
American
Civil War
WARHAMMER HISTORICAL

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD

INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL RULES

CHARACTERS EQUIPMENT
Characters may have the equipment of the unit they join at the start of the battle (free). Any additional equipment available for that unit can also be taken but the points are doubled which have to be paid for the character.

DRAGOONS
- counts as Light Infantry/Cavalry mixture with a movement rate of 8
- fear formed units
- cannot charge formed enemy units in the front

CANISTER SHOT
If not fired last turn a cannon is able to choose stand and shoot as charge reaction with a canister shot at the charger. In such a case roll the artillery dice for how many S4 hits the enemy unit get.

CARBINES
- range 16", S3, save modifier -1
- mounted troops (except Dragoons) may not move and shoot

ELITE
Can re-roll failed panic tests caused by friendly non-elite units.

ENTRENCHMENT (100pts soft, 200pts hard)
The player can field an obstacle (hard or soft cover) within his deployment zone before deployment, with a length of up to 16".

FIELD GUN (75pts)
(See rulesbook page 130). Each machine has a four man crew.

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Crew	**4**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**1**	**7**	**-**
Canon	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**7**	**3**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**75**

Equipment: Hand weapon.
The crew may have light armour (+6).
Range 48", S7, no save, D6 wounds per hit
Special Rules: *Cannon*

GALLOPPER GUN (60pts)
Count as *Light Cannon* with M8.

HOWITZER (100pts)
Count as *Stone Thrower*, see rulesbook page.126

LIGHT CANNON (50pts)
(See rulesbook page 130). Each machine has a three man crew.

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Crew	**4**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**1**	**7**	**-**
Canon	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**6**	**3**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**50**

Equipment: Hand weapon. The crew may have light armour (+6).
Range 36", S6, no save, D6 wounds per hit
Special Rules: *Cannon*

LINE INFANTRY
- count as open order
- no rank bonus
- able to perform an order
- able to reform into a *Square*
- can choose to reform as charge reaction, Ld-test needed, -1 if attacked in flank, -2 in rear
- in case they are charged in the flank and a *Battalion Gun* is attached, simply ignore the gun and it's crew

LINE CAVALRY
- count as open order
- may add rank bonus up to +1
- able to perform an order

LINE OR LIGHT
Units with this rule can change the troop type per reform. They also can reform from Skirmishers to Line Infantry and vice versa. Can perform *Orders* all the time.

ORDERS
Each character model enables one line infantry or line cavalry unit with a successful Ld-test to have extra movement or a reform before the normal movement phase. The extra movement does include a march move. In case the Ld-test of the unit is not successful the unit have to remain stationary for this turn, is not able to shoot and count as moved. Range: Division General 18", Brigade General 12", Officer 6" (also Ld)

PISTOLS
- range 12", S3, save modifier -1
- models armed with pistols count as armed with an additional hand weapon in melee
- cavalry armed with pistols may fire twice per turn, 180° arc of sight
- do not suffer penalties for move&shoot or long range

REDOUBT
The unit is covered with 1" earthwork at front and both flanks, which counts as hard cover. It remains stationary orhave to turn and leave the redoubt by manoeuvre or if fleeing. Must be deployed first.

RIFLE
- range 24", S3, S4 at short range (with minie also at long range)
- two ranks may shoot (salvoe), but suffer a -1 to hit, enemy units have to make a panic test immediately if they have casualties

SQUARE
Line Infantry units of at least 18 models may reform into a Square with 4 models per side looking in the same direction. This formation is useful in case of a charge from a cavalry unit. A Square don't has a flank or rear, can stand and shoot as charge reaction at unengaged sides and against cavalry it negates Ferocious Charge. A unit in square formation is not allowed to pursue. Additional models are placed in the center. As soon as the unit has less than 18 models the Square is canceled and the normal formation takes place immedately.



UNITS
All units may have a leader, standard and musician for 5pts each.
All limits for units (like 0-1) are written for armies of 2000 points or less. If you play with armies that have more points simply take those units as 0-1 for each 2000 points e.g.. Always round down if you have an odd number. Exception is the wagon tabor which is 0-1 regardless of size.

VETERANS
Additional to the rule they can re-roll failed panic tests caused by missles.

WAGON TABOR
See WAB Errata for details:
http://warhammer-historical.com/PDF/WAB2%20Errata.pdf

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The **American Civil War** (1861–1865) was a civil war in the United States of America. Eleven Southern slave states declared their secession from the United States and formed the Confederate States of America, also known as "the Confederacy". Led by Jefferson Davis, the Confederacy fought for its independence from the United States. The U.S. federal government was supported by twenty mostly-Northern free states in which slavery already had been abolished, and by five slave states that became known as the border states. These twenty-five states, referred to as the Union, had a much larger base of population and industry than the South. After four years of bloody, devastating warfare (mostly within the Southern states), the Confederacy surrendered and slavery was outlawed everywhere in the nation. The restoration of the Union, and the Reconstruction Era that followed, dealt with issues that remained unresolved for generations.

In the presidential election of 1860, the Republican Party, led by Abraham Lincoln, had campaigned against the expansion of slavery beyond the states in which it already existed. The Republicans were strong advocates of nationalism and in their 1860 platform explicitly denounced threats of disunion as avowals of treason. After a Republican victory, but before the new administration took office on March 4, 1861, seven cotton states declared their secession and joined together to form the Confederate States of America. Both the outgoing administration of President James Buchanan and the incoming administration rejected the legality of secession, considering it rebellion. The other eight slave states rejected calls for secession at this point. No country in the world recognized the Confederacy.

Hostilities began on April 12, 1861, when Confederate forces attacked a U.S. military installation at Fort Sumter in South Carolina. Lincoln responded by calling for a volunteer army from each state to recapture federal property. This led to declarations of secession by four more slave states. Both sides raised armies as the Union seized control of the border states early in the war and established a naval blockade that virtually ended cotton sales on which the South depended for its wealth, and blocked most imports. Land warfare in the East was inconclusive in 1861–62, as the Confederacy beat back Union efforts to capture its capital, Richmond, Virginia. In September 1862, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation made ending slavery in the South a war goal,[2] and dissuaded the British from intervening.[3]

Confederate commander Robert E. Lee won battles in Virginia, but in 1863 his northward advance was turned back with heavy casualties after the Battle of Gettysburg. To the west, the Union gained control of the Mississippi River after their capture of Vicksburg, Mississippi, thereby splitting the Confederacy in two. The Union was able to capitalize on its long-term advantages in men and materiel by 1864 when Ulysses S. Grant fought battles of attrition against Lee, while Union general William Tecumseh Sherman captured Atlanta and marched to the sea. Confederate resistance ended after Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865.

The American Civil War was one of the earliest true industrial wars. Railroads, the telegraph, steamships, and mass-produced weapons were employed extensively. The practices of total war, developed by Sherman in Georgia, and of trench warfare around Petersburg foreshadowed World War I in Europe. It remains the deadliest war in American history, resulting in the deaths of 620,000 soldiers and an undetermined number of civilian casualties. According to John Huddleston, "Ten percent of all Northern males 20–45 years of age died, as did 30 percent of all Southern white males aged 18–40."[4] Victory for the North meant the end of the Confederacy and of slavery in the United States, and strengthened the role of the federal government. The social, political, economic and racial issues of the war decisively shaped the reconstruction era that lasted to 1877.

Sourc: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Civil_War

Eastern Theater



President Lincoln visiting the Army of the Potomac at the Antietam battlefield, September 1862. Photo by Alexander Gardner.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD

Theater of operations

The Eastern Theater included the states of Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and the coastal fortifications and seaports of North Carolina. (Operations in the interior of the Carolinas in 1865 are considered part of the Western Theater.)

The Eastern Theater included the campaigns that are generally most famous in the history of the war, if not for their strategic significance, but for their proximity to the large population centers, the major newspapers, and the capital cities of the opposing parties. The imaginations of both Northerners and Southerners were captured by the epic struggles between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under Robert E. Lee, and the Union Army of the Potomac, under a series of less successful commanders. The bloodiest battle of the war (Gettysburg) and the bloodiest single day of the war (Antietam) were both fought in this theater. The capitals of Washington, D.C., and Richmond were both attacked or besieged. It has been argued that the Western Theater was more strategically important in defeating the Confederacy, but it is inconceivable that the civilian populations of both sides could have considered the war to be at an end without the resolution of Lee's surrender at Appomattox Courthouse in 1865.

The theater was bounded by the Appalachian Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. By far, the majority of battles occurred in the 100 miles between the cities of Washington and Richmond. This terrain favored the Confederate defenders because a series of rivers ran primarily west to east, making them obstacles rather than avenues of approach and lines of communication for the Union. This was quite different than the early years of the Western theater, and since the Union Army had to rely solely on the primitive road system of the era for its primary transportation, it limited winter campaigning for both sides. The Union advantage was control of the sea and major rivers, which would allow an army that stayed close to the ocean to be reinforced and supplied.

The campaign classification established by the United States National Park Service[1] is more fine-grained than the one used in this article. Some minor NPS campaigns have been omitted and some have been combined into larger categories. Only a few of the 160 battles the NPS classifies for this theater are described. Boxed text in the right margin show the NPS campaigns associated with each section.

Principal commanders of the Eastern Theater


Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, USA


Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, USA


Maj. Gen. John Pope, USA


Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, USA


Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, USA


Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, USA


Gen. Robert E. Lee, CSA


Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, CSA


Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, CSA


Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, CSA


Lt. Gen. Stonewall Jackson, CSA


Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early, CSA

Early operations (1861)

After the fall of Fort Sumter in April 1861, both sides scrambled to create armies. President Abraham Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the rebellion, which immediately caused the secession of four additional states, including Virginia. The United States Army had only around 16,000 men, with more than half spread out in the West. The army was commanded by the elderly Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, veteran of the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War. On the Confederate side, only a handful of Federal officers and men resigned and joined the Confederacy; the formation of the Confederate States Army was a matter initially undertaken by the individual states. (The decentralized nature of the Confederate defenses, encouraged by the states' distrust of a strong central government, was one of the disadvantages suffered by the South during the war.)

Some of the first hostilities occurred in western Virginia (now the state of West Virginia). Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commanding the Department of the Ohio, ordered troops to march from Grafton and attack the Confederates under Col. George A. Porterfield. The skirmish on June 3, 1861, known as the Battle of Philippi, or the "Philippi Races", had little significance other than to raise public awareness of the young general. His victory at the Battle of Rich Mountain in July was instrumental in his promotion that fall to command the Army of the Potomac. As the campaign continued through a series of minor battles, General Robert E. Lee, who, despite his excellent reputation as a former U.S. Army colonel, had no combat command experience, gave a lackluster performance that earned him the derogatory nickname "Granny Lee". He was soon transferred to the Carolinas to construct fortifications.

The first significant battle of the war took place in eastern Virginia on June 10. Union Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, based at Fort Monroe, sent converging columns from Hampton and Newport News against advanced Confederate outposts. At Big Bethel, near Fort Monroe, Colonel John B. Magruder won the first Confederate victory.

First Bull Run (First Manassas)

In early summer, the commander of Union field forces around Washington was Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, an inexperienced combat officer in command of volunteer soldiers with even less experience. Many of them had enlisted for only 90 days, a period soon to expire. McDowell was pressured by politicians and major newspapers in the North to take immediate action, exhorting him "On to Richmond!" His plan was to march with 35,000 men and attack the 20,000 Confederates under Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas. The second major Confederate force in the area, 12,000 men under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley, was to be held in place by Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson with 18,000 men menacing Harpers Ferry, preventing the two Confederate armies from combining against McDowell.

On July 21, McDowell's Army of Northeast Virginia executed a complex turning movement against Beauregard's Confederate Army of the Potomac, beginning the First Battle of Bull Run (also known as First Manassas). Although the Union troops enjoyed an early advantage and drove the Confederates back, the battle advantage turned that afternoon. Col. Thomas J. Jackson inspired his Virginia brigade to withstand a strong Union attack, and he received his famous nickname, "Stonewall" Jackson. Timely reinforcements arrived by railroad from Johnston's army; Patterson had been ineffective in keeping them occupied. The inexperienced Union soldiers began to fall back, and it turned into a panicky retreat, with many running almost as far as Washington, D.C. Civilian and political observers, some of whom had treated the battle as festive entertainment, were caught up in the panic. The army returned safely to Washington; Beauregard's army was too tired and inexperienced to launch a pursuit. The Union defeat at First Bull Run shocked the North, and a new sense of grim determination swept the United States as military and civilians alike realized that they would need to invest significant money and manpower to win a protracted, bloody war.

George B. McClellan was summoned east in August to command the newly forming Army of the Potomac, which would become the principal army of the Eastern Theater. As a former railroad executive, he possessed outstanding organizational skills well-suited to the tasks of training and

administration. He was also strongly ambitious, and by November 1, he had maneuvered around Winfield Scott and was named general-in-chief of all the Union armies, despite the embarrassing defeat of an expedition he sent up the Potomac River at the Battle of Balls Bluff in October.

North Carolina coast (1861–65)

North Carolina was an important area to the Confederacy because of the vital seaport of Wilmington and because the Outer Banks were valuable bases for ships attempting to evade the Union blockade. Benjamin Butler sailed from Fort Monroe and captured the batteries at Hatteras Inlet in August 1861. In February 1862, Brig. Gen. Ambrose Burnside organized an amphibious expedition, also from Fort Monroe, that captured Roanoke Island, a little-known but important Union strategic victory. The Goldsboro Expedition in late 1862 marched briefly inland from the coast to destroy railroad tracks and bridges.

The remainder of operations on the North Carolina coast began in late 1864, with Benjamin Butler's and David D. Porter's failed attempt to capture Fort Fisher, which guarded the seaport of Wilmington. Union forces at the Second Battle of Fort Fisher, led by Alfred H. Terry, Adelbert Ames, and Porter, in January 1865, were successful in defeating Gen. Braxton Bragg, and Wilmington fell in February. During this period, the Western Theater armies of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman were marching up the interior of the Carolinas, where they eventually forced the surrender of the last major Confederate field army, under Joseph E. Johnston, in late April 1865.

The Valley (1862)



Valley Campaign: Kernstown to McDowell.

In the spring of 1862, Confederate exuberance over First Bull Run declined quickly, following the early successes of the Union armies in the Western Theater, such as Fort Donelson and Shiloh. George B. McClellan's massive Army of the Potomac was approaching Richmond from the southeast in the Peninsula Campaign, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's large corps was poised to hit Richmond from the north, and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's army threatened the rich agricultural area of the Shenandoah Valley.

Valley Campaign: Front Royal to Port Republic.

To the rescue of Southern morale came an eccentric former professor at VMI, Stonewall Jackson, bearing his nickname earned at First Bull Run. His command included the Stonewall Brigade and a variety of militia units insufficient for offensive operations. While Banks remain north of the Potomac River, Jackson's cavalry commander, Col. Turner Ashby, raided the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Banks reacted by crossing the Potomac in late February and moving south to protect the canal and railroad from Ashby. Jackson's command was operating as the left wing of Joseph E. Johnston's army, and when Johnston moved from Manassas to Culpeper in March, Jackson's position at Winchester was isolated. On March 12, Banks continued his advance to the southwest ("up the Valley") and occupied Winchester. Jackson had withdrawn to Strasburg. Banks's orders, as part of McClellan's overall strategy, were to move farther south and drive Jackson from the Valley. After accomplishing this, he was to withdraw to a position nearer Washington. A strong advance force began the movement south from Winchester on March 17, about the same time that McClellan began his amphibious movement to the Virginia Peninsula.

Jackson's orders from Johnston were to avoid general combat because he was seriously outnumbered, but at the same time he was to keep Banks occupied enough to prevent the detachment of troops to reinforce McClellan on the Peninsula. Receiving incorrect intelligence, Banks concluded that Jackson had left the Valley, and he proceeded to move east, back to the vicinity of Washington. Jackson was dismayed at this movement because Banks was doing exactly what Jackson had been directed to prevent.

At the First Battle of Kernstown (March 23, 1862), the Federals stopped Jackson's advance and then counterattacked, turning his left flank and forcing him to retreat, his only defeat during the campaign. Although a tactical defeat for Jackson, it was a strategic victory for the Confederacy, forcing President Lincoln to keep Banks's forces in the Valley and McDowell's 30,000-man corps near Fredericksburg, subtracting about 50,000 soldiers from McClellan's Peninsula invasion force.

Jackson, now reinforced to 17,000 men, decided to attack the Union forces piecemeal rather than waiting for them to combine and overwhelm him. While marching on a devious route to mask his intentions, he was attacked at the Battle of McDowell on May 8 but was able to repulse the Union army after severe fighting. Banks sent a division to reinforce Irvin McDowell's forces at Fredericksburg, leaving Banks only 8,000 troops, which he relocated to a strong position at Strasburg, Virginia.

On May 21, Jackson marched his command east from New Market and proceeded northward. Their speed of forced marching was typical of the campaign and earned his infantrymen the nickname of "Jackson's foot cavalry". He sent his horse cavalry directly north to make Banks think that he was going to attack Strasburg, but his plan was to defeat the small outpost at Front Royal and quickly attack Banks's line of communication at Harpers Ferry.

On May 23, at the Battle of Front Royal, Jackson's army surprised and overran the pickets of the 1,000-man Union garrison. Jackson's victory forced Banks at Strasburg into a rapid retreat towards Winchester. Although Jackson attempted to pursue, his troops were exhausted and looted Union supply trains, slowing them down immensely. On May 25, at the First Battle of Winchester, Banks's army was attacked by converging Confederate columns and was soundly defeated. They withdrew north across the Potomac River. Jackson attempted pursuit but was unsuccessful.

In Washington, President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton decided that the defeat of Jackson was an immediate priority (even though Jackson's orders were solely to keep Union forces occupied away from Richmond). They ordered Irvin McDowell to send 20,000 men to Front Royal and Frémont to move to Harrisonburg. If both forces could converge at Strasburg, Jackson's only escape route up the Valley would be cut. The immediate repercussion of this move was to abort McDowell's coordinated attack with McClellan on Richmond.

On June 2, two columns of Union forces pursued Jackson. His army took up defensive positions in Cross Keys and Port Republic, where he was able to defeat Frémont and Shields, respectively, on June 8 and June 9.

Union forces were withdrawn from the Valley. Jackson joined Robert E. Lee on the Peninsula for the Seven Days Battles (where he delivered an uncharacteristically lethargic performance, perhaps because of the strains of the Valley Campaign). He had accomplished his mission, withholding over 50,000 needed troops from McClellan. With the success of his Valley Campaign, Stonewall Jackson became the most celebrated soldier in the Confederacy (until he was eventually eclipsed by Lee) and lifted the morale of the public. In a classic military campaign of surprise and maneuver, he pressed his army to travel 646 miles (1,040 km) in 48 days of marching and won five significant victories with a force of about 17,000 against combined foes of 60,000.

Peninsula Campaign (1862)

George B. McClellan spent the winter of 1861–62 training his new Army of the Potomac and fighting off calls from President Lincoln to advance against the Confederates. Lincoln was particularly concerned about the army of General Joseph E. Johnston at Centreville, just 30 miles (50 km) from Washington. McClellan overestimated Johnston's strength and shifted his objective from that army to the Confederate capital of Richmond. He proposed to move by water to Urbanna on the Rappahannock River and then overland to Richmond before Johnston could move to block him. Although Lincoln favored the overland approach because it would shield Washington from any attack while the operation was in progress, McClellan argued that the road conditions in Virginia were intolerable, that he had arranged adequate defenses for the capital, and that Johnston would certainly follow him if he moved on Richmond. This plan was discussed for three months in the capital until Lincoln approved McClellan's proposal in early March. By March 9, however, Johnston withdrew his army from Centreville to Culpeper, making McClellan's Urbanna plan impracticable. McClellan then proposed to sail to Fort Monroe and then up the Virginia Peninsula (the narrow strip of land between the James and York rivers) to Richmond. Lincoln reluctantly agreed.

Before departing for the Peninsula, McClellan moved the Army of the Potomac to Centreville on a "shakedown" march. He discovered there how weak Johnston's force and position had really been, and he faced mounting criticism. On March 11, Lincoln relieved McClellan of his position as general-in -chief of the Union armies so that he could devote his full attention to the difficult campaign ahead of him. Lincoln himself, with the assistance of Secretary of War Stanton and a War Board of officers, assumed command of the Union armies for the next four months. The Army of the Potomac began to embark for Fort Monroe on March 17. The departure was accompanied by a newfound sense of concern. The first combat of ironclad ships occurred on March 8 and March 9 as the CSS *Virginia* and the USS *Monitor* fought the inconclusive Battle of Hampton Roads. The concern for the Army was that their transport ships would be attacked by this new weapon directly in their path. And the U.S. Navy failed to assure McClellan that they could protect operations on either the James or the York, so his idea of amphibiously enveloping Yorktown was abandoned, and he ordered an advance up the Peninsula to begin April 4. On April 5, McClellan was informed that Lincoln had canceled the movement of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's corps to Fort Monroe, taking this action because McClellan had failed to leave the number of troops previously agreed upon at Washington, and because Jackson's Valley Campaign was causing concern. McClellan protested vociferously that he

was being forced to lead a major campaign without his promised resources, but he moved ahead anyway.

Up the Peninsula

Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines.

The Union forces advanced to Yorktown, and after a lengthy delay building up siege resources, McClellan defeated the Confederates in a skirmish, the Battle of Yorktown. During the campaign, the Union Army also seized Hampton Roads and occupied Norfolk. As the Union forces chased withdrawing Confederate forces up the Peninsula (northwest) in the direction of Richmond, the inconclusive single-day Battle of Williamsburg took place at and around Fort Magruder, one mile (1.5 km) east of the old colonial capital.

By the end of May, the Union forces had successfully advanced to within several miles of Richmond, but progress was slow. McClellan had planned for massive siege operations and brought immense stores of equipment and siege mortars. Poor weather and inadequate roads kept his advance to a crawl. And McClellan was by nature a cautious general. He was nervous about attacking a force he believed was twice his in size. In fact, his imagination and his intelligence operations failed him; the proportions were roughly the reverse. During Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's slow retreat up the Peninsula, his forces practiced deceptive operations. In particular, the division under John B. Magruder, who was an amateur actor before the war, was able to fool McClellan by ostentatiously marching small numbers of troops past the same position multiple times, appearing to be a larger force.

As the Union Army drew towards the outer defenses of Richmond, it became divided by the Chickahominy River, weakening its ability to move troops back and forth along the front. The Battle of Seven Pines (also known as the Battle of Fair Oaks) took place on May 31 – June 1, 1862, as the Confederates struck at the smaller Union force south of the river. The battle was tactically inconclusive, but there were two strategic effects. First, Johnston was wounded during the battle and was replaced by the more aggressive General Robert E. Lee, who would lead this Army of Northern Virginia to many victories in the war. Second, General McClellan chose to abandon his offensive operations to lay siege and await reinforcements he had requested from President Lincoln. He never regained his strategic momentum.

Lee used the month-long pause in McClellan's advance to fortify the defenses of Richmond. On the south side of the James River, defensive lines were built south to a point below Petersburg. The total length of the new defensive line was about 30 miles (50 km). To buy time to complete the new defensive line and prepare for an offensive, Lee repeated the tactic of making a small number of troops seem more numerous than they really were. McClellan was also unnerved by Confederate Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's audacious (but otherwise militarily pointless) cavalry ride completely around the Union army (June 13–15).

Seven Days



June 26–27, 1862. Battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill

Lee then moved onto the offensive, conducting a series of battles that lasted seven days (June 25 – July 1) and pushed McClellan back to a safe but nonthreatening position on the James River.

The first major battle of the Seven Days was Mechanicsville or Beaver Dam Creek, on June 26. Lee observed that McClellan had positioned his army straddling the Chickahominy River and could be defeated

in detail. He struck McClellan's right flank on the northern bank and was repulsed with heavy casualties. Despite being a Union tactical victory, it was the start of a strategic debacle. McClellan withdrew to the southeast.

June 30, 1862. Battle of Glendale

Lee continued his offensive at the Battle of Gaines' Mill, June 27, launching the largest Confederate attack of the war. (It occurred in almost the same location as the 1864 Battle of Cold Harbor and had similar numbers of casualties.) The attack was poorly coordinated, and the Union lines held for most of the day, but Lee eventually broke through and McClellan withdrew again, heading for a secure base at Harrison's Landing on the James River.

The Battle of Glendale on June 30 was a bloody battle in which three Confederate divisions converged on the retreating Union forces in the White Oak Swamp, near Frayser's Farm, another name for the battle. Because of a lackluster performance by Stonewall Jackson, Lee's army failed in its last attempt to cut off the Union army before it reached the James.

The final battle of the Seven Days, July 1, consisted of reckless Confederate assaults against the impregnable Union defenses—buttressed by masterful artillery placements—on Malvern Hill. Lee's army suffered over 5,000 casualties in this wasted effort.

The Seven Days Battles ended the Peninsula Campaign. McClellan withdrew to the safety of the James River, protected by fire from Union gunboats. The Army of the Potomac stayed there until August, when they were withdrawn by order of President Lincoln in the run-up to the Second Battle of Bull Run. Although McClellan retained command of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln showed his displeasure by appointing Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck to McClellan's previous position as general-in-chief of all the Union armies on July 11, 1862.



July 1, 1862. Battle of Malvern Hill

The cost to both sides was high. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia suffered almost 20,000 casualties out of a total of over 90,000 soldiers during the Seven Days, McClellan almost 16,000 out of 105,445.

After a successful start on the Peninsula that foretold an early end to the war, Northern morale was crushed by McClellan's retreat. Despite heavy casualties and Lee's clumsy tactical performance, Confederate morale skyrocketed, and Lee was emboldened to continue his aggressive strategy through Northern Virginia and Maryland Campaigns.

Northern Virginia and Maryland (1862)

Following his success against McClellan on the Peninsula, Lee initiated two campaigns that can be considered one almost continuous offensive operation: defeating the second army that threatened Richmond and then continuing north on an invasion of Maryland.

Army of Virginia

President Lincoln reacted to McClellan's failure by appointing John Pope to command the newly formed Army of Virginia. Pope had achieved some success in the Western Theater, and Lincoln sought a more aggressive general than McClellan. The Army of Virginia consisted

of over 50,000 men in three corps. Three corps of McClellan's Army of the Potomac later were added for combat operations. Two cavalry brigades were attached directly to two of the infantry corps, which presented a lack of centralized control that had negative effects in the campaign.



Northern Virginia Campaign, August 7–28, 1862.

Pope's mission was to fulfill two objectives: protect Washington and the Shenandoah Valley, and draw Confederate forces away from McClellan by moving in the direction of Gordonsville. Pope started on the latter by dispatching cavalry to break the railroad connecting Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg. The cavalry got off to a slow start and found that Stonewall Jackson had occupied Gordonsville with over 14,000 men.

Lee perceived that McClellan was no longer a threat to him on the Peninsula, so he felt no compulsion to keep all of his forces in direct defense of Richmond. This allowed him to relocate Jackson to Gordonsville to block Pope and protect the railroad. Lee had larger plans in mind. Since the Union Army was split between McClellan and Pope and they were widely separated, Lee saw an opening to destroy Pope before returning his attention to McClellan. Believing that Ambrose Burnside's troops from North Carolina were being shipped to reinforce Pope, and wanting to take immediate action before those troops were in position, Lee committed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill to join Jackson with 12,000 men, while distracting McClellan to keep him immobilized.

On July 29, Pope moved some of his forces to a position near Cedar Mountain, from whence he could launch raids on Gordonsville. Jackson advanced to Culpeper on August 7, hoping to attack one of Pope's corps before the rest of the army could be concentrated. On August 9, Nathaniel Banks's corps attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain, gaining an early advantage. A Confederate counterattack led by A.P. Hill drove Banks back across Cedar Creek. By now Jackson had learned that Pope's corps were all together, foiling his plan of defeating each in separate actions. He remained in position until August 12, when he withdrew to Gordonsville.

On August 13, Lee sent Maj. Gen. James Longstreet to reinforce Jackson and on the following day sent all of his remaining forces except for two brigades, after he was certain that McClellan was leaving the Peninsula. Lee himself arrived at Gordonsville to take command on August 15. His plan was to defeat Pope before McClellan's army could arrive to reinforce it by cutting bridges in Pope's rear and then attacking his left flank and rear. Pope withdrew to the line of the Rappahannock River. He was aware of Lee's plan because a Union cavalry raid captured a copy of the written order.

A series of skirmishes between August 22 and August 25 kept the attention of Pope's army along the river. By August 25, three corps from the Army of the Potomac had arrived from the Peninsula to reinforce Pope. Lee's new plan in the face of all these additional forces outnumbering him was to send Jackson and Stuart with half of the army on a flanking march to cut Pope's line of communication, the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Pope would be forced to retreat and could be defeated while moving and vulnerable.

On the evening of August 26, after passing around Pope's right flank, Jackson's wing of the army struck the railroad at Bristoe Station and before daybreak August 27 marched to capture and destroy the massive Union supply depot at Manassas Junction. This surprise movement forced Pope into an abrupt retreat from his defensive line along the Rappahannock. During the night of August 27–28, Jackson marched his divisions north to the First Bull Run (Manassas) battlefield, where he took position behind an unfinished railroad grade. Longstreet's wing of the army marched through the Thoroughfare Gap to join Jackson, uniting the two wings of Lee's army.

Second Bull Run

In order to draw Pope's army into battle, Jackson ordered an attack on a Federal column that was passing across his front on August 28, beginning the Second Battle of Bull Run, the decisive battle of the Northern Virginia Campaign. The fighting lasted several hours and resulted in a stalemate. Pope became convinced that he had trapped Jackson and concentrated the bulk of his army against him. On August 29, Pope launched a series of assaults against Jackson's position along the unfinished railroad grade. The attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties on both sides. At noon, Longstreet arrived on the field and took position on Jackson's right flank. On August 30, Pope renewed his attacks, seemingly unaware that Longstreet was on the field. When massed Confederate artillery devastated a Union assault, Longstreet's wing of 28,000 men counterattacked in the largest simultaneous mass assault of the war. The Union left flank was crushed and the army driven back to Bull Run. Only an effective Union rearguard action prevented a replay of the First Bull Run disaster. Pope's retreat to Centreville was precipitous, nonetheless. The next day, Lee ordered his army in pursuit.

Making a wide flanking march, Jackson hoped to cut off the Union retreat. On September 1, Jackson sent his divisions against two Union divisions in the Battle of Chantilly. Confederate attacks were stopped by fierce fighting during a severe thunderstorm. Recognizing that his army was still in danger, Pope ordered the retreat to continue to Washington.

Invasion of Maryland

Maryland Campaign, actions September 3 to September 15, 1862.

Lee decided that his army, despite taking heavy losses during the spring and summer, was ready for a great challenge: an invasion of the North. His goal was to penetrate the major Northern states of Maryland and Pennsylvania and cut off the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad line that supplied Washington. He also needed to supply his army and knew the farms of the North had been untouched by war, unlike those in Virginia. And he wished to lower Northern morale, believing that an invading army wreaking havoc inside the North might force Lincoln to negotiate an end to the war, particularly if he would be able to incite an uprising in the slave-holding state of Maryland.

The Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River and reached Frederick, Maryland, on September 7. Lee's specific goals were thought to be an advance towards Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, cutting the east-west railroad links to the Northeast, followed by operations against one of the major eastern cities, such as Philadelphia. News of the invasion caused panic in the North, and Lincoln was forced to take quick action. George B. McClellan had been in military limbo since returning from the Peninsula, but Lincoln restored him to command of all forces around Washington and ordered him to deal with Lee.

Lee divided his army. Longstreet was sent to Hagerstown, while Jackson was ordered to seize the Union arsenal at Harpers Ferry, which commanded Lee's supply lines through the Shenandoah Valley; it was also a tempting target, virtually indefensible. McClellan requested permission from Washington to evacuate Harpers Ferry and attach its garrison to his army, but his request was refused. In the Battle of Harpers Ferry, Jackson placed artillery on the heights overlooking the town, forcing the surrender of the garrison of more than 12,000 men on September 15. Jackson led most of his soldiers to join the rest of Lee's army, leaving A.P. Hill's division to complete the occupation of the town.

Overview of the Battle of Antietam.

McClellan moved out of Washington with his 87,000-man army in a slow pursuit, reaching Frederick on September 13. There, two Union soldiers discovered a mislaid copy of the detailed campaign plans of Lee's army—General Order Number 191—wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically, thus making each subject to isolation and defeat in detail. McClellan waited 18 hours before deciding to take advantage of this intelligence, a delay that almost squandered his opportunity. That night, the Army of the Potomac moved toward South Mountain where elements of the Army of Northern Virginia waited in defense of the mountain passes. At the Battle of South Mountain on September 14, the Confederate defenders

were driven back by the numerically superior Union forces, and McClellan was in a position to destroy Lee's army before it could concentrate.
Lee, seeing McClellan's uncharacteristic aggression, and learning through a Confederate sympathizer that his order had been compromised, frantically moved to concentrate his army. He chose not to abandon his invasion and return to Virginia yet, because Jackson had not completed the capture of Harpers Ferry. Instead, he chose to make a stand at Sharpsburg, Maryland.

Antietam
On September 16, McClellan confronted Lee near Sharpsburg, defending a line to the west of Antietam Creek. At dawn on September 17, the Battle of Antietam began, with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's corps mounting a powerful assault on Lee's left flank. Attacks and counterattacks swept across the Miller Cornfield and the woods near the Dunker Church. Union assaults against the Sunken Road ("Bloody Lane") eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not pressed.
In the afternoon, Burnside's corps crossed a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and rolled up the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and counterattacked, driving back Burnside's men and saving Lee's army from destruction. Although outnumbered two to one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in less than three quarters of his army. This enabled Lee to shift brigades and concentrate on each individual Union assault. At over 23,000 casualties, it remains the bloodiest single day in American history. Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley. Despite being tactically inconclusive, the battle of Antietam is considered a strategic victory for the Union. Lee's strategic initiative to invade Maryland was defeated. But more importantly, President Lincoln used this opportunity to announce his Emancipation Proclamation, after which the prospect of European powers intervening in the war on behalf of the Confederacy was significantly diminished.

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (1862–63)
On November 7, 1862, President Lincoln relieved McClellan of command because of his failure to pursue and defeat Lee's retreating army from Sharpsburg. Ambrose Burnside, despite his indifferent performance as a corps commander at Antietam, was appointed to command the Army of the Potomac. Once again, Lincoln pressured his general to launch an offensive as quickly as possible. Burnside rose to the task and planned to drive directly south toward Richmond. He hoped to outflank Robert E. Lee by quickly crossing the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg and placing himself in between the Confederate army and their capital. Administrative difficulties prevented the pontoon bridging boats from arriving on time, and his army was forced to wait across the river from Fredericksburg while Lee took that opportunity to fortify a defensive line on the heights behind the city. Rather than giving up or finding another way to advance, Burnside crossed the river and on December 13, launched massive frontal assaults against Marye's Heights on Lee's left flank. His attacks were more successful on Lee's right, but he did not follow up and persisted in pounding the fortified heights with waves of futile attacks. The Union Army lost over 12,000 men that day; Confederate casualties were significantly less.



Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862.

Despite the defeat and the dismay felt in Washington, Burnside was not yet relieved from command. He planned to resume his offensive south of Fredericksburg, but it went amiss in January 1863 in the humiliating Mud March. Following this, a cabal of his subordinate generals made it clear to the government that Burnside was incapable of leading the army. One of those conspirators was Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, who was appointed to command the Army of the Potomac on January 26, 1863. Hooker, who had an excellent record as a corps commander in previous campaigns, spent the remainder of the winter reorganizing and resupplying his army, paying special attention to health and morale issues. And being known for his aggressive nature, he planned a complex spring campaign against Robert E. Lee.

Both armies remained in their positions before Fredericksburg. Hooker planned to send his cavalry, under Maj. Gen. George Stoneman, deep into the Confederate rear to disrupt supply lines. While one corps remained to fix Lee's attention at Fredericksburg, the others were to slip away and make a stealthy flanking march that would

put the bulk of Hooker's army behind Lee, catching him in a vise. Lee, who had dispatched a corps of his army under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet to forage in southern Virginia, was outnumbered 57,000 to 97,000.

Chancellorsville Campaign



May 1, 1863. Hooker loses his nerve.



May 2. Jackson's flank attack.



May 3. Lee's assaults against Chancellorsville.

The plan began executing well, and the bulk of the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and was in position on May 1. However, after minor initial contact with the enemy, Hooker began to lose his confidence, and rather than striking the Army of Northern Virginia in its rear as planned, he withdrew to a defensive perimeter around Chancellorsville. On May 2, Robert E. Lee executed one of the boldest maneuvers of the war. Having already split his army to address both wings of Hooker's attack, he split again, sending 20,000 men under Stonewall Jackson on a lengthy flanking march to attack Hooker's unprotected right flank. Achieving almost complete surprise, Jackson's corps routed the Union XI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Following this success Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire while scouting in front of his army.



May 3. Battles of Second Fredericksburg and Salem Church.



May 4-6. Union withdrawals.

While Lee pounded the Chancellorsville defense line with repeated, costly assaults on May 3, the Union VI Corps, under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, finally achieved what Ambrose Burnside could not, by successfully assaulting the reduced forces on Marye's Heights in Fredericksburg. The corps began moving westward, once again threatening Lee's rear. Lee was able to deal with both wings of the Army of the Potomac, keeping the stunned Hooker in a defensive posture and dispatching a division to deal with Sedgwick's tentative approach. By May 7, Hooker withdrew all of his forces north of the Rappahannock. It was an expensive victory for Lee, who lost 13,000 men, or

25% of his army. Hooker lost 17,000, a lower casualty rate.

Gettysburg and fall maneuvering (1863)

In June 1863, Robert E. Lee decided to capitalize on his victory at Chancellorsville by repeating his strategy of 1862 and once again invading the North. He did this to resupply his army, give the farmers of Virginia a respite from war, and threaten the morale of Northern civilians, possibly by seizing an important northern city, such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or Baltimore, Maryland. The Confederate government agreed to this strategy only reluctantly because Jefferson Davis was concerned about the fate of Vicksburg, Mississippi, the river fortress being threatened by Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg campaign. Following the death of Jackson, Lee organized the Army of Northern Virginia into three corps, led by Lt. Gens. James Longstreet, Richard S. Ewell, and A.P. Hill.



Initial movements in the campaign, through July 3; cavalry movements shown with dashed lines.

Lee began moving his army northwest from Fredericksburg into the Shenandoah Valley, where the Blue Ridge Mountains screened their northward movements. Joseph Hooker, still in command of the Army of the Potomac, sent cavalry forces to find Lee. On June 9, the clash at Brandy Station was the largest predominantly cavalry battle of the war but ended inconclusively. Hooker started his entire army in pursuit, but on June 28, President Lincoln lost patience with him and relieved him of command, replacing him with V Corps commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.

Lee was surprised to find that the Federal army was moving as quickly as it was. As they crossed the Potomac and entered Frederick, Maryland, the Confederates were spread out over a considerable distance in Pennsylvania, with Richard Ewell across the Susquehanna River from Harrisburg and James Longstreet behind the mountains in Chambersburg. His cavalry, under Jeb Stuart, was engaged in a wide-ranging raid around the eastern flank of the Union army and was uncharacteristically out of touch with headquarters, leaving Lee blind as to his enemy's position and intentions. Lee realized that, just as in the Maryland Campaign, he had to concentrate his army before it could be defeated in detail. He ordered all units to move to the general vicinity of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Gettysburg Campaign



Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 1863.



Battle of Gettysburg, July 2.

The Battle of Gettysburg is often considered the war's turning point. Meade defeated Lee in a three-day battle fought by 160,000 soldiers, with 51,000 casualties. It started as a meeting engagement on the morning of July 1, when brigades from Henry Heth's division clashed with Buford's cavalry, and then John F. Reynolds's I Corps. As the Union XI Corps arrived, they and the I Corps were smashed by Ewell's and Hill's corps arriving from the north and forced back through the town, taking up defensive positions on high ground south of town. On July 2, Lee launched a massive pair of assaults against the left and right flanks of Meade's army. Fierce battles raged at Little Round Top, Devil's Den, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, East Cemetery Hill, and Culp's Hill. Meade was able to shift his defenders along interior lines, and they repulsed the Confederate advances. On July 3, Lee launched Pickett's Charge against the Union center, and almost three divisions were slaughtered. By this time, Stuart had returned, and he fought an inconclusive cavalry duel to the east of the main battlefield, attempting to drive into the Union rear area. The two armies stayed in position on July 4 (the same day the Battle of Vicksburg ended in a stunning Union victory), and then Lee ordered a retreat back across the Potomac to Virginia.

Meade's pursuit of Lee was tentative and unsuccessful. He received considerable criticism from President Lincoln and others, who believed he could have ended the war in the aftermath of Gettysburg. His two final offensive campaigns in the fall of 1863, Bristoe and Mine Run, were inconsequential. In both cases, Lee repeatedly outmaneuvered Meade, who was reluctant to lose men in frontal assaults.



Battle of Gettysburg, July 3.



Retreat, July 5–14.

Grant versus Lee (1864–65)

In March 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of all the Union

armies. He devised a coordinated strategy to apply pressure on the Confederacy from many points, something President Lincoln had urged his generals to do from the beginning of the war. Grant put Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in immediate command of all forces in the West and moved his own headquarters to be with the Army of the Potomac (still commanded by George Meade) in Virginia, where he intended to maneuver Lee's army to a decisive battle; his secondary objective was to capture Richmond, but Grant knew that the latter would happen automatically once the former was accomplished. His coordinated strategy called for Grant and Meade to attack Lee from the north, while Benjamin Butler drove toward Richmond from the southeast; Franz Sigel to control the Shenandoah Valley; Sherman to invade Georgia, defeat Joseph E. Johnston, and capture Atlanta; George Crook and William W. Averell to operate against railroad supply lines in West Virginia; and Nathaniel P. Banks to capture Mobile, Alabama.[2]

Most of these initiatives failed, often because of the assignment of generals to Grant for political rather than military reasons. Butler's Army of the James bogged down against inferior forces under P.G.T. Beauregard before Richmond in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign. Sigel was soundly defeated at the Battle of New Market in May and was soon afterward replaced by David Hunter. Banks was distracted by the Red River Campaign and failed to move on Mobile. However, Crook and Averell were able to cut the last railway linking Virginia and Tennessee, and Sherman's Atlanta campaign was a success, although it dragged on through the fall.[3]

Overland Campaign

In early May, the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and entered the area known as the Wilderness of Spotsylvania. There, in dense woods that nullified the Union army's advantages in artillery, Robert E. Lee surprised Grant and Meade with aggressive assaults. The two-day Battle of the Wilderness was tactically inconclusive, although very damaging to both sides. However, unlike his predecessors, Grant did not retreat after the battle; he sent his army to the southeast and began a campaign of maneuver that kept Lee on the defensive through a series of bloody battles and moved closer to Richmond. Grant knew that his larger army and base of manpower in the North could sustain a war of attrition better than Lee and the Confederacy could. And although Grant suffered high losses—approximately 55,000 casualties—during the campaign, Lee lost even higher percentages of his men, losses that could not be replaced.

In the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, Lee was able to beat Grant to the crossroads town and establish a strong defensive position. In a series of attacks over two weeks, Grant hammered away at the Confederate lines, mostly centered on a salient known as the "Mule Shoe". A massive assault by Winfield S. Hancock's II Corps on the "Bloody Angle" portion of this line on May 12 foreshadowed the breakthrough tactics employed against trenches late in World War I. Grant once again disengaged and slipped to the southeast.



Overland Campaign, from the Wilderness to crossing the James River.

Intercepting Grant's movement, Lee positioned his forces behind the North Anna River in a salient to force Grant to divide his army to attack it. Lee had the opportunity to defeat Grant but failed to attack in the manner necessary to spring the trap he had set, possibly because of an illness. Grant continued moving southeast.

On May 31, Union cavalry seized the vital crossroads of Old Cold Harbor while the Confederates arrived from Richmond and from the Totopotomoy Creek lines. Late on June 1, two Union corps reached Cold Harbor and assaulted the Confederate works with some success. By June 2, both armies were on the field, forming on a seven-mile (11 km) front. At dawn on June 3, the II and XVIII Corps, followed later by the IX Corps, assaulted the line and were slaughtered at all points in the Battle of Cold Harbor. Grant lost over 12,000 men in a battle that he regretted more than any other and Northern newspapers thereafter frequently referred to him as a "butcher".

On the night of June 12, Grant again advanced by his left flank, marching to the James River. He was able to disguise his intentions from Lee, and his army crossed the river on a bridge of pontoons that stretched over 2,100 feet

(640 m).[4] What Lee had feared most of all—that Grant would force him into a siege of the capital city—was poised to occur.

Petersburg

Richmond-Petersburg Theater, fall 1864.

Grant had decided, however, that there was a more efficient way to get at Richmond and Lee. A few miles to the south, the city of Petersburg contained crucial rail links supplying the capital. If the Union Army could seize it, Richmond would be taken. However, Benjamin Butler had failed to capture it earlier and then indecisive advances by Grant's subordinates also failed to break through the thin lines manned by P.G.T. Beauregard's men, allowing Lee's army to arrive and erect defenses. Both sides settled in for a siege.

In an attempt to break the siege, Union troops in Ambrose Burnside's corps mined a tunnel under the Confederate line. On July 30, they detonated the explosives, creating a crater some 135 feet (41 m) in diameter that remains visible to this day. Almost 350 Confederate soldiers were instantly killed in the blast. Despite the ingenuity of the Union's plan, the lengthy, bloody Battle of the Crater, as it came to be called, was marred by poor tactical planning and was a decisive Confederate victory.

Through the fall and winter, both armies constructed elaborate series of trenches, eventually spanning more than 30 miles (50 km), as the Union Army attempted to get around the right (western) flank of the Confederates and destroy their supply lines. Although the Northern public became quite dispirited by the seeming lack of progress at Petersburg, the dramatic success of Sherman at Atlanta helped ensure the reelection of Abraham Lincoln, which guaranteed that the war would be fought to a conclusion.

Shenandoah Valley (1864–65)

Valley Campaigns of 1864



Valley operations, May-August 1864.

The Shenandoah Valley was a crucial region for the Confederacy. It was one of the most important agricultural regions in Virginia and was a prime invasion route against the North. Grant hoped that an army from the Department of West Virginia under Franz Sigel could seize control of the Valley, moving "up the Valley" (southwest to the higher elevations) with 10,000 men to destroy the railroad center at Lynchburg. Sigel immediately suffered defeat at the Battle of New Market and was soon replaced by David Hunter, who also failed in his mission.

Robert E. Lee, now besieged in Petersburg, was concerned about Hunter's advances and sent Jubal Early's corps to sweep Union forces from the Valley and, if possible, to menace Washington, D.C., hoping to compel Grant to dilute his forces around Petersburg. Early got off to a good start. He drove down the Valley without opposition, bypassed Harpers Ferry, crossed the Potomac River, and advanced into Maryland. Grant dispatched a corps under Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright and other troops under George Crook to reinforce Washington and pursue Early.

At the Battle of Monocacy (July 9, 1864), Early defeated a smaller force under Lew Wallace near Frederick, Maryland, but this battle delayed his progress enough to allow time for reinforcing the defenses of Washington. Early attacked a fort on the northwest defensive perimeter of Washington (Fort Stevens (July 11–12) without success and withdrew back to Virginia. He successfully fought a series of minor battles in the Valley through early August

and prevented Wright's corps from returning to Grant at Petersburg. He also burned the city of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.



Valley operations in August 1864 – March 1865.

Grant knew that Washington remained vulnerable if Early was still on the loose. He found a new commander aggressive enough to defeat Early: Philip Sheridan, the cavalry commander of the Army of the Potomac, who was given command of all forces in the area, calling them the Army of the Shenandoah. Sheridan initially started slowly, primarily because the impending presidential election of 1864 demanded a cautious approach, avoiding any disaster that might lead to the defeat of Abraham Lincoln.

Sheridan began moving aggressively in September. He defeated Early in the Third Battle of Winchester and the Battle of Fisher's Hill. With Early damaged and pinned down, the Valley lay open to the Union. Adding Sherman's capture of Atlanta, Lincoln's re-election seemed assured. Sheridan pulled back slowly down the Valley and conducted a scorched earth campaign that presaged Sherman's March to the Sea in November. The goal was to deny the Confederacy the means of feeding its armies in Virginia, and Sheridan's army burned crops, barns, mills, and factories.

The campaign was effectively concluded at the Battle of Cedar Creek (October 19, 1864). In a brilliant surprise attack, Early routed two thirds of the Union army, but his troops were hungry and exhausted and fell out of their ranks to pillage the Union camp; Sheridan managed to rally his troops and defeat Early decisively. Sheridan returned to assist Grant at Petersburg. Most of the men of Early's corps rejoined Lee at Petersburg in December, while Early remained to command a skeleton force until he was relieved of command in March 1865.

Appomattox (1865)



Grant's final Petersburg assaults and the start of Lee's retreat.

In January 1865, Robert E. Lee became the general-in-chief of all Confederate armies, but this move came too late to help the Southern cause.

As the siege of Petersburg continued, Grant attempted to break or encircle the Confederate forces in multiple attacks moving from east to west. By March, the siege had taken an enormous toll on both armies, and Lee decided to pull out of Petersburg. Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon then devised a plan to have the army attack Fort Stedman on the eastern end of the Union Lines, forcing the Union forces to shorten their lines. Although initially a success, his outnumbered corps was forced back.

Sheridan returned from the Valley and was tasked with flanking the Confederate Army, which forced Lee to send forces under Maj. Gen. George Pickett to defend the flank. Grant then deployed a corps to cut off Pickett's forces, who were forced to withdraw to Five Forks on March 31. In the following days, the Union continued to press the attack, flanking Pickett's forces and destroying the Confederate left.

Lee's retreat in the Appomattox Campaign, April 3–9, 1865.

After the victory at Five Forks, Grant ordered an assault along the entire Confederate line, called the Third Battle of Petersburg, resulting in dramatic breakthroughs. In the

following days, Lee pulled his forces out from Petersburg and Richmond and headed west to Danville, the destination of the fleeing Confederate government, and then south to meet up with General Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina. The capital city of Richmond surrendered on the morning of April 3.
The campaign became a race between Lee and Sheridan, with Lee attempting to obtain supplies for his retreat and Sheridan attempting to cut him off. At Sayler's Creek on April 6, nearly a quarter of the Confederate Army (about 8,000 men, the heart of two corps) was cut off and forced to surrender. Many of the Confederate supply trains were also captured. In Lee's final stand on April 9, John B. Gordon's depleted corps attempted to break the Union lines and reach the supplies in Lynchburg. They pushed back Sheridan's cavalry briefly but found themselves faced with the full Union V Corps. They were surrounded on three sides, and Lee surrendered his army to Grant at Appomattox Court House.
There were further minor battles and further surrenders of Confederate armies, but Lee's surrender on April 9, 1865, marked the effective end of the Civil War. The premier army of the Confederacy and its greatest general had been defeated and were offered generous and honorable terms of surrender. Lee, rejecting advice from some of his staff, wanted to ensure that his army did not melt away into the countryside to continue the war as guerrillas, helping immeasurably to heal the divisions of the country.

Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Theater_of_the_American_Civil_War

Western Theater



Theater of operations

The Western Theater was an area defined by both geography and the sequence of campaigning. It originally represented the area east of the Mississippi River and west of the Appalachian Mountains. It excluded operations against the Gulf Coast and the Eastern Seaboard, but as the war progressed and William Tecumseh Sherman's Union armies moved southeast from Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 1864 and 1865, the definition of the theater expanded to encompass their operations in Georgia and the Carolinas. For operations in the Southwest see Trans-Mississippi Theater of the American Civil War.
The West was by some measures the most important theater of the war. The Confederacy was forced to defend with limited resources an enormous land mass, which was subject to Union thrusts along multiple avenues of approach, including major rivers that led directly to the agricultural heartland of the South. Capture of the Mississippi River was one of the key tenets of Union General Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan.
The Virginia front was by far the more prestigious theater. ... Yet the war's outcome was decided not there but in the vast expanse that stretched west from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi and beyond. Here, in the West, the truly decisive battles were fought.
Stephen E. Woodworth, *Jefferson Davis and His Generals*[1]
The Eastern Theater received considerably more attention than the Western, both at the time and in subsequent historical accounts. This is due to a number of factors, including the proximity of the opposing capitals, the concentration of newspapers in the major cities of the East, several unanticipated Confederate victories, and the fame of Eastern generals such as Robert E. Lee, George B. McClellan, and Stonewall Jackson. Because of this, the progress that Union forces made in defeating Confederate armies in the West and overtaking Confederate territory went nearly unnoticed.
Military historian J. F. C. Fuller has described the Union invasion as an immense turning movement, a left wheel that started in Kentucky, headed south down the Mississippi River, and then east through Tennessee, Georgia, and the Carolinas. With the exception of the Battle of Chickamauga and some daring raids by cavalry or guerrilla forces, the four years in the West marked a string of almost continuous defeats for the Confederates; or, at best, tactical draws that eventually turned out to be strategic reversals. And the arguably most successful Union generals of the war (Grant, Thomas, Sherman, and Sheridan) came from this theater, consistently outclassing most of their Confederate opponents (with the possible exception of cavalry commander Nathan Bedford Forrest).
The campaign classification established by the United States National Park Service[2] is more fine-grained than the one used in this article. Some minor NPS campaigns have been omitted and some have been combined into larger categories. Only a few of the 117 battles the NPS classifies for this theater are described. Boxed text in the right margin show the NPS campaigns associated with each section.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD

Principal commanders of the Western Theater


Lt. Gen.Ulysses S. Grant, USA


Maj. Gen.Henry W. Halleck, USA


Maj. Gen.William T. Sherman, USA


Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, USA


Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, USA


Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans, USA


Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, CSA


Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, CSA


Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, CSA


Gen. Braxton Bragg, CSA


Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood, CSA


Lt. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, CSA

Early operations (June 1861 – January 1862)



From Belmont (November 1861) to Shiloh (April 1862).

The focus early in the war was on two critical states: Missouri and Kentucky. The loss of either would have been a crippling blow to the Union cause. Primarily because of the successes of Captain Nathaniel Lyon and his victory at Boonville in June, Missouri was held in the Union. The state of Kentucky, with a pro-Confederate governor and a pro-Union legislature, had declared neutrality between the opposing sides. This neutrality was first violated on September 3, when Confederate Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk occupied Columbus, considered key to controlling the Lower Mississippi, and two days later Union Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, displaying the personal initiative that would characterize his later career, seized Paducah. Henceforth, neither adversary respected the proclaimed neutrality of the state. This sequence of events is considered a victory for the Union because Kentucky never formally sided with the Confederacy, and if the Union had been prevented from maneuvering within Kentucky, its later successful campaigns in Tennessee would have been more difficult.

On the Confederate side, General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded all forces from Arkansas to the Cumberland Gap. He was faced with the problem of defending a broad front with numerically inferior forces, but he had an excellent system of lateral communications, permitting him to move troops rapidly where they were needed, and he had two able subordinates, Polk and Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee. Johnston also gained political support from secessionists in central and western counties of Kentucky via a new Confederate capital at Bowling Green, set up by the Russellville Convention. The alternative government was recognized by the Confederate government, which admitted Kentucky into the Confederacy in December 1861. Using the rail system resources of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, Polk was able to quickly fortify and equip the Confederate base at Columbus.[3]

The Union military command in the West, however, suffered from a lack of unified command, organized by November into three separate departments: the Department of Kansas, under Maj. Gen. David Hunter, the Department of Missouri, under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, and the Department of the Ohio, under Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell (who had replaced Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman). By January 1862, this disunity of command was apparent because no strategy for operations in the Western theater could be agreed upon. Buell, under political pressure to invade and hold pro-Union East Tennessee, moved slowly in the direction of Nashville, but achieved nothing more substantial toward his goal than a minor victory at Mill Springs under Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas. (Mill Springs was a significant victory in a strategic sense because it broke the end of the Confederate Western defensive line and opened the Cumberland Gap to East Tennessee, but it got Buell no closer to Nashville.) In Halleck's department, Grant demonstrated up the Tennessee River to divert attention from Buell's intended advance, which did not occur. On February 1, 1862, after repeated requests by Grant, Halleck authorized Grant to move against Fort Henry on the Tennessee.

Tennessee, Cumberland, and Mississippi Rivers (February–June 1862)

Grant moved swiftly, starting his troops down the Tennessee River toward Fort Henry on river transports on February 2. His operations in the campaign were well coordinated with United States Navy Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote. The fort was poorly situated on a floodplain and virtually indefensible against gunboats, with many of its guns under water. Because of the previous neutrality of Kentucky, the Confederates could not build river defenses at a more strategic location inside the state, so they settled for a site just inside the border of Tennessee. Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman withdrew almost all of his garrison on February 5, moving them across country 11 miles (18 km) to the east to Fort Donelson. The Tennessee River was then open for future Union operations into the South.

Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, was more defensible than Henry, and Navy assaults on the fort were ineffective. Grant's army marched cross-country in pursuit of Tilghman and attempted immediate assaults on the fort from the rear, but they were unsuccessful. On February 15, the Confederate forces under Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd attempted to escape and launched a surprise assault against the Union right flank (commanded by Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand), driving McClernand's division back but not creating the opening they needed to slip away. Grant recovered from this temporary reversal and assaulted the weakened Confederate right. Trapped in the fort and the town of Dover, Tennessee, Confederate Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner surrendered his command of 11,500 men and many needed guns and supplies to Grant's demand for "unconditional surrender". The combined victories at Henry and Donelson were the first significant Union victories in the war, and two major rivers became available for invasions into Tennessee.

Johnston's forward defense was broken. As Grant had anticipated, Polk's position at Columbus was untenable, and he withdrew soon after Donelson fell. Grant had also cut the Memphis and Ohio Railroad that previously had allowed Confederate forces to move laterally in support of each other. General P.G.T. Beauregard had arrived from the East to report to Johnston in February, and he commanded all Confederate forces between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, which effectively divided the unity of command so that Johnston controlled only a small force at Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Beauregard planned to concentrate his forces in the vicinity of Corinth, Mississippi, and prepare for an offensive. Johnston moved his force to concentrate with Beauregard's by late March.

The preparations for the Union campaign did not proceed smoothly, and Halleck seemed more concerned with his standing in relation to General-in-Chief George B. McClellan than he did with understanding the Confederate Army was divided and could be defeated in detail. Further, he could not agree with his peer, Buell, now in Nashville, on a joint course of action. He sent Grant up the Tennessee River while Buell remained in Nashville. On March 11, President Lincoln appointed Halleck the commander of all forces from the Missouri River to Knoxville, Tennessee, thus achieving the needed unity of command, and Halleck

ordered Buell to join Grant's forces at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River.

On April 6, the combined Confederate forces under Beauregard and Johnston surprised Grant's unprepared Army of West Tennessee with a massive dawn assault at Pittsburg Landing in the Battle of Shiloh. In the first day of the battle, the Confederate onslaught drove Grant back against the Tennessee but could not defeat him. Johnston died that day; he was considered by Jefferson Davis to be the most effective general in the Confederacy at that time. On the second day, April 7, Grant received reinforcements from Buell and launched a counterattack that drove back the Confederates. Grant failed to pursue the retreating enemy and received enormous criticism for this and for the great loss of life—more casualties (almost 24,000) than all previous American battles combined.

Union control of the Mississippi River began to tighten. On April 7, while the Confederates were retreating from Shiloh, Union Maj. Gen. John Pope defeated Beauregard's isolated force at Island Number 10, opening the river almost as far south as Memphis. On May 18, Admiral David Farragut captured New Orleans, the South's most significant seaport. Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler occupied the city with a strong military government that caused considerable resentment among the civilian population.

Although Beauregard had little concentrated strength available to oppose a southward movement by Halleck, the Union general showed insufficient drive to take advantage of the situation. He waited until he assembled a large army, combining the forces of Buell's Army of the Ohio, Grant's Army of West Tennessee, and Pope's Army of the Mississippi, to converge at Pittsburg Landing. He moved slowly in the direction of the critical rail junction at Corinth, taking four weeks to cover the twenty miles (32 km) from Shiloh, stopping nightly to entrench. The slowness of this movement has led this campaign to be nicknamed the Siege of Corinth. When he finally reached the fortified city, his opponent, Beauregard, decided not to make a costly defensive stand and withdrew without hostilities on May 29.

Grant did not command directly in the Corinth campaign. Halleck had reorganized his army, giving Grant the powerless position of second-in-command and shuffling divisions from the three armies into three "wings". When Halleck moved east to replace McClellan as general-in-chief, Grant resumed his field command. But before he left, Halleck squandered any opportunity to pursue and destroy Beauregard. He sent Buell to Chattanooga, Sherman to Memphis, one division to Arkansas, and Pope was ordered to hold a covering position south of Corinth.

Kentucky, Tennessee, and northern Mississippi (June 1862 – January 1863)

From Corinth (May 1862) to Perryville (October 1862).

While Halleck accomplished little following Corinth, Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg succeeded Beauregard (on June 27, for health reasons) in command of his 56,000 troops of the Army of Tennessee, in Tupelo, Mississippi, due south of Corinth. But he determined that an advance directly north from Tupelo was not practical. He left Maj. Gens. Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn to distract Grant and shifted 35,000 men by rail through Mobile, Alabama, to Chattanooga. Even though he did not leave Tupelo until July 21, he was able to reach Chattanooga before Buell could. Bragg's general plan was to invade Kentucky in a joint operation with Maj. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, cut Buell's lines of communications, defeat him, and then turn back to defeat Grant.

Kirby Smith left Knoxville on August 14, forced the Union to evacuate Cumberland Gap, defeated a small Union force at the Battle of Richmond (Kentucky), and reached Lexington on August 30. Bragg departed Chattanooga just before Smith reached Lexington, while Buell moved north from Nashville to Bowling Green. But Bragg moved quickly and by September 14 had interposed his army on Buell's supply lines from Louisville. Bragg was reluctant to develop this situation because he was outnumbered by Buell; if he had been able to combine with Kirby Smith, he would have been numerically equal, but Smith's command was separate, and Smith believed that Bragg could capture Louisville without his assistance.

Buell, under pressure from the government to take aggressive action, was almost relieved of duty (only the personal reluctance of George H. Thomas to assume command from his superior at the start of a campaign prevented it). As he approached Perryville, Kentucky, he began to concentrate his army in the face of Confederate forces there. Bragg was not initially present with his army, having decided to attend the inauguration ceremony of a Confederate governor of Kentucky in Frankfort. On October 8, fighting began at Perryville over possession of water sources, and as the fighting escalated, Bragg's Army of Mississippi achieved some tactical success in an assault against a single corps of Buell's Army of the Ohio. That evening Bragg realized that he was facing Buell's entire army and ordered a retreat to Harrodsburg, where he was

joined by Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky on October 10. Despite having a strong combined force, Bragg made no attempt to regain the initiative. Buell was equally passive. Bragg retreated through the Cumberland Gap and returned to Murfreesboro by way of Chattanooga.

While Buell was facing Bragg's threat in Kentucky, Confederate operations in northern Mississippi were aimed at preventing Buell's reinforcement by Grant, who was preparing for his upcoming Vicksburg campaign. Halleck had departed for Washington, and Grant was left without interference as commander of the District of West Tennessee. On September 14, Maj. Gen. Sterling Price moved his Confederate Army of the West to Iuka, 20 miles (32 km) east of Corinth. He intended to link up with Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn's Army of West Tennessee and operate against Grant. But Grant sent forces under Maj. Gens. William S. Rosecrans and Edward Ord to attack Price and Van Dorn at Iuka. Rosecrans won a minor victory at the Battle of Iuka (September 19), but poor coordination of forces allowed Price to escape from the intended Union double envelopment.

Price and Van Dorn decided to attack the concentration of Union troops at Corinth and then advance into West or Middle Tennessee. In the Second Battle of Corinth (October 3–4), they attacked the fortified Union troops but were repulsed with serious losses. Retreating to the northwest, they escaped pursuit by Rosecrans's exhausted army, but their objectives of threatening Middle Tennessee and supporting Bragg were foiled.

As winter set in, the Union government replaced Buell with Rosecrans. After a period of resupplying and training his army in Nashville, Rosecrans moved against Bragg at Murfreesboro just after Christmas. In the Battle of Stones River, Bragg surprised Rosecrans with a powerful assault on December 31, pushing the Union forces back to a small perimeter against the Tennessee River. But on January 2, 1863, further attempts to assault Rosecrans were beaten back decisively and Bragg withdrew his army southeast to Tullahoma. In proportion to the size of the armies, the casualties at Stones River (about 12,000 on each side) made it the bloodiest battle of the war. At the end of the campaign, Bragg's threat against Kentucky been defeated, and he effectively yielded control of Middle Tennessee.

Vicksburg Campaigns (December 1862 – July 1863)

Abraham Lincoln believed that the river fortress city of Vicksburg, Mississippi, was a key to winning the war. Vicksburg and Port Hudson were the last remaining strongholds that prevented full Union control of the Mississippi River. Situated on high bluffs overlooking a sharp bend in the river and called the "Gibraltar of the Mississippi", Vicksburg was nearly invulnerable to naval assault. Admiral David Farragut had found this directly in his failed operations of May 1862.

The overall plan to capture Vicksburg was for Ulysses S. Grant to move south from Memphis and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks to move north from Baton Rouge. Banks's advance was slow to develop and bogged down at Port Hudson, offering little assistance to Grant.



Operations against Vicksburg and Grant's Bayou Operations.

First campaign

Grant's first campaign was a two-pronged movement. William T. Sherman sailed down the Mississippi River with 32,000 men while Grant was to move in parallel through Mississippi by railroad with 40,000. Grant advanced 80 miles (130 km), but his supply lines were cut by Confederate cavalry under Earl Van Dorn at Holly Springs, forcing him to fall back. Sherman reached the Yazoo River just north of the city of Vicksburg, but without support from Grant's half of the mission, he was repulsed in bloody assaults against Chickasaw Bayou in late December.

Political considerations then intruded. Illinois politician and Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand obtained permission from Lincoln to recruit an army in southern Illinois and command it on a river-born expedition aimed at Vicksburg. He was able to get Sherman's corps assigned to him, but it departed Memphis before McClernand could arrive. When Sherman returned from the Yazoo, McClernand asserted control. He inexplicably detoured from his primary objective by capturing Arkansas Post on the Arkansas River, but before he could resume his main advance, Grant had reasserted control, and McClernand became a corps commander in Grant's army. For the rest of the winter, Grant attempted five separate projects to reach

the city by moving through or reengineering, rivers, canals, and bayous to the north of Vicksburg. All five were unsuccessful; Grant explained afterward that he had expected these setbacks and was simply attempting to keep his army busy and motivated, but many historians believe he really hoped that some would succeed and that they were too ambitious.

Second campaign

Grant's operations against Vicksburg.

The second campaign, beginning in the spring of 1863, was successful and is considered Grant's greatest achievement of the war (and a classic campaign of military history). He knew that he could not attack through Mississippi from the northwest because of the vulnerability of his supply line; river-born approaches had failed repeatedly. So after movement became possible on dirt roads that were finally drying from the winter rains, Grant moved the bulk of his army down the western bank of the Mississippi. On April 16, U.S. Navy gunboats and troop transports managed at great risk to slip past the Vicksburg defensive guns and were able to ferry Grant's army across the river to land south of Vicksburg at Bruinsburg. Grant employed two strategic diversions to mask his intentions: a feint by Sherman north of Vicksburg and a daring cavalry raid through central Mississippi by Colonel Benjamin Grierson, known as Grierson's Raid. The former was inconclusive, but the latter was a success. Grierson was able to draw out significant Confederate forces, dispersing them around the state.

Grant faced two Confederate armies in his campaign: the Vicksburg garrison, commanded by Maj. Gen. John C. Pemberton, and forces in Jackson, commanded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, the overall theater commander. Rather than simply heading directly north to the city, Grant chose to cut the line of communications (and reinforcement) between the two Confederate armies. His army headed swiftly northeast toward Jackson. Meanwhile, Grant brought with him a limited supply line. The conventional history of the campaign indicates that he cut loose from *all* of his supplies, perplexing Pemberton, who attempted to interdict his nonexistent lines at Raymond on May 12. In reality, Grant relied on the local economy to provide him only foodstuffs for men and animals, but there was a constant stream of wagons carrying ammunition, coffee, hardtack, salt, and other supplies for his army.

Sherman's corps captured Jackson on May 14. The entire army then turned west to confront Pemberton in front of Vicksburg. The decisive battle was at Champion Hill, the effective last stand for Pemberton before he withdrew into his entrenchments around the city. Grant's army assaulted the Confederate works twice at great cost at the start of the Siege of Vicksburg but then settled in for a lengthy siege.

The soldiers and civilians in Vicksburg suffered greatly from Union bombardment and impending starvation. They clung to hope that General Johnston would arrive with reinforcements, but Johnston was both cut off and too cautious. On July 4, Pemberton surrendered his army and the city to Grant. In conjunction with the defeat of Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Gettysburg the previous day, Vicksburg is widely considered one of the turning points of the war. By July 8, after Banks captured Port Hudson, the entire Mississippi River was in Union hands, and the Confederacy was split in two.

Tullahoma, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga (June–December 1863)



Tullahoma Campaign.

After his victory at Stones River, Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro for almost six months while Bragg rested in Tullahoma, establishing a long defensive line that was intended to block Union advances against the strategic city of Chattanooga in his rear. In April, Union cavalry under Col. Abel Streight moved against the railroad that supplied Bragg's army in Middle Tennessee, hoping it would cause them to withdraw to Georgia. Streight's brigade raided through Mississippi and Alabama, fighting against Nathan Bedford Forrest. Streight's Raid ended when his exhausted men surrendered near Rome, Georgia, on May 3. In June, Rosecrans finally advanced against Bragg in a brilliant, almost bloodless, campaign of maneuver, the Tullahoma Campaign, and drove Bragg from Middle Tennessee.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD



From Vicksburg (December 1862 – July 1863) to Chickamauga (September 1863).

During this period, Brig. Gen. John Hunt Morgan and his 2,460 Confederate cavalrymen rode west from Sparta in middle Tennessee on June 11, intending to divert the attention of Ambrose Burnside's Army of the Ohio, which was moving toward Knoxville, from Southern forces in the state. At the start of the Tullahoma Campaign, Morgan moved northward. For 46 days as they rode over 1,000 miles (1,600 km), Morgan's cavalrymen terrorized a region from Tennessee to northern Ohio, destroying bridges, railroads, and government stores before being captured; in November they made a daring escape from the Ohio Penitentiary, at Columbus, Ohio, and returned to the South.

After delaying for several weeks in Tullahoma, Rosecrans planned to flush Bragg out of Chattanooga by crossing the Tennessee River, heading south, and interdicting the Confederate supply lines from Georgia. He began operations on August 18 and used a two-week bombardment of Chattanooga as a diversion. The Confederate high command reinforced Bragg with a division from Mississippi and a corps (Longstreet's) from Virginia. Rosecrans pursued Bragg into the rugged mountains of northwestern Georgia, only to find that a trap had been set. Bragg started the Battle of Chickamauga (September 19–20, 1863) when he launched a three-division assault against the corps of George H. Thomas. A command misunderstanding allowed a major gap to appear in the Union line as reinforcements arrived, and Longstreet was able to drive his corps into that gap and send the Union Army into retreat. If not for the defensive stand by a portion of the line led by Thomas ("The Rock of Chickamauga"), the Union Army would have been completely routed. Rosecrans, devastated by his defeat, withdrew his army to Chattanooga, where Bragg besieged it, occupying the high ground dominating the city.

Back in Vicksburg, Grant was resting his army and planning for a campaign that would capture Mobile and push east. But when news of the dire straits of Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland reached Washington, Grant was ordered to rescue them. On October 17, he was given command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, controlling all of the armies in the Western Theater. He replaced Rosecrans with Thomas and traveled to Chattanooga, where he approved a plan to open a new supply line (the "Cracker Line"), allowing supplies and reinforcements to reach the city. Soon the troops were joined by 40,000 more, under Sherman and Joseph Hooker. While the Union army expanded, the Confederate army contracted; Bragg dispatched Longstreet's corps to Knoxville to hold off an advance by Burnside.



Battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, Chattanooga Campaign.

The Battles for Chattanooga began in earnest on November 24, 1863, as Hooker took Lookout Mountain, which is one of two dominant peaks over the city. The next day, Grant planned a double envelopment of Bragg's position on the other mountain, Missionary Ridge. Sherman was to attack from the north, Hooker from the south, and Thomas was to hold the center. But Sherman's attack bogged down in confusion, and Grant ordered Thomas to launch a minor attack as a diversion to relieve pressure on Sherman. Thomas's troops, caught up in enthusiasm and anxious to redeem themselves after their humiliation at Chickamauga, continued their initial attack by charging up the imposing ridge, breaking the Confederate line and causing them to retreat. Chattanooga was saved; along with the failure of Longstreet's Knoxville Campaign against Burnside, politically sensitive eastern Tennessee was free of Confederate control. An avenue of invasion pointed directly to Atlanta and the heart of the Confederacy. Bragg, whose personal friendship with Confederate President Jefferson Davis saved his command following his defeats at Perryville and Stones River, was finally relieved of duty and replaced by General Joseph E. Johnston.

Atlanta Campaign (May–September 1864)

Map of the Atlanta Campaign.

In March 1864, Grant was promoted to lieutenant general and went east to assume command of all the Union armies. Sherman succeeded him in command of the Western Theater. Grant devised a strategy for simultaneous advances across the Confederacy. It was intended to destroy or fix Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia with three major thrusts (under Meade, Butler, and Sigel) launched in the direction of Richmond and in the Shenandoah Valley; capture Mobile with an army under Nathaniel Banks; and destroy Johnston's army while driving toward Atlanta. Most of the initiatives failed: Butler became bogged down in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign; Sigel was quickly defeated in the valley; Banks became occupied in the ill-fated Red River Campaign; Meade and Grant experienced many setbacks and much bloodshed in the Overland Campaign before finally settling down to a siege of Petersburg. Sherman's Atlanta Campaign was more successful.

At the start of the campaign, Sherman's Military Division of the Mississippi consisted of three armies: James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee (Sherman's old army under Grant), John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio, and George H. Thomas's Army of the Cumberland. Opposing him, the Army of Tennessee was commanded by Joseph E. Johnston. Sherman outnumbered Johnston 98,000 to 50,000, but his ranks were depleted by many furloughed soldiers, and Johnston received 15,000 reinforcements from Alabama.

The campaign opened with several battles in May and June 1864 as Sherman pressed Johnston southeast through mountainous terrain. Sherman prudently avoided frontal assaults against most of Johnston's positions; instead he maneuvered in flanking marches around the defenses. When Sherman flanked the defensive lines (almost exclusively around Johnston's left flank), Johnston would retreat to another prepared position. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain (June 27) was a notable exception, in which Sherman attempted a frontal assault and suffered significant losses. Both armies took advantage of the railroads as supply lines, with Johnston shortening his supply lines as he drew closer to Atlanta, and Sherman lengthening his own.

Just before the Battle of Peachtree Creek (July 20) in the outskirts of Atlanta, Jefferson Davis lost patience with Johnston's strategy and replaced him with the more aggressive Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood. This turned out to be a strategic error because Hood, after occupying strong defensive works around Atlanta for a few weeks, chose to fight Sherman on open ground, a fight that his smaller army could not win. Sherman eventually cut Hood's supply lines from the south. Knowing that he was trapped, Hood evacuated Atlanta on the night of September 1, burning military supplies and installations, causing a great conflagration in the city.

Coincident with Sherman's triumph in Atlanta, Admiral David Farragut won the decisive naval Battle of Mobile Bay on August 24. The city itself, long a desired target of Grant's, remained untouched until 1865, but the last seaport east of the Mississippi on the Gulf Coast was closed, further tightening the Union blockade. The capture of Atlanta and Mobile Bay together boosted Northern morale and made an enormous contribution to the re-election of Abraham Lincoln.

Franklin-Nashville Campaign (September–December 1864)

While Sherman rested his army in preparation for offensive operations to the east, Hood embarked on a campaign to defeat Sherman by interfering with his lines of communications from Chattanooga. He drove west through Alabama and turned north toward Tennessee, hoping that Sherman would follow him and do battle. This was partially effective because his movements, and raids by Nathan Bedford Forrest, were causing considerable consternation to Sherman. However, the Union general did not fully engage. He sent Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas to Nashville to coordinate a defense against Hood, while taking the remainder of his army in the direction of Savannah, Georgia.

Thomas's forces were divided. Half were with him in Nashville and the other half with John M. Schofield, moving in pursuit from Atlanta. Hood hoped to defeat Schofield before he could concentrate his forces with Thomas. He had the chance at the Battle of Spring Hill in Tennessee (November 29, 1864), but the Union troops were able to slip through the trap. At the Battle of Franklin the following day, Hood launched repeated massive frontal assaults against strong entrenchments and suffered severe casualties. It has been said that he mortally wounded his army at Franklin but killed it at the Battle of Nashville

(December 15–16).[4] There, facing the combined force of Schofield and Thomas, he dug in a few miles south of the city and waited. After a two-week preparation period in winter weather, during which he received great pressure from Grant and the Union government to attack, Thomas unleashed an overwhelming assault that sent Hood and his survivors in retreat to Franklin and then to Mississippi, never to recover as a fighting force.

Franklin-Nashville Campaign.

Sherman's March to the Sea (November–December 1864)



Sherman's March to the Sea.

Sherman's Savannah Campaign is more popularly known as the March to the Sea. He and Grant believed that the Civil War would end only if the Confederacy's strategic, economic, and psychological capacity for warfare were decisively broken. Sherman therefore applied the principles of scorched earth, ordering his troops to burn crops, kill livestock, consume supplies, and destroy civilian infrastructure along their path. This policy is one of the key tenets of a strategy of total war.

Sherman's army left Atlanta on November 15, 1864, and was conducted in two columns separated by about 60 miles (100 km), the right under Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard and the left under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. Between these columns, the destruction was significant and spawned hatred for generations. At Savannah, Sherman encountered about 10,000 defending troops under Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee. Following lengthy artillery bombardments, Hardee abandoned the city and Sherman entered on December 22, 1864. He telegraphed to President Lincoln, "I beg to present you as a Christmas gift the City of Savannah ...."

Carolinas Campaign (February–March 1865)

Carolinas Campaign.

After Sherman captured Savannah, he was ordered by Grant to embark his army on ships to reinforce the Union armies in Virginia, where Grant was bogged down in the Siege of Petersburg against Robert E. Lee. Sherman proposed an alternative strategy. He persuaded Grant that he should march north through the Carolinas instead, destroying everything of military value along the way, similar to his march to the sea through Georgia. He was particularly interested in targeting South Carolina, the first state to secede from the Union, for the effect it would have on Southern morale.

Sherman's plan was to bypass the minor Confederate troop concentrations at Augusta, Georgia, and Charleston, South Carolina, and reach Goldsboro, North Carolina, by March 15, 1865. As with his Georgia operations, he marched his armies in multiple directions simultaneously, confusing the scattered Confederate defenders as to his first true objective, which was the state capital Columbia. He faced

the smaller and battered Army of Tennessee, again under the command of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.
On February 17, Columbia surrendered to Sherman. Fires began in the city, and most of the central city was destroyed. The burning of Columbia has engendered controversy ever since, with some claiming the fires were accidental, others a deliberate act of vengeance. On that same day, the Confederates evacuated Charleston. On February 18, Sherman's forces destroyed virtually anything of military value in Columbia. The last significant Confederate seaport, Wilmington, surrendered on February 22.
Johnston's last stand was at the Battle of Bentonville (March 19–21), where he unsuccessfully attempted to defeat a wing of Sherman's army (under Slocum) before it could reach Goldsboro. Sherman pursued Johnston toward Raleigh.
On April 18, three days after the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, Johnston signed an armistice with Sherman at Bennett Place, a farmhouse near Durham Station. Sherman got himself into political trouble by offering terms of surrender to Johnston that encompassed political issues as well as military, without authorization from General Grant or the United States government. The confusion on this issue lasted until April 26, when Johnston agreed to purely military terms and formally surrendered his army and all Confederate forces in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida. It was the second significant surrender that month; on April 9, Robert E. Lee had surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House. It was the virtual end for the Confederacy, although some smaller forces held out, particularly in the Trans-Mississippi region, into the summer.

Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Theater_of_the_American_Civil_War

Trans-Mississippi Theater



Map of Trans-Mississippi Theater of the American Civil War, featuring only the major battles.

The **Trans-Mississippi Theater of the American Civil War** was the major military and naval operations west of the Mississippi River. The area excluded the states and territories bordering the Pacific Ocean, which formed the Pacific Coast Theater of the American Civil War.
The campaign classification established by the United States National Park Service[1] is more fine-grained than the one used in this article. Some minor NPS campaigns have been omitted and some have been combined into larger categories. Only a few of the 75 battles the NPS classifies for this theater are described. Boxed text in the right margin show the NPS campaigns associated with each section.

Trans-Mississippi Department

The Confederate **Trans-Mississippi Department** was formed May 26, 1862, to include Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Indian Territory (now Oklahoma), and Louisiana west of the Mississippi River. It absorbed the Trans-Mississippi District (Department Number Two), which had been organized January 10, 1862, to include that part of Louisiana north of the Red River, the Indian Territory, and the states of Missouri and Arkansas, except for the country east of St. Francis County, Arkansas, to Scott County, Missouri. The combined department had its headquarters at Shreveport, Louisiana, and Marshall, Texas.

Commanders

- Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn (January 10, 1862 – May 23, 1862, District part of Department Number Two)
- Brig. Gen. Paul O. Hébert (May 26, 1862 – June 20, 1862)
- Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder (assigned June 20, 1862, but did not accept)
- Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman (June 20, 1862 – July 16, 1862)
- Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes (July 30, 1862 – February 9, 1863)
- Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith (March 7, 1863 – April 19, 1865)
- Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner (April 19, 1865 – April 22, 1865)
- General Edmund Kirby Smith (April 22, 1865 – May 26, 1865)

Confederate Arizona and New Mexico Territory

In 1861, the Confederate States Army launched a successful campaign into the territory of present day Arizona and New Mexico. Residents in the southern portions of this territory adopted a secession ordinance of their own and requested that Confederate forces stationed in nearby Texas assist them in removing Union Army forces still stationed there. The Confederate territory of Arizona was proclaimed by Col. John Baylor after victories in the Battle of Mesilla at Mesilla, New Mexico, and the capture of several Union forces. Confederate troops were unsuccessful in attempts to press northward in

the territory and withdrew from Arizona completely in 1862 when Union reinforcements arrived from California.
The Battle of Glorieta Pass was a small skirmish in terms of both numbers involved and losses (140 Union, 190 Confederate). Yet the issues were large, and the battle was decisive in resolving them. The Confederates might well have taken Fort Union and Denver had they not been stopped at Glorieta. As one Texan put it, "If it had not been for those devils from Pike's Peak, this country would have been ours."
This small battle dissolved any possibility of the Confederacy taking New Mexico and the far west territories. In April, Union volunteers from California pushed the remaining Confederates out of present-day Arizona at the Battle of Picacho Pass. In the Eastern United States, the fighting dragged on for three more years, but in the Southwest the war was over.
Several battles occurred between Confederate soldiers and or militia within Confederate Arizona, the height of the Apache campaigns against rebel forces was during mid to late 1861.

Missouri
Though a slave state with a highly organized and militant secessionist movement, thanks to the pro-slavery "border ruffians" who battled antislavery militias in Kansas in the 1850s, Missourians sided with the Union by a ratio of two or three to one. Pro-Confederate Governor Claiborne F. Jackson and his small state guard under General Sterling Price linked up with Confederate forces under General Ben McCulloch. After victories at the Battle of Wilson's Creek and at Lexington, Missouri, Confederate forces were driven out of the state by the arrival of large Union forces in February 1862 and were effectively locked out by defeat at the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, on March 7 and March 8.
A guerrilla conflict began to wrack Missouri. Gangs of Confederate insurgents, commonly known as "bushwhackers", ambushed and battled Union troops and Unionist state militia forces. Much of the fighting was between Missourians of different persuasions; both sides carried out large-scale atrocities against civilians, ranging from forced resettlement to murder. Historians estimate that the population of the state fell by one-third during the war; most survived but fled or were driven out by one side or the other. Many of the most brutal bushwhacker leaders, such as William C. Quantrill and William T. "Bloody Bill" Anderson, won national notoriety. A group of their followers remained under arms and carried out robberies and murders for sixteen years after the war, under the leadership of Jesse James, his brother Frank James, and Cole Younger and his brothers.

Texas and Louisiana
The Union mounted several attempts to capture the trans-Mississippi regions of Texas and Louisiana from 1862 until the war's end. With ports to the east under blockade or captured, Texas in particular became a blockade-running haven. Referred to as the "back door" of the Confederacy, Texas and western Louisiana continued to provide cotton crops that were transferred overland to the Mexican border towns of Matamoros and the port of Bagdad, and shipped to Europe in exchange for supplies.
Determined to close this trade, the Union mounted several invasion attempts of Texas, each of them unsuccessful. Confederate victories at Galveston, Texas, and the Battle of Sabine Pass repulsed invasion forces. The Union's disastrous Red River Campaign in western Louisiana, including a defeat at the Battle of Mansfield, effectively ended the Union's final invasion attempt of the region until the fall of the Confederacy. Jeffery Prushankin argues that Kirby Smith's "pride, poor judgment, and lack of military skill" prevented General Richard Taylor from potentially winning a victory that could have greatly affected the military and political situation east of the Mississippi River.[2]
Isolated from events in the east, the Civil War continued at a low level in the Trans-Mississippi theater for several months after Lee's surrender in April 1865. The last battle of the war occurred at Palmito Ranch in southern Texas – a Confederate victory.

Indian Territory
Indian Territory occupied most land of the current U.S. state of Oklahoma and served as an unorganized region set aside for Native American tribes of the Southeastern United States after being removed from their lands more than thirty years before the war. The area hosted numerous skirmishes and seven officially recognized battles[3] involving Native American units allied with the Confederate States of America, Native Americans loyal to the United States government, and Union and Confederate troops. A campaign led by Union General James G. Blunt to secure Indian Territory culminated with the Battle of Honey Springs on July 17, 1863. Though his force included Native Americans, the Union did not incorporate Native American soldiers into its regular army.[4] Officers and soldiers supplied to the Confederacy from Native American lands numbered at 7,860[4] and came largely from the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole nations.[5] Among these was Brig. Gen. Stand Watie, who raided Union positions in Indian Territory with his 1st Cherokee Mounted Rifles regiment well after the Confederacy abandoned the area. He became the last Confederate General to surrender on June 25, 1865.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Mississippi_Theater_of_the_American_Civil_War

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD

ARMY LISTS

44. UNION 1861 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

0-1 INFERIOR DRAGOONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Dragoon	8	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	6	18

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Line or Light Cavalry*

INFANTRY

INFERIOR MINIE

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Inferior	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	6	7

Equipment: Minie Rifles, bayonet
0-1 unit may be *Veterans* (+2)
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

ARTILLERY

0-2 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)
0-1 Galloper Gun Regiment (1-3)

45. CONFEDERATE 1861 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

0-1 DRAGOONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Dragoon	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	22

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Line or Light Cavalry*

INFANTRY

BAYONETS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Bayonet	4	3	2	3	3	1	3	1	7	8

Equipment: Minie Rifle, bayonet
0-1 unit may be *Veterans* (+2)
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

ARTILLERY

0-2 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD

46. UNION 1862 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

INFERIOR DRAGOONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Dragoon	8	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	6	18

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Line or Light Cavalry*

INFANTRY

MINIE

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Minies	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	10

Equipment: Minie Rifles, bayonet
0-2 unit may be *Veterans* (+2)
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

ARTILLERY

0-3 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)
0-1 Galloper Gun Regiment (1-3)

47. CONFEDERATE 1862 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

0-2 DRAGOONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Dragoon	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	22

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Line or Light Cavalry*

INFANTRY

BAYONETS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Bayonet	4	3	2	3	3	1	3	1	7	8

Equipment: Minie Rifle, bayonet
0-2 units may be *Veterans* (+2)
0-1 unit may have *Ambush (+10)*
0-2 may have *Redoubt (+25)*
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

0-1 ENTRENCHMENT

ARTILLERY

0-1 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD

48. UNION 1862 WEST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

0-1 INFERIOR DRAGOONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Dragoon	8	2	2	3	3	1	3	1	6	18

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Line or Light Cavalry*

INFANTRY

MINIE

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Minies	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	10

Equipment: Minie Rifles, bayonet
0-2 unit may be *Veterans* (+2)
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

0-1 SKIRMISHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Marksman	4	2	4	3	3	1	3	1	8	15

Equipment: Minie Rifles
Marksmen are *Elite*
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

ARTILLERY

0-3 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)

49. CONFEDERATE 1862 WEST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

0-1 LIGHT HORSE

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Light	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	24

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry*, *Elite*

INFANTRY

BAYONETS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Bayonet	4	3	2	3	3	1	3	1	7	8

Equipment: Minie Rifle, bayonet
0-2 units may be *Veterans* (+2)
0-1 unit may have *Ambush (+10)*
0-2 may have *Redoubt (+25)*
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

0-1 ENTRENCHMENT

ARTILLERY

0-1 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD

50. UNION 1863-1865 WEST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

DRAGOONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Dragoon	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	22

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Line or Light Cavalry*, 0-2 before 1865

INFANTRY

MINIE

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Minies	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	10

Equipment: Minie Rifles, bayonet
0-4 unit may be *Veterans* (+2)
0-2 may be *Elite* (+2)
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

0-1 SKIRMISHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Marksman	4	2	4	3	3	1	3	1	8	15

Equipment: Minie Rifles
Marksmen are *Elite*
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

0-1 ENTRENCHMENT

ARTILLERY

0-3 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)
0-1 Galloper Gun Regiment (1-3)

51. CONFEDERATE 1863-1865 WEST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

DRAGOONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Dragoon	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	22

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Line or Light Cavalry*

0-1 LIGHT HORSE

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Light	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	24

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry, Elite*

INFANTRY

BAYONETS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Bayonet	4	3	2	3	3	1	3	1	7	8

Equipment: Minie Rifle, bayonet
0-2 units may be *Veterans* (+2)
0-1 unit may have *Ambush (+10)*
0-2 may have *Redoubt (+25)*
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

0-2 ENTRENCHMENT

ARTILLERY

0-2 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)

WAB FORUM SUPPLEMENT

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861 – 1865 AD

52. UNION 1863-1865 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

DRAGOONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Dragoon	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	22

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Line or Light Cavalry*

INFANTRY

MINIE

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Minies	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	10

Equipment: Minie Rifles, bayonet
0-4 unit may be *Veterans* (+2)
0-2 may be *Elite* (+2)
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

0-1 SKIRMISHERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Marksman	4	2	4	3	3	1	3	1	8	15

Equipment: Minie Rifles
Marksmen are *Elite*
Special Rules: *Skirmishers*

ARTILLERY

0-3 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)
0-2 Galloper Gun Regiment (1-3)

53. CONFEDERATE 1863-1865 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

CHARACTERS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
General	4	5	5	3	3	3	5	2	9	130
0-2 Officer	4	5	5	3	3	2	5	2	8	75

Equipment: Sabre, light armour
Special Rules: *Elite*, *Orders*, General is *Army General* (Brigade General) and may be upgraded to Division General with Ld10 (+50). One Officer can be designated as *Army General* (+25) if no General is taken.
May ride a horse (+8, M8).

CAVALRY

DRAGOONS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Dragoon	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	22

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Line or Light Cavalry*

0-1 LIGHT HORSE

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Light	8	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	7	24

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols
Special Rules: *Light Cavalry, Elite*

INFANTRY

BAYONETS

	M	WS	BS	S	T	W	I	A	Ld	Pts
Bayonet	4	3	2	3	3	1	3	1	7	8

Equipment: Minie Rifle, bayonet
0-2 units may be *Veterans* (+2)
0-1 unit may have *Ambush (+10)*
0-2 may have *Redoubt (+25)*
Special Rules: *Line* or *Light Infantry*

0-2 ENTRENCHMENT

ARTILLERY

0-2 Battery of Field Guns (2-4)
0-1 Galloper Gun Regiment (1-3)

Battle of Gettysburg

The **Battle of Gettysburg** was fought July 1–3, 1863, in and around the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The battle with the largest number of casualties in the American Civil War,[7] it is often described as the war's turning point.[8] Union Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade's Army of the Potomac defeated attacks by Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, ending Lee's invasion of the North.

After his success at Chancellorsville in Virginia in May 1863, Lee led his army through the Shenandoah Valley to begin his second invasion of the North—the Gettysburg Campaign. With his army in high spirits, Lee intended to shift the focus of the summer campaign from war-ravaged northern Virginia and hoped to influence Northern politicians to give up their prosecution of the war by penetrating as far as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or even Philadelphia. Prodded by President Abraham Lincoln, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker moved his army in pursuit, but was relieved just three days before the battle and replaced by Meade.

Elements of the two armies initially collided at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863, as Lee urgently concentrated his forces there, his objective being to engage the Union army and destroy it. Low ridges to the northwest of town were defended initially by a Union cavalry division under Brig. Gen. John Buford, and soon reinforced with two corps of Union infantry. However, two large Confederate corps assaulted them from the northwest and north, collapsing the hastily developed Union lines, sending the defenders retreating through the streets of town to the hills just to the south.

On the second day of battle, most of both armies had assembled. The Union line was laid out in a defensive formation resembling a fishhook. In the late afternoon of July 2, Lee launched a heavy assault on the Union left flank, and fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and the Peach Orchard. On the Union right, demonstrations escalated into full-scale assaults on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. All across the battlefield, despite significant losses, the Union defenders held their lines.

On the third day of battle, July 3, fighting resumed on Culp's Hill, and cavalry battles raged to the east and south, but the main event was a dramatic infantry assault by 12,500 Confederates against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, known as Pickett's Charge. The charge was repulsed by Union rifle and artillery fire, at great losses to the Confederate army. Lee led his army on a torturous retreat back to Virginia. Between 46,000 and 51,000 soldiers from both armies were casualties in the three-day battle. That November, President Lincoln used the dedication ceremony for the Gettysburg National Cemetery to honor the fallen Union soldiers and redefine the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address.

Background and movement to battle



Gettysburg Campaign (through July 3); cavalry movements shown with dashed lines.
Red - Confederate
Blue - Union

Shortly after the Army of Northern Virginia won a major victory over the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville (April 30 – May 6, 1863), Robert E. Lee decided upon a second invasion of the North (the first was the unsuccessful Maryland Campaign of September 1862, which ended in the bloody Battle of Antietam). Such a move would upset Federal plans for the summer campaigning season and possibly reduce the pressure on the besieged Confederate garrison at Vicksburg. The invasion would allow the Confederates to live off the bounty of the rich Northern farms while giving war-ravaged Virginia a much-needed rest. In addition, Lee's 72,000-man army[3] could threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and possibly strengthen the growing peace movement in the North.[9]

Thus, on June 3, Lee's army began to shift northward from Fredericksburg, Virginia. To attain more efficiency in his command, Lee had reorganized his two large corps into three new corps. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet retained command of his First Corps. The old corps of deceased Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson was divided in two, with the Second Corps going to Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell and

the new Third Corps to Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill. The Cavalry Division was commanded by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart.[10]
The Union Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, consisted of seven infantry corps, a cavalry corps, and an Artillery Reserve, for a combined strength of about 94,000 men.[2] However, President Lincoln replaced Hooker with Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, a Pennsylvanian, because of Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville and his timid response to Lee's second invasion north of the Potomac River.
The first major action of the campaign took place on June 9 between opposing cavalry forces at Brandy Station, near Culpeper, Virginia. The 9,500 Confederate cavalrymen under Stuart were surprised by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton's combined arms force of two cavalry divisions (8,000 troopers) and 3,000 infantry, but Stuart eventually repulsed the Union attack. The inconclusive battle, the largest predominantly cavalry engagement of the war, proved for the first time that the Union horse soldier was equal to his Southern counterpart.[11]
By mid-June, the Army of Northern Virginia was poised to cross the Potomac River and enter Maryland. After defeating the Federal garrisons at Winchester and Martinsburg, Ewell's Second Corps began crossing the river on June 15. Hill's and Longstreet's corps followed on June 24 and June 25. Hooker's army pursued, keeping between the U.S. capital and Lee's army. The Federals crossed the Potomac from June 25 to June 27.[12]
Lee gave strict orders for his army to minimize any negative impacts on the civilian population.[13] Food, horses, and other supplies were generally not seized outright, although quartermasters reimbursing Northern farmers and merchants with Confederate money were not well received. Various towns, most notably York, Pennsylvania, were required to pay indemnities in lieu of supplies, under threat of destruction. During the invasion, the Confederates seized some 40 northern African Americans, a few of whom were escaped fugitive slaves but most were freemen. They were sent south into slavery under guard.[14]
On June 26, elements of Maj. Gen. Jubal Early's division of Ewell's Corps occupied the town of Gettysburg after chasing off newly raised Pennsylvania militia in a series of minor skirmishes. Early laid the borough under tribute but did not collect any significant supplies. Soldiers burned several railroad cars and a covered bridge, and destroyed nearby rails and telegraph lines. The following morning, Early departed for adjacent York County.[15]

Meanwhile, in a controversial move, Lee allowed Jeb Stuart to take a portion of the army's cavalry and ride around the east flank of the Union army. Lee's orders gave Stuart much latitude, and both generals share the blame for the long absence of Stuart's cavalry, as well as for the failure to assign a more active role to the cavalry left with the army. Stuart and his three best brigades were absent from the army during the crucial phase of the approach to Gettysburg and the first two days of battle. By June 29, Lee's army was strung out in an arc from Chambersburg (28 miles (45 km) northwest of Gettysburg) to Carlisle (30 miles (48 km) north of Gettysburg) to near Harrisburg and Wrightsville on the Susquehanna River.[16]
In a dispute over the use of the forces defending the Harpers Ferry garrison, Hooker offered his resignation, and Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, who were looking for an excuse to get rid of him, immediately accepted. They replaced Hooker early on the morning of June 28 with Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, then commander of the V Corps.[17]
On June 29, when Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac River, he ordered a concentration of his forces around Cashtown, located at the eastern base of South Mountain and eight miles (13 km) west of Gettysburg.[18] On June 30, while part of Hill's Corps was in Cashtown, one of Hill's brigades, North Carolinians under Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured toward Gettysburg. In his memoirs, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, claimed that he sent Pettigrew to search for supplies in town—especially shoes.[19]

This 1863 oval-shaped map depicts Gettysburg Battlefield during July 1–3, 1863, showing troop and artillery positions and movements, relief hachures, drainage, roads, railroads, and houses with the names of residents at the time of the Battle of Gettysburg.

When Pettigrew's troops approached Gettysburg on June 30, they noticed Union cavalry under Brig. Gen. John Buford arriving south of town, and Pettigrew returned to Cashtown without engaging them. When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. Despite General Lee's order to avoid a general

engagement until his entire army was concentrated, Hill decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front. Around 5 a.m. on Wednesday, July 1, two brigades of Heth's division advanced to Gettysburg.

First day of battle



Overview map of the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 1863

Anticipating that the Confederates would march on Gettysburg from the west on the morning of July 1, Buford laid out his defenses on three ridges west of the town: Herr Ridge, McPherson Ridge, and Seminary Ridge. These were appropriate terrain for a delaying action by his small cavalry division against superior Confederate infantry forces, meant to buy time awaiting the arrival of Union infantrymen who could occupy the strong defensive positions south of town at Cemetery Hill, Cemetery Ridge, and Culp's Hill. Buford understood that if the Confederates could gain control of these heights, Meade's army would have difficulty dislodging them.[21]

Heth's division advanced with two brigades forward, commanded by Brig. Gens. James J. Archer and Joseph R. Davis. They proceeded easterly in columns along the Chambersburg Pike. Three miles (5 km) west of town, about 7:30 a.m. on July 1, the two brigades met light resistance from vedettes of Union cavalry, and deployed into line. According to lore, the Union soldier to fire the first shot of the battle was Lt. Marcellus Jones.[22] In 1886 Lt. Jones returned to Gettysburg to mark the spot where he fired the first shot with a monument.[23] Eventually, Heth's men reached dismounted troopers of Col. William Gamble's cavalry brigade, who raised determined resistance and delaying tactics from behind fence posts with fire from their breechloading carbines.[24] Still, by 10:20 a.m., the Confederates had pushed the Union cavalrymen east to McPherson Ridge, when the vanguard of the I Corps (Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds) finally arrived.[25]

North of the pike, Davis gained a temporary success against Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade but was repulsed with heavy losses in an action around an unfinished railroad bed cut in the ridge. South of the pike, Archer's brigade assaulted through Herbst (also known as McPherson's) Woods. The Federal Iron Brigade under Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith enjoyed initial success against Archer, capturing several hundred men, including Archer himself.[26]

General Reynolds was shot and killed early in the fighting while directing troop and artillery placements just to the east of the woods. Shelby Foote wrote that the Union cause lost a man considered by many to be "the best general in the army."[27] Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday assumed command. Fighting in the Chambersburg Pike area lasted until about 12:30 p.m. It resumed around 2:30 p.m., when Heth's entire division engaged, adding the brigades of Pettigrew and Col. John M. Brockenbrough.[28]

As Pettigrew's North Carolina Brigade came on line, they flanked the 19th Indiana and drove the Iron Brigade back. The 26th North Carolina (the largest regiment in the army with 839 men) lost heavily, leaving the first day's fight with around 212 men. By the end of the three-day battle, they had about 152 men standing, the highest casualty percentage for one battle of any regiment, North or South.[29] Slowly the Iron Brigade was pushed out of the woods toward Seminary Ridge. Hill added Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pender's division to the assault, and the I Corps was driven back through the grounds of the Lutheran Seminary and Gettysburg streets.[30]

As the fighting to the west proceeded, two divisions of Ewell's Second Corps, marching west toward Cashtown in accordance with Lee's order for the army to concentrate in that vicinity, turned south on the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads toward Gettysburg, while the Union XI Corps (Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard) raced north on the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown Road. By early afternoon, the Federal line ran in a semicircle west, north, and northeast of Gettysburg.[31]

However, the Federals did not have enough troops; Cutler, who was deployed north of the Chambersburg Pike, had his right flank in the air. The leftmost division of the XI Corps was unable to deploy in time to strengthen the line, so Doubleday was forced to throw in reserve brigades to salvage his line.[32]

Around 2 p.m., the Confederate Second Corps divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Jubal Early assaulted and

out-flanked the Union I and XI Corps positions north and northwest of town. The Confederate brigades of Col. Edward A. O'Neal and Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson suffered severe losses assaulting the I Corps division of Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson south of Oak Hill. Early's division profited from a blunder by Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, when he advanced his XI Corps division to Blocher's Knoll (directly north of town and now known as Barlow's Knoll); this represented a salient[33] in the corps line, susceptible to attack from multiple sides, and Early's troops overran Barlow's division, which constituted the right flank of the Union Army's position. Barlow was wounded and captured in the attack.[34]

As Federal positions collapsed both north and west of town, Gen. Howard ordered a retreat to the high ground south of town at Cemetery Hill, where he had left the division of Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr in reserve.[35] Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock assumed command of the battlefield, sent by Meade when he heard that Reynolds had been killed. Hancock, commander of the II Corps and Meade's most trusted subordinate, was ordered to take command of the field and to determine whether Gettysburg was an appropriate place for a major battle.[36] Hancock told Howard, "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." When Howard agreed, Hancock concluded the discussion: "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Hancock's determination had a morale-boosting effect on the retreating Union soldiers, but he played no direct tactical role on the first day.[37]

General Lee understood the defensive potential to the Union if they held this high ground. He sent orders to Ewell that Cemetery Hill be taken "if practicable." Ewell, who had previously served under Stonewall Jackson, a general well known for issuing peremptory orders, determined such an assault was not practicable and, thus, did not attempt it; this decision is considered by historians to be a great missed opportunity.[38]

The first day at Gettysburg, more significant than simply a prelude to the bloody second and third days, ranks as the 23rd biggest battle of the war by number of troops engaged. About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged.[39]

Second day of battle

Plans and movement to battle

Throughout the evening of July 1 and morning of July 2, most of the remaining infantry of both armies arrived on the field, including the Union II, III, V, VI, and XII Corps. Longstreet's third division, commanded by Maj. Gen. George Pickett, had begun the march from Chambersburg early in the morning; it did not arrive until late on July 2.[40]

The Union line ran from Culp's Hill southeast of the town, northwest to Cemetery Hill just south of town, then south for nearly two miles (3 km) along Cemetery Ridge, terminating just north of Little Round Top. Most of the XII Corps was on Culp's Hill; the remnants of I and XI Corps defended Cemetery Hill; II Corps covered most of the northern half of Cemetery Ridge; and III Corps was ordered to take up a position to its flank. The shape of the Union line is popularly described as a "fishhook" formation. The Confederate line paralleled the Union line about a mile (1,600 m) to the west on Seminary Ridge, ran east through the town, then curved southeast to a point opposite Culp's Hill. Thus, the Federal army had interior lines, while the Confederate line was nearly five miles (8 km) long.



Robert E. Lee's plan for July 2, 1863

Lee's battle plan for July 2 called for Longstreet's First Corps to position itself stealthily to attack the Union left flank, facing northeast astraddle the Emmitsburg Road, and to roll up the Federal line. The attack sequence was to begin with Maj. Gens. John Bell Hood's and Lafayette McLaws's divisions, followed by Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division of Hill's Third Corps. The progressive *en echelon* sequence of this attack would prevent Meade from shifting troops from his center to bolster his left. At the same time, Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's and Jubal Early's Second Corps divisions were to make a demonstration against Culp's and Cemetery Hills (again, to prevent the shifting of Federal troops), and to turn the demonstration into a full-scale attack if a favorable opportunity presented itself.[42]

Lee's plan, however, was based on faulty intelligence, exacerbated by Stuart's continued absence from the battlefield. Instead of moving beyond the Federals' left and

attacking their flank, Longstreet's left division, under McLaws, would face Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles's III Corps directly in their path. Sickles had been dissatisfied with the position assigned him on the southern end of Cemetery Ridge. Seeing higher ground more favorable to artillery positions a half mile (800 m) to the west, he advanced his corps—without orders—to the slightly higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road. The new line ran from Devil's Den, northwest to the Sherfy farm's Peach Orchard, then northeast along the Emmitsburg Road to south of the Codori farm. This created an untenable salient at the Peach Orchard; Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys's division (in position along the Emmitsburg Road) and Maj. Gen. David B. Birney's division (to the south) were subject to attacks from two sides and were spread out over a longer front than their small corps could defend effectively.
Longstreet's attack was to be made as early as practicable; however, Longstreet got permission from Lee to await the arrival of one of his brigades, and while marching to the assigned position, his men came within sight of a Union signal station on Little Round Top. Countermarching to avoid detection wasted much time, and Hood's and McLaws's divisions did not launch their attacks until just after 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., respectively.

Attacks on the Union left flank



Overview map of the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 2, 1863

As Longstreet's divisions slammed into the Union III Corps, Meade was forced to send 20,000 reinforcements[45] in the form of the entire V Corps, Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell's division of the II Corps, most of the XII Corps, and small portions of the newly arrived VI Corps. The Confederate assault deviated from Lee's plan since Hood's division moved more easterly than intended, losing its alignment with the Emmitsburg Road,[46] attacking Devil's Den and Little Round Top. McLaws, coming in on Hood's left, drove multiple attacks into the thinly stretched III Corps in the Wheatfield and overwhelmed them in Sherfy's Peach Orchard. McLaws's attack eventually reached Plum Run Valley (the "Valley of Death") before being beaten back by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of the V Corps, moving down from Little Round Top. The III Corps was virtually destroyed as a combat unit in this battle, and Sickles's leg was amputated after it was shattered by a cannonball. Caldwell's division was destroyed piecemeal in the Wheatfield. Anderson's division, coming from McLaws's left and starting forward around 6 p.m., reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge, but it could not hold the position in the face of counterattacks from the II Corps, including an almost suicidal bayonet charge by the small 1st Minnesota regiment against a Confederate brigade, ordered in desperation by Hancock to buy time for reinforcements to arrive.[47]
As fighting raged in the Wheatfield and Devil's Den, Col. Strong Vincent of V Corps had a precarious hold on Little Round Top, an important hill at the extreme left of the Union line. His brigade of four relatively small regiments was able to resist repeated assaults by Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law's brigade of Hood's division. Meade's chief engineer, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, had realized the importance of this position, and dispatched Vincent's brigade, an artillery battery, and the 140th New York to occupy Little Round Top mere minutes before Hood's troops arrived. The defense of Little Round Top with a bayonet charge by the 20th Maine was one of the most fabled episodes in the Civil War and propelled Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain into prominence after the war.

Attacks on the Union right flank

About 7:00 p.m., the Second Corps' attack by Johnson's division on Culp's Hill got off to a late start. Most of the hill's defenders, the Union XII Corps, had been sent to the left to defend against Longstreet's attacks, and the only portion of the corps remaining on the hill was a brigade of New Yorkers under Brig. Gen. George S. Greene. Because of Greene's insistence on constructing strong defensive works, and with reinforcements from the I and XI Corps, Greene's men held off the Confederate attackers, although the Southerners did capture a portion of the abandoned Federal works on the lower part of Culp's Hill.
Just at dark, two of Jubal Early's brigades attacked the Union XI Corps positions on East Cemetery Hill where Col. Andrew L. Harris of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, came under a withering attack, losing half his men; however, Early failed to support his brigades in their

attack, and Ewell's remaining division, that of Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, failed to aid Early's attack by moving against Cemetery Hill from the west. The Union army's interior lines enabled its commanders to shift troops quickly to critical areas, and with reinforcements from II Corps, the Federal troops retained possession of East Cemetery Hill, and Early's brigades were forced to withdraw.

Union breastworks on Culp's Hill

Jeb Stuart and his three cavalry brigades arrived in Gettysburg around noon but had no role in the second day's battle. Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton's brigade fought a minor engagement with newly promoted 23-year-old Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer's Michigan cavalry near Hunterstown to the northeast of Gettysburg.

Third day of battle

General Lee wished to renew the attack on Friday, July 3, using the same basic plan as the previous day: Longstreet would attack the Federal left, while Ewell attacked Culp's Hill.[52] However, before Longstreet was ready, Union XII Corps troops started a dawn artillery bombardment against the Confederates on Culp's Hill in an effort to regain a portion of their lost works. The Confederates attacked, and the second fight for Culp's Hill ended around 11 a.m., after some seven hours of bitter combat.

Lee was forced to change his plans. Longstreet would command Pickett's Virginia division of his own First Corps, plus six brigades from Hill's Corps, in an attack on the Federal II Corps position at the right center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Prior to the attack, all the artillery the Confederacy could bring to bear on the Federal positions would bombard and weaken the enemy's line.



Overview map of the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 3, 1863

Around 1 p.m., from 150 to 170 Confederate guns began an artillery bombardment that was probably the largest of the war. In order to save valuable ammunition for the infantry attack that they knew would follow, the Army of the Potomac's artillery, under the command of Brig. Gen. Henry Jackson Hunt, at first did not return the enemy's fire. After waiting about 15 minutes, about 80 Federal cannons added to the din. The Army of Northern Virginia was critically low on artillery ammunition, and the cannonade did not significantly affect the Union position. Around 3 p.m., the cannon fire subsided, and 12,500 Southern soldiers stepped from the ridgeline and advanced the three-quarters of a mile (1,200 m) to Cemetery Ridge in what is known to history as "Pickett's Charge". As the Confederates approached, there was fierce flanking artillery fire from Union positions on Cemetery Hill and north of Little Round Top, and musket and canister fire from Hancock's II Corps. In the Union center, the commander of artillery had held fire during the Confederate bombardment, leading Southern commanders to believe the Northern cannon batteries had been knocked out. However, they opened fire on the Confederate infantry during their approach with devastating results. Nearly one half of the attackers did not return to their own lines. Although the Federal line wavered and broke temporarily at a jog called the "Angle" in a low stone

fence, just north of a patch of vegetation called the Copse of Trees, reinforcements rushed into the breach, and the Confederate attack was repulsed. The farthest advance of Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Armistead's brigade of Maj. Gen. George Pickett's division at the Angle is referred to as the "High-water mark of the Confederacy", arguably representing the closest the South ever came to its goal of achieving independence from the Union via military victory.[56]

There were two significant cavalry engagements on July 3. Stuart was sent to guard the Confederate left flank and was to be prepared to exploit any success the infantry might achieve on Cemetery Hill by flanking the Federal right and hitting their trains and lines of communications. Three miles (5 km) east of Gettysburg, in what is now called "East Cavalry Field" (not shown on the accompanying map, but between the York and Hanover Roads), Stuart's forces collided with Federal cavalry: Brig. Gen. David McMurtrie Gregg's division and Brig. Gen. Custer's brigade. A lengthy mounted battle, including hand-to-hand sabre combat, ensued. Custer's charge, leading the 1st Michigan Cavalry, blunted the attack by Wade Hampton's brigade, blocking Stuart from achieving his objectives in the Federal rear. Meanwhile, after hearing news of the day's victory, Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick launched a cavalry attack against the infantry positions of Longstreet's Corps southwest of Big Round Top. Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth protested against the futility of such a move but obeyed orders. Farnsworth was killed in the attack, and his brigade suffered significant losses.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gettysburg

ARMY LIST SAMPLES

BATTLE REPORT

MANUFACTURERS

http://www.oldgloryminiatures.com
http://www.perry-miniatures.com/
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COMMUNITY

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http://www.wab-forum.de (german)

SPECIAL THANKS

Many thanks to WAB Forum members for providing the template and their great support.