PANZER HUNTERS

Tactical Air Support Rules for PANZERBLITZ and PANZER LEADER

by Carl Schwamberger

	Tactical air support was of major concern to the battlefield commander of World War II, and quickly became a critical part of the modem war of combined arms. Although tied to relatively fixed bases, the speed of aircraft gave them a tactical mobility exceeding any other weapon in existence. The weight of ammunition which could be placed on target within a few days (or even hours) of request rivaled that of the artillery arm. Ostensibly games of armored warfare, PANZERBLITZ, and it's companion PANZER LEADER are readily adaptable to the simulation of most aspects of combined arms warfare, including tactical air support. Of course PANZER LEADER already includes air units and their use. These are quite useful for illustrating the general effects of tactical air support. But, there
are no comparable rules for PANZERBLITZ. Neither do the PANZER LEADER rules simulate the use and control of air support as completely as they might. To fill this gap I'll first briefly review the development of tactical air power through 1945, then suggest some rules for its inclusion in these two games.

PRELUDE
	The earliest use of tactical bombers was by the Italian army during it's conquest of Libya in 1911-12. This consisted of little more than dropping oversized grenades from altitudes of a few hundred feet. Whatever effect this might have had on the Africans is obscure, but its effect on military aviators everywhere was dynamic. Even so, further development of the concept was hampered by the engineering problems; at this stage of aviation, it was difficult enough designing machines which could carry more than just the pilot. There was also the matter of convincing the entrenched military authorities that these powered kites could have any real effect on the battlefield. The value of air reconnaissance was grudgingly recognized, but it was not completely appreciated and was in fact still often misused at the start of the Great War. The collapse of traditional military concepts during 1914-1918 forced the development of air power as far as the crude technology of the time would then allow.
	The use of airplanes for observing long range artillery fire against targets deep in enemy territory did prove successful. This use of aircraft was highly specialized, but still no more than an extension of normal reconnaissance procedures. More important however were the efforts to arm the aircraft for the ground attack role. Entrenchments made the front lines a poor target for the light machine guns and 25 Kg bombs of the era, but the lines of communications were a different matter entirely. Moving combat and supply units were particularly vulnerable to the new weapons. By 1918 effective tactical air operations against maneuvering enemy forces were being sustained by the Allied armies on all fronts. Of particular significance were the campaigns along the Mediterranean. There, relatively small air forces greatly accelerated the collapse of the enemy armies. In Palestine the British, with barely a dozen operational aircraft, learned to effectively disrupt every attempt of the Ottomans to move any formation of significant size. In Macedonia, the Bulgarian army was mercilessly machine-gunned and bombed in the restricted mountain passes when attempting to retreat, turning an orderly troop movement into a rout. The Italians gave the Austrians the same treatment as they retreated into the southern Alps, with similar results. Franco/British operations of this sort on the Western Front were effective, but rendered less noticeable by the size of the armies, the lack of such choke points in the terrain, and the better discipline of the German armed forces. They were also overshadowed by the British air operations against German supply depots and rail communications.
	The result of these successes was an attitude on the part of the air commanders that they could
accomplish great things while operating independently of the ground forces. The Italian Marshal Douhet and others theorized that future wars could be decisively and quickly won by massive precision air attacks on the enemy military. Participation by the traditional armed forces the infantry, artillery, and cavalry  would be limited to mopping-up operations of the paralyzed enemy. Airmen argued that, like the Naval arm, the new Air Corps should become separate services, their operations complementing those of the Army's only at the strategic level. Unfortunately their analysis was simplistic and flawed. While air activities in WW I had been closely coordinated at the senior levels, there was little interaction with the infantry in contact with the enemy. The airmen depended largely on their own reconnaissance for acquiring targets. The information gained by air recon also tended to go to the army HQ first, then be disseminated downwards. Finally, the selection of targets, while supporting the battle at large, seldom directly affected the infantry engaged. Since there was little interaction with the infantry who were actually fighting, little thought was given to incorporating such a combination into the new
air doctrines.
	The colonial wars across the globe during the 1920's gave practical schooling in a different concept. There small groups of half a dozen (or fewer) planes coordinated with the local commander, who was often no more than a lonely battalion or company commander fighting a gang of bandits. With little in the way of strategic or operational targets, the airmen turned to attacking in direct support of their comrades on the ground. Communication was crude; messages could be dropped from the plane, sometimes they could be returned by a skilled pilot using a hook suspended from the aircraft to snatch a message container suspended on cord strung between two poles. Using colored cloth panels to indicate to the airmen the direction and range of a desired target proved very successful, but it was often most effective to simply land for a conference with the colonel or captain of a cavalry patrol. Many pilots were formerly of the infantry or cavalry, and this familiarity with operational considerations was of great help to their understanding of what was happening on the ground below.
	The experience gained from these campaigns on the North West Frontier of India, in North Africa, and in Nicaragua would become a counter balance to the theory of the "Strategic Air Force". Unfortunately, a hide-bound mindset was rarely a hindrance to a career in the interwar years, and many of the bright young airmen of 1918 became themselves rigid traditionalists by the 1930's. In ill-considered attempts to retain control, authority and status, many commanding officers presented tremendous resistance to anything that might prevent the growth of their fledgling air services into separate military entities; true "air forces". The younger lieutenants and captains who were then doing the flying were left to ponder their combat experience in obscurity.

THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE
	The Luftwaffe started the war little different from other air forces. The majority of its leaders were convinced of the validity of the Douhet philosophy, so the precision dive bombing tactics of which the Germans were particularly enamored would make the Luftwaffe more effective than its counterparts, but fundamentally no different. Like the French and Soviets, the intent was to attack the enemy ground combat units while they were on the move, or in camp, or re-supplying; in short, to maintain pressure at all times. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe was detailed to provide more direct support of the ground battles in Poland, against the Allies in the West and later in the Soviet Union. This took the form of bombers attacking enemy ground troops a few kilometers ahead of the advancing German ground forces, and was highly effective against poorly defended positions and ill-disciplined soldiers.
	Guderian's crossing at Sedan is an excellent example. There, some 1,500 aircraft comprising the VII & II Fliegerkorps attacked the two French "B'" divisions over a seven hour period, an attack foreshadowing the American carpet bombing tactics practiced four years later.
	It was soon realized that to improve the effectiveness of tactical air support, direct coordination at levels lower than Army HQ would be necessary. Thus in the Polish campaign the leading elements of the Wehrmacht, the Panzers, had air liaison officers attached to the HQ's down to the corps and division level. Equipped with radios, the purpose of these liaison teams was to send support requests and coordinating instructions directly to the HQ of the supporting air unit, rather than up one side of the chain of command to the top echelon and then back down the other side to the requesting field unit.
	As the war progressed, the number of these liaison teams increased; one such team per panzer division was common by 1941, with the team including spotters in light reconnaissance aircraft. With radio links to both the attacking aircraft and the ground liaison teams, these reconnaissance units would fly at low altitudes, hunting for targets in front and to the flanks of the ground advance, and guiding combat aircraft to the battle area. Liaison officers on the ground also took their coordinating efforts closer to the targets, and by using their radios to contact the combat aircraft entering the battle area, could guide those aircraft to targets in visual range of the ground liaison officer.
	The potential effectiveness of this technique of close air support cannot be overstated. Although in practice difficult to master, the ability to guide bombers directly to a target is extremely advantageous. While air attacks a few kilometers ahead of the ground advance are useful, there are several problems: Important targets often are not seen by the air crew, due to camouflage, terrain or the vagaries of weather. Moving at high speed, pilots have difficulty identifying the critical targets out of the aggregate. All too often, airmen mistake their own comrades for the enemy, or are fired on by their own side. But
perhaps most important, the enemy usually has time to recover part or all of his combat power before the ground attack can follow up the air strike. By 1944, for example, US soldiers in Europe discovered that one hour was usually sufficient time for the German survivors of air or artillery attacks to recover combat effectiveness. A ground commander who could have an air attack guided to the targets he needed hit at the appropriate time thus gained a tremendous advantage.
	The result of the lessons learned at the beginning of World War II was that by the summer of 1942 the German air liaison teams had their own communications vehicles, capable of keeping up with the leading panzer and panzergrenadier formations. The ability to deliver air attacks synchronized with the ground battle was no small part of the success of the Wehrmacht that summer. But these efforts could not be sustained. Germany's shortsighted production policies began to hamper her military efforts by the Fall of 1942. New units could not be added to exploit the new tactics which had been developing for them, nor could the existing Luftwaffe formations be maintained in strength sufficient for the commitment to close air support required to sustain large scale offensive actions. Shortages also meant liaison teams were only provided to a few of the panzer divisions and other elite units. Many of the air commanders felt that bombing a few dispersed vehicles or strong points in contact with the  ground force was not as productive as bombing a larger concentration of targets along the lines of  communications, or in assembly areas. Consequently true close air support was generally not available to the German ground commander.
	The most common types of aircraft used in the close air support role were the single engine bombers. Although most bombers appeared on tactical missions near the ground battle, several types can nevertheless be modelled in PANZERBLITZ. The Ju-87 proved too slow and unmaneuverable to survive against either competent fighter opposition or the antiaircraft cannon encountered after 1941. Indeed, the Luftwaffe intended to begin replacing the Stuka in the Fall of 1940, but for the failure of intended replacements such as the Me 210. Fighters were therefore equipped as bombers, and eventually the FW-190 became successful as both a tactical bomber and an interceptor. Like the Ju-87's, the FW-190's of 1943-45 were often armed with armor piercing cannon. Other aircraft types which served in the ground attack role included the Hs-129, a sort of prehistoric A-10. Armed with a 30mm cannon and heavily armored, it performed ground attacks from 1942 to '44. The Germans also frequently made use of medium bombers for tactical air support. The bomb loads of such aircraft
compensated for lack of strafing weapons, and of these the Do 17 series is a typical example.

FRANCE
	The French had no chance to develop anything beyond what existed in May of 1940. Their
existing system for coordinating tactical air support was poor compared to those of the British, German, and even the Soviets. The entire reason for this is too complex to reiterate completely here, but some points should be touched upon. 
	First, liaison between the air and ground units barely functioned below the army HQ level.
Attack requests and target information were passed along in a methodical manner up the chain of command, then across to the operational air HQ for Northwest France, and then down to the air unit to make the attack, virtually guaranteeing the obsolescence of the information by the time the attack could be made. This lack of efficient coordination also meant that requests for air attacks and their execution by the ground and air commands were often ill-conceived. Interdiction of roads and bridges were the bulk of the missions performed by the French Armee de I' Air, as well as by the RAF of that period. These attacks, while in themselves not entirely ineffective, yet lagged a day or two behind the rapidly
moving events of May 1940. Thus, in operational terms, they were of marginal value at best.
	A variety of tactical bombers were available to the French in 1940. Unfortunately there were not very many and most of them were not very good. The Po-633 was the most common type, with
about 300 units available. The Po-633' s light bomb load was partially compensated by the twin 20mm cannon (The French were a little ahead of other nations, equipping ground attack planes with cannon as early as 1939.).
	The LeO-451 was an excellent machine. Actually a medium bomber, it possessed a bomb load of 4,000 Ibs. and a maximum speed of 300 mph. Less than one hundred were used in combat, and low level tactics against the German panzer columns generally resulted in their immolation by anti-aircraft fire.
	The 167A-3 Martin Maryland Bomber (MM 167) was originally designed for the US Army Air Corps as a "Strike" bomber. Though rejected by the Americans, it was ordered by the French. Even so, the 75 which arrived at the end of May 1940 served to good effect in the last weeks of the Battle of France.

SOVIET STURMOVIKS
	The usual propaganda and misinformation endemic to Russian historical records applies as well to the chronicles of their use of air power. It is apparent the use of tactical air support developed along the same general lines as in other nations, with the same problems, and with some unique Soviet hindrances. The shortage of skilled officers created by the purges after 1937 was as damaging to the abilities of the Red Air Force as to those of the ground forces. And lack of good communications equipment made the liaison between the air and ground formations even more cumbersome than in comparable services of other nations. As with other Soviet operations, effective air support depended on careful, detailed planning before the engagement. Adequate response to unexpected changes in the
battle was always a problem. Like the French, liaison and planning for air support usually went no lower than the army HQ, with the exception of the elite mechanized and armored formations, following the German model. Much like the Luftwaffe and other air forces of the early 1940's, Soviet tactical air support usually operated a few kilometers ahead of the advancing ground forces, but there were exceptions. Innovative leaders would scrape together the communication equipment necessary and create an ad hoc system for getting bombs on targets of immediate interest. By 1944, the Soviet armored and mechanized corps usually did have liaison teams, although these did not always take up the forward air control role.
	The Sturmovik air regiments deserve special mention. Clearly these were the most effective
Soviet air units, acquiring a healthy reputation as tactical bombers. They were mixed formations of interceptors and tactical bombers.  The I1-2 bombers of the Sturmovik regiments were piloted by more determined men than were usually found in other Soviet air units, and were heavily armored against light antiaircraft weapons; advantages offset by the aircraft's moderate bomb load.
	Virtually all Soviet aircraft were used as tactical bombers as well as in their designed role. Most air units were less aggressive than the Sturmoviks, and were less likely to be controlled by a ground liaison party. Some of these other aircraft types included the Su-2, a pre-war design produced in quantity, but which had faded away by 1942.
	The Pe-3 was originally a high altitude interceptor. A dive bomber version and good bomb load led to it's common use as a tactical bomber. The Yak-1 armament was typical of the variety of cannon, bomb, and rocket-armed fighters that provided tactical air support to ground forces.

ANGLO-AMERICAN SUCCESS
	Like their German counterparts of 1940, British liaison teams seldom existed below the corps level, and were organized and equipped for planning rather than direct control. Tactical bombers, as with the French, were sent against the German lines of communication, with no better results. The battle against the Afrika Korps provided a field laboratory for testing a different application of air power. By the end of 1942, the concept of direct liaison between the ground divisions and the tactical bombers was accepted. And, as with the Germans, this led to the liaison teams (which the British colorfully named Tentacles) moving closer to the actual fighting in order to give more effective direction to the tactical bombers. This lesson stayed with the Eighth Army through the remainder of the war. The leaders who accompanied Montgomery to Britain attempted to obtain the same sort of support for the campaign in France, but found their counterparts in the RAF were less than cooperative. Whereas in Italy in 1944 liaison teams for forward air control could be provided to brigade HQ's whenever and wherever needed, in Normandy only one was available for an entire division.
	Although the United States ostensibly possessed no independent air force, the US Army Air Corps acquired an independent attitude as aloof as any other nation's air service.
	Consequently, close air support techniques were no better developed in the American armed
forces than elsewhere in 1939. The US Army in the European theatre did not gain any real combat experience until early 1943. But as Rommel observed, no one learns faster than the Americans. By the middle of 1944 they had equalled British methods for controlling direct air support of their combat troops, despite the fact that, like other air force commanders, the US Army Air Force leaders very often did not want to risk their units to provide close air support. By the end of the Sicilian campaign, close air support was regularly available from the Army Air Corps, although such support was hampered by the forward air control officers not having been regularly provided with radios. This forced them to use cloth panels, smoke grenades, and other archaic signaling systems.
	But unlike the British in Normandy, General Omar Bradley was aided by an airman who did not balk at the fine points of doctrine or supply protocol. General Quesada, commanding the 9th Tactical Air Command, proved energetic and enthusiastic in providing the support the ground leaders requested. When he realized the visual signals were inadequate. General Quesada obtained radios compatible with those of his aircraft and distributed them to the US combat units in the line, in time for the critical Cobra operation of the Normandy campaign. Although the US efforts in Europe never included sufficient training, by the last year of the war they had equalled (and in many cases exceeded) the air/ground liaison abilities of both the Germans and British.
	In 1940, Britain fielded two tactical bombers. The Fairey Battle acquired a poor reputation,
probably due to the low numbers of them which returned from bombing missions. The Bristol Blenheim was very popular throughout its three years of war service; perhaps due to its great speed, since in 1940, it had proven as vulnerable to anti-aircraft weapons as any other plane at low altitudes.
	The Typhoon and Thunderbolt aircraft depicted in PANZER LEADER are typical of the highspeed fighters which provided air support in 1943, '44 and '45. Like the FW-190, their speed
and superior handling abilities enabled them to survive anti-aircraft fire better than the tactical bombers of the early war.
	In late 1944, the A-26 Invader began a thirty-year career, unloading its three tons of bombs and rockets on the Ardennes battlefield. The Invader's service life continued into the Vietnam era, where A-26's were operated in Coin (Counter-Insurgency) configurations.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN
	No nation in the European theatre developed the technique of close air support as far as they might have done. As with the Germans, compettuted a drain on available assets. And in fact, there were very good reasons for assigning ground-attack capable aircraft to interdiction of transport, attacking supply depots and airfields, navar bases and ships at sea, ground units in reserve, and mounting strategic operations against enemy industry and population centers. Only in the last eighteen months of the war did the Anglo-American Allies possess sufficient aircraft to allocate significant numbers to all types of air missions.
	Another major obstacle to the full application of air support to ground operations was the lack of sufficient liaison teams. An excellent example of this can be found during Operation Goodwood in Normandy. Close air support for the Eleventh Armored Division failed when the forward air control team's only communications asset, the halftrack carrying the radios, was destroyed as the attack began. The waiting Typhoons eventually dropped their bombs and rockets on targets of opportunity in the German rear, rather than on the Tigers and anti-tank guns that were savaging the British forces. There was also strong resistance by many pilots to the entire concept of close air support. Not only did close support run counter to the idea of the airmen single-handedly raining stunning blows on the enemy, but neither was it much fun making circles in the sky waiting for an air controller's call designating a target. More important was the perception among airmen that attacking concentrations of targets  such as march columns, supply dumps, repair depots and so forth  was more productive than attention to those dispersed and difficult-to-hit enemy targets which were in contact with the friendly ground forces.
	Strictly in terms of attrition of enemy resources, this outlook was valid. But unsupported friendly tanks and infantry take greater losses than when aided by air strikes. Further, when ground forces with close air support can break loose from or overrun the enemy, then the rear targets become equally vulnerable to them as they are to the air forces.
	In fairness to the airmen, ground commanders themselves did not help their case. They did not always use their air support effectively, and thus provided the airmen with their evidence that close air support wasn't practical. Finally, there were the usual teething troubles to deal with as everyone involved experimented to learn the best techniques and procedures for actually controlling air attacks from the ground. It had taken since the turn of the century for the field artillery to bring the methods of control and coordination up to the sophisticated level permitted by the technology of the 1940's. It was perhaps asking too much for tactical air support to achieve the same level of efficiency in far less time.
	Still, far more might have been accomplished. It is interesting to compare developments in the Asian and Pacific theaters with those of Europe. An early example occurred during 1942 on Guadalcanal. The US First Marine Division airfield located literally within it's lines. The primary mission of the Marine, Navy and Army pilots based there was to attack the Japanese combat and transport ships as part of the battle of attrition focused on the island of Guadacanal. They were also called upon to act as flying artillery in defense of their own airfield.
	When given close air support missions, the pilots often traveled the three or four miles to the front line to have the targets shown to them, review the ground commander's plan, exchange radio frequencies, and otherwise coordinate with the Marine infantry. From this intimate way of fighting developed an idea of carrying liaison down to the battalion level. As the Pacific campaigns developed this grew into a sophisticated system. The Air Liaison Parties (ALP) were expected to be placed where they could see the targets and direct the bombers precisely. The use of smoke grenades and mortar shells, flares, and tracer ammunition to provide reference points for the pilots was also developed far beyond the common practice in Europe. That the liaison officers were often pilots, and that a large  portion of the Marine pilots had training or experience as infantry leaders, could only help matters. In 1944, the provision of Marine Air Group 24 and its jeep mounted ALP's to the US Army 37th Infantry
and 1st Cavalry divisions in the Philippines campaign proved an enormous success  much to the embarrassment of the staff of the US Fifth Air Force who, during planning for the Philippines campaign, had rejected the whole idea of close air support as impractical. Subsequently, on Okinawa the Tenth Army had a full-blown liaison system, with ALP's available for all the infantry battalions in the front lines.
	In Burma the British army similarly developed close air support to a fine art, which served them well in the battles around Imphal. As did the Americans, they created as many liaison teams as possible so that every battalion engaged in combat might have close air support. The British used transport aircraft to insert infantry battalions and light artillery, along with their logistical support, to the flanks and rear of the Japanese positions  anticipating the future concept of "vertical envelopment" which would
eventually develop as a part of helicopter tactics. The fact that heavy infantry and artillery units with vehicles were landed and sustained solely by air made this a more effective airborne force than the light paratroop formations used elsewhere in the Pacific and Europe. It also carried the meaning of "close air support" far beyond just tactical bombing.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT RULES
	The existing rules in PANZER LEADER provide a solid foundation for simulating close air support, and anyone not familiar with the PANZER LEADER air rules should review them at this time. For those who do not possess this game, a copy of these rules are included in the sidebar, allowing these rules to be grafted onto the PANZER BLITZ game by using the modified turn sequence which follows.
	The rules for the observation plane are concerned specifically with observation for the spotting of artillery fire. The remainder of these original rules are sufficient for simulating tactical air support when direct communication is not available between the aircraft and the ground units.
	The additional rules proposed here are intended to improve the general simulation of close air support in the PANZERBLITZ and PANZER LEADER game systems. They are certainly not as detailed or realistic as they might be, but to do so would make them hopelessly complex and incompatible with those systems.
	Remember that the attachment of an air liaison team to a ground division or brigade was not common practice. Such teams were placed with armored or infantry units leading the critical attacks. The liaison teams attached to the Corps or Army HQ were intended for planning; they often did not have the equipment, time, or training to act as forward air controllers (FAC), so your use of this capability should be minimal. No more than one FAC per scenario should be allowed, nor should this capability be available for any side but the Germans before 1943. If using weather rules, their effect must also be considered. Visibility conditions that would hardly be noticed by the ground troops could
prevent pilots from seeing the signals of the FAC and identifying their target; and sufficiently bad visibility would certainly make the pilot of any aircraft somewhat reluctant to get too close to the ground.
	The aircraft described here are samples of the most common types used for tactical air support. The Hs-129, while not actually very common, was included for the unusual weapons different models carried. The French were incapable of close air support tactics in 1940, but are included because attacks, albeit uncoordinated, were conducted near their ground troops. The A-26 squadrons did perform some close support missions; their inclusion gives the players some indication of what close support aircraft would be capable of in the second half of the twentieth century, when accurate delivery of even larger bomb loads became common. (Also, frankly, I wanted an air unit counter that would be capable of squashing a King Tiger in one pass.)
	The PANZER LEADER sighting rules for aircraft are a bit too optimistic. Admittedly, the observation plane crew does have the advantage of low speed and binoculars; even so, only medium and large caliber cannon would be visible firing from any distance. In addition, those rules do not allow spotting of vehicles on roads that pass through wooded or urban terrain. Attack aircraft move considerably faster, and their crews were far less experienced at spotting things. Pilots typically had difficulty picking out weapons firing from concealed positions. Again, the effect of weather is significant and should affect spotting.

PANZERBLITZ AND PANZER LEADER

SUPPLEMENTARY AIRPOWER RULES

XII B 2. Change to read: Observation aircraft may sight enemy units in clear terrain to a range of twenty (20) hexes. Enemy units in woods and town hexes may be sighted if the observation aircraft is within six (6) hexes of the unit(s) to be spotted, if those units fire, or if they used road movement to enter the hex they occupy.
XII C 4 e. Change to read: FB units may sight targets in the same manner as observation aircraft, except that they may not sight targets which fire from woods or town hexes. They may not spot targets for ground units, but if one FB unit sights a target it is spotted for all FB units on the board.

E. FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER
1. The air liaison team in the Forward Air Control (FAC) role is represented by a command post marker. This unit may only spot for aircraft. 
2. Any enemy unit which is spotted by the FAC marker under the applicable PANZERBLITZ or
PANZER LEADER rules may be designated as a target for air attack.
3. The designation of the target, the spotting unit, and the attacking unit is made at the same time as the artillery indirect fire attacks in the PANZER LEADER game. A modified PANZER BLITZ  Sequence of Play is provided below. The designating player secretly notes the targets and reveals them when the attack is performed.
4. The air attacks designated by the FAC are executed during the regular air phase of the turn following the designation of the attack.
5. If the unit counter representing the FAC is dispersed or destroyed, any air attacks designated and not yet executed are canceled.
6. Liaison officers in the FAC role usually had vehicle- mounted radios. The FAC may therefore spot while being carried on any (C) class vehicle.

F. FIGHTER BOMBER ADDITIONS
1. Aircraft are not all of uniform performance. Some extra rules following show the special capabilities of certain types.
2. Sturmovik formations were less likely to break off an attack because of anti-aircraft fire. Add one to the die roll of any anti-aircraft attack against an I1-2 which results in a 'D'. X results are unaffected. Similarly, certain German formations (such as Rudel's Stukas and the Hs-129 squadrons) and some Anglo-American squadrons were known to press home their attacks despite intimidating return fire from the ground. If you are designing a highly historical scenario where such elite pilots appeared, then extending the same rule to the German or Allied aircraft would be appropriate. Conversely, if your research indicates extraordinarily non-aggressive airmen were present, then increase the likelihood of the D result.
3. Some pilots made multiple passes on a target, dropping only part of the bomb load at a time. Divide the attack factor by the number of attacks to be made and use that value in each attack. No more than four attacks may be made by a single aircraft counter.
4. The A-26 could carry a full load of bombs and rockets. Both may be included as its payload. It
may not use both in the same attack.

G. AA DEFENSE ADDITIONS
1. The anti-aircraft weapons represented in PANZER BLITZ and PANZER LEADER, ranging from 12.7mm to 40mm calibers, are the heaviest that can be easily simulated in these games. The anti-aircraft machine guns common among the motorized and mechanized units were of some small use, so simulation of them is worthwhile.
2. The vehicles which have an "I" class attack factor may use this attack factor out to a range of two (2) hexes against aircraft.
3. Tanks, assault guns, and self propelled guns did not always carry anti-aircraft machine-guns. Should the players agree that specific vehicles do, then give the representative unit counter an "I" class attack factor of two (2), with a range of two hexes, as above.
4. Units which make an anti-aircraft attack are considered to have made a direct fire attack, and are subject to all applicable rules for that situation,
H. AIR RECONNAISSANCE
1. Although a large portion of the light reconnaissance planes were controlled by the artillery units solely for their use, tactical air reconnaissance was used by infantry and armored commanders from the start of the war. When playing refereed PANZER LEADER games with "blind" rules, the addition of a reconnaissance plane is recommended.
2. A CP unit must be present to represent the communication link between the reconnaissance plane and the ground commander. This is the CP unit's only function.
3. If the CP unit is dispersed, no enemy units may be spotted by the reconnaissance plane. If it is destroyed, the aircraft counter is permanently removed from the game.
4. The reconissance plane may spot enemy units only for friendly units adjacent to or stacked with the linking CP unit. The reconnaissance plane may spot for artillery fire, or spot for ground units, but it may not do both simultaneously.

MODIFIED PANZERBLITZ SEQUENCE OF PLAY

MODIFIED STEPS
Step 2  German player announces which of his units are attacking which Soviet units, and what attack techniques are being used; identifies targets for air attacks for the following turn; declares the spotting unit and the attacking unit.
Step 4  German player moves as many face-up VEHICULAR and AIRCRAFT units as-he desires, executing any Overrun attacks as he does so. Soviet player may execute anti-aircraft attacks against any aircraft that move into range of his anti-aircraft weapons, as the aircraft are moved. Anti-aircraft weapons are inverted after attacking, but are not considered "dispersed,'' mark them with a blank counter or an "Opportunity Fire" marker from PANZER LEADER to avoid any confusion.
Step 5  German player moves any face-up NON-VEHICULAR units, then executes air attacks identified the previous turn, and makes Close Assaults after doing so.