PANZER LEADER 1940
by Ramiro Cruz

	The battle for France in 1940, for all its brevity, is probably still one of the most fateful events in modern history. Just think of it: At daybreak on May 10, 1940, France was the cultural center of the world. Her army was widely regarded as the most powerful on Earth. Her empire was second only to the British in size. Actually, the French empire, being made up mostly of African colonies, was much easier to protect and defend than the British, with its colonies spread all over the world. Great Britain, in turn, was the world power, the only nation with possessions everywhere . . . and the naval power to defend them. The two foremost powers on Earth faced again the foe they had defeated twenty years before. And just six weeks later, how it all changed! The French armies had been routed, most of France had been occupied and Britain was now alone, seemingly defenseless in the face of imminent attack. And look around now. The two powers facing the Germans that tenth of May took part in the final victory, despite their initial defeats, but not without crippling themselves in the process. Both have lost their empires and have been reduced to an inconsequential position in world affairs, all due to that six weeks of battle, thirty-seven years ago . . .
	The reasons for the collapse of 1940 have been argued, proven and refuted to death. There is no point in beating that dead horse again here. One point worth discussion, however, is the relative capabilities  of German  and  Allied   weapons, especially tanks. During the war, no one was in the mood to publish hard data on weapons still in use. As a result, exaggerated estimates, misconceptions and propaganda were taken as fact for years. Nowadays, of course, we know better.
	For the historically minded wargamer, it is unfortunate that no one has designed a tactical wargame on the battles, of 1940. The disparity between the German and the Allied armies, an abyss at strategic level, was not as pronounced at the tactical  level.  As  in  Russia  a year later,  the equipment to stop the Germans was there, but was badly misused . . . Our purpose here is to create a variant for the regular PANZER LEADER game. A few extra rules will be added as required and, with the addition of a few extra 1940-vintage weapons,

THE UNITS

Anti-tank Artillery
	During the 1930's, mechanical development made tanks a bigger menace than the WWI models had ever been. To stop them, most major armies developed anti-tank guns of 37-40mm caliber, weighing about a thousand pounds. These were precision instruments, designed to hurl a shell or solid shot at a very high velocity and to penetrate the against it. A good example was the German 37mm PAK. 35/36, on which Japanese, Soviets and Americans based their own 37mm guns. This weapon had an effective range of about 400 yards, although it was powerless against the heavier (and better armored) British infantry tanks. Early in 1941, the Germans began to replace it with a bigger gun. The British Army developed the two pounder: a 40mm gun, firing a two-pound solid shot. This gun had more range than the German weapon and was more sophisticated. It incorporated such niceties as a mounting which allowed all-around traverse in the firing position. It also weighed twice as much as its German counterpart (you will never get something for nothing). The French (always different from everybody else) relied on three different pieces for anti-tank defense. The most common was the 25mm gun. Most of these were a 1934 model, heavier than the more powerful German 37mm. An improved 1937 version was also available. As a back-up the French used the veteran 75mm gun, model 1897. This was actually a medium field gun, used in the A-T role. Although effective, this old cannon was gradually being replaced by the new 47mm gun. Only a few of these weapons were issued on time for the battle. In latter years, it became fashionable to regard these small guns as little more than peashooters, but don't forget that the anti-tank guns of 1940 were quite able to deal with the tanks of 1940. The King Tiger was not around yet.
	Finally, in a class by itself, there was the famous German 88mm gun. This weapon had been designed for heavy anti-aircraft work: to put a 20-pound shell at any desired point up to five miles  up. The Germans tested this (and other) weapon(s) in Spain, during the ;ivil war, and discovered that the 88 made a fearsome anti-tank gun, taking note of the fact for future reference. The 88 was used in the battle for France, but seldom in the A-T role. That would not become fashionable until later in the war. Eventually, the idea of killing tanks with AA guns was copied by the Americans and the Russians. The 88 was used by the Germans until the end of the war and by other nations after it. A few nations still use them to this day.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery
	As tanks improved, aircraft did the same, and the old WWI anti-aircraft guns, which had been retained since then, became obsolete within a few years. Everybody agreed on the need for powerful guns to deal with high-flying planes (above, say, 20,000 feet). This required sophisticated weapon systems like the German 88 or the British 3.7 inch gun and their associated paraphernalia: trackers, range predictors, etc. Older weapons were retrofitted with the new gadgets and kept in service. The best example of this is the British 3 inch anti-aircraft gun, which entered the service in 1914 and remained in use until 1946. Except for the German 88, these weapons were used only in the rear areas, against airplanes. That's why they are not included in the game. Everybody agreed, too, on the need for small caliber quick-firing guns to deal with low flying planes (under 10,000 feet) and planes at medium altitudes (up to 20,000 feet). The former were light weapons up to about 25mm caliber while the latter went up to about 50mm. Predictors were much less sophisticated than in the big guns and would have been useless against low flying planes anyway. High rate of fire (over 100 rounds per minute) and tracer ammunition were used to make up for this deficiency.
	The German light flak gun was the 2 cm Flak 30 while the medium gun was the 3.7 cm Flak 36. Both were fine weapons and were used throughout the war, supplemented by newer weapons or modified as needed. In addition to these, the Germans also made good use of a large number of captured foreign weapons, mostly in rear areas. In Britain, the army had neglected its A-A defense for many years. As the threat of war grew bigger, the top army brass began to see the light and thus began a last minute search for anything which could be called light flak. The Royal Navy had been using quick-firing guns for decades and had what seemed to be a model suitable for use on land. This was the O.Q.F., 2 pr, better known as the 2-pounder Pom Pom. This
was a 40mm weapon, based on an older I-pounder gun. The army having nothing else available, tried to adapt the Royal Navy's gun for their purposes. Unfortunately, this gun had been designed to be used in a ship, where weight is almost insignificant. Weighing seven and a half tons, the Pom Pom could never be considered a mobile weapon. Fortunately, an alternative appeared after all: the 40mm Bofors gun. This Swedish weapon weighed only two tons and had a more powerful shell and greater range than the British Pom Pom. The choice was obvious, and purchase of a batch of Bofors guns was followed by production under license in Britain. Versatile enough to be used both as a light and medium anti-aircraft gun, the Bofors is one of the great weapons of the war. It was used, through purchase, loan or capture, by all major combatants and many minor ones in WWII and has remained in service around the world to this day. The French Army used two light guns, a 20mm and a 25mm gun. The 20mm weapon was the Swiss Oerlikon, made in France under license. This was also a very popular gun, as widely used as the 40mm Bofors, although the Oerlikon was used mainly as a naval weapon. The 25mm piece was a French design, produced by Hotchkiss since 1930. Other weapons were also available, like the 37mm Hotchkiss and the 40mm Bofors, but were not used by army units in the field. The French did not seem to worry too much about the menace from the air and their units' establishment did not include any anti-aircraft artillery at all. Twenty-two divisions had a dozen 20mm Oerlikons apiece and another thirteen divisions had six 25mm guns each. More than half of the French Army had no anti-aircraft protection at all!

Infantry Guns
	During the First World War, the various combatants soon discovered the impotence of infantry against any strong position, specially when defended with machine guns. This led to the invention of a number of weapons to increase the infantry's firepower. At the infantryman's level, there was the submachinegun and the hand grenade. Platoons, companies and larger units had various sizes of mortars and light guns. It is the light infantry gun with which we are concerned here. 
	The infantry gun was never all that popular, since most nations thought the mortar was a more efficient solution to the infantry's needs. Of the major powers, the French and the Japanese went for the infantry gun idea, but not to the extent that the Germans did. The two former nations had only small man-carried guns at company level. The French gun was a 37mm WWI piece which was used in WWII. This was the "Canon d'infantrie de 37 mle 1916 TRP." Obsolete by  1939, it was used by the French in WWII due to the limited number of infantry support weapons available. It was issued mainly to second class units: reservists, colonial troops, etc. The Germans, on the other hand, made full-size guns and organized them in eightigun companies, attached to the infantry regiments.
	The most common German infantry gun was the 7.5 cm IG 18, a weapon developed in 1927. It had the unusual feature of a break-open action, like a shotgun, to load the gun. It was used throughout the war, like the heavier 15 cm sIG 33. This was a more conventional design, issued in 1933. The IC 18 weighed only 800 Ibs., while the sIG 33 tilled the scales at 3500 Ibs. Just for comparison, the British 25 pounder and the American 105mm howitzer weighed 4000 and 5000 Ibs. respectively. The usefulness of the German infantry guns seems to be highly questionable, specially when compared with the mortars, which were every bit as effective as the infantry guns, but were lighter, cheaper and easier to manufacture and to use.

Medium Guns
	Seemingly since the Dark Ages, field guns have been part of all Western armies, becoming more important with each technological improvement. Centuries of steady development culminated in the invention of the first modern gun, the French Schneider 75mm gun, in 1897. This gun had an hydraulic recoil system and a breech, block design which permitted a high rate of fire (6 to 12 rounds per minute). These features were copied in contemporary guns and have been used in these weapons ever since. "Medium gun" is a very loose term, meaning different things to different people. Here, we will define as "medium gun" those weapons normally used in the artillery regiments of front-line divisions.
	The medium guns of 1940, whether WWI veterans  or brand-new weapons, shared some similarities. They all were mobile weapons, weighing about one to six tons and of 75 to 155mm caliber.  Some retained the old wooden-spoked wheels and carriage designed for horse traction, but many had newer carriages and pneumatic wheels for lowing  by  motorized  vehicles.  Self-propelled artillery had been advocated for many years, but it had not yet been put in practice. All the medium guns of 1940 were towed.
	At the end of WWI, the French had huge numbers of the 75mm gun already mentioned. For economic reasons, these old weapons had been retained and were in use in 1940. This is not as terrible as it seems, since the 75 was a fine gun. The U.S. Army adopted it as standard field gun in 1918, and did not begin to replace it until 1940. Indeed, this 80-year old weapon is still in use today in a few nations around the world. In addition to the 75. the French also used 105 and 155mm medium guns. These weapons came in various models, from old pre-WWI pieces to brand-new designs, but they were never as numerous as the ubiquitous 75.
	The British equivalent of the French 75 was the 18  pounder gun.  This weapon, whose official designation was "Ordnance, Q. F. 18 pr." entered the service in 1904. Its caliber was 3.3 in and was used in large numbers in WWI. During the 1930's, new and better weapons came out. but the shortage of them forced the use of the 18 pr when WWII began. A number of these veterans were taken to France by the British and abandoned there in 1940. Some remained in service, for training purposes, until the end of the war. The need for a gun firing a 25 pound shell was seen as early as 1925, but it was , not until the early thirties that anything was done about it. The reason for the delay was, of course the large number of 18 prs available. Trying to have their cake and eat it, too, the British began, in 1935, to rebore existing 18 pr barrels to take the 25 pound ammunition (3.45 in caliber). The result was the "Ordnance, Q. F. 25 pr Mark I," commonly known as the 18/25 pr. By 1939 this weapon had become the most common gun in the British field artillery regiments. Large numbers of them were sent to France and lost there. The 18/25 pr was intended to be only a stop-gap, until the "pure" 25 prs could take their place. The latter weapon, the 25 pr Mark 2, was designed from the beginning to take the 25 pound shell.   It  entered  service  in   1940,  completely replacing the 18/25 pr by 1944. The Mark 2 was used for the first time in Norway, and none were sent to the British Expeditionary Force in France. This is the "25 pr" included in the PANZER LEADER units.
	Germany, after her defeat in WWI, was forced by the Versailles Treaty to scrap most of the guns she had. Thus, when her army began to be expanded after Hitler's rise to power, new weapons had to be provided, giving the German artillery an edge over opponents equipped with older weapons. The smallest medium gun was the 7.5 cm leFK 18, first issued in 1938 and used until 1945. Wooden-spoked wheels were fitted, making the gun unfit for lowing by motor vehicles. The "medium" medium gun was the 10.5 cm leFH 18. A first class weapon, this gun entered service in 1935 and was the backbone of the German field artillery until the end of the war. It was fitted with either wooden-spoked wheels or rubber tires. The heavier partner of the leFH 18 was the sFH 18, a 15 cm weapon which served from 1934 to 1945. It was also fitted for horse draught or motor lowing. These weapons  are also included in the PANZER LEADER game. Like the French 75 and the British 25 pr, these German guns were used by other nations after the end of the war and some armies have kept them to this day.

Mortars
	About 1908, the German Army began to issue a small man-carried mortar to be carried by the infantry and provide it with the firepower to deal with minor enemy strongpoints. During the First World War, the practice was copied by the other warring nations. Infantry guns, already mentioned, and mortars of various sizes were developed. Most of the latter were improvisations which were discarded after the war, but their capabilities were not forgotten. During the late twenties, the concept of heavy firepower in the hands of the infantry, for close support, came up again. Light mortars were the obvious weapon to fill this need. being powerful for their size, cheap and easily portable, so all nations began to make or buy mortars again. They came essentially in three sizes: small (45 to 60mm caliber), medium (75 to 85mm) and large (over
90mm).
	The small ones were used by the infantry platoons and are part of the infantry units' Attack Strength   in  the   PA NZERBLITZ/ PANZER LEADER game system, so no unit counter is provided for them. The French Army used the Brandt 60mm mortar, model 1935. This mortar was. by the way. made under license in the U.S. and was used by the American Army in WWII. The British used the Spanish Ecia 50mm mortar. Under the official name of "Ordnance. M.L. 2-inch mortar." It entered service in 1938. being used throughout the war and for many years afterwards. Fifteen different models were developed. The Germans had a 50mm mortar which saw service in limited numbers in WWII. Slightly more powerful and accurate than its British counterpart, it weighed over three times as much (31 vs IOIbs.). which did not exactly endear it to the infantrymen who had to carry the thing around.
	The German medium mortar was the 8cm Granatenwerfer 34. an 81mm weapon used in the German Army from 1934 to 1945. The "Ordnance. M.L. 3 inch" mortar was the British medium weapon. It was based on the 3 inch Stokes mortar of 1915. on which are based all modern medium mortars. The 3 inch mortar was outranged by the German 81mm. but fired a heavier bomb. The French used the Brandt 81mm, model 27/31. Like the Brandt 60mm. this mortar was produced in the U.S. It is included in PANZER LEADER, as are the British 3 inch (76mm) and the German 81mm mortars.
	The large mortars were used mainly by the chemical warfare units of the various armies, to deliver poison gas (not used in WWII) and smoke, although some thought had been given to the idea of firing high explosive from them. There were not that many of them in service and certainly were not as popular as they were to become later, as the war went on. The French and the British had no heavy mortars. The Germans had the 10 cm Nebelwerfer 35. This was a 105mm weapon first issued in 1935. It was used in small numbers until the end of the war. It was replaced since  1941  by rocket batteries and since 1942 by a copy of the 120mm Soviet mortar.

Infantry
	By the fourth decade of the 20th century, the infantry's traditional title of "Queen of Battles" had become little more than a bad joke as far as the infantrymen were concerned. The dramatic improvement in guns and rifles made in the last decades of the 19th century, coupled witfi the invention of the machine gun. forced the infantry first to hide among the bushes and then to dig into the ground for protection. Hardly the position for the  queen  of anything.  Despite  her  obvious weakness, made only worse by the new threat from the air. infantry made the bulk of the armies of 1940, the reason being that infantry is. of all branches, the cheapest.
	The basic infantry unit in PANZER LEADER is the platoon. These were very similar among the various warring nations: a few machine guns and automatic rifles, an anti-tank rifle and a light mortar (sometimes) and a small crowd armed with SMG's, rifles, hand grenades, pistols and bayonets. Usually, the platoon was made of four squads of about ten men each. Three infantry platoons would form a company, three companies would form a battalion and three battalions, a regiment or a brigade. This method of building units with three sub-units as building blocks, known as the triangular system, was very popular then and now. Exceptions were sometimes made, as in German infantry companies, made up of four infantry platoons, or in British battalions,  made  of  four  infantry  companies. Special sub-units with heavy weapons were added to support the infantry element in the higher echelon units.
	Most of the infantry's firepower came from its machine guns. The Germans considered the MG the most important infantry weapon and had more per platoon than their opponents. Grenades and submachine guns provided additional punch at short range. Everybody had hand grenades in 1940. but only the Germans had sub-machine guns. The French had automalic rifles, but these are heavier weapons, closer to light machine guns than to SMG's. The British Expeditionary Force did not have any SMG's either, since the top Brass had made quite clear before the war that they did not want them. As a War Office officer put it: "the British Army saw no need to equip itself with gangster weapons." Light mortars were a useful addition, but were not all that important. The Germans and the British had anti-tank rifles, but these were of very limited value. They could only penetrate light armor although they could break the tracks of larger tanks. Rifles and pistols were almost ineffective except as morale boosters for the men carrying them, while bayonets were seldom used in combat, being reserved for really important things, like opening tin cans and cooking.
	The other infantry-type unit in the game is the engineer platoon. These units were armed like infantry, but had a smaller number of heavier weapons (MG's. mortars, etc.). The engineer units had (and still have) two main duties: to create obstacles to oppose enemy advance and to speed up friendly advance by removing enemy or natural obstacles. For these tasks, they carried construction and demolition equipment, including explosives, flamethrowers and other nasty toys which made them very effective in close assault, as shown in the game.

Transport
	Although motor vehicles had been around for decades and had shown their potential since the First World War, the armies of 1940 were, for the most part. dependent on horses for transport. The main reasons for this anachronism were two: conservatism among top army officers and limited motor vehicle production capacity. The German and the French armies depended on horses to move most of their infantry. Horses were sometimes a strategic and tactical liability as they had some problems which motor vehicles did not have: low speed, low endurance and vulnerability to disease. For instance, the German 78th Infantry Division was immobilized for over a week due to an epidemic of equine flu. The German and the French armies both had a small number of mechanized formations (about 20 percent of the total field force) which used trucks for most of their transport needs. Unmotorized formations had a limited number of motor vehicles for supply, support, recon. etc. The British Expeditionary Force, on the other hand, was completely motorized. but it must be remembered that the small BEF was about the size of the motorized element in the French and the German armies.
	Besides trucks, all major armies had tracked and semi-tracked transport vehicles to get to places where trucks could not go. In the game, these vehicles are assumed to be armored, although this was not always the case. The Germans developed a number of armored and unarmored half-tracks of which the most important was the Sd Kfz 251, which was first used in Poland in 1939. Used in large numbers throughout the war. twenty-two different variants of this vehicle were issued. Britain had the Bren Carrier, a fully tracked vehicle which, first produced in 1936. was used in huge numbers throughout the war. The early models carried only a Bren machine gun (from which came the vehicle's name) and its gunners, but no other passengers. A few were made with unprotected seats on the outside, to carry infantrymen, but they were a
failure. Another variant, the Scout Carrier, was made with the passenger's compartment protected by armor. It was made in limited numbers and used by the BEF, as were the other models described. For simplicity, only the Scout Carrier will be used here. It was very similar to the Universal Carrier, included in PANZER LEADER. The French had two fully tracked armored carriers: the Renault UE and the Lorraine 37L. The former was a 1931 vehicle, obsolescent by 1940, while the latter was first issued in 1937 and was intended to replace the older model.
These vehicles, known as "chenillettes." were used by motorized and unmotorized formations, to supply front-line units with ammunition and fuel. A few mounted a machine gun, but most had no
armament. The carrying capacity of the vehicles themselves was rather limited, so an armored tracked trailer was usually provided. A small number of 37L's were converted to armored personnel carriers by raising the armor in the cargo compartment of the vehicles and in their trailers. These AOC's would have been a useful addition to the French mechanized forces, had more been available. As it was, the few made could not have any effect on the battle. The APC version of the chenilletes is the only one included here, since supply is not needed in the game.

Armored Cars
	The armored car was used by all combatants for many and varied duties: security, reconnaissance, mobile headquarters, etc. As several models and variants were normally in use. only the most important ones will be mentioned here. The Germans, with their customary thoroughness, took the time and effort to provide themselves with a good number of light and heavy armored cars. The light car was the Sd Kfz 221, a four-wheel car armed with a machine gun. This was a fast vehicle which, despite its poor cross-country performance, remained in service throughout the war. There were two heavy cars. the Sd Kfz 231 6-wheeler and the Sd
K.fz 231  8-wheeler.  Both vehicles had the same designation although they were completely different. The 6-wheeler was first introduced in 1933 and was based on a commercial truck chassis, with steering in the two front wheels and propulsion in the two rear axles. This vehicle suffered from poor manoeuvrability and cross-country performance and it began to be replaced in 1938 by the 8-wheel car, which had eight-wheel steering and drive and was very similar to the Sd Kfz 234/ I (issued in 1944 and included in the game). Both the 6-and the 8-wheelers were armed with a 20mm gun and a machine gun. The British had two armored cars: the Morris CS9/ LAC and the Daimler Scout Car. Both were four-wheeled vehicles, but only the Daimler had 4-wheel drive. The Morris was first issued in 1938 and was armed with a machine gun and an anti-tank rifle. It was intended as a stop-gap only, until a better car came out of the factories, due to its poor cross-country performance. Its replacement was the Daimler, first produced in 1939. This was an outstanding design, although the early models were handicapped by poor weaponry (only a machine gun). These Daimlers are not the Daimler armored cars included in the game. Only 38 Morris cars and a smaller number of Daimlers were used by the BEF in 1940. Unlike the Germans and the British, the French had only one armored car design: the Panhard 178. This was a four-wheeled car, with four-wheel drive and entered service in 1935. Armed with a 25mm anti-tank gun and a machine gun. the Panhard was one of the best armored cars of its time and, after the collapse of the French Army. the Germans put to their own use all the Panhards they could lay their hands on.

Tanks
	For all that has been said about them. the tanks of 1940 were not the invincible monsters some believed them to be at that time. They were bounded both by their technical limitations and by the relatively small numbers available. The "average" (so to speak) tank of 1940 had relatively thin armor, with seldom a maximum thickness of more than one or two inches and. in light tanks, as little as 1/8 of an inch in the weaker places. Sloped armor was uliusual, flat vertical plates being almost the rule. Few tank guns were capable of Firing both high explosive shells and armor piercing shot. The majority of the gun-armed tanks were equipped to Fire only the latter. With machine guns as their only anti-personnel weapon, most tanks were, therefore, handicapped when attacking infantry positions, unless they could obtain external support. Indeed, thousands of tanks had no other weapon than one or two machine guns, to the obvious detriment of their fighting ability. Despite their bulk and size, tanks were (and still are) fragile vehicles, requiring careful  maintenance  and  subject  to  frequent breakdowns. To keep them going, good mechanics and well trained crews were needed and the number of tanks an army could maintain was limited as
effectively by manufacturing capacity and vehicle procurement and operating costs as by the limited supply of men trained to handle the machines. On the other hand. the tanks' might should not be underestimated. They could be stopped only with weapons designed for that purpose or with medium and heavy artillery (which usually was not close to the front). Infantrymen caught without anti-tank weapons were helpless against tanks and as likely as not to flee in disorder at their approach. Awareness of what tanks could and could not accomplish also limited their use. although the definition of what could be done or not was often subject to the prejudices of officers committed to the preservation of traditional branches of the army (like horsed cavalry). Which brings us to another element which also limited (or enhanced) the capabilities of the tanks: the doctrine of their owners. Since each army had its own doctrine on the use of tanks, it is more practical to study these weapons by nationality as we shall do here.
	British military planners agreed on the need for two basic types of tank: the cruiser and the infantry tank.  British doctrine called  for the  infantry, supported by the heavily armored "I" (infantry) tanks, to break the enemy front and for the faster cruiser tanks to exploit the gap and attack the enemy rear. Being in the forefront of battle, infantry tanks would require heavy armor. On the other hand, speed would not be essential, since they just had to be fast enough to keep pace with marching infantry. Two models Filled this need: the infantry tanks Mark I (A 11) and the Mark 11 Matilda (Al 2). The former was a light and cheap vehicle, developed in 1936. It was well armored for its small size, but badly underpowered, with a top speed of only 8 miles per hour. Armed only with one machine gun, the A 11 was obsolete by 1939, but was used in 1940 anyway. It was a total failure, unable to outrun enemy tanks against which it was defenseless and, after the debacle in France, it was relegated to use in training. The A 12, First issued in 1940. was less of a failure, if only because its thick armor could only be penetrated by the more powerful German guns. It also was very slow. with a maximum speed of 15 m.p.h.. and was armed with a 2-pdr gun and a MG, both in the turret. Since its gun fired only armor-piercing shot, its only anti-personnel weapon was its MG, which was a serious limitation in combat. Like the A 12, all British tanks of this period suffered from the inability to fire high explosive from their weapons.
	The cruiser tanks, in turn. were further divided into light and medium. The British light tank was the "Light Tank Mark VI B". a fast little machine, thinly armored and with two MG's as its only weapon, the final product of a long line of light tanks made in Britain during the thirties. Despite its good speed, the Mark VI proved to be virtually useless in battle, due to its weak armor and poor armament. The medium cruisers were the A 10 and the A 13. The A 10 was a mediocre tank, based on a previous cruiser tank whose main virtue was that it was cheap. It was a vain attempt to make a tank able to act both as an infantry and as a cruiser tank, resulting in a machine combining the worst of both: the speed of an "I" tank (16 m.p.h.), but with armor too thin for such a job. The A 13 was a better tank, being based on a Christie tank brought from the United States, and had a top speed of 30 m.p.h. First issued in 1939, the First models were rather thinly armored and an uparmored version soon came out. Both variants saw action in France. Both the A 10 and the A 13 were armed like the A 12, with a 2-pdr gun and a MG in the turret.
	British tank doctrine was the product of two diverging schools of thought. The first, represented by most senior officers, regarded the new weapon as a threat to the dominance of the older branches of the army and tried to keep tankists under control by keeping their tanks in small units, directly controlled by the infantry. The second school was made up of tank enthusiasts, who wanted a bigger role for their machines. As a reaction to the pressure from the  conservative  senior  officers,  most  tankists turned their backs to the lessons of the peacetime exercises of the thirties and claimed that an all-tank army was the army of the future and that the physical and morale shock caused by their all-powerful machines would be enough to shatter any unarmored enemy. It was a most unfortunate situation, for both sides were actually turning away from science and experience, relying instead on fear, superstition and myth. Both sides got some of what they wanted, with the senior officers, of course, getting things done their way most of the time. Both sides received tanks tailored to their requirements. The tankists had an armored division created, but were not allowed to command it and, eight months after the war began, this unit still was in England. Tankists were promoted to high rank but immediately sent out of the way (to Egypt in one case. to retirement in another). Many British lives were thus wasted, either by refusing to use armor until too late. like in France, or by launching it in headlong charges against dug-in German anti-tank guns. as so often happened in the North African desert.
	At the end of the First World War. the French had more tanks than anyone. This lead in quantity and quality was allowed to lapse, due to lack of interest (and money) during the thirties, just as the Germans and Russians stepped-up their tank building programs. French military doctrine at that time was based on the supposed inviolability of a well organized defense line. Offensive action was inconceivable except to mop up the remnants of the enemy after it has spent its strength in futile attacks. French tanks, and the doctrine for their employment. were developed with this scenario in mind. It would be incorrect, however, to say that the French Army discarded tanks completely. After all. the French created an armored division before the Germans and the British did.
	The French Army had two uses for armor. The cavalry wanted  light fast tanks to assume its traditional role of covering the front and flanks of advancing armies and to scout for information. The infantry, on the other hand. wanted well armored tanks for close support and was willing to accept slower machines in exchange for more armor. The French tanks of 1940 were designed and built during the twenties and thirties with these requirements in mind. Although they sound very similar to the British concepts, in practice they never were. French tanks were. in general, well armored and armed, something which cannot be said of most British tanks of the period. And, although their machines were sometimes a bit slow. the French never wasted their limited resources in 8 m.p.h. tanks like the British did. Despite their designation, most French tanks were capable of operating together, having similar speeds and armor and. by 1940. tanks from both branches were operating together in the armored divisions.
	With two organizations ordering tanks, it's not surprising to Find a large number of tank models in service with the French Army. The most important light cavalry tanks were the Hotchkiss H-35 and the H-39. Both were light machines, weighing about 13 tons, but not very fast (17 m.p.h. for the H-35 and 22 m.p.h. for the H-39). The H-35 was armed with a machine gun and the 37mm gun, model 1918, the same gun mounted in the old WWI tanks. This gun was used in some of the H-39's. but most had the improved 37mm 1939 model. This weapon had a longer barrel than the 1918 piece and was more powerful. Also used by the cavalry were the AMR-35 and the AMC-35. These were fast tanks, lightly armored and intended for reconnaissance. They were not main battle tanks as the H-35 and the H-39 were. The AMR-35 was very fast (34 m.p.h.), thinly armored and armed with either a MG or a 25mm anti-tank gun. The AMC-35 was a bit slower (25 m.p.h.), but better armored and armed with a 47mm short gun and a MG. The medium cavalry tank. and one of the best of that time, was the Somua S-35. This was a Fine machine, reasonably fast. well armored and armed, carrying a 47mm gun. After the battle, the Germans equipped some of their garrison units in France with captured S-35's. releasing first line German tanks for service in Russia and North Africa.
	The infantry had three different light tank models (not counting WWI veterans), but one model accounted for over 80% of their numbers: the Renault R-35. This tank was well armored for its weight ( 11 tons) and was armed with the 37mm 1918 gun and a MG. It was also quite slow (12 m.p.h.). The two other light tanks were the FCM-36 and the R-40. Both were very similar to the R-35. although some of the R-40's had the long 37mm gun. For this reason, no counters have been included for the FCM-36 and the R-40 with the short gun. The "WWI veteran" mentioned above was the Renault FT-17. Armed with the 37mm 1918 gun, these tanks had fair armor protection, but were extremely slow. The French were well aware of the limitations of these old and tired machines and used them for infantry support in secondary fronts. The medium infantry tank was the D-2, a sluggish vehicle, but armed with a 47mm gun, plus a MG. Not many were made, the cavalry's S-35 being preferred instead. Finally, there was the Char B-l, a medium-heavy tank, heavily armored and carrying two MG's and two guns, a 47mm anti-tank gun in a revolving turret and a 75mm howitzer in the glacis plate, between the tracks. This was a fine tank, but had a serious drawback: its range was only 85 miles.
	We should not leave the topic of French tanks without some general comments. By 1940, the French had developed some of the best tanks of the West. And it is of interest to note that while 2/3 of the British tank force and 1/3 of the Germans' were made up of machine gun-armed tanks, only a few French tanks, in secondary roles, were armed in that manner. But the technical limitations of French tanks were very serious. Only one tank in five (usually company commanders') had radio. Almost all had one-man turrets, with the tank commander having to direct his tank, search for targets, load, aim and fire his gun and keep an eye on flag signals from his company commander. The company commander's lot was even worse. He had to do all of the above except looking for flag signals, because he had to open his hatch, come out and make them. French tanks, unable to communicate and to coordinate their efforts in battle, were reduced to a group of crews, isolated in their own vehicles and fighting for their own survival. By way of contrast, all British and German tanks of the period had radio, and most German tanks (and many British) had two or three-man turrets. The result was a more effective tank and crew. Finally, most French tanks had a very limited fuel supply and. therefore, a very short range. This was suitable for the kind of war the French generals had planned, but not for what the Germans had in mind.
	After the First World War, the Germans were explicitly  forbidden  to  have  tanks.  For  years afterwards, they got around this prohibition by various schemes such as sending German technicians to work in tank design abroad, setting up a secret tank testing facility in the Soviet Union and conducting army exercises using civilian cars as tanks. It was not until the advent of Hitler to power that German tank enthusiasts came out of the closet, so to speak. Like France and Britain, Germany had its share of men who realized the value of armored and mechanized troops. Hitler, enjoying boundless power, was able to give a free hand to these men and to force the top German generals (most of which were as conservative as their French and British counterparts) to accept it. After a few years in this favorable environment, a German armored force resulted which was second to none. 
	When the Germans began to rearm, they realized that an interim light tank would be needed while a suitable battle tank was developed and produced. Tank design and construction is a very specialized endeavour, requiring expertise almost beyond the capabilities of the German industry of the early thirties. And, of course, the facilities to build hundreds of twenty ton tanks just did not exist. Light tanks, due to their smaller size, were less of a burden to industry and could be manufactured by the automotive industry in existing facilities. Crews had to be trained and tanks and their support units had to be organized and tested. The use of an easily available tank in these early stages would speed up the creation of a truly potent force when the heavier tanks became available. The interim tank was to be the small and cheap Panzerkampf-wagen I (For those who do not know yet, Panzer=armored, kampf=combat, wagen=vehicle.). In service since 1934, this machine was armed with two machine guns and was regarded as too thinly armored for combat, as experience in the Spanish civil war had clearly shown, but the acute need for tanks, any tanks, made imperative its use both in Poland and in France. In the latter campaign, about a third of the German tank force was composed of Pzkw l's. This machine did not leave front line service until 1941. By 1939, a steady supply of modern tanks was assured and the phasing out of the Pzkw I began. The chassis of this tank was used for various variants for training, supply, armored command vehicles and towing. In that year, an armored anti-tank vehicle was made, consisting of a captured 47mm Czech anti-tank gun, behind an armored shield, on top of a surplus Pzkw 1. The whole thing was called "Panzeijager (4.7 cm Pak(t) auf Pzkw I (aufs B))". It was as ugly as its name and saw limited service with the infantry divisions until 1942. Another variant was the "Geschutzwagen I fur 15 cm sIG 33", consisting of a 15cm infantry gun (complete with carriage and wheels) on top of a Pzkw 1. Thirty-eight were converted and used for close support in the armored divisions. Due to delays in the production of the main battle tanks, another interim tank was developed: the Pzkw II. In service since 1935, the Pzkw II was armed with a 20mm automatic cannon (the standard anti-aircraft gun) and a MG and made up another third of the German tank force in May, 1940. Faster and better armored than tho Pzkw I the Pzkw II still was unbattle-worthy, due to its small gun. Nevertheless, this tank was used in front-line service and made in large numbers until 1942. Production declined to a trickle after that, the tank being relegated to the reconnaissance battalions of the armored and the motorized divisions and used until the end of the war. The surplus chassis were used for a number of variants of which the most important was the "Wespe" self-propelled gun.
	When planning the requirements of their new armored force, the Germans envisaged two types of tank. Both were to have bow and turret machine guns; the first would be the main battle tank, with a high-velocity anti-tank gun, while the second would mount a large caliber gun, for close support. The former would be the Pzkw HI, while the latter was to be the Pzkw IV. Deliveries of the long awaited battle tank, the Pzkw III, did not begin until late 1938 and it was not until after the war began that this tank was officially accepted by the Army. The tankists had originally asked for a 50mm gun, but they had to settle for the 37mm piece then being made for the infantry. However, the turret ring was designed with a large diameter, to allow the installation of a larger gun at a future date. In this tank, the commander had a raised cupola in the turret, allowing all-around vision. This feature, and the three-man turret arrangement, which relieved the commander of all duties except commanding, resulted in a very effective vehicle, despite its relatively weak gun and armor. Periodically upgunned and uparmored, the Pzkw II I was to remain in production until 1943 and in service until 1944. A number of variants were made, of which the most important was the assault gun StuG III, which was produced and used until the end of the war. Production of the Pzkw IV began in 1936, with a few vehicles being made for training purposes, but it was not until 1938 that this tank began to join the panzer divisions. The Pzkw IV was a close support tank, so only a relatively small number was required and, once a few hundred were made, production was slowed down. In addition to two MG's, this tank was armed with a 75mm L24 gun, capable of tiring both anti-tank shot and high explosive. It resembled the Pzkw III, which was slightly smaller, and had a similar interior arrangement: three-man turret, commander's cupola, etc. Like the Pzkw III, the Pzkw IV had a large diameter turret ring which allowed the installation of a larger gun as the war went on. Later in the war, the Pzkw IV took the Pzkw Ill's place as main battle tank and, uparmored and upgunned, it was retained in production and in service until the end of the war. In typical German fashion, the chassis of this tank was used for a number of assault gun and tank destroyer variants, anti-aircraft tanks (like Wirbelwind) and self-propelled guns (like Hummel).
	Due to the delays in delivering the Pzkw III, the Wehrmacht had to make use of the tanks captured when Czechoslovakia was occupied in 1939. There were two models, designated by the Germans as Pzkw 35(t) and Pzkw 38(1). Both were small light tanks, about the size and weight of a Pzkw II, but were better armed, having a 37mm anti-tank gun (albeit not as powerful as the German piece of the same caliber) and two MG's. These tanks were not as good as the Pzkw III, having such drawbacks as a two-man turret, bolted armor, and a smaller ammunition supply. Nevertheless, in German hands they proved to be quite effective. In the battle for France, the 6th Panzer Division used a large number of Pzkw 35(t)'s, while the Pzkw 38(t), which was a slightly better tank, was used by the 7th and 8th Panzer Divisions. These tanks remained in front-line service until 1943. The surplus chassis were used for variants (like the "Hetzer" tank destroyer   which remained in service until the end of the war. We shall represent both Czech tanks with the same counters, since their capabilities were very similar.
	During September and October, 1940, a special armored regiment was created and trained for the invasion of England. This unit was equipped with amphibious tanks, to land an armored force in the very First wave of the invasion. Fifty-two Pzkw 11's were modified by waterproofing the hull and adding a flotation device and a marine propeller connected to the waterproofed engine. The flotation device consisted of metal floats. Filled with celluloid bags and attached to the tank. Also two hundred and ten Pzkw Ill's and IVs were converted into submarine tanks. Each was made watertight and equipped with a snorkel and a gyro compass. They were supposed to be lowered through a ramp from a barge to the sea floor and crawl ashore under their own power, using the compass and directions given by radio to get there. These machines, of course, were not used against the British, but the Pzkw Ill's and Pzkw IV's saw employment against the Russians the following year, when they were used to cross the river Bug. 
	German use of tanks was based on the indirect approach, concentration of force on a selected weak point and rapid exploitation of any breakthrough. The Panzer force would pierce through the enemy lines and penetrate deep into their rear, disrupting their supply and communication lines and causing a collapse of enemy resistance by a sudden blow to its brains rather than a protracted battle against the body (the attrition strategy of WWI). For this purpose, German tank crews (the elite of the Army) had been trained and equipped. All German tanks had radio and, in their advanced models, the tank commander had rio other duty but to command his vehicle. This could only result in better control and coordination of the armored force. Senior officers were provided with armored command vehicles, allowing them to follow and observe the battle from close range and to control their units through radio. However, it is in a sense a mistake to talk about "German" tank doctrine, for it was not developed only by Germans nor did all Germans believe in it. The tactics and strategy used by the Wehrmacht in France were the product of the work of French, British and German tank enthusiasts. Their ideas were put into practice thanks to the endeavours of General Guderian and a few other men sharing their vision, including  Hitler himself.  Unfortunately, while  the  German  armored  force  was  being developed, the French were too busy with domestic politics to pay any attention. And the British, well, they were busy too, sending their tank experts out of the way, in an attempt to make England safe for such anachronisms as horsed cavalry.

Aircraft
	Air power, in our case, can only mean one thing: German air power, the Luftwaffe. In the Battle of France, the Germans enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the air and all the advantages that this brought. The explanation for this situation lies in the relative fighter strength of the opposing air forces. The Germans had a total of 1264 Fighters, against which the Allies could muster only 800, for a 3 to 2 ratio favoring the Germans. This looks bad enough as it is, but it gets much worse for the Allies if obsolete aircraft are not counted, for the German first line fighter strength was 1016 Messerschmitt Mel09's while the Allied modern fighters were limited to 80 British Hawker Hurricanes and 25 French Dewoitine De520's, a 19 to 2 ratio! After sweeping the
Allied air forces from the skies, the Luftwaffe was left free to concentrate its efforts on assisting the German ground forces, with decisive results. The blitzkrieg was based on the rapid movement of motorized units, sweeping through the enemy rear, and for this they needed quick assistance to deal with any check met by the advancing forces. Towed guns are slow and take time to set up. but airplanes can be on call just a few minutes away. In this role of flying artillery, the Luftwaffe helped to maintain the momentum of the offensive, to keep the Allies off balance and to deny them the chance to consolidate their defenses. The Allies could move troops by day only at their own peril, for observation by German aircraft was unavoidable and attack from the air could come at any time. The German armies were spared these problems.
	The most important German ground attack airplane was the Junkers Ju 87 Sturzkampflugzeug, or "diving-combat-airplane," better known as the Stuka. The Stuka was a slow and poorly armed machine, obsolescent by 1940 standards. It could not operate in contested skies without suffering steep losses, as was shown in the Battle of Britain. Nevertheless, in the German-dominated air over France, against defenseless troops, this machine proved to be extremely effective. Despite its ugly, evil-looking square shapes (or perhaps because of them), the Stuka became a symbol of the Luftwaffe and of Germany, probably the most notorious airplane of World War II. The model in service in 1940 was the "B," armed with one forward-firing machine gun and another one in the rear and carrying one bomb of up to 500 kg (II Ibs.). Its attack strength for game purposes is:
	Machine Guns 1 (1)
	Bombs 20 (H)

NEW RULES

	PANZER LEADER, 1940 uses all the standard rules of the regular PANZER LEADER game. with optional and experimental rules used as agreed by the players. A few extra rules will be added here to represent some special units and situations not present in the regular game.

1. CHENILLETTES - This  vehicle  had  a  very limited transport capacity. For that reason, only infantry type units may be carried by it. No lowed guns or mortars of any kind may be carried.
2. FRENCH TANKS - French tank units represent  companies (10 to  13  vehicles) instead  of
platoons. Therefore, all French tank units are counted as two units for stacking purposes. If a French tank unit is destroyed, it must be replaced by two wreck counters instead of one. This rule does not apply to other French armored units like the Chenillette  37L  carrier  and  the  Panhard  178 armored car. As per the standard rules, no more than three wreck counters may be placed in the same hex. even if two French tank units are destroyed in it.
3. INFANTRY  TANK  MARK  I  (All)  AND RENAVLT FT-17 TANK - The British All tank and the French FT-17 tank both have a Movement Factor of 2. It costs them only 2 MP to enter a slope hex. Other movement rules are unaffected.
4. AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS - With :he Germans engaged in this business (and the Allies on the receiving end), this section of the standard rules must be changed to reflect the new situation. All rules applying to the German player will now apply to the Allied player and vice-versa. Other than that, the rules will remain unchanged.
5. AMPHIBIOUS TANKS - The Pzkw II, with its flotation device, is used in the game in the same way as the Shennan DD tank. For each amphibious Pzkw II, a die is rolled (as was the case for the DD) and the unit lands normally with a die roll of 1,2,3, 4 or 5. With a roll of 6, the unit is sunk and removed from play. Amphibious (Pzkw Ill's and Pzkw IV's, being submersible tanks, behave in a slightly different way. All the rules for DD Shermans apply, except that the Allied player may not fire at a submerged tank (Hopefully, this requires no explanation). For each one of these units, a die must be rolled and the unit is lost with a die roll of 6. With a die roll of I through 5, the unit lands unharmed, but may not move in the turn in which it lands on the beach. Once on the beach, it may be attacked like any other unit and it may move normally in the turn following the landing.
6. AIRPOWER - Contrary to the regular game, here the Germans have airplanes and the Allies don't. Therefore, the German Player Segment in each turn must have an Air Phase after the Combat Phase. All Airpower rules in the standard game remain in effect., with the Germans taking the place of the Allies and vice-versa. The German observation airplane is the Henshel 123 and all rules applying to the L-5 apply to it. The Stuka is the German fighter-bomber and all fighter-bomber rules apply to it.

THE SITUATIONS

	The scenarios collected here portray the French, British and German armies both in attack and defense, baring the strengths and weaknesses of them all. The French Army is a slow war machine, hampered by weak infantry and insufficient firepower, deficiencies which its good divisional artillery cannot really compensate. As you would expect, French armor is less effective than the British or the German armor, due to its one-man turrets and the lack of radio. The British Army suffers from the same problems its ally has: weak infantry and insufficient firepower, although its tanks are a bit more effective. Unlike the French, however, most British tanks carry only machine guns. thus placing virtually the entire weight of the battle on the small gun-armed fraction of the armored force. Finally, there is the German Army, with infantry at all levels superior to its Allied opponents and with artillery second to none. German armor, like the British, suffers from its small number of effective tanks. Only the few Pz Ill's and Pz 38's are a match for Allied armor, a fact which the German commander may only ignore at his peril. The German armor is an instrument which must be carefully handled to be effective, unlike the German infantry, which is usually strong enough to tolerate some bungling from above.
	The various scenarios are more or less self-explanatory, but a few words here may put things in perspective and help to clarify what's going on.
	SITUATION 21 - After the Germans invaded Belgium, the Allies entered the country. The vanguard of the Allied force was Prioux's Cavalry Corps, made up of the 2nd and 3rd DLM's (Division Legere Mecanique). Two days after the invasion, they met the German spearhead, Hoepner's XVI Panzer Corps, made up of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions. The battle that followed (the first big tank battle of WWII) took place in Merdorp, West of Hannut, and both sides lost about 100 tanks. The Germans were disconcerted by the thick armor of the French tanks, but soon discovered their weak point: Their poor coordination due to lack of radio. It was also relatively easy to approach a French tank from the rear, their commanders had so many things to do that no time was left for them to look to their backs. In the end, the Germans held the field.
	SITUATION 22 - The Mouse is one of the major rivers of Western Europe and, from the German viewpoint, the major obstacle to their advance.  Lacking  any  armored  amphibious vehicles, any German attempt to cross the river could have been repulsed. Even after the crossing, with only lightly armed infantry holding the beachhead, it would have been relatively easy for the French to retake it. Instead, the French allowed the Germans to get across the river at Sedan and waited a whole day before counter attacking. Guderian, the German corps commander, seized the opportunity and began to send his tanks across and to expand the beachhead immediately. The French earmarked two infantry regiments and two independent armored battalions for the attack, but only half of this force actually took part in the battle. The result, needless to say, was a defeat for the French, a consequence of their "too little-too late" approach to warfare.
	SITUATION  23 - After  Guderian  broke through at Sedan, he sent most of his forces westwards, while the French tried to stop him by striking at his flanks. The first attempt was at Stonne. This village had been taken by the Germans and was a critical position in their southern flank. The attack shown here lasted all morning and the battle for the village lasted several days, during which the village changed hands several times. This is anotherexample of the French "too little-too late" approach to warfare. In the end, the Germans held the village.
	SITUATION 24 - After the Germans penetrated the Allied front, the French tried in vain to stop them by throwing units in their path. The last barrier between Guderian's forces and the open and defenseless French plains was a stop-gap force made up of the 3rd Brigade of Spahis (a cavalry unit) and the 152nd Infantry Regiment (14th Division). It was easily pierced. Incidentally, the 152nd was commanded by Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, who would become a hero of the Liberation four years later.
	SITUATION  25 - Another attack on Guderian's flank was done by the 4th DCR (Division Cuirasee), under the command of Charles de Gaulle. His "division" was made up of three tank battalions, a few independent tank companies, a handful of guns and an infantry battalion in buses. These units met for the first time on the eve of their first battle, depicted here. De Gaulle, aware of the importance of the time element, decided to attack Guderian's flank at Montcornet on the morning of May 17, with whatever forces reached him by that time. And attack he did, but in vain. For three days he kept trying to interfere with the German progress, but it was a hopeless task. for his improvised division was not strong enough for the job and was pulled out of the front.
	SITUATION 26 - This is De Gaulle's second attack, again a vain attempt to slow down the German juggernaut by striking at its flanks. In later years, perhaps out of nationalistic pride, De Gaulle and some French historians exaggerated the results of the attacks depicted in this situation and in the preceding one. The fact is that these attacks did not achieve much and the Germans did not pay much attention to them. This implies no slur against De Gaulle and his 4th DCR, for the unit was no match for even one Panzer division and yet it dared to challenge an armored corps. It could not have done more than it did. De Gaulle's 4th DCR has the unique distinction of being the only French armored division (out of 3 DLM's and 4 DCR's which was not destroyed or crippled in its First encounter with the enemy.
	SITUATION 27 - When the Allies realized that their armies in Belgium were in danger of being cut off, they tried to coordinate a massive attack on the German pincer both from the North and from the South, to isolate its armored tip. From these grandiose plans came a small, local attack by an improvised Anglo-French force. With the immediate purpose of relieving the German pressure on Arras, 74 British infantry tanks, 2 battalions of British infantry (on foot), a gun battery and a few French tanks went to the attack. They had a Field day against the German infantry, which lacked armored support and whose anti-tank guns were useless against the thick British armor, but had to withdraw, at heavy cost. when the Germans counterattacked  with  tanks  that  afternoon. Nevertheless, heavy losses were inflicted on the German infantry, specially to the 7th Panzer, whose commander had sent his tanks too far ahead for them to be able to come back on time. At that time the Germans believed that the attack had been carried out by five Allied divisions and feared another attack, on a larger scale, that might cut off their armored forces in France. Thus, the German High Command ordered the Panzer divisions to stop and even sent the 5th Panzer Division back, to assist the 7th. This delay gave the Allies the time they needed to fortify the Dunkirk perimeter, making possible the evacuation that would take place a few days later and would save the British Expeditionary Force from the German prison camps. On the other hand, the commander of the 7th Panzer Division also profited from the lesson he received that day. His name was Rommel.
	SITUATION 28 - With the Allied armies cut in two and the Germans lacing northwards along the coast to surround the northern forces, the British finally sent to France the armored division held in reserve in England (the only other British armor was in Egypt), which had been idle all this time. One tank regiment and two motorized infantry battalions were sent to Calais, to hold the city and its port and to delay the German forces advancing toward Dunkirk by the coastal road. This force landed on May 22 and began operations the following day, with some success. The Germans countered by increasing the pressure against the besieged city and, on the 26th, the few surviving tanks escaped from the city, running along the beach and reaching the relative safety of the Dunkirk perimeter, from which the men, if not the machines, would have a chance of returning to England.
	SITUATION 29 - Surrounded and with their backs to the sea. the Allied forces trapped in the Dunkirk perimeter had no other escape route than by sea, to England. It was a desperate situation and desperate action was needed. Unable to stop the Germans, the Allies had to settle for slowing them down with raids and spoiling attacks like the one depicted here. This one was an attack on a German bridgehead  across  the  La  Basee canal,  near Givenchy, held by an infantry battalion. It was an attempt to pull on Rommel the same trick tried before in Arras, but this time he had his armor close at hand, and the British tanks were quickly driven off.
	SITUATION 30 - Needless to say, this situation never took place. It was included because it was the only chance to use the German amphibious tanks. Besides, it gives the Germans an opportunity to get even for all the beatings they take in the "D-Day" scenarios of PANZER LEADER.. Both sides seem to be rather weak in this situation and that deserves some explanation. The reasons for the British weakness are fairly obvious: With so much equipment lost in France, they just did not have the resources to adequately cover the beaches. Besides, they had not had neither the time nor the slave labor to build defenses like those the Allies faced four years later. For the invasion, the Germans had plenty of men and equipment, but lacked the ships to get them across the English Channel. Landing craft were scarce and there was a serious shortage of warships for escort and bombardment, due to the naval losses suffered in the conquest of Norway.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

	Tons of ink and paper have been devoted to the Second World War, and the Battle of France has received more than its share of both. Listed here are the most useful of the various sources used in this writing. Shirer's The Collapse of the Third Republic,  Chapman's Why  France  Fell and Home's To Lose a Battle are good accounts of the campaign, the events leading to it and its consequences. Shirer's book is the best reference for the socio-political causes of the French defeat. Home, on the other hand, presents a more detailed account of the battle itself.
	Ballantines' "Illustrated History of World War II" series provided a good amount of information on various topics. Hogg's The Guns 1939-45 and Grenades and  Mortars  and  Weeks'  Infantry Weapons were the most valuable. Macksey's Panzer Division and Tank Force were also used. The "WW2 Fact Files" series was also employed, with Anti-Aircraft Guns, Mortars and Rockets, Light and Medium Artillery and Infantry, Mountain and Airborne Guns (all by Chamberlain and Gander)
being used as references.
	Tanks of the World, 1915-45, by Chamberlain and Ellis, and White's Tanks and other Armored Fighting Vehicles of the Blitzkrieg Era provided the bulk of the data on AFV's. Additional information was provided by von Senger und Etterlin's German Tanks of World War II, Profile Publication's "Armour in Profile" series and Doughty's "French Anti-tank Doctrine, 1940" (Military Review: May, 1976). Finally, a few details came from a rather unorthodox source: the "Designer's Notes and Campaign Analysis" booklet of FRANCE, 1940.

The Search for the Best Tank of 1940

The  PANZERBLITZ/PANZER  LEADER game system is centered around armored fighting vehicles and, in a special way, around the tank. The AFV's dominate the battle with their mobility and firepower to a greater extent than they actually did in real life. Although tanks, tank destroyers and assault guns are employed in the same way in the games, the tank is clearly first among equals. Only tanks and tank destroyers appear on the PANZERBLITZ box, only tanks on PANZER LEADER'S. In this context, it is only too natural to ask which tank, among those used in the Battle of France, was the best of all. Picking the "best" tank is much like trying to pick the "best" automobile, airplane or wargame, for each user has his own views of which features are a "must" and which are not.  However,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that mobility, armor protection and firepower are the most important elements in a tank, so we shall look mainly at these.
	Starting with the British, the A 11 and the Mark VI B are immediately disqualified, being armed only with machine guns. The AIO goes the same route, due to its low speed. This leaves two tanks in the competition: the A 12 Matilda and the A 13. The A 13 was a fast tank, adequately armored and armed with a 2 pdr gun and a machine gun. It was also mechanically unreliable, kept in service because it was the only gun-armed British tank with decent speed. Periodically "improved", the A 13 evolved into the A13  Mark III Covenanter (a tank so unreliable that it was never used in combat, being relegated to training instead) and the A 15 Crusader, of TOBRUK fame. This leaves only the A 12 Matilda, which had the same weapons as the A13, but was more reliable and had very thick armor which compensates for its low speed. The A 12 was not really a good tank, but it was the best of a bad lot and on that is based its claim to the title of "Best British Tank."
	The French had a large number of tank models, but most of these were too slow or carried only light guns, so we really have to look at only two tanks: the Somua S35 and the Char Bl. Both tanks were armed with a 47mm gun and a machinegun in the turret, with the Char Bl also carrying a 75mm howitzer slung between its tracks. Thus, the Bl had the advantage in firepower, while the S35 was faster. In armor thickness, the Bl had the edge. The S35 was a very good tank (among the best of its day), but was second to the Char Bl, which was superior due to its ability to engage both armored and unarmored targets with its two guns.
	Among the Germans, we can quickly eliminate the Pzkw's I and II (insufficient firepower in both cases) and the Pzkw 38 (inferior to the Pzkw III in all details except speed). This leaves two German contenders in the arena: the Pzkw's III and IV. The Pzkw IV was probably the most successful German tank design of the war, being designed in the late thirties with room for improvements that would keep it in service until the end of the conflict. The model used in 1940, however, was not as good as the Pzkw III, which was better armored and had the anti-tank gun which the "IV" lacked. Also designed with room for improvements, the Pzkw III was the best German tank of 1940 and probably was better than any of the machines it faced at that time, which usually were better armed and armored, but were slower and, in the case of the French, without radio. 
	Comparison of the machines mentioned above with those possessed by other powers is interesting, to say the least, so we shall undertake that task here. By mid-1940, the Italians had begun production of their most important tank of the war: the M 13/40 medium. This machine had a good 47mm gun and that was about all that could be said for it. The M 13 was slow, unreliable and its armor was inadequate, being too thin and of riveted construction. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Americans had spent a decade  in experiments  and trials, improving previous designs, but never building more than a few copies of each new model. The momentum of tank development  was thus maintained at a minimum cost. The best U.S. tank of 1940 was the medium M2AI. This machine was comparable to the German tanks of the time, carrying a 37mm gun and having about the same armor protection. It was very reliable, due to a lengthy development, but was not  produced in quantity. The M3 Grant and the M4 Sherman were based on the M2. Back in the Old World, the Japanese had also been busy designing and testing tanks and their standard medium model was the Type 97, Chi-Ha. This machine entered the service in 1937, armed with a short 57mm gun and a maximum armor thickness of only 25mm. It was a success because it had the good fortune to face only opponents with little anti-tank capability in the early years of the war. Good luck was no substitute for quality which the Chi-Ha lacked, for the tank was no match for contemporary Western models. Finally, there were the Soviets, but they were playing an entirely different game, their tanks being two years ahead of anything the rest of the world had. We are talking, of course, about the T-34, a reliable tank, easy to build and maintain, fast, with thick sloped armor and with a 76.2 mm L30 gun, soon to be replaced by a more powerful (L40) weapon. In production since June, 1940, the T-34 was the most successful tank of the war, used
throughout the conflict and still in service to this day. With its ability to "dance like a butterfly and sting like a bee," the Russian T-34 truly was "the Greatest."

THE PRESCRIPTION THAT FAILED:
French Anti-tank Doctrine of 1940

	War, said Clausewitz, is the realm of chance, for the unexpected may at any time take place. Even so, the Battle for France surprised the world, for if there was an unexpected event, that was the sudden French collapse of 1940. Never before had a big power like France suffered such a swift and catastrophic defeat. To the French people and to the Army, the defeat was a very unpleasant surprise. The people had relied on their Army and the Army had relied on its own capacity to repel the German attack. What failed? What went wrong? There were many factors which contributed to France's defeat, like the poor quality of her reserve divisions, her limited population and industrial base and the turbulent pre-war French politics, just to name a few, but, in the end, the instrument of the German victory was the armored spearhead of the German Army: the Panzer divisions. The French Army always considered itself quite able to stop the German armored assault and had established a defensive doctrine against it. This doctrine, and the reasons for its failure, are our topic here. 
	With an army made up mostly of "leg" infantry, the  French  were  aware  of the  infantryman's vulnerability to armor attack, and devoted much thought and effort to counter that threat. When establishing the defense doctrine of their infantry divisions (the bulk of their army), the French assumed that all attacks would be supported by armor, to a maximum strength of no more than fifty tanks per kilometer of front. To counter these, an average of ten anti-tank guns per kilometer would supposedly be sufficient. These would be deployed in depth and not stretched in a single line across the front, for French anti-tank doctrine emphasized defense in depth against tanks. Most of the anti-tank guns were to be in the main line of resistance and in the interior "barrage", behind the main line. A smaller number of anti-tank weapons were to be placed forward and behind the two principal lines, in the advance posts and in the final stopping line. The plan, then, was to wear the attacking armored force with four successive defense positions: the advance posts, the main defense line, the interior barrage and the final stopping line. The French infantry's task was to hide and let the tanks pass through their lines and to emerge and engage the German infantry coming behind. The dual combination of the anti-tank gun and the machine gun, it was hoped, would defeat the attacker or at least weaken him enough to be easily defeated by a counterattack. On paper at least, this seemed to be a sensible  scheme  that  should  have  been  more successful than it actually was. 
	The French Army of 1940 had three models of anti-tank gun in service. By and large, the most abundant was the 25mm. At 500 meters, this gun could penetrate about 20mm of armor. The 25's were backed up by the new 47mm anti-tank guns and by the old 75mm Model 1897 guns used in this role. Despite its smaller caliber, the 47 was about as effective as the 75, which had low penetration and poor accuracy beyond 500 meters due to its low muzzle velocity. Both could penetrate about 50mm of armor at 500 meters. Needless to say, penetration could be higher at shorter range, while vulnerable parts (like the tracks and suspension system) could be damaged at longer range. These figures, to have any meaning, must be compared with the armor of their intended target: German tanks. The Pzkw I had 13mm of armor, making it vulnerable to all French anti-tank guns at common "battle" range (about 500 meters). The Pzkw II had a frontal armor of 30mm and about 15mm in the sides and rear, while the Pzkw IV had 30mm and 20mm, respectively. The Pzkw 38 had 25mm in the turret and at the front of the hull and 18mm or less in other places. The best armored of the lot was the Pzkw III, with 30mm armor all around. We can see, then, that all German tanks (except the Pzkw III) were vulnerable to all French anti-tank guns at usual battle range. The Pzkw III was better protected, but no Panzer division had more than 65 of them. The bulk of the German tank force was made up of the thin-skinned Pzkw's I and II.
	Even before the battle began, things were not going exactly according to plan. Since each French infantry division was expected to cover about ten kilometers of front line,  it should have been provided with at least a hundred anti-tank guns, according to the ten-guns-per-km rule. Instead, only 58 were authorized for each division (5.8 guns per km). To make matters worse, not all divisions were up to full strength. The reserve units defending the critical Sedan sector (where the German attack was to come) could only muster 4.7 guns per km. Obviously, the French were not practicing what they preached. French divisional commanders had been instructed to identify the most likely avenues of approach and deploy their anti-tank weapons there, but this placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of officers who usually had little experience with tanks and less desire to acquire any. With the advantage of hindsight, we can now see that their task would have been hopeless anyway: all natural or man-made "tank-proof" barriers had eventually been penetrated . . . by tanks. 
	When the battle began, it soon became apparent that the pre-war assumptions of 10 anti-tank guns per km and no more than 50 enemy tanks per km of front had been in error. Even that ratio implied that each gun would have to destroy an average of five enemy tanks, a clearly unrealistic rate. And. when the attack came, it was with a strength of about a hundred tanks per km. The defense was simply overwhelmed by the unexpected concentration of offensive  power.  No  reserve  existed,  since the division did not have enough anti-tank guns to create any, while the guns themselves were heavy pieces, mostly horse-drawn, and therefore too slow to be moved about the battlefield. The painstakingly drawn defense plans, like so much else, collapsed under the strain of the battle. The anti-tank weapons available were not enough to stop the German tanks, while the infantry ran away rather than try to accomplish their part of the plan. Again using the advantage of hindsight, it becomes evident that the French defenders did not have a chance of success. Comparison with what was done later in the war is enlightening. The French in 1940 believed that ten guns per km were sufficient, but three years later, in the Battle of Kursk, the Russians employed 29.8 anti-tank guns per km in their defensive fortifications and even that line was pierced by the Germans, requiring the intervention of Russian armor to restore the situation.