing. He then retreated towards Thebes, hoping to lure the Greek army into territory which would be suitable for the Persian cavalry. Mardonius created a fortified encampment on the north bank of the Asopus river in Boeotia, and waited for the Greeks.

The Athenians sent 8,000 hoplites, led by Aristides, along with 600 Plataean exiles, to join the Allied army. The army then marched in Boeotia across the passes of Mount Cithaeron, arriving near Plataea, and above the Persian position on the Asopus. Under the guidance of the commanding general, Pausanias, the Greeks took up position opposite the Persian lines, but remained on high ground. Knowing that he had little hope of successfully attacking the Greek positions, Mardonius sought to either sow dissension amongst the Allies, or lure them down into the plain. Plutarch reports that a conspiracy was discovered amongst some prominent Athenians, who were planning to betray the Allied cause; although this account

is not universally accepted, it may indicate Mardonius's attempts to intrigue with the Greeks.



The initial movements at the Battle of Plataea. The Greek line moves forward to the Asopus ridge.

Mardonius also sent hit-and-run cavalry attacks against the Greek lines, possibly trying to lure the Greeks down to the plain in pursuit. Although initially having some success, this strategy backfired when the cavalry commander Masistius was killed, whereupon the cavalry retreated.

Their morale boosted by this small victory, the Greeks moved forward, still remaining on higher ground, to a new position nearer Mardonius's camp. The Spartans and Tegeans were on a ridge to the right of the line, the Athenians on a hillock on the left, and the other contingents on the slightly lower ground between. In response Mardonius brought his men up to the Asopus, and arrayed them for battle. However, both sides refused to attack; Herodotus claims this is because both sides received bad omens during sacrificial rituals. The armies thus stayed camped in their present locations for 8 days, and all the while new Greek troops arrived. Mardonius then sought to break the stalemate by sending his cavalry to attack the passes of Mount Cithaeron; this raid resulted in the capture of a convoy of provisions intended for the Greeks. Two further days passed, during which time the supply lines of the Greeks continued to be menaced. Mardonius then launched a further cavalry raid on the Greek lines, which succeeded in blocking the Gargaphian Spring, which had been the only source of water for the Greek army (they could not use the Asopus due to the threat posed by the Persian archers).[36] Coupled with the lack of food, the restriction of the water supply made the Greek position untenable, so they decided to retreat to a position in front of Plataea, from where they could guard the passes and have access to fresh water.[37] To prevent the Persian cavalry attacking the retreat, it was to be performed that night.

However, the retreat went badly awry. The Allied contingents in the centre missed their appointed position, and ended up scattered in front of Plataea itself.[30] The Athenians, Tegeans and Spartans, who had been guarding the rear of the retreat, had not even begun to retreat by daybreak.[30] A single Spartan division was thus left on the ridge to guard the rear, whilst the Spartans and Tegeans retreated uphill; Pausanias also instructed the Athenians to begin the retreat and if possible to join up with the Spartans.[3038] However, the Athenians at first retreated directly towards Plataea,[38] and thus the Allied battle line remained fragmented as the Persian camp began to stir.[30]

The opposing forces

The Greeks

According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men; 5,000 Spartiates (full citizen soldiers), 5,000 other Lacodaemonian hoplites (perioeci) and 35,000 helots (seven per Spartiate).[29] This was probably the largest Spartan force ever assembled.[30] The Greek army had been reinforced by contingents of hoplites from the other Allied city-states, as shown in the table.

According to Herodotus, there were a total of 69,500 lightly armed troops; 35,000 helots,[39] and 34,500 troops from the rest of Greece; roughly one per hoplite.[39] The number of 34,500 has been suggested to represent 1 light troop supporting each non-Spartan hoplite (33,700), together with 800 Athenian archers, whose presence in the battle Herodotus later notes.[40] Herodotus also tells us that there were also 1,800 Thespians (but not how they were equipped), giving a total strength of 110,000 men.[41]

The number of hoplites is accepted as reasonable (and possible); the Athenians alone had fielded 10,000 hoplites at the Battle of Marathon.[30] Some historians have accepted the number of light troops and used them as a population census of Greece at the time. Certainly these numbers are theoretically possible. Athens, for instance, allegedly fielded a fleet of 180 triremes at Salamis,[42] manned by approximately 36,000 rowers.[43] Thus 69,500 light troops could easily have been sent to Plataea. Nevertheless, the number of light troops is often rejected as exaggerated, especially in view of the ratio of 7 helots to 1 Spartiate.[30] For instance, Lazenby accepts that hoplites from other Greek cities might have been accompanied by 1 lightly armoured retainer each, but rejects the number of 7 helots per Spartiate.[44] He further speculates that each Spartiate was accompanied by 1 armed helot, and the remaining helots were employed in the logistical effort, transporting food for the army.[44] Both Lazenby and Holland deem the lightly armed troops, whatever their number, as essentially irrelevant to the outcome of battle.[4445]

A further complication is that a certain proportion of Allied manpower was needed to man the fleet, which amounted to at least 110 triremes, and thus approximately 22,000 men.[46] Since the Battle of Mycale was fought at least near-simultaneously with the Battle of Plataea, then this was a pool of manpower which could not have contributed to Plataea, and further reduces the likelihood that 110,000 Greeks assembled before Plataea.[47]

The Greek forces were, as agreed by the Allied congress, under the overall command of Spartan Royalty in the person of Pausanias. Pausanias was the regent for Leonidas's young son, Pleistarchus, his cousin. Diodorus tells us that the Athenian contingent was under the command of Aristides;[48] it is probable that the other

contingents also had their leader. Herodotus tells us in several places that the Greeks held council during the prelude to the battle, implying that decisions were consensual, and that Pausanias did not have the authority to issue direct orders to the other contingents.[3337] This style of leadership contributed to the way events unfolded during the battle itself. For instance, in the period immediately before the battle, Pausanias was unable to order the Athenians to join up with his forces, and thus the Greeks fought the battle completely separated from each other.

The Persians

1780s map of Battle

According to Herodotus, the Persians numbered 300,000 and were accompanied by troops from Greek city states which supported the Persian cause (including Thebes).[50] Herodotus admits that no-one counted the latter, so he guesses that there were 50,000 of them.[50]

Ctesias, who wrote a history of Persia based on Persian archives, claimed there were 120,000 Persian and 7,000 Greek soldiers, but his account is generally garbled (for instance, placing this battle before Salamis, he also says there were only 300 Spartans, 1000 perioeci, and 6000 from the other cities at Plataea, perhaps confusing it with Thermopylae).

The figure of 300,000 has been doubted, along with many of Herodotus's numbers, by many historians; modern consensus estimates the total number of troops for the Persian invasion at around 250,000.[52] According to this consensus, Herodotus's 300,000 Persians at Plataea would self-evidently be impossible. One approach to estimating the size of the Persian army has been to estimate how many men might feasibly have been accommodated within the Persian camp; this approach gives figures of between 70,000 and 120,000 men.[45] Lazenby, for instance, by comparison with later Roman military camps calculates a number of 70,000 troops, including 10,000 cavalry.[44] Meanwhile, Connolly derives a number of 120,000 from the same sized camp.[53] Indeed, most estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range.[545556] For instance, Delbrück, based on the distance the Persians marched in a day when Athens was attacked, concluded that 75,000 was the upper limit for the size of the army.

Strategic and tactical considerations

In some ways, the run-up to Plataea resembled that at the Battle of Marathon; there was a prolonged stalemate in which neither side risked attacking the other.[30] The reasons for this stalemate were primarily tactical, and similar to the situation at Marathon; the Greek hoplites did not want to risk being outflanked by the Persian cavalry, and the lightly armed Persian infantry could not hope to assault well defended positions.

According to Herodotus, both sides wished for a decisive battle which would tip the war in their favour.[3058] However, Lazenby believed that Mardonius's actions during the Plataea campaign were not consistent with an aggressive policy.[57] He interprets the Persian operations during the prelude not as attempts to force the Allies into battle, but as attempts to force the Allies into retreat (which indeed became the case).[59] Mardonius may have felt he had little to gain in battle, and that he could simply wait for the Greek alliance to fall apart (as it had nearly done over the winter).[57] There can be little doubt from Herodotus's account that Mardonius was prepared to accept battle on his own terms however. Regardless of the exact motives, the initial strategic situation allowed both sides to procrastinate, since food supplies were in ample supply for both armies.[3058] Under these conditions, the tactical considerations outweighed the strategic need for action.

When Mardonius's raids disrupted the Allied supply chain, it forced a strategic rethink on the part of the Allies. Rather than now moving to attack, however, they instead looked to retreat and secure their lines of communication.[37] Despite this defensive move from the Greeks, it was in fact the chaos resulting from this retreat which finally ended the stalemate. Mardonius perceived this as a full-on retreat, in effect thinking that the battle was already over, and sought to pursue the Greeks.[60] Since he did not expect the Greeks to fight, the tactical problems were no longer an issue, and he tried to take advantage of the altered strategic situation he thought he had produced.[30] Conversely, the Greeks had, inadvertently, lured Mardonius into attacking them on the higher ground and, despite being outnumbered, were thus at a tactical advantage.

The Battle

Once the Persians discovered that the Greeks had abandoned their positions, and appeared to be in retreat, Mardonius decided to set off in immediate pursuit with the elite Persian infantry.[62] As he did so, the rest of the Persian army, unbidden, also began to move forward.[62] The Spartans and Tegeans had by now reached the Temple of Demeter.[63] The rearguard under Amompharetus began to withdraw from the ridge, under pressure from Persian cavalry, to join them.[63] Pausanias sent a messenger to the Athenians, asking them to join up with the Spartans.[49] However, the Athenians had been engaged by the Theban phalanx, and unable to assist Pausanias.[63] The Spartans and Tegeans were first assaulted by the Persian cavalry,[49] whilst the Persian infantry made their way forward. The Persian infantry then planted their shields and began

shooting arrows at the Greeks, whilst the cavalry withdrew.



The main battle at Plataea. The Greek retreat becomes disorganised, and the Persians cross the Asopus to attack

According to Herodotus, Pausanias refused to advance, because good omens were not divined in the goat-sacrifices that were performed.[64] At this point, as men began to fall under the barrage of arrows, the Tegeans started to run at the Persian lines.[64] Offering one last sacrifice and a prayer to the heavens, Pausanias finally received favourable omens, and gave the command for the Spartans to advance, whereupon they too charged the Persian lines.[65]

The numerically superior Persian infantry were of the heavy (by Persian standards) sparabara formation, but this was still much lighter than the Greek phalanx.[66] The Persian defensive weapon was a large wicker shield, and they used short spears; by contrast the hoplites were armoured in bronze, with a bronze shield and a long spear.[63] As at Marathon, it was a severe mismatch.[6567] The fight was fierce and long, but the Greeks continued to push into the Persian lines.[63] The Persians tried to break the Greeks' spears by grabbing hold of them, but the Greeks were able to use their swords instead.[65] Mardonius was present at the scene, riding a white horse, and surrounded by a bodyguard of 1,000 men, and whilst he remained, the Persians stood their ground.[66] However, the Spartans closed in on Mardonius, and a stone thrown by the Spartan Aeimnestus hit him in the head, killing him.[68] With Mardonius dead, the Persians began to flee, although his bodyguard remained and were annihilated.[63] Quickly the rout became general, with many Persians fleeing in disorder to their camp.[67] However, Artabazus (who had earlier commanded the Sieges of Olynthus and Potidea), had disagreed with Mardonius about attacking the Greeks,[60] and he had not fully engaged the forces under his command.[69] As the rout commenced, he led these men (40,000 according to Herodotus) away from the battle field, on the road to Thessaly, hoping to escape eventually to the Hellespont.[69]

On the opposite side of the battle field, the Athenians had triumphed in a tough battle against the Thebans.[70] The other Greeks fighting for the Persians had deliberately fought badly, according to Herodotus.[70] The Thebans retreated from the battle, but in a different direction from the Persians, allowing them to escape without further losses.[71] The Allied Greeks, reinforced by the contingents who had not taken part in the main battle, then stormed the Persian camp.[6372] Although the Persians initially defended the wall vigorously, it was eventually breached; and the Persians, packed tightly together in the camp, were slaughtered by the Greeks.[73] Of the Persians who had retreated to the camp, scarcely 3,000 were left alive.[73]

According to Herodotus, only 43,000 Persians survived the battle.[73] The number who died of course depends on how many there were in the first place; there would be 257,000 dead by Herodotus's reckoning. Herodotus claims that the Greeks as a whole lost only 159 men.[73] Furthermore, he claims that only Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians died, since they were the only ones who fought.[73] Plutarch, who had access to other sources, gives 1,360 Greek casualties,[74] while both Ephorus and Diodorus Siculus tally the Greek casualties to over 10,000.[75]

edit Accounts of individuals

Herodotus recounts several anecdotes about the conduct of specific Spartans during the battle.

- **Amompharetus** - The leader of a battalion of Spartans, he refused to undertake the night-time retreat towards Plataea before the battle, since doing so would be shameful for a Spartan.[76] Herodotus has an angry debate continuing between Pausanias and Amompharetus until dawn, whereupon the rest of the Spartan army finally began to retreat, leaving Amompharetus's division behind.[77] Not expecting this, Amompharetus eventually led his men after the retreating Spartans.[78] However, another tradition remembers Amompharetus as winning great renown at Plataea, and it has thus been suggested that Amompharetus, far from being insubordinate, had instead volunteered to guard the rear.[63]
- **Aristodemus** - the lone Spartan survivor of the slaughter of the 300 at the Battle of Thermopylae, he had, with a fellow Spartiate, been dismissed from the army by Leonidas I because of an eye infection. However, his colleague had insisted on being led into battle, partially blind, by a helot.[79] Preferring to return to Sparta, Aristodemus was branded a coward, and suffered a year of reproach before Plataea.[63] Anxious to redeem his name, he charged the Persian lines by himself, killing in a savage fury before being killed.[80] Although the Spartans agreed that he had redeemed himself, they awarded him no special honour, because he failed to fight in the disciplined manner expected of a Spartan.[63]
- **Callicrates** - Considered the "most beautiful man, not among the Spartans only, but in the whole Greek camp" Callicrates was eager to distinguish himself that day as a warrior but was deprived of the chance by a stray arrow that pierced his side

while standing in formation. When the battle commenced he insisted on making the charge with the rest but collapsed within a short distance. His last words, according to Herodotus, were "I grieve not because I have to die for my country, but because I have not lifted my arm against the enemy."

Aftermath

Greek hoplite and Persian warrior depicted fighting on an ancient kylix. 5th c. BC

According to Herodotus, the Battle of Mycale occurred on the same afternoon as Plataea. A Greek fleet under the Spartan king Leotychides had sailed to Samos to challenge the remnants of the Persian fleet.[82] The Persians, whose ships were in a poor state of repair, had decided not to risk fighting, and instead drew their ships up on the beach at the feet of Mount Mycale in Ionia. An army of 60,000 men had been left there by Xerxes, and the fleet joined with them, building a palisade around the camp to protect the ships.[82] However, Leotychides decided to attack the camp with the Allied fleet's marines.[83] Seeing the small size of the Greek force, the Persians emerged from the camp, but the Greek hoplites again proved superior, and destroyed much of the Persian force.[83] The ships were abandoned to the Greeks, who burnt them, crippling Xerxes' sea power, and marking the ascendancy of the Greek fleet.[83]

With the twin victories of Plataea and Mycale, the second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover, the threat of future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried that Xerxes would try again, over time it became apparent that the Persian desire to conquer Greece was much diminished.[84]

The remnants of the Persian army, under the command of Artabazus, tried to retreat back to Asia Minor. Travelling through the lands of Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace by the shortest road, Artabazus eventually made it back to Byzantium, though losing many men to Thracian attacks, weariness and hunger.[85] After the victory at Mycale, the Allied fleet sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this was already done.[86] The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held by the Persians.[86] The Persians in the region, and their allies, made for Sestos, the strongest town in the region, and the Athenians laid siege to them there. After a protracted siege, Sestos fell to the Athenians, marking the beginning of a new phase in the Greco-Persian Wars, the Greek counterattack.[87] Herodotus ended his *Histories* after the Siege of Sestos. Over the next 30 years, the Greeks, primarily the Athenian-dominated Delian League, would expel (or help expel) the Persians from Macedon, Thrace, the Aegean islands and Ionia.[87] Peace with Persia finally came in 449 BC with the Peace of Callias, finally ending the half-century of warfare.

Significance

Plataea and Mycale have great significance in ancient history as the battles which decisively ended the second Persian invasion of Greece, thereby swinging the balance of the Greco-Persian Wars in favour of the Greeks.They kept Persia from conquering all of Europe, although they paid a high price by losing most of their men.[87] The Battle of Marathon showed that the Persians *could* be defeated, and the Battle of Salamis saved Greece from immediate conquest, but it was Plataea and Mycale which effectively ended that threat.[87] However, neither of these battles is nearly as well-known as Thermopylae, Salamis or Marathon.[88] The reason for this discrepancy is not entirely clear; it might however be a result of the circumstances in which the battle was fought. The fame of Thermopylae certainly lies in the doomed heroism of the Greeks in the face of overwhelming numbers;[89] and Marathon and Salamis perhaps because they were both fought against the odds, and in dire strategic situations. Conversely, the Battles of Plataea and Mycale were both fought from a relative position of Greek strength, and against lesser odds; the Greeks in fact sought out battle on both occasions.[2387] Militarily, the major lesson of both Plataea and Mycale (since both were fought on land) was to re-emphasise the superiority of the hoplite over the more-lightly armed Persian infantry, as had first been demonstrated at Marathon.[84] Taking on this lesson, after the Greco-Persian Wars the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries.[90] One such mercenary expedition, the "Anabasis of the 10,000" as narrated by Xenophon, further proved to the Greeks that the Persians were militarily vulnerable even well within their own territory, and paved the way for the destruction of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great some decades later.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Plataea

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